Question:
Having noted the difference in positions on the status of Chechnya and how strongly those opinions are
felt, how can the situation be resolved without the use of violence?
If you have already posted a response "in character," feel free to do one "out of character," that is, as an
observer. In character, posts can be to a broad audience (the whole board), to the press or to specific
members (as private communications ... although everyone will be able to see these).
Be sure to remind us, if you are in character (and which character you are) or out of character.
Running Head: SIMULATION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CHECHNYA
Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya: An Exploration through Track-Two Diplomacy
Student’s Name
Institutional Affiliation
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Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya: An Exploration through Track-Two Diplomacy
Hello Comrades. My name is (insert name). I am the Executive Director at INTAR a
Civil Humanitarian Organization (n.d.). As one of the delegates in the reconstruction
commission, I call upon this committee to think in-depth about the rights of the Chechen people.
The Chechen people have endured suffering for way too long. Through the first and second
Chechen wars, Chechen people are the ones that have been at a loss from lives and land to
resources and homes; about 30, 000 lives have been lost with close to half a million people
displaced (n.d.). Close to 200, 000 of our people, our own blood are habitants of refugee camps,
unsure of what fate befalls them day by day (n.d.). These wars amongst the Russians and our
people have gone on for far too long; but the more recent conflict over the last decade has done
much to reinvigorate old hatreds and fears. All they have done is take the loved ones from us,
deprived us of peace and a stable living environment. This is just one of the reasons why end of
violence is highly important; human life is the most important factor. What good would be
getting back our land without our own to live, cultivate and gain from it? To help us achieve this
I have appealed to the international humanitarian aid, but has been unsuccessful in securing this
because of the continuation of the hostilities, the insecure environment, and Russian refusal to
issue permits for international organizations.
I wish to protect not only the security of Chechens but also help in the provision of basic
needs like food and clothing as they reclaim their land. I presume that we all understand that all
of our supplies are rationed. There are many reasons we should take this path but I’ll begin with
the simplest one, Peace in our country! We have to take pride in our nation. Permit me to remind
you, Comrades, the lives of our people are always what has been laid in line, throughout the
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whole struggle. And for what? Not that we get to keep our resources, Not that our families are
assured of a safe morning.
We have been left with nothing but rubble. The conditions are not perfect, they are barely
middling. Our people work too hard in the land, work themselves out and for what? How can we
ever expect change if it doesn’t start with us? This land has always belonged to us; too much of
our blood has been shed for this land. Comrades, we are all experts in our field, we know just
about much to understand that this is not a bargaining matter. A fact remains that we must regard
our land with the love it so rightfully deserves, both Russian and Chechen delegates understand
this equally. To do so, we both have to create a process through which the we both can a
mutually beneficial way to meet our needs and secure our interest with the least possible physical
violence. Our voices have been submerged for way too long. Therefore, I hope that my
participation will be a contribution towards achieving peace and make our Country Chechnya a
home again, not just for us but our children, for the lives lost, for the coming generations, for
Chechnya.
SIMULATION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN CHECHNYA
References
United States Institute of Peace (n.d.). Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya: An
Exploration through Track-Two Diplomacy. https:www.usip.org
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Simulation on
The Use of Force in Chechnya:
An Exploration through Track-Two Diplomacy
This simulation focuses on the conflict in Chechnya and provides an opportunity to take part in a
problem-solving workshop involving Russian and Chechen representatives of civil society.
Participants will play the roles of Russians and Chechens from various sectors of society: low to
mid-level government officials, religious leaders, and representatives of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). Participants will explore possible future directions of this conflict, the
needs and interests of the two peoples, and the conditions and situations under which violence
and the use of force might possibly be justified.
The potential benefits of “track-two diplomacy” – that is, an effort to bring together influential
members of the parties to a conflict in an unofficial capacity to explore joint problem solving – will
be discussed and analyzed.
Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya
Simulation on the Use of Force in Chechnya:
An Exploration through Track-Two Diplomacy
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................... 4
An Introduction to Track-Two Diplomacy ...................................................................... 4
Basics of the Problem-Solving Workshop ..................................................................... 4
Participant Tasks........................................................................................................... 5
Materials............................................................................................ 7
Scenario ............................................................................................ 8
Background ...................................................................................... 9
Setting the Stage........................................................................................................... 9
Conflict Chronology....................................................................................................... 9
Impact of the War: Facts and Figures ........................................................................ 17
Background on Russia ................................................................................................ 17
Background on Chechnya........................................................................................... 20
The US on Chechnya.................................................................................................. 22
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe................................................. 22
Annotated Bibliography ............................................................................................... 24
Roles................................................................................................ 28
Viktor Ozerov .............................................................................................................. 29
Valery Manilov............................................................................................................. 30
Igor Fiodorov ............................................................................................................... 31
Mikhail Rekalov ........................................................................................................... 32
Alexei Arbatov ............................................................................................................. 33
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Boris Nemtsov............................................................................................................. 34
Abdul-Khakim Sultygov ............................................................................................... 35
Archimandrite Mark Golovkov ..................................................................................... 36
Oleg Orlov ................................................................................................................... 37
Valentiana Malnikova .................................................................................................. 38
Sergei A. Kovalyov...................................................................................................... 39
Anna Politkovskaya..................................................................................................... 40
Hussein Iskhanov........................................................................................................ 41
Hamid Lashkarov ........................................................................................................ 42
Salambek Maigov........................................................................................................ 43
Emin Ortsa .................................................................................................................. 44
Hassan Khamil ............................................................................................................ 45
Garan Sureyev ............................................................................................................ 46
Shamsail Saraliyev...................................................................................................... 47
Umar Gregarov ........................................................................................................... 48
Malik Saidullayev ........................................................................................................ 49
Vakha Kasturiyev ........................................................................................................ 50
Zarman Shakhmurzayev ............................................................................................. 51
Kazbek Arsenaev ........................................................................................................ 52
Related Web Links.......................................................................... 53
Related Institute Resources ........................................................................................ 53
Other Web Resources................................................................................................. 53
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Introduction
An Introduction to Track-Two Diplomacy
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has been confronted by several
persistent ethno-political conflicts, which frequently have deep historical roots and which require
particular sensitivity to cultural and religious identities, political fears and aspirations, and security
and well-being. Although these conflicts may involve official government action, they are
frequently fueled by insecurity and discontent among the general population or segments of the
population. The interactions of high-level policy makers in most cases deal expressly with state
interests and questions of power, i.e., the kind of diplomatic interaction that brought former
President Clinton, Yasser Arafat, and Ehud Barak together. This type of diplomacy, known as
“track-one” diplomacy, involves negotiation among the official representatives to the parties to the
conflict and is essential in producing and implementing policies that make and support peace.
In certain conflicts, track-one diplomacy has proven ineffective - in particular those conflicts
dealing with issues of identity, survival, and ethnic fears of “the other.” In these cases traditional
negotiation processes work best when supplemented by unofficial processes that address the
perceptions of the “other” and fears that fuel the conflict. This unofficial process, known as “tracktwo” diplomacy, or “citizens’” diplomacy, brings together influential members of the parties to a
conflict in an unofficial capacity for joint analysis of the problem and joint problem solving.
Participants may include lower-level government policy advisors, community and religious
leaders, prominent businesspersons, and representatives of non-governmental organizations.
Their unofficial position allows them the freedom to explore alternative solutions to the conflict at
hand. The idea is to involve members of the community who will be able to replicate and
advance the diplomatic process even after the facilitated sessions are complete. For some it is a
way of imbedding a negotiated agreement or peace treaty into the communities that must live
with the terms of that agreement.
The focus in track-two diplomacy is not on negotiating a specific outcome, but rather on opening
up communication between conflicted groups, developing creative approaches to differences in
identity, discussing the sources of violence and discontent, and encouraging understanding of the
“other.” Sessions are typically facilitated by experts in dispute resolution who are also somewhat
familiar with the cultures and conventions of both parties.
Ideally, sustained track-two diplomacy promotes reconciliation and builds public support and
political will for the long-term developments that contribute to a lasting peace. It is important to
note that track-two diplomacy is not meant to be a substitute for official negotiations. Ultimately,
track-one diplomacy is necessary for structuring and institutionalizing the peacemaking process.
However, track-two diplomacy is an excellent complement to the official process and can be quite
helpful when government dialogues come to a standstill.
Basics of the Problem-Solving Workshop
This simulation takes place within the framework of a problem-solving workshop, one particular
method of conducting track-two diplomacy. Such workshops often take place over two to four
weeks and involve several hours of building trust and confidence among the participants,
examining preconceptions and stereotypes, discussing group interests and positions, sharing
personal motivations and feelings, brainstorming future solutions and goals, and practicing
conflict transformation within the context of specific cultures. A problem-solving workshop also
includes a variety of structured and unstructured social activities designed to give participants an
opportunity to get to know one another in a low-risk environment. In some cases, participants live
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in the same location for the duration of the workshop. The problem-solving workshop, then, is
intended to provide community leaders with the opportunity to speak candidly, free from the
pressure that high-level policy makers feel from their constituencies. The open-ended nature of
the workshop sessions gives both parties the liberty to explore potential solutions without having
to commit or make concessions that might indicate weakness.
