Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens
Author(s): Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, No. 3 (September 2014), pp. 564-581
Published by: American Political Science Association
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Articles
Testing Theories of American Politic
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average
Citizens
Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page
Each of four theoretical traditions in the study of American politics - which can be characterized as theories of Majoritarian
Electoral Democracy, Economic-Elite Domination, and two types of interest-group pluralism, Majoritarian Pluralism and Biase
Pluralism - offers different predictions about which sets of actors have how much influence over public policy: average citizens;
economic elites; and organized interest groups, mass-based or business-oriented.
A great deal of empirical research speaks to the policy influence of one or another set of actors, but until recendy it has not been
possible to test these contrasting theoretical predictions against each other within a single statistical model. We report on an effort
to do so, using a unique data set that includes measures of the key variables for 1,779 policy issues.
Multivariate analysis indicates that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantia
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have litde or no
independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories o
Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.
Electoral Democracy , Economic-Elite Domination , and two
the broad body of U.S. citizens sovereign, semiWho sovereign, the governs?
sovereign,
broador body
largelyorpowerless?
Who largely
Theseofquestions
really U.S. powerless? citizens rules? To These sovereign, what questions extent semi- is
types of interest-group pluralism - Majoritarian Pluralism ,
in which the interests of all citizens are more or less equally
have animated much important work in the study of
represented, and Biased Pluralism , in which corporations,
American politics.
business associations, and professional groups predominate.
While this body of research is rich and variegated, it can
Each of these perspectives makes different predictions about
loosely be divided into four families of theories: Majoritarian
the independent influence upon U.S. policy making of four
sets of actors: th t Average Citizen or "median voter," Economic
Elites, and Mass-based or Business-oriented Interest Groups or
industries.
A permanent link to supplementary materials provided by
the authors precedes the References section.
Each of these theoretical traditions has given rise to
a large body of literature. Each is supported by a great
Martin Gilens is Professor of Politics at Princeton University
deal of empirical evidence - some of it quantitative,
some historical, some observational - concerning the
(mgilens@princeton.edu). His research examines representation, public opinion , and mass media, especially in relation
importance of various sets of actors (or, all too often,
a single set of actors) in U.S. policy making. This
to inequality and public policy. Professor Gilens is the author
literature has made important contributions to our
understanding of how American politics works and
of Affluence & Influence: Economic Inequality and
Political Power in America (2012, Princeton University
Press). Benjamin I. Page is Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of
Decision Making at Northwestern University (b-page@northwestern.edu). His research interests include public
opinion, policy making, the mass media, and U.S. foreign
has helped illuminate how democratic or undemocratic
(in various senses) our policy making process actually is.
Until very recently, however, it has been impossible to
test the differing predictions of these theories against
each other within a single statistical model that permits
policy. He is currently engaged in a large collaborative project
one to analyze the independent effects of each set of
actors upon policy outcomes.
to study Economically Successful Americans and the Common
Good. For helpful comments the authors are indebted to Larry
Bartels and Jeff Isaac, to the anonymous reviewers from
Here - in a tentative and preliminary way - we offer such
Perspectives on Politics, and to seminar participants at
a test, bringing a unique data set to bear on the problem. Our
Harvard University and the University of Rochester.
measures are far from perfect, but we hope that this first step
doi: 1 0. 1 01 7/S1 53759271 4001 595
564 Perspectives on Politics
© American Political Science Association 2014
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will help inspire further research into what we see as some of
Downs in his Economic Theory of Democracy - states that
the most fundamental questions about American politics.
two vote-seeking parties will both take the same position, at
The central point that emerges from our research is
that economic elites and organized groups representing
business interests have substantial independent impacts
positions. Under the relevant assumptions, public policy
the center of the distribution of voters' most-preferred
that fits the preferences of the median voter is not only the
on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest
empirically-predicted equilibrium result of two-party elec-
groups and average citizens have little or no independent
toral competition; as the "Condorcet winner" it also has the
influence. Our results provide substantial support for
normative property of being the "most democratic" policy,
of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian
Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.
