employment security, management assignment help

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Hello, please Write a research brief on : employment security.

  1. Include the following in your research brief:
    1. A brief summary of each outside reference including what it has to say about the topic of employment security.
    2. Answer the question: Should public policy (laws) be devised to promote employment security?
      1. If so, how? If not, why not?
      2. Include a definition and discussion of public policy.
      3. Include a definition and discussion of employment security.
      4. What should be done instead?
  2. Use appropriate section headings to organize your brief.
  3. Your research brief should be 600 words and include a title page and reference page. The paper must use APA 6th edition formatting.
  4. You must use, at a minimum, your textbook Holley, W. H., Jennings, K. M., & Wolters, R. S. (2012). The labor relations process (10th Ed.). Mason, OH: South-Western. and two references from professional and/or peer reviewed journals for a total of three references. Note that non-professional/non-peer reviewed references will not count toward the reference requirement.

Please use the below articles as sources:

https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/e... Job Security and Benefits Most valued by Employees

Attached: Dau-Schmidt, K. G. (1996). Employment security: A comparative institutional debate. Texas Law Review, 74, 1645-1654.

Auer, P. (2006). Protected mobility for employment and decent work: labour market security in a globalized world. Journal of Industrial Relations, 48(1), 21-40.

Catalano, R., Rook, K., & Dooley, D. (1998). Labor markets and help-seeking: A test of the employment security hypothesis. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 277-287.