In this simulation, students will assume roles of Russians and Chechens meeting at a problemsolving workshop to explore the needs and interests of each side in an effort to create alternative
solutions to the conflict in Chechnya. The participants will include Russians and Chechens from
various sectors of society: low-level government officials, religious leaders, and representatives of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Positions will include hard line, moderate, and liberal
viewpoints on the Russian side and moderate, separatist, and pro-Russian on the Chechen side.
The workshop is intended to acquaint participants with the concepts and processes involved in
track-two diplomacy, the benefits of open-ended problem solving, the need for alternative
approaches to ethno-political problems, and some of the complexities of the Chechen conflict.
Throughout the simulation, participants should consider how the facilitation and problem-solving
workshop could apply to real-world situations. Because the simulation will be significantly shorter
in duration than most real problem-solving workshops, it is very important for each participant to
think in advance about the kinds of issues that are at stake for his or her individual role and
group. Participants should examine their own views about the causes of conflict, options for
resolution, and the situations in which war might be a justified response. As they prepare for the
simulation, participants should consider as well in what ways these concepts apply to the dispute
between Russia and Chechnya.
The problem-solving workshop is an attempt to move from a debate between opposing parties to
a mutual problem-solving process.
In Session 1 of the workshop, participants will have the opportunity to debate viewpoints
within their group.
In Session 2, participants will listen to the needs and interests of the opposing group to
determine points of overlap.
Participants will use this information in Session 3 as they develop recommendations for a
future course of action with regard to the conflict, which they can bring back to their
organizations and communities.
The workshop will be facilitated by participants playing representatives of the OSCE. They will
guide the discussions. The workshop process is informal and relies heavily on respecting the
thoughts and opinions of fellow workshop participants. There is no hierarchy in the workshop. All
opinions are to be listened to and given the same weight, regardless of the title of the individual
expressing the opinion.
Participants will not have access to organizational contacts during the workshop. Discussions
and events that take place in the workshop setting are to remain in the room. Communicating
opinions and beliefs shared in the workshop with individuals outside of the workshop can
endanger participants’ jobs and lives. If a crisis should arise outside of the workshop, facilitators
will provide any necessary information to participants.
Participant Tasks
Participants’ first task is to read the background documents and their role guides, and begin to
understand the position and views of the role each will play. A list of questions designed to help
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participants think about the simulation follows each section of the Background. Participants are
not expected to develop detailed answers for each question; rather, they are included to guide
preparations for the problem-solving workshop.
Throughout the problem-solving workshop, each participant should:
Explore the reasons for the conflict (Session 1)
Given these reasons, consider the justifications for and against the use of force, in light of the
principles of just war theory. (Session 1)
Listen to the needs and interests of the opposing party. (Session 2)
Develop a series of recommendations for the future course of the conflict. (Session 3)
The simulation promises to be an enriching and fun experience. The importance of being
prepared cannot be stressed enough. Participants should read all of the enclosed documents
and take time to analyze the situation. It is important that participants remember which issues
must be addressed, on which points flexibility is possible, and which issues are vital to a
particular role’s interests. With sufficient preparation, this simulation will provide participants with
a firsthand experience of the rewards—and frustrations—that characterize track-two diplomacy.
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Materials
Each participant should receive the following materials:
The various Introduction, Scenario and Background documents (pages 1-27)
A role guide
Teachers may wish to make available as well the following items for this simulation:
A classroom or conference room and sufficient breakout rooms or additional space for any
needed sub-group meetings or other teamwork exercises
An overhead projector or multimedia data projector and an overhead screen.
Flip charts and flip chart paper (or white boards) and markers
1 pad and pen per participant
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Scenario
It is October 2003, and a group from the Russian Federation, and another from Chechnya are in
Vienna, Austria to participate in a problem-solving workshop at the request of Rolf Ekeus, the
High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE). The participants have gathered to work toward a joint diagnosis of the Chechen
conflict and to communicate their needs and concerns, hopefully to lead to common solutions that
consider these needs and interests. The High Commissioner has reiterated the fact that the
OSCE is not concerned with developing substantive solutions to the Chechen conflict, but rather
with creating a process through which the disputants can find ways of meeting their needs and of
securing their interests with the least possible physical violence.
This meeting has arisen in the wake of recent indications from both the Russian and Chechen
sides that they are willing to explore alternatives to a military solution to end the Chechen conflict.
President Putin’s traditionally hard-nosed stance on the Chechen issue has softened due to
increasing domestic opposition as well as international (European) appeals for negotiations on
the part of both sides. Russian participants include members from the government, various
political parties, human rights organizations, and the media.
On the Chechen side, this workshop reflects the wishes of moderates who have been
consistently calling for negotiations without conditions. Previously, their voices have been
submerged or ignored by more militant elements. However, the U.S declaration that it views the
actions of Chechen separatists within the context of international terrorism has spurred some
militant elements to pledge (at least publicly) their support for exploring alternative solutions with
the Russians. The Chechen participants include members of the Russian-backed administration
in Grozny, individuals supporting the various factions of the Chechen rebels, members of the
Chechen underground separatist government, and religious and civil society leaders.
Given the reluctance of both parties to commit to a fully-fledged negotiation process, the large
degree of mutual distrust and suspicion, and the lack of a positive track record with regard to
talks, Mr. Ekeus has suggested a problem-solving workshop format. He sees this as a forum to
air and exchange positions and ideas about the conflict and its possible resolution, and to deal
with the ongoing violence on both sides, the victims of which are primarily civilians. He has made
it very clear that participants have been invited in an unofficial capacity and with the explicit
understanding that the workshop will offer an environment for the exploration of ideas without
prejudice to any existing official positions. Participants will be able to express their own needs,
interests, fears, and hopes and hear the same from others. Clearly, the fact that the participants
will be able to explore options freely without the risk of any idea being interpreted as a concession
or commitment has been significant in bringing both parties to the workshop. On the other hand,
skeptics seem to think that this kind of meeting will produce very little in the form of tangible
results, given that the participants do not have to commit to anything.
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Background
Setting the Stage1
The conflict between Russians and Chechens in Chechnya has taken a variety of forms. What
began as an independence movement in 1991 was by 1999 transformed into a fractured
movement with a significant faction of Chechens fighting for the creation of an Islamic state. This
added religious component, coupled with the increased use of terrorist tactics, has resulted in a
complicated, protracted conflict.
In August 1999, a group of guerrilla fighters led by Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, invaded
Dagestan, a neighboring Russian Republic of Chechnya, in an attempt to create a greater Islamic
state. Shortly thereafter, a string of unexplained bombings rocked apartment buildings in Moscow
and Volgodonsk. The Kremlin swiftly condemned the bombings as terrorist attacks, blaming the
government of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov for the death of nearly 300 civilians. As
Russian Defense and Interior Ministry forces massed on the Chechnya's borders, both sides
braced for the second conflict in less than two years.
Today, rebel fighters and Russian forces remain locked in a protracted guerrilla war where death
and despair are the only clear victors. According to the Mothers of Russian Soldiers Committee,
Russian military losses are nearly 11,000 dead and over 12,000 wounded. Experts estimate that
the war costs Moscow upwards of $100 million each month, and that as many as ten to twenty
Russian conscripts and contract soldiers die every day.
For Chechens, the calamity is far worse. The Chechen Committee for National Salvation
estimates that between 20,000 and 40,000 people have died since 1999. Total casualties,
including those from the 1995-1997 war, could be as high as 100,000 people, or one person in
ten. Another 400,000 Chechens have been displaced, with some 180,000 now living in refugee
camps in nearby Ingushetia.
Support for the war is waning, however. Sixty-one percent of Russians surveyed in a recent poll
indicated a desire to resume negotiations with rebel leaders. Recent articles by high-ranking
former Russian government officials indicate growing concern over the course of the war. Private
meetings between representatives of the pro-independence government of Chechen President
Aslan Maskhadov and Chechen leaders loyal to Moscow have opened the way for formal talks in
the future. (Excerpted from American Committee for Peace in Chechnya website).
It is within the context of these changing political and societal attitudes that the OSCE has
convened a workshop aimed at setting the stage for future negotiations between the parties to the
conflict.
Conflict Chronology
Deep History of Conflict with Russia
Russia and Chechnya have a long history of difficult encounters and entrenched conflict.
Russian forces began moving into the Caucasus region as early as 1830 in order to secure the
empire against the Ottomans. In 1858, Russia finally subdued the Chechen populace, which had
1 This section excerpted from American Committee for Peace in Chechnya website, 27 May, 2003,
http://www.peaceinchechnya.org/background.htm.
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resisted under the leadership of their national hero, Imam Shamil. During World War II Joseph
Stalin accused Chechens of collaborating with the Nazis and deported all ethnic Chechens to
Siberia and Kazakhstan. They were permitted to return only in 1957 under Khrushchev.2 The
forced “Russification” program and the death of nearly one-fourth of the Chechen population in
exile left deep rifts in an already conflicted relationship.
The 150-year history of Russian-Chechen engagement has solidified a number of negative
stereotypes on both sides of the conflict, but the more recent conflict over the last decade has
done much to reinvigorate old hatreds and fears. Russians see the Chechens as a lawless and
corrupt people, frequently engaging in insidious, destructive acts against the Russian Empire, the
Soviet Union, and later the Russian Federation. Chechens have never regarded the invasion of
Chechnya and incorporation into the empire to be a legitimate or legal act, and view the Russians
as exploitative and tyrannical. The religious divide (Chechens are mostly Muslim and Russians
are mostly Russian Orthodox) has been an ever-present issue throughout Chechnya’s history
with Russia, but recent years have brought the conflict into sharp relief, particularly since the
American invasion of Afghanistan in 2002.
