John Locke Second Treatise concerning Civil Government
CHAPTER. II.
OF THE STATE OF NATURE.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must
consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within
the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of
any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and
the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any
manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident
and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident
in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to
mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and
from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to
love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all
have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's
hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of
my desire herein satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is
undoubtedly in other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered
them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so
that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew
greater measure of love to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire
therefore to be loved of my equals in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon
me a natural duty of bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation
of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several rules and
canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol.
Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though
man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions,
yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession,
but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has
a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all
the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one
sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his
property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of
nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize
us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior
ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not
to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not
in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may
not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends
to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from
doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace
and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put
into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of
that law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all
other laws that concern men in this world be in vain, if there were no body that in the
state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and
restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil
he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally
there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in
prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but
yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands,
according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only
to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate
to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for
these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which
is that we call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares
himself to live by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that
measure God has set to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes
dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being
slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the
peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by
the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,
destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath
transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him,
and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this
ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE
EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before
they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put
to death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their
laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative,
reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to
them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that
commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making
laws in England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men
without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to
punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the
magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in
reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have
over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the
right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to
quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly
injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his
transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of
punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from
him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that
is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make
satisfaction for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint,
and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of
taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the
magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his
hands, can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit
the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the
satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the
damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the
offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime,
to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and
doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in
the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the
like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that
attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who
having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind,
hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war
against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those
wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is
grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood
be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a
criminal, that after the murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me,
shall slay me; so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser
breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each
transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice
to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others
from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in
the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a
commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into
the particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there
is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier
of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much as
reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men,
following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of
the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the
law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the
executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men
partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and
revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion
and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government
to restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be
great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that
he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn
himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that
absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils,
which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of
nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know what kind of government that is,
and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding a
multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects
whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those
who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoever he doth, whether led by reason, mistake
or passion, must be submitted to? much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men
are not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss
in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any
men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since
all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state
of nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in
that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are,
or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state
of nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one
community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make
one with another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for
truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la
Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America,
are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one
another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of
society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will not
only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he
says,
The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men
absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never
any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as
we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things,
needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore
to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this
was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies.
But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by
their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt
not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
Jean Jacques Rousseau The Social Contract Bk 1
I MEAN to inquire if, in the civil order, there can be any sure and legitimate rule of administration,
men being taken as they are and laws as they might be. In this inquiry I shall endeavour always to
unite what right sanctions with what is prescribed by interest, in order that justice and utility may in
no case be divided. I enter upon my task without proving the importance of the subject. I shall be
asked if I am a prince or a legislator, to write on politics. I answer that I am neither, and that is why I
do so. If I were a prince or a legislator, I should not waste time in saying what wants doing; I should
do it, or hold my peace. As I was born a citizen of a free State, and a member of the Sovereign, I feel
that, however feeble the influence my voice can have on public affairs, the right of voting on them
makes it my duty to study them: and I am happy, when I reflect upon governments, to find my
inquiries always furnish me with new reasons for loving that of my own country.
1. Subject of the First Book[edit]
MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still
remains a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make
it legitimate? That question I think I can answer.
If I took into account only force, and the effects derived from it, I should say: "As long as people are
compelled to obey, and they obey, it does well; as soon as they can shake off the yoke, and they
shake it off, it does still better; for, regaining their liberty by the same right as took it away, either it is
justified in resuming it, or there was no justification for those who took it away." But the social order
is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right does not come from
nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions. Before coming to that, I have to prove what I
have just asserted.
2. The First Societies[edit]
THE most ancient of all societies, and the only one that is natural, is the family: and even so the
children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation. As soon
as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved. The children, released from the obedience they
owed to the father, and the father, released from the care he owed his children, return equally to
independence. If they remain united, they continue so no longer naturally, but voluntarily; and the
family itself is then maintained only by convention.
This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide for his own
preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself; and, as soon as he reaches years of
discretion, he is the sole judge of the proper means of preserving himself, and consequently
becomes his own master. The family then may be called the first model of political societies: the
ruler corresponds to the father, and the people to the children; and all, being born free and equal,
alienate their liberty only for their own advantage. The whole difference is that, in the family, the love
of the father for his children repays him for the care he takes of them, while, in the State, the
pleasure of commanding takes the place of the love which the chief cannot have for the peoples
under him. Grotius denies that all human power is established in favour of the governed, and quotes
slavery as an example. His usual method of reasoning is constantly to establish right by fact.1 It
would be possible to employ a more logical method, but none could be more favourable to tyrants.
It is then, according to Grotius, doubtful whether the human race belongs to a hundred men, or that
hundred men to the human race: and, throughout his book, he seems to incline to the former
alternative, which is also the view of Hobbes. On this showing, the human species is divided into so
many herds of cattle, each with its ruler, who keeps guard over them for the purpose of devouring
them.