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Maurer School of Law: Indiana University Digital Repository @ Maurer Law Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship 1996 Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt Indiana University Maurer School of Law, kdauschm@indiana.edu Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons Recommended Citation Dau-Schmidt, Kenneth G., "Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate" (1996). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 593. http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/593 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact wattn@indiana.edu. Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional Debate Kenneth G. Dau-Schnidt* The debate at this Symposium concerning what legal doctrine should govern questions of employment security mirrors the larger academic debate on this subject in its diversity of opinions and arguments.' Supporters and detractors of the employment-at-will doctrine have presented arguments concerning the number of unjust discharges,2 the preferences of employers and employees with respect to job security,3 the relative bargaining power and information available to employers and employees, 4 the effect of the employment-at-will doctrine on the enforcement of other statutes such as6 Title VII,' the efficacy of collateral torts in wrongful discharge litigation, employer opportunism over the employee life-cycle, 7 and the external costs of discharges in violation of public policy.8 * Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, on leave from the University of Wisconsin. B.A. 1978, University of Wisconsin; M.A., J.D. 1981, Ph.D. (Economics) 1984, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Sam Issacharoff, Jack Getman, and the editors of the Texas Law Review for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and write this comment. I would also like to thank the other participants in the Symposium for the knowledgeable and stimulating discussion that inspired these comments. 1. A nonexhaustive bibliography of the larger academic debate includes: PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths:An EmpiricalandEconomic Reassessment of the Rise of EmploymentAt-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994); Cornelius I. Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads TowardFull Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICE. L. REV. 8 (1993); Clyde W. Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal:Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); and J. Hoult Verkerke, An EmpiricalPerspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:Resolving the Just CauseDebate, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 837. 2. Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful DischargeLaw, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1905-14 (1996). 3. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 841-43. 4. Samuel Issacharoff, Contractingfor Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1792-95 (1996). 5. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1678-82 (1996). 6. Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693 (1996). 7. Morriss, supra note 2, at 1919; Schwab, supra note 1, at 39, 38-51; Verkerke, supra note 1, at 861-63. For the theory of opportunistic use of the life-cycle, see infra note 19. 8. Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful DischargeLaw and the Searchfor Third-Party Effects, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1943 (1996). 1645 1646 Texas Law Review [Vol. 74:1645 Although the arguments put forth in this Symposium and in the larger academic debate are diverse, I maintain that they all really address one question of comparative institutional analysis: 9 Which institutionindividual bargaining, collective bargaining, the courts, or legislative and administrative regulation-can most efficiently accommodate employers' and employees' preferences concerning employment security? As formulated in this Symposium, the debate over this question has focused primarily on the possible failures of individual bargaining to accommodate these divergent preferences and only secondarily on the possible deficiencies of the alternative institutions-these later deficiencies being raised largely as a rear-guard action by the defenders of individual bargaining.1" This focus on individual bargaining and its possible virtues and failures seems appropriate given that, despite a growing list of common-law and statutory exceptions to the notion of freedom of contract in employment law, individual bargaining remains by far the dominant institution for determining employment security rights in this country.1 Under comparative institutional analysis, however, one must examine the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative institution for resolving the conflict over employment security before one can make public policy recommendations.'" I will return to this question of the possible advantages and disadvantages of the alternative institutions put forth in the employment security debate toward the end of this comment. 13 Morriss and Verkerke are right to extol the virtues of individual bargaining.' 4 When it works, it provides individualized solutions to problems by balancing the divergent preferences of the affected parties 9. For the definitive treatise on comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONs IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 10. See, e.g., Morriss, supra note 2, at 1933-36 (arguing that the regulation of labor markets through institutions would be ineffectual or counterproductive). Professors Estlund and Issacharoff also explicitly discuss the efficacy of other institutions in dealing with the problem of employment security. See infra notes 22-24, 45-47 and accompanying text. 11. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting theDemandsof Workers into the Twenty-First Century:The FutureofLabor andEmployment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 691 (1993) (stating that individual bargaining dominates collective bargaining and regulation in the resolution of employer and employee conflict over the terms of employment); see also Terry A. O'Neil, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate ConstituencyDebate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 691 (1993) (stating that the unions' ability to negotiate protective contracts is "useless to most employees because over eighty percent of the workforce is nonunion"). 12. See KOMESAR, supranote 9, at 6 (arguing that "the correct question" is the comparative ability of institutions to deal with a specific issue). 13. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48. 14. See Morriss, supra note 2, at 1923 ("[D]ifferent employees have different preferences about job security. Legal rules which apply one-size-fits-all standards of job security will inevitably disadvantage some employees."); Verkerke, supra note 1,-at 843 (arguing that empirical data undermine claims of market failure in the employment contract context). 