In what follows, we briefly review the four theoretical
traditions that form the framework for our analyses and
policy in head-to-head majority-rule voting by all citizens.3
theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories
highlight some of the most prominent empirical research
associated with each. We then describe our data and
in the sense that it would be preferred to any alternative
Subsequent "chaos" results by social choice theorists,
starting with Kenneth Arrow, have indicated that the
median voter prediction follows logically only for unidimensional politics. If citizens' preference orderings are
not unidimensional and are sufficiently diverse, majority
measures and present our results. We conclude by rule - hence also two-party electoral competition - might
discussing the implications of our work for understandingnot lead to any equilibrium outcome at all.4 It is important
American democracy and by identifying some of the to note, however, that what might theoretically happen will
directions for future research that our findings suggest. not necessarily ever happen in practice. Real-world outcomes depend upon how institutions are organized and
Four Theoretical Traditions
how preferences are actually configured.
Despite the "chaos" results, and despite many criticisms
Each of the four theoretical traditions we are addressing
of
median-voter theorem as simplistic and empirically
has produced a body of literature much too vast to the
review
inapplicable
in detail here. We can only allude to a few central
pieces or wrong,5 a good many scholars - probably
more economists
than political scientists among them of work in each tradition. And we must acknowledge
that
still
cling
to
the
idea
that the policy preferences of the
a particular scholar's work does not always fall neatly into a
median
voter
tend
to
drive policy outputs from the U.S.
single category. Some scholars work across - or indepenpolitical
system. A fair amount of empirical evidence has
dently of - our theoretical categories, embracing
multiple
been
adduced
- by Alan Monroe; Benjamin Page and
influences and complex processes of policy making. Here
Robert Shapiro;
Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and
we focus on ideal types of theory, for the purpose
of
James
Stimson (authors of the very influential Macro
outlining certain distinctive predictions that those
types of
Polity
);
and others - that seems to support the notion that
theory tend to make. Given the nature of our data, we focus
the median
on the societal sources of influence that these theories
posit, voter determines the results of much or most
policy
making. This evidence indicates that U.S. federal
rather than on the mechanisms of influence that they
discuss.
Majoritarian Electoral Democracy
government policy is consistent with majority preferences
roughly two-thirds of the time; that public policy changes
the same
Theories of majoritarian electoral democracy, as in
positive
or direction as collective preferences a similar
two-thirds
empirical theories, attribute U.S. gpvernment policies of the time; that the liberalism or conservatism
citizens
is closely associated with the liberalism or
chiefly to the collective will of average citizens,of
who
are
of policy across states; and that fluctuations
seen as empowered by democratic elections. Suchconservatism
thinking
in
the
liberal
or conservative "mood" of the public are
goes back at least to Tocqueville, who (during the
Jacksonian era) saw American majorities as strongly
"omnipo- associated with changes in the liberalism or
conservatism
of policy in all three branches of governtent" - particularly at the state level - and worried
about
ment.6
"tyranny of the majority."1 It is encapsulated in
Abraham
flythe
in the ointment is that none of this evidence
Lincoln's reference to government "of the people,The
by
allows Dahl
for, or explicitly assesses, the impact of such
people, for the people," and was labeled by Robert
variables as the preferences of wealthy individuals, or
"populistic democracy."2
the preferences
An important modern incarnation of this tradition
is and actions of organized interest groups,
which may independendy
influence public policy while
found in rational choice theories of electoral democracy,
in
perhaps being positively associated with public opinion which vote-seeking parties or candidates in a two-party
thereby
producing a spurious statistical relationship
system tend to converge at the mid-point of citizens'
policy
between
opinion and policy.