As a shepherd is of a nature superior to that of his flock, the shepherds of men, i.e., their rulers, are
of a nature superior to that of the peoples under them. Thus, Philo tells us, the Emperor Caligula
reasoned, concluding equally well either that kings were gods, or that men were beasts.
The reasoning of Caligula agrees with that of Hobbes and Grotius. Aristotle, before any of them, had
said that men are by no means equal naturally, but that some are born for slavery, and others for
dominion.
Aristotle was right; but he took the effect for the cause. Nothing can be more certain than that every
man born in slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the desire of
escaping from them: they love their servitude, as the comrades of Ulysses loved their brutish
condition.2 If then there are slaves by nature, it is because there have been slaves against nature.
Force made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated the condition.
I have said nothing of King Adam, or Emperor Noah, father of the three great monarchs who shared
out the universe, like the children of Saturn, whom some scholars have recognised in them. I trust to
getting due thanks for my moderation; for, being a direct descendant of one of these princes,
perhaps of the eldest branch, how do I know that a verification of titles might not leave me the
legitimate king of the human race? In any case, there can be no doubt that Adam was sovereign of
the world, as Robinson Crusoe was of his island, as long as he was its only inhabitant; and this
empire had the advantage that the monarch, safe on his throne, had no rebellions, wars, or
conspirators to fear.
3. The Right of the Strongest[edit]
THE strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into
right, and obedience into duty. Hence the right of the strongest, which, though to all seeming meant
ironically, is really laid down as a fundamental principle. But are we never to have an explanation of
this phrase? Force is a physical power, and I fail to see what moral effect it can have. To yield to
force is an act of necessity, not of will — at the most, an act of prudence. In what sense can it be a
duty?
Suppose for a moment that this so-called "right" exists. I maintain that the sole result is a mass of
inexplicable nonsense. For, if force creates right, the effect changes with the cause: every force that
is greater than the first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity,
disobedience is legitimate; and, the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is
to act so as to become the strongest. But what kind of right is that which perishes when force fails? If
we must obey perforce, there is no need to obey because we ought; and if we are not forced to
obey, we are under no obligation to do so. Clearly, the word "right" adds nothing to force: in this
connection, it means absolutely nothing.
Obey the powers that be. If this means yield to force, it is a good precept, but superfluous: I can
answer for its never being violated. All power comes from God, I admit; but so does all sickness:
does that mean that we are forbidden to call in the doctor? A brigand surprises me at the edge of a
wood: must I not merely surrender my purse on compulsion; but, even if I could withhold it, am I in
conscience bound to give it up? For certainly the pistol he holds is also a power. Let us then admit
that force does not create right, and that we are obliged to obey only legitimate powers. In that case,
my original question recurs.
4. Slavery[edit]
SINCE no man has a natural authority over his fellow, and force creates no right, we must conclude
that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men.
If an individual, says Grotius, can alienate his liberty and make himself the slave of a master, why
could not a whole people do the same and make itself subject to a king? There are in this passage
plenty of ambiguous words which would need explaining; but let us confine ourselves to the word
alienate. To alienate is to give or to sell. Now, a man who becomes the slave of another does not
give himself; he sells himself, at the least for his subsistence: but for what does a people sell itself?
A king is so far from furnishing his subjects with their subsistence that he gets his own only from
them; and, according to Rabelais, kings do not live on nothing. Do subjects then give their persons
on condition that the king takes their goods also? I fail to see what they have left to preserve. It will
be said that the despot assures his subjects civil tranquillity. Granted; but what do they gain, if the
wars his ambition brings down upon them, his insatiable avidity, and the vexations conduct of his
ministers press harder on them than their own dissensions would have done? What do they gain, if
the very tranquillity they enjoy is one of their miseries? Tranquillity is found also in dungeons; but is
that enough to make them desirable places to live in? The Greeks imprisoned in the cave of the
Cyclops lived there very tranquilly, while they were awaiting their turn to be devoured.
To say that a man gives himself gratuitously, is to say what is absurd and inconceivable; such an act
is null and illegitimate, from the mere fact that he who does it is out of his mind. To say the same of a
whole people is to suppose a people of madmen; and madness creates no right.
Even if each man could alienate himself, he could not alienate his children: they are born men and
free; their liberty belongs to them, and no one but they has the right to dispose of it. Before they
come to years of discretion, the father can, in their name, lay down conditions for their preservation
and well-being, but he cannot give them irrevocably and without conditions: such a gift is contrary to
the ends of nature, and exceeds the rights of paternity. It would therefore be necessary, in order to
legitimise an arbitrary government, that in every generation the people should be in a position to
accept or reject it; but, were this so, the government would be no longer arbitrary.
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its
duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such a renunciation is
incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his will is to remove all morality from his
acts. Finally, it is an empty and contradictory convention that sets up, on the one side, absolute
authority, and, on the other, unlimited obedience. Is it not clear that we can be under no obligation to
a person from whom we have the right to exact everything? Does not this condition alone, in the
absence of equivalence or exchange, in itself involve the nullity of the act? For what right can my
slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and, his right being mine, this right of
mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?
