Case Study 1-1: Reinstatement and Back Pay Remedy for Illegal Discharge, management homework help

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Hello, please Read the Case Study 1-1, "Reinstatement and Back Pay Remedy for Illegal Discharge" that is located at the end of the chapter.

  1. Answer the case study questions, in your response to Case Question #2, incorporate your answers to the following questions based on the 1.1 Devotional (Deuteronomy 17:14-20):
    1. What priorities did the leaders of this organization display when they hired illegal immigrants as employees?
    2. Contrast this with the profile of a leader described in the scripture reading from the 1.1 Devotional.
  2. Provide a detailed post that demonstrates clear, insightful critical thinking. Each response should be 200 words in length and is to include a minimum of two sources properly cited and referenced: (a) the textbook, and (b) an academic journal article that is at least 3-5 pages in length and published within the last 3-5 years.

Attached : Case Study - "Reinstatement and Back Pay Remedy for Illegal Discharge"

Source to use for the assignment: https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pag... 5 Wacky Termination Cases—and Their Lessons

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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 15–415. Argued April 20, 2016—Decided June 20, 2016 The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires employers to pay overtime compensation to covered employees who work more than 40 hours in a given week. In 1966, Congress enacted an exemption from the overtime compensation requirement for “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles” at a covered dealership. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §209, 80 Stat. 836, codified as amended at 29 U. S. C. §213(b)(10)(A). Congress authorized the Department of Labor to promulgate necessary rules, regulations, or orders with respect to this new provision. The Department exercised that authority in 1970 and issued a regulation that defined “salesman” to mean “an employee who is employed for the purpose of and is primarily engaged in making sales or obtaining orders or contracts for sale of the vehicles . . . which the establishment is primarily engaged in selling.” 29 CFR §779.372(c)(1) (1971). The regulation excluded service advisors, who sell repair and maintenance services but not vehicles, from the exemption. Several courts, however, rejected the Department’s conclusion that service advisors are not covered by the statutory exemption. In 1978, the Department issued an opinion letter departing from its previous position and stating that service advisors could be exempt under 29 U. S. C. §213(b)(10)(A). In 1987, the Department confirmed its new interpretation by amending its Field Operations Handbook to clarify that service advisors should be treated as exempt under the statute. In 2011, however, the Department issued a final rule that followed the original 1970 regulation and interpreted the statutory term “salesman” to mean only an employee who sells vehicles. 76 Fed. Reg. 18859. The Department gave little explanation for its decision to abandon its decades-old practice of treating service advisors 2 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO Syllabus as exempt under §213(b)(10)(A). Petitioner is an automobile dealership. Respondents are or were employed by petitioner as service advisors. Respondents filed suit alleging that petitioner violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime compensation when they worked more than 40 hours in a week. Petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that the FLSA overtime provisions do not apply to respondents because service advisors are covered by the §213(b)(10)(A) exemption. The District Court granted the motion, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. Deferring under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, to the interpretation set forth in the 2011 regulation, the court held that service advisors are not covered by the §213(b)(10)(A) exemption. Held: Section 213(b)(10)(A) must be construed without placing controlling weight on the Department’s 2011 regulation. Pp. 7–12. (a) When an agency is authorized by Congress to issue regulations and promulgates a regulation interpreting a statute it enforces, the interpretation receives deference if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron, supra, at 842– 844. When Congress authorizes an agency to proceed through noticeand-comment rulemaking, that procedure is a “very good indicator” that Congress intended the regulation to carry the force of law, so Chevron should apply. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229–230. But Chevron deference is not warranted where the regulation is “procedurally defective”—that is, where the agency errs by failing to follow the correct procedures in issuing the regulation. 