The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and Its Contemporary Transformation Author(s): Roland Axtmann Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 25, No. 3, The Nation-State and Globalization: Changing Roles and Functions. Les États nations et la globalisation: Roles et fonctions en mutation (Jul., 2004), pp. 259-279 Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601667 . Accessed: 22/01/2015 15:46 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions InternationalPoliticalScienceReview(2004), Vol 25, No. 3, 259-279 IPSR RISP The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation ROLANDAXTMANN The first part of this article sketches the ideal-type of the territorially consolidated, sovereign nation-state. The second part discusses how the assumptions of "homogeneity," "unity," and "sovereignty" that underlie this ideal-type have become problematized over the past few decades. The moves toward a state form that institutionalizes polycentricity, heterogeneity, and plurality are discussed in the context of the conflict between nationalism and multiculturalism; the internationalization of the state; and geopolitical transformations. Methodologically, the article puts forward an argument in favor of a historically informed institutional analysis of state transformations. ABSTRACT. Keywords: * Globalization * Governance * Sovereignty * State For the past two centuries or so, the territorially consolidated, centralized, sovereign state has been the dominant paradigm in western political thought and western mainstream political science. It constituted the ideal of the well-ordered, western, modern political community. It was considered to be the model which any political community that strove toward modernity was expected to embrace. From the vantage point of the early 21st century, we are well placed to review this model and identify some of the significant transformations that it is undergoing as the new century gathers pace. (I) Key Concepts of the Modern State (1) The TerritorialState and the Unitary Sovereign Will In "pre-modern" Europe, political authority was shared between a wide variety of secular and religious institutions and individuals - between emperors, kings, princes and nobility, bishops, abbots and the papacy, guilds and cities, agrarian DOI: 10.1177/0192512104043016 ? 2004 International Political Science Association SAGEPublications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 260 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) landlords, and "bourgeois" merchants and artisans, to name but the most important ones. The modern state project aimed at replacing these overlapping and often contentious jurisdictions through the institutions of a centralized state. This endeavor was legitimized by the theory of sovereignty. This theory claimed the supremacy of the government of any state over the people, resources, and, ultimately, over all other authorities within the territory it controlled. "State sovereignty" meant that final authority within the political community lay with the state whose will legally, and rightfully, commanded without being commanded by others, and whose will was thus "absolute" because it was not accountable to anyone but itself (Anderson, 1996; Axtmann, 1996). Historically, the idea of state sovereignty came to dominate political thought after the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe. Then, governments recognized each others' autonomy from external interference in the most important matter of the time: religious belief. No longer, so governments pledged, would they support foreign co-religionists in conflict with their states. This agreement changed the balance of power between territorial authority and confessional groups in favor of the state. It created the precondition for the build-up of an effective system of control and supervision by the state over its population. Such "sovereignty" is premised on the occupation and possession of territory. The spatial dimension of territorial integrity manifests itself most clearly in the drawing up of territorial boundaries that separate the "inside" (the arena of the "domestic") from the "outside" (the arena of the "international"). "Governing" by the "sovereign" thus aimed to bring about the artful combination of space, people, and resources in territorialized containments. As a result of historical developments that spanned several centuries, the modern territorial state came into existence as a differentiated ensemble of governmental institutions, offices, and personnel that claims the exclusive power of authoritative political rule-making for a population within a continuous territory that has a clear, internationally recognized boundary. (2) The TerritorialState as a HomogeneousNation-State In the 19th century, the notion of the "nation"-state came to stand for the idea that legitimate government could only be based upon the principle of national selfdetermination and that, at least ideally, state and nation ought to be identical with one another. The nation became the "unitary" body in which sovereignty resided. Nationalism tightened the relation between "state" and "society." Nationalism aimed "to overcome local ethno-cultural diversity and to produce standardized citizens whose loyalties to the nation [and its state] would be unchallenged by extra-societal allegiances" (Robertson, 1990: 49). This political nationalism was complemented by the nationalization of culture in the pursuit of the creation of a national-societal identity. Cultural achievements became routinely claimed for "nations"; culture became "nationalized" and "territorialized." The universalization of the nation-state norm went hand in hand with the "nationalization" of of found one expression in "the expectation culture. This development uniqueness of identity" (Robertson, 1990), and thus the norm of particularism and localism. While the universalization of the nation-state norm contributed to the global spread of the interstate system, (the idea of) the cultural homogenization within the nation-state reinforced the cultural diversity of that system. The success of the modern nation-state in the past 200 years or so rested on the This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 261 acceptance of its claim to be able to guarantee the physical security, the economic well-being, and the cultural identity of its citizens. Through the monopolization of coercion domestically in the form of police forces, and externally through military forces, states aimed to enforce order and authority internally, uphold "national" interests vis-A-vis other states externally, and ensure the safety and security of their citizens more generally. The preparation for war and the waging of war also allowed states to develop a strong appeal to the emotions and generate, as well as strengthen, the loyalty of their citizens to "their" state and their sense of belonging to "their" nation. Since the French Revolution, states have also turned their attention increasingly to collecting and collating information about their citizens. The development of the modern state depended upon effectively distinguishing between citizens or subjects and possible interlopers, and regulating the physical movements of each. States endeavored to define "who belongs and who does not, who may come and go and who not" in order to develop the capacity to "embrace" their own citizens in an attempt to extract from them the resources they needed to reproduce themselves over time (Torpey, 2000: 2, 13). These regulatory endeavors contributed to the efforts of states to construct homogeneous nations. States came to address the "social question" through developing and institutionalizing welfare policies; to restore order through policing "deviancy" and improving moral life; to shape the national economy through state subsidies, the elimination of internal trade barriers (such as tariffs), and the imposition of import duties; and to expand the transport infrastructure as well as the communication infrastructure more generally, including state education. (3) Democratization and Popular Sovereignty As a consequence of its activity, the modern state became the focal point for political mobilization. Ever more social groups found themselves compelled to strive to capture, or influence, the core institutions of the state in order to advance their own objectives. Thus, the state pulled society into its political space, at the same time as it was trying to shape society according to its own objectives. In this process, state-society relations were tightened and social relations were "caged" (Mann, 1993: 61) within the national rather than the local and regional or transnational terrain. The state could no longer be evaded. It became imperative for the state's subjects to gain rights as citizens in order to be better able to control its activities, share in the benefits it could bring, and lessen the negative effects of its policies on the life of individuals, families, and communities. In the course of the struggle for democratic rights, the "subjects" of the state constituted themselves as "citizens" on whose sovereignty as a collective the power and legitimacy of the state was claimed to rest. Sovereignty is understood to have been transferred from the (monarchical) ruler to the people, and the people to have been defined as the sum of legally equal citizens. The dominant understanding of "popular sovereignty" emerged out of a welding together of key ideas from nationalism and liberalism. Liberalism aims to create a society in which conditions obtain that enable the individual to exercise her or his capacity of selfrule. In that respect, its key concern is with curtailing the power of other individuals as well as of government to interfere with an individual's freedom. The democratic idea centers upon the assumption of the capacity of individuals as citizens to govern themselves or, to put it differently, to determine for themselves their collective life. It is assumed, first, that every adult individual can be rightly This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 262 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) considered to be, in principle, sufficiently well qualified to participate in the democratic process of governing the state to whose laws they are subjected. It is further assumed that "among adults no persons are so definitely better qualified than others that they should be entrusted with the complete and final authority over the government of the state" (Dahl, 1998: 75, 76, 78). The collective "self' whose own determination modem political liberalism aims to ensure in the democratic process is the politically organized nation. Individuals must be members of the state, must be its "nationals," in order to possess citizenship rights. Popular sovereignty is thus understood as the self-rule of nationals in their capacity as citizens. This "liberal" conceptualization of "popular sovereignty" is premised upon the acceptance of this dual notion of self-determination: the capacity of the individual to govern herself or himself and the capacity of individuals as citizens to govern themselves as a political community. Democratic rule is exercised in the sovereign, territorially consolidated nation-state. In a bounded territory, people's sovereignty is the basis upon which democratic decision-making takes