Grotius and the rest find in war another origin for the so-called right of slavery. The victor having, as
they hold, the right of killing the vanquished, the latter can buy back his life at the price of his liberty;
and this convention is the more legitimate because it is to the advantage of both parties.
But it is clear that this supposed right to kill the conquered is by no means deducible from the state
of war. Men, from the mere fact that, while they are living in their primitive independence, they have
no mutual relations stable enough to constitute either the state of peace or the state of war, cannot
be naturally enemies. War is constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons;
and, as the state of war cannot arise out of simple personal relations, but only out of real relations,
private war, or war of man with man, can exist neither in the state of nature, where there is no
constant property, nor in the social state, where everything is under the authority of the laws.
Individual combats, duels and encounters, are acts which cannot constitute a state; while the private
wars, authorised by the Establishments of Louis IX, King of France, and suspended by the Peace of
God, are abuses of feudalism, in itself an absurd system if ever there was one, and contrary to the
principles of natural right and to all good polity.
War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and individuals are
enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their
country, but as its defenders. Finally, each State can have for enemies only other States, and not
men; for between things disparate in nature there can be no real relation.
Furthermore, this principle is in conformity with the established rules of all times and the constant
practice of all civilised peoples. Declarations of war are intimations less to powers than to their
subjects. The foreigner, whether king, individual, or people, who robs, kills or detains the subjects,
without declaring war on the prince, is not an enemy, but a brigand. Even in real war, a just prince,
while laying hands, in the enemy's country, on all that belongs to the public, respects the lives and
goods of individuals: he respects rights on which his own are founded. The object of the war being
the destruction of the hostile State, the other side has a right to kill its defenders, while they are
bearing arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender, they cease to be enemies or
instruments of the enemy, and become once more merely men, whose life no one has any right to
take. Sometimes it is possible to kill the State without killing a single one of its members; and war
gives no right which is not necessary to the gaining of its object. These principles are not those of
Grotius: they are not based on the authority of poets, but derived from the nature of reality and
based on reason.
The right of conquest has no foundation other than the right of the strongest. If war does not give the
conqueror the right to massacre the conquered peoples, the right to enslave them cannot be based
upon a right which does not exist. No one has a right to kill an enemy except when he cannot make
him a slave, and the right to enslave him cannot therefore be derived from the right to kill him. It is
accordingly an unfair exchange to make him buy at the price of his liberty his life, over which the
victor holds no right.
Is it not clear that there is a vicious circle in founding the right of life and death on the right of slavery,
and the right of slavery on the right of life and death?
Even if we assume this terrible right to kill everybody, I maintain that a slave made in war, or a
conquered people, is under no obligation to a master, except to obey him as far as he is compelled
to do so. By taking an equivalent for his life, the victor has not done him a favour; instead of killing
him without profit, he has killed him usefully. So far then is he from acquiring over him any authority
in addition to that of force, that the state of war continues to subsist between them: their mutual
relation is the effect of it, and the usage of the right of war does not imply a treaty of peace. A
convention has indeed been made; but this convention, so far from destroying the state of war,
presupposes its continuance.
So, from whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null and void, not only as
being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and meaningless. The words slave and right
contradict each other, and are mutually exclusive. It will always be equally foolish for a man to say to
a man or to a people: "I make with you a convention wholly at your expense and wholly to my
advantage; I shall keep it as long as I like, and you will keep it as long as I like."
5. That We Must Always Go Back to a First Convention[edit]
EVEN if I granted all that I have been refuting, the friends of despotism would be no better off. There
will always be a great difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society. Even if
scattered individuals were successively enslaved by one man, however numerous they might be, I
still see no more than a master and his slaves, and certainly not a people and its ruler; I see what
may be termed an aggregation, but not an association; there is as yet neither public good nor body
politic. The man in question, even if he has enslaved half the world, is still only an individual; his
interest, apart from that of others, is still a purely private interest. If this same man comes to die, his
empire, after him, remains scattered and without unity, as an oak falls and dissolves into a heap of
ashes when the fire has consumed it.
A people, says Grotius, can give itself to a king. Then, according to Grotius, a people is a people
before it gives itself. The gift is itself a civil act, and implies public deliberation. It would be better,
before examining the act by which a people gives itself to a king, to examine that by which it has
become a people; for this act, being necessarily prior to the other, is the true foundation of society.
Indeed, if there were no prior convention, where, unless the election were unanimous, would be the
obligation on the minority to submit to the choice of the majority? How have a hundred men who
wish for a master the right to vote on behalf of ten who do not? The law of majority voting is itself
something established by convention, and presupposes unanimity, on one occasion at least.
6. The Social Contract[edit]
I SUPPOSE men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in
the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of
each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer;
and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. But, as men cannot
engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of
preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to
overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and
cause to act in concert.
This sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty
of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without
harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? This difficulty, in its bearing
on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms:
"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common
force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may
still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. " This is the fundamental problem of which the
Social Contract provides the solution.
The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification
would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have perhaps never been formally set
forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, until, on the
violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while
losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it.
These clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one — the total alienation of each
associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for, in the first place, as each gives
himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in
making them burdensome to others.
Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate
has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no
common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own judge,
would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would
necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.
Finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over
whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent
for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.
If then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces
itself to the following terms: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the
supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole. "
At once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association
creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains
votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. This public person,
so formed by the union of all other persons formerly took the name of city,4 and now takes that of
Republic or body politic; it is called by its members State when passive. Sovereign when active, and
Power when compared with others like itself. Those who are associated in it take collectively the
name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects,
as being under the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and taken one for another:
it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision.
LEVIATHAN
By Thomas Hobbes
1651
LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER,
FORME, & POWER OF A COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVILL
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury
Printed for Andrew Crooke,
at the Green Dragon
in St. Paul's Churchyard,
1651.
CHAPTER XIII. OF THE NATURALL
CONDITION OF MANKIND,
AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND MISERY
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though
there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind
then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man,
is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to
which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest
has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy
with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.
And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and
especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science;
which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us;
nor attained, (as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,) I find yet a greater
equality amongst men, than that of strength. For Prudence, is but Experience; which
equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in those things they equally apply themselves
unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of
ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the
Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for
concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that
howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or
more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For
they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But this proveth rather that
men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of
the equall distribution of any thing, than that every man is contented with his share.
From Equality Proceeds Diffidence
From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends.
And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which neverthelesse they cannot
both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is principally
their owne conservation, and sometimes their delectation only,) endeavour to destroy,
or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where an Invader hath
no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse
a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces
united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of
his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another.
From Diffidence Warre
And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure
himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons
of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him:
And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also
because there be some, that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the
acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that
otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion
increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their
defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men,
being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Againe, men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping
company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh
that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon
all signes of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which
amongst them that have no common power, to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make
them destroy each other,) to extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage;
and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First,
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory.
The first, maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for
Reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves Masters of other mens persons,
wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word,
a smile, a different opinion, and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their
Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession,
or their Name.
Out Of Civil States,
There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is manifest, that
during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in
that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every
man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract
of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the
notion of Time, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of
Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but
in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not
in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no
assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE.
The Incommodites Of Such A War
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy
to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other
security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them
withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is
uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments
of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face
of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of
all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short.
It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature
should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he
may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to
have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe,
when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when
going to sleep, he locks his dores; when even in his house he locks his chests; and this
when he knows there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries
shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of
his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he
locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by
my words? But neither of us accuse mans nature in it. The Desires, and other Passions
of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those
Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them; which till Lawes be made they cannot
know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make
it.
It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre
as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many
places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America,
except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall
lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said
before. Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where
there were no common Power to feare; by the manner of life, which men that have
formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into, in a civill Warre.
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition
of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and persons of Soveraigne
authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state
and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one
another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes;
and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because
they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that
misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men.
In Such A Warre, Nothing Is Unjust
To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing
can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no
place. Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice.
Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none
of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that
were alone in the world, as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that
relate to men in Society, not in Solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition,
that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to
be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the
ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility
to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.
The Passions That Incline Men To Peace
The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as
are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And
Reason suggesteth convenient Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to
agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Lawes of Nature:
whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.
Politics
By Aristotle
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
Courtesy of MIT Classics Archive
---------------------------------------------------------------------BOOK ONE
Part I
Every tate is a community of some kind, and every community is established
with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain
that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good,
the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and
which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than
any other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder,
and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only
in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few
is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a
still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference
between a great household and a small state. The distinction which
is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the
government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the
rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in
turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will
be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method
which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science,
so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple
elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the
elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see
in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether
any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
Part II
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether
a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In
the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without
each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue
(and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but
because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have
a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and
of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that
which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to
be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to
such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and
slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between
the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith
who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing
for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended
for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction
is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler
among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore
the poets say,
"It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; "
as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature
one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave,
the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he
says,
"First house and wife and an ox for the plough, "
for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association
established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and
the members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,'
and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when
several families are united, and the association aims at something
more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed
is the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to
be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and
grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And
this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by
kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came
together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the
eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form
of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer
says:
"Each one gives law to his children and to his wives. "
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore
men say that the Gods have a king, because they themselves either
are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine,
not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like
their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large
enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in
existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier
forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of
them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is
when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking
of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of
a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that
man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not
by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above
humanity; he is like the
"Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, "
whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of
war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing
in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the
gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure
or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature
attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation
of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended
to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise
the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the
like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes
a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to
the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part;
for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot
or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone
hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But
things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to
say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality,
but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is
a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual,
when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part
in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society,
or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either
a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted
in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the
greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals,
but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all;
since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at
birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which
he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he
is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full
of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for
the administration of justice, which is the determination of what
is just, is the principle of order in political society.
Part III
Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking
of the state we must speak of the management of the household. The
parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose
the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen.
Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible
elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are
master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore
to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be:
I mean the relation of master and servant, the marriage relation (the
conjunction of man and wife has no name of its own), and thirdly,
the procreative relation (this also has no proper name). And there
is another element of a household, the so-called art of getting wealth,
which, according to some, is identical with household management,
according to others, a principal part of it; the nature of this art
will also have to be considered by us.