1991 – Fall of the Soviet Union
In 1991 the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Russian Federation came under the leadership of
Boris Yeltsin, a prominent advocate of reform. The former Union splintered into 15 independent
states. While most of the former Soviet Republics would later voluntarily join the political
association known as the Commonwealth of Independent States, Chechnya’s newly elected
president, Dzokhar Dudayev, declared unilateral independence for the small republic. In the
following year, Chechnya adopted a constitution and announced the state to be independent and
secular, to be governed by a president and parliament. In 1991, the movement for independence
was clearly a nationalist one.
In 1991 the three Baltic republics to the west of the Russian Federation also declared
independence, but unlike Chechnya, they were actually granted statehood. The Russian
Federation’s refusal to grant Chechnya status as an independent republic remains subject to a
great deal of speculation. Some experts claim that the region’s rich oil and natural resources
make the republic especially valuable to a country that is dependent on petroleum exports.
Others note that Chechnya is mostly surrounded by Russian territory and that allowing a small
section of the country to secede could have triggered massive fragmentation and threatened
large portions of the country. While much of the Russian Federation is ethnically and linguistically
Russian, there are other republics with high percentages of different ethnic and religious groups
that might have been particularly likely to push for independence or greater autonomy.
The First Chechen War: 1994-1996
Yeltsin invades Chechnya to quash rebellion
December 1994 – Yeltsin, in what he later described as his greatest mistake as president, sent
troops into the Chechen Republic in December 1994 to end the independence movement.
Experts estimate that as many as 100,000 Chechens, mostly civilians, died in the initial
campaign. Russian troops were nonetheless unable to subdue the population, and beginning in
1995, Chechen tactics took on a distinctly terrorist-type approach. In June of 1995, Chechen
2 Wikipedia
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rebels took control of a hospital in Southern Russia, seizing hundreds of hostages and killing
more than one hundred in the process. Russian forces fared worse in Chechnya than Yeltsin had
expected, incurring heavy casualties in guerilla style warfare.
Peace talks and Chechen elections
April 1996 – It was not until Dudayev was killed in April of 1996 that Yeltsin began to broker a
peace agreement with the Chechen successor, Zemlikhan Yanderbiyev. In August the Chechen
rebels attacked once again, this time taking Grozny. The Chechen rebel Chief of Staff, Aslan
Maskhadov, negotiated a ceasefire, known as the Khasavyurt Accords, with Russian General
Alexander Lebed, laying the groundwork for an official peace treaty with Russia almost two years
later.
1997 – Maskhadov was elected Chechen president in an election monitored by the OSCE.
Russian President Yeltsin signed a peace treaty recognizing Maskhadov’s authority as head of
the republic, but the question of Chechen independence was never properly resolved.
Failure to establish lasting solution to the conflict
It is perhaps unfortunate that a more comprehensive solution to the problem was not reached
when the conflict was still clearly a nationalist movement for independence. In the chaos that
followed the first war, the changing international scene and the increasing discontent with the
republic’s welfare, complicated the issue of Chechen independence. Islamic fundamentalism and
a new desire to establish a distinctly Islamic state developed throughout the second half of the
1990s.
Interwar Years: 1997-1999
Russia withdraws from Chechnya – increase in violence and lawlessness
1997 – Following the first Chechen War, Russia withdrew troops from the republic but continued
to maintain a strong presence in the region. Russia did little to aid in reconstruction and
rebuilding after what had been a devastating war. Crime statistics rose to new levels and terrorist
activities and hostage-taking became the order of the day. After a number of prominent
kidnappings, including foreign journalists and professionals, Maskhadov imposed a state of
emergency. His authority as president became increasingly challenged by the strength of local
warlords and rival rebel forces.
1998 May - Valentin Vlasov, Russia's presidential representative in Chechnya, was kidnapped
and held for six months. Later in the year, four engineers from Britain and New Zealand were
kidnapped and murdered.
Chechen political instability – rise of Islamic fundamentalism
1998 – Amid growing lawlessness, Maskhadov imposes a state of emergency.
1999 - Maskhadov announced that the imposition of Islamic Shari’a Law would be phased in over
three years. A group of opposition forces, however, announced their immediate intention to
govern the republic according to Shari’a Law and demanded Maskhadov’s resignation. Although
Maskhadov remained in power, the incident was indicative of the fragmented political scene in
Chechnya and growing Islamization. The rise of fundamentalism is a key factor in the
transformation of the conflict between the first and the second war.
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Second Chechen War: 1999-Current
Moscow apartment bombings – Prime Minister Putin invades
Chechnya
July/August 1999 – Shamil Basayev, a Chechen warlord, led rebel forces into the neighboring
republic of Dagestan and announced his intention to create an Islamic state out of these two
republics. Moscow responded with condemnation for Maskhadov and his inability to control the
republic.
Following a series of apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities in Russia, the newly
appointed Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, and his Federal Security Services (FSS) rose to the
forefront in the war against Chechen terrorism. Approximately 220 individuals died in the first two
bombings in Moscow. Another eighty died in a second round of bombings a few days later. Putin
and the FSS were quick to lay the blame on Chechen terrorists, although they provided little
evidence regarding the specific case against Chechen groups. Observers were increasingly
skeptical when a fifth bomb did not detonate, and the FSS called the entire operation to evacuate
the apartment building a ‘test.’ Since then many in Moscow have come to believe that the
Security Services were involved in some way in the bombings.
The incidents launched Putin’s political career. Russians came to associate him with his military
campaign against Chechnya and with his tough stance against terrorism, factors that ultimately
got him elected to the presidency. Chechens have claimed that he staged the bombings to start
a war and achieve the political clout he needed as a relatively inexperienced politician. As
Russian troops entered the Chechen republic, an estimated 200,000 Chechen refugees fled to
neighboring Russian republics, the first in a series of human rights crises in the region.
Chechnya has claimed that the conflict has continued primarily for Putin’s own political and
personal agenda.
Establishment of Russian-backed government in Chechnya
2000 - The Russian Federation recaptured Grozny in early 2000, and declared that Chechnya
would be governed directly from Moscow, establishing a pro-Russian Chechen administration
with Chechen mufti Akhmad Kadyrov as President and Stanislav Ilyasov as Prime Minister.
Maskhadov denounced Kadyrov as a traitor and took up leadership of the Chechen rebel forces.
While Moscow considers the Kadyrov administration to be the official government of Chechnya,
Maskhadov continues to be leader of the underground Chechen government, which appears to
maintain the loyalty of the vast majority of the Chechen population.
Western journalists and human rights groups reported widespread abuses by Russian forces in
so-called “filtration camps.”
Human rights violations and international response
2001 – International journalists’ fears of war crimes were confirmed by the discovery of a mass
grave and hundreds of severely mutilated bodies. Journalists reported Russian “cleansing”
operations targeting Chechen non-combatants. Europe was especially vocal about condemning
the Russian Federation and specifically Putin’s security service for the violations. President Bush
was far more reserved in his approach, seeking a new relationship with Russia and attempting to
eliminate much of the tension that had developed between Putin and Clinton. Neither Europe nor
the United States, however, took any concrete action to investigate or intervene in the Chechen
conflict. Putin consistently claimed it was an internal Russian affair and while some of the
international community might have been dissatisfied with the development of the conflict, it did in
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fact remain a largely internal issue. At the same time, Putin transferred control of the Chechen
war to the FSS.
U.S.-Russian relations under President Bush, international relations
After September 11, 2001 the conflict between Russia and Chechnya changed fundamentally.
President Bush entered into an even closer security relationship with Putin and essentially
promised to keep the Chechnya conflict off meeting agendas. Moreover, Putin was able to
successfully claim that Chechen rebels were receiving significant funding and support from
Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Middle East, specifically from Osama bin Laden and his AlQaeda forces. The result has been a decline in international criticism of Putin’s conduct of the
war and an increase in support from the United States for his tough stance against international
terrorism.
A particularly striking difference between the first and second Chechen Wars has been the
restriction of free press and media coverage. Accurate coverage of the situation in Chechnya has
been difficult since Putin invaded in 1999, with journalists frequently reporting harassment and
persecution when they have attempted to provide a realistic picture of anti-terrorist operations in
Chechnya. Only recently has the policy of restricting media coverage been officially endorsed at
the highest levels. In November 2002, Russia's upper house of parliament approved new
amendments to the media law, giving the President broad authority to curb news coverage of
anti-terrorist operations and promotion of rebel materials. The amendments were passed almost
unanimously, drawing harsh criticism from free speech groups.3 The new restrictions are likely to
make it even more difficult to monitor the events in the small republic.
New peace initiatives under President Putin
November 2001 – Greater guerilla resistance erupted than Putin had initially predicted and
Moscow began to examine options for troop withdrawal. In November, during a brief lull in the
fighting, Putin authorized peace talks between Akhmad Zakayev, Maskhadov’s special envoy and
Russian ambassador Viktor Kazantsev. They represented the first formal negotiations since
Yeltsin’s peace talks in 1999.
Rise of terrorist activities, public opinion, implications for peace
The pause in the hostilities, however, did not last long and relations crumbled again in the face of
renewed terrorist activity and three highly publicized incidents. The combination of events
between July-December 2002 significantly damaged any international support for Chechen
independence.
