N~NETEENTH-CENTURY
STEELINDUSTRY
KURTHACKEMER
WING THE NATION,whether for war or peace, has stirred controversy
since the republi6s inception. The shift towards an industrial economy
and the steady erosion of the militia ideal radically altered the traditional
procurement process as the progressivelytechnicalsophisticationof war materiel festered new relationships between governmentand the expanding industrial state in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Nowhere was this
more evident than in the ties that developed between the U.S.Navy and the
emerging steel industry.
The U.S. Navy, after the Civil War,had one of the mest powerful fleets in
the world. Primarily designed for coastal or riverine operations, it featwd
shallow-draft turreted monitors that were capable of repelling any invading
fleet then in existence. Preoccupation with domestic events, especially
Reconstruction, and satisfactionwith the current state of the nation’s defense
led to neglect as the navy entered a period some historians label “the doldrums.” At the same time, European nations forged ahead. Britain and
France spent most of the Civil War and subsequent decades embroiled in a
naval arms race, experimentingwith new technologyin armor and ordnance.
Unable to meet their technical needs in government shipyards, Britain and
France turned to private industry. By the 188Os,both possessed a respectable
defense establishment.’
As other countries turned to Britain and France for technology and advice, shipyards soon bustled with foreign orders. Americans also felt the effects of these sales in the western hemisphere. During the 1870s and early
188Os, Chile engaged in the War of the Pacific against Peru and Bolivia,a war
in which her British-built warships played a key role. The United States, trying to restore stability to the region, offered its services as an arbitrator, but
A
Kurt hkkemer recently received a Pk.D. in history from Texas A6M Uni~m’ty.
JamesPhinney Baxter offem the m t complete assessment of these developments in
The Introduftion of fhelmncbd Waship (Cambridge, M a s , 1933; =print, Hamden, 1%). For
a closer look at the British experience see Robii Higham, “Complex Skills and Skeletonsin
the Military-Industrial Relationship in Great Britain,” in War, Business and World MilitaryIndustrial Complexes, ed.BenjaminFranklin Cooling (Port Washington,1981),12-6.
704
THE HISTORIAN
did so with a note that threatened military action if the warring parties refused to come to the negotiating table. The Chileans, having all but won the
war, repcted the U.S. demands and made veiled threats about sinking the
Paafic Squadron. Congress, shocked by such foreign impudence, looked at
the stateof the navy and found an obsolete and antiquated fleet unable to defend the nation's coastline. Amid hysterical fears of a Chilean bombardment
of San Francisco, or New York being held hostage by a European power,
Congress convened a board to study the matter.
Congress found itselfin a pecuhar predicament. An abundanceof tariffmenue had created a surplus in the tnmw.Unwilling to tamper with the politically sensitivetariff,Congress decided b use the funds to remedy the deaepit
state of the nation's defenses. An appmpriationsbill allocated fundsfor the first
steel ships in the M V ~h
Sistov.These new ships,and the improved vessels that
soon followed, would change the M V ~ traditional
S
shipbuilding praclice and
raise importantnew questionsabout themanufacturingprocess. Although steel
armor and improved ordnance signalled the way of the future, no viable
sources of supply existed in theUnited States and the technology was expensive
and ill-adapted to c o m m d purposes. The government and the navy considered thissituation unacceptable since the United States must not be dependent
on foreign suppliers for meeting its defense needs. The ensuing debate about
rechfying this situationand the effects of the solutionare the focus of thisessay.
Recent general texts describe an ambiguous relationship between the
government and the steel industry, noting cooperation between the two.
However, they lack analysis. Most military histories do little more than announce the emergence of a new navy, declare it a necessary step, and then
move on to the Spanish-AmericanWar.By the battles of Santiago and Manila
Bay, the navy possessed the firm foundation of the modem fleet,yet how it
got that way and what that meant for future dealings between government
and industry receive no attention2
Business histories are more interested in explaining the rise of the modern corporation and the integration of industry; they ignore the potentially
important interaction and concentrate on traditional aspects of their field.
The only business historian to address the question does so in only two
pages. He apprises his readers of conflict between the U.S. government and
the Camegie Company in the 188Os, but dismisses the subject by telling his
readers that "it is no longer dear just what happened, much less who is at
For examples of this textbook approach see Kenneth J. H a p , This Peoples N q : The
Making of Amoican Sen Power (New York,1991); Stephen Howarth, To Shining Saa: A History of
the United S t a b N a y , 17754991 mew York,1991); Robert William Low, Jr.,History offhe US.