Let us first speak of master and slave, looking to the needs of practical
life and also seeking to attain some better theory of their relation
than exists at present. For some are of opinion that the rule of a
master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the
mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying
at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a
master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction
between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and
being an interference with nature is therefore unjust.
Part IV
Property is a part of the household, and the art of acquiring property
is a part of the art of managing the household; for no man can live
well, or indeed live at all, unless he be provided with necessaries.
And as in the arts which have a definite sphere the workers must have
their own proper instruments for the accomplishment of their work,
so it is in the management of a household. Now instruments are of
various sorts; some are living, others lifeless; in the rudder, the
pilot of a ship has a lifeless, in the look-out man, a living instrument;
for in the arts the servant is a kind of instrument. Thus, too, a
possession is an instrument for maintaining life. And so, in the arrangement
of the family, a slave is a living possession, and property a number
of such instruments; and the servant is himself an instrument which
takes precedence of all other instruments. For if every instrument
could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of
others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus,
which, says the poet,
"of their own accord entered the assembly of the Gods; "
if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum touch
the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want
servants, nor masters slaves. Here, however, another distinction must
be drawn; the instruments commonly so called are instruments of production,
whilst a possession is an instrument of action. The shuttle, for example,
is not only of use; but something else is made by it, whereas of a
garment or of a bed there is only the use. Further, as production
and action are different in kind, and both require instruments, the
instruments which they employ must likewise differ in kind. But life
is action and not production, and therefore the slave is the minister
of action. Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of;
for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs
to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the
master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave
is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him. Hence
we see what is the nature and office of a slave; he who is by nature
not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be
said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession.
And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable
from the possessor.
Part V
But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for
whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all
slavery a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both
of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled
is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their
birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule.
And there are many kinds both of rulers and subjects (and that rule
is the better which is exercised over better subjects- for example,
to rule over men is better than to rule over wild beasts; for the
work is better which is executed by better workmen, and where one
man rules and another is ruled, they may be said to have a work);
for in all things which form a composite whole and which are made
up of parts, whether continuous or discrete, a distinction between
the ruling and the subject element comes to fight. Such a duality
exists in living creatures, but not in them only; it originates in
the constitution of the universe; even in things which have no life
there is a ruling principle, as in a musical mode. But we are wandering
from the subject. We will therefore restrict ourselves to the living
creature, which, in the first place, consists of soul and body: and
of these two, the one is by nature the ruler, and the other the subject.
But then we must look for the intentions of nature in things which
retain their nature, and not in things which are corrupted. And therefore
we must study the man who is in the most perfect state both of body
and soul, for in him we shall see the true relation of the two; although
in bad or corrupted natures the body will often appear to rule over
the soul, because they are in an evil and unnatural condition. At
all events we may firstly observe in living creatures both a despotical
and a constitutional rule; for the soul rules the body with a despotical
rule, whereas the intellect rules the appetites with a constitutional
and royal rule. And it is clear that the rule of the soul over the
body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate,
is natural and expedient; whereas the equality of the two or the rule
of the inferior is always hurtful. The same holds good of animals
in relation to men; for tame animals have a better nature than wild,
and all tame animals are better off when they are ruled by man; for
then they are preserved. Again, the male is by nature superior, and
the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this
principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.
Where then there is such a difference as that between soul and body,
or between men and animals (as in the case of those whose business
is to use their body, and who can do nothing better), the lower sort
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them as for all inferiors
that they should be under the rule of a master. For he who can be,
and therefore is, another's and he who participates in rational principle
enough to apprehend, but not to have, such a principle, is a slave
by nature. Whereas the lower animals cannot even apprehend a principle;
they obey their instincts. And indeed the use made of slaves and of
tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister
to the needs of life. Nature would like to distinguish between the
bodies of freemen and slaves, making the one strong for servile labor,
the other upright, and although useless for such services, useful
for political life in the arts both of war and peace. But the opposite
often happens- that some have the souls and others have the bodies
of freemen. And doubtless if men differed from one another in the
mere forms of their bodies as much as the statues of the Gods do from
men, all would acknowledge that the inferior class should be slaves
of the superior. And if this is true of the body, how much more just
that a similar distinction should exist in the soul? but the beauty
of the body is seen, whereas the beauty of the soul is not seen. It
is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others slaves,
and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.