July 2002 – The United Nations chose to suspend aid to Chechnya indefinitely after Chechen
rebels kidnapped a Russian aid worker. While kidnappings were frequent throughout the 1990s,
particularly as a financially lucrative practice, it was only at this point that aid workers became a
targeted group. The United Nations chose to act in support of an affiliated agency, Druzhba,
which also helps to provide critical supplies and support throughout the region.
October 2002 – Chechen rebels seized a crowded theater in Moscow, demanding independence
for Chechnya in return for the nearly 800 individuals held hostage in the building. In a commando
operation to disarm the terrorist group, Russian forces pumped a sleeping agent, Fentanyl gas,
3 “Russian Upper House Approves Amendments to Restrict Media,” Dow Jones International News, 13 Nov
2002: 3:38.
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into the air duct system and charged the building. About 150 people died as a result of the gas.
The incident dramatically increased Russian rhetoric against Chechen independence, prompted
Putin to expand military power in Chechnya, and sparked both domestic and international anger.
Approximately 85% of Russians polled after the siege said they supported Putin’s actions. 32%
of Muscovites thought that officials should increase security in Moscow, and nearly 25% believed
that all Caucasians should be expelled from the city.
December 2002 – Chechen rebel forces attacked again, this time in a bombing of the proRussian Chechen government headquarters in Grozny, killing approximately 80 people. In both
the Moscow theater siege and the attack on government headquarters, Chechen rebels claimed
full responsibility for the acts.
Russia questions the reliability of Chechen leaders
The Russian Federation has struggled to determine precisely what involvement higher-level
Chechen officials might have had in the Moscow theater siege and the government headquarters
bombing. Putin has insisted that both Maskhadov and his special envoy Zakayev were
instrumental in planning and carrying out the actions, although both officials have denied a
connection to the Chechen terrorists. Following the Moscow theater siege in October 2002,
Akhmed Zakayev, deputy and Foreign Minister to the Chechen underground government, was
arrested and detained in Denmark while attending a conference. Despite a mutual extradition
treaty with Russia, the Danish government ruled to block the extradition of Zakayev, claiming that
Russia had provided too little evidence regarding Zakayev’s participation in the incident. The
decision seemed to be an indication of general European support for the Chechen cause and
potential for peace. After his release, Zakayev traveled to the United Kingdom in December 2002
where he was once again arrested upon arrival in the country. Despite his arrest and subsequent
release, repeated Russian requests for the extradition of Zakayev have thus far been met with
negative replies in British courts.4 The British government has not ruled to extradite Zakayev to
Russia where he would certainly face an uphill battle proving his innocence in the hostage taking
and other acts of terrorism by Chechens. However, the courts began to waver in their views of
the merits of Zakayev’s case and have considered releasing him to Russian authorities. The two
incidents were prominently covered in European and American press, further limiting sympathy
for the Chechen cause, although a decision to extradite would almost certainly be a non-political,
purely legal decision. Putin proclaimed himself justified in his appraisal of the Chechen rebels as
a lawless and internationally connected terrorist group.
March 23 – Implications of the referendum and new constitution
In an unexpected move, Putin scheduled a new constitutional referendum to occur in Chechnya
in mid-March. The Russian-backed constitution firmly establishes Chechnya as an integral part
of Russia, although officials claim it offers broad political freedoms to the republic. The Kremlin
announced that over 80% of the population turned out for the vote, affirming the new constitution
by an overwhelming 95%. A host of countries and organizations, including the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, have reservedly praised the outcome as the most recent
hope for a peaceful political solution. It is difficult to determine the accuracy of Russian figures as
many of the monitoring groups that normally oversee such votes declined their invitations to avoid
the appearance of supporting either side. Putin has indicated that he is willing to provide
4 Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/russia/zakayev_case.html
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amnesty for Chechen rebels if they agree to a cease-fire and has also proposed a wide-ranging
property compensation plan.
At this stage, the international community - Chechnya and Russia included – was “holding its
breath” until it became clear that the referendum would in fact result in positive political solutions.
Despite the respite in heavy military action, a broad range of criticisms concerning the vote has
been voiced, and it was entirely possible that a significant backlash to a rigged referendum might
spark a new round of hostilities. Separatist groups and human rights activists have called the
referendum vote a scam, insisting that the announced turnout and outcome were far too favorable
to be accurate. Moreover, they claim that a fair and democratic vote is impossible given the
presence of nearly 80,000 Russian troops in the region. The polls were heavily fortified with
Russian security and at 18 of the 418 booths, shots were actually fired to keep order.
Additionally, approximately 30,000 Russian troops permanently stationed in Chechnya were
eligible to vote, a fact that has concerned both Chechens and observers alike.
Aslan Maskhadov, still in hiding, was quoted on pro-guerilla websites as urging a negative vote in
the referendum.5 He continued to maintain that the referendum did not reflect the vote of the
people. He and other separatists claim that many Chechens who were opposed to the
constitution actually boycotted the vote and refused to go to the polls. Meanwhile, Shamil
Basayev continued to lead Chechen forces in terrorist activities.6
Russian public opinion and responses to the referendum
A factor in Putin’s decision to hold the referendum may have been his own sense that the
Russian public would not support continued military action for much longer. A poll taken in 2001
indicated the following:
30.6 % of respondents thought it necessary to continue military operations until all the
Chechen guerrillas are destroyed.
20.0 % of respondents thought Russia should pull out its troops from Chechnya, recognizing
its independence.
15.4 % of respondents thought it necessary to reduce Russian military presence in the rebel
republic.
9.3 % thought it is necessary that more power be granted to local Chechen administration
headed by Akhmad Kadyrov.
5.5 % of respondents suggest that a solution to the problem of Chechnya be developed by
the international community.
“Don’t Knows” or those with other opinions accounted for 13.6 % of the respondents.7
The figures supporting continued military operations were slightly lower than the previous year,
indicating a low level of willingness to make long term commitments to a region that has been
problematic for so long. Russian casualties in Chechnya have typically been quite high, which
has also contributed to the general wariness about long-term action there.
5 Michael Wines, “Rebel Leader Urges ‘No’ Vote,” New York Times, 19 Mar 2003: A6.
6 Sabrina Tavernise, “Possible Amnesty for Rebels,” New York Times, 20 Mar 2003: A8.
7 Russian Opinion and Market Research Webpage. http://romir.ru/eng/default.htm.
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The above survey was conducted in mid-2001, before the 2002 wave of terrorist activities that
included the Moscow Theater Siege. Polls taken immediately following the incident indicated a
drastically different set of opinions. Although there is general discontent with Russian policy,
there appears to be a fairly strong interest in tightening military operations within Chechnya. The
Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Group reported the following data from November
20028:
How much do you approve or disapprove of the policy of Russian authorities in the Chechen
Republic?
% of total number of respondents
Strongly approve
10.5
Somewhat approve
35.5
I don't care
9.9
Somewhat disapprove
25.8
Strongly disapprove
11.2
Don't know
7.1
What policy, in your opinion, should Russian authorities pursue in Chechnya, taking into account
the October 23-26 tragic events in Moscow?
% of total number of respondents
The policy should be toughened, with the stress made on the
64.0
use of force.
The policy should be eased, allowing talks with the militants. 15.0
The policy should not change.
13.5
Don't know.
7.5
8 “Russian Citizens About Policy in Chechnya,” Russian Public Opinion and Market Resaerch Website,
http://www.romir.ru/eng/research/11_2002/chechnya.htm.
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It is possible that the strong negative opinion of potential peace in Chechnya was the result of
heightened emotions after the terrorist attack and that public opinion will eventually return to the
more balanced views of 2001. The next several months will be crucial in determining precisely
how Russians will consider the prospects for peace. Currently, very few are optimistic about the
potential for peaceful resolution following the referendum. When asked in advance whether
authorities would be able to ensure fair voting, over half responded that they would not. Only
20% believed that officials could guarantee fair and equal voting practices. When asked, “Do you
think that the adoption of the constitution and the election of president of Chechnya will lead to
peace in the republic?" a full 67% responded that the constitution would not, or was unlikely to
produce peace in the region. Only 23% believed the contrary.9
Impact of the War: Facts and Figures10
According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, Moscow’s military losses total 4,750 killed and
13,040 wounded. Unofficial estimates are far greater, with an October 2002 report by the
German intelligence service pegging Russian deaths at 10,000, or more than twice the official
figure. All told, the Russian Federation lost more troops in Chechnya over the last three years
than did the Soviet Union during its decade-long campaign in Afghanistan.
The U.S. Department of State conservatively estimates that 80,000 Chechen civilians and
resistance fighters have died since 1999. Total deaths, including those from the first RussoChechen war (1994-1996), are believed to be around 180,000, though figures compiled by both
Russian and Chechen non-governmental organizations suggest that this number may be closer
to 250,000.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that approximately
350,000 Chechens continue to be displaced by fighting, with 150,000 sheltering in the nearby
Republic of Ingushetia, and another 30,000 seeking refuge in regions throughout the Russian
Federation. Thousands more have joined the small yet growing diaspora in Central Asia, Europe
and North America.
Background on Russia
Geography and History
The Russian Federation is the largest country in the world, with approximately twice the landmass
of the United States. Its northerly location, however, makes much of the land unusable for
agriculture or industry and provides few warm-water ports for access to world sea lanes. The
current population of Russia is approximately 145 million, 81% of whom are ethnic Russians.
