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Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens Author(s): Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 564-581 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43281052 Accessed: 05-01-2019 23:24 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Articles Testing Theories of American Politic Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics - which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biase Pluralism - offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens; economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented. A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recendy it has not been possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues. Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantia independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have litde or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories o Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. Electoral Democracy , Economic-Elite Domination , and two the broad body of U.S. citizens sovereign, semiWho sovereign, the governs? sovereign, broador body largelyorpowerless? Who largely Theseofquestions really U.S. powerless? citizens rules? To These sovereign, what questions extent semi- is types of interest-group pluralism - Majoritarian Pluralism , in which the interests of all citizens are more or less equally have animated much important work in the study of represented, and Biased Pluralism , in which corporations, American politics. business associations, and professional groups predominate. While this body of research is rich and variegated, it can Each of these perspectives makes different predictions about loosely be divided into four families of theories: Majoritarian the independent influence upon U.S. policy making of four sets of actors: th t Average Citizen or "median voter," Economic Elites, and Mass-based or Business-oriented Interest Groups or industries. A permanent link to supplementary materials provided by the authors precedes the References section. Each of these theoretical traditions has given rise to a large body of literature. Each is supported by a great Martin Gilens is Professor of Politics at Princeton University deal of empirical evidence - some of it quantitative, some historical, some observational - concerning the (mgilens@princeton.edu). His research examines representation, public opinion , and mass media, especially in relation importance of various sets of actors (or, all too often, a single set of actors) in U.S. policy making. This to inequality and public policy. Professor Gilens is the author literature has made important contributions to our understanding of how American politics works and of Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America (2012, Princeton University Press). Benjamin I. Page is Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making at Northwestern University (b-page@northwestern.edu). His research interests include public opinion, policy making, the mass media, and U.S. foreign has helped illuminate how democratic or undemocratic (in various senses) our policy making process actually is. Until very recently, however, it has been impossible to test the differing predictions of these theories against each other within a single statistical model that permits policy. He is currently engaged in a large collaborative project one to analyze the independent effects of each set of actors upon policy outcomes. to study Economically Successful Americans and the Common Good. For helpful comments the authors are indebted to Larry Bartels and Jeff Isaac, to the anonymous reviewers from Here - in a tentative and preliminary way - we offer such Perspectives on Politics, and to seminar participants at a test, bringing a unique data set to bear on the problem. Our Harvard University and the University of Rochester. measures are far from perfect, but we hope that this first step doi: 1 0. 1 01 7/S1 53759271 4001 595 564 Perspectives on Politics © American Political Science Association 2014 This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms will help inspire further research into what we see as some of Downs in his Economic Theory of Democracy - states that the most fundamental questions about American politics. two vote-seeking parties will both take the same position, at The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts positions. Under the relevant assumptions, public policy the center of the distribution of voters' most-preferred that fits the preferences of the median voter is not only the on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest empirically-predicted equilibrium result of two-party elec- groups and average citizens have little or no independent toral competition; as the "Condorcet winner" it also has the influence. Our results provide substantial support for normative property of being the "most democratic" policy, of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism. In what follows, we briefly review the four theoretical traditions that form the framework for our analyses and policy in head-to-head majority-rule voting by all citizens.3 theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories highlight some of the most prominent empirical research associated with each. We then describe our data and in the sense that it would be preferred to any alternative Subsequent "chaos" results by social choice theorists, starting with Kenneth Arrow, have indicated that the median voter prediction follows logically only for unidimensional politics. If citizens' preference orderings are not unidimensional and are sufficiently diverse, majority measures and present our results. We conclude by rule - hence also two-party electoral competition - might discussing the implications of our work for