The U.S. Army Natick Soldier Systems Center’s new virtual reality dome, demonstrated 7 October 2015 at the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center, Natick, Massachusetts, will enable researchers to assess the impact of the environment on soldier
cognition, including decision making, spatial memory, and wayfinding. (Photo by David Kamm, U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center)
Strategic Acquisition for
Effective Innovation
Lt. Col. Rafael Rodriguez, U.S. Army
Maj. William Shoemate, U.S. Army
Maj. Justin Barnes, U.S. Army
Karen Burke
20
September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW
INNOVATION
T
his article reflects recommendations developed
by a team from the Chief of Staff of the Army
Strategic Studies Group (CSA SSG). The CSA
SSG is a think tank that conducts independent research
on topics selected by the CSA.1 The team studied an
essential strategic question: How can the Army make its
acquisition process lead to effective innovation?
That the Army acquisition process is cumbersome is
widely accepted, as several case studies and task forces
established to improve it have clearly demonstrated. For
example, in 2009, the Task Force on Defense Acquisition
Law and Oversight recommended significant acquisition
reform to increase unity of effort across all acquisition
stakeholders, recruit personnel with business skills and
experience, and focus on outcomes that would meet the
needs of warfighters.2 However, attempts such as this at
improving the acquisition process have largely failed, and
innovation has suffered for that reason.
The Future Combat System (FCS) exemplifies the
task force’s findings. The FCS originally was envisioned
as a major Army innovation effort. However, FCS
program managers failed across all acquisition functions
to plan effectively, generate realistic requirements, and
manage the complex program. Their failure largely was
due to an unreformed acquisition process that did not
include adequate analysis nor achieve technology readiness before the program was under way.3
A critical roadblock to innovative solutions reaching warfighters is the difficulty of introducing new
ideas, technologies, and concepts from the scientific
and research community into acquisition programs.4
Acquisition programs offer minimal flexibility—with
fixed requirements, schedules, testing protocols, and
budgets that deter integration of innovative solutions.
Furthermore, a key metric of success in research and
development (R&D) efforts is the number of transitions
from the R&D community to acquisition programs. This
metric drives R&D investments toward existing acquisition programs, requirements, and funding lines, and
away from effective innovation.
The team conducted extensive research before
reaching its conclusions on how the Army can encourage the kind of acquisition process it needs to be ready
for future conflict. However, the final recommendations
are adapted primarily from a 2014 paper by Joseph
P. Lawrence III, titled “A Strategic Vision and a New
Management Approach for the Department of the
MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016
Navy’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) Portfolio.”5 Lawrence’s proposals, while aimed
at improving Navy acquisition, apply strategic principles
relevant across the Department of Defense. Therefore,
for the purposes of ensuring acquisition supports effective innovation for the force, the Army should adopt the
following recommendations:
1. Separate research (technology development) from
product development.
2. Establish an Army R&D corporate board to set
Army acquisition priorities consistent with projected future conflict.
3. Realign acquisition management under
Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).
4. Increase competitive prototyping and
experimentation.
These changes are necessary because the Army
suffers from a kind of acquisition paralysis—a limited
ability to get good ideas and effective new technology
applications into the field rapidly, as evidenced by
the number of ad hoc organizations that are created during times of conflict.6 For example, during
the conflicts of the past decade, the Army needed
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
technologies for squad-level command-and-control
systems, but attempts to integrate ISR programs into
Army acquisition failed because of R&D stakeholder
ownership issues and federal regulations on the use of
frequencies.7 The Army acquisition process, however,
is not in need of broad-based acquisition reforms—
these have been tried before. Nor is acquisition paralysis the result of underinvestment.
The problem stems from how the Army traditionally
views and executes R&D, and from how it defines the
word innovation. For example, the Army tends to focus
on the near term. In addition, Army leaders sometimes
pursue exciting new technology solutions rather than effective innovation. Some leaders use the word innovation
narrowly, to mean inventing new technologies. However,
innovation also can include exploiting an existing capability or resource in a new and clever way to solve a
problem. Objective, data-driven analysis for understanding problems can inform creative thinking that leads to
inexpensive or nonmateriel solutions.