There are small but numerous ethnic minorities throughout the nation, including Tatar, Ukrainian,
Chuvash, Bashkir, Belarusian, Moldovan, and Chechen peoples. Russian Orthodox is the
9 “Referendum and Elections in Chechnya,” Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Website,
http://www.romir.ru/eng/research/03_2003/chechnya-referendum.htm
10 The Russo-Chechen War: Facts and Figures, The American Committee for Peace in Chechnya
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majority religion within the Russian Federation, although Muslims make up the largest segment of
the population in some of the 21 somewhat autonomous republics. Russian is the primary
language with numerous other languages spoken in specific locales.11
Government and Politics
The Russian Federation is a constitutional federation with a bicameral legislature (called the
Federal Assembly) consisting of the Federation Council and the State Duma. The current
President, Vladimir Putin, was elected from the position of prime minister in March 2000. There
are nearly 150 officially registered political parties in Russia and seats in the Duma are awarded
according to election percentages.12
The 1990s were a particularly tumultuous decade for the Russian Federation. In 1991 the Soviet
Union, then under the presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev, splintered into fifteen separate,
independent states. Boris Yeltsin, a prominent reform voice came to power following a power
struggle within the communist party. The Russian Federation soon joined the former Soviet
Republics of Ukraine and Belarus to form the Commonwealth of Independent States. Eventually,
all but the Baltic States would join the Commonwealth.
President Yeltsin managed to maintain power throughout the 1990s despite continued unrest in
the parliament, economic difficulties, strong elections for the communist party and his own
declining health. In 1998 Yeltsin dismissed his Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, beginning a
struggle over the prime minister position that would last for the next eighteen months. In August
1999, Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin the fifth Prime Minister in a year-and-a-half. Putin, then
head of security services, took a hard line stance against security concerns and rapidly launched
a campaign into the Caucasus, claiming that Chechen rebels were responsible for a series of
Moscow terrorist attacks. Putin’s tough approach to security increased his popularity among
Russians and ensured his accession to the presidency in the 2000 election.
Because of the political instability over the past decade and continued ethnic conflicts throughout
parts of the former Soviet Union, Putin has made the claim that Chechnya represents a real
security threat to the Russian Federation, not only as a refuge for terrorist cells, but also because
granting Chechen independence could trigger a series of breakaway republics, as was the case
in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Chechens claim that both Yeltsin and Putin were politically
motivated in their invasions of Chechnya – that their presidential authority and reelection bid
depended on a strong show of force to draw attention away from a lagging economy and
government corruption.13
Today, Putin seems unlikely to take any chances in Chechnya, despite a current approval rating
of 70%. The conflict seems to haunt Putin who was elected President in 2000 vowing to resolve
the war swiftly. Facing hardliner demands to increase military action and liberal demands to
pursue diplomacy, Putin seems determined to pave his own path. He has recently promised to
11 “Russia,” The CIA World Factbook 2002, 13 Feb. 2003
12 CIA World Factbook 2002
13 “Chechen Perspective,” BBC In-Depth, 26 Dec. 1999 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/577525.stm
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“finish the job” of getting rid of the rebels while at the same time he has offered amnesty to those
rebels who put down their arms by August 1.14
Economy
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent lifting of communist price
controls, the Russian Federation experienced high levels of inflation, and the economy contracted
for five years under slow government implementation of market reforms. High budget deficits,
depreciation of the ruble, and international debt continued to be detrimental to the economy until
1999. Although the economy has rebounded in recent years, growing an average of 6% from
1999-2001,15 Russia continues to face serious economic difficulties even ten years after the end
of communism.
The Russian economy is heavily dependent on its main export commodities, which include
petroleum, natural gas, wood and wood products, and a number of manufactures. While rising
world prices, particularly of oil, have contributed to the growth of the Russian economy, heavy
reliance on the international market makes the country extremely vulnerable to market instability.
Russia’s involvement with oil in particular complicates its relationship with the Caucasus region.
Many have claimed that control over the petroleum pipelines that run directly through Chechnya
is largely responsible for the continued military occupation there.16
International Issues
As a nuclear power and permanent member of the Security Council, the Russian Federation has
a long history of international engagement. Relationships with both Europe and the United States
have frequently been strained during the last decade over a wide range of issues including arms
reductions, nuclear trade with Iran, environmental policy, human rights abuses in the Caucasus,
and limitations on the media. Despite the often conflicting policies, relationships with Europe and
the US remain important to the Russian Federation as the country continues its transition from a
totalitarian system. The US in particular provides large aid packages and technical assistance
every year for arms reduction and nuclear security programs. The Russian Federation also has a
number of crucial trading ties with both Europe and the United States. Germany and the US are
Russia’s main export and import partners, followed by Ukraine and Belarus.
Russia’s borders have been unstable since the nineteenth-century and the country currently has
a number of unresolved border and water rights conflicts with several former Soviet republics.
Most significant to this simulation is a particular ongoing military and cultural conflict in the
Caucasus, a mountainous region situated between the Black and Caspian Seas. Until recently,
Russia’s military policies in the region drew harsh criticism from both Europe and the United
States. Non-governmental organizations have consistently provided information indicating that
the Russian forces are engaging in human rights violations and war crimes. Putin claims that the
matter is a purely internal one.
14 “Editorial: Chechen gambit,” Toronto Star, 23 May 2003
http://thestar.com/NASAappp/cs/Contentserver?pagename
15 CIA World Factbook 2002
16 “Chechen Perspective”
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Questions to consider when examining the Russian position:
What is at stake for Russia politically? Economically?
Does the international community have any influence over Russian policy?
How could the opinion of the international community affect peace negotiations?
Background on Chechnya
Geography and History
Chechnya is a small republic, only 19.3 thousand square km, within the Russian Federation. Its
southern border is situated deep in the Caucasus Mountains along the northern border of the
state of Georgia. The republic is home to approximately 1.3 million people, largely ethnic
Chechens who are mostly Sunni Muslims.17
Government and Politics
Political and military authority in Chechnya has been fragmented over the past decade into
essentially three camps: the official Russian-sanctioned government based in Grozny, the
Chechen underground government, and militant separatists. Aslan Maskhadov is the current
president of the underground government and leader of secular nationalist forces. He was
elected in 1997 and was originally recognized by the Russian Federation until his association with
the rebel factions, who have been waging guerilla and terrorist warfare in Chechnya and Moscow
since the mid-90s. In 1999, the Russian Federation established a pro-Russian government in
Grozny, with Akhmad Kadyrov acting as president and Rudnik Dudayev as the head of the
Chechen Security Council. Although this is the official government according to Russians, most
Chechens continue to recognize Maskhadov as the rightful leader of the republic. The militant
separatists are comprised of different groups such as those resisting federal and other forms of
governmental authority, externally funded foreign volunteers fighting for an Islamic state, and
those fighting for revenge, financial gain or other personal reasons.
Legal and political relationship with Russia
The fractured nature of authority in Chechnya has had a number of implications for potential
ceasefires and peace negotiations. President Putin has claimed that Maskhadov is a terrorist and
therefore unacceptable as a negotiating partner. The problem, however, is finding a
representative who is both acceptable to the Russians and a legitimate spokesperson for the
Chechens. Some experts have pointed to Maskhadov’s Deputy Special Envoy, Akhmad Zakayev
as a potential broker for peace. However, Putin has implicated him in the recent Moscow theater
siege and Moscow is attempting to have him extradited from the United Kingdom.
17 “Chechnya,” Wikepedia Online Encyclopedia, 6 Mar. 2003
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One possible broker might be Salambek Maigov who is the representative of Maskhadov’s
government to Russia. Putin’s recognition of Maigov signals that he distinguishes between
Maskhadov and extremist rebels and that he is interested in keeping a backdoor channel open for
possible negotiations.
It is unclear precisely to what extent Islamic fundamentalism is a factor for Chechens in the most
recent round of warfare. The war with Russia in 1994 was a more clearly defined nationalist
independence movement. Chechen secular nationalists, who are fighting to establish an Islamic
republic, claim that the religious connection is less crucial in the current fight than the Russian
war crimes and human rights violations.
Economy
Although the republic was once rich in resources, especially in petroleum, persistent war has
destroyed both the infrastructure and the quality of life in Chechnya. Much of Grozny remains in
ruins, corpses go unburied, and attendance at universities and public schools has dropped to
around 20%.18 Mafia action, arms smuggling, and financial scams have skyrocketed, as the lack
of a central and strong authority throughout the 1990s made crime a prominent aspect of daily
life. Part of the problem has stemmed from Russia’s refusal after the first war in Chechnya to
provide any help with rebuilding destroyed cities and industries. The deep poverty and constant
threat to life are likely to be a major stumbling block in forging understanding and peace between
Chechens and Russians.
International Issues
The international approach to the Chechen conflict has changed in light of a new anti-terrorism
focus in the international community. The destruction of the world trade center and President
Bush’s prominent war on terrorism has not only removed U.S. support for the republic, but has
encouraged Putin to increase his rhetoric linking the conflict in Chechnya with those in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Non-governmental organizations and conscientious citizens have tried repeatedly to
draw international attention to the human rights abuses and war crimes that are a daily part of the
current war, but Putin has thus far managed to maintain the position that the conflict is purely
internal.