Part VI
But that those who take the opposite view have in a certain way right
on their side, may be easily seen. For the words slavery and slave
are used in two senses. There is a slave or slavery by law as well
as by nature. The law of which I speak is a sort of convention- the
law by which whatever is taken in war is supposed to belong to the
victors. But this right many jurists impeach, as they would an orator
who brought forward an unconstitutional measure: they detest the notion
that, because one man has the power of doing violence and is superior
in brute strength, another shall be his slave and subject. Even among
philosophers there is a difference of opinion. The origin of the dispute,
and what makes the views invade each other's territory, is as follows:
in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the
greatest power of exercising force; and as superior power is only
found where there is superior excellence of some kind, power seems
to imply virtue, and the dispute to be simply one about justice (for
it is due to one party identifying justice with goodwill while the
other identifies it with the mere rule of the stronger). If these
views are thus set out separately, the other views have no force or
plausibility against the view that the superior in virtue ought to
rule, or be master. Others, clinging, as they think, simply to a principle
of justice (for law and custom are a sort of justice), assume that
slavery in accordance with the custom of war is justified by law,
but at the same moment they deny this. For what if the cause of the
war be unjust? And again, no one would ever say he is a slave who
is unworthy to be a slave. Were this the case, men of the highest
rank would be slaves and the children of slaves if they or their parents
chance to have been taken captive and sold. Wherefore Hellenes do
not like to call Hellenes slaves, but confine the term to barbarians.
Yet, in using this language, they really mean the natural slave of
whom we spoke at first; for it must be admitted that some are slaves
everywhere, others nowhere. The same principle applies to nobility.
Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere, and not only in their
own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home,
thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom,
the one absolute, the other relative. The Helen of Theodectes says:
"Who would presume to call me servant who am on both sides sprung
from the stem of the Gods? "
What does this mean but that they distinguish freedom and slavery,
noble and humble birth, by the two principles of good and evil? They
think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good
men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend
it, cannot always accomplish.
We see then that there is some foundation for this difference of opinion,
and that all are not either slaves by nature or freemen by nature,
and also that there is in some cases a marked distinction between
the two classes, rendering it expedient and right for the one to be
slaves and the others to be masters: the one practicing obedience,
the others exercising the authority and lordship which nature intended
them to have. The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for
the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and
the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of
his bodily frame. Hence, where the relation of master and slave between
them is natural they are friends and have a common interest, but where
it rests merely on law and force the reverse is true.
Part VII
The previous remarks are quite enough to show that the rule of a master
is not a constitutional rule, and that all the different kinds of
rule are not, as some affirm, the same with each other. For there
is one rule exercised over subjects who are by nature free, another
over subjects who are by nature slaves. The rule of a household is
a monarchy, for every house is under one head: whereas constitutional
rule is a government of freemen and equals. The master is not called
a master because he has science, but because he is of a certain character,
and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there
may be a science for the master and science for the slave. The science
of the slave would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made
money by instructing slaves in their ordinary duties. And such a knowledge
may be carried further, so as to include cookery and similar menial
arts. For some duties are of the more necessary, others of the more
honorable sort; as the proverb says, 'slave before slave, master before
master.' But all such branches of knowledge are servile. There is
likewise a science of the master, which teaches the use of slaves;
for the master as such is concerned, not with the acquisition, but
with the use of them. Yet this so-called science is not anything great
or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which
the slave must know how to execute. Hence those who are in a position
which places them above toil have stewards who attend to their households
while they occupy themselves with philosophy or with politics. But
the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs
both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a
species of hunting or war. Enough of the distinction between master
and slave.
Part VIII
Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of getting
wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been
shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the
art of getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household
or a part of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in
the way that the art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art
of weaving, or in the way that the casting of bronze is instrumental
to the art of the statuary, for they are not instrumental in the same
way, but the one provides tools and the other material; and by material
I mean the substratum out of which any work is made; thus wool is
the material of the weaver, bronze of the statuary. Now it is easy
to see that the art of household management is not identical with
the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the
other provides. For the art which uses household stores can be no
other than the art of household management. There is, however, a doubt
whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household management
or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence
wealth and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property
and riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food
in general, parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again,
there are many sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of
lives both of animals and men; they must all have food, and the differences
in their food have made differences in their ways of life. For of
beasts, some are gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the
way which is best adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are
carnivorous or herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined
for them by nature in such a manner that they may obtain with greater
facility the food of their choice. But, as different species have
different tastes, the same things are not naturally pleasant to all
of them; and therefore the lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals
further differ among themselves. In the lives of men too there is
a great difference. The laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life,
and get their subsistence without trouble from tame animals; their
flocks having to wander from place to place in search of pasture,
they are compelled to follow them, cultivating a sort of living farm.
Others support themselves by hunting, which is of different kinds.
Some, for example, are brigands, others, who dwell near lakes or marshes
or rivers or a sea in which there are fish, are fishermen, and others
live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The greater number obtain
a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil. Such are the modes
of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry springs up
of itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and retail tradethere is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the fisherman,
the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two employments,
eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus the life
of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of
a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly
combined in any way which the needs of men may require. Property,
in the sense of a bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself
to all, both when they are first born, and when they are grown up.
For some animals bring forth, together with their offspring, so much
food as will last until they are able to supply themselves; of this
the vermiparous or oviparous animals are an instance; and the viviparous
animals have up to a certain time a supply of food for their young
in themselves, which is called milk. In like manner we may infer that,
after the birth of animals, plants exist for their sake, and that
the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and
food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for
food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now
if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference
must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. And so,
in one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition,
for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought
to practice against wild beasts, and against men who, though intended
by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind
is naturally just.