The Army is no stranger to innovation. Jeffrey J.
Clarke, former director of the Center for Military
History, frames the Army’s rich innovation history
21
in the foreword to A History of Innovation: U.S. Army
Adaptation in War and Peace:
From the exploits of the Lewis and Clark
Expedition at the beginning of the nineteenth century to the medical and engineering advances associated with the construction of the Panama Canal begun at its end,
… [Army innovation also includes] military
initiatives in weapons, tactics, organization,
training, and other areas.8
requirements. Their objective is to transition developmental systems to production and then into fielding.
Frequently, product managers fund engineers from
RDECOM’s research, development, and engineering
centers (RDECs)—usually the same RDECs that oversee
the supporting technology. Figure 1 (adapted from
Lawrence) illustrates the transition point of research
and product development, where prototyping leads to
innovations.9 However, at this transition point, prototypes tend to be influenced by end users before product
requirements are
generated and
locked in.
Research
While the
process sometimes
Prototype Development of products
Explore
Develop
works, there are
(transition)
some unanticipated consequences.
For example, the
(Graphic adapted from Joseph P. Lawrence III)
Army tends to be
Figure 1. Traditional Process Flow of Research
focused on increand Development (with Transition Point Highlighted)
mentally improvWith the right changes to the acquisition process, the
ing existing equipment and systems without adequate
Army can make sure the force remains adaptable through consideration of return on investment. This approach
effective innovation. The CSA SSG team’s recommenleads to a stove-piped, product-based culture instead
dations are designed to ensure Army innovation thrives
of a solid strategy and a balanced investment portfolio
within budgetary limits. They could help ensure R&D
that could address the most pressing Army problems.
investments address both near-term and future needs.
Alternately, by focusing on early prototyping of new
capabilities and concepts rather than product-based
Recommendation 1: Separate
programs for improving trucks, aircraft, and rifles, the
Research from Product Development acquisition community could become responsive to bigThe Army needs to separate research (where
ger-picture Army needs for accomplishing missions.
technologies are discovered or created) from product
The intentional separation of research and product
development (where technologies are refined for use).
development would also prevent immature technolA separation between research and product developogies from entering into formal programs where they
ment would increase the discovery of innovative solu- are exposed to rigid processes and fixed requirements
tions. It would facilitate determining a technology’s
that can lead to high risk of failure, delays, and cost
viability before significant resources were expended in overruns. A 2010 review of Army acquisition, known
product development.
as the Decker-Wagner report states, “even with this
Army researchers and scientists explore and devellaborious [acquisition] process, new weapon systems
op technologies to solve the Army’s capability gaps and
continue to enter engineering and manufacturing
maintain military superiority. They do this mainly as
development prematurely with technological risk,
part of the Research, Development and Engineering
leaving a legacy of program cost overruns, reduced
Command (RDECOM). In contrast, program execuquantities fielded, and terminations.” 10
This same point is made in a report published by
tive officers, and their subordinate project and product
Business Executives for National Security (BENS). The
managers, undertake product development as part of
report notes the Department of Defense effectively
formal programs of record guided by fixed capability
22
September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW
INNOVATION
fixed requirements and
acquisition processes. In
contrast, to fail during
product development
leads to very different
outcomes, with far
greater costs, as noted
in the Decker-Wagner
report.13 How, then, does
the Army realign risk to
the technology development phase and increase
the rate of innovation in
Army culture?
Lawrence, an
acquisition expert at
the National Defense
University, is a strenuous advocate of early
prototyping and experimentation during
technology development. He promotes “use
of early experiments
Deryck James, Army Research Laboratory (ARL), operates the Stream Line PRO Light Detection and Ranging
and/or demonstrations
(LiDAR) at the Parachute Operations Mishap Prevention Orientation Course 2016, Fort Stewart, Georgia,
by SYSCOMs [systems
to demonstrate enhanced capabilities not available with current precision airdrop operations systems. In
commands] to resolve
response to a request from United States Army Africa, ARL undertook a program to reduce the size, weight,
technology risks, prior to
and power of current commercial off-the-shelf Doppler LiDAR systems. The new system weighs less than
forty-five pounds, is under two cubic feet, and operates on standard twenty-four-volt batteries with reinitiation of product dequired power of less than one hundred watts. (Photo courtesy of U.S. Army)
velopment, reducing cost
and schedule overruns;
encourages unnecessary risk in acquisition product-de- and use of early-fielded prototypes as a mechanism for
velopment programs with unproven technologies and
achieving speed to the fleet/force.” 14 Lawrence further
11
notes that prototyping should be a mechanism for refinuncertain requirements. Demanding a high science
and technology (S&T) transition success rate places the ing requirements, gaining customer expertise and buy-in
greatest S&T program risk where it does not belong—
on the value of the product, and reducing the risk otherin product development.