preferences. If preferences are jointly single-peaked
so that
research by Larry Bartels and by one of the
they can be arrayed along a single dimension, the Recent
"median
present authors (Gilens), which explicitly brings the
voter theorem" - posited verbally by Harold Hotelling,
of "affluent" Americans into the analysis along
proved by Duncan Black, and popularized bypreferences
Anthony
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Articles ÄĽ Testing Theories of American Politics
with the preferences of those lower in the income
a chief aim of the framers of the U.S. Constitution was to
distribution, indicates that the apparent connection be-
protect private property, favoring the economic interests
tween public policy and the preferences of the average
citizen may indeed be largely or entirely spurious.7
the interests of the then-majority small farmers, laborers,
of wealthy merchants and plantation owners rather than
and craft workers. A landmark work in this tradition is
G. William Domhoff 's detailed account of how elites
The "electoral reward and punishment" version of
democratic control through elections - in which voters
retrospectively judge how well the results of government
policy have satisfied their basic interests and values, and
(working through foundations, think-tanks, and an "opinion-
politicians enact policies in anticipation of judgments that
shaping apparatus," as well as through the lobbyists and
politicians they finance) may dominate key issues in U.S.
they expect will later be made by what V.O. Key, Jr., called
policy making despite the existence of democratic elections.
"latent" public opinion - might be thought to offer
Philip A. Burch has exhaustively chronicled the economic
a different prediction: that policy will tend to satisfy
citizens' underlying needs and values, rather than corre-
backgrounds of federal government officials through
American history. Thomas Ferguson's analysis of the
sponding with their current policy preferences.8 We
political importance of "major investors" might be seen as
cannot test this prediction because we do not have - and
a theory of economic elites. Most recently, Jeffrey
cannot easily imagine how to obtain - good data on
individuals' deep, underlying interests or values, as
Winters has posited a comparative theory of "Oligarchy,"
opposed to their expressed policy preferences. But the
like the United States - dominate policy concerning crucial
issues of wealth and income protection.11
in which the wealthiest citizens - even in a "civil oligarchy"
evidence that collective policy preferences are generally
rather stable over time suggests that expressed collective
Our third and fourth theoretical traditions posit that
public policy generally reflects the outcome of struggle
among organized interest groups and business firms.12
policy preferences may not often diverge markedly from
subsequently manifested "latent" preferences. They may
do so only under special circumstances, such as economic
recessions or disastrous wars.9 If so, the electoral-reward-
Majoritarian Pluralism
The roots of what we can characterize as theories of
and-punishment type of democratic theory, too, predicts
that most of the time public policy will respond to the
current policy preferences of the average citizen.
"majoritarian" interest-group pluralism go back to James
Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10, which analyzed politics
in terms of "factions" - a somewhat fuzzy concept that
apparendy encompassed political parties and even popular
Economic-Elite Domination
A quite different theoretical tradition argues that U.S.
majorities, as well as what we would today consider organized
policy making is dominated by individuals who have interest groups, business firms, and industrial sectors. Madison
substantial economic resources, i.e., high levels of income argued that struggles among the diverse factions that would be
or wealth - including, but not limited to, ownership of found in an extensive republic would lead to policies more or
business firms.
less representative of the needs and interests of the citizenry as
Not all "elite theories" share this focus. Some emphasize a whole - or at least would tend to defeat "tyrannical" policies,
social status or institutional position - such as the occu- including the much-fèared issuance of inflationary paper
pancy of key managerial roles in corporations, or top-level money that might cater to local majority factions of farmerpositions in political parties, in the executive, legislative, or debtors but would be cosdy to merchant creditors.13
judicial branches of government, or in the highest ranks of
In the twentieth century, Arthur Bendey's The Process
the military. Some elite theories postulate an amalgam of of Government and then David Truman's monumental
elites, defined by combinations of social status, economic The Governmental Process put groups at the center of
resources, and institutional positions, who achieve a degree political analysis, laying out a detailed picture of how
of unity through common backgrounds, coinciding inter- organized interest groups might get their way. Truman
ests, and social interactions.