understandingnot lead to any equilibrium outcome at all.4 It is important American democracy and by identifying some of the to note, however, that what might theoretically happen will directions for future research that our findings suggest. not necessarily ever happen in practice. Real-world outcomes depend upon how institutions are organized and Four Theoretical Traditions how preferences are actually configured. Despite the "chaos" results, and despite many criticisms Each of the four theoretical traditions we are addressing of median-voter theorem as simplistic and empirically has produced a body of literature much too vast to the review inapplicable in detail here. We can only allude to a few central pieces or wrong,5 a good many scholars - probably more economists than political scientists among them of work in each tradition. And we must acknowledge that still cling to the idea that the policy preferences of the a particular scholar's work does not always fall neatly into a median voter tend to drive policy outputs from the U.S. single category. Some scholars work across - or indepenpolitical system. A fair amount of empirical evidence has dently of - our theoretical categories, embracing multiple been adduced - by Alan Monroe; Benjamin Page and influences and complex processes of policy making. Here Robert Shapiro; Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and we focus on ideal types of theory, for the purpose of James Stimson (authors of the very influential Macro outlining certain distinctive predictions that those types of Polity ); and others - that seems to support the notion that theory tend to make. Given the nature of our data, we focus the median on the societal sources of influence that these theories posit, voter determines the results of much or most policy making. This evidence indicates that U.S. federal rather than on the mechanisms of influence that they discuss. Majoritarian Electoral Democracy government policy is consistent with majority preferences roughly two-thirds of the time; that public policy changes the same Theories of majoritarian electoral democracy, as in positive or direction as collective preferences a similar two-thirds empirical theories, attribute U.S. gpvernment policies of the time; that the liberalism or conservatism citizens is closely associated with the liberalism or chiefly to the collective will of average citizens,of who are of policy across states; and that fluctuations seen as empowered by democratic elections. Suchconservatism thinking in the liberal or conservative "mood" of the public are goes back at least to Tocqueville, who (during the Jacksonian era) saw American majorities as strongly "omnipo- associated with changes in the liberalism or conservatism of policy in all three branches of governtent" - particularly at the state level - and worried about ment.6 "tyranny of the majority."1 It is encapsulated in Abraham flythe in the ointment is that none of this evidence Lincoln's reference to government "of the people,The by allows Dahl for, or explicitly assesses, the impact of such people, for the people," and was labeled by Robert variables as the preferences of wealthy individuals, or "populistic democracy."2 the preferences An important modern incarnation of this tradition is and actions of organized interest groups, which may independendy influence public policy while found in rational choice theories of electoral democracy, in perhaps being positively associated with public opinion which vote-seeking parties or candidates in a two-party thereby producing a spurious statistical relationship system tend to converge at the mid-point of citizens' policy between opinion and policy. preferences. If preferences are jointly single-peaked so that research by Larry Bartels and by one of the they can be arrayed along a single dimension, the Recent "median present authors (Gilens), which explicitly brings the voter theorem" - posited verbally by Harold Hotelling, of "affluent" Americans into the analysis along proved by Duncan Black, and popularized bypreferences Anthony September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3 565 This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Articles ļ Testing Theories of American Politics with the preferences of those lower in the income a chief aim of the framers of the U.S. Constitution was to distribution, indicates that the apparent connection be- protect private property, favoring the economic interests tween public policy and the preferences of the average citizen may indeed be largely or entirely spurious.7 the interests of the then-majority small farmers, laborers, of wealthy merchants and plantation owners rather than and craft workers. A landmark work in this tradition is G. William Domhoff 's detailed account of how elites The "electoral reward and punishment" version of democratic control through elections - in which voters retrospectively judge how well the results of government policy have satisfied their basic interests and values, and (working through foundations, think-tanks, and an "opinion- politicians enact policies in anticipation of judgments that shaping apparatus," as well as through the lobbyists and politicians they finance) may dominate key issues in U.S. they expect will later be made by what V.O. Key, Jr., called policy making despite the existence of democratic elections. "latent" public opinion - might be thought to offer Philip A. Burch has exhaustively chronicled the economic a different prediction: that policy will tend to satisfy citizens' underlying needs and values, rather than corre- backgrounds of federal government officials through American history. Thomas Ferguson's analysis of the sponding with their current policy preferences.8 We political importance of "major investors" might be seen as cannot test this prediction because we do