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FEDERAL RESERVE
How the Fed Was Born
A book about the birth of the Federal Reserve overlooks the flaws in the system.
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL | FROM THE APRIL 2016 ISSUE
(Penguin Press)
America's Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve, by Roger Lowenstein, Penguin Press, 368 pages,
$29.95
Conspiracy theories about the creation of the Federal Reserve System abound. Typically they give a prominent
place to a now infamous but then-secret meeting in November 1910 at an exclusive Georgia resort on the
secluded Jekyl Island (at that time spelled with only one l). Organized and chaired by the powerful pro-business
and pro-tariff Sen. Nelson W. Aldrich (R–R.I.), the small conclave included such prominent New York bankers as
Frank A. Vanderlip of National City Bank and Paul M. Warburg of Kuhn, Leob & Co. Together the group
hammered out a proposal known as the Aldrich Plan. Introduced into Congress with minor modifications in
January 1912, the plan become a template for the final Federal Reserve Act, passed in late 1913 with the crucial
backing of President Woodrow Wilson.
The actual story is both more complicated and more interesting than the simple conspiracy narrative. Roger
Lowenstein, a financial journalist—his previous books include a study of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital
Management and its collapse—has now ventured into this historical territory with America's Bank: The Epic
Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve. Displaying extensive primary research into the personal papers of all the
Penguin Press
major players, he provides a readable narrative interwoven with well-sketched background biographies.
Unfortunately, Lowenstein renders this narrative as a simplistic morality play, with pro-central bank heroes ("patriotic conspirators," as he styles
them at one point) and anti-central bank villains, leaving the book devoid of much economic insight.
The book is divided into two parts. The first covers the efforts, particularly after the Panic of 1907, that led up to the Jekyl Island meeting: A few
bankers, economists, and reformers exploited the defects of the prevailing national banking system to persuade influential citizens in business,
universities, and the press that a European-style central bank was the only viable path forward. The second part recounts how the Aldrich Plan was
translated into legislation that populist politicians who were traditionally hostile to central banking and Wall Street would be willing to embrace.
Andrew Jackson's destruction of the Second United States Bank in the mid-1830s left a legacy of popular aversion to central banking of any sort.
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Given these inauspicious prospects, several competing factions ended up playing major roles in the Fed's founding.
There were populists, such as William Jennings Bryan, who had given up on their inflationist efforts to remonetize silver but were still a political
force to be reckoned with, especially within Democratic ranks. Their ideal system centered around a government-issued paper currency, like the
Greenbacks introduced during the Civil War, free from the machinations of Wall Street and bankers.
There were the small country bankers, who emphatically defended the prevailing system of unit banking, with its legal limitations on branch
banking. That system protected local rural banks from competition, so they effectively blocked all attempts to bring about interstate branching and
even most attempts to permit intrastate branching.
There were the Midwestern city bankers, centered in Chicago, who tended to support what was referred to as the asset-currency reform. This
approach would grant banks greater freedom to issue banknotes, especially during periods of financial stringency.
And then there were the major New York bankers, who ultimately came to believe that they could only preserve their financial dominance with a
government-sponsored but privately controlled centralized clearinghouse empowered to loan currency to banks in times of stress. This last scheme
was essentially what the original Aldrich Plan would have created.
These crosscurrents produced bitter, drawn-out debates about what form, if any, the country's central bank should take. The struggle involved,
among other disputes, whether the institution would be privately or governmentally controlled, whether it would be a central organization with
branches or a loose federation of regional organizations, and whether the resulting currency would be solely a bank liability or governmentguaranteed. On all three of these questions, the second alternative gained critical concessions, thanks to Bryan's influence and Wilson's mediation.
When the final act passed, it was a complex brew of compromises. Indeed, by this time Aldrich, no longer in the Senate, was denouncing the act. In
light of his extreme unpopularity with progressives, that opposition probably assisted the plan's passage.
Many of the principals in this struggle would subsequently claim primary authorship of the final act or have it claimed for them. The candidates
included the banker Paul Warburg, principle drafter of the Aldrich Plan; Rep. Carter Glass, a Virginia Democrat who introduced the initial House
version of the act; Sen. Robert Owen, an Oklahoma Democrat, who did likewise in the Senate; H. Parker Willis, an economist who assisted Glass; J.
Laurence Laughlin, an economist who was Willis' teacher and advised him as he assisted Glass; and "Colonel" Edward M. House, Wilson's enigmatic
intimate. This led Warburg, when asked to identify the Fed's father, to quip that he didn't know, but given how many made the claim, "its mother
must have been a most immoral woman."
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Lowenstein's account of a few specialized aspects of the Fed's creation is not as detailed as previous scholarly works, and he occasionally ascribes
motives beyond what scrupulous attention to sources would warrant. Still, America's Bank provides a good, comprehensive overview to anyone
primarily interested in the personal, political, and ideological details of the story. But when it comes to objectively describing the economic
background behind the Fed's creation, or to understanding the economic reasoning of its opponents and even some of its proponents, the book is
deeply flawed.
The problem is not just that America's Bank unreflectively extols the Fed. It's that this celebratory tone is informed by the author's superficial
understanding of monetary theory and history. These weaknesses are clearest in the first few chapters, which offer a vulgar caricature of early U.S.
monetary history, sprinkled with more than a few outright factual errors. Contrary to Lowenstein's account, James Madison, as president, did not
oppose but supported the rechartering of the first U.S. Bank. The second U.S. Bank, rather than muting the business cycle, presided over and
contributed to the Panic of 1819, the first major depression in U.S. history. And when Lowenstein describes America's so-called free banking era as a
"monetary babel," he ignores decades of scholarly research finding that the charges of reckless and fraudulent "wildcat" banking are highly
exaggerated and that, to the limited extent the phenomenon was real, it was mainly the result of a government-imposed restriction on the issue of
banknotes, known as the bond-collateral requirement.
That requirement was later embodied in the post-Civil War national banking system. The new system was therefore hardly the "remedy" Lowenstein
claims it was—before he goes on in future pages to contradict himself by overstating its real faults. The depression of 1873 did not last six years but
at most 27 months, according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Nor was the secular deflation from 1867 to 1896 drastic; prices declined
about 2 percent per year, accompanied by robust secular growth of real gross domestic product per capita. When Lowenstein writes that "beginning
in 1887, there had been serious financial turmoil roughly every three years," his "serious financial turmoil" must mean every spike in interest rates.
In fact, between the Civil War and the Fed's creation, major bank panics followed by recessions occurred only in 1873, 1893, and 1907, and none of
those events approached the severity of the Great Depression. On the other hand, incipient bank panics in 1884 and 1890 were nipped in the bud by
bank clearinghouses issuing extralegal clearinghouse receipts that could serve as currency.