offered a comprehensive and still-interesting catalogue of
For example, C. Wright Mills' important book, lobbying techniques and other methods of group in-
The Power Elite , offers a rather nuanced account of how fluence. He also added an ingenious gloss to Madison
U.S. social, economic, political, and military elites have that tends to increase both the plausibility and the
historically alternated in different configurations of domi- normative appeal of majoritarian interest-group pluralism:
nance. Mills noted that his elites derived in substantial the assertion that all interests have at least a minimum of
proportions from the upper classes, including the very rich influence in group-dominated policy making, because
and corporate executives, but their elite status was not
policy makers must (in order to avoid subsequent punish-
defined by their wealth.10 Our focus here is on theories that ment) heed all "potential" groups that would form if their
emphasize the policy-making importance of economic elites. interests were trampled upon.14
Analyses of U.S. politics centered on economic elites
go back at least to Charles Beard, who maintained that
Robert Dahl's analysis of New Haven city politics was
Madisonian or Truman-like in its insistence that many
566 Perspectives on Politics
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(all?) diverse interests were represented, though Dahl
investors" - especially representatives of particular indus-
focused as much on active members of the general public
trial sectors - fund political parties in order to get
as on organized groups. Dahl's analyses of American
policies that suit their economic interests. Fred Block's
"neo-Polanyian" analysis emphasizes groups. Jacob Hacker
and Paul Piersons analysis of "winner-take-all-politics,"
politics in terms of "polyarchy" or "pluralist democracy"
also come close to our ideal type of majoritarian pluralist
theory, since they imply that the wants or needs of the
average citizen tend to be reasonably well served by the
outcomes of interest-group struggle. Several contemporary
analysts of interest-group politics likewise appear to accept
(at least implicidy) a picture of group struggle that results
in more or less majoritarian results.1
A major challenge to majoritarian pluralist theories,
however, is posed by Mancur Olson's argument that
which emphasizes the power of the finance industry, can
be seen as a recent contribution to the literature of biased
pluralism.18
Marxist and neo-Marxist theories of the capitalist state
hold that economic classes - and particularly the bourgeoisie, the owners of the means of production - dominate
policy making and cause the state to serve their
material interests. As the Communist Manifesto put it,
collective action by large, dispersed sets of individuals with
"The bourgeoisie has . . . conquered for itself, in the
individually small but collectively large interests tends to
modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The
be prevented by the "free rider" problem. Barring special
circumstances (selective incentives, byproducts, coercion),
individuals who would benefit from collective action may
managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie."19
We cannot precisely test the predictions of such theories,
have no incentive to personally form or join an organized
group. If everyone thinks this way and lets George do it,
the job is not likely to get done. This reasoning suggests
that Truman's "potential groups" may in fact be unlikely
to form, even if millions of peoples' interests are neglected
or harmed by government. Aware of the collective action
problem, officials may feel free to ignore much of the
population and act against the interests of the average
citizen.16
Biased Pluralism
executive of the modern State is but a committee for
because we lack good measures of policy preferences by
economic class. (In Marxist theory, neither income nor
wealth accurately signals class position.) We can note,
however, that certain "instrumentalist" Marxist theories,
including the important version put forth by Ralph
Miliband, make predictions resembling those of theories
of Biased Pluralism: that interest groups and corporations
representing "large scale business" tend to prevail.20
As to empirical evidence concerning interest groups, it
is well established that organized groups regularly lobby
and fraternize with public officials, move through
Olson's argument points toward an important variant linerevolving doors between public and private employment,
provide self-serving information to officials, draft legof thinking within the pluralist tradition: theories of
" biased " pluralism, which posit struggles among an un-islation, and spend a great deal of money on election
representative universe of interest groups - characterizedcampaigns.21 Moreover, in harmony with theories of
by E.E. Schattschneider as a heavenly chorus with anbiased pluralism, the evidence clearly indicates that most
"upper-class accent," and more recendy dubbed by Kay interest groups and lobbyists represent business firms or
Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Henry Brady an professionals. Relatively few represent the poor or even the
"unheavenly chorus." Theories of biased pluralism gener- economic interests of ordinary workers, particularly now
ally argue that both the thrust of interest-group conflictthat the U.S. labor movement has become so weak.22
and the public policies that result tend to tilt toward the But do interest groups actually influence policy?