wise inherent to introducing new technologies. Adopting
According to Lawrence, the risk of failure should be
an approach similar to what Lawrence describes would
12
mainly in the research phase of R&D. The cost of failure allow the Army to place and resolve risk early in the
during research is less than the cost of failure during
R&D process, where failures contribute valuable insights
product development. New ideas and theories can be
that inform the Army’s future decisions—and where
expounded and tested, prototypes built, and experiments failures cost far less.
conducted apart from product development. Allowing
Furthermore, the separation of research from product
researchers to explore ideas without having to perfect a
development prevents the Army from over influencing
specific product would provide the Army with tremenS&T investments to support existing near-term technoldous value because it would allow the freedom to explore
ogy and programs. Capability gaps, operational requirecreative solutions to the Army’s challenges prior to facing
ments, strategic direction, and space for innovative ideas
MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016
23
Army Research and Development Corporate Board
Selection of priorities, investment approval
Technology and capability analysis, research and development strategy development
Top-down priorities
Technology Oversight Board
Focus Area/Priority Integrated Product Teams
Project oversight, proposal recommendations, transition coordination
Near-term focus:
Incremental upgrades to
existing systems
Future focus:
Science & technology and
prototyping & experimentation
(Graphic by Innovation and Improved Acquisition Team, Cohort IV, Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group, 2015-2016)
Figure 2. Recommended Research and Development Governance Structure
should direct focus areas, not existing programs of record.
Essentially, the current investment strategy, which emphasizes continual incremental improvement of existing
systems for today’s threats and operating environments,
closes an effective entry point into Army R&D that
would keep pace with the Army’s accelerating needs.
Before creating a program of record, there should be
an iterative refinement of requirements for new capabilities by warfighters, technologists, sponsors, and the acquisition community. Scientists and engineers should be free
to explore new ideas and move toward a larger strategic
vision that would guide their work.
Recommendation 2: Establish an
Army Research and Development
Corporate Board
An Army senior leader R&D corporate board would
bridge the gap between technology development and
product development. It would ensure the CSA and
24
Army secretariat could identify the Army’s problems
and set priorities to guide the acquisition community to
align its R&D investments. It could increase the direct
participation of uniformed military personnel in setting
acquisition priorities and guiding R&D investments.
Without that participation, the CSA’s ability to influence
acquisition to meet future threats and operational needs
will be stymied by a lack of synchronization across military, civilian, and congressional stakeholders.
The board would not be a new governance body.
It would be a repurposing of existing four-star general-officer-level and senior civilian-level boards such as
the Army Science & Technology Assessment Group or
the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC).
It would achieve unity of purpose across the Army’s
senior leadership by reinvigorating corporate R&D governance and development of an Army R&D strategy.
In early 2016, CSA Gen. Mark A. Milley took charge
of the requirements process by convening four-star
September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW
INNOVATION
Spc. Logan Fishburn, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, tests a PD-100 unmanned aerial
vehicle 22 July 2016 during the Pacific Manned-Unmanned Initiative at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Hubenthal, U.S. Army)
commanders to participate in frequent AROC forums.15
By reinvigorating other senior-leader groups in a similar
manner, senior leaders could set priorities for the current
and the future force, balance the R&D portfolio, and
establish an Army R&D strategy built on an analytical
foundation. An Army corporate board (illustrated in
figure 2) would operate as a governance team, directing
R&D resources toward the Army’s most pressing nearand far-term needs, and promote unity across Army labs,
combatant commands, and networks of industry and
academia. A four-star corporate R&D board could establish a single Army R&D strategy and exercise substantial
influence to cut through bureaucratic processes and
organizational stovepipes. 16 To be effective, the corporate
board would require access to valid analysis to enable
thoughtful decision making.