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is
a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household
management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such
things necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family
or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches;
for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not
unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that
"No bound to riches has been fixed for man. "
But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts;
for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number
or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be
used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural
art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and
by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.
Excerpts from Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae
Question 90. The essence of law
Article 1. Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex"
[law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human
acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated
above (I-II:1:1 ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all
matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is
the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement
in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.
Article 2. Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
As stated above (Article 1), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their
rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something
which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must
needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical
reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (I-II:2:7; III:3:1). Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover,
since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the
perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness.
Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the
body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce
and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he
says in Polit. i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong
to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of
heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently,
since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual
work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good.
Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
Article 3. Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order
anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent
of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a
public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything
to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.
Article 4. Whether promulgation is essential to a law?
As stated above (Article 1), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or
measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in
order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men
who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation.
Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.
Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than
an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated.
AFRICAN STUDIES CENTER - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
"Letter from a Birmingham Jail [King, Jr.]"
16 April 1963
My Dear Fellow Clergymen:
While confined here in the Birmingham city jail, I came across your recent statement calling my present activities "unwise and untimely." Seldom do I pause to answer criticism of my work and ideas. If I
sought to answer all the criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries would have little time for anything other than such correspondence in the course of the day, and I would have no time for constructive
work. But since I feel that you are men of genuine good will and that your criticisms are sincerely set forth, I want to try to answer your statement in what I hope will be patient and reasonable terms.
I think I should indicate why I am here in Birmingham, since you have been influenced by the view which argues against "outsiders coming in." I have the honor of serving as president of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, an organization operating in every southern state, with headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. We have some eighty five affiliated organizations across the South, and one of them
is the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights. Frequently we share staff, educational and financial resources with our affiliates. Several months ago the affiliate here in Birmingham asked us to be
on call to engage in a nonviolent direct action program if such were deemed necessary. We readily consented, and when the hour came we lived up to our promise. So I, along with several members of my
staff, am here because I was invited here. I am here because I have organizational ties here.
But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their "thus saith the Lord" far beyond the boundaries of their
home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond
my own home town. Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid.
Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice
everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow,
provincial "outside agitator" idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds.
You deplore the demonstrations taking place in Birmingham. But your statement, I am sorry to say, fails to express a similar concern for the conditions that brought about the demonstrations. I am sure that
none of you would want to rest content with the superficial kind of social analysis that deals merely with effects and does not grapple with underlying causes. It is unfortunate that demonstrations are taking
place in Birmingham, but it is even more unfortunate that the city's white power structure left the Negro community with no alternative.
In any nonviolent campaign there are four basic steps: collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; self purification; and direct action. We have gone through all these steps in
Birmingham. There can be no gainsaying the fact that racial injustice engulfs this community. Birmingham is probably the most thoroughly segregated city in the United States. Its ugly record of brutality is
widely known. Negroes have experienced grossly unjust treatment in the courts. There have been more unsolved bombings of Negro homes and churches in Birmingham than in any other city in the nation.
These are the hard, brutal facts of the case. On the basis of these conditions, Negro leaders sought to negotiate with the city fathers. But the latter consistently refused to engage in good faith negotiation.
Then, last September, came the opportunity to talk with leaders of Birmingham's economic community. In the course of the negotiations, certain promises were made by the merchants--for example, to
remove the stores' humiliating racial signs. On the basis of these promises, the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth and the leaders of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights agreed to a moratorium on
all demonstrations. As the weeks and months went by, we realized that we were the victims of a broken promise. A few signs, briefly removed, returned; the others remained. As in so many past experiences,
our hopes had been blasted, and the shadow of deep disappointment settled upon us. We had no alternative except to prepare for direct action, whereby we would present our very bodies as a means of laying
our case before the conscience of the local and the national community. Mindful of the difficulties involved, we decided to undertake a process of self purification. We began a series of workshops on
nonviolence, and we repeatedly asked ourselves: "Are you able to accept blows without retaliating?" "Are you able to endure the ordeal of jail?" We decided to schedule our direct action program for the
Easter season, realizing that except for Christmas, this is the main shopping period of the year. Knowing that a strong economic-withdrawal program would be the by product of direct action, we felt that this
would be the best time to bring pressure to bear on the merchants for the needed change.
Then it occurred to us that Birmingham's mayoral election was coming up in March, and we speedily decided to postpone action until after election day. When we discovered that the Commissioner of Public
Safety, Eugene "Bull" Connor, had piled up enough votes to be in the run off, we decided again to postpone action until the day after the run off so that the demonstrations could not be used to cloud the
issues. Like many others, we waited to see Mr. Connor defeated, and to this end we endured postponement after postponement. Having aided in this community need, we felt that our direct action program
could be delayed no longer.
You may well ask: "Why direct action? Why sit ins, marches and so forth? Isn't negotiation a better path?" You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action.
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that
it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word "tension." I have
earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that
individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of
tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. The purpose of our direct action program is to create a
situation so crisis packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation. I therefore concur with you in your call for negotiation. Too long has our beloved Southland been bogged down in a tragic effort to
live in monologue rather than dialogue.
