FAU Ethics in Euthanasia Discussion

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Writing

Florida Atlantic University

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I’m studying for my Writing class and need an explanation.


Topic chosen: Euthanasia 

Beginning to Think about Applied Ethics

Before beginning this paper, make sure that you have completed Module 1 and chosen your Applied Ethics topic (euthanasia). It is also highly recommend that you have read LaFollette's "Writing a Philosophy Paper" from Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. This paper is worth 5% of your grade in this course. Make sure to follow the following instructions.


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In addition to covering many standard issues such as abortion, euthanasia, animal rights, the environment, and world hunger, the volume includes essays that discuss less familiar, but equally important topics such as hate speech, drug-use, gun control, and political correctness. Half of the essays have been written or revised for this anthology. Eleven essays are new to this edition, and the sections on theory, reproductive technologies, war and terrorism, and animals have all been expanded. The essays are philosophically rigorous yet engaging and accessible to introductory students, enabling them to think critically about a wide range of moral issues. The supporting website (www.hughlafollette.com/eip4/) contains extensive links to sources on the topics, ethical theories, and guides on writing philosophical papers. Together, these features make Ethics in Practice the ideal volume for introductory and applied ethics courses. pb_9780470671832.indd 1 Fourth Edition Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2013, Wiley Blackwell), author of three books, including The Practice of Ethics (2007) and editor of six more in ethics. Most of his published essays have been in ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. An Anthology The fourth edition of the highly successful Ethics in Practice offers an impressive collection of 70 new, revised, and classic essays covering 13 key ethical issues. Through the careful selection of essays, thoughtful organization of the sections, and helpful introductions, this book brings together a collection that integrates ethical theory with the discussion of practical ethical issues. Ethics in Practice “Hugh LaFollette, a leading ethicist who is known (and valued) in particular for his contributions to practical ethics, has done a superb job selecting papers for this important anthology.” Christopher Heath Wellman, Washington University in St. Louis Edited by LaFollette “A superb and thoughtfully edited collection of ethical writing, both theoretical and applied, containing timeless classics (many revised) and timely contemporary essays on important practical topics.” David Archard, Queen’s University Belfast Ethics in Practice An Anthology fourth edition Edited by Hugh LaFollette 14/11/13 05:57:29 Ethics in Practice BLACKWELL PHILOSOPHY ANTHOLOGIES Each volume in this outstanding series provides an authoritative and comprehensive collection of the essential primary readings from philosophy’s main fields of study. Designed to complement the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, each volume represents an unparalleled resource in its own right, and will provide the ideal platform for course use. 1 Cottingham: Western Philosophy: An Anthology (second edition) 2 Cahoone: From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology (expanded second edition) 3 LaFollette: Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (third edition) 4 Goodin and Pettit: Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (second edition) 5 Eze: African Philosophy: An Anthology 6 McNeill and Feldman: Continental Philosophy: An Anthology 7 Kim and Sosa: Metaphysics: An Anthology 8 Lycan and Prinz: Mind and Cognition: An Anthology (third edition) 9 Kuhse and Singer: Bioethics: An Anthology (second edition) 10 Cummins and Cummins: Minds, Brains, and Computers – The Foundations of Cognitive Science: An Anthology 11 Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath: Epistemology: An Anthology (second edition) 12 Kearney and Rasmussen: Continental Aesthetics – Romanticism to Postmodernism: An Anthology 13 Martinich and Sosa: Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology 14 Jacquette: Philosophy of Logic: An Anthology 15 Jacquette: Philosophy of Mathematics: An Anthology 16 Harris, Pratt, and Waters: American Philosophies: An Anthology 17 Emmanuel and Goold: Modern Philosophy – From Descartes to Nietzsche: An Anthology 18 Scharff and Dusek: Philosophy of Technology – The Technological Condition: An Anthology 19 Light and Rolston: Environmental Ethics: An Anthology 20 Taliaferro and Griffiths: Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology 21 Lamarque and Olsen: Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art – The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology 22 John and Lopes: Philosophy of Literature – Contemporary and Classic Readings: An Anthology 23 Cudd and Andreasen: Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology 24 Carroll and Choi: Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology 25 Lange: Philosophy of Science: An Anthology 26 Shafer-Landau and Cuneo: Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology 27 Curren: Philosophy of Education: An Anthology 28 Shafer-Landau: Ethical Theory: An Anthology 29 Cahn and Meskin: Aesthetics: A Comprehensive Anthology 30 McGrew, Alspector-Kelly and Allhoff: The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology 31 May: Philosophy of Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings 32 Rosenberg and Arp: Philosophy of Biology: An Anthology 33 Kim, Korman, and Sosa: Metaphysics: An Anthology (second edition) 34 Martinich and Sosa: Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology (second edition) 35 Shafer-Landau: Ethical Theory: An Anthology (second edition) 36 Hetherington: Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology 37 Scharff and Dusek: Philosophy of Technology – The Technological Condition: An Anthology (second edition) 38 LaFollette: Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (fourth edition) Ethics in Practice An Anthology fourth edition Edited by Hugh LaFollette University of South Florida St. Petersburg This edition first published 2014 © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc Registered Office John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ , UK Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148–5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ , UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ , UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell. The right of Hugh LaFollette to be identified as the author of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. Limit of Liability/Disclaimer of Warranty: While the publisher and author have used their best efforts in preparing this book, they make no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this book and specifically disclaim any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services and neither the publisher nor the author shall be liable for damages arising herefrom. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available on request. 9780470671832 (PB) A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Cover image: Camille Pissarro, Father Sawing Wood, Pontoise, 1879, oil on canvas. © Christie’s Images / Corbis Cover design by Nicki Averill Design and Illustration Set in 9.5/11.5pt Ehrhardt by SPi Publishers, Pondicherry, India 1 2014 Contents [N]: New to fourth edition; [R]: Revised for Ethics in Practice; [W]: Written for Ethics in Practice Preface for Instructors x Acknowledgmentsxii Source Acknowledgments xiii General Introduction 1 Theorizing about Ethics 3 Reading Philosophy 11 Writing a Philosophy Paper [N] 15 Part I Ethical Theory 23 Ethical Theory 25 1 Consequentialism [NR] William H. Shaw 28 2 Deontology [W] David McNaughton and Piers Rawling 37 3 Rights [NW] George W. Rainbolt 49 4 Virtue Theory [W] Rosalind Hursthouse 60 Part II Life and Death 71 Euthanasia 73 5 Rule-Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [W] Brad Hooker 76 6 Justifying Physician-Assisted Deaths [W] Tom L. Beauchamp 85 vi contents 7 Against the Right to Die [R] J. David Velleman 92 8 Dying at the Right Time: Reflections on (Un)Assisted Suicide [W] John Hardwig 101 9 A Duty to Care Revisited [R] Felicia Cohn and Joanne Lynn 112 Abortion 121 10 A Defense of Abortion Judith Jarvis Thomson 124 11 On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion [R] Mary Anne Warren 132 12 An Argument that Abortion is Wrong [W] Don Marquis 141 13 The Moral Permissibility of Abortion Margaret Olivia Little 151 14 Virtue Theory and Abortion [R] Rosalind Hursthouse 160 Animals 169 15 All Animals are Equal Peter Singer 172 16 Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism R. G. Frey 181 17 The Case for Animal Rights Tom Regan 192 18 The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research [N] Carl Cohen 198 19 Why Cohen is Mistaken [NR] Hugh LaFollette 204 Part III 215 The Personal Life Family and Sexuality 217 20 What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents? Jane English 219 21 Morality, Parents, and Children James Rachels 223 22 Missing Staircases and the Marriage Debate: Is Same-Sex Marriage Bad for Children? [NR] John Corvino 233 23 What Is Marriage For? Children Need Mothers and Fathers [N] Maggie Gallagher 239 contents Biomedical Technologies vii 245 24 Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding of the Family Ruth Macklin 247 25 Is Women’s Labor a Commodity? Elizabeth S. Anderson 255 26 “Goodbye Dolly?” The Ethics of Human Cloning John Harris 265 27 The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans Leon R. Kass 274 28 Cognitive Enhancement Allen Buchanan and David R. Crawford [NW] 283 Part IV Liberty and Equality 291 Paternalism and Risk 293 29 Freedom of Action John Stuart Mill 295 30 On Improving People by Political Means Lester H. Hunt 299 31 Against the Legalization of Drugs James Q. Wilson 309 32 Why We Should Decriminalize Drug Use [R] Douglas Husak 314 33 The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms [R] Todd C. Hughes and Lester H. Hunt 323 34 Gun Control Hugh LaFollette 334 Free Speech 346 35 Freedom of Thought and Discussion John Stuart Mill 348 36 “The Price We Pay?” Pornography and Harm [R] Susan J. Brison 352 37 The Right to Get Turned On: Pornography, Autonomy, Equality Andrew Altman 361 38 Sticks and Stones [W] John Arthur 370 39 Speech Codes and Expressive Harm [W] Andrew Altman 381 viii contents Sexual and Racial Discrimination 389 40 Racism Michele Moody-Adams 392 41 Servility and Self-Respect Thomas E. Hill, Jr. 401 42 Sexual Harassment Anita M. Superson 407 43 Date Rape Lois Pineau 415 44 Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape [R] Larry May and Robert Strikwerda 422 Affirmative Action 431 45 The Case against Affirmative Action [R] Louis P. Pojman 433 46 The Rights of Allan Bakke Ronald Dworkin 443 47 Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportunity: Challenging the Myth of “Preferential Treatment” [W] Luke Charles Harris and Uma Narayan 449 Part V 461 Justice Punishment 463 48 Punishment and Desert [W] James Rachels 466 49 Out of Character: On the Psychology of Excuses in the Criminal Law [W] John M. Doris 474 50 Does Punishment Work? [W] John Paul Wright, Francis T. Cullen, and Kevin M. Beaver 484 51 In Defense of the Death Penalty Louis P. Pojman 494 52 Against the Death Penalty Jeffrey Reiman 503 Economic Justice 510 53 A Theory of Justice John Rawls 513 54 The Entitlement Theory of Justice Robert Nozick 524 55 Displacing the Distributive Paradigm Iris Marion Young 535 contents 56 Economic Competition: Should We Care about the Losers? [W] Jonathan Wolff World Hunger ix 545 552 57 Famine, Aff luence, and Morality Peter Singer 554 58 Famine Relief and the Ideal Moral Code [W] John Arthur 563 59 Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources Dividend [R] Thomas W. Pogge 571 60 Feeding People versus Saving Nature [R] Holmes Rolston III 583 Environment 592 61 The Value of Nature [NW] Ronald Sandler 594 62 A Place for Cost-Benefit Analysis [R] David Schmidtz 602 63 Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments Thomas E. Hill, Jr. 611 64 A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption [NR] Stephen M. Gardiner War, Terrorism, and Reconciliation 620 631 65 Is the War on Terrorism a Defense of Civilization? [N] Stephen Nathanson 634 66 Just War Doctrine and the Military Response to Terrorism [R] Joseph Boyle 640 67 Nipping Evil in the Bud: The Questionable Ethics of Preventive Force [W] Douglas P. Lackey 649 68 The Justifiability of Humanitarian Intervention [R] Charles R. Beitz 658 69 Pacifism: Reclaiming the Moral Presumption [W] William J. Hawk 666 70 Political Reconciliation [NR] Colleen Murphy 675 Preface for Instructors This anthology seeks to provide engagingly written, carefully argued philosophical essays, on a wide range of important, contemporary ethical issues. When I had trouble finding essays that suited those purposes, I commissioned new essays – four for this edition. I also invited a number of philosophers to revise their “classic” essays – three for this edition, with four reprints new to this edition. Altogether, more than half of the essays were written or revised specifically for Ethics in Practice. This edition also features a new introductory essay, “Writing a Philosophy Paper.” The result is a tasty blend of the old and the new, the familiar and the unfamiliar. I have organized the book into five thematic sections and fifteen topics to give you the greatest flexibility to construct the course you want. When feasible, I begin or end sections with essays that bridge to preceding or following sections. Although I have included essays I think introductory students can read and comprehend, no one would believe me if I claimed all the essays are easy to read. We all know many students have trouble reading philosophical essays. That is not surprising. Many of these essays were written originally for other professional philosophers, not firstyear undergraduates. Moreover, even when philosophers write expressly for introductory audiences, their ideas, vocabularies, and styles are often foreign to the introductory student. So I have included a brief introduction on Reading Philosophy to advise students on how to read and understand philosophical essays. I want this volume to be suitable for a variety of courses. The most straightforward way to use the text is to assign essays on six of seven of your favorite practical issues. If you want a more topical course, you could