wishes of corporations and business and professionalNumerous case studies have detailed instances in which
associations.17
all but the most dedicated skeptic is likely to perceive
Schattschneider suggested that policy outcomes vary interest-group influence at work. A leading classic
with the "scope of conflict": for example, that business-remains Schattschneider's analysis of the 1928 enactment
oriented interest groups tend to prevail over ordinary of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, an astounding orgy of porkcitizens when the scope is narrow and visibility is low. barrel politics.23 Still, many quantitatively-oriented political
Grant McConnell added the idea that the actual
scientists seem to ignore or dismiss such non-quantitative
There have also been some efforts (particularly
"constituencies" of policy implementers can consist evidence.
of
during the Cold War era, when unflattering depictions of
powerful groups. George Stigler (articulating what some
U.S. politics may have been thought unpatriotic) to
economists have scorned as "Chicago Marxism") analyzed
demonstrate
that interest groups have no influence on
the politics of regulation in terms of biased pluralism: the
policy at all. Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool, and Lewis
capture of regulators by the regulated. Charles Lindblom
outlined a number of ways - including the "privileged Anthony Dexter argued that business had litde or no effect
on the renewal of reciprocal trade authority. Lester
position" of business - in which business firms and their
Milbrath, having conducted interviews with lobbyists and
associations influence public policy. Thomas Ferguson has
members of Congress, rated lobbyists' influence as very low.
posited an "investment theory" of politics in which "major
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Articles | Testing Theories of American Politics
More recently, Fred McChesney has made the ingenious
1,779 instances between 1981 and 2002 in which
argument that campaign contributions from interest groups
a national survey of the general public asked a favor/
may not represent quid pro quo bribery attempts by groups,
oppose question about a proposed policy change. A total of
but instead result from extortion by politicians who threaten
1,923 cases met four criteria: dichotomous pro/con
responses, specificity about policy, relevance to federal
Very few studies have offered quantitative evidence
government decisions, and categorical rather than condiconcerning the impact of interest groups based on
tional phrasing. Of those 1,923 original cases, 1,779 cases
a number of different public policies. Important excepalso met the criteria of providing income breakdowns for
tions include the work of Mark Smith and that of
respondents, not involving a Constitutional amendment
Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki,
or a Supreme Court ruling (which might entail a quite
David Kimball, and Beth Leech.25
different policy-making process), and involving a clear, as
Mark Smith examined 2,364 "business unity" issues opposed
to partial or ambiguous, actual presence or
over a period of four decades - on which the U.S. Chamber
absence of policy change. These 1,779 cases do not
of Commerce (arguably a reasonable proxy for business
constitute a sample from the universe of all possible policy
groups as a whole, on this particular set of issues where most
alternatives (this is hardly conceivable), but we see them as
businesses agreed) took a public stand for or against. He then
particularly relevant to assessing the public's influence on
calculated six measures of the Chambers annual rate of
policy. The included policies are not restricted to the narrow
to harm the groups' interests.24
"success" at getting the action or inaction it favored from
Washington "policy agenda." At the same time - since they
Congress.26 The Chambers average success rate in termswere
of seen as worth asking poll questions about - they tend
proportion of bills enacted or defeated appears to have been
to concern matters of relatively high salience, about which it
fairly high,27 but Smith did not argue that such success
is plausible that average citizens may have real opinions and
necessarily demonstrates influence. (A batting-averagemay exert some political influence.30
approach to influence would have to assume that stand- For each case, Gilens used the original survey data to
taking is unrelated to expectations of success. Further,assess
in
responses by income level. In order to cope with
order to gauge business's independent impact and avoid
varying income categories across surveys, he employed
spurious results, data on stands taken by other actors would
a quadratic logistic regression technique to estimate the
need to be included as well.) Instead, Smith devoted mostopinions
of
of respondents at the tenth income percentile
his effort to analyzing the over-time correlates of high or low
(quite
poor), the fiftieth percentile (median), and the
success, such as variations in the public "mood" and in the
ninetieth percentile (fairly affluent).31
partisan composition of Congress.
