discussion question and Weekly Question 2

Writing

Causes of Terrorism

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Question Description

1.Discussion Board (26%): You will be required to post one answer, and one comment in the discussion board each week. a.I will post at least one discussion question related to the topic and relevant readings at the beginning of each week. The discussion questions will usually be broad to allow the responses from a wide spectrum. You are required to post your answer to the professor’s discussion question(s). You are required to post one answer with minimum 250 words long. You are required to write a comment to at least one of your classmates’ p•Your comment should be thoughtful and should go beyond simple “I agree” posts. Your comment will be at least 100 words long. •To secure credit, your responses and comments should be thoughtful; that is, they must refer to the weekly readings and information from other pertaining resources, and they expand the idea presented and contribute to the discussion. •

2.Weekly Question( 13 %): You are required to submit at least one question from the weekly readings assigned•The question whether it is factual or fictitious, should provoke thought and criticism relevant to the weekly class readings.•
A question such as “Has there been more research conducted on [the weekly topic]” is not an acceptable one.•The purpose of the “weekly question” the assignment is to promote your critical thinking, but not to receive an answer. Please do not expect a reply to your every question. •Your “weekly questions” must be substantially different from the question I posted on the Discussion Board.2-

1-Discussion 2

What are the two most important causes of terrorism? Please explain your opinion based on this week's readings?

2-Weekly Question 2

  • The question of whether it is factual or fictitious should provoke thought and criticism relevant to the weekly class readings.

    3-write a comment

  • You are required to write a comment to at least one of your classmates’ p•Your comment should be thoughtful and should go beyond simple “I agree” posts. Your comment will be at least 100 words long. •To secure credit, your responses and comments should be thoughtful; that is, they must refer to the weekly readings
  • student1 Nunn
  • The two most important causes of terrorism are elite dissatisfaction and ethnic discrimination. Elite dissatisfaction is the idea that a small group of educated elites grows dissatisfied with the current society that they live in. Often partnered with this dissatisfaction is the ignorance of outside opinions and experiences held by these few elite. This is highlighted when Crenshaw states that, “Terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection; it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular constituency who have not been consulted.” (384). The reason why this is one of the most important causes of terrorism is that this dissatisfaction can lead to the development of organizations and movements instead of just single events. These elite individuals become increasingly disillusioned with the idea of changing society and due to their minority status tend to adopt violent and terrorist practices to reach their goals. Their disillusionment will motivate these individuals to continue their terrorist attacks until they achieve their goals. These individuals are the most important cause of terrorism because they represent the presence of elongated terrorist activity in a country caused by a movement of educated and capable individuals. Ethnic discrimination is also an important cause of terrorism. Ethnic discrimination often precedes a larger social revolution within a given society. Ethnic discrimination sanctioned by the state means that those being discriminated against utilizing violence and rebellion to achieve their goals. This violence and rebellion are also appreciated by the oppressed population. Furthermore, any response from the state caused by terrorism will lead to more terrorist activity to achieve equality. The oppressed will use terrorist activity to release anger for the existence of inequality. Crenshaw highlights this when they say, “Moreover, it seems likely that for terrorism to occur the government must be singled out to blame for popular suffer.” (383). The reason why this is one of the most important causes of terrorism is that much like elite dissatisfaction, ethnic discrimination leads to a social movement that utilizes terrorist activity to achieve its goals. The presence of this movement signifies multiple terrorist attacks and a social movement that sanctions terrorism as a means. These movements and rebellions almost always lead to the deaths of thousands of individuals, whether that’s due to war or terrorist activity. This widespread influence and terrorist activity are why elite dissatisfaction and ethnic discrimination are the most important causes of terrorism.