Even worse is the disdainful contempt Lowenstein displays toward opponents of central banking, particularly those who advocated alternative
reforms. To be sure, the national banking system did have serious drawbacks. Two were particularly harmful: It fastened the fragile and fragmented
unit banking system on the country, and it created what was known as an "inelastic currency." But Lowenstein hardly touches on the ideal solution
to the first problem—the legalization of branch banking—and he does not fully appreciate the nature of the second. The term "inelastic currency"
does not properly refer to an inelastic money supply but rather to the inability of national banks to freely convert their deposits into banknotes.
The bond-collateral requirement rigidly tied the quantity of banknotes to a shrinking national debt. Despite the increasing importance of bank
deposits in the U.S. money stock, many transactions still required currency rather than less liquid and potentially more risky checks. (As late as the
Great Depression, most workers, having no checking accounts, were still paid with weekly envelopes of cash.) In a country with a large agricultural
sector, there were regular seasonal demands to convert deposits into currency. But because banks could not freely issue banknotes, these seasonal
demands drained reserves of gold and Greenbacks from the banks. This inelastic currency became a major source of potential panics.
Hence the asset-currency reform that America's Bank so casually dismisses. It proposed relaxing the restrictions on issuing banknotes, thereby solving
the problem of an inelastic currency without creating a central bank. Proponents of this reform repeatedly pointed to the success of Canadian
banking, which faced the same seasonal fluctuations in currency demand that the U.S. banks did. But Canada—which had no central bank, had
nationwide branching, and allowed banks a nearly unrestricted freedom to issue currency—sailed through this era with no credit crunches, bank
panics, or major bank failures. The asset-currency reform movement emerged in the 1890s, and it initially had the support of influential economists
such as Laurence Laughlin and many bankers—even Frank Vanderlip. Asset-currency bills were regularly introduced in Congress, but they were
inevitably blocked by a coalition of small country and New York bankers. Laughlin, Vanderlip, and others eventually turned to some kind of central
bank as the only viable alternative.
Was the Federal Reserve actually an improvement over the flawed national banking system that preceded it, as Lowenstein assumes? Let us look at
the record.
Created just before the outbreak of World War I, the Fed helped finance U.S. participation in that war by generating the highest rate of inflation in
American history outside of the two hyperinflations during the American Revolution and in the Civil War Confederacy. After the war, it orchestrated
the most rapid rate of deflation in U.S. history, so severe that it makes the mild, benign deflation of 1867 to 1896 look like price stability by
comparison. During the Great Depression, the Fed presided over the most massive banking panic not just in the history of the U.S. but in the entire
history of the world, despite being created to prevent such a catastrophe. It also contributed to the recession of 1937, in the midst of high
unemployment lingering from the Great Depression; and it followed that with another bout of inflation during World War II, severe enough to inspire
comprehensive wage and price controls. During the postwar period, the Fed was responsible for the Great Inflation of the 1970s, which hit doubledigits and was accompanied by the country's first inflationary recessions. And let's not forget the financial crisis of 2007–08.
In fact, there are only three periods during the entire century of the Fed's existence when one can plausibly claim that it performed satisfactorily:
during the 1920s, when the price level was stable; during the low-inflation 1950s; and during the two decades beginning in the mid-1980s, a spell
whose low inflation and two minor recessions earned the sobriquet "the Great Moderation." Some critics would even question how satisfactory the
Fed's record was during those three periods. (The '50s, for example, were punctuated by three recessions.)
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If we ignore the most recent panic affecting mostly investment banks and other components of the shadow banking system, bringing on the financial
crisis, the period since the Great Depression did see the elimination of contagious bank runs. But the timing suggests that this change owes more to
the introduction of deposit insurance than to the Fed. Yet since the Fed's creation, the economy has experienced two periods with significant numbers
of bank failures unassociated with panics or depressions: the rural failures of the 1920s and the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. Indeed, more
outbreaks of numerous bank failures occurred in the century under the Federal Reserve than in the century before, with the Fed presiding over the
most serious case of all: again, the Great Depression. By any objective measure, the Fed has been an abysmal failure.
Ironically, this makes Lowenstein's book, with all its shortcomings, all the more instructive. It provides valuable insight not just into how a central
bank was foisted on the body politic but into how it became an object of superstitious reverence, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL is the author of Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men: A History of the American Civil War (Open Court). He teaches economics and history at San Jose State
University.
FEDERAL RESERVE
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CHAPTER
19
Money Supply, Money Demand,
and the Banking System
There have been three great inventions since the beginning of time: fire, the
wheel, and central banking.
—Will Rogers
T
he supply and demand for money are crucial to many issues in macroeconomics. In Chapter 4, we discussed how economists use the term “money,”
how the central bank controls the quantity of money, and how monetary
policy affects prices and interest rates in the long run when prices are flexible. In
Chapters 10 and 11, we saw that the money market is a key element of the IS–LM
model, which describes the economy in the short run when prices are sticky. This
chapter examines money supply and money demand more closely.
In Section 19-1 we see that the banking system plays a key role in determining
the money supply. We discuss various policy instruments that the central bank can
use to influence the banking system and alter the money supply. We also discuss
some of the regulatory problems that central banks confront—an issue that rose in
prominence during the financial crisis and economic downturn of 2008 and 2009.
In Section 19-2 we consider the motives behind money demand, and we analyze the individual household’s decision about how much money to hold. We
also discuss how recent changes in the financial system have blurred the distinction between money and other assets and how this development complicates the
conduct of monetary policy.
19-1 Money Supply
Chapter 4 introduced the concept of “money supply’’ in a highly simplified manner.
In that chapter we defined the quantity of money as the number of dollars held by
the public, and we assumed that the Federal Reserve controls the supply of money
by increasing or decreasing the number of dollars in circulation through openmarket operations. This explanation is a good starting point for understanding what
determines the supply of money, but it is incomplete, because it omits the role of the
banking system in this process. We now present a more complete explanation.
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In this section we see that the money supply is determined not only by Fed
policy but also by the behavior of households (which hold money) and banks (in
which money is held). We begin by recalling that the money supply includes both
currency in the hands of the public and deposits at banks that households can use
on demand for transactions, such as checking account deposits. That is, letting M
denote the money supply, C currency, and D demand deposits, we can write
Money Supply = Currency + Demand Deposits
M
=
C
+
D.
To understand the money supply, we must understand the interaction between
currency and demand deposits and how Fed policy influences these two components of the money supply.
100-Percent-Reserve Banking
We begin by imagining a world without banks. In such a world, all money takes
the form of currency, and the quantity of money is simply the amount of currency that the public holds. For this discussion, suppose that there is $1,000 of
currency in the economy.