not have - and a theory of economic elites. Most recently, Jeffrey cannot easily imagine how to obtain - good data on individuals' deep, underlying interests or values, as Winters has posited a comparative theory of "Oligarchy," opposed to their expressed policy preferences. But the like the United States - dominate policy concerning crucial issues of wealth and income protection.11 in which the wealthiest citizens - even in a "civil oligarchy" evidence that collective policy preferences are generally rather stable over time suggests that expressed collective Our third and fourth theoretical traditions posit that public policy generally reflects the outcome of struggle among organized interest groups and business firms.12 policy preferences may not often diverge markedly from subsequently manifested "latent" preferences. They may do so only under special circumstances, such as economic recessions or disastrous wars.9 If so, the electoral-reward- Majoritarian Pluralism The roots of what we can characterize as theories of and-punishment type of democratic theory, too, predicts that most of the time public policy will respond to the current policy preferences of the average citizen. "majoritarian" interest-group pluralism go back to James Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10, which analyzed politics in terms of "factions" - a somewhat fuzzy concept that apparendy encompassed political parties and even popular Economic-Elite Domination A quite different theoretical tradition argues that U.S. majorities, as well as what we would today consider organized policy making is dominated by individuals who have interest groups, business firms, and industrial sectors. Madison substantial economic resources, i.e., high levels of income argued that struggles among the diverse factions that would be or wealth - including, but not limited to, ownership of found in an extensive republic would lead to policies more or business firms. less representative of the needs and interests of the citizenry as Not all "elite theories" share this focus. Some emphasize a whole - or at least would tend to defeat "tyrannical" policies, social status or institutional position - such as the occu- including the much-fèared issuance of inflationary paper pancy of key managerial roles in corporations, or top-level money that might cater to local majority factions of farmerpositions in political parties, in the executive, legislative, or debtors but would be cosdy to merchant creditors.13 judicial branches of government, or in the highest ranks of In the twentieth century, Arthur Bendey's The Process the military. Some elite theories postulate an amalgam of of Government and then David Truman's monumental elites, defined by combinations of social status, economic The Governmental Process put groups at the center of resources, and institutional positions, who achieve a degree political analysis, laying out a detailed picture of how of unity through common backgrounds, coinciding inter- organized interest groups might get their way. Truman ests, and social interactions. offered a comprehensive and still-interesting catalogue of For example, C. Wright Mills' important book, lobbying techniques and other methods of group in- The Power Elite , offers a rather nuanced account of how fluence. He also added an ingenious gloss to Madison U.S. social, economic, political, and military elites have that tends to increase both the plausibility and the historically alternated in different configurations of domi- normative appeal of majoritarian interest-group pluralism: nance. Mills noted that his elites derived in substantial the assertion that all interests have at least a minimum of proportions from the upper classes, including the very rich influence in group-dominated policy making, because and corporate executives, but their elite status was not policy makers must (in order to avoid subsequent punish- defined by their wealth.10 Our focus here is on theories that ment) heed all "potential" groups that would form if their emphasize the policy-making importance of economic elites. interests were trampled upon.14 Analyses of U.S. politics centered on economic elites go back at least to Charles Beard, who maintained that Robert Dahl's analysis of New Haven city politics was Madisonian or Truman-like in its insistence that many 566 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms (all?) diverse interests were represented, though Dahl investors" - especially representatives of particular indus- focused as much on active members of the general public trial sectors - fund political parties in order to get as on organized groups. Dahl's analyses of American policies that suit their economic interests. Fred Block's "neo-Polanyian" analysis emphasizes groups. Jacob Hacker and Paul Piersons analysis of "winner-take-all-politics," politics in terms of "polyarchy" or "pluralist democracy" also come close to our ideal type of majoritarian pluralist theory, since they imply that the wants or needs of the average citizen tend to be reasonably well served by the outcomes of interest-group struggle. Several contemporary analysts of interest-group politics likewise appear to accept (at least implicidy) a picture of group struggle that results in more or less majoritarian results.1 A major challenge to majoritarian pluralist theories, however, is posed by Mancur Olson's argument that which emphasizes the power of the finance industry, can be seen as a recent contribution to the literature of biased pluralism.18 Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of the capitalist state hold that economic classes - and particularly the bourgeoisie, the owners of the means of production - dominate policy making and cause the state to serve their material interests. As the Communist Manifesto put it, collective action by large, dispersed