Likewise, international recognition of and assistance for Chechnya’s independence, which
seemed to be a strong likelihood during the first Chechen War and throughout the 1990s, have
largely quieted in the current anti-terrorism atmosphere. The prominent terrorist actions in the
Moscow Theater Siege and bombing of the Chechen government headquarters in Grozny have
done little to win the support of the international community. Moreover, the war with Iraq in midMarch drew much of the attention away from the small republic. It seems for now at least, that
much of the outside world will leave the fate of Chechnya to Russia.
Questions to consider when examining the Chechen position:
What are some of the economic factors contributing to the current conflict with Russia?
To what extent is fundamentalism important to the conflict?
18 “In the Ruins of Grozny The Kremlin Says it is Winning Hearts and Minds in Chechnya.” Time 2 April
2001.
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What is the responsibility of the international community in either monitoring or intervening in
Chechnya?
Is there a legitimate link between Bush’s war on terrorism and the Chechen independence
movement?
How could the opinion of the international community affect peace negotiations?
The US on Chechnya
Former President Clinton took an active interest in the region, calling for changes in Russian
policy and an end to the military involvement in Chechnya. President Bush has been less active,
forging a closer relationship with Putin almost immediately after entering office. With the
increasing focus on anti-terrorism, President Bush has backed away from the rhetoric of his
predecessor and has been providing Putin with more diplomatic support for his war in Chechnya.
This change is partially linked to Putin’s claims that Chechen rebels are being funded by Osama
bin Laden and other Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. Moreover, Bush has engaged in an
active negotiation process with Moscow to gain support for military action against Iraq. In early
February 2003, the US State Department announced its decision to include three Chechen rebel
groups on its list of terrorist organizations. All of the groups are linked to prominent Chechen
rebel Shamil Basayev. Analysts have pointed to the decision as one in a series of attempts to
win Moscow’s support for, or at least tacit agreement, with US action in the Middle East.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Background and Involvement in Russia and Chechnya
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) evolved out of a series of
meetings and conferences that lasted from the early 1970s until the creation of the official
organization in 1994. Today the OSCE comprises 55 countries from Central Asia, Europe, and
North America, and is the largest regional security body in the world. The main responsibilities of
the OSCE include “early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict
rehabilitation.”19 Particularly crucial to these roles is the High Commissioner on National
Minorities, based in The Hague, Netherlands.20 Currently serving this post is Rolf Ekeus, who
succeeded the first High Commissioner, Max Van Der Stoel in July of 2001.
The mandate for the High Commissioner includes two primary roles:
providing early warning of potential national minority conflicts; and
acting to prevent eruption of conflict in the OSCE area.
The mandate gives the High Commissioner a great deal of flexibility in terms of his activities
within states, and Max Van Der Stoel in particular was heavily involved in the kind of work on
which this simulation is based. It is important to note that the role of the High Commissioner is
19 “What is the OSCE?” OSCE Website, http://www.osce.org/publications/factsheets/osce_e.pdf
20 “What is the OSCE?”
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primarily security-based; he is unlikely to offer the kinds of public reporting and censure that a
group such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission does. Instead, the High Commissioner
operates in an atmosphere of privacy, confidentiality, and discretion that ensures parties in
conflict will be open to exploring alternative solutions to disputes. This “quiet diplomacy,” as it
came to be known under Max Van Der Stoel, has become a major tenet of the High
Commissioner’s practice and has been adopted by Rolf Ekeus.21 His methods have the potential
of being particularly effective in an area such as Chechnya where tensions are high and violence
is widespread.
The OSCE also has a history of working in Chechnya over the past decade. An OSCE
Assistance Group (AG) to Chechnya was established in April of 1995. OSCE staff there helped
to broker cease-fire agreements, oversaw the Chechen presidential elections in 1997, and
engaged in post-conflict rehabilitation until security concerns forced the group to relocate to
Moscow. In 2001, the assistance group returned to northern Chechnya to promote stability,
facilitate delivery of international aid, and provide support for the return of refugees and displaced
persons. In early 2003, Russian President Putin refused to renew the OSCE mandate in
Chechnya, and the office was scheduled to close in March.22 Regardless, the organization has a
stake in the security of the Caucasus and is likely to push for continued involvement in the area.
Moreover, the High Commissioner has a unique ability to engage any member state that he
considers to be of strategic concern to Europe, and can request participation in lower-level
diplomacy even if the organization is not officially acting in the area.
Questions to Consider when examining the OSCE Mediation Role:
In terms of the problem-solving workshop, it might be helpful to think ahead of time about the role
the third-party mediator plays in establishing the right tone for conflict resolution:
What is the benefit of private and confidential discussions regarding a conflict like the one in
Chechnya? What are the consequences of breaking the trust established in resolution
sessions?
What sort of atmosphere would be conducive to open-ended discussion?
What is at stake for the OSCE? What could make Rolf Ekeus a trustworthy mediator for both
the Russian and Chechen camps?
21 Rolf Ekeus, “Preventative Diplomacy,” The Hague, 30 Jan 2003
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/documents/speeches/2003/hcnmspeech2003-1.pdf
22 “OSCE Assistance Group To Chechnya.” OSCE Website. http://www.osce.org/chechnya.
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Annotated Bibliography
Background Sources
“Russia.” Information Please Almanac Online. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107909.html
“Russia.” CIA World Factbook 2002. 13 Feb. 2003
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factook/print/rs.html
“Profile: Chechnya” BBC News Country Profiles.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm
“Chechnya.” Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. 6 Mar. 2003
http://www.wikipedia.org/w/wiki.phtml?title=Chechnya
All of the above are solid sources for background information on Russia and Chechnya. The
sources on Russia are far more complete in terms of statistics, but BBC website on Chechnya is
an especially well-condensed description of the background and chronology of the conflict.
Conflict Chronology
“The Chechen Conflict.” BBC News In-Depth. 6 Jan, 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/2000/chechnya/default.stm
One of the best websites available for broad coverage of the conflict. Articles range from separate
Russian and Chechen timelines, roots of the conflict, implications for the region, and analysis of
the first and second Chechen Wars. There is an article entitled “Chechen Perspective” which is
particularly helpful if you are having trouble gauging Chechen attitudes and opinions.
Russian Opinion and Market Research Webpage. http://www.romir.ru/eng/default.htm.
excellent website for a range of Russian public opinion polls on Chechnya.
An
OSCE Involvement
“High Commissioner on National Minorities Homepage.” OSCE Website.
http://www.osce.org/hcmn.
This page has links to a number of articles and press releases on the OSCE website, including
information about the official mandate of the High Commissioner, ‘quiet diplomacy,’ and a speech
by Rolf Ekeus outlining his philosophy for his term as High Commissioner.
“OSCE Assistance Group To Chechnya.” OSCE Website. http://www.osce.org/chechnya.
This website provides details about the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, their mission
there, dates of engagement, and a press release regarding Putin’s decision to send the group out
of the region.
Second-Track Diplomacy
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Davies, John and Edward Kaufman. Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy. Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2002.
This book is an excellent source for information about the concept of track-two diplomacy,
problem solving workshops, and their current application to ethnopolitical conflict.
Current Situation
Here are a number of the most recent articles (within the last two years) published on the RussiaChechnya conflict. They are organized thematically to facilitate your research.
Life in Grozny/Human Rights Questions
Boustany, Nora. “A Russian’s Passion for Mending Ethnic Fractures.” Washington Post 18 May
2001, final ed.: A23.
“Chechnya’s Refugees.” Editorial. Washington Post 10 Jun. 2002, final ed.: A20.
Glasser, Susan B. “‘Cleansing’ Operation in Chechnya Blasted by Moscow-Installed Chief.”
Washington Post 10 Jul. 2001, final ed.: A12.
---. “Troops in Chechnya Rebuked; Russian General Acknowledges Abuses Against Civilians.”
Washington Post 12 Jul. 2001, final ed.: A24.
LaFraniere, Sharon. “Georgia Dispatches Troops Towards Separatist Region.” Washington Post
12 Oct. 2001, final ed.: A29.
---. “Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only.” Washington Post 25 Jun. 2001, final ed.: A1+.
---. “Sifting a Human Dumping Ground in Chechnya.” Washington Post 13 Apr. 2001, final ed.:
A1+.
---. “Pressed by the U.S., Georgia Gets Tough with Outsiders.” Washington Post 28 Apr. 2002,
final ed.: A18.
“No Change in Chechnya.” Editorial. Washington Post 26 may 2001, final ed.: A26.
Politkovskaya, Anna. “Remember Chechnya.” Editorial. Washington Post, final ed.: A33
Russian Politics
Caryl, Christian. “Is Putin Looking to Expand the Chechnya War?” Newsweek 14 Oct. 2002: 6.
Lipman, Masha. “A Shifting Chechnya Policy?” Washington Post 5 Oct. 2002, final ed.: A21.
Glasser, Susan B. “Putin’s War Persists as Sentiment Shifts.” Washington Post 28 Jul. 2001, final
ed.: A1+.
---. “Putin Now ‘Ready’ for Chechnya Talks.” Washington Post 8 Sep. 2001, final ed.: A16.
Myers, Steven Lee. “Russia to Shut Monitoring by Europeans in Chechnya.” New York Times 1
Jan 2003: A5.
Backlash Against Terrorism, US-Russian Security Relationship
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Baker, Peter. “Russians Announce Chechnya Crackdown.” Washington Post 4 Nov. 2002, final
ed.: A12.