place and "the people" are the addressees, or the constituents, of those political decisions. The territorially consolidated, democratic polity, which is clearly demarcated from other political communities, is seen as rightly governing itself and determining its own future through the interplay between forces operating within its boundaries. Only in a sovereign state can the people's will command without being commanded by others. (4) The Global Spread of the Idea of the Nation-State In the 20th century, due to the global diffusion of the idea of the nation-state as an global norm and the extensive global legitimation of the institutionalized sovereign state as a primary feature of the world system, the sovereign nation-state did indeed come to be considered as the "ultimate power" that could impose, and enforce, order within a clearly demarcated territory, defend its territory and its people against external enemies, and represent its people authoritatively abroad. Yet, the spread of the nation-state norm beyond its European homeland was less a matter of cultural "diffusion" and more the result of coercive imposition by hegemonic western powers as an integral part of colonialism and imperialism reaching back to the "age of discovery." The European state ideal and its key concept of sovereignty became a cornerstone of the global interstate system after the Second World War. The breakup of empires and colonial states in the period of decolonization created new states that were modeled on the European ideal borders as their territorial basis). retaining colonial (while frequently Furthermore, the Charter of the United Nations and its support for the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity confirmed the centrality of the European state ideal. In an important discussion, Robert H. Jackson (1990) distinguished between "negative" and "positive" sovereignty. For Jackson, "negative" sovereignty was a formal legal condition under which states enjoyed rights of nonintervention and a society of other international immunities. Upon this legal foundation, independent and formally equal states fundamentally rests. A state which possesses not only "negative" sovereignty, but also the capabilities and the wherewithal to provide political goods for its citizens, enjoys "positive" sovereignty: "the means which enables states to take advantage of their independence usually indicated by able and responsible rulers and productive and allegiant citizens" (Jackson, 1990: This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 263 29). Jackson argued that, due to a shift in international norms after the Second World War, many of the newly founded states in the era of decolonization attained "statehood" not as a result of any evidence of capacity to rule ("empirical statehood"), but through "juridical qualifications" ("juridical statehood"). These "quasi-states" by definition are deficient and defective as apparatuses of power. Their "sovereignty is derived not internally from empirical statehood but externally from the states-system whose members have evidently decided and are resolved that these jurisdictions shall not disappear. The quasi-state is upheld by an external covenant among sovereign states" (Jackson, 1990: 168-9) .' In his analysis, Jackson disregarded the involvement of European powers in demolishing many viable African polities in the course of the 19th century in pursuit of geopolitical aggrandizement and economic profit. As Carolyn Warner has argued, "through treaty violations, military conquest and occupations, and alliances with disaffected groups, Europeans chipped away at the integrity of African political systems" (1999: 254). After 1945, the same western powers, which in the 19th century had destroyed "real" states in Africa, now created "quasistates." Still, Jackson's analytical distinctions allow us to suggest that the principle of "negative" sovereignty was universalized after 1945, not that of "positive" sovereignty. Structured around the principle of "negative" sovereignty the interstate system since the second half of the 20th century has been populated (to use Jackson's terminology) by both "real" states and "quasi-states". We can see that a "sovereign" right to ultimate authority and control does not imply an ability to exercise it. The history of state formation can be analyzed as the protracted efforts of rulers and their staff to translate 'juridical" sovereignty into "empirical" sovereignty. Jackson's conceptualizations have recently been taken up by Kjell Goldmann (2001: 62-5), who distinguishes between "sovereignty," on the one hand, and the capacity of the state for effective action, or what he calls "autonomy" (defined in terms of "action possibilities"), on the other hand. In his reading, the concept of "sovereignty" refers to a legal right. "Internal sovereignty" is a constitutional concept that pertains to the ultimate source of legitimate authority inside a state. "External sovereignty" is, in a sense, an international law concept. A state's external sovereignty "is a function of its recognition by other countries as being in legitimate possession of rights such as the right of non-interference by others in its internal affairs, and the right not to be submitted to international norms and decisions to which it has not consented" (Goldmann, 2001: 63). State capacity is considered to be conceptually, and empirically, quite separate from either notion of "sovereignty." However, arguably, for a democratic regime such a distinction is unintelligible. What could it possibly mean for a "people" to possess "sovereign" rights while being incapable of acting upon these rights and turning its collective will into an actuality? On these grounds, a distinction between "internal sovereignty" and "capacity" would appear to be spurious. At the same time, tying "popular sovereignty" to "state sovereignty" creates a major problem once the sovereignty of the state is being eroded - as we will see in the second part of this article. To sum up, where modern state-building has been successful, the state is constituted in terms of, and is expected to meet, six characteristic requirements: First, it should be territorially distinct, possess a single source of sovereignty, and enjoy legally unlimited authority within its boundary. Second, it should rest This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 264 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) on a single set of constitutional principles and exhibit a singular and unambiguous identity. . . Third. . . [it] represents a homogeneous legal space within which its members move about freely, carrying with them a more or less identical basket of rights and obligations. Fourth ... all citizens are directly and identically related to the state, not differentially or through their membership of intermediate communities. Fifth, members of the state are deemed to constitute a single and united people . . . Sixth and finally, if the state is federally constituted, its component units should all enjoy the same rights and powers (Parekh, 2002: 41-2). In this reading, the territorially consolidated institution. state is a thoroughly homogenizing (u) The Modern State Transformed sovereign nation-state has faced increasing The territorially consolidated, pressures over the past few decades. I shall concentrate on some of those processes that have had an impact on the homogeneity, unity, and sovereignty of the state. (1) Multiculturalism meetsNationalism Over the past few decades, in ever more countries, national and ethnic communities with distinct languages, histories, and traditions have demanded recognition and support for their cultural identity. They demand groupdifferentiated rights, powers, status, or immunities that go beyond the common rights of citizenship. These claims encompass demands for territorial autonomy (ranging in its form from federalism to devolution and to the acquisition of the status of "autonomous" region in either symmetrical or asymmetrical arrangements); for self-government in certain key matters such as education, health, or family law; for guaranteed representation in the political institutions of the larger society on the basis of quota systems favorable to the group and guaranteed veto powers over legislation and policies that centrally affect the respective minorities; and for group-specific legal exemptions. These demands are premised upon the belief that only by possessing and exercising these rights, powers, and immunities will it be possible for these communities to ensure the full and free development of their culture. A policy of assimilation, which aims to incorporate (or "melt") the "minority" into the dominant "majority" culture, is therefore not an option (Barry, 2000; Gagnon and Tully, 2001; Kelly, 2002; Kukathas, 2003; Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000; Parekh, 2000). These demands raise the question of the very nature, authority, and permanence of the "multicultural," or rather "multicommunal," state of which these various cultural communities are part. Our prevailing assumptions of common citizenship, common identity, and social and political cohesion will be questioned. The question has arisen as to how these communities can coordinate their actions in areas of common concern or common interest, for example, with regard to the environment, the economy, or military security. The much more fragmented, decentralized institutional pattern emerging from this diversity would have to allow for the following: first, democratic, communal self-government; second, a public debate on the matters communities have in common; third, protection of legitimate powers to uphold autonomy; and, fourth, the political coordination of This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 265 the communities that keeps them part of one larger community. Given that many of these communities have "transnational" political, economic, and cultural links with their "home country" and retain a sense of loyalty to, and possibly derive even their identity from, their "place of origin," the state will find it difficult to facilitate or, even more ambitiously, steer their interactions within the state territory (Cohen, 1996). The net effect would appear to be a state that is limited to act as the coordinator of these political and cultural networks that are formed by a plethora of "cultural" communities. The past few decades have also witnessed the revival of ethnic nationalism in liberal democracies and secessionist threats by "internal" nationalities as well as the related recognition of the "multinational" character of most "nation"-states. These issues have dominated the domestic politics of countries such as the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland), Spain, Belgium, and Canada (Quebec). Furthermore, we are also witnessing the political struggle of indigenous peoples in white settler states (such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, but also, to an extent, in the USA) for recognition as free, equal, and self-governing peoples (Ivison et al., 2000). As "nations within" both "stateless nations" (such as the Catalans, the Scots, or the Quebecois) and indigenous peoples share the historical experience of an existence of complete and functioning societies on their historic homeland before being incorporated into a larger state. However, there are two major differences between these two forms of "national minorities" in democratic states. First, indigenous peoples in white settler societies were sometimes subjected to de facto "genocidal" policies and generally threatened in their very physical survival to an extent quite incomparable to anything experienced by most "stateless nations." Second, most "stateless nations" embrace a form of "civic" or "post-ethnic" nationalism (such that group identities and membership are held to be fluid, hybrid, and multiple), a form of nationalism they tend to share with the "majority nation." Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, are firmly (if not exclusively) mobilizing around a more static, descent-based, and culturally exclusive conception of group identity and membership. To the extent that they do not (wish to) speak the political language of "liberal nationalism," and make demands for official apologies for past humiliations and atrocities, indigenous peoples raise the stakes in the intercultural dialog and challenge the assumption that political accommodation could be achieved within the institutional arrangements of liberal democracy (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). The indigenous claim to "sovereignty without secession" develops the idea of "nested" sovereignty, which demands the right of self-determination over those jurisdictions of direct relevance to the indigenous people while at the same time acknowledging a shared jurisdiction over certain lands and resources on the basis of mutual consent (Tully, 2000). Indigenous demands raise, then, a number of questions. What does it mean to do justice to indigenous claims within the framework of a democratic and postcolonial state? Again, at stake is the need for reconfiguring political authority structures as well as the redefinition of democracy so that it should no longer be seen as an affair of a single body of citizens who together constitute a single people, but rather as an affair of citizens who constitute a plurality of diverse peoples, groups, and associations (see, for example, Hindess, 2001; Wilson, 2001). This multiculturalism, however, shares the political space with nationalism. There are a number of structural reasons why nationalism is likely to remain a This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 266 Intenational PoliticalScienceReview25 (3) vibrant political force. First, nationalism is structurally embedded in the changes in the interstate system. After the end of the Cold War, the geostrategic interests of the superpowers can no longer be defined as necessitating the perpetuation of the freezing of international borders on the grounds of security. As a result, demands for independence within states can be voiced more persuasively along nationalist lines. Second, the formation of regional blocs as part of the restructuring of the global geopolitical and geo-economic space allows "small" states to conceive of themselves as viable "independent" states within a larger formation. Nationalist mobilization in pursuit of secession and independence is thus a potentially viable opt-out strategy, as, for example, the experience of the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia demonstrated with regard to the European Union (EU). Third, the restructuring of the global economy adds to the chances of "survival" of (at least some) smaller states: with the increasing importance of high-tech, highknow-how economies, scale and space become less important in economic terms, as Hong Kong and Singapore demonstrate. Even "city-states" have thus a good chance of establishing themselves in the global system. Fourth, global capitalism has brought in its wake regional disparities and economic dislocations. Deindustrialization and unemployment, rising prices, and declining living standards have intensified the demands by citizens for protection and security. In this situation, citizens expect their governments to act on their behalf and in their interest. Should such policies not be forthcoming, or else turn out to be ineffectual, extreme nationalism and right-wing extremism may then become popular among those social classes and groups most adversely affected by the processes of economic globalization, and thus excluded from strategies of purchasing "privatized" services. Lastly, it is a key aspect of the contemporary stage of global interconnectedness that concrete societies situate themselves in the context of a world complex of societies, that they conceptualize themselves as part of a global order. As a result of this global self-reflection, the criteria for societal change and conduct tend to become "matters of inter-societal, inter-continental, inter-civilizational, and interdoctrinal interpretation and debate" (Robertson and Chirico, 1985: 237). Such a situating of societies may engender strains and even discontent within societies. It heightens the significance of the problem of societal order in relation to global order and is thus likely to give rise to a large number of political-ideological and religious movements with conflicting definitions of the location of their society in relation to the rest of the world and global circumstances as a whole. A "nationalist" discourse and mobilization are situated within this structural configuration. (2) Some Structural Causesfor Societal Heterogeneity Western societies are increasingly understood to be "multicultural" societies in which distinct and cohesive communities demand the recognition and institutionalization of group rights in order to preserve their culturally and morally distinct way of life. They increasingly resemble an assemblage of national, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities with distinct languages, histories, traditions, and more or less complete institutional structures. In order to ensure the full and free development of their culture, these communities demand the right to govern themselves in certain key matters, urging the transfer of power and legislative jurisdictions from central government to their own communities. This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 267 that manifests itself in such a pluralization of The cultural heterogeneity societal communities is complemented by the state's decline in its capacity to act as a moral (or moralizing) agent. The modern state achieved societal integration through developing capabilities for the gathering, storing, and controlling of information. Through their very activities, routines, and rituals states "define, in great detail, acceptable forms and images of social activity and individual and collective identity": The routines of state both materialize and take for granted particular definitions. "How things are" (allowed to be) is not simply a matter of ideological assertion ... it is concretized in laws, judicial decisions (and their compilation as case law), registers, census returns, licenses, charters, tax forms, and all the other myriad ways in which the State states and individualities are regulated. . . . [This is a] massively authoritative organization of what is to count as reality. This system of power is inseparably also a system of knowledge, both in terms of quantity (how much the state knows, its "intelligence" . . .) and quality (the authority claimed for it, other sources of knowledge being less authoritative by the very fact of being unauthorized). (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985: 197, also 3-4) As a moral regulator, the state "creates" society; it "regulates" and "disciplines" social relationships in that territorial space over which it claims sovereignty. In this perspective, the state, of necessity, is a moral (or moralizing) agent. Recently, however, the state as an integrating force through moral regulation has become ever less powerful. We have been witnessing an increasing disenchantment with the project of the Enlightenment, which was informed by the belief that we could become the masters of our own destiny through the advance of human knowledge of, and intervention in, social and material reality. This belief in "progress" through reason and "instrumental" rationality has been shattered and it has become evident that "progress," based on the application of science, has resulted in an increase in uncertainty and the creation of new risks threatening the survival of humankind (Beck, 1996). The new risks are not open to mechanisms of "command and obedience." Though in some areas, such as the behavior of individuals regarding the environment, monetary inducements or penalties (fines and taxes) can be used to influence behavior, with regard to many risks, monetary penalties are useless (for example, AIDS). In these instances, the state has to rely on education and persuasion. An authoritative solution to these questions imposed from the "center" has become illusionary; instead, the state must attempt to "convince" the people through dialog. Furthermore, these new risks are the result notjust of a particular combination of knowledge, practice, and social interest that came together in the technocratic manifestation of rationality and reason. Rather, they are deeply implicated in the process of structural differentiation that is the hallmark of modernity. That modern society is characterized by functional differentiation is, of course, a widely shared view. The institutionalization of the separation, for example, of church and state, of politics and economics, or of religion and science was not the inevitable result of evolutionary processes, but rather the consequence of social and political struggles. From a political perspective, the institutionalization of separate spheres of action with considerable (and constitutionally protected) autonomy meant also a diffusion of social power and, by the same token, a limitation to any attempts at centralizing power. Differentiation also allowed for a This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 268 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) more "efficient" realization of the respective goals of the "subsystems": knowledge could be more efficiently produced once science and religion had become differentiated or the production of commodities and the satisfaction of needs could be more efficiently organized once politics and economics had become institutionalized as distinct structures of social action. Restrictions on the exercise of any centralized power as well as the dynamic of the "subsystems" as a result of the increase in "efficiency" (in the sense of acting according to the system-specific criterion of rationality) lie behind the incessant drive to ever greater specialization, professionalization, and organizational structuration of each "subsystem." Yet, we must not overlook that the functionally differentiated "subsystems" tend to be interconnected - for the very simple reason that all subsystems aim to externalize negative effects or costs of their mode of operation. For example, the economic subsystem in its capitalist form has always externalized the cost of securing the existence of the worker and let other forms of association, such as the family, state, or charitable organizations, deal with it. Notwithstanding these interconnections and degrees of integration, however, we live in a world of radical uncertainty. A radical plurality and diversity of opinions, norms, values, and expectations underpin a