sets of individuals with "The bourgeoisie has . . . conquered for itself, in the individually small but collectively large interests tends to modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The be prevented by the "free rider" problem. Barring special circumstances (selective incentives, byproducts, coercion), individuals who would benefit from collective action may managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."19 We cannot precisely test the predictions of such theories, have no incentive to personally form or join an organized group. If everyone thinks this way and lets George do it, the job is not likely to get done. This reasoning suggests that Truman's "potential groups" may in fact be unlikely to form, even if millions of peoples' interests are neglected or harmed by government. Aware of the collective action problem, officials may feel free to ignore much of the population and act against the interests of the average citizen.16 Biased Pluralism executive of the modern State is but a committee for because we lack good measures of policy preferences by economic class. (In Marxist theory, neither income nor wealth accurately signals class position.) We can note, however, that certain "instrumentalist" Marxist theories, including the important version put forth by Ralph Miliband, make predictions resembling those of theories of Biased Pluralism: that interest groups and corporations representing "large scale business" tend to prevail.20 As to empirical evidence concerning interest groups, it is well established that organized groups regularly lobby and fraternize with public officials, move through Olson's argument points toward an important variant linerevolving doors between public and private employment, provide self-serving information to officials, draft legof thinking within the pluralist tradition: theories of " biased " pluralism, which posit struggles among an un-islation, and spend a great deal of money on election representative universe of interest groups - characterizedcampaigns.21 Moreover, in harmony with theories of by E.E. Schattschneider as a heavenly chorus with anbiased pluralism, the evidence clearly indicates that most "upper-class accent," and more recendy dubbed by Kay interest groups and lobbyists represent business firms or Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady an professionals. Relatively few represent the poor or even the "unheavenly chorus." Theories of biased pluralism gener- economic interests of ordinary workers, particularly now ally argue that both the thrust of interest-group conflictthat the U.S. labor movement has become so weak.22 and the public policies that result tend to tilt toward the But do interest groups actually influence policy? wishes of corporations and business and professionalNumerous case studies have detailed instances in which associations.17 all but the most dedicated skeptic is likely to perceive Schattschneider suggested that policy outcomes vary interest-group influence at work. A leading classic with the "scope of conflict": for example, that business-remains Schattschneider's analysis of the 1928 enactment oriented interest groups tend to prevail over ordinary of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, an astounding orgy of porkcitizens when the scope is narrow and visibility is low. barrel politics.23 Still, many quantitatively-oriented political Grant McConnell added the idea that the actual scientists seem to ignore or dismiss such non-quantitative There have also been some efforts (particularly "constituencies" of policy implementers can consist evidence. of during the Cold War era, when unflattering depictions of powerful groups. George Stigler (articulating what some U.S. politics may have been thought unpatriotic) to economists have scorned as "Chicago Marxism") analyzed demonstrate that interest groups have no influence on the politics of regulation in terms of biased pluralism: the policy at all. Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool, and Lewis capture of regulators by the regulated. Charles Lindblom outlined a number of ways - including the "privileged Anthony Dexter argued that business had litde or no effect on the renewal of reciprocal trade authority. Lester position" of business - in which business firms and their Milbrath, having conducted interviews with lobbyists and associations influence public policy. Thomas Ferguson has members of Congress, rated lobbyists' influence as very low. posited an "investment theory" of politics in which "major September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3 567 This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Articles | Testing Theories of American Politics More recently, Fred McChesney has made the ingenious 1,779 instances between 1981 and 2002 in which argument that campaign contributions from interest groups a national survey of the general public asked a favor/ may not represent quid pro quo bribery attempts by groups, oppose question about a proposed policy change. A total of but instead result from extortion by politicians who threaten 1,923 cases met four criteria: dichotomous pro/con responses, specificity about policy, relevance to federal Very few studies have offered quantitative evidence government decisions, and categorical rather than condiconcerning the impact of interest groups based on tional phrasing. Of those 1,923 original cases, 1,779 cases a number of different public policies. Important excepalso met the criteria of providing income breakdowns for tions include the work of Mark Smith and that of respondents, not involving a Constitutional amendment Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki, or a Supreme Court ruling (which might entail a quite David Kimball, and Beth Leech.25 different policy-making process), and involving a clear, as Mark Smith