---. “U.N. Work in Chechnya Halted after Abduction.” Washington Post 30 Jul. 2002, final ed.:
A12.
Diehl, Jackson. “Chechnya Discounted.” Editorial. Washington Post 11 Jun. 2001, final ed.: A19.
Elliot, Michael. “Dining with the Devil; When Great Powers Have Work to Do, Moral Absolutes
Can Get in the Way.” Time 22 Apr. 2002: 80.
Glasser, Susan B. “Russia Welcomes Chechnya Support.” Washington Post 28 Sep. 2001, final
ed.: A25.
---. “Russia May Seek U.S. Concessions; Support on Terrorism Promised.” Washington Post 23
Sep. 2001, final ed.: A34.
LaFraniere, Sharon. “Moscow Eager to Tie Rebels in Chechnya to Bin Laden.” Washington Post
26 Sep. 2001, final ed.: A17.
---. “Setback Seen for Rebel Cause.” Washington Post 28 Oct 2002, final ed.: A1+.
Peterson, Scott. “Chance for Chechen Peace Wanes.” Christian Science Monitor 1 Nov. 2002: 6.
---. “Defiance of Russia Only Deepens in Chechnya.” Christian Science Monitor 22 May 2001: 1.
---. “‘Lawless’ Russian Actions Reflect Mounting Frustration.” Christian Science Monitor 13 Jul.
2001: 7.
Weir, Fred. “Hostage Crisis Refuels Chechnya Debate.” Christian Science Monitor 25 Oct 2002:1.
---. “Russia Surfs Antiterrorist Wave.” Christian Science Monitor 26 Sep. 2001: 6.
---. “Russian Backlash Against Chechens Begins.” Christian Science Monitor 7 Nov. 2002: 9.
“Why Chechnya is Different.” Editorial. Washington Post 4 Oct. 2001, final ed.: A30. Wines,
Michael. “Russia Links Arab Militants to Bombing in Chechnya.” New York Times 29 Dec. 2002,
sec. 1: 4.
---. “Suicide Bombers Kill at Least 46 at Chechen Government Offices.” New York Times 28 Dec.
2002: A1+.
Controlling the Press, Misinformation
“Chechnya’s Non-Hostilities.” Editorial. Washington Post 6 Sep. 2001, final ed.: A22
Nivat, Anne. “The Muffled Sounds of War.” Washington Post 29 Dec 2002, final ed.: B4.
QuinnJudge, Paul. “The Chechen Suicide Squad.” Time 4 Nov. 2002: 54.
---. “In the Ruins of Grozny The Kremlin Says it is Winning Hearts and Minds in Chechnya.” Time
2 Apr. 2001: 54+.
Schorr, Daniel. “Snuffing out Russia’s Free Press.” Editorial. Christian Science Monitor 20 Apr.
2001: 11.
Referendum, New Constitution
“A Sham Referendum in Chechnya.” Editorial. New York Times 14 Jan 2003: A26.
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Tavernise, Sabrina. “Russia Announces Chechen Vote on New Constitution in March.” New York
Times 11 Jan 2003: A6.
---. “World Briefing Europe: Russia: Possible Amnesty for Rebels.” New York Times 20 Mar.
2003: A8.
Wines, Michael. “World Briefing Europe: Russia: Rebel Leader Urges ‘No’ Vote.” New York Times
19 Mar. 2003: A6.
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Roles
The simulation is planned for between 25-27 participants (i.e. 24 Russian and Chechen roles and
1-3 participants in the role of OSCE mediator.
Questions to Consider When Preparing to Play a Role:
The following questions may be helpful as participants try to become acquainted with their
assigned roles:
How does the individual view the conflict? What is the most important issue to the individual?
What is the war really about?
Is the survival or identity of the individual’s group at stake?
What does he or she believe about the violence to date? Is it a legitimate war? What would
be a legitimate use of violence?
What would the individual like to see in terms of potential solutions to the conflict? Does he
or she believe the conflict can be resolved without violence?
What sort of preconceived notions of the other side does he or she have? What does he or
she believe about the other side’s motivations?
What sort of individual prejudices might this person have? Are there any personal issues that
would make objective discussion of the conflict difficult? Does the individual have anything
personal at stake in the outcome of the conflict?
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Viktor Ozerov
Retired, Former Chair, Federation’s Council’s Committee for Security
and Defense
Victor Ozerov has placed a high premium on fighting terrorism and insurrections against the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. He sees the Chechen issue as an internal terrorist
problem for the Russian Federation and believes that the rebels have to be defeated militarily
before negotiations can succeed.
However, Ozerov also seems particularly aware of the need for international support and is
conscious of Russia’s role on the Security Council and as a partner of NATO. He believes that
the international community should support Russia’s stance, as it is an important part of the
global war on terrorism. He is likely to be one of the most outspoken opponents to any peaceful
discussions with Chechnya until a military solution to the problem has successfully disbanded the
terrorist factions.
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Valery Manilov
Retired, Former First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff
As one of the most important military figures in Russia’s first war with Chechen rebels, Valery
Manilov has been an outspoken proponent of a strong military response. Manilov considers the
military failures to this point to be a result of mismanagement and bad planning at the highest
levels. He has advocated that the government give greater freedom and control to the military to
solve the Chechen problem. He has been urging for an increase in military engagement in the
republic, advocating the deployment of six Russian soldiers to every one Chechen insurgent.
Because operations within Chechnya are of a counter-terrorist nature, he firmly believes that
peace talks can only be held after order has already been established.
Manilov’s primary concern is with the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and believes
that total destruction of Chechen rebel troops by the end of the year is an attainable and desirable
goal. Ultimately, he believes that the restoration of peace and democracy in the Chechen
republic is possible, but not until Russia firmly establishes control over the insurrectionist republic.
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Igor Fiodorov
Aide to Stanislav Ilyasov, Federal Minister for the Reconstruction in
Chechnya
Igor Fiodorov is Stanislav Ilyasov’s representative in unofficial meetings and negotiations. In
November 2002, Stanislav Ilyasov resigned his post as the Russian-appointed Prime Minister to
Chechnya and was replaced by Mikhail Babich, a young businessman and former vice-governor
of a nearby province. As Prime Minister, Ilyasov was one of the most outspoken representatives
of the Russian government, consistently backing the military campaign against the terrorists.
Ilyasov frequently clashed with Russian-backed President Ahmed Kadyrov and pushed a more
hard line stance against the terrorists. It is unclear precisely what Ilyasov’s role will be as the new
Federal Minister for the Reconstruction of Chechnya, although it was not a particularly powerful
position for his predecessor.
Ilyasov expressed a great deal of support for the March 23 referendum, although he has taken a
more balanced approach to the conflict in many of his recent public statements. He has also
expressed sympathy for the Chechen position and is confident that with intensive work
reconstruction can be complete within the next five years. Ilyasov’s position is one that could be
increasingly important if fighting in Chechnya is halted.
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Mikhail Rekalov
Chair, The Development Group
Mikhail Rekalov, an influential and powerful businessman is Chair of the Board of the
Development Group, one of Russia’s largest and most powerful businesses, which incidentally is
the largest supplier of food and rations for the Russian military. The Group, as it is popularly
known started out in the transportation business and has earned a reputation among competitors
for its aggressive business style. The Chair of The Development Group is believed to be closely
connected to some of Russia’s key political and military figures.
The Development Group is one among many business enterprises in Russia that have been
ardent supporters of the government’s efforts to eradicate the insurrection in Chechnya. They
believe the Chechen uprising to be externally financed and aimed at destabilizing Russia.
Eradicating extremism in their view, is an important first step towards ensuring political stability in
Russia.
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Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya
Alexei Arbatov
Deputy of the State Duma, Member of the Yabloko Faction and
Member, State Duma Commission for Promoting a Political
Settlement in Chechnya
Alexei Arbatov has been a member of the State Duma, the Russian Parliament, since 1994. He
has been an outspoken proponent of a more moderate approach to Chechnya, particularly in
regards to political negotiations. He believes that the military response to terrorism should not
come at the expense of peace negotiations and that a negotiated solution is very much within
reach. However, he believes that military success is a vital precondition for negotiations to
succeed.
He has urged the government (and the military) to come up with an effective strategy to identify,
marginalize, and eliminate Chechen extremists. He has argued for the complete cordoning off of
the civilian border between Chechnya and Russia, which would permit civilians and businessmen
to cross, and would give security officials the ability to control movement of guerillas and
terrorists. He has also claimed that the current system of government in the republic is too
decentralized and that a direct representative of Putin should be given presidential authority.
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Boris Nemtsov
Co-Chair, Union of Right Forces
Boris Nemtsov is Co-Chair of the Union of Right Forces, a liberal political party in Russia. The
Union of Right Forces is a minority party in the Russian Duma and represents 8.25% of the
national vote. As a liberal in Russia, Nemtsov finds himself to the political right of the Communistleaning Russian legislative body.
Nemtsov’s approach towards Chechnya has been moderate. He was a supporter of the
referendum, but insisted that it take place in an atmosphere free from political and military
coercion. He has also advocated open negotiations with the Chechens and would allow the
Chechens to choose their own negotiators.