Here we use these policy preference data to measure Frank Baumgartner and his colleagues, in their meticimperfectly, but, we believe, satisfactorily - two indepen-
ulous examination of 98 cases of congressional policy
dent variables posited as major influences upon policy
making in which interest groups were active, investigated
making in the theoretical traditions discussed above.
whether the magnitude of group resources that werePolicy preferences at the fiftieth income percentile deployed was related to outcomes across those cases. Inthat is, the preferences of the median-income survey
their multivariate analyses, Baumgartner et al. found
respondent - work quite well as measures of the prefera modest tendency for policy outcomes to favor the side
ences of the average citizen (or, more precisely, the median
non-institutionalized adult American), which are central
that enjoyed greater resources (PAC contributions, lobbying expenditures, membership size, etc.).28
to theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy.32 In all
Prior to the availability of the data set that we analyze
cases in which the relationship between income and
preferences is monotonie, and in all cases in which there
here, no one we are aware of has succeeded at assessing
interest-group influence over a comprehensive setisof
no systematic relationship at all between the two, the
issues, while taking into account the impact of either
preferences of the median-income respondent are identical
the public at large or economic elites - let alone analyzing
to those of the median-preference respondent. In the
all three types of potential influences simultaneously. remaining cases the two are very close to each other.33
We believe that the preferences of "affluent" Americans
Testing Theoretical Predictions
at the ninetieth income percentile can usefully be taken as
What makes possible an empirical effort of this sort is theproxies for the opinions of wealthy or very-high-income
existence of a unique data set, compiled over many years Americans, and can be used to test the central predictions
by one of us (Gilens) for a different but related purpose: of Economic-Elite theories. To be sure, people at the
for estimating the influence upon public policy of ninetieth income percentile are neither very rich nor very
"affluent" citizens, poor citizens, and those in the middle elite; in 2012 dollars, Gilens' "affluent" respondents
of the income distribution.
received only about $146,000 in annual household
Gilens and a small army of research assistants29 income. To the extent that their policy preferences differ
gathered data on a large, diverse set of policy cases:from those of average-income citizens, however, we would
568 Perspectives on Politics
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argue that there are likely to be similar but bigger differ-
"strongly" favorable or strongly unfavorable positions.
ences between average-income citizens and the truly
In order to allow for the likelihood of diminishing
returns as the net number of groups on a given side
wealthy.
2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.34 Based
on 13 policy-preference questions asked on this survey, the
increases (an increase from 10 to 11 groups likely
matters less than a jump from 1 to 2 does), he took
the logarithms of the number of pro groups and the
preferences of the top 2 percent of income earners (a group
number of con groups before subtracting. Thus,
Some evidence for this proposition comes from the
that might be thought "truly wealthy") are much more
highly correlated with the preferences of the top 1 0 percent
of earners than with the preferences of the average survey
respondent (r=.91 versus .69). 35 Thus, the views of our
moderately high-income "affluent" respondents appear to
capture useful information about the views of the truly
wealthy.
In any case, the imprecision that results from use of
our "affluent" proxy is likely to produce ««¿surestimâtes of
the impact of economic elites on policy making. If we find
substantial effects upon policy even when using this
imperfect measure, therefore, it will be reasonable to infer
that the impact upon policy of truly wealthy citizens is still
greater.36
In order to measure interest-group preferences and
actions, we would ideally like to use an index of the sort
that Baumgartner and his colleagues developed for their
ninety-eight policy issues: an index assessing the total
resources brought to bear by all major interest groups that
took one side or the other on each of our 1,779 issues.
But it is not feasible to construct such an index for all our
cases; this would require roughly twenty times as much
work as did the major effort made by the Baumgartner
Net Interest-Group Alignment = ln(# Strongly Favor + [0.5 * #
Somewhat Favor] + 1) - ln(# Strongly Oppose + [0.5 * #
Somewhat Oppose] + l).38
We also report here results for comparable group
alignment indices that were computed separately for the
mass-based and for the business-oriented sets of groups
listed in Appendix 1 .