Now introduce banks. At first, suppose that banks accept deposits but do not
make loans. The only purpose of the banks is to provide a safe place for depositors to keep their money.
The deposits that banks have received but have not lent out are called reserves.
Some reserves are held in the vaults of local banks throughout the country, but most
are held at a central bank, such as the Federal Reserve. In our hypothetical economy, all deposits are held as reserves: banks simply accept deposits, place the money in
reserve, and leave the money there until the depositor makes a withdrawal or writes
a check against the balance. This system is called 100-percent-reserve banking.
Suppose that households deposit the economy’s entire $1,000 in Firstbank.
Firstbank’s balance sheet—its accounting statement of assets and liabilities—
looks like this:
Firstbank’s Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Reserves
$1,000
Deposits
$1,000
The bank’s assets are the $1,000 it holds as reserves; the bank’s liabilities are the
$1,000 it owes to depositors. Unlike banks in our economy, this bank is not making loans, so it will not earn profit from its assets. The bank presumably charges
depositors a small fee to cover its costs.
What is the money supply in this economy? Before the creation of Firstbank,
the money supply was the $1,000 of currency. After the creation of Firstbank,
the money supply is the $1,000 of demand deposits. A dollar deposited in a bank
reduces currency by one dollar and raises deposits by one dollar, so the money
supply remains the same. If banks hold 100 percent of deposits in reserve, the banking
system does not affect the supply of money.
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Money Supply, Money Demand, and the Banking System | 549
Fractional-Reserve Banking
Now imagine that banks start to use some of their deposits to make loans—
for example, to families who are buying houses or to firms that are investing
in new plants and equipment. The advantage to banks is that they can charge
interest on the loans. The banks must keep some reserves on hand so that
reserves are available whenever depositors want to make withdrawals. But as
long as the amount of new deposits approximately equals the amount of withdrawals, a bank need not keep all its deposits in reserve. Thus, bankers have an
incentive to make loans. When they do so, we have fractional-reserve
banking, a system under which banks keep only a fraction of their deposits
in reserve.
Here is Firstbank’s balance sheet after it makes a loan:
Firstbank’s Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Reserves
$200
Deposits
$1,000
Loans
$800
This balance sheet assumes that the reserve–deposit ratio—the fraction of deposits
kept in reserve—is 20 percent. Firstbank keeps $200 of the $1,000 in deposits in
reserve and lends out the remaining $800.
Notice that Firstbank increases the supply of money by $800 when it
makes this loan. Before the loan is made, the money supply is $1,000, equaling the deposits in Firstbank. After the loan is made, the money supply is
$1,800: the depositor still has a demand deposit of $1,000, but now the borrower holds $800 in currency. Thus, in a system of fractional-reserve banking, banks
create money.
The creation of money does not stop with Firstbank. If the borrower deposits
the $800 in another bank (or if the borrower uses the $800 to pay someone who
then deposits it), the process of money creation continues. Here is the balance
sheet of Secondbank:
Secondbank’s Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Reserves
$160
Deposits
$800
Loans
$640
Secondbank receives the $800 in deposits, keeps 20 percent, or $160, in reserve,
and then loans out $640. Thus, Secondbank creates $640 of money. If this $640
is eventually deposited in Thirdbank, this bank keeps 20 percent, or $128, in
reserve and loans out $512, resulting in this balance sheet:
Thirdbank’s Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Reserves
$128
Deposits
$640
Loans
$512
The process goes on and on. With each deposit and loan, more money is created.
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Although this process of money creation can continue forever, it does not create an infinite amount of money. Letting rr denote the reserve–deposit ratio, the
amount of money that the original $1,000 creates is
Original Deposit
Firstbank Lending
Secondbank Lending
Thirdbank Lending
=
=
=
=
$1,000
(1 − rr) × $1,000
(1 − rr)2 × $1,000
(1 − rr)3 × $1,000
Total Money Supply = [1 + (1 − rr) + (1 − rr)2
+ (1 − rr)3 + . . . ] × $1,000
= (1/rr) × $1,000.
Each $1 of reserves generates $(1/rr) of money. In our example, rr = 0.2, so the
original $1,000 generates $5,000 of money.1
The banking system’s ability to create money is the primary difference
between banks and other financial institutions. As we first discussed in Chapter
3, financial markets have the important function of transferring the economy’s
resources from those households that wish to save some of their income for the
future to those households and firms that wish to borrow to buy investment
goods to be used in future production. The process of transferring funds from
savers to borrowers is called financial intermediation. Many institutions in the
economy act as financial intermediaries: the most prominent examples are the
stock market, the bond market, and the banking system. Yet, of these financial
institutions, only banks have the legal authority to create assets (such as checking accounts) that are part of the money supply. Therefore, banks are the only
financial institutions that directly influence the money supply.
Note that although the system of fractional-reserve banking creates money, it
does not create wealth. When a bank loans out some of its reserves, it gives borrowers the ability to make transactions and therefore increases the supply of
money. The borrowers are also undertaking a debt obligation to the bank, however, so the loan does not make them wealthier. In other words, the creation of
money by the banking system increases the economy’s liquidity, not its wealth.
A Model of the Money Supply
Now that we have seen how banks create money, let’s examine in more detail
what determines the money supply. Here we present a model of the money supply under fractional-reserve banking. The model has three exogenous variables:
1
Mathematical note: The last step in the derivation of the total money supply uses the algebraic
result for the sum of an infinite geometric series (which we used previously in computing the multiplier in Chapter 10). According to this result, if x is a number between –1 and 1, then
1 + x + x2 + x3 + . . . = 1/(1 − x).
In this application, x = (1 − rr).
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19
Money Supply, Money Demand, and the Banking System | 551
The monetary base B is the total number of dollars held by the public
as currency C and by the banks as reserves R. It is directly controlled by
the Federal Reserve.
The reserve–deposit ratio rr is the fraction of deposits that banks hold
in reserve. It is determined by the business policies of banks and the laws
regulating banks.
The currency–deposit ratio cr is the amount of currency C people
hold as a fraction of their holdings of demand deposits D. It reflects the
preferences of households about the form of money they wish to hold.
Our model shows how the money supply depends on the monetary base, the
reserve–deposit ratio, and the currency–deposit ratio. It allows us to examine how
Fed policy and the choices of banks and households influence the money supply.
We begin with the definitions of the money supply and the monetary base:
M = C + D,
B = C + R.
The first equation states that the money supply is the sum of currency and
demand deposits. The second equation states that the monetary base is the sum
of currency and bank reserves. To solve for the money supply as a function of
the three exogenous variables (B, rr, and cr), we first divide the first equation by
the second to obtain
M C+D
=
.