Recommendation 3: Realign
Acquisition Management
The third recommendation is focused on aligning
R&D, program executive officer programs of record,
MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016
and systems engineering functions under a single chain
of command. A misalignment between S&T (far term)
and product development (near term) has created
counterproductive incentives that lead to integrating
immature technologies into Army systems and investments in nonprioritized efforts.
Figure 3 (next page) depicts a realignment of acquisition stakeholders that would enhance their ability to
respond to guidance from the corporate board, as refined
from the CSA’s guidance and priorities. Existing Army
labs, RDECs, program executive officers, and program
managers would provide formal analysis and S&T, R&D,
and systems integration within a proposed technology
oversight board. Most important, an execution command
(i.e., a proposed modernization command) could unify
and integrate R&D organizations to execute well-founded programs that are in line with the needs of the Army.
This realignment would calibrate the technology
development and product development efforts to help
solve tough Army problems and inform the corporate
board on potential courses of action. This would be
25
especially important
when the corporate
Guidance:
Corporate
board
board and the CSA
Key
needed to make tough
decisions such as
Authority
redirecting program
Analysis:
efforts and funds.
Partnership
Technology
The proposed
oversight board
HQDA organizational
Organizational
elements
structure would develop strategic approachExecution:
es around Army
Proposed modernization
problems by balancing
command
Assistant
investments through
Secretary of the
cost-benefit and
Army for
Acquisition,
trade-off analyses. An
Logistics, and
analysis-based R&D
Combine
acquisition’s
Technology
strategy—grounded in
key elements under a
shared views of future
single command
operational environments and supported
Systems
Program
by data from operEngineering
Management
ational prototyping
and experimentaScience and
Prototyping and
tion—would coalesce
Technology
Experimentation
around shared Army
goals and objectives.
Combined with a
(Graphic by Innovation and Improved Acquisition Team, Cohort IV, Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group, 2015-2016)
technology- and capaFigure 3. Recommended Organizational
bility-vetting process
Alignment of Army Acquisition
led by RDECOM, the
R&D strategy would
be integrated with operational test venues to inform
creating a more flexible, focused, and responsive culture
the corporate board and the executing acquisition orga- among the Army RDECs, program executive officers
nizations on how to accelerate innovation and reduce
and product managers, and centers of excellence.
program-of-record risk. Test venues integrated with
Once this alignment was achieved, the work of identhat R&D strategy would include the Rapid Equipping
tifying and analytically vetting technologies and capabilForce, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, combat
ities could begin. Prototyping and early experimentation
training centers, and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
would be key to this process.
Command battle labs.
Recommendation 4: Increase
By placing R&D, prototyping, program executive
Competitive Prototyping and
officers and product managers, and systems engineerExperimentation
ing funding under a single HQDA priority schema, in
How can the Army senior leaders influence the
partnership with the assistant secretary of the Army for
acquisition process to maximize the benefit it has on
acquisition, logistics, and technology, the CSA can better
R&D? The final recommendation is to strategically
execute a streamlined, need-driven R&D program. This
manage prototyping and experimentation as a distinct
realignment also would provide the added benefit of
26
September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW
INNOVATION
portfolio that progresses toward the Army’s
strategic vision. This is akin to seizing key
terrain in battle.
The CSA has limited influence over the
current force, as the budget investments
are set through 2025. However, with these
recommendations, Milley could align Army
R&D to meet the needs of the future force
as he realigned Army capability requirements when he reenergized the AROC. The
CSA has significant influence on the future.
Milley has indicated he welcomes opportunities to guide R&D for the success of the
future force. In his view, the future must be
informed by analysis derived from prototyping and experimentation, and inspired
by networks of expertise.17
As of 2016, most prototyping funds are
executed by program executive officers, in
a process that does not allow for early, unconstrained prototyping and experimentation that could positively influence multiple capability solutions. The CSA, as the
uniformed leader of the R&D corporate
board, should strategically oversee prototyping efforts and strategies. This would
assure Army priorities were met, and it
would provide the capabilities needed for
the current and future force.