examined 2,364 "business unity" issues opposed to partial or ambiguous, actual presence or over a period of four decades - on which the U.S. Chamber absence of policy change. These 1,779 cases do not of Commerce (arguably a reasonable proxy for business constitute a sample from the universe of all possible policy groups as a whole, on this particular set of issues where most alternatives (this is hardly conceivable), but we see them as businesses agreed) took a public stand for or against. He then particularly relevant to assessing the public's influence on calculated six measures of the Chambers annual rate of policy. The included policies are not restricted to the narrow to harm the groups' interests.24 "success" at getting the action or inaction it favored from Washington "policy agenda." At the same time - since they Congress.26 The Chambers average success rate in termswere of seen as worth asking poll questions about - they tend proportion of bills enacted or defeated appears to have been to concern matters of relatively high salience, about which it fairly high,27 but Smith did not argue that such success is plausible that average citizens may have real opinions and necessarily demonstrates influence. (A batting-averagemay exert some political influence.30 approach to influence would have to assume that stand- For each case, Gilens used the original survey data to taking is unrelated to expectations of success. Further,assess in responses by income level. In order to cope with order to gauge business's independent impact and avoid varying income categories across surveys, he employed spurious results, data on stands taken by other actors would a quadratic logistic regression technique to estimate the need to be included as well.) Instead, Smith devoted mostopinions of of respondents at the tenth income percentile his effort to analyzing the over-time correlates of high or low (quite poor), the fiftieth percentile (median), and the success, such as variations in the public "mood" and in the ninetieth percentile (fairly affluent).31 partisan composition of Congress. Here we use these policy preference data to measure Frank Baumgartner and his colleagues, in their meticimperfectly, but, we believe, satisfactorily - two indepen- ulous examination of 98 cases of congressional policy dent variables posited as major influences upon policy making in which interest groups were active, investigated making in the theoretical traditions discussed above. whether the magnitude of group resources that werePolicy preferences at the fiftieth income percentile deployed was related to outcomes across those cases. Inthat is, the preferences of the median-income survey their multivariate analyses, Baumgartner et al. found respondent - work quite well as measures of the prefera modest tendency for policy outcomes to favor the side ences of the average citizen (or, more precisely, the median non-institutionalized adult American), which are central that enjoyed greater resources (PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, membership size, etc.).28 to theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy.32 In all Prior to the availability of the data set that we analyze cases in which the relationship between income and preferences is monotonie, and in all cases in which there here, no one we are aware of has succeeded at assessing interest-group influence over a comprehensive setisof no systematic relationship at all between the two, the issues, while taking into account the impact of either preferences of the median-income respondent are identical the public at large or economic elites - let alone analyzing to those of the median-preference respondent. In the all three types of potential influences simultaneously. remaining cases the two are very close to each other.33 We believe that the preferences of "affluent" Americans Testing Theoretical Predictions at the ninetieth income percentile can usefully be taken as What makes possible an empirical effort of this sort is theproxies for the opinions of wealthy or very-high-income existence of a unique data set, compiled over many years Americans, and can be used to test the central predictions by one of us (Gilens) for a different but related purpose: of Economic-Elite theories. To be sure, people at the for estimating the influence upon public policy of ninetieth income percentile are neither very rich nor very "affluent" citizens, poor citizens, and those in the middle elite; in 2012 dollars, Gilens' "affluent" respondents of the income distribution. received only about $146,000 in annual household Gilens and a small army of research assistants29 income. To the extent that their policy preferences differ gathered data on a large, diverse set of policy cases:from those of average-income citizens, however, we would 568 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms argue that there are likely to be similar but bigger differ- "strongly" favorable or strongly unfavorable positions. ences between average-income citizens and the truly In order to allow for the likelihood of diminishing returns as the net number of groups on a given side wealthy. 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.34 Based on 13 policy-preference questions asked on this survey, the increases (an increase from 10 to 11 groups likely matters less than a jump from 1 to 2 does), he took the logarithms of the number of pro groups and the preferences of the top 2 percent of income earners (a group number of con groups before subtracting. Thus, Some evidence for this proposition comes from the that might be thought "truly wealthy") are much more highly correlated with the preferences of the top 1 0 percent of earners than with the preferences of the average survey respondent (r=.91 versus .69). 