politics which cannot any longer be grounded in a recourse to tradition or transcendence and which has to accommodate wideranging moral reflections on "progress" and the ambivalences of "modernity" without the possibility of appealing to a set of universal principles. The opinions and decisions of the experts are as unlikely as majoritarian decision-making conclusively to settle and solve these "existential" moral and ethical matters. With the incapability of the state authoritatively to impose decisions, with the of experts and their expertise, and with delegitimization and demonopolization the formation of radical diversity among the population at large, new ways will have to be found to uphold societal integration. It is highly questionable, however, whether under these conditions governance aimed at achieving integration can be reinvented through the establishment of wide-ranging regimes of government using thorough auditing as a strategy of reflexive self-ordering (Power, 1997). In many western states, we can witness the introduction of intensified normalizing regulation by a new class of supervisory professionals (such as school inspectors, social workers, and accountants), who, with lists of performance indicators and "best practice" models, contribute to the attempt to achieve hierarchical control in a decentered environment characterized by strong pressures toward autonomy. The problem with such a system of government by audit is, first, the systematic increase in governmental surveillance, with its attendant threat to civil liberties. Second, surveillance based on norms radicalizes "a clash between standardized definitions of norms and the widely different values groups of citizens bring to issues like healthcare, education, environmental protection, public health and moral conduct" (Hirst, 2000: 284). Enlisting third parties and their related technological expertise into regulatory governmental structures remains part of an ideology of unitary governance, premised on the notion of "one-size-fits-all policies," in a world that has become polycentric, heterogeneous, and pluralized. (3) The Internationalization of the State and DemocraticGovernance In a recent study, Kjell Goldmann (2001) has analyzed the structural transformation of the European nation-state in the direction of the internationalization of This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 269 the state. He discerns three "master" processes of internationalization. First, the "internationalization of problems" means that many of the political problems that a country faces come (increasingly) from abroad. Examples include environmental problems or crime. Second, the intensification of all kinds of human relations across nation-state borders manifests societal internationalization: the "internationalization of societies" comprises an increasing exchange of goods, services, people, information, and ideas. Third, there is an increase in the "internationality"of political decision-making. This internationalization expresses itself in the "intensity"of decision-making, running from consultation with other states before national decisions are made to negotiated international agreements, on to decision-making by intergovernmental organizations, and, finally, to supranational decision-making. The "scope" of internationalized decision-making has also changed insofar as we witness the proliferation of international decisionmaking to new, and ever-expanding, policy areas (Goldmann, 2001: 8-17). These three dimensions of internationalization reinforce each other. With policy problems being increasingly contingent on conditions, actions, or events abroad, it makes sense for governments to seek solutions at the international level. Yet, participation in international decision-making, particularly in institutionalized settings, tends to make the concerns of the other participants into one's own. Positions on policy matters may have to be formulated which could otherwise have been sidestepped. Societal internationalization may contribute to the internationalization of national agendas and internationalized decision-making. On the one hand, for example, transnational economic relations or the increasing transnational movement of people, goods, and capital contain forces beyond national control and may require international cooperation. On the other hand, the societal perception of problems as being of "international" significance may lead to transnational cooperation between societal actors and hence to societal internationalization, as the examples of the peace and environmental movements demonstrate. Societal internationalization, in turn, may be fostered by increased political cooperation. For example, as the case of the EU shows, transnational cooperation between special interests may be encouraged by internationalized decision-making (Goldmann, 2001: Ch. 2). If, despite these interdependencies, we focus on the structural effects of internationalization on the state, we may discern two major developments (Brenner, 1998: 60-7; Jessop, 2002). The first trend is the "denationalization of the state": This is reflected empirically in the "hollowing out" of the national state apparatus with old and new state capacities being reorganized territorially and functionally on supranational, national, subnational and translocal levels as attempts are made by state managers on different territorial scales to enhance their respective operational autonomies and strategic capacities. (Jessop, 2002: 195) State powers are delegated "upward"to supraregional and international bodies, "downward"to regional, urban, and local levels, and also "outwards,"as a result of transborder cooperation, to relatively autonomous cross-national alliances among local metropolitan or regional states with complementary interests. The second trend is the "destatization of the political system" that manifests itself in the strategic reorientation from government to governance: This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 270 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) While denationalization concerns the territorial dispersion of the national state's activities ... destatization involves redrawing the public-private divide, reallocating tasks, and rearticulating the relationship between organizations and tasks across this divide on whatever territorial scale(s) the state in question acts. (Jessop, 2002: 199) This development creates the political space for "civil society," the "third sector," "private interest government," "policy communities," "policy networks," and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), that is, a space where states have either entirely transferred responsibilities for managing economic and social relations to private or commercial actors, or are exercising parastatal, nongovernmental, "public" functions in "partnership" with these actors - the world of New Labour's (and Anthony Giddens's) "Third Way" (see Giddens, 2001; Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 256-80;Jones, 2000: Ch. 8; Ronit, 2001). The consequences of these developments for democratic governance would seem to be obvious. As a result of a high level of societal differentiation and the increasing transnationalization of a wide range of societal interactions, the effective political solution of ever more societal problems is being sought at a level above or outside the nation-state. Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WITO) have acquired ever more authority, in some domains thereby curtailing the "sovereignty" of their nation-state members. A similar argument can be advanced with regard to the EU. Many transnational interactions, and the transnationalization of economic action in particular, have hurried ahead of the current possibilities for their political regulation. At the same time, the structures and mechanisms of international regulatory policy-making (such as international governmental organizations) are, in turn, more advanced than the institutions for their democratic control. This development has created an extreme tension between the effectiveness of political problem-solving at the "international" level, on the one hand, and democratic legitimacy which remains embedded in "domestic" political institutional arrangements, on the other. This tension is aggravated by the repercussions of international policy-making on domestic societies. As a result of the binding force of international political agreements, democratic politics at the nation-state level is increasingly curtailed. While "democracy beyond the nation-state" remains weak, "democracy within the nation-state" is thus weakened as well. However, we must remain aware of the fact that states are not all affected by these developments in the same way, as the case of the USA shows, for example. I shall return to this matter later in this article. The exercise of public functions by private agencies further adds to the problem of democracy. These private agencies are essentially undemocratic and the actors tend to be free from constraints from the wider community and often unconstrained by the countervailing powers of governments. Citizens often lack any real chance to exert influence on these private bodies. In addition, the composition of the citizen body itself has become, as we saw above, problematic to the extent that it fragments into a plurality of communities. Moreover, in the age of globalization, asJames Anderson (2002a: 28) has succinctly argued: With huge advances in space-spanning technologies for moving people and information . . . people's actual social communities are more likely to be spatially discontinuous, less territorially delimited, or defined by function This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 271 rather than territory; and their communities are also increasingly likely to vary, or vary more widely, for different functions and purposes. People are increasingly likely to have as much in common with individuals and groups living in another part of their city or country, or across the border in another country, as with their next-door neighbour. Anderson rightly concludes that, as a result, "the social base for territorially defined democracy becomes less coherent" (2002a: 28). Democratic rule thus becomes problematic. The demands for establishing a "cosmopolitan," "global," or "transnational"democracy emanate from the perception of such a democratic deficit (Anderson, 2002b; Dower and Williams, 2002; Etzioni-Halevy, 2002; Held, 1995; Holden, 2000). Yet, the changes we witness in the structure of the state are unlikely to lead to its demise. First, nation-states retain the "nodal role" in the expanding web of state powers, mediating between the increasing number of significant supranational and the subnational scales of action. Second, in addition to the state's key role in inter-scalar articulation within the emerging governance structure, it "falls to the state to facilitate collective learning about functional linkages and material interdependencies among different sites and spheres of action" (Jessop, 2002: 203). Third, like national markets, global markets, too, need regulation. This may mean regulation through international governmental organizations (such as the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank), intergovernmental mechanisms (such as the meetings of the G7), or through the development