B C+R
Then divide both the top and bottom of the expression on the right by D.
M
C/D + 1
=
.
B C/D + R/D
Note that C/D is the currency–deposit ratio cr, and that R/D is the
reserve–deposit ratio rr. Making these substitutions, and bringing the B from the
left to the right side of the equation, we obtain
M=
cr + 1
× B.
cr + rr
This equation shows how the money supply depends on the three exogenous
variables.
We can now see that the money supply is proportional to the monetary base.
The factor of proportionality, (cr + 1)/(cr + rr), is denoted m and is called the
money multiplier. We can write
M = m × B.
Each dollar of the monetary base produces m dollars of money. Because the
monetary base has a multiplied effect on the money supply, the monetary base is
sometimes called high-powered money.
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Here’s a numerical example. Suppose that the monetary base B is $800 billion,
the reserve–deposit ratio rr is 0.1, and the currency–deposit ratio cr is 0.8. In this
case, the money multiplier is
m=
0.8 + 1
= 2.0,
0.8 + 0.1
and the money supply is
M = 2.0 × $800 billion = $1,600 billion.
Each dollar of the monetary base generates two dollars of money, so the total
money supply is $1,600 billion.
We can now see how changes in the three exogenous variables—B, rr, and
cr—cause the money supply to change.
1. The money supply is proportional to the monetary base. Thus, an increase
in the monetary base increases the money supply by the same percentage.
2. The lower the reserve–deposit ratio, the more loans banks make, and the
more money banks create from every dollar of reserves. Thus, a decrease in
the reserve–deposit ratio raises the money multiplier and the money supply.
3. The lower the currency–deposit ratio, the fewer dollars of the monetary
base the public holds as currency, the more base dollars banks hold as
reserves, and the more money banks can create. Thus, a decrease in the currency–deposit ratio raises the money multiplier and the money supply.
With this model in mind, we can discuss the ways in which the Fed influences
the money supply.
The Three Instruments of Monetary Policy
In previous chapters we made the simplifying assumption that the Federal
Reserve controls the money supply directly. In fact, the Fed controls the money
supply indirectly by altering either the monetary base or the reserve–deposit
ratio. To do this, the Fed has at its disposal three instruments of monetary policy: open-market operations, reserve requirements, and the discount rate.
Open-market operations are the purchases and sales of government bonds
by the Fed. When the Fed buys bonds from the public, the dollars it pays for the
bonds increase the monetary base and thereby increase the money supply. When
the Fed sells bonds to the public, the dollars it receives reduce the monetary base
and thus decrease the money supply. Open-market operations are the policy
instrument that the Fed uses most often. In fact, the Fed conducts open-market
operations in New York bond markets almost every weekday.
Reserve requirements are Fed regulations that impose on banks a minimum
reserve–deposit ratio. An increase in reserve requirements raises the
reserve–deposit ratio and thus lowers the money multiplier and the money supply. Changes in reserve requirements are the least frequently used of the Fed’s
three policy instruments.
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The discount rate is the interest rate that the Fed charges when it makes
loans to banks. Banks borrow from the Fed when they find themselves with too
few reserves to meet reserve requirements. The lower the discount rate, the
cheaper are borrowed reserves, and the more banks borrow at the Fed’s discount
window. Hence, a reduction in the discount rate raises the monetary base and the
money supply.
Although these three instruments—open-market operations, reserve requirements, and the discount rate—give the Fed substantial power to influence the
money supply, the Fed cannot control the money supply perfectly. Bank discretion in conducting business can cause the money supply to change in ways the
Fed did not anticipate. For example, banks may choose to hold excess
reserves—that is, reserves above the reserve requirement. The higher the
amount of excess reserves, the higher the reserve–deposit ratio, and the lower the
money supply. As another example, the Fed cannot precisely control the amount
banks borrow from the discount window. The less banks borrow, the smaller the
monetary base, and the smaller the money supply. Hence, the money supply
sometimes moves in ways the Fed does not intend.
CASE STUDY
Bank Failures and the Money Supply in the 1930s
Between August 1929 and March 1933, the money supply fell 28 percent. As we
discussed in Chapter 11, some economists believe that this large decline in the
money supply was the primary cause of the Great Depression. But we did not
discuss why the money supply fell so dramatically.
The three variables that determine the money supply—the monetary base, the
reserve–deposit ratio, and the currency–deposit ratio—are shown in Table 19-1
for 1929 and 1933. You can see that the fall in the money supply cannot be
attributed to a fall in the monetary base: in fact, the monetary base rose 18 percent over this period. Instead, the money supply fell because the money multiplier fell 38 percent. The money multiplier fell because the currency–deposit and
reserve–deposit ratios both rose substantially.
Most economists attribute the fall in the money multiplier to the large number
of bank failures in the early 1930s. From 1930 to 1933, more than 9,000 banks suspended operations, often defaulting on their depositors. The bank failures caused
the money supply to fall by altering the behavior of both depositors and bankers.
Bank failures raised the currency–deposit ratio by reducing public confidence
in the banking system. People feared that bank failures would continue, and they
began to view currency as a more desirable form of money than demand
deposits. When they withdrew their deposits, they drained the banks of reserves.
The process of money creation reversed itself, as banks responded to lower
reserves by reducing their outstanding balance of loans.
In addition, the bank failures raised the reserve–deposit ratio by making
bankers more cautious. Having just observed many bank runs, bankers became
apprehensive about operating with a small amount of reserves. They therefore
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TABLE
19-1
The Money Supply and Its Determinants: 1929 and 1933
August 1929
Money Supply
Currency
Demand deposits
March 1933
26.5
3.9
22.6
19.0
5.5
13.5
Monetary Base
Currency
Reserves
7.1
3.9
3.2
8.4
5.5
2.9
Money Multiplier
Reserve–deposit ratio
Currency–deposit ratio
3.7
0.14
0.17
2.3
0.21
0.41
Source: Adapted from Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of
the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963),
Appendix A.
increased their holdings of reserves to well above the legal minimum. Just as
households responded to the banking crisis by holding more currency relative to
deposits, bankers responded by holding more reserves relative to loans. Together
these changes caused a large fall in the money multiplier.
Although it is easy to explain why the money supply fell, it is more difficult
to decide whether to blame the Federal Reserve. One might argue that the monetary base did not fall, so the Fed should not be blamed. Critics of Fed policy
during this period make two counterarguments. First, they claim that the Fed
should have taken a more vigorous role in preventing bank failures by acting as
a lender of last resort when banks needed cash during bank runs. This would have
helped maintain confidence in the banking system and prevented the large fall
in the money multiplier. Second, they point out that the Fed could have
responded to the fall in the money multiplier by increasing the monetary base
even more than it did. Either of these actions would likely have prevented such
a large fall in the money supply, which in turn might have reduced the severity
of the Great Depression.