Through prototyping efforts, the CSA
receives user needs from two primary
sources: first, from the current force
(through FORSCOM) and the combatant
commands, and, second, from the projected future force, as influenced by the S&T
technology communities and future operating concept data. The outputs from these
data are strategic requirements, priorities,
and funding for both forces.18 For the
current force, the corporate board and the
CSA can identify the equipment needed
for incremental capability enhancements.
For the future force, they can identify
critical technologies for the S&T portfolio.
The CSA would have the means to manage
R&D strategically so that Army innovation could thrive even during downsizing.
The Boeing–Sikorsky RAH-66 Comanche prototype made its maiden flight
4 January 1996 at West Palm Beach, Florida. The program was canceled in 2004 just
before mass production. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)
Sunk Costs on Terminated Acquisition Programs
The Army spends more unrecoverable money—sunk costs—on more
terminated acquisition programs than any other entity in the Department
of Defense (DOD): “The Army has both the largest number of canceled
programs and the largest percentage of sunk RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] costs [compared to DOD and other services].
The amount of funding lost was relatively constant for the Army from
2004 through 2010, coming down sharply thereafter. The majority of the
Army’s sunk funding problem through this period was due to the cancellation of the Future Combat System (FCS); however, every year from 1996
to 2010, the Army spent more than $1 billion annually on programs that
ultimately were canceled.”1
According to Patrick Clowney, Jason Dever, and Steven Stuban, the
Army’s sunk cost for the failed FCS is estimated at $20 billion.2 Another
example of a sunk cost for a failed acquisition program is the estimated $6
billion spent on the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter.3 Helicopters exceed
their budgets more frequently than most other major defense acquisition
programs.4 A third example is the sunk cost of the failed Joint Tactical
Radio System, estimated at $11 billion.5
Notes
1. Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]),
Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2013 Annual Report, (Washington, DC:
USD[AT&L], 28 June 2013), 13. The annual reports on the performance of the defense acquisition system are available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/news.html.
2. Patrick Clowney, Jason Dever, and Steven Stuban, “Department of Defense Acquisition
Program Terminations: Analysis of 11 Program Management Factors,” Defense Acquisition Research
Journal 78, July 2016, table 1.
3. Ibid.
4. USD(AT&L), Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, 2015 Annual Report,
(Washington, DC: USD[AT&L], 16 September 2015), 28.
5. Clowney, Dever, and Stuban, “Department of Defense Acquisition Program Terminations:
MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016
Analysis of 11 Program Management Factors,” table 1.
27
Conclusion
The Army can create space for innovation to
thrive within the acquisition process. It can do this
by (1) separating research (technology development)
from product development, (2) establishing an Army
corporate board to direct R&D for unity of effort,
(3) realigning acquisition management under HQDA,
and (4) strategically managing prototyping and experimentation to nest within the strategic vision for the
Army’s current and future force.
The Army can apply analytical rigor to determining how it will invest in discovering technologies that
can ensure the Army is successful in future conflicts.
The Army can begin to overcome acquisition inflexibility and provide interdisciplinary solutions to
complex issues; this does not require overhauling of
the system through reform. The goal should be to
identify long-lasting and impactful improvements to
the acquisition system that will survive the frequent
change of leaders in senior positions.
Biographies
Lt. Col. Rafael Rodriguez, U.S. Army, formerly served as a Chief of Staff of the Army fellow in the Strategic Studies Group.
He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, and a master’s degree in defense analysis from the
Naval Postgraduate School. He has served in multiple airborne and Special Forces command and staff assignments, where he
deployed routinely on overseas contingency operations.
Maj. William H. Shoemate is a U.S. Army engineer and formerly served as a Chief of Staff of the Army fellow in the
Strategic Studies Group. He holds a BA from the University of the Ozarks and an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College. He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments and was an observer/controller/
trainer at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.