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The Causes of Terrorism Author(s): Martha Crenshaw Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Jul., 1981), pp. 379-399 Published by: Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/421717 Accessed: 07-01-2020 20:36 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: https://www.jstor.org/stable/421717?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Comparative Politics, Ph.D. Programs in Political Science, City University of New York is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms The Causes of Terrorism Martha Crenshaw* Terrorism occurs both in the context of violent resistance to the state as well as in the service of state interests. If we focus on terrorism directed against gov- ernments for purposes of political change, we are considering the premeditated use or threat of symbolic, low-level violence by conspiratorial organizations. Terrorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go be- yond damaging an enemy's material resources.' The victims or objects of terrorist attack have little intrinsic value to the terrorist group but represent a larger human audience whose reaction the terrorists seek. Violence characterized by spontaneity, mass participation, or a primary intent of physical destruction can therefore be excluded from our investigation. The study of terrorism can be organized around three questions: why terrorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are. Here the objective is to outline an approach to the analysis of the causes of terrorism, based on comparison of different cases of terrorism, in order to distinguish a common pattern of causation from the histori- cally unique. The subject of terrorism has inspired a voluminous literature in recent years. However, nowhere among the highly varied treatments does one find a general theoretical analysis of the causes of terrorism. This may be because terrorism has often been approached from historical perspectives, which, if we take Laqueur's work as an example, dismiss explanations that try to take into account more than a single case as "exceedingly vague or altogether wrong." 2 Certainly existing general accounts are often based on assumptions that are neither explicit nor factually demonstrable. We find judgments centering on social factors such as the permissiveness and affluence in which Western youth are raised or the imitation of dramatic models encouraged by television. Alternatively, we encounter political explanations that blame rev- olutionary ideologies, Marxism-Leninism or nationalism, governmental weakness in giving in to terrorist demands, or conversely government oppres0010-4159/81/0715-0001/$05.00/1 ? 1981 The City University of New York 379 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Comparative Politics July 1981 sion, and the weakness of the regime's opponents. Individual psychopathology is often cited as a culprit. Even the most persuasive of statements about terrorism are not cast in the form of testable propositions, nor are they broadly comparative in origin or intent. Many are partial analyses, limited in scope to revolutionary terrorism from the Left, not terrorism that is a form of protest or a reaction to political or social change. A narrow historical or geographical focus is also common; the majority of explanations concern modern phenomena. Some focus usefully on terrorism against the Western democracies.3 In general, propositions about terrorism lack logical comparability, specification of the relationshp of variables to each other, and a rank-ordering of variables in terms of explanatory power. We would not wish to claim that a general explanation of the sources of terrorism is a simple task, but it is possible to make a useful beginning by establishing a theoretical order for different types and levels of causes. We approach terrorism as a form of political behavior resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organization. A comprehensive explanation, however, must also take into account the environment in which terrorism occurs and address the question of whether broad political, social, and economic conditions make terrorism more likely in some contexts than in others. What sort of circumstances lead to the formation of a terrorist group? On the other hand, only a few of the people who experience a given situation practice terrorism. Not even all individuals who share the goals of a terrorist organization agree that terrorism is the best means. It is essential to consider the psychological variables that may encourage or inhibit individual participation in terrorist actions. The analysis of these three levels of causation will center first on situational variables, then on the strategy of the terrorist organization, and last on the problem of individual participation. This paper represents only a preliminary set of ideas about the problem of causation; historical cases of terrorism are used as illustrations, not as demonstrations of hypotheses. The historical examples referred to here are significant terrorist campaigns since the French Revolution of 1789; terrorism is considered as a facet of secular modern politics, principally associated with the rise of nationalism, anarchism, and revolutionary socialism.4 The term terrorism was coined to describe the systematic inducement of fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population, and the phenomenon of terrorism as a challenge to the authority of the state grew from the difficulties revolutionaries experienced in trying to recreate the mass uprisings of the French Revolution. Most references provided here are drawn from the bestknown and most-documented examples: Narodnaya Volya and the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary party in Russia, from 1878 to 1913; anarchist terrorism of the 1890s in Europe, primarily France; the Irish 380 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Martha Crenshaw Republican Army (IRA) and its predecessors and successors from 1919 t present; the Irgun Zwai Leumi in Mandate Palestine from 1937 to 