N a y 1775-1941 (Harrisburk 1992); Robert (yconnell, SMBd V
. "he C d t of the Battleship
and the Rise of the US.N q (New York,1991). E m the MVY'Sofficial administrativehistory,
Robert G. Albion's Makes of Nnwl Policy 1798-1947 (Armapolis, 1980), has nothing to say on
the subpa other than that steel signaled a mapr shift in construNcfionhabits.
STEELINDUSTRY
705
fault." Even worse he adds: "The armor controversy was not of great importance, and we are not obligated to ferret out the secrets of this ~truggle."~
Perhaps much of the sidesteppingof the issue resultsfrom the ways military and economic historians ignore or mistrust each other's work. Too
many historians rest content within their n m w spheres of knowledge, unwilling to explorethe bounds of their fields. However, some historiansappreciate the importance of the new navy and question its effects for both the
Gilded Age and later years. This discussion will focus on how military historians view the process from the navy's perspective. The subject has become
the focus of pointed research in recent years, and, although not yet incorporated into general works, it is on the cutting edge of the new military histoory.
Frank Bennett, completingin the early 1890shis magisterial work on the
origins of the U.S. steam navy, recognized the importance of the steel indus
try to the new navy. Although concentrating on the technical aspects of the
evolution of steam power in his own work, Bennett only mentioned the
naval revolution then taking place, even though "the subject of the new navy
is one so different from much that has preceded in these pages as to make it a
subject by itself." Bennefd was optimistic about the future of U.S.seapower,
particularly the massive building program that would culminate in the
Naval Act of 1916. However, he thought that it was still too early to pass
judgment on the subject of military-industrialrelations. He told his readers
that only after completionof the work then underway would it "be fittingfor
the history of the new navy to be written in detail, with minute regad for the
designsand constructionof all the ships [and] the far-reachinginfluencesu p
on the manufacturing industries of the country exerted by the Navy
Department in prosecuting this work."4
Scholars apparently took Bennett at his word, since none attempted a serious analysisof relations between the govement and thesteel industry until well after World War II. Historians unaitically accepted the navy's interpretation of events, noting the existence of the relationship without going
into much depth. They bought the navy line that domestic armor manufae
3Peter Ternin,I
m and Steel in NineteenthCenfury Anmiuz An E c o m ' c Inquiry (Cambridge, 1%4), 229. For examples ofgeneral neglect see JohnW.Oliver,Hktoy of Ameriam Tednobgy(hleWYork, 1956);HarOldCLivesay,And~ndrauGrrnegieandtheRi4eofBigB~&~~(8oston,
1975); Mark Reutter, Spanaos Point: Making Stael, TheRke and Ruin ofAme?ianIndustridMi&
(New York, 1988). Reutter mentions Bethlehem Steel's intmduction to the manufacture of armor plate, but says only that the company built ib specialized plant at the suggestion of the
mnAaryofthenavy He p r o further into the &tionship betweenbusinessand government and quickly moves into the early decades of the twentiethcentury and Bethlehem's effortsto enter the world armsmarket.
lFrankM. Bennett,TheSttmnNayoftheUnitedStafs.AHistoryoftheG~oftheStemn
V d of Wr in the US.Nmy, and ofthe N d Engineer Corps (l'ittsbur& 18%; reprintWestport
1972), ?7l.
706
THEHISTORIAN
hw was absolutelynecesary, but never looked at the reaction of the steel industry. In 1939, Harold and Margaret Sprout suggested that
by the end of Cleveland's first term (18891,the day was in sight when
the country's industrial plants would be able to cope with any type of
~ v aconstruction.
l
Incidentally,this rquirement [of domestic pwhase
of armor] also had the exceedingly important, if perhaps not wholly
foreseen result of building up a group of industries with a vested interest in a continuous and p m w i v e development of the Nav. The industries were to become active lobbyists and pmpagandists for ~ v a l
expansion. And the desirability of keeping these industriespmspemus
and abmast of new developmenb in naval technology was to provide
the Navy's official spokesmen with a telling answer to all pmposals to
curtail naval construction.5
A n u m k of important points emerge in the Sprouts' work, which became a
standard neferene in naval history. First, the
initiated contact with industry and set realistic standards for armor production. Second, the major
steel companies readily complied with the navfs wishes because they realized that this partnership with government would be benefiaal. Finally, industry became an active vehicle for propounding the necessity of naval expansion. In general, the Sprouts painted a positive picture of the situation, one
which seemed overly optimistic to many of their contemporaries.