of trade blocs. But markets, NGOs, media companies, commercial organizations and interests, and all the other institutions that propel globalization need a secure environment to prosper. They look to the state to protect them from criminal or terrorist attack; to ensure law and order and the stabilization and enforcement of property rights; to develop communications infrastructure; to prepare the labor supply through education and training; and, more generally, to provide economic support through congenial tax regimes, subsidies, or other forms of state intervention (G. Gill, 2003: 246-55; Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 271-5). Evidently, there has also formed a host of private regulatory systems, such as debt security or rating agencies, that organize information for suppliers and (private as well as public) borrowers of capital. There are also the various private bodies set up for international commercial arbitration, such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the American Arbitration Commission, or the London Court of International Commercial Arbitration. In addition, there are the multinational legal firms which feed into this (essentially private) Lex Mercatoria. Yet, in this as in other policy areas, we observe that states together with international governmental organizations, that have been the building blocks of the multilateral arrangements entered into by sovereign states, are being drawn into a system of "complex multilateralism" in which international NGOs, citizens' movements, and multinational corporations share in the task of governance. Fourth, states retain their importance for dealing with social conflicts and securing the social cohesion of a society divided into classes and other forms of social division (Jessop, 2002: 210-3). Through ameliorative action and welfare services, states stabilize societies that may be experiencing disruption and dislocation as a result of the effects of globalization. In effectively dealing with these disruptions, states may not only retain their own legitimacy, but also provide global processes with a veneer of legitimacy. Paul Hirst has argued that states "are This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 272 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) pivots between international agencies and subnational activities because they provide legitimacy as the exclusive voice of a territorially bounded population," going on to suggest that: States ensure that, in a very mediated degree, international bodies are answerable to the world's key publics, and that decisions backed by the major states can be enforced by international agencies because they will be reinforced by domestic laws and local state power. (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 276; see also Hirst, 2001) To the extent that states retain, and even expand, their power, the question of how democratically and efficiently to control this state-based authority retains its significance. (4) Causes Behind the Transformation How the state can go about discharging these functions depends, ultimately, on the constellation of social forces and dynamics of the institutional structure in each particular state. A comprehensive account of the formation of the sociopolitical and institutional arrangements of states and changes in state form would have to be embedded in an analytical history of state-building in Europe over the past millennium. Such an endeavor is clearly outside the scope of this article. One recently published study, which has been widely discussed within academia and the general public, Philip Bobbitt's The Shield of Achilles (2002a), gives a good indication as to the required scope of such an exercise and the analytical problems that adhere to it. Bobbitt sets out, according to the subtitle of his study, to trace the course of history through an analysis of war and peace. This endeavor necessitates an inquiry into the formation of the state and its varied institutional manifestations and into the formation of the interstate systems, which are both formed by the state and, in turn, contribute to innovations in state forms. For Bobbitt, the state is distinctive in that the violence it deploys on behalf of its subjects or citizens must be legitimate: "it must be accepted within as a matter of law, and accepted without as an appropriate act of state sovereignty. Legitimacy must cloak the violence of the State, or the State ceases to be" (2002a: 17). He further argues that each state form is the outcome of "epochal wars": "Because the very nature of the State is at stake in epochal wars, the consequence of such wars is the transformation of the State itself to cope with the strategic innovations that determine the outcome of the conflict" (Bobbitt, 2002a: 333). Each great peace conference that ended an epochal war therefore not only wrote a constitution for the society of states, and hence reconstituted international order, but also ratified the dominance of the victorious state form. On the basis of this linkage between the state and legitimacy, Bobbitt distinguishes between five state forms of the past which were ratified at five epochdefining peace conferences: The princely state promised external security, the freedom from domination and interference by foreign powers [Peace of Augsburg, 1555]. The kingly state inherited this responsibility and added the promise of internal stability [Peace of Westphalia, 1648]. The territorial state added the promise of expanding material wealth [Treaty of Utrecht, 1713], to which the state-nation further added the civil and political rights of popular sovereignty [Congress of Vienna, This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 273 1815]. To all these responsibilities the nation-state added the promise of providing economic security and public goods to its people [Treaty of Versailles, 1919]. (Bobbitt, 2002a: 215) As far as our discussion is concerned, Bobbitt's central claim is that the nationstate can no longer fulfill its function of maintaining, nurturing, and improving the conditions of its citizens. It will thus lose its legitimacy. This development has been caused by strategic innovations that led to the victory of the liberaldemocratic version of the nation-state over both its fascist and communist variants. The end of this epochal war came in the late 1980s with the collapse, first, of the state socialist societies in central and eastern Europe and, second, of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was ratified by an array of international treaties, which, in their totality, constitute the Peace of Paris, 1990. Three strategic innovations that won this epochal war (nuclear weapons, international communications, and the technology of rapid mathematical computation) have wrought dramatic changes in the military, cultural, and economic challenges that face the nation-state (Bobbitt, 2002a: 216). Among the developments that he identifies as fundamentally undermining the legitimizing premise of the nation-state, namely, to better the wellbeing of the people, Bobbitt highlights five as of particular importance: first, the recognition of human rights as norms that require adherence within all states regardless of their internal laws; second, the development of weapons of mass destruction that render the defense of state borders ineffectual; third, the proliferation of global and transnational threats (such as those that damage the environment or threaten states through migration, disease, or famine) that no nation-state alone can control or evade; fourth, the growth of global capitalism, which curtails the capacity of states for economic management; and, fifth, the creation of a global communications network that penetrates borders and threatens national languages, customs, and cultures (Bobbitt, 2002a: 214-28, 2002b). These developments, and the concomitant loss of legitimacy for the nationstate, lead to a new constitutional order: a market-state that no longer aims to improve the wellbeing of the nation, but to "make the world available" for the individual by creating new worlds of choice and protecting the autonomy of the person to choose (Bobbitt, 2002a: 233): Such a [market-]state depends on the international capital markets and, to a lesser degree, on the modern multinational business network to create stability in the world economy, in preference to management by national or transnational political bodies. Its political institutions are less representative ... than those of the nation-state. . . . Like the nation-state, the market-state assesses its economic success or failure by its society's ability to secure more and better goods and services, but in contrast to the nation-state it does not see the State as more than a minimal provider or redistributor. (Bobbitt, 2002a: 229) This market-state comes in three variants. The mercantile market-state relies upon a strong central government, protects national identities, subsidizes crucial research and development, steers certain important enterprises toward success, and, more generally, sacrifices the opportunities available to the consumer to the long-term opportunities of the society. Japan may develop into this type. The managerial market-state operates a "social market economy" organized around free and open markets within a regional trading framework as a counterweight to This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 274 Intenational PoliticalScienceReview25(3) national competition, a government that provides a safety net and manages a stringent monetary policy, and a socially cohesive society. Germany and (possibly) the European Union may approximate this variant. The entrepreneurial marketstate, based on a libertarian ethos, upholds the ideal of minimal state intervention in the economy as well as in the private lives of its citizens. It also blurs the distinction between the welfare of the single state and that of the society of states. It seeks the sharing of collective goods within that society. Bobbitt counsels that the USA should continue along the road to becoming a fully fledged, entrepreneurial market-state (Bobbitt, 2002a: 336-7, 671-3). The society of market-states, so Bobbitt avers, will be composed of multinational companies, nongovernmental organizations, governments, and ad hoc coalitions which will share overlapping authority within a framework of universal commercial law, but regionalized political rule. It will be a system in which the power and influence of the great international organizations of the society of nation-states, institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations, or the International Court ofJustice, will be much diminished (Bobbitt, 2002a: 363-4). For Bobbitt, then, the transition from one state form to another is technologically determined, although mediated through political leadership or "statecraft." Once the state has embodied "technological innovations" in its (new) institutional structures as a result of the considered choices made by its political elites, it regains legitimacy and, hence, need not fear opposition or even resistance from its citizens. The society of market-states will not abolish war, and therefore does not signal "the end of history." Yet, it is a manifestation of "the cunning of reason," the result of a wise acceptance of the necessary. Looking simply at the theoretical framework of Bobbitt's