Since the 1930s, many policies have been put into place that make such a large
and sudden fall in the money multiplier less likely today. Most important, the system of federal deposit insurance protects depositors when a bank fails. This policy
is designed to maintain public confidence in the banking system and thus prevents
large swings in the currency–deposit ratio. Deposit insurance has a cost: in the late
1980s and early 1990s, for example, the federal government incurred the large
expense of bailing out many insolvent savings-and-loan institutions. Yet deposit
insurance helps stabilize the banking system and the money supply. That is why,
during the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation raised the amount guaranteed from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor. ■
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Bank Capital, Leverage, and Capital Requirements
The model of the banking system presented in this chapter is simplified. That is
not necessarily a problem: after all, all models are simplified. But it is worth drawing attention to one particular simplifying assumption.
In the bank balance sheets presented so far, a bank takes in deposits and uses
those deposits to make loans or to hold reserves. Based on this discussion, you
might think that it does not take any resources to open up a bank. That is,
however, not true. Starting a bank requires some capital. That is, the bank
owners must start with some financial resources to get the business going.
Those resources are called bank capital or, equivalently, the equity of the
bank’s owners.
Here is what a more realistic balance sheet for a bank would look like:
A Bank’s Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities and Owners’ Equity
Reserves
$200
Deposits
$750
Loans
$500
Debt
$200
Securities
$300
Capital (owners’ equity) $50
The bank obtains resources from its owners, who provide capital, and also by taking in deposits and issuing debt. It uses these resources in three ways. Some funds
are held as reserves; some are used to make bank loans; and some are used to buy
financial securities, such as government or corporate bonds. The bank allocates
its resources among these asset classes, taking into account the risk and return
that each offers and any regulations that restrict its choices. The reserves, loans,
and securities on the left side of the balance sheet must equal, in total, the
deposits, debt, and capital on the right side of the balance sheet.
This business strategy relies on a phenomenon called leverage, which is the
use of borrowed money to supplement existing funds for purposes of investment. The leverage ratio is the ratio of the bank’s total assets (the left side of the
balance sheet) to bank capital (the one item on the right side of the balance
sheet that represents the owners’ equity). In this example, the leverage ratio is
$1000/$50, or 20. This means that for every dollar of capital that the bank
owners have contributed, the bank has $20 of assets and, thus, $19 of deposits
and debts.
One implication of leverage is that, in bad times, a bank can lose much of its
capital very quickly. To see how, let’s continue with this numerical example. If
the bank’s assets fall in value by a mere 5 percent, then the $1,000 of assets are
now worth only $950. Because the depositors and debt holders have the legal
right to be paid first, the value of the owners’ equity falls to zero. That is, when
the leverage ratio is 20, a 5-percent fall in the value of the bank assets leads to a
100-percent fall in bank capital. The fear that bank capital may be running out,
and thus that depositors may not be fully repaid, is typically what generates bank
runs when there is no deposit insurance.
One of the restrictions that bank regulators put on banks is that the banks
must hold sufficient capital. The goal of such a capital requirement is to ensure
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that banks will be able to pay off their depositors. The amount of capital required
depends on the kind of assets a bank holds. If the bank holds safe assets such as
government bonds, regulators require less capital than if the bank holds risky
assets such as loans to borrowers whose credit is of dubious quality.
In 2008 and 2009 many banks found themselves with too little capital after
they had incurred losses on mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities. The
shortage of bank capital reduced bank lending, contributing to a severe economic downturn. (This event was discussed in a Case Study in Chapter 11.) In
response to this problem, the U.S. Treasury, working together with the Federal
Reserve, started putting public funds into the banking system, increasing the
amount of bank capital and making the U.S. taxpayer a part owner of many
banks. The goal of this unusual policy was to recapitalize the banking system so
bank lending could return to a more normal level.
19-2 Money Demand
We now turn to the other side of the money market and examine what determines money demand. In previous chapters, we used simple money demand
functions. We started with the quantity theory, which assumes that the
demand for real balances is proportional to income. That is, the quantity theory assumes
(M/P)d = kY,
where k is a constant measuring how much money people want to hold for every
dollar of income. We then considered a more general and realistic money
demand function that assumes the demand for real money balances depends on
both the interest rate and income:
(M/P)d = L(i, Y ).
We used this money demand function when we discussed the link between
money and prices in Chapter 4 and when we developed the IS–LM model in
Chapters 10 and 11.
There is, of course, much more to say about what determines how much
money people choose to hold. Just as studies of the consumption function rely
on microeconomic models of the consumption decision, studies of the money
demand function rely on microeconomic models of the money demand decision. In this section we first discuss in broad terms the different ways to model
money demand. We then develop one prominent model.
Recall that money serves three functions: it is a unit of account, a store of
value, and a medium of exchange. The first function—money as a unit of
account—does not by itself generate any demand for money, because one can
quote prices in dollars without holding any. By contrast, money can serve its
other two functions only if people hold it. Theories of money demand emphasize the role of money either as a store of value or as a medium of exchange.
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Portfolio Theories of Money Demand
Theories of money demand that emphasize the role of money as a store of value
are called portfolio theories. According to these theories, people hold money
as part of their portfolio of assets. The key insight is that money offers a different combination of risk and return than other assets. In particular, money offers
a safe (nominal) return, whereas the prices of stocks and bonds may rise or fall.
Thus, some economists have suggested that households choose to hold money as
part of their optimal portfolio.2
Portfolio theories predict that the demand for money should depend on the
risk and return offered by money and by the various assets households can hold
instead of money. In addition, money demand should depend on total wealth,
because wealth measures the size of the portfolio to be allocated among money
and the alternative assets. For example, we might write the money demand
function as
(M/P)d = L(rs, rb, E , W ),
p
where rs is the expected real return on stock, rb is the expected real return on
bonds, E is the expected inflation rate, and W is real wealth. An increase in rs
p
or rb reduces money demand, because other assets become more attractive. An
increase in E also reduces money demand, because money becomes less attracp
tive. (Recall that −E is the expected real return to holding money.) An increase
p
in W raises money demand, because greater wealth means a larger portfolio.
From the standpoint of portfolio theories, we can view our money demand
function, L(i, Y ), as a useful simplification. First, it uses real income Y as a
proxy for real wealth W. Second, the only return variable it includes is the
nominal interest rate, which is the sum of the real return on bonds and
expected inflation (that is, i = rb + E ). According to portfolio theories, howp
ever, the money demand function should include the expected returns on
other assets as well.