533 U. S., at 227. One basic procedural requirement of administrative rulemaking is that an agency must give adequate reasons for its decisions. Where the agency has failed to provide even a minimal level of analysis, its action is arbitrary and capricious and so cannot carry the force of law. Agencies are free to change their existing policies, but in explaining its changed position, an agency must be cognizant that longstanding policies may have “engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U. S. 502, 515. An “[u]nexplained inconsistency” in agency policy is “a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice,” National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 981, and an arbitrary and capricious regulation of this sort receives no Chevron deference. Pp. 7–10. (b) Applying those principles, the 2011 regulation was issued without the reasoned explanation that was required in light of the Department’s change in position and the significant reliance interests Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 Syllabus involved. The industry had relied since 1978 on the Department’s position that service advisors are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay requirements, and had negotiated and structured compensation plans against this background understanding. In light of this background, the Department needed a more reasoned explanation for its decision to depart from its existing enforcement policy. The Department instead said almost nothing. It did not analyze or explain why the statute should be interpreted to exempt dealership employees who sell vehicles but not dealership employees who sell services. This lack of reasoned explication for a regulation that is inconsistent with the Department’s longstanding earlier position results in a rule that cannot carry the force of law, and so the regulation does not receive Chevron deference. It is appropriate to remand for the Ninth Circuit to interpret §213(b)(10)(A) in the first instance. Pp. 10–12. 780 F. 3d 1267, vacated and remanded. KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined. Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­ ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 15–415 _________________ ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC, PETITIONER v. HECTOR NAVARRO, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 20, 2016] JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case addresses whether a federal statute requires payment of increased compensation to certain automobile dealership employees for overtime work. The federal statute in question is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq., enacted in 1938 to “pro­ tect all covered workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours.” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 739 (1981). Among its other provisions, the FLSA requires employers to pay overtime compensation to covered employees who work more than 40 hours in a given week. The rate of overtime pay must be “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” of the employee’s pay. §207(a). Five current and former service advisors brought this suit alleging that the automobile dealership where they were employed was required by the FLSA to pay them overtime wages. The dealership contends that the posi­ tion and duties of a service advisor bring these employees within §213(b)(10)(A), which establishes an exemption from the FLSA overtime provisions for certain employees 2 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO Opinion of the Court engaged in selling or servicing automobiles. turns on the interpretation of this exemption. The case I A Automobile dealerships in many communities not only sell vehicles but also sell repair and maintenance services. Among the employees involved in providing repair and maintenance services are service advisors, partsmen, and mechanics. Service advisors interact with customers and sell them services for their vehicles. A service advisor’s duties may include meeting customers; listening to their concerns about their cars; suggesting repair and mainte­ nance services; selling new accessories or replacement parts; recording service orders; following up with custom­ ers as the services are performed (for instance, if new problems are discovered); and explaining the repair and maintenance work when customers return for their vehi­ cles. See App. 40–41; see also Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 475 F. 2d 1095, 1096 (CA5 1973); 29 CFR §779.372(c)(4) (1971). Partsmen obtain the vehicle parts needed to perform repair and maintenance and provide those parts to the mechanics. See §779.372(c)(2). Me­ chanics perform the actual repair and maintenance work. See §779.372(c)(3). In 1961, Congress enacted a blanket exemption from the FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions for all automobile dealership employees. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, §9, 75 Stat. 73. In 1966, Congress repealed that broad exemption and replaced it with a narrower one. The revised statute did not exempt dealer­ ship employees from the minimum wage requirement. It also limited the exemption from the overtime compensa­ tion requirement to cover only certain employees—in particular, “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primar­ ily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trailers, Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 Opinion of the Court trucks, farm implements, or aircraft” at a covered dealer­ ship. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §209, 80 Stat. 836. Congress authorized the Department of Labor to “promulgate necessary rules, regulations, or orders” with respect to this new provision. §602, id., at 844. The Department exercised that authority in 1970 and issued a regulation that defined the statutory terms “salesman,” “partsman,” and “mechanic.” 35 Fed. Reg. 5896 (1970) (codified at 29 CFR §779.372(c)). The De­ partment intended its regulation as a mere interpretive rule explaining its own views, rather than a legislative rule with the force and effect of law; and so the Depart­ ment did not issue the regulation through the notice-and­ comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 35 Fed. Reg. 5856; see also 5 U. S. C. §553(b)(A) (ex­ empting interpretive rules from notice and comment). The 1970 interpretive regulation defined “salesman” to mean “an employee who is employed for the purpose of and is primarily engaged in making sales or obtaining orders or contracts for sale of the vehicles or farm imple­ ments which the establishment is primarily engaged in selling.” 29 CFR §779.372(c)(1) (1971). By limiting the statutory term to salesmen who sell vehicles or farm implements, the regulation excluded service advisors from the exemption, since a service advisor sells repair and maintenance services but not the vehicle itself. The regu­ lation made that exclusion explicit in a later subsection: “Employees variously described as service manager, ser­ vice writer, service advisor, or service salesman . . . are not exempt under [the statute]. This is true despite the fact that such an employee’s principal function may be dis­ agnosing [sic] the mechanical condition of vehicles brought in for repair, writing up work orders for repairs authorized by the customer, assigning the work to various employees and directing and checking on the work of mechanics.” 4 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO Opinion of the Court §779.372(c)(4). Three years later, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the Department’s conclusion that service advisors are not covered by the statutory exemption. Deel Motors, supra. Certain District Courts followed that precedent. See Yenney v. Cass County Motors, 81 CCH LC ¶33,506 (Neb. 1977); Brennan v. North Bros. Ford, Inc., 76 CCH LC ¶33,247 (ED Mich. 1975), aff ’d sub nom. Dunlop v. North Bros. Ford, Inc., 529 F. 2d 524 (CA6 1976) (table); Brennan v. Import Volkswagen, Inc., 81 CCH LC ¶33,522 (Kan. 1975). In the meantime, Congress amended the statutory provision by enacting its present text, which now sets out the exemption in two subsections. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, §14, 88 Stat. 65. The first subsec­ tion is at issue in this case. It exempts “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements” at a covered dealership. 29 U. S. C. §213(b)(10)(A). The second subsection exempts “any salesman primarily engaged in selling trailers, boats, or aircraft” at a covered dealership. §213(b)(10)(B). The statute thus exempts certain employ­ ees engaged in servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, but not similar employees engaged in servic­ ing trailers, boats, or aircraft. In 1978, the Department issued an opinion letter de­ parting from its previous position. Taking a position consistent with the cases decided by the courts, the opin­ ion letter stated that service advisors could be exempt under §213(b)(10)(A). Dept. of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter No. 1520 (WH–467) (1978), [1978–1981 Transfer Binder] CCH Wages–Hours Administrative Rulings ¶31,207. The letter acknowledged that the De­ partment’s new policy “represent[ed] a change from the position set forth in section 779.372(c)(4)” of its 1970 regulation. In 1987, the Department confirmed its 1978 Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 Opinion of the Court interpretation by amending its Field Operations Hand­ book to clarify that service advisors should be treated as exempt under §213(b)(10)(A). It observed that some courts had interpreted the statutory exemption to cover service advisors; and it stated that, as a result of those decisions, it would “no longer deny the [overtime] exemption for such employees.” Dept. of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Field Operations Handbook, Insert No. 1757, 24L04–4(k) (Oct. 20, 1987), online at https://perma.cc/5GHD-KCJJ (all Internet materials as last visited June 16, 2016). The Department again acknowledged that its new position represented a change from its 1970 regulation and stated that the regulation would “be revised as soon as is practi­ cable.” Ibid. Twenty-one years later, in 2008, the Department at last issued a notice of proposed rulemaking. 