emphasize issues in one or more of the major thematic sections. You could also focus on practical and theoretical issues s­panning individual topics and major divisions of the book. If, for instance, you want to focus on gender, you could select most essays from four sections: Abortion, Family and Sexuality, Sexual and Racial Discrimination, and Affirmative Action, and combine these with some specific articles scattered throughout, for example, Young’s “Displacing the Distributive Paradigm” (Economic Justice). Finally, you can also give your course a decided theoretical flavor by using the section on Ethical Theory, and then selecting essays that address, in diverse contexts, significant t­heoretical issues like the act/omission distinction, the determination of moral status, or the limits of morality, and so on. You can also direct your students to Theorizing about Ethics – a brief introductory essay designed to help them understand why we should theorize, and then giving them a snapshot of some major theories. One distinctive feature of the anthology is the section introductions. Some anthologies do not include them. Those that do often use introductions simply to summarize the articles in that section. The introductions here do indicate the main thrust of the essays. However, that is not their primary purpose. Their purpose is (1) to focus students’ attention on the theoretical issues at stake, and (2) to relate those issues to the discussion of the same or related issues in other sections. All too often students (and philosophers) see practical ethics as a hodgepodge of largely (or wholly) unrelated problems. The introductions should go some way toward remedying this tendency. They show students that practical questions are not discrete, but intricately connected with one another. Thinking carefully about any problem invariably illuminates (and is illuminated by) others. Thus, the overarching aim of these introductions is to give the book a coherence some anthologies lack. p r e fac e f o r i n s t ru c t o r s There are consequences of this strategy you might mention to your students. I organized the order of the papers within each section to maximize the students’ understanding of that practical issue – nothing more. However, I wrote the introductions and organized the summaries to maximize the understanding of theoretical issues. Often the order of the discussion of essays in the introduction matches the order of essays in that section; occasionally it does not. Moreover, I spend more time “summarizing” some essays to the exclusion of others. That in no way suggests that the essays on which I focus are more cogent, useful, or in any way better than the others. Rather, I found it easier to use them as entrées into the theoretical questions. Finally, since I do not know which sections you will use, you should be aware that the introductions will likely refer to essays the student will not read. When that happens, they will not realize one aim of the introductions. They may still be valuable. For even if the student does not read the essays to which an introduction refers, she can better appreciate the interconnections between issues. It might even have the delicious consequence of encouraging the student to read an essay that you did not assign. One last note about the criteria for selecting essays. Many practical ethics anthologies include essays on opposing sides of every issue. For most topics I think that is a laudable aim that an editor can normally xi achieve. But not always. I include essays that discuss the issue as we currently frame and understand it. Sometimes that understanding precludes some positions that might have once been part of the debate. For instance, early practical ethics anthologies included essays that argued that an individual should always choose to prolong her life, by any medical means whatever. On this view, euthanasia of any sort and for any reason was immoral. Although that was once a viable position, virtually no one now advocates or even discusses it. Even the author of the essay with serious misgivings about a “right to die” would not embrace that position. The current euthanasia debate largely concerns when people might choose not to sustain their lives, how they might carry out their wishes, and with whose assistance. Those are the questions addressed by these essays on euthanasia. Likewise, I do not have any essays that argue that women and Blacks ought to be relegated to the bedroom or to manual labor. Although everyone acknowledges that racism and sexism are still alive and well in the United States, few people openly advocate making Blacks and women second class citizens. No one seriously discusses these proposals in academic circles. Instead, I include essays that highlight current issues concerning the treatment of minorities and women (sexual harassment, date rape, etc.). Acknowledgments I would like to thank three people who, through their