Are portfolio theories useful for studying money demand? The answer
depends on which measure of money we are considering. The narrowest measures of money, such as M1, include only currency and deposits in checking
accounts. These forms of money earn zero or very low rates of interest. There
are other assets—such as savings accounts, Treasury bills, certificates of deposit,
and money market mutual funds—that earn higher rates of interest and have the
same risk characteristics as currency and checking accounts. Economists say that
money (M1) is a dominated asset: as a store of value, it exists alongside other
assets that are always better. Thus, it is not optimal for people to hold money as
part of their portfolio, and portfolio theories cannot explain the demand for
these dominated forms of money.
Portfolio theories are more plausible as theories of money demand if we adopt
a broad measure of money. The broad measures include many of those assets that
2
James Tobin, “Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk,’’ Review of Economic Studies 25 (February 1958): 65–86.
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dominate currency and checking accounts. M2, for example, includes savings
accounts and money market mutual funds. When we examine why people hold
assets in the form of M2, rather than bonds or stock, the portfolio considerations
of risk and return may be paramount. Hence, although the portfolio approach to
money demand may not be plausible when applied to M1, it may be a good theory to explain the demand for M2.
CASE STUDY
Currency and the Underground Economy
How much currency are you holding right now in your wallet? How many $100
bills?
In the United States today, the amount of currency per person is about
$3,000. About half of that is in $100 bills. Most people find this fact surprising,
because they hold much smaller amounts and in smaller denominations.
Some of this currency is used by people in the underground economy—
that is, by those engaged in illegal activity such as the drug trade and by those
trying to hide income to evade taxes. People whose wealth was earned illegally may have fewer options for investing their portfolio, because by holding
wealth in banks, bonds, or stock, they assume a greater risk of detection. For
criminals, currency may not be a dominated asset: it may be the best store of
value available.
Some economists point to the large amount of currency in the underground
economy as one reason that some inflation may be desirable. Recall that inflation is a tax on the holders of money, because inflation erodes the real value of
money. A drug dealer holding $20,000 in cash pays an inflation tax of $2,000 per
year when the inflation rate is 10 percent. The inflation tax is one of the few
taxes those in the underground economy cannot evade.3 ■
Transactions Theories of Money Demand
Theories of money demand that emphasize the role of money as a medium of
exchange are called transactions theories. These theories acknowledge that
money is a dominated asset and stress that people hold money, unlike other assets,
to make purchases. These theories best explain why people hold narrow measures of money, such as currency and checking accounts, as opposed to holding
assets that dominate them, such as savings accounts or Treasury bills.
Transactions theories of money demand take many forms, depending on how
one models the process of obtaining money and making transactions. All these
theories assume that money has the cost of earning a low rate of return and the
benefit of making transactions more convenient. People decide how much
money to hold by trading off these costs and benefits.
3
To read more about the large quantity of currency, see Case M. Sprenkle, “The Case of the Missing Currency,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (Fall 1993): 175–184.
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To see how transactions theories explain the money demand function, let’s
develop one prominent model of this type. The Baumol–Tobin model was
developed in the 1950s by economists William Baumol and James Tobin, and it
remains a leading theory of money demand.4
The Baumol–Tobin Model of Cash Management
The Baumol–Tobin model analyzes the costs and benefits of holding money. The
benefit of holding money is convenience: people hold money to avoid making a
trip to the bank every time they wish to buy something. The cost of this convenience is the forgone interest they would have received had they left the
money deposited in a savings account that paid interest.
To see how people trade off these benefits and costs, consider a person who
plans to spend Y dollars gradually over the course of a year. (For simplicity,
assume that the price level is constant, so real spending is constant over the year.)
How much money should he hold in the process of spending this amount? That
is, what is the optimal size of average cash balances?
Consider the possibilities. He could withdraw the Y dollars at the beginning
of the year and gradually spend the money. Panel (a) of Figure 19-1 shows his
FIGURE
19-1
(b) Money Holdings With
Two Trips to the Bank
(a) Money Holdings With
One Trip to the Bank
Money holdings
Y
Money holdings
Average Y/2
1
Time
Y/2
Average Y/4
1/2
1
Time
(c) Money Holdings With
N Trips to the Bank
Money Holdings Over the Year Average money
Money holdings
Average Y/(2N)
holdings depend on the number of trips a person
makes to the bank each year.
Y/N
1/N
4
1 Time
William Baumol, “The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach,’’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 66 (November 1952): 545–556; and James Tobin, “The Interest Elasticity of
the Transactions Demand for Cash,’’ Review of Economics and Statistics (August 1956): 241–247.
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money holdings over the course of the year under this plan. His money holdings
begin the year at Y and end the year at zero, averaging Y/2 over the year.
A second possible plan is to make two trips to the bank. In this case, he
withdraws Y/2 dollars at the beginning of the year, gradually spends this
amount over the first half of the year, and then makes another trip to withdraw
Y/2 for the second half of the year. Panel (b) of Figure 19-1 shows that money
holdings over the year vary between Y/2 and zero, averaging Y/4. This plan
has the advantage that less money is held on average, so the individual forgoes
less interest, but it has the disadvantage of requiring two trips to the bank
rather than one.
More generally, suppose the individual makes N trips to the bank over the
course of the year. On each trip, he withdraws Y/N dollars; he then spends the
money gradually over the following 1/Nth of the year. Panel (c) of Figure 19-1
shows that money holdings vary between Y/N and zero, averaging Y/(2N ).
The question is, what is the optimal choice of N? The greater N is, the less
money the individual holds on average and the less interest he forgoes. But as N
increases, so does the inconvenience of making frequent trips to the bank.
Suppose that the cost of going to the bank is some fixed amount F. We can
view F as representing the value of the time spent traveling to and from the bank
and waiting in line to make the withdrawal. For example, if a trip to the bank
takes 15 minutes and a person’s wage is $12 per hour, then F is $3. Also, let i
denote the interest rate; because money does not bear interest, i measures the
opportunity cost of holding money.
Now we can analyze the optimal choice of N, which determines money
demand. For any N, the average amount of money held is Y/(2N ), so the forgone interest is iY/(2N ). Because F is the cost per trip to the bank, the total cost
of making trips to the bank is FN. The total cost the individual bears is the sum
of the forgone interest and the cost of trips to the bank:
Total Cost = Forgone Interest + Cost of Trips
=
iY/(2N )
+
FN.
The larger the number of trips N, the smaller the forgone interest, and the larger the cost of going to the bank.
Figure 19-2 shows how total cost depends on N. There is one value of N that
minimizes total cost. The optimal value of N, denoted N*, is5
N* =
⎯.