1947; Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in Algeria from 1954 to 1962; the P lar Front for the Liberation of Palestine from 1968 to the present; the Armee Fraktion (RAF) and the 2nd June Movement in West Germany s 1968; and the Tupamaros of Uruguay, 1968-1974. The Setting for Terrorism An initial obstacle to identification of propitious circumstances for terrorism the absence of significant empirical studies of relevant cross-national fac There are a number of quantitative analyses of collective violence, assas tion, civil strife, and crime,5 but none of these phenomena is identical campaign of terrorism. Little internal agreement exists among such stud and the consensus one finds is not particularly useful for the study of rorism.6 For example, Ted Robert Gurr found that "modem" states are violent than developing countries and that legitimacy of the regime inhi violence. Yet, Western Europe experiences high levels of terrorism. Sur ingly, in the 1961-1970 period, out of 87 countries, the United States w ranked as having the highest number of terrorist campaigns.7 Although impractical to borrow entire theoretical structures from the literature on po cal and criminal violence, some propositions can be adapted to the analysi terrorism. To develop a framework for the analysis of likely settings for terrorism must establish conceptual distinctions among different types of factors. F a significant difference exists between preconditions, factors that set the for terrorism over the long run, and precipitants, specific events that imm ately precede the occurrence of terrorism. Second, a further classificatio vides preconditions into enabling or permissive factors, which provide portunities for terrorism to happen, and situations that directly inspire motivate terrorist campaigns. Precipitants are similar to the direct cause terrorism.8 Furthermore, no factor is neatly compartmentalized in a si nation-state; each has a transnational dimension that complicates the analy First, modernization produces an interrelated set of factors that is a sig cant permissive cause of terrorism, as increased complexity on all level society and economy creates opportunities and vulnerabilities. Sophistic networks of transportation and communication offer mobility and the m of publicity for terrorists. The terrorists of Narodnaya Volya would have unable to operate without Russia's newly established rail system, an Popular Front for the Liberaton of Palestine could not indulge in hijack without the jet aircraft. In Algeria, the FLN only adopted a strategy of u 381 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Comparative Politics July 1981 bombings when they were able to acquire plastic explosives. In 1907, the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary party paid 20,000 rubles to an inventor who was working on an aircraft in the futile hope of bombing the Russian imperial palaces from the air.9 Today we fear that terrorists will exploit the potential of nuclear power, but it was in 1867 that Nobel's invention of dynamite made bombings a convenient terrorist tactic. Urbanization is part of the modern trend toward aggregation and complexity, which increases the number and accessibility of targets and methods. The popular concept of terrorism as "urban guerrilla warfare" grew out of the Latin American experience of the late 1960s.1' Yet, as Hobsbawn has pointed out, cities became the arena for terrorism after the urban renewal projects of the late nineteenth century, such as the boulevards constructed by Baron Haussman in Paris, made them unsuitable for a strategy based on riots and the defense of barricades." In preventing popular insurrections, governments have exposed themselves to terrorism. P.N. Grabosky has recently argued that cities are a significant cause of terrorism in that they provide an opportunity (a multitude of targets, mobility, communications, anonymity, and audiences) and a recruiting ground among the politicized and volatile inhabitants.12 Social "facilitation," which Gurr found to be extremely powerful in bringing about civil strife in general, is also an important permissive factor. This concept refers to social habits and historical traditions that sanction the use of violence against the government, making it morally and politically justifiable, and even dictating an appropriate form, such as demonstrations, coups, or terrorism. Social myths, traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom. An excellent example of such a tradition is the case of Ireland, where the tradition of physical force dates from the eighteenth century, and the legend of Michael Collins in 1919-21 still inspires and partially excuses the much less discriminate and less effective terrorism of the contemporary Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland. Moreover, broad attitudes and beliefs that condone terrorism are communi- cated transnationally. Revolutionary ideologies have always crossed borders with ease. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such ideas were primarily a European preserve, stemming from the French and Bolshevik Revolutions. Since the Second World War, Third World revolutions--China, Cuba, Algeria-and intellectuals such as Frantz Fanon and Carlos Marighela'3 have significantly influenced terrorist movements in the developed West by promoting the development of terrorism as routine behavior. The most salient political factor in the category of permissive causes is a government's inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism. The absence of adequate prevention by police and intelligence services permits the spread of conspiracy. However, since terrorist organizatons are small and clandestine, the majority of states can be placed in the permissive category. Inefficiency or 382 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Martha Crenshaw leniency can be found in a broad range of all but the most brutally efficien dictatorships, including incompetent authoritarian states such as tsarist Russ on the eve of the emergence of Narodnaya Volya as well as modem liberal democratic states whose desire to protect