35 Thus, the views of our moderately high-income "affluent" respondents appear to capture useful information about the views of the truly wealthy. In any case, the imprecision that results from use of our "affluent" proxy is likely to produce ««¿surestimâtes of the impact of economic elites on policy making. If we find substantial effects upon policy even when using this imperfect measure, therefore, it will be reasonable to infer that the impact upon policy of truly wealthy citizens is still greater.36 In order to measure interest-group preferences and actions, we would ideally like to use an index of the sort that Baumgartner and his colleagues developed for their ninety-eight policy issues: an index assessing the total resources brought to bear by all major interest groups that took one side or the other on each of our 1,779 issues. But it is not feasible to construct such an index for all our cases; this would require roughly twenty times as much work as did the major effort made by the Baumgartner Net Interest-Group Alignment = ln(# Strongly Favor + [0.5 * # Somewhat Favor] + 1) - ln(# Strongly Oppose + [0.5 * # Somewhat Oppose] + l).38 We also report here results for comparable group alignment indices that were computed separately for the mass-based and for the business-oriented sets of groups listed in Appendix 1 . Our dependent variable is a measure of whether or not the policy change proposed in each survey question was actually adopted within four years after the question was asked. (It turns out that most of the action occurred within two years). Of course there was nothing easy about measuring the presence or absence of policy change for each of 1,779 different cases; Gilens and his research assistants spent many hours poring over news accounts, government data, Congressional Quarterly publications, academic papers and the like.39 In order to test among our theoretical traditions, we begin by considering all organized interest groups together, not distinguishing between mass-based and business-oriented groups. Within a single statistical model, we estimate the independent impact upon our dependent research team on their cases. Fortunately, however, variable (policy change) of each of three independent Baumgartner et al. found that a simple proxy for their variables: the average citizens policy preferences (preferences index - the number of reputedly "powerful" interest at the fiftieth income percentile); the policy preferences of groups (from among groups appearing over the years in Fortune magazine's "Power 25" lists) that favored a given economic elites (measured by policy preferences at the policy change, minus the number that opposed it - groups (the Net Interest-Group Alignment Index). Later, in order to distinguish clearly between Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism, we will use two correlated quite substantially in their cases with the full interest-group index (r=0.73).37 Gilens, using a modified version of this simple count of the number of "powerful" interest groups favoring ninetieth income percentile); and the stands of interest separate measures of net interest-group alignment, one involving only mass-based interest groups and the other (minus those opposing) each proposed policy change, limited to business and professional groups. The main developed a measure of Net Interest Group Alignment . hypotheses of interest, summarized in table 1 , follow fairly To the set of groups on the "Power 25" lists (which seemed to neglect certain major business interests) he types of theory. added ten key industries that had reported the highest lobbying expenditures. (For the final list of included industries and interest groups, refer to Appendix 1.) For each of the 1,779 instances of proposed policy change, Gilens and his assistants drew upon multiple sources to code all engaged interest groups as "strongly favorable," straightforwardly from our discussion of our four ideal In their pure form, theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy (for example, rational models of electoral competition that include no societal actors other than average citizens), predict that the influence upon policy of average citizens is positive, significant, and substantial, while the influence of other actors is not. "somewhat favorable," "somewhat unfavorable," or Theories of Economic-Elite Domination predict pos- "strongly unfavorable" to the change. He then combined the numbers of groups on each side of a given issue, weighting "somewhat" favorable or somewhat itive, significant, and substantial influence upon policy by economic elites. Most such theories allow for some unfavorable positions at half the magnitude of (though not much) independent influence by average citizens, e.g., on non-economic social issues. Many also September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3 569 This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Articles ļ Testing Theories of American Politics Table 1 Theoretical predictions concerning the independent influence of sets of actors upon policy outcomes Sets of Actors Average Economic All Interest Mass Interest Business Interest Theory (ideal type) Majoritarian Democracy Dominance Elites Electoral by Y Economic y n n Y y n n n y Majoritarian Pluralism y n Y Y Y Biased Pluralism n n y y Y n = little or no independent y = some Y = substantial allow for interest taken independent a some individuals. In dict - whole general, that influence independent groups as influence influence independent Influence upon Policy of Averageinfluenc and probably Citizens,therefore Economic Elites, and Interest though Groups their Before we proceed further, it is important to note that even theories if one of ourof predictorinterest-group variables is found (when controlling only organized interest for the others) to have no independent impact on policy at significant, and substantial all, it does not follow