Maj. Justin Barnes is a U.S. Army judge advocate and formerly served as a Chief of Staff of the Army fellow in the
Strategic Studies Group. He is a summa cum laude graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of Law and a graduate of Indiana University. He was an assistant professor in the administrative and civil law department and editor
of the Military Law Review at the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. He has served in a variety of
Army staff judge advocate assignments.
Karen Burke is an acquisition professional in the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command
(RDECOM). A Chief of Staff of the Army fellow in the Strategic Studies Group, she has over twenty years’ experience in
defense acquisition in positions across Army science and technology and joint program management. She holds an MS in
engineering management from Western New England College and a BA from Framingham State College. She holds Level III
certification in program management and systems engineering and is a member of the Army Acquisition Corps.
Notes
1. Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group (CSA
SSG) website, accessed 21 June 2016, http://csa-strategic-studies-group.hqda.pentagon.mil/SSG_Index.html. The authors were
members of the Innovation and Improved Acquisition Team,
Cohort IV, 5 July 2015 through 10 June 2016.
2. Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight,
Getting to Best: Reforming the Defense Acquisition Enterprise
(Washington, DC: Business Executives for National Security, July
2009), accessed 30 June 2016, http://www.bens.org/document.
doc?id=12. Other acquisition studies include Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,
28
Performance of the Defense Acquisition System (Washington, DC:
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, 2013), accessed 30 June 2016, http://www.defense.
gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/PerformanceoftheDefenseAcquisitionSystem-2013AnnualReport.pdf; Government Accountability
Office (GAO), Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Research and Development Budget Requests to Congress Do Not Provide Consistent,
Complete, and Clear Information, GAO-07-1058 (Washington, DC:
GAO, 5 September 2007).
3. Christopher G. Pernin et al., Lessons from the Army’s
Future Combat Systems Program (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW
INNOVATION
Corporation, September 2012), accessed 30 June 2016, http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/
RAND_MG1206.pdf.
4. Thomas Russell, technical director of the Army Research Lab,
interview by Karen Burke, Rafael Rodriquez, and William Shoemate on Army Research Lab initiatives, 21 January 2016, Adelphi,
Maryland.
5. Joseph P. Lawrence III, A Strategic Vision and a New Management Approach for the Department of the Navy’s Research,
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Portfolio (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, August 2014).
6. Army Science Board, FY 2009, Institutionalization of Innovation in the Army (Washington, DC: Army Science Board, December
2009), 11–14.
7. National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Manual of Regulations and Procedures for Federal
Radio Frequency Management (Redbook) (Arlington, VA: NTIA,
September 2015), accessed 30 June 2016, https://www.ntia.doc.
gov/page/2011/manual-regulations-and-procedures-federal-radio-frequency-management-redbook.
8. Jeffrey J. Clarke, “Foreword,” in ed. Jon T. Hoffman, A History
of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 2009), v.
9. Ibid., 5, 3.
10. Gilbert F. Decker and Louis C. Wagner Jr., “Army Strong:
Equipped, Trained and Ready,” final report of the 2010 Army
Acquisition Review (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: U.S. Army
Research, Development and Engineering Command, 2011), iv.
11. Task Force on Defense Acquisition Law and Oversight,
Getting to Best, 28.
12. Lawrence, “A Strategic Vision,” 10.
13. Decker and Wagner, “Army Strong,” 92.
14. Lawrence, “A Strategic Vision,” 6.
15. Brant Dayley, CSA SSG fellow July 2014 through June 2015,
interview by Karen Burke and Rafael Rodriquez about insights on
Army innovation, 11 February 2016, Arlington, Virginia.
16. Joseph Lawrence, “Prototyping and Experimentation for
Improved Acquisition: Setting the Stage” (lecture, National Defense
University, Washington, DC, 14 September 2015).
17. Report to Congress on Chief of Staff of the Army Acquisition
Authorities, In Response to Section 801 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 Pub. L. 114-92 (March 2016)
(statement of 39th Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army Gen. Mark A.
Milley). See also Jen Judson, “US Army Chief Moves to Center of
Acquisition Universe,” Defense News online, accessed 30 June 2016,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/land/army/2016/03/10/
us-army-chief-moves-center-acquisition-universe/81588944/.
18. Ibid., 16.
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