analysis, we may notice a complete lack of inquiry into the field of social forces whose conflicts and contestations, struggles and resistances mediate socio-structural change and political development, and move history away from a trajectory of the inevitable toward an open-ended, though structured, future. An alternative theoretical framework would focus on the political economy of the social reproduction of capitalism. In this perspective, globalization is not best understood as an independent variable that "affects" the nation-state and its policy capabilities - although such an erosion can be discerned. Globalization is not "technologically" driven, but a political "project" aimed at stabilizing capitalism Economic "globalization" has had through global economic management. manifest "political" roots in the decisions and nondecisions of national governments over the past three decades or so, mainly in the area of macroeconomic management (Boyer, 2000; Jones, 2000: 55-64). State policies of liberalization, deregulation, and marketization that have been presented by national and transnational political and economic elites as a necessary and inevitable "response" to the "challenges" of globalization to the nation-state have propelled (economic) globalization forward, resulting in transition from the industrial welfare state to the neoliberal "competition state" (Cerny, 2000). This kind of global governance is premised on "the internationalization of the state," by which Stephen Gill (in contradistinction to Kjell Goldmann) means the development of a state that has become increasingly attuned to and conditioned and restructured by the pressures emanating from the global economy (S. Gill, 2003). At the heart of this project of global governance lies the attempt to "lock in" commitments to liberalization and to "lock out" popular-democratic and parliamentary forces from control over crucial economic, social, and ecological This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 275 policies (S. Gill, 2003: 214). This global governance is carried through by a transnational class: "In addition to state managers (those embracing liberalization), there are the new financial and transnational corporate elites combined with the managers of the newly-empowered multilateral institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization" (McMichael, 1996: 32). Thus, we can detect a trend toward "the centralization of power in multilateral institutions to set global rules and the internationalization of those rules in national policy-making" (McMichael, 1996: 39). But we may also detect a trend toward the formation of counter-hegemonic forces of resistance at the global level. The networks of groups and movements that make up the protesters at WTO, World Bank, or IMF meetings may serve as examples (S. Gill, 2003: Ch. 11). The substantive differences between this position and that of Bobbitt need not concern us in the context of our discussion. For example, pace Bobbitt, this line of reasoning sees an increasing importance for intergovernmental organizations and multilateral institutional arrangements because of their centrality in capitalist regulation. Stephen Gill is also adamant that neoliberalism, rather than protecting the privacy of the individual and respecting her or his autonomy, undermines liberties and destroys civil society. This is for the simple reason that neoliberal policies entrench social inequalities and dislocations as well as political polarizations both locally and globally. For these reasons, "neo-liberalism necessarily involves the use of coercive power, allied to practices of intensified surveillance ('transparency') of populations" (S. Gill, 2003: 197) .2 Nor do we need to list the similarities in their respective analyses. For example, Bobbitt's market-state is largely identical with the "internationalized state" and there is also agreement that the neoliberal form of capitalism, prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon world, can usefully be distinguished from more corporatist forms of either an Asian or western European variety. Of greater importance for our discussion are the differences in the theoretical framework. It is clear that, in contrast to Bobbitt's emphasis on the importance of "statecraft,"the alternative perspective emphasizes the constellation of class forces, the formation of transnational elites, their modes of interaction and institutional settings, as well as the resistance they encounter in (local and global) civil societies. In this perspective, we are invited to understand historical processes of social and political structural transformation as outcomes of political contestations, and thus as being amenable to collective agency. The examination of the "opportunity structure" of collective agency may require combining "political economy" with "comparative politics." In all the democratic nation-states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, we find well-developed systems of interest formation and intermediation, of institutionalized conflict management and institutionalized norms of social justice. Among the forces that have had the greatest impact on the formation of these systems, the political, economic, and cultural struggles around the formation of centralized, and secularized, state structures and of industrialcapitalist national economies stand out. Of course, the precise cleavage structure has been different in each country, and so have the course and outcome of the struggles caused by it. As a result, each country has developed complexes of interest formation and intermediation that are fairly idiosyncratic. In the process of democratization and the formation of "masspolitics," each country has built up political parties, trade unions, professional associations, voluntary associations, special interest groups, and media for the formation and expression of public This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 276 InternationalPoliticalScienceReview25 (3) opinion. Yet party systems, structures of industrial relations, the incorporation of interest groups into the political system, and the allocation of jurisdictions and resources to subnational, regional, and municipal bodies have developed in historically distinct ways in each case. The same is true of systems of social inequality and class formation. This observation applies, for example, to the specific mix of policies through which national welfare states became institutionalized. "National" economies and national welfare states exhibit distinct structures and institutional features that influence the degree to which they are able to respond to, and even propel, "globalization." Furthermore, public welfare services must be wanted, and demanded, by citizens, and citizens must be willing to pay for them. Such solidaristic values and attitudes must be embedded in a national political culture, but for them to be sustained, and acted upon, political mobilization and citizens' involvement at the "local" level are necessary (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: Ch. 6). An analysis of path dependency leads us to ask (to take yet another example) why the highly internationalized smaller European states have higher than average levels of public expenditure and extensive welfare provision, while their levels of productivity and their record of job creation (as in the case of, for example, Denmark and the Netherlands) is comparable to the USA. It allows us to understand why countries such as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have relied on domestic capital formation, rather than on policies to attract foreign capital, to achieve high income levels or why Indonesia, with its reliance on foreign capital, suffered more severe dislocations in the Asian Crisis of 1997-8 than Malaysia, which had pursued a policy of exchange controls and of attracting long-term direct investment (Jones, 2000: Ch. 10). To explain such convergence and divergence in policies or structural reforms, it is necessary to analyze how specific structures and structural configurations reinforce selectively specific forms of action, tactics, or strategies and discourage others. At the same time, social and political actors are capable of reflection about "the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures so that they come to orient their strategies and tactics in the light of their understanding of the current conjuncture and their 'feel for the game"' (Jessop, 2001: 1224). To the extent that institutional structures are recursively reproduced through specific forms of action, they are open to modification and transformation, and contain the possibility of their decay. How these structures and the identity of relevant actors are best defined in concrete cases remains, manifestly, a major challenge for the analyst. Notes of transnational private security 1. Reno (2000) discusses the interesting phenomenon firms acting as mediators between "strong" and "weak" states. 2. For works relating to surveillance, see Garland (2001), Lyon (2001), McCahill (2002), Torpey (2000), and Whitaker (1999). References Anderson, James (1996). 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"Internal Wars, Private Enterprise, and the Shift in Strong State-Weak State Relations," International Politics 37 (1): 57-74. Robertson, Roland (1990). "After Nostalgia? Wilful Nostalgia and the Phases of Globalization," in B.S. Turner (ed.), Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity. London: Sage. Robertson, Roland and Chirico, J. (1985). "Humanity, Globalization and Worldwide Religious Resurgence: A Theoretical Exploration," Sociological Analysis 46 (3): 219-42. Ronit, Karsten (2001). "Institutions of Private Authority in Global Governance: Linking Territorial Forms of Self-Regulation," Administration and Society33 (5): 555-78. Torpey, John (2000). The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tully, James (2000). "The Struggles of Indigenous Peoples for and of Freedom," in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (eds), Political Theory and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Warner, Carolyn M. (1999). "The Political Economy of 'Quasi-Statehood' and the Demise of 19th Century African Politics," Review of International Studies 25 (2): 233-55. Whitaker, Reg (1999). The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance is Becoming a Reality. New York: New Press. Wilson, Robin (2001). "The Politics of Contemporary Ethno-Nationalist Conflicts," Nations and Nationalism 7 (3): 365-84. Biographical Note is a Reader in Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen. He also serves as the Associate Director of the university's Centre for the Study of Globalization. He has held visiting appointments at the ROLAND AXTMANN This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions AXTMANN: TheStateof theState 279 University of Graz (Austria), the University of Heidelberg (Germany), and the University of California at Los Angeles (USA). He has published widely on matters concerning democracy and democratic theory, on state formation in Europe from a historical-sociological perspective, and macro-political change in the current age of globalization. ADDRESS: Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, AB24 3QY, Scotland [email: r.axtmann~abdn.ac.uk]. This content downloaded from 74.217.196.6 on Thu, 22 Jan 