that the actors whose preferences are positive, b emphas gr eff policy. Influence proceeds from gro reflected by that variable - average citizens, economic elites, wealthy (or other) individuals. Depen or organized interest groups of one sort or another - always type be do of pluralist theory, average citizens "lose" in policy decisions. Policy making is not necessarily well represented through organized not their have own. Theories a a zero-sum game among these actors. When one set of great deal of independe actors wins, others may win as well, if their preferences are positively correlated with each other. of Majoritarian Pluralism pr It turns out, in fact, that the preferences of average stands of organized interest groups, all citizens are positively and fairly highly correlated, across rather faithfully represent (that is, are issues, with the preferences of economic elites (refer to substantially correlated with) the prefer citizens. But table 2). Rather often, average citizens and affluent citizens since most political inf (our proxy for economic elites) want the same things from a multivariate analysis t government. This bivariate correlation affects how we interest-group alignments and citizens' p should interpret our later multivariate findings in terms of show far more independent influence by through the groups, however, citizens. Theories Biased Pluralism, too, see or may be dead wrong in terms ofinfluence causal impact. Ordinary much more tha citizens, for example, might often be observed But to "win" individual economic elites. th groups or "winners" and "losers." It also suggests why Truman's idea ofa reason "potent serious scholars might keep adhering to both the Majorleave room for some direct inf itarian Electoral Democracy and the Economic-Elite Domination theoretical traditions, even if one of them citizens. as of having (that is, to get their preferred policy outcomes) even if they groups play the major r no independent effect whatsoever of on policy the making, if poli Recognizing the had complexity elites (with whomthe they often possibility agree) actually prevail. must also acknowledge th of these theoretical traditions some t But net interest-group stands are has not substantially business-oriented with our the preferences of average citizens. several - even all correlated - of sets of Taking actors interest groups together, the index of net interest-group stantial, positive, all independent influence alignment correlates only a non-significant .04 with And we must consider the null hypothe average citizens' preferences! correctly (Refer to table 2.) This casts desc these theoretical traditions what goes on in grave doubt on David Truman's and others' argument that American politics. 570 Perspectives on Politics This content downloaded from 72.220.45.186 on Sat, 05 Jan 2019 23:24:59 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Table 2 Correlations among independent variables Average citizens' Economic elites' All interest Mass public Business preferences preferences groups interest groups interest groups Average citizens' preferences Economic elites' .78*** - preferences All interest groups .04 .05 Mass public .12*** .01 .47*** interest Business groups interest -.10*** -.02 - .96*** -.05 - groups 001 Note: ;n= 1779. Entries are correlation coefficients corrected f groups together, for now) is modeled separately as organized interest interest groups tend to do a goo the sole predictor of policy Just as previous Indeed representing the population as change. a whole. each of three broad of theoretical 2 indicates, even the literature net suggests, alignments the gro traditions - Majoritarian Electoral Democracy,with Economiccategorized as "mass-based" correlate avera Elite Domination, and interest-group pluralism -(though seems to preferences only at the very modest s gain support. When taken separately, each independent significant) level of .12. Some particular variable - the preferences of average citizens, the preferences U.S. membership organiz especially the AARP and labor unions - do ten the same policies as average citizens. But othe Table 3 ship groups take stands that are unrelated (pr Policy outcomes and the policy preferen-(gun pro-choice groups) or negatively related ces of average wants.40 citizens, economic Some elites, what the average American me and interest groups groups may reflect the views of corporate back most affluent constituents. Others focus on issues on which the public is fairly evenly divided. Whatever the reasons, all mass-based groups taken together simply do not add up, in aggregate, to good representatives of the citizenry as a whole. Business-oriented groups do even worse, with a modest negative over-all correlation of -.10. Nor do we find an association between the preferences of economic elites and the alignments of either massbased or business-oriented groups. The latter finding, which surprised us, may reflect profit-making motives among businesses as contrasted with broader ideological views among elite individuals. For example, economic elites tend to prefer lower levels of government spending Preferences .64 - - .03 of average (.08)*** (.08) citizens Preferences - .81 - .76 of (.08)*** (.08)*** economic elites Alignment of - - .59 .56 interest (.09)*** (.09)*** groups R-sq .031 .049 .028 .074 ***p
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Annotated Bibliography

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Gilens, M., & Page, B. (2014). Testing theories of American politics (pp. 564-581). American
Political Science Association.
The study seeks to identify the theories of American politics and their influence on
economic elites, organized interest groups, citizens, and public policy. The theories discussed
aim at defining distinctive predi...

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