The only contemporary history of the new steel navy, published in 1940,
took a neutral position on the relationship between the government and the
steel industry. Author George Davis concentrated more on ship design and
specifications than policy decisions in the Gilded Age, saving his arguments
about politics for the middle decades of the twentieth century. Unliie his pre
decessors, Davis at least tlriticized the cost overruns involved with setting up
new plants in cooperation with Bethlehem Steel, but he generally support&
the course of events in the 1880s and 1890s and did not attempt to examine
contract irregularitiesor fraudulent certificationpractices6
In 1946,Donald h4itcheU offered scathing criticism of the dationship b e
tween armor manufacturers and the government. Writing after the Second
World War,which made clear theinlemmnectionsbetweengovernment and industry, Mitchell argued that the steel magnates had manipulated the government in every way possible and had ignond the national interest to make a
Harold Hane Sprout and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power,
17754918 (Prin&on, 1939), 194. For the same aqyrnent in a much abbreviatedform see E. B.
Potter, Sen Puwer: A N d History, 2d ed. (Annaplis, 1981), 160; Bernard B d i e , Stn Paoer in
fheMachine Age Prbmton, 1943),241.
George T. Davis,A N a y Smnd to None: The Dewlopmolf 0fModem Naml Policy (New
York, 1940; reprint, Westport, 19711,457.
STEELINDUSTRY
707
profit Not only were the primary contractors (Camegie Steel and Bethlehem
Steel) consistendy late with deliveries, but they produced inferior armor. when
possible, they falsified test d t s and undermined the competitivebidding
process by pxhately agreeing to prices beforehand. Even after admitting guilt,
the manufachum avoided serious repermssions and the government xefused
to takeappmpriatepunitive ac~ion.If these companies d d surviveone pn?sidential administratiow they expectd new contracts at even higher rates fmm
the next administration While the US. Navy's m r cost more and protected
less thanthat @ u d by its Eu~opeanrivals, American m a n u f m gained
valuable experience and s p e d i z e d manufacturing facilities that paved the
way for the massive naval build-up of the early twentieth
Not every historian shared post-World War II skepticismabout the busines-government relationship. Those who did tempend their aiticism with
their confidence in the current state of affairs and an almost unswerving belief in the ability of U.S.technology and industry to do good. As late as 1956,
Walter Millis could unabashedly declaxe that "in the [18]8Osthe private contractor was not quite yet the unsullied hero which he has since become."
While there may have been problems, Millis concentrated on the results. He
viewed the relationship between government and industry in the relatively
benign terms of the Sprouts' analysis, accepting the idea that "it has overwhelmingly been government's demand (often government's ukase) which
has evoked profitable armament enterprise in this countryr rather than a
thirst for profits which has instigated the government demand." In a clear
case of the ends justifying the means, Millis consciously glossed over the admittedimproprietiesof the 1880s and 1890s and rationalized them as a necessary evil that modern society would not allow to happen again8
The turning point in perceptions came not from an important new book
or article but from President Dwight D. Eisenhower's farewell speech to the
nation in 1%1, when he warned of the dangers inhexent in the military-industzial complex. Although recognizing "the imperativeneed for this development,'' he cautioned that "we must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democraticprocesses." The public took notice,
especially with the widespread introduction of industry experts into the
Kennedy administration. Taking their Cue from public interest, historians finally began to explore the roots of the military-industrial complex and to unDonald W.Mitchell, History of the MOarm Americnn Navy: F m 1883 Thmugh Pmd Hmbor
(New York, 1946), 24-6. For the role of W
i
l
l
i
a
m T. samp6on in the controversy between the
M Vand
~ the steelmufachvers w JosephG. Dawson III, 'William T.Sampn:Progressive
Technologist as Naval C o d e r , " in Admimls of the New Steel Navy:Makers 4 the A m h n
Nawl Tradition 1880-1930, ed.J m C .Bradford (Annapolis, 1990),157.
Walter Millis, Arms and M m A Study in Ameriuan Mil& y History (New York,1956), 150,
306-7.
708
THE HISTORIAN
derstand the veiled institution that had become so powerful.In doing so,
they raised more questionsthan they answered?