civil liberties constrains security measures. The absence of effective security measures is a necessary cause, since our limited information on the subject indicates that terrorism does n occur in the communist dictatorships; and certainly repressive military r gimes in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina have crushed terrorist organization For many governments, however, the cost of disallowing terrorism is too high. Turning now to a consideration of the direct causes of terrorism, we focus on background conditions that positively encourage resistance to the state. These instigating circumstances go beyond merely creating an environment in which terrorism is possible; they provide motivation and direction for the terrorist movement. We are dealing here with reasons rather than opportunities. The first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. A social movement develops in order to redress these grievances and to gain either equal rights or a separate state; terrorism is then the resort of an extremist faction of this broader movement. In practice, terrorism has frequently arisen in such situations: in modern states, separatist nationalism among Basques, Bretons, and Qu6begois has motivated terrorism. In the colonial era, nationalist movements commonly turned to terrorism. This is not to say, however, that the existence of a dissatisfied minority or majority is a necessary or a sufficient cause of terrorism. Not all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism, nor does terrorism always reflect objective social or economic deprivation. In West Germany, Japan, and Italy, for example, terrorism has been the chosen method of the privileged, not the downtrodden. Some theoretical studies have suggested that the essential ingredient that must be added to real deprivation is the perception on the part of the deprived that this condition is not what they deserve or expect, in short, that discrimination is unjust. An attitude study, for example, found that "the idea of justice or fairness may be more centrally related to attitudes toward violence than are feelings of deprivation. It is the perceived injustice underlying the deprivation that gives rise to anger or frustration." 14 The intervening variables, as we have argued, lie in the terrorists' perceptions. Moreover, it seems likely that for terrorism to occur the government must be singled out to blame for popular suffering. The second condition that creates motivations for terrorism is the lack of opportunity for political participation. Regimes that deny access to power and persecute dissenters create dissatisfaction. In this case, grievances are primar383 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Comparative Politics July 1981 ily political, without social or economic overtones. Discrimination is not directed against any ethnic, religious, or racial subgroup of the population. The terrorist organization is not necessarily part of a broader social movement; indeed, the population may be largely apathetic. In situations where paths to the legal expression of opposition are blocked, but where the regime's repression is inefficient, revolutionary terrorism is doubly likely, as permissive and di- rect causes coincide. An example of this situation is tsarist Russia in the 1870s. Context is especially significant as a direct cause of terrorism when it affects an elite, not the mass population. Terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection; it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the terrorists' aims or methods. There is re- markable relevance in E.J. Hobsbawn's comments on the political conspirators of post-Napoleonic Europe: "All revolutionaries regarded themselves, with some justification, as small elites of the emancipated and progressive operating among, and for the eventual benefit of, a vast and inert mass of the ignorant and misled common people, which would no doubt welcome liberation when it came, but could not be expected to take much part in preparing it." 15 Many terrorists today are young, well-educated, and middle class in background. Such students or young professionals, with prior political experience, are disillusioned with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access to the system despite their privileged status. Much terrorism has grown out of student unrest; this was the case in nineteenth century Russia as well as post-World War II West Germany, Italy, the United States, Japan, and Uruguay. Perhaps terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to provoke the majority of the populace to action against the regime, yet a small minority, without access to the bases of power that would permit overthrow of the government through coup d' tat or subversion, seeks radical change. Terrorism may thus be a sign of a stable society rather than a symptom of fragility and impending collapse. Terrorism is the resort c, an elite when conditions are not revolutionary. Luigi Bonanate has blamed terrorism on a "blocked society" that is strong enough to preserve itself (pre- sumably through popular inertia) yet resistant to innovation. Such selfperpetuating "immobilisme" invites terrorism.16 The last category of situational factors involves the concept of a precipitating event that immediately precedes outbreaks of terrorism. Although it is generally thought that precipitants are the most unpredictable of causes, there does seem to be a common pattern of government actions that act as catalysts for terrorism. Government use of unexpected and unusual force in response to protestor reform attempts often compels terrorist retaliation. The develop384 This content downloaded from 198.91.32.137 on Tue, 07 Jan 2020 20:36:00 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Martha Crenshaw ment of such an action-reaction syndrome then establishes the structure o conflict between the regime and its challengers. There are numerous histo examples of a campaign of terrorism precipitated by a government's reli on excessive force to quell protest or squash dis ...
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