2F
√莦
iY
5
Mathematical note: Deriving this expression for the optimal choice of N requires simple calculus.
Differentiate total cost C with respect to N to obtain
dC/dN = −iYN −2/2 + F.
At the optimum, dC/dN = 0, which yields the formula for N*.
CHAPTER
FIGURE
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Money Supply, Money Demand, and the Banking System | 561
19-2
The Cost of Money Holding
Cost
Forgone interest, the cost of trips to
the bank, and total cost depend on
the number of trips N. One value of N,
denoted N *, minimizes total cost.
Total cost
Cost of trips
to bank FN
Forgone
interest iY/(2N)
N*
Number of trips to bank, N
Number of trips that
minimizes total cost
Average money holding is
Average Money Holding = Y/(2N *)
YF
= ⎯.
2i
√莦
This expression shows that the individual holds more money if the fixed cost of
going to the bank F is higher, if expenditure Y is higher, or if the interest rate i
is lower.
So far, we have been interpreting the Baumol–Tobin model as a model of the
demand for currency. That is, we have used it to explain the amount of money
held outside of banks. Yet one can interpret the model more broadly. Imagine a
person who holds a portfolio of monetary assets (currency and checking
accounts) and nonmonetary assets (stocks and bonds). Monetary assets are used
for transactions but offer a low rate of return. Let i be the difference in the return
between monetary and nonmonetary assets, and let F be the cost of transforming nonmonetary assets into monetary assets, such as a brokerage fee. The decision about how often to pay the brokerage fee is analogous to the decision about
how often to make a trip to the bank. Therefore, the Baumol–Tobin model
describes this person’s demand for monetary assets. By showing that money
demand depends positively on expenditure Y and negatively on the interest rate
i, the model provides a microeconomic justification for the money demand
function, L(i, Y), that we have used throughout this book.
One implication of the Baumol–Tobin model is that any change in the fixed
cost of going to the bank F alters the money demand function—that is, it
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changes the quantity of money demanded for any given interest rate and income.
It is easy to imagine events that might influence this fixed cost. The spread of
automatic teller machines, for instance, reduces F by reducing the time it takes
to withdraw money. Similarly, the introduction of Internet banking reduces F by
making it easier to transfer funds among accounts. On the other hand, an increase
in real wages increases F by increasing the value of time. And an increase in banking fees increases F directly. Thus, although the Baumol–Tobin model gives us a
very specific money demand function, it does not give us reason to believe that
this function will necessarily be stable over time.
CASE STUDY
Empirical Studies of Money Demand
Many economists have studied the data on money, income, and interest rates to
learn more about the money demand function. One purpose of these studies is
to estimate how money demand responds to changes in income and the interest
rate. The sensitivity of money demand to these two variables determines the
slope of the LM curve; it thus influences how monetary and fiscal policy affect
the economy.
Another purpose of the empirical studies is to test the theories of money
demand. The Baumol–Tobin model, for example, makes precise predictions for
how income and interest rates influence money demand. The model’s
square-root formula implies that the income elasticity of money demand is 1/2:
a 10-percent increase in income should lead to a 5-percent increase in the
demand for real balances. It also says that the interest elasticity of money demand
is 1/2: a 10-percent increase in the interest rate (say, from 10 percent to 11 percent) should lead to a 5-percent decrease in the demand for real balances.
Most empirical studies of money demand do not confirm these predictions.
They find that the income elasticity of money demand is larger than 1/2 and that
the interest elasticity is smaller than 1/2. Thus, although the Baumol–Tobin
model may capture part of the story behind the money demand function, it is
not completely correct.
One possible explanation for the failure of the Baumol–Tobin model is
that some people may have less discretion over their money holdings than the
model assumes. For example, consider a person who must go to the bank
once a week to deposit her paycheck; while at the bank, she takes advantage
of her visit to withdraw the currency needed for the coming week. For this
person, the number of trips to the bank, N, does not respond to changes in
expenditure or the interest rate. Because N is fixed, average money holdings
[which equals Y/(2N)] are proportional to expenditure and insensitive to the
interest rate.
Now imagine that the world is populated with two sorts of people. Some
obey the Baumol–Tobin model, so they have income and interest elasticities of
1/2. The others have a fixed N, so they have an income elasticity of 1 and an
interest elasticity of zero. In this case, the overall demand for money looks like a
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weighted average of the demands of the two groups. The income elasticity will
be between 1/2 and 1, and the interest elasticity will be between 1/2 and zero,
as the empirical studies find.6 ■
Financial Innovation, Near Money, and
the Demise of the Monetary Aggregates
Traditional macroeconomic analysis groups assets into two categories: those used
as a medium of exchange as well as a store of value (currency, checking accounts)
and those used only as a store of value (stocks, bonds, savings accounts). The first
category of assets is called “money.” In this chapter we have discussed its supply
and demand.
Although the distinction between monetary and nonmonetary assets remains
a useful theoretical tool, in recent years it has become more difficult to use in
practice. In part because of the deregulation of banks and other financial institutions, and in part because of improved computer technology, the past two
decades have seen rapid financial innovation. Monetary assets such as checking
accounts once paid no interest; today they earn market interest rates and are
comparable to nonmonetary assets as stores of value. Nonmonetary assets such as
stocks and bonds were once inconvenient to buy and sell; today mutual funds
allow depositors to hold stocks and bonds and to make withdrawals simply by
writing checks from their accounts. These nonmonetary assets that have acquired
some of the liquidity of money are called near money.
The existence of near money complicates monetary policy by making the
demand for money unstable. Because money and near money are close substitutes, households can easily switch their assets from one form to the other. Such
changes can occur for minor reasons and do not necessarily reflect changes in
spending. Thus, the velocity of money becomes unstable, and the quantity of
money gives faulty signals about aggregate demand.
One response to this problem is to use a broad definition of money that includes
near money. Yet, because there is a continuum of assets in the world with varying
characteristics, it is not clear how to choose a subset to label “money.” Moreover,
if we adopt a broad definition of money, the Fed’s ability to control this quantity
may be limited, because many forms of near money have no reserve requirement.
The instability in money demand caused by near money has been an important practical problem for the Federal Reserve. In February 1993, Fed Chairman
Alan Greenspan announced that the Fed would pay less attention to the monetary aggregates than it had in the past. The aggregates, he said, “do not appear to
be giving reliable indications of economic developments and price pressures.” It’s
easy to see why he reached this conclusion when he did. Over the preceding
6
To learn more about the empirical studies of money demand, see Stephen M. Goldfeld and
Daniel E. Sichel, “The Demand for Money,’’ Handbook of Monetary Economics, vol. 1 (Amsterdam:
North-Holland, 1990), 299–356; and David Laidler, The Demand for Money: Theories and Evidence,
3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1985).