Our dependent variable is a measure of whether or not
the policy change proposed in each survey question was
actually adopted within four years after the question was
asked. (It turns out that most of the action occurred
within two years). Of course there was nothing easy
about measuring the presence or absence of policy change
for each of 1,779 different cases; Gilens and his research
assistants spent many hours poring over news accounts,
government data, Congressional Quarterly publications,
academic papers and the like.39
In order to test among our theoretical traditions, we
begin by considering all organized interest groups
together, not distinguishing between mass-based and
business-oriented groups. Within a single statistical model,
we estimate the independent impact upon our dependent
research team on their cases. Fortunately, however,
variable (policy change) of each of three independent
Baumgartner et al. found that a simple proxy for their
variables: the average citizens policy preferences (preferences
index - the number of reputedly "powerful" interest
at the fiftieth income percentile); the policy preferences of
groups (from among groups appearing over the years in
Fortune magazine's "Power 25" lists) that favored a given
economic elites (measured by policy preferences at the
policy change, minus the number that opposed it -
groups (the Net Interest-Group Alignment Index).
Later, in order to distinguish clearly between Majoritarian Pluralism and Biased Pluralism, we will use two
correlated quite substantially in their cases with the full
interest-group index (r=0.73).37
Gilens, using a modified version of this simple count
of the number of "powerful" interest groups favoring
ninetieth income percentile); and the stands of interest
separate measures of net interest-group alignment, one
involving only mass-based interest groups and the other
(minus those opposing) each proposed policy change,
limited to business and professional groups. The main
developed a measure of Net Interest Group Alignment .
hypotheses of interest, summarized in table 1 , follow fairly
To the set of groups on the "Power 25" lists (which
seemed to neglect certain major business interests) he
types of theory.
added ten key industries that had reported the highest
lobbying expenditures. (For the final list of included
industries and interest groups, refer to Appendix 1.) For
each of the 1,779 instances of proposed policy change,
Gilens and his assistants drew upon multiple sources to
code all engaged interest groups as "strongly favorable,"
straightforwardly from our discussion of our four ideal
In their pure form, theories of Majoritarian Electoral
Democracy (for example, rational models of electoral
competition that include no societal actors other than
average citizens), predict that the influence upon policy of
average citizens is positive, significant, and substantial,
while the influence of other actors is not.
"somewhat favorable," "somewhat unfavorable," or
Theories of Economic-Elite Domination predict pos-
"strongly unfavorable" to the change. He then combined the numbers of groups on each side of a given
issue, weighting "somewhat" favorable or somewhat
itive, significant, and substantial influence upon policy by
economic elites. Most such theories allow for some
unfavorable positions at half the magnitude of
(though not much) independent influence by average
citizens, e.g., on non-economic social issues. Many also
September 2014 | Vol. 12/No. 3 569
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Articles ÄĽ Testing Theories of American Politics
Table 1
Theoretical predictions concerning the independent influence of sets of actors upon policy
outcomes
Sets of Actors
Average Economic All Interest Mass Interest Business Interest
Theory
(ideal
type)
Majoritarian
Democracy
Dominance
Elites
Electoral
by
Y
Economic
y
n
n
Y
y
n
n
n
y
Majoritarian Pluralism y n Y Y Y
Biased Pluralism n n y y Y
n
=
little
or
no
independent
y
=
some
Y
=
substantial
allow
for
interest
taken
independent
a
some
individuals.
In
dict
-
whole
general,
that
influence
independent
groups
as
influence
influence
independent
Influence upon Policy of Averageinfluenc
and
probably
Citizens,therefore
Economic Elites, and Interest
though
Groups
their
Before we proceed further, it is important to note that even
theories
if one of ourof
predictorinterest-group
variables is found (when controlling
only organized
interest
for the others) to have no independent
impact on policy at
significant,
and
substantial
all, it does not follow that the actors whose preferences are
positive,
b
emphas
gr
eff
policy. Influence
proceeds from gro
reflected by that variable - average citizens, economic elites,
wealthy (or other)
individuals. Depen
or organized interest groups of one sort or another - always
type
be
do
of pluralist theory, average citizens
"lose" in policy decisions. Policy making is not necessarily
well represented through organized
not
their
have
own.
Theories
a
a zero-sum game among these actors. When one set of
great deal of independe
actors wins, others may win as well, if their preferences are
positively correlated with each other.
of
Majoritarian
Pluralism
pr
It turns out, in fact, that the preferences of average
stands of organized interest groups, all
citizens are positively and fairly highly correlated, across
rather faithfully represent (that is, are
issues, with the preferences of economic elites (refer to
substantially correlated with) the prefer
citizens.