The first exploratoryexaminationsof the military-industrialcomplex had
a salutary effect. In the late 1960s and early 197Os, several historians writing
about the First World War defined the terms of the debate and set up a framework that otherswould follow.They raised important questions: At what point
did the military-industrial complex emerge as a viable entity? Who profited
more from the special relationship between government and industry? Has
one group been manipulated by the other over time or has each acted in the
best interests of each other? Although good questions, none examined the
Gilded Age sources in any detailJ0
Historians began digging deeper into the morass of military contrack and
procurementduring the 1970s.They tried to isolatethe forces that had burst on
the scene in the First World War. Focusing on capital ships, the only pre-war
big tidcet items in the arsenal, historians made convincing new arguments for
an even earlier genesis of the military-industrialcomplex. The 1883appropriation for the ABCD vessels, the first four steel warships authorizedby Congress,
became the accepted point of departure for discussionof the phenomenon.An
important early study was an unpublished master’s thesis of 1959 that remained relatively unknown for severalyears. The author described the navy‘s
initiation of a relationshipthat goaded a reluctant steel industry into upgrading
its technology by promising large contracts to those mills that produced steel
armor. The navy mained the active but wary partner in the relationship until
1894, when Congress and the navy became convinced that the steel manufacturers habituallyovercharged their own governmentwhile selling armor plate
at reduced prices to foreign powers. Although the navy still relied upon domestic armor plate, it viewed the steel industry with deep suspicion. In 1981,
JamesAbrahamsonexpanded the argument and suggested a mutually beneficial relationshipbetween the military and civilian contractors.The military, by
putting pressm on the steel industry mated a domestic supply of strategic
materials. The industry benefited from the modernization of its facilities and
Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘7’he Military-Industrial Complex,” in In War and Peace:An
Amerirnn Military Histoy Anthology, ed.Edward K. Eclcert (Belmont, 1990), 340.
lo Paul A. C. Koistinen, “The IndustTial-Military Complex in Historical Perspective: The
Interwar Years,” journal of American Histoy 56 (1970):819-39; Koistinen,‘’TheIndustrialMilitary Complex in Historical Perspective:World War I,” Business History Reoiew 41 (winter
1967):378-403.Readers would also profit from Koistinen’s discussionof the phenomena in The
especially the chapters
Military-Industrial Compler.A Historical Perspectkoe (New York. lW),
‘The Military-Industrial Complex in Historical Perspective” and ”The Political Economy of
Warfare in the United States”; Robert D. Cuff, The War IndustrieF Board: Business-Governmolt
Relations During World War I (Baltimore, 1973); Terrene J. Gough, “Origins of the Army
Industrial College:Military-Business Tensions After World War 1,” Armed Forces and Society 17
(winter 1991): 259-75; Melvin I. Urofs9, Big Steel and the wlzson Administratioa A Study in
BusinessGowmmt Relations (Columbus,1%9).
STEEL
INDUSTRY
709
widespread introductionof new manufacturingproasses. Answering potential aitics from the New Left, Abrahamson concluded that "the relations be
tween the nation's military and avilian elites, however close, constituted no
enduring, quasianspiratorial network promoting class or p u p intemsts to
the consciousdetrimentof nationalneeds."ll
While t h m may not have been an overt conspiracy, Big Steel had clearly
taken advantage of the situation and made a tranendous pmfit from government contracts. JohannesLischka,focusing on the nickel industry, showed industry executives acting for their own benefit to control the world's supply of
nickel, an essential element in hardened amor plate. Chastising them for excess p f i t s (even by modem defense industry standards), Lischka explained
thismonopolistic control as an essential element in the economic maturationof
the United States as an industrial power. The 1890s saw two major combines
formed to control the nickel market.One, based in Europe, took the early lead
in controlling the om and the necessary productionpatents. The sealnd combination, formed in the United States in response to the European monopoly
copied and impmved on the European example until comparable U.S.armor
became cheaper to produce than Erench or British armor. In learning to compete with international suppliers, domestic steelmakers ultimately came out
ahead. Industry applied the lessons learned to other aspects of the economy,a
beneiit that outweighed the stigma of excess pmfits.12
Walter Herrick came to similar conclusions in his analysis of the navy's
growth during thisperiod,but took a more critical stance. As with othersb e f o ~
him,Harick pmented documentary evidence of fraud on the part of the steel
producers. For example, Camegie employees reworked armor plate set aside
for government testing and made them stronger than the batch of steel they
w m supposed to qxesent. Still, the navy had entered the v e n m looking for
y a stronger steel industry, which in turn
such a relationship. A bigger ~ v meant
led to the availabfityof higher quality armor. The steel industrygained because
M Vcontracts
~
carried them through the alarmingly frequent nxessions and de
pmsions of the 1890s.According to Herrick, Andrew Carnegie m i d e r e d his
first W to manufachm armor plate when confronted with a soft market for
the steel rails that made up the bulk of his business in 1890. By the twentieth
centmy, the M Vand
~ the steel industry both pmfikd.13
11'Ihe ABCD Mssels we^ the proteaed auisers A t W , &ston,and QriCng0,and thedispatch
ship LXd#it~ Deen G.Alkrd, Jr.,'The M u m of the United %tes Navy Upon the American
Steel I
d
, 1880-1900" (maSaer's thesis, G e o q p w n U n i d t y , 1959); JamesL Abraharnson.