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Abdul-Khakim Sultygov
President’s Representative for Human Rights in Chechnya
Abdul-Khakim Sultygov serves as Russian President Putin’s Representative for Human Rights in
Chechnya. Sultygov has held this position since July 2002, when President Putin appointed him
at the recommendation of Chechen administration head Akhmed Kadyrov. Sultygov has
promised broad progress in human rights protection in Chechnya, but some remain suspicious of
his close connections with the Putin Administration. He has advocated broader amnesty plans in
Chechnya, for both servicemen and members of illegal armed formations, in order to advance the
process of peace and political rebuilding. Chechens with up to five-year sentences in jail would
be freed. He even advocates amnesty for some who committed felonies, which is a departure
from many in the Kremlin. At the same time, Sultygov has bristled at suggestions of unfairness in
the recent referendum in Chechnya. When it was suggested that many Chechens may not have
felt free to cast the vote that they would like, he retorted, "The Chechen people did what they
were expected to do in a fair and open manner: they voted for the territorial integrity of Russia.”
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Archimandrite Mark Golovkov
Vice-Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External
Church Relations
As the Vice-Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations
(DECR), Archimandrite Mark Golovkov is the second-ranking official most responsible for
representing the needs and interests of the Russian Orthodox Church. Chechnya has become
the latest issue of importance for the Church, as it has come under increasing criticism for
ignoring the plight of the Chechens. Officials from the DECR and other branches of the Church
have repeatedly indicated numerous efforts to aid the Chechen people, ranging from food,
clothing and medicine collected from Russian parishioners and sent to the region, to its public
statement on November 12, 1999 urging the Russian government to ensure that Chechen
civilians are properly protected and not injured in the ensuing conflict. But critics maintain that
these efforts do more harm than good, with the former donations going largely to Russian
soldiers, and the latter statements empty given the Church’s continued support of the Russian
government’s efforts.
As a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, Archimandrite Mark Golovkov continues to
combat these criticisms and properly represent the Church’s interests. Golovkov represents the
Church’s view that the Russian government has taken all appropriate measures to prevent civilian
deaths and damage and he stands resolute that the Russian government is justified in opposing
the terrorism that thrives within its borders.
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Oleg Orlov
Chair, Council of Human Rights Center, Memorial
Oleg Orlov is Chairman of the Council of Human Rights Center, “Memorial”, which is Russia’s
predominant human rights group. The group gathers and disseminates factual information about
human rights abuses within Russia in an effort to bring public attention, both national and
international, and pressure to end those abuses. Memorial reports on human rights violations
committed by both sides: the federal troops and separatist organizations within Russia. Memorial
recognizes that neither side has clean hands in the Chechen conflict, and calls on an end to
abuses of all kinds.
Memorial considers the Russian courts inadequate to deal with Chechen claims of human rights
violations and is pushing for a greater role for the European Court for Human Rights in
Strasbourg in dealing with human rights abuses in Chechnya.
Orlov has strongly condemned the referendum as not being an expression of the will of the
people, saying the populace was scared of actions against civilians if turnout was low. Orlov and
Memorial advocate political negotiations between Russian officials and the separatist
government.
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Valentiana Malnikova
Founding Member and Executive Secretary of the Union of
Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (UCSMR)
Valentiana Malnikova is a founding member and Executive Secretary of the Union of Committees
of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (UCSMR), a non-governmental organization established in 1989 to
draw attention to human rights violations within the Russian military. She is an advocate of the
rights of soldiers and their families and as such does not support war that puts those men in
danger. Although Chechnya is not its sole focus, the UCSMR has become heavily involved in the
Chechen conflict and is an advocate against human rights violations in the conflict. The UCSMR
urges an immediate end to obligatory military conscription by the Russian military and amnesty
for Russian soldiers who have abandoned their units to distance themselves from the war crimes
allegedly committed by those units.
Malnikova and the UCSMR believe that the Russian government has failed in its attempts to
create a peaceful solution to the Chechen conflict and has entrenched itself in a position which is
in opposition to the international community and its own population. In the conflict, the Russian
government has violated UN treaties and international declarations as well as the very notions of
human rights and equality. The UCSMR is skeptical about the Russian military leadership’s
commitment to finding a solution to the conflict.
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Sergei A. Kovalyov
Russian Duma member, and Member of joint Duma-PACE working
group; Human Rights Institute
The former head of a parliamentary human rights committee, Sergei A. Kovalyov made headlines
at the end of 1994 for his outspoken criticism of the Russian invasion of Chechnya. Kovalyov
reported on the effects of Russia's military operation in the secessionist Chechen territory shortly
after it began. His condemnation of the widespread bombing of the capital, Grozny, and the
deaths of innocent civilians during the first several weeks of the war helped bring international
scrutiny, and ultimately censure, for the war. Kovalyov held a private meeting with President Boris
Yeltsin in the first week of January 1994 and persuaded him to call the first of many largely
unheeded cease-fires in the bombing raids against the Chechen republic. Kovalyov vowed to
monitor the war until its end from an outpost in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. In 1995
State Duma nationalists revoked Kovalyov's human rights commission. In January 1996
Kovalyov resigned as head of Yeltsin's human rights commission. Kovalyov remains one of the
most influential critics of the Russian government’s military operations in Chechnya.
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Anna Politkovskaya
Journalist, Author of A Dirty War
An investigative journalist, Anna Politkovskaya has been one of the most outspoken reporters on
human rights abuses in Chechnya. Called by many “Russia’s lost moral conscience” she has
made enemies of the most powerful men in Moscow, not the least of which is President Vladimir
Putin. Her dispatches for the Russian bi-weekly Novaya Gazeta, published in English under the
title A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya have won her acclaim internationally and death
threats at home.
Politkovskaya has been outraged about the toll the war has taken on civilians. Excesses
perpetrated by the Russian army have been all but ignored and persist today. Since 1999 she
has visited Chechnya roughly 40 times, reporting on conditions and increasing awareness of the
human rights violations in the republic. When in October of 2002 Chechen rebels seized a theatre
in Dubrovka and took hostages. Politkovskaya was called on to go in and attempt to negotiate the
release of the hostages, Although she was ultimately unsuccessful, the incident was a testament
to her credibility with separatists in Chechnya.
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Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya
Hussein Iskhanov
Advisor to Aslan Maskhadov, President of the Chechen Underground
Government
It has been increasingly hard for Maskhadov to articulate his views for Chechnya as both Russian
military advances and internal conflict with senior military officials-turned-warlords have
weakened his influence. Pro-military Russian officials have characterized Maskhadov’s regime in
Chechnya as “Wahhabite,” or extremist, painting their military operation into the region as one
aimed at quelling terrorism let loose by a madman. Maskhadov has responded by expelling
extremist commanders such as Shamil Basayev from his government and has insisted that his
government represents the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the Chechen people. He is a
strong advocate of achieving independence through political means and has consistently been in
favor of talks with Russia.
Iskhanov has served as Maskhadov’s advisor since 1997 and is the architect of many of
Maskhadov’s policies implemented as President of the underground government.
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Simulation on The Use of Force in Chechnya
Hamid Lashkarov
Aide to Ilias Akhmadov, Foreign Minister of underground Chechen
Government
Since Akhmadov has not admitted to being in Chechnya since 1999, when the Russian
authorities added him to their most wanted list, his aide, Lashkarov, is responsible for much of the
Foreign Minister’s legwork in Chechnya. As an aide, it is also his responsibility to brief the
Foreign Minister and double-check security measures for both transportation and
communications.
Although Akhmadov maintains a low public profile to escape being targeted by the Russian
government, as a key member of the officially unrecognized Chechen government, it is generally
understood that he believes in the independence of a Chechen state and staunchly opposes
Russia’s claim to sovereignty over the Chechen “domestic problem.” He has also stated that the
Russian Federation is exploiting the international war on terrorism to justify humanitarian crimes
against Chechens.
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Salambek Maigov
Representative of the Underground Chechen Government in Moscow
Appointed February 3, 2003 by Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, Salambek Maigov serves
as Maskhadov’s representative in Moscow and is committed to a peaceful settlement between
Chechnya and the Russian Federation. Having spent the greater part of his life in Moscow as well
as serving as a top official in the Eurasian Party, Maigov has been seen as something of a
moderate bridge between the two sides. He has repeatedly declared his hopes and efforts for
peace negotiations and is eager to begin an active dialogue with his Russian counterparts. His
appointment, however, has not been without repercussions. Upon confirmation of his new post,
Maigov was voted out of the Eurasian Party. However, he continues to retain the majority of the
connections he formed during his years in Moscow and within the party, a potential asset for
future peace negotiations. In addition, Maigov has declared that only legitimately elected
representatives can secure peace in Chechnya and believes that a cease-fire is essential if any
progress is to be made. His skeptical outlook toward the more radical Chechen elements has
earned him a degree of respect and legitimacy within Russian political circles.
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Emin Ortsa
Commander of Rebel Forces and Rebel Negotiator
Emin Ortsa is an independent rebel commander and close associate of Shamil Basayev. He is
fiercely loyal to the separatist cause and his convictions regarding the current conflict almost
perfectly mirror those of Basayev. Ortsa has repeatedly criticized Russian military atrocities
toward the Chechen civilian population and has consistently demanded the immediate withdrawal
of any and all Russian troops. He has also suggested the Russian Federation pay reparations as
partial compensation. His experience in the field is coupled with an intense sense of Chechen
nationalism. He sees Chechnya as a fully sovereign and independent state, engaged in a life-ordeath struggle to cast off the iron shackles of Russian oppression. For Ortsa, the Russian
Federation is the last “...
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