2015 15:46:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions INTL 190 POLITICAL BOUNDARIES: CONTESTED BORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS FALL QUARTER 2020 Dr. Vidya Nadkarni Email: nadkarni@sandiego.edu Seminar Meeting Time and Location: Zoom Link: Wednesdays 9:00 AM to 10:50 AM (One-hour prerecorded lecture to be viewed prior to each class session.) Please note that on December 2 and 9 we will meet from 9:00 AM11:50 AM for student presentations of the research paper. Read syllabus in its entirety for details. Office Hours: Instructor is available for consultation after class every Wednesday. Zoom-Related Information: I will be uploading to Canvas pre-recorded lectures that you will be expected to watch before class each Wednesday. These lectures (either in a single segment or in multiple segments) will run for approximately 60-75 minutes. Class time (live Zoom sessions) will be adjusted accordingly, so we will meet from 9:00 AM until about 10:35 or 10:50 AM every Wednesday depending on the length of the pre-recorded lecture for that week. After listening to the pre-recorded lecture and doing the weekly readings, you will need to prepare thoughtful responses to a set of posted questions that will be available either on the PowerPoint slides accompanying the pre-recorded lecture or uploaded separately to Canvas. You will be expected to come prepared to discuss these questions in the Zoom class sessions. I will call on you randomly to offer your answers to these questions and will expect you to offer thoughtful responses demonstrating that you have carefully read the material for the week. Anyone missing the live Zoom session(s) for any reason, will need to complete and then email me (nadkarni@sandiego.edu) by midnight on Wednesday a written 2-page double-spaced response (in a Word or Google Doc attachment) to the questions on the readings for every missed session. This written work will be considered in calculating your class participation grade. Pre-recorded lectures will be uploaded by 8:00 PM on the previous Sunday for an upcoming class on Wednesday. Course Scope and Objectives: What do boundaries signify in twenty-first century international politics? Do they represent lines of political and legal division separating citizens from foreigners? Or have boundaries been rendered invisible by the movement of people and trade across borders? Transnational challenges dealing with the environment, drugs, and terrorism do 1 not stop at borders. How may we conceptualize borders that serve as lines of division and points of exchange? This seminar will begin with a study of religious and ethical traditions on the making and unmaking of boundaries. Drawing on historical examples from around the world, we will examine boundary narratives, explore the causes of border conflicts that often spill over into violence, and investigate the conditions for the creation of zones of peace in border areas. Required Books and Readings: Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, ed. Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State, Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, ed. States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Assigned readings that are not from the texts above are posted on Canvas. Policy on Academic Integrity: Students are expected to abide by ethical standards and exercise responsibility concerning principles of scholastic integrity. By enrolling in this course, all students have consented to submit their work to Turnitin.com. All work must be done exclusively by the individual to whom it has been assigned. Students should assume that collaboration on assignments, the use of unattributed outside sources or outside aids (both written and electronic) is not allowed unless explicitly approved by the professor. All cases of suspected cheating and plagiarism will be referred for adjudication to the Office of Academic Integrity and the Dean of Student Affairs of the student’s undergraduate college. Any violation for which a student is found responsible is considered grounds for failure in the course. To review the policy, please see: http://students.ucsd.edu/_files/Academic-Integrity/Policy-onIntegrity-of-Scholarship_eff-fall2009.pdf. Course Requirements: Regular attendance at all Zoom class sessions is expected. If, for any reason, you cannot comply with this expectation, please contact the instructor with details. Students are also expected to be on time for each seminar session. Active participation counts for a total of 20% of your grade and includes initiating and contributing ideas that spark discussion and debate (15%) and presenting the research paper in class (5%). For more on expectations in this category, please see the sections below on “Seminar Participation” and “Oral Presentations.” The primary assignment for this class is writing a research paper. Details on all these requirements and the grade distribution appear below. 2 Seminar Participation: 15% Class participation in discussions requires careful reading and thoughtful analysis of the assigned weekly class material, the distillation of the main arguments, and the identification of issues of interest that warrant discussion. All students will be expected to have read the material thoroughly so that we may have a fruitful exchange of ideas. Non-participation in these discussions will negatively affect your class participation grade. Research Paper: 80% The research paper is the primary component of the seminar and students are urged to follow scrupulously the posted deadlines for all stages of the writing process. Students will select a topic (selection to be cleared with the instructor by October 14) dealing with historical or contemporary contested border issues between two or more states/peoples anywhere in the world. The topic can cover any area of transboundary interaction—trade and commerce, territorial disputes, immigration, refugees, cultural exchanges, and so on. The central question, the hypothesis derived from the central question, and a preliminary bibliography are all due on October 21—use the format on page 9 of the syllabus in completing this assignment). The detailed and annotated bibliography is due on October 28 (details on how to prepare an annotated bibliography are appended to the syllabus—see pages 10-12). The first draft of the research paper is due on November 18 and final paper due by 12:00 Noon on December 16. All assignments should be uploaded to Canvas by midnight of the posted deadline dates, except the final draft of the paper, which is due by noon on December 16. The final draft will be submitted as a Turnitin assignment on Canvas. The research paper should run between 12-15 pages (typed, double-spaced, and paginated, with proper citations and a bibliography). For the paper, students will have to consult a minimum of seven sources not counting the readings from the assigned materials for class. These can be books, book chapters, articles from scholarly journals, primary source materials or materials from authoritative web sites, such as the official U.S. State Department web site, the United Nations or NATO web site, etc. Magazines such as Time, Newsweek, and/or Economist may be consulted and cited, but cannot be part of the count for the minimum of seven scholarly resources. Proper citations (Author, title, publisher or journal title, page numbers, date/year and place of publication; if you are citing a chapter from an edited book, you need to cite the author of the chapter and the chapter title, page numbers of the chapter, and bibliographic details for the edited book) must be provided for all your sources. You must also choose an appropriate title for each paper and paginate your paper. Paper topics must be cleared with the instructor. Students will be required to submit a thesis statement, a bibliography, a first draft, and a final draft of the paper. The thesis statement should posit a clear link between the dependent variable (that 3 which is being explained) and the independent variable(s) (factors used to explain the dependent variable. The posited causal link should derive from an established body of analytical literature. Students will get feedback from the instructor at all stages of the paperwriting process. Use the APA format for citations and bibliography. The paper is worth 80% of your grade and will include a separate oral presentation component (see below). The final research paper is due no later than 12:00 Noon on Wednesday, December 16. Oral Presentation of Research Paper: 5% Students will present their research papers in class on December 2 and 9. Please note that class sessions for these two days will run from 9:00-11:50 AM. Prepare a PowerPoint presentation outlining the thesis, main arguments, evidence, and conclusions reached in the paper, along with relevant visuals (no more than 2-3 slides). Presentations will be graded on clarity of the hypothesis, the cogency of the argument, evidentiary data, presentation style, and the quality of the responses to questions asked following the presentation. Course Policies: Please note that the following Reading Assignment Schedule may be subject to change. In this event, changes will be announced in class in a timely fashion and students will be responsible for keeping themselves informed of these changes. Readings may be added to the schedule, so please keep abreast of modifications. Reading Assignment Schedule Week One October 7 Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings 1. Diener and Hagen, Introduction 2. Buchanan and Moore, Introduction 3. Roland Axtmann, “The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation,” International Political Science Review (2004), Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 259-279. 4. Oscar J. Martinez, “Borderlands and Borderlanders,” Chapter 1, pp. 5-25, in Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1994) Workshop: Research Topic 4 Week Two October 14 1. 2. 3. 4. Jewish and Islamic Religious Traditions and the IsraeliPalestinian Dispute Buchanan and Moore, The Jewish Tradition (Chapters 2 & 3) Buchanan and Moore, The Islamic Tradition (Chapters 10 & 11) Diener and Hagen, Chapter 6: The Green Line Between Israel and Palestine Roundtable Discussion, “Religion and the Conflict,” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture. 2015, Vol. 20/21 Issue 4/1, p129-144. Workshop: Thesis Statement Due today: Topic for Research Paper Week Three October 21 Christian and Natural Law Traditions Case Studies: Argentina and the Migrant Crisis 1. Buchanan and Moore, The Christian Tradition (Chapters 6 & 7) 2. Buchanan and Moore, The Natural Law Tradition (Chapters 8 & 9) 3. Diener and Hagen, Misiones Province, Argentina: How Borders Shape Political Identity (Chapter 10) Workshop: Annotated Bibliography Due today: Thesis Statement and Preliminary Bibliography for Research Paper. See page 8 of this syllabus for format to be used in completing of this assignment. Check links on p. 6 for information on how to write a hypothesis. Week Four October 28 Confucian Tradition and Case Studies: China, Thailand and Burma (Myanmar) Liberal Tradition 1. Buchanan and Moore, The Confucian Tradition (Chapters 4 & 5) 2. June Teufel Dreyer, “The ‘Tianxia’ Trope: Will China Change the International System?” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 24, No. 96 (2015): 1015-1031. 