America Arms for a New Century The Making of a Gmt Military Paoer (New York, 1981), 139.
l2 J o h a ~R.
e ~Lischka, "Armor Plate: Nickle and Steel, Monopoly and Profit," in War,
Business, and Ameriurn SoCieiy: Historical Perspectiws on the Milifary-IndusfrialComplex, ed.
Benjamin Franklin cooling (Portwashurgton. 19m,43-58.
l3 Walter R Henick, Jr., The Amerimn NnOalReOdutiOn(BatonRouge, 19661,&5,78-80,164-5.
710
THEHISTORIAN
Leonard Swann, while tacitly admitting the existence of some fraud,
faulted the government for exacerbating tensions with business. Focusing on
the A K D contracts, he suggested that personal animosities, prior suspiaons,
and the revised political agenda of a new presidential administration drove
shipbuilderand steel contractor JohnRoach out of business. Swann acknowledged legitimate problems in the relationship between Roach and the
government,but portrayedRoach as the victim of a calculated plot by the secretary of the M V to~ make political apital by chastising a visible representative of big business. Because Roach's name had been linked unfairly to corruption with M V contracts
~
authorized by Republican administrations in the
187Os,he had been an obvious target for the m t a r y ' s housecleaning efforts.
As a result, the governmentwasted much timeand money driving one of the
few firms qualified to meet the MVY'S shipbuilding needs into bankruptcy
Roach's painstaking efforts to build a vertically integrated business capable of
constructing warships more efficiently than any other shipyard in the United
States came to naught. Politics,argued Swann, had triumphed over rea~0n.l~
The most in-depth analysis of the 1980s came from Benjamin Franklin
Cooling. Many analyses in institutionalhistories of the steel industry accepted
industry assessments of the situation:the M V needed
~
industry more than industry needed the work; rigid governmentstandards only complicatd the situation. Cooling's research indicated that industry moguls understood the
tremendouspmfit they stood to gain by their association with the government.
While they might not need the government in times of general prosperity,
Camegie Steel, Midvale Steel, and Bethlehem Steel all relied on government
contracts to carry them through periodic depressions. These corporationsalso
applied the technology developedfor armor and ordnancemanufacttux?to other purposes. Impmved physical plants and expanded knowledge found outlets in ColTUnercial production. According to Cooling,the relationshipwas mutually beneficial: 'The proliferation of defense-related industries became
inevitableonce American industrial capaaty and the needs of security became
synonymousin the minds of policy makers and entreplweus alike."l5
l4Leonard A. Swann, Iohn Roach, Maritime Entrepreneur: The Yenrs as Naval Contractor,
1862-1886 (Annapolis, 1965), 12!j-Z34. Leon Burr Richardson comes to the same codusion
about the navy's treatment of Roach in W l h E . Chnndk: Republican (New York, 1940).
Richadson's only cotnnrent on the dwelopnent of the ~ l a t i ~ hbetween
ip
the government
and the steel companies is that Serretary Whitney was "able to induce the Camegie Steel
c o m p a n y t o s e t u p t h e f i r s t A m e i c a n ~ p l a t e ~ ~.~ ,hedoeslittlem
~380~.~
than~~efa~ofUlevariousinvesti~ti~intothe~lcompmig'pricingofarmorplate.
l5 Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of
Americn's MilifnryZnduSftialComplpx (Hamden, 1981), 109. Cooling may be the best qualified
of all historians in thispaper to addressthisissue. He was trained by noted business historian
Thomas cochran,giving him the broad perspectivenecessacy for this topic.