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12 months, M1 had grown at an extremely high 12-percent rate, while M2 had
grown at an extremely low 0.5-percent rate. Depending on how much weight
was given to each of these two measures, monetary policy was either very loose,
very tight, or somewhere in between.
Since then, the Fed has conducted policy by setting a target for the federal funds
rate, the short-term interest rate at which banks make loans to one another. It
adjusts the target interest rate in response to changing economic conditions.
Under such a policy, the money supply becomes endogenous: it is allowed to
adjust to whatever level is necessary to keep the interest rate on target. Chapter
14 presented a dynamic model of aggregate demand and aggregate supply in
which an interest rate rule for the central bank is explicitly incorporated into the
analysis of short-run economic fluctuations.
19-3 Conclusion
Money is at the heart of much macroeconomic analysis. Models of money supply and money demand can help shed light on the long-run determinants of the
price level and the short-run causes of economic fluctuations. The rise of near
money in recent years has shown that there is still much to be learned. Building
reliable microeconomic models of money and near money remains a central
challenge for macroeconomists.
Summary
1. The system of fractional-reserve banking creates money, because each dollar
of reserves generates many dollars of demand deposits.
2. The supply of money depends on the monetary base, the reserve–deposit
ratio, and the currency–deposit ratio. An increase in the monetary base
leads to a proportionate increase in the money supply. A decrease in the
reserve–deposit ratio or in the currency–deposit ratio increases the money
multiplier and thus the money supply.
3. The Federal Reserve changes the money supply using three policy
instruments. It can increase the monetary base by making an open-market
purchase of bonds or by lowering the discount rate. It can reduce the
reserve–deposit ratio by relaxing reserve requirements.
4. To start a bank, the owners must contribute some of their own financial
resources, which become the bank’s capital. Because banks are highly leveraged, however, a small decline in the value of their assets can potentially
have a major impact on the value of bank capital. Bank regulators require
that banks hold sufficient capital to ensure that depositors can be repaid.
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5. Portfolio theories of money demand stress the role of money as a store of
value. They predict that the demand for money depends on the risk and
return on money and alternative assets.
6. Transactions theories of money demand, such as the Baumol–Tobin model,
stress the role of money as a medium of exchange. They predict that the
demand for money depends positively on expenditure and negatively on
the interest rate.
7. Financial innovation has led to the creation of assets with many of the
attributes of money. These near moneys make the demand for money less
stable, which complicates the conduct of monetary policy.
K E Y
C O N C E P T S
Reserves
100-percent-reserve banking
Balance sheet
Fractional-reserve banking
Financial intermediation
Monetary base
Reserve–deposit ratio
Currency–deposit ratio
Q U E S T I O N S
Money multiplier
High-powered money
Open-market operations
Reserve requirements
Discount rate
Excess reserves
Bank capital
Leverage
F O R
R E V I E W
1. Explain how banks create money.
2. What are the three ways in which the Federal
Reserve can influence the money supply?
3. Why might a banking crisis lead to a fall in the
money supply?
4. Explain the difference between portfolio and
transactions theories of money demand.
P R O B L E M S
A N D
Capital requirement
Portfolio theories
Dominated asset
Transactions theories
Baumol–Tobin model
Near money
5. According to the Baumol–Tobin model, what
determines how often people go to the bank?
What does this decision have to do with money
demand?
6. In what way does the existence of near money
complicate the conduct of monetary policy?
How has the Federal Reserve responded to this
complication?
A P P L I C AT I O N S
1. The money supply fell from 1929 to 1933
because both the currency–deposit ratio and the
reserve–deposit ratio increased. Use the model of
the money supply and the data in Table 19-1 to
answer the following hypothetical questions
about this episode.
a. What would have happened to the money
supply if the currency–deposit ratio had risen
but the reserve–deposit ratio had remained
the same?
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b. What would have happened to the money
supply if the reserve–deposit ratio had risen
but the currency–deposit ratio had remained
the same?
c. Which of the two changes was more responsible for the fall in the money supply?
2. To increase tax revenue, the U.S. government in
1932 imposed a two-cent tax on checks written
on deposits in bank accounts. (In today’s dollars,
this tax was about 25 cents per check.)
a. How do you think the check tax affected the
currency–deposit ratio? Explain.
b. Use the model of the money supply under
fractional-reserve banking to discuss how this
tax affected the money supply.
c. Now use the IS–LM model to discuss the
impact of this tax on the economy. Was the
check tax a good policy to implement in the
middle of the Great Depression?
3. Give an example of a bank balance sheet with a
leverage ratio of 10. If the value of the bank’s
assets rises by 5 percent, what happens to the
value of the owners’ equity in this bank? How
large a decline in the value of bank assets would
it take to reduce this bank’s capital to zero?
4. Suppose that an epidemic of street crime sweeps
the country, making it more likely that your
wallet will be stolen. Using the Baumol–Tobin
model, explain (in words, not equations) how
this crime wave will affect the optimal frequency
of trips to the bank and the demand for money.
5. Let’s see what the Baumol–Tobin model says
about how often you should go to the bank to
withdraw cash.
a. How much do you buy per year with
currency (as opposed to checks or credit
cards)? This is your value of Y.
b. How long does it take you to go to the bank?
What is your hourly wage? Use these two
figures to compute your value of F.
c. What interest rate do you earn on the
money you leave in your bank account? This
is your value of i. (Be sure to write i in decimal form—that is, 6 percent should be
expressed 0.06.)
d. According to the Baumol–Tobin model, how
many times should you go to the bank each
year, and how much should you withdraw
each time?
e. In practice, how often do you go to the bank,
and how much do you withdraw?
f. Compare the predictions of the Baumol–Tobin
model to your behavior. Does the model
describe how you actually behave? If not, why
not? How would you change the model to
make it a better description of your behavior?
6. In Chapter 4, we defined the velocity of money
as the ratio of nominal expenditure to the quantity of money. Let’s now use the Baumol–Tobin
model to examine what determines velocity.
a. Recalling that average money holdings equal
Y/(2N), write velocity as a function of the
number of trips to the bank N. Explain your
result.
b. Use the formula for the optimal number of
trips to express velocity as a function of
expenditure Y, the interest rate i, and the cost
of a trip to the bank F.
c. What happens to velocity when the interest
rate rises? Explain.
d. What happens to velocity when the price
level rises? Explain.
e. As the economy grows, what should happen to
the velocity of money? (Hint: Think about
how economic growth will influence Y and F.)
f. Suppose now that the number of trips to the
bank is fixed rather than discretionary. What
does this assumption imply about velocity?
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