3. Karin Dean, “The Sites of Sino-Burmese and Thai-Burmese Boundaries: Transpositions Between the Conceptual and Life Worlds,” (Chapter 8) in Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr, Ed. Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and politics at Territory’s Edge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007: 183-200. 4. Buchanan and Moore, The Liberal Tradition (Chapters 12 & 13) Due Today: Annotated bibliography. 5 Week Five November 4 International Law Tradition Case Studies: The United States and Mexico 1. Buchanan and Moore, The International Law Tradition (Chapters 14 & 15) 2. Buchanan and Moore, Chapter 16 3. Diener and Hagen, Point Roberts, Washington: Boundary Problems of an American Enclave (Chapter 11) 4. David Thelan, “Rethinking History and the Nation-State: Mexico and the United States,” Journal of American History (1999), Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 439-452. 5. Fazila Bhimji, “Contesting/Negotiating Power and Domination on the USMexico Border,” Cultural Dynamics (June 2009), Vol. 29, Issue 2, pp. 107-132. 6. Pablo Vila, “Constructing Social Identities in Transnational Contexts: The Case of the US-Mexico Border,” International Social Science Journal (March 1999), Vol. 51, Issue 159, pp. 75-87. Week Six November 11 Veterans Day Holiday Week Seven November 18 Case Studies: Asia 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Diener and Hagan, The Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary (Chapter 3) Diener and Hagan, Locating Kurdistan (Chapter 7) Diener and Hagan The Wakhan Corridor (Chapter 4) Diener and Hagan, The Border Enclaves of India and Bangladesh (Chapter 2) Diener and Hagan, Borders in a Changing Global Context (Chapter 12) Workshop: Research Paper First Draft of Research Paper due by midnight on November 18. Week Eight November 25 Case Studies: Europe and Africa 1. Guntram Herb, “Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National Identities in Germany, 1949-1979,” Annals of the American Association of Geographers (March 2004), Vol. 94, Issue 1, pp. 140-164. 2. Diener and Hagan, Russia’s Kaliningrad Enclave (Chapter 8) 3. Diener and Hagan, Defining Liechtenstein (Chapter 9) (Contd. Pg. 7) 4. Diener and Hagan, The Caprivi Strip of Namibia (Chapter 5) Workshop: Research Paper Schedule for Oral Presentations will be posted on Canvas on Nov. 25 6 Week Nine December 2 Oral Presentations of Research Paper Week Ten December 9 Oral Presentations of Research Paper Finals Week Research Papers will be due no later than 12:00 Noon on Wednesday, December 16. 1. Submit the papers as a turnitin assignment link on Canvas. ___________________________________________ Resources for Writing and Hypothesis Development http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/purpose 7 https://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/22782_Chapter_7.pdf http://writing2.richmond.edu/writing/wweb/polisci/hypothesis.html https://writingcenter.unc.edu/tips-and-tools/political-science/ http://www.psci.unt.edu/~tmatsubayashi/teaching/hypothesis Seven Steps for Powerful Paper Writing 1. Brainstorm Gather all the things you know about the question 2. Categorize How can each of the pieces of information be grouped? What questions or new ideas do these groupings suggest? 3. Critique What are the strengths and limitations of each category or argument? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each? What would be the criticisms leveled by other theoretical perspectives? 4. Order How could we order these categories or arguments? 5. Outline Introduction Tell the reader what the question you are addressing is and what main points you will be addressing. Be sure to articulate your hypothesis. Body Break your analysis into three to five main themes/points with a subsection for each. Explain and critique each main theme/point. Conclusion Tell your reader what the question you addressed was and what main points you made and what you concluded about your subject. Did your analysis uphold your hypothesis? Why or why not? 6. Write Turn your ideas into sentences and paragraphs. Sentences should average ten words in length. Paragraphs should be approximately five sentences. Write in the active voice. 7. Edit “Powerful papers are not written. They are rewritten.” Check spelling. Check grammar. Cut everything not essential to the paper. Create smooth transitions from idea to idea. Bibliography William Strunk, E. B White, The Elements of Style, 1995. Annie Dillard, The Writing Life, 1990. 8 Use the format below to complete the assignment that is due on October 21 General Topic • What is the topic in which you are interested? Research or Analytical Question • After reading material on the topic, can you formulate an interesting question or questions about the topic? This should be a "why" question and you should have a hypothesis about the "why?" What follows the "because" are your independent variables. Hypothesis • Formulate a hypothesis based on the question(s) that interest you. A hypotheis is an educated guess that posits a cause-effect relationship between two sets of variables. Analytical/Conceptual Perspective • A hypothesis is generally informed by an analytical perspective. This is the "educated" part of your guess. Identify the model/concept that informs your hypothesis. 9 WHAT IS AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY? An annotated bibliography is a list of citations to books, articles, and documents. Each citation is followed by a brief (usually about 150 words) descriptive and evaluative paragraph, the annotation. The purpose of the annotation is to inform the reader of the relevance, accuracy, and quality of the sources cited. THE PROCESS Creating an annotated bibliography calls for the application of a variety of intellectual skills: concise exposition, succinct analysis, and informed library research. First, locate and record citations to books, periodicals, and documents that may contain useful information and ideas on your topic. Briefly examine and review the actual items. Then choose those works that provide a variety of perspectives on your topic. Cite the book, article, or document using the appropriate style. Write a concise annotation that summarizes the central theme and scope of the book or article. Include one or more sentences that (a) evaluate the authority or background of the author, (b) comment on the intended audience, (c) compare or contrast this work with another you have cited, or (d) explain how this work illuminates your bibliography topic. SOURCE: https://guides.library.cornell.edu/annotatedbibliography OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION FOR PREPARING AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY INITIAL APPRAISAL A. Author 1. What are the author's credentials--institutional affiliation (where he or she works), educational background, past writings, or experience? Is the book or article written on a topic in the author's area of expertise? You can use the various Who's Who publications for the U.S. and other countries and for specific subjects and the biographical information located in the publication itself to help determine the author's affiliation and credentials. 2. Has your instructor mentioned this author? Have you seen the author's name cited in other sources or bibliographies? Respected authors are cited frequently by other scholars. For this reason, always note those names that appear in many different sources. 3. Is the author associated with a reputable institution or organization? What are the basic values or goals of the organization or institution? 10 B. Date of Publication 1. When was the source published? This date is often located on the face of the title page below the name of the publisher. If it is not there, look for the copyright date on the reverse of the title page. On Web pages, the date of the last revision is usually at the bottom of the home page, sometimes every page. 2. Is the source current or out-of-date for your topic? Topic areas of continuing and rapid development, such as the sciences, demand more current information. On the other hand, topics in the humanities often require material that was written many years ago. At the other extreme, some news sources on the Web now note the hour and minute that articles are posted on their site. C. Edition or Revision Is this a first edition of this publication or not? Further editions indicate a source has been revised and updated to reflect changes in knowledge, include omissions, and harmonize with its intended reader's needs. Also, many printings or editions may indicate that the work has become a standard source in the area and is reliable. If you are using a Web source, do the pages indicate revision dates? D. Publisher Note the publisher. If the source is published by a university press, it is likely to be scholarly. Although the fact that the publisher is reputable does not necessarily guarantee quality, it does show that the publisher may have high regard for the source being published. E. Title of Journal Is this a scholarly or a popular journal? This distinction is important because it indicates different levels of complexity in conveying ideas. If you need help in determining the type of journal, see Distinguishing Scholarly from Non-Scholarly Periodicals. Or you may wish to check your journal title in the latest edition of Katz's Magazines for Libraries (Olin Ref Z 6941 .K21, shelved at the reference desk) for a brief evaluative description. CONTENT ANALYSIS Having made an initial appraisal, you should now examine the body of the source. Read the preface to determine the author's intentions for the book. Scan the table of contents and the index to get a broad overview of the material it covers. Note whether bibliographies are included. Read the chapters that specifically address your topic. Reading the article abstract and scanning the table of contents of a journal or magazine issue is also useful. As with books, the presence and quality of a bibliography at the end of the article may reflect the care with which the authors have prepared their work. A. Intended Audience What type of audience is the author addressing? Is the publication aimed at a specialized or a general audience? Is this source too elementary, too technical, too advanced, or just right for your needs? 11 B. Objective Reasoning 1. Is the information covered fact, opinion, or propaganda? It is not always easy to separate fact from opinion. Facts can usually be verified; opinions, though they may be based on factual information, evolve from the interpretation of facts. Skilled writers can make you think their interpretations are facts. 2. Does the information appear to be valid and well-researched, or is it questionable and unsupported by evidence? Assumptions should be reasonable. Note errors or omissions. 3. Are the ideas and arguments advanced more or less in line with other works you have read on the same topic? The more radically an author departs from the views of others in the same field, the more carefully and critically you should scrutinize his or her ideas. 4. Is the author's point of view objective and impartial? Is the language free of emotion-arousing words and bias? C. Coverage 1. Does the work update other sources, substantiate other materials you have read, or add new information? Does it extensively or marginally cover your top...
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