STEEL INDUSTRY
711
Pragmatic considerationsplayed an important role in naval rearmament
and the development of the military-industrial complex. In the 1980s two
other historians pointed to “a coalescing of business, military, and political
interest groups in support of a military build-up” at the end of the nineteenth
century. Using quantitativeanalysis, they postulated that critical support for
the navy‘s programs owed as much to concerns about protecting the nation’s
commerce and inU.S.partiapation in world affairs as it did to matters of national defense. Legislators justified and supported the emerging
military-industrialcomplex because of its direct and indirect benefits to their
constituencies. The relationshipbetween govemmentand industry was sufficiently weak at the end of the nineteenth century to make this kind of political support absolutely essential. Not until the early years of the twentieth
century would the military-industrialcomplex stabilize enough to withstand
partisan warfare in Congress.16
Some historians have supported the argument that government-industry interaction would have been impossiblewithout congressional supervision and approval. The impetus for building the steel M V did
~ not take hold
until Congress became involved. From the end of the Civil War unfil the late
187Os, Congress considered the navy perfectly adequate for a commerce protection role, with the navy receiving little funding in this period because of
conscious policy dedsions, not shortsightedness. When a changing intemational situation made it clear that the United Statesneeded to enter the naval
building race, Congress moved, when politically expedient to do so. The
Democrats, controlling the House of Representativesbut not the presidency
during the early years of the rearmament debate, did all they could to hinder
Republican efforts to obtain funding. However, once the Demmats controlled both the house and the presidency, they quickly moved ahead and eagerly took the credit and the patronage.17
In the early 199Os, Brue Brunton reinforced Cooling‘s work and expanded on that of others by exploring the logic behind the development of a military-industrial complex in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Examining the motivation for government-businessinteraction, Brunton suggests
that “in the industrial epoch mapr nations react to the perception of unfavorable technological gaps with resped to rivals through government effork to
promote strategicindustries.” The relative isolation of the UNted States from
Europe ended, at least in the minds of policymakers, with the Anglo-French
I6Ben Baack and Edward Ray “The Political Economy of the Origins of the MilitaryIndustrial Complexin the U N t d States,” Iacmal of Economic History45 (1985): 369.
17Lance C. Buhl, ’Maintaining ‘An American Navy,’ 1865-1889,” in In Pmce and Wac
Interpretations of American N d Histoy, 1775-1984, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, 1984),
145-73; William S. Peterson, “Congressional Politics: Building the New Navy, 1876-86,”
Armed Forces and Society 14 (summer 1988): 489-509.
712
THEHISTORIAN
naval race after the Civil War. It became possible, although unlikely, for a
European power to cross the Atlantic and threaten the U.S. seaboard. The
government's response "changed production relationships mating an environment favorable to the emergenceof institutions that facilitate and/or l
e
gitimate the government's role in the catching-up process.'' Close ties b e
tween the government and the steel industry arose because of the issues of
the day, not necessarily internal politics. Thing and technology, not greed
and mnyism, determined how industries were affected. Brunton applied his
thesis to later periods as well, but marked the construction of the steel navy
as the first manifestation of this special relationship.18
What is the current status of the study of military-industrialrelations in
the Gilded Age? The intricaciesof the relationshipbetween Big Steel and the
U.S.governmenthave best been described by Cooling, one of the few historians of this period with a solid background in both military and economic history. Although the navy pushed and prodded the steel industry into some
thing it was not sure it wanted to do, and although the steel industry cheated
the government and came out with abnormally high profit margins, the relationship proved mutually beneficial. Most historians agree about the basic
framework of the military-industrialcomplex as it developed in the Gilded
Age. However, much remains for detailed examination.
Despite a general consensus on the relationshipbetween the steel industry and government, debate over the exact origins of the military-industrial
complex as a general phenomenon remains wide open. Because of an abundance of primary sources,historians have only examined the rise of the steel
navy and its impact. Enough work has been done on steel to provide an example for historians wishing to branch out and explore related industries in
this period. The integration of other sectors of the Gilded Age economy into
the military-industrialframework has not yet been explored and could provide fruitful insights.Why is this important?The story of the military-industrial complex is the story of a nation coming technologicallyof age, both nationally and internationally. A better study of this pervasive phenomenon
can help explain modem soaety, its values, and its p o l i t i d 9
l8 Bruce G. Brunton, "An Historical Perspective on the Futule of the Military-Industrial
Complex," The socinl Sciolce Joumnl28,no. 1 (1991): 49. For an earlier and less developed version of this argument see Bruce G. Brunton, "Institutional Origins of the Military-Indushial
Complex,"Journalof Economic Issues 22 uune 1988): 599-606.
l9See the brilliant comparative study by Maurice Pearton, The Knowledgeable State: D i p b
mucy, War, and Techmbgysince 1830 (London, 1982 and Lawrence, Kan., 1984).
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