One of the basic points in your statement is that the action that I and my associates have taken in Birmingham is untimely. Some have asked: "Why didn't you give the new city administration time to act?"
The only answer that I can give to this query is that the new Birmingham administration must be prodded about as much as the outgoing one, before it will act. We are sadly mistaken if we feel that the
election of Albert Boutwell as mayor will bring the millennium to Birmingham. While Mr. Boutwell is a much more gentle person than Mr. Connor, they are both segregationists, dedicated to maintenance of
the status quo. I have hope that Mr. Boutwell will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to desegregation. But he will not see this without pressure from devotees of civil rights. My
friends, I must say to you that we have not made a single gain in civil rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure. Lamentably, it is an historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their
privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but, as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups tend to be more immoral than individuals.
We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct action campaign that was "well
timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait"
has almost always meant "Never." We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied."
We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining political independence, but we still creep at
horse and buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, "Wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs
lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast
majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you
seek to explain to your six year old daughter why she can't go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is
closed to colored children, and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward
white people; when you have to concoct an answer for a five year old son who is asking: "Daddy, why do white people treat colored people so mean?"; when you take a cross county drive and find it
necessary to sleep night after night in the uncomfortable corners of your automobile because no motel will accept you; when you are humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs reading "white" and
"colored"; when your first name becomes "nigger," your middle name becomes "boy" (however old you are) and your last name becomes "John," and your wife and mother are never given the respected title
"Mrs."; when you are harried by day and haunted by night by the fact that you are a Negro, living constantly at tiptoe stance, never quite knowing what to expect next, and are plagued with inner fears and
outer resentments; when you are forever fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodiness"--then you will understand why we find it difficult to wait. There comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over,
and men are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair. I hope, sirs, you can understand our legitimate and unavoidable impatience. You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to
break laws. This is certainly a legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme Court's decision of 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, at first glance it may seem
rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws. One may well ask: "How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and
unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree
with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all."
Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a
code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human
personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense
of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I it" relationship for an "I thou" relationship and ends
up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and sinful. Paul Tillich has said that sin is separation. Is
not segregation an existential expression of man's tragic separation, his awful estrangement, his terrible sinfulness? Thus it is that I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for it is
morally right; and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordinances, for they are morally wrong.
Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This
is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Let me give another
explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set
up that state's segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some counties in
which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the population, not a single Negro is registered. Can any law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured?
Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its application. For instance, I have been arrested on a charge of parading without a permit. Now, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance which requires
a permit for a parade. But such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens the First-Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and protest.
I hope you are able to see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law, as would the rabid segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an
unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of
imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.
Of course, there is nothing new about this kind of civil disobedience. It was evidenced sublimely in the refusal of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to obey the laws of Nebuchadnezzar, on the ground that a
higher moral law was at stake. It was practiced superbly by the early Christians, who were willing to face hungry lions and the excruciating pain of chopping blocks rather than submit to certain unjust laws of
the Roman Empire. To a degree, academic freedom is a reality today because Socrates practiced civil disobedience. In our own nation, the Boston Tea Party represented a massive act of civil disobedience.
We should never forget that everything Adolf Hitler did in Germany was "legal" and everything the Hungarian freedom fighters did in Hungary was "illegal." It was "illegal" to aid and comfort a Jew in
Hitler's Germany. Even so, I am sure that, had I lived in Germany at the time, I would have aided and comforted my Jewish brothers. If today I lived in a Communist country where certain principles dear to
the Christian faith are suppressed, I would openly advocate disobeying that country's antireligious laws.
I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost
reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more
devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek,
but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises
the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much
more bewildering than outright rejection.
I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that
block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which
the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct
action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be
cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human
conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured.
In your statement you assert that our actions, even though peaceful, must be condemned because they precipitate violence. But is this a logical assertion? Isn't this like condemning a robbed man because his
possession of money precipitated the evil act of robbery? Isn't this like condemning Socrates because his unswerving commitment to truth and his philosophical inquiries precipitated the act by the misguided
populace in which they made him drink hemlock? Isn't this like condemning Jesus because his unique God consciousness and never ceasing devotion to God's will precipitated the evil act of crucifixion? We
must come to see that, as the federal courts have consistently affirmed, it is wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because the quest may precipitate violence.
Society must protect the robbed and punish the robber. I had also hoped that the white moderate would reject the myth concerning time in relation to the struggle for freedom. I have just received a letter from
a white brother in Texas. He writes: "All Christians know that the colored people will receive equal rights eventually, but it is possible that you are in too great a religious hurry. It has taken Christianity
almost two thousand years to accomplish what it has. The teachings of Christ take time to come to earth." Such an attitude stems from a tragic misconception of time, from the strangely irrational notion that
there is something in the very flow of time that will inevitably cure all ills. Actually, time itself is neutral; it can be used either destructively or constructively. More and more I feel that the people of ill will
have used time much more effectively than have the people of good will. We will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions...
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