But
table 2). Rather often, average citizens and affluent citizens
since
most
political
inf
(our proxy for economic elites) want the same things from
a multivariate analysis t
government. This bivariate correlation affects how we
interest-group alignments and citizens' p
should interpret our later multivariate findings in terms of
show far more independent influence by
through
the
groups,
however,
citizens.
Theories
Biased Pluralism, too, see or
may be dead wrong
in terms ofinfluence
causal impact. Ordinary
much
more
tha
citizens, for example, might
often be observed But
to "win"
individual economic
elites.
th
groups
or
"winners" and "losers."
It also suggests
why
Truman's
idea
ofa reason
"potent
serious
scholars
might
keep
adhering
to
both
the
Majorleave room for some direct inf
itarian Electoral Democracy and the Economic-Elite
Domination theoretical traditions, even if one of them
citizens.
as
of
having
(that is, to get their preferred
policy outcomes)
even
if they
groups
play
the
major
r
no independent effect whatsoever of
on policy the
making, if poli
Recognizing the had
complexity
elites (with whomthe
they often possibility
agree) actually prevail.
must also acknowledge
th
of these theoretical
traditions
some t
But net
interest-group stands are has
not substantially
business-oriented
with our
the preferences
of average citizens.
several - even all correlated
- of
sets
of Taking
actors
interest groups together, the index of net
interest-group
stantial, positive, all
independent
influence
alignment correlates
only a non-significant
.04 with
And we must consider
the
null hypothe
average citizens' preferences! correctly
(Refer to table 2.) This casts desc
these theoretical traditions
what
goes
on
in
grave doubt on David Truman's
and others' argument that
American
politics.
570 Perspectives on Politics
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Table 2
Correlations among independent variables
Average citizens' Economic elites' All interest Mass public Business
preferences preferences groups interest groups interest groups
Average citizens' preferences
Economic elites' .78*** -
preferences
All interest groups .04 .05 Mass public .12*** .01 .47***
interest
Business
groups
interest
-.10***
-.02
-
.96***
-.05
-
groups
001
Note:
;n=
1779.
Entries
are
correlation
coefficients
corrected
f
groups together, for
now) is modeled
separately
as
organized interest interest
groups
tend
to
do
a goo
the sole predictor of policy
Just as previous Indeed
representing the population
as change.
a whole.
each of three broad of
theoretical
2 indicates, even the literature
net suggests,
alignments
the gro
traditions - Majoritarian
Electoral Democracy,with
Economiccategorized as "mass-based"
correlate
avera
Elite Domination,
and interest-group
pluralism -(though
seems to
preferences only at the
very
modest
s
gain support. When taken separately, each independent
significant) level of .12.
Some
particular
variable - the
preferences of average citizens, the preferences
U.S.
membership
organiz
especially the AARP and labor unions - do ten
the same policies as average citizens. But othe
Table 3
ship groups take stands that are unrelated (pr
Policy
outcomes and the policy
preferen-(gun
pro-choice groups) or
negatively
related
ces of average wants.40
citizens, economic Some
elites,
what the average American
me
and
interest
groups
groups may reflect the views of corporate back
most affluent constituents. Others focus on issues on
which the public is fairly evenly divided. Whatever the
reasons, all mass-based groups taken together simply do
not add up, in aggregate, to good representatives of the
citizenry as a whole. Business-oriented groups do even
worse, with a modest negative over-all correlation of -.10.
Nor do we find an association between the preferences
of economic elites and the alignments of either massbased or business-oriented groups. The latter finding,
which surprised us, may reflect profit-making motives
among businesses as contrasted with broader ideological
views among elite individuals. For example, economic
elites tend to prefer lower levels of government spending
Preferences .64 - - .03
of average (.08)*** (.08)
citizens
Preferences
- .81 - .76
of (.08)*** (.08)***
economic
elites
Alignment of - - .59 .56
interest (.09)*** (.09)***
groups
R-sq .031 .049 .028 .074
***p
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