work, encouraged me to think about practical moral issues, and who through their lives, encouraged me to act on what I found: Joel Feinberg, James Rachels, and Richard Wasserstrom. I would like to thank Eva LaFollette for insight and her comments on the structure and content of this volume. I would like to thank Jeff Dean, who is everything one could possibly want in an editor. He is knowledgeable, thoughtful, and efficient. I will miss his presence at the press. Finally I would like to the staff at Wiley-Blackwell for making my job as editor easier. My copy editor, Helen Kemp, was superb. Source Acknowledgments The editor and publisher gratefully acknowledge the permission granted to reproduce the copyright material in this book and that appear in the following chapters: 1 William H. Shaw, “Consequentialism.” This essay is a revised and abridged version of William H. Shaw, “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in James Dreier, ed., Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 5–20. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd and the author. 7 J. David Velleman, “Against the Right to Die,” revised version of pp. 665–681 from “Against the Right to Die,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (6) (1992). Reprinted with permission of Oxford University Press and the author. 9 Felicia Cohn and Joanne Lynn, “A Duty to Care Revisited,” from J. Hardwig, Is There a Duty to Die? (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 145–154. Reprinted with permission of Taylor & Francis USA. 10 Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” pp. 47–62, 65–66 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1). Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal 11  Status of Abortion,” revised version of pp. 43–61 from The Monist: An Inter­national Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 57 (1973), Peru, Illinois, USA 61354. Reprinted with permission. 13 Margaret Olivia Little, “The Moral Permissibility of Abortion,” pp. 27–39 from Christopher Heath Wellman and Andrew Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 0002055439.INDD 13 14 Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” revised version of pp. 223–246 from Philosophy and Public Affairs 20. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 15 Peter Singer, “All Animals are Equal,” from Philosophical Exchange 1, 1974. © by Peter Singer. Reprinted with kind permission of the author. 16 R. G. Frey, “Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism,” pp. 191–201 from Between the Species 4 (1988). Reprinted with permission of author and the online journal. 17 Tom Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights,” from Peter Singer (ed.), In Defense of Animals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 13–26. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 18 Carl Cohen, “The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,” pp. 865–870 from New England Journal of Medicine 315 © 1986 Reprinted with permission. 19 Hugh LaFollette, “Why Cohen Is Mistaken,” excerpted and revised from Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (ed. Beauchamp and Frey) © 2011 Oxford University Press. Repro­duced with permission from Oxford University Press. 20 Jane English, “What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents?,” from William Ruddick and Onora O’Neill (eds.), Having Children, pp. 351–356. © Oxford University Press, 1979. Reprinted with permission of Oxford University Press. 21 James Rachels, “Morality, Parents and Children.” Reprinted with kind permission of David Rachels, son of James Rachels. 24 Ruth Macklin, “Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding of the Family,” The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pp. 5–11, 11/27/2013 12:40:59 PM xiv 25 26 27 30 31 32 33 34 36 37 40 s o u rc e ac k n o w l e d g m e n t s January–February 1991. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Elizabeth S. Anderson, “Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?,” pp. 71–92 from Philosophy and Public Affairs (1990). Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons. John Harris, “ ‘Goodbye Dolly’: the Ethics of Human Cloning,” pp. 353–360 from Journal of Medical Ethics. BMJ Publishing Group, 1997. Reprinted with permission of the BMJ. Leon R. Kass, “The Wisdom of Repugnance,” pp. 17–27 from The New Republic, June 2, 1997. Reprinted with kind permission of the author. Lester H. Hunt, “On Improving People by Political Means,” pp. 61–76 from Reason Papers, 1985. Reprinted with permission of Reason Papers and the author. James Q. Wilson, “Against the Legalization of Drugs,” from Commentary (February 1990). Reprinted by ­permission. All rights reserved. Douglas Husak, “Why We Should Decriminalize Drug Use,” pp. 21–29 from Criminal Justice Ethics 22 (1), Winter/Spring 2003. Reprinted with kind permission of the author. Todd C. Hughes and Lester H. Hunt, revised version of “The Liberal Basis of the Right to Bear Arms,” pp. 1–25 from Public Affairs Quarterly 14, 2000. Reprinted with permission of Public Affairs Quarterly. Hugh LaFollette, “Gun Control.” This essay first appeared in Ethics 110 (2000). Reprinted with permission of The University of Chicago Press © 2000. Reprinted with permission of University of Chicago Press. Susan J. Brison, revised version of “The Price We Pay?,” pp. 236–250 from Christopher Heath Wellman and Andrew Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 1. Malden, MA: Blackwell 2004. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Andrew Altman, “The Right to Get Turned On: Pornography, Autonomy, Equality,” pp. 223–235 from Christopher Heath Wellman and Andrew Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, 1. Malden, MA: Blackwell 2004. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Michele Moody-Adams, “Racism,” pp. 89–101 from R. G. Frey and C. H. Wellman (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics. Malden: Blackwell 41 42 43 44 45 46 52 53 54 55 57 2003. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Servility and Self-Respect,” pp. 87–104 from The Monist, 1974. © 1974 The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, Peru, Illinois, 61354. Reprinted by permission. Anita M. Superson, “Sexual Harassment,” pp. 51–64 from Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (3), 1993. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons. Louis Pineau, “Date Rape,” pp. 217–243 from Law and Philosophy 8. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. Reprinted with permission of Springer Verlag. Larry May and Robert Strikwerda, revised version of “Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape,” pp. 134–151 from Hypatia 9, 1994. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons. Louis P. Pojman, revised version of “The Case against Affirmative Action,” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1998). Reprinted courtesy of the late author Louis Pojman, by his wife Trudy. Ronald Dworkin, “The Rights of Allan Bakke,” from The New York Review of Books, 1977. Reprinted with permission of New York Review of Books. Jeffrey Reiman, “Against the Death Penalty,” pp. 553–562 from S. Luper, Living Well. Harcourt Brace and Company, 2000. Reprinted by permission of the author. John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice,” pp. 11–22, 60–65, 150–156 from Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971. © 1971, 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Reprinted with permisison of Harvard University Press. Robert Nozick, “The Entitlement Theory of Justice,” pp. 140–164, 167–174 from Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books, 1974. © 1974 by Basic Books, Inc. Reprinted with permission. Iris Marion Young, “Displacing the Distributive Paradigm,” pp. 15–16, 18–30, 33–34, 37–38 from Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press, 1990. © 1990 Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press. Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” pp. 229–243 from Philosophy and Public Affairs. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons, USA. s o u rc e ac k n o w l e d g m e n t s 59 Thomas W. Pogge, revised version of “Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources Dividend,” pp. 501–538 from D. Crocker and T. Linden, Ethics of Consumption. Rowman Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1997. Reprinted by permission of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 60 Holmes Rolston III, revised version of “Feeding People versus Saving Nature,” pp. 248–267 from W. Aiken and Hugh LaFollette, World Hunger and Morality. Prentice Hall, 1996. Reprinted with kind permission of the author. 62 David Schmidtz, revised version of “A Place for CostBenefit Analysis,” pp. 148–171 from Philosophical Issues 11. Supplement to Nous, 2001. Reprinted by permission of John Wiley & Sons. 63 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments,” pp. 211– 224 from Environmental Ethics 5, 1983. Reprinted with the kind permission of the author and Environmental Ethics. xv 64 Stephen Gardiner, “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption,” 2011. Revised from “A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change.” Oxford. First published in Environmental Values, 15 (2006), pp. 397–413 © 2006 The White Horse Press. Reprinted with permission. 66 Joseph Boyle, revised version of “Just War Doctrine and the Military Response to Terrorism,” from Journal of Political Philosophy, 11 (2), 2003, pp. 153–170. 68 Charles Beitz, “Humanitarian Intervention,” revised version of “The Justifiability of Humanitarian Intervention.” from Bowdoin College Bulletin, Vol. 5, 2001. Reprinted by permission of Bowdoin College. 