1996] Employment Security 1647 according to their willingness to pay. t" On the problem of employment security, absent some failure of the bargaining process, employees could use individual bargaining to obtain all the contractual employment security they desire as long as the costs of those contractual protections to the employer are less than the benefits of those terms to the employees. If employees did not contract for employment security of some type, it would be because the cost to the employer of such assurances outweighed their benefits to the employees and the employees decided they would rather do without the security and take their portion of the savings in higher wages and benefits. 6 Unfortunately, participants in this Symposium have identified a number of plausible ways in which individual bargaining may fail to accommodate adequately the countervailing costs and benefits of employment security. Schwab and Estlund argue that individual bargaining fails to account for all the costs of employer discretion in firing because sometimes discharges impose costs on parties other than those engaged in the negotiations."i Schwab persuasively offers this externalization-of-costs argument as a rationale for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.'8 Schwab has also argued elsewhere that, because of transaction costs in negotiations and enforcement, individual bargaining fails to specify long-term implicit contracts that would provide the employee with protection from opportunistic discharge by the employer over the employee's life-cycle.' 9 Schwab enjoys some success in linking 15. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992) ("By a process of voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which the value to the customer, as measured by willingness to pay, is highest."). 16. See Morriss, supra note 2, at 1902-03 ("[T]he default nature of the at-will rle allows the heterogeneous class of employees to choose among a diverse set of job characteristics when making employment decisions."). 17. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1664-65 (arguing that the wrongful discharge antidiscrimination and antiretaliatory doctrines protect the public as a whole by promoting the equality of citizens and providing incentives for employees to disclose illegal conduct); Schwab, supra note 8, at 1951-52 (noting that at-will employment does not adequately deter employers from requiring that their employees engage in activities like lying under oath, serving drinks to the drunk, or refusing jury duty). 18. Schwab, supra note 8, at 1950-52. For cases examining the public policy wrongful discharge tort, see, for example, White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990) (ordering a jury instruction that would allow the plaintiff to recover in his wrongful discharge suit if it was found that the termination was "significantly motivated by the [plaintiffs] refusal to commit perjury" because of the strong public interest in truthful testimony); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (holding that the tort of wrongful discharge for violation of public policy could be asserted by an employee who alleged that she was fired for performing jury duty because of the important community interest in the jury system). 19. Schwab, supra note 1, at 52-54. Under the life-cycle theory, workers are paid less than their productivity justifies early in their tenure with the firm, and more than their productivity justifies late in their tenure. Id. at 14-15. This practice allows employees to invest in job-specific human capital and prevents shirking because employees will not want to be discharged before they obtain the high wages of their late tenure. Id. at 17. Unfortunately, this life-cycle of wages and productivity gives 1648 Texas Law Review [Vol. 74:1645 his economic arguments with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 20 although Verkerke challenges his reading of the cases. 1 Issacharoff accepts Schwab's life-cycle arguments, and also argues that employees suffer in individual bargaining from an asymmetry of information and bargaining power between employees and employers. ' On the basis of the asymmetries in individual bargaining, Issacharoff argues for "information-forcing" defaults in employment contract law that would effectively require employers to raise the question of employment security in individual negotiations and make clear the conditions under which employees could be discharged.' 3 On the basis of Schwab's life-cycle analysis, Issacharoff argues for a European-style severance scheme in which, after two years of employment, a discharged employee is presumptively entitled to one month's severance pay for every year of service, unless the employer can establish that the discharge was for cause. 24 The Symposium participants discussed additional arguments that other authors have raised concerning the failure of individual bargaining in the negotiation of efficient employment security provisions.' For example, some scholars argue that employees systematically underestimate the employers an incentive to act opportunistically by firing employees before they receive their late tenure payoff. Id. at 19. It is also possible for an employer to act opportunistically with respect to employees early in their job tenure by, for example, firing a salesperson after she makes a sale but before she receives her commission. 20. See Schwab, supra note 1, at 32-51 (arguing that the pattern of court protection of employees mimics the life-cycle theory, protecting workers at the beginning and the end of their careers when they are most vulnerable to employers). For an example of the application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context, see Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (finding that an employer who fired an employee in order to avoid having to pay him a large commission violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). 21. See Verkerke, supra note 1, at 863, 848-63 ("[Schwab's] life-cycle just cause hypothesis is far less consistent with the pattern of employment contract decisions than an alternative hypothesis of systematic jurisdictional variation."). 22. In terms far too romantic for the dismal science of economics, Issacharoff likens the bargaining relationship between an employer and an employee to courtship "between a polygamist and a monogamist." Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1795. To formalize his analogy for my fellow economic nerds, I understand Issacharoff to be making two arguments. First, employers will be unable to identify perfectly the productivity of potential employees, and employees will be hesitant to request employment security in individual bargaining because this may falsely signal that they will be bad workers. See David I. Levine, Just-CauseEmployment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9 J. LAB. EcoN. 294, 295 (1991). Second, employers have more bargaining power than employees in individual bargaining because they deal with many employees, few of whom are individually of vital importance to the enterprise, while the employee deals with only one employer who provides the employee's means of sustenance. It should be noted that information asymmetry may also prevent employers from initially offering employment security provisions for fear of attracting only bad employees. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 902-03. 23. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1794-96. 24. Id. at 1806-07. 25. For a good summary of these arguments and an intelligent rebuttal, see Verkerke, supra note 1, at 898-912; see also Dau-Schmidt, supranote 11, at 688-92 (assessing the advantages and disadvantages of individual bargaining as a method of obtaining employment security). 1996] Employment Security 1649 benefits of employment security provisions because they underestimate the probability and costs of discharge.26 Similarly, employers may systematically overestimate the costs of unjust discharge suits based on contractual protections." If employees systematically underestimate the benefits of employment security while employers systematically overestimate its cost, the parties will negotiate too little employment security through individual bargaining. Finally, it has been argued that, because working under a contract with just-cause discharge provisions requires a costly managerial system for documenting employee performance, employment security is a public good in the workplace and employees will bargain for too little of that good in individual negotiations.' These arguments, along with Issacharoff's arguments above concerning asymmetries in information and bargaining power, suppose a more pervasive failure in individual bargaining than the third-party-cost and life-cycle arguments proposed by Schwab and Estlund, and thus could be used to justify a more extensive intervention on the province of individual bargaining by the courts or the legislature.29 In my mind there is no doubt that individual bargaining does, at least in some ways, fail to efficiently accommodate employers' and employees' conflicting preferences with respect to employment security. Schwab and 26. Under established theories on the resolution of cognitive dissonance, "people prefer not to think about unpleasant possibilities." Verkerke, supra note 1, at 898. Also, according to prospect theory, people tend to underestimate the expected losses from relatively remote, low-probability events. See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 464, 465 (Daniel Kahmeman et al. eds., 1982) (arguing that people underestimate the risk of rare events unless they are publicized); Daniel Kalmeman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability:AJudgmentofRepresentativeness, 3 COGNITIVEPSYCHOL. 430 (1972) (exploring the factors that influence people's subjective assessments of risk). If workers tend not to think about the unfortunate circumstance of discharge and also tend to underestimate the probability of that event, then it stands to reason that they would tend to underestimate the probable costs of discharge. 27. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of the Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge,26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 47, 64 (1992). 28. Douglas L. Leslie, LaborBargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 355-56 (1984). Verkerke's data seem to support the hypothesis that the standard of discharge is a public good because most employers have all their employees on the same standard of discharge. See Verkerke, supra note 1, at 866. A "public good" is a good or benefit that exhibits the characteristic that if one person obtains it, others cannot be excluded from its enjoyment. For example, if it is efficient for employers to operate under only one standard of discharge for their employees, then if one employee negotiates a just-cause standard of discharge, all employees will enjoy the benefits of that standard. Employees will individually bargain for too little of public goods because in their individual negotiations they will tend not to ask for such goods with the hope that another employee will negotiate such a term from which they can all benefit. See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 646-52 (1991) (discussing the concept of public goods and contending that private provisions of public goods may be lower than the socially optimal level). 29. If defects in individual bargaining produce employment security contract terms that differ significantly from what the efficient terms would be, then one could argue that the judicial or legislative imposition of the efficient employment security terms would increase wealth. 1650 Texas Law Review [Vol. 74:1645 Estlund have made compelling and largely noncontroversial arguments concerning the externalization of costs in employers' decisions to fire employees for refusing to break the law, fulfilling a public obligation (including "whistleblowing"), or exercising a statutory right. 30 Schwab's arguments concerning employers' opportunistic behavior associated with the life-cycle also seem well founded, although Verkerke has convinced me that Schwab's normative arguments for common-law ...
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Running head: EMPLOYMENT

Employment Security
Institution Affiliation:


Employment security is a situation where any given employee is assured of being in a
certain job for the agreed period or until retirement. Job security which is used to mean the same
as employment security arises from the terms of the agreement or the contract; it may also arise
from agreements arising from collective bargaining or even legislation from labor that prevents
the employees from being laid off or their jobs being terminated arbitrarily. Employment security
may also be affected by the economic conditions. Government tries to come up with laws that
prevent employers from firing employees for certain reasons. It is through improvement of skills
and experience that employees can influence their degree of job security. Workers have come up
with unions that have actively contributed to the strengthening and promotion of job security for
Public policy should be devised to promote employment security. It is because
employment security is one of the key issues concerning the improvement of productivity of any
business organization. The reason for increment in productivity is attributed to the satisfaction of
the workers, and therefore they work extra hard since they are assured of the job. They,
therefore, work hard to avoid poor performance of their organization. They have the feeling of
owning the organization.
Mostly, employees who are employed in the government sector have employment
security. Most of those that are employed in private sector have no job security. They, therefore,
work under pressure and this makes the...

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