73 Fed. Reg. 43654. The notice observed that every court that had considered the question had held service advisors to be exempt under §213(b)(10)(A), and that the Department itself had treated service advisors as exempt since 1987. Id., at 43658–43659. The Department proposed to revise its regulations to accord with existing practice by inter­ preting the exemption in §213(b)(10)(A) to cover service advisors. In 2011, however, the Department changed course yet again. It announced that it was “not proceeding with the proposed rule.” 76 Fed. Reg. 18833. Instead, the Depart­ ment completed its 2008 notice-and-comment rulemaking by issuing a final rule that took the opposite position from the proposed rule. The new final rule followed the original 1970 regulation and interpreted the statutory term “salesman” to mean only an employee who sells automo­ biles, trucks, or farm implements. Id., at 18859 (codified at 29 CFR §779.372(c)(1)). The Department gave little explanation for its decision to abandon its decades-old practice of treating service 6 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO Opinion of the Court advisors as exempt under §213(b)(10)(A). It was also less than precise when it issued its final rule. As described above, the 1970 regulation included a separate subsection stating in express terms that service advisors “are not exempt” under the relevant provision. 29 CFR §779.372(c)(4) (1971). In promulgating the 2011 regula­ tion, however, the Department eliminated that separate subsection. According to the United States, this change appears to have been “an inadvertent mistake in drafting.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 50. B Petitioner is a Mercedes-Benz automobile dealership in the Los Angeles area. Respondents are or were employed by petitioner as service advisors. They assert that peti­ tioner required them to be at work from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. at least five days per week, and to be available for work matters during breaks and while on vacation. App. 39–40. Respondents were not paid a fixed salary or an hourly wage for their work; instead, they were paid commissions on the services they sold. Id., at 40–41. Respondents sued petitioner in the United States Dis­ trict Court for the Central District of California, alleging that petitioner violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime compensation when they worked more than 40 hours in a week. Id., at 42–44. Petitioner moved to dis­ miss, arguing that the FLSA overtime provisions do not apply to respondents because service advisors are covered by the statutory exemption in §213(b)(10)(A). The District Court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. It construed the statute by deferring under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), to the interpretation set forth by the Department in its 2011 regulation. Applying that deference, the Court of Appeals held that service Cite as: 579 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 Opinion of the Court advisors are not covered by the §213(b)(10)(A) exemption. 780 F. 3d 1267 (2015). The Court of Appeals recognized, however, that its decision conflicted with cases from a number of other courts. Id., at 1274 (citing, inter alia, Walton v. Greenbrier Ford, Inc., 370 F. 3d 446 (CA4 2004); Deel Motors, 475 F. 2d 1095; Thompson v. J. C. Billion, Inc., 368 Mont. 299, 294 P. 3d 397 (2013)). This Court granted certiorari to resolve the question. 577 U. S. ___ (2016). II A The full text of the statutory subsection at issue states that the overtime provisions of the FLSA shall not apply to: “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily en­ gaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufac­ turing establishment primarily engaged in the busi­ ness of selling such vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers.” §213(b)(10)(A). The question presented is whether this exemption should be interpreted to include service advisors. To resolve that question, it is necessary to determine what deference, if any, the courts must give to the Department’s 2011 interpretation. In the usual course, when an agency is authorized by Congress to issue regulations and promulgates a regula­ tion interpreting a statute it enforces, the interpretation receives deference if the statute is ambiguous and if the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This principle is implemented by the two-step analysis set forth in Chevron. At the first step, a court must determine ...
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Dr Donald
School: Purdue University

Hello there,.... here you go,..please see the complete task in the discussion below..

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Human Resources Post 2

Human Resource Post 2

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Human Resources Post 2

Human Resource Post 2
The case presented in this case is one of failed leadership where, for their own reasons,
they recruit individuals who are not natives but illegal immigrants. These actions showed that
their priorities were not in line with the organization...

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Tutor went the extra mile to help me with this essay. Citations were a bit shaky but I appreciated how well he handled APA styles and how ok he was to change them even though I didnt specify. Got a B+ which is believable and acceptable.

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