70 Colleen Murphy, “The Justifiability of Political Reconciliation,” from “Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law,” Law and Philosophy, 24 (3) (2005), pp. 239–262. Reprinted with permission of Springer. General Introduction All of us make choices. Some of these appear to concern only ourselves: what to wear, when to sleep, what to read, where to live, how to decorate our homes, and what to eat. Under most circumstances these choices are purely personal. Purely personal concerns are beyond the scope of morality and will not be discussed in this book. Other choices demonstrably affect others: whether to prolong the life of our comatose grandmother, when and with whom to have sex, how to relate to people of different races, and whether to support capital punishment or laws against cloning. These choices clearly affect others and are normally thought to be choices we should assess, at least in part, on moral grounds. Upon closer examination, however, we see that it is not always obvious whether a choice affects only us. Is choosing to view pornography personal or does it support the degradation of women? Is eating meat purely personal or does it encourage and sustain the inhumane treatment of animals or the depletion of resources that we could use to feed the starving? Is choosing where to live purely personal or does it sometimes support racist practices that confine African Americans or Hispanics or Asians to inadequate housing? If so, then some choices that seem purely personal turn out to affect others in morally significant ways. In short, once we reflect carefully on our choices, we ­discover that many might profoundly affect others and, therefore, that we ought to evaluate them morally. By choosing to buy a new stereo rather than send money for famine relief, children in India may starve. By choosing to support political candidates who oppose or support abortion, tough drug laws, affirmative action, or environmental protection, I affect others in demonstrably significant ways. Of course knowing that our choices affect others does not yet tell us how we should behave. It does, however, confirm that we should evaluate those choices morally. Unfortunately many of us are individually and collectively nearsighted: we fail to see or appreciate the moral significance of our choices, thereby increasing the evil in the world. Often we talk and think as if evil resulted solely from the conscious choices of wholly evil people. I suspect, however, that evil results more often from ignorance and inattention: we just don’t notice or attend to the significance of what we do. A central aim of this book is to improve our moral vision: to help us notice and comprehend the moral significance of what we do. The primary means of achieving this end is to present essays that carefully and critically discuss a range of practical moral issues. These essays will supply information you likely do not have and perspectives you may not have not considered. Many of you may find that your education has ill prepared you to think carefully about these issues. Far too many public schools in the United States neither expect nor even permit students to think critically. Many of them will not have expected or wanted you to develop and defend your own views. Instead, many will have demanded that you memorize the content of your texts and the assertions of your teachers. Philosophy professors, in contrast, do not standardly expect you to memorize what they or someone else says. Still less will they want you to parrot them or the texts. They require you to read what others have said, but Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, Fourth Edition. Edited by Hugh LaFollette. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2 g e n e r a l i n t ro d u c t i o n not because they want you to recite it. Instead, these professors contend that critically reading the arguments of others will help you better attain your own conclusions. For those of you who find that your high school education, with its premium on memorization and blind adherence to authority, did not prepare you to read philosophical essays, I have included a brief section on Reading Philosophy. I also include a brief introductory essay on ethical theorizing. Philosophers do not discuss practical issues in a vacuum. They place their discussions in a larger context that helps clarify and define the practical issues. They discuss not only the details peculiar to the issue, but more general features that are relevant to many practical moral quandaries. That essay will explain the purpose of Theorizing about Ethics. The essay will also briefly describe some prominent ethical theories that you will encounter in these pages. You will see, as you read individual essays, that some authors provide detailed explanations of these theories. I also include an introductory essay on Writing a Philosophy Paper. Some of what I say will overlap themes from several of the earlier introductions. However, since I know not all teachers will assign, and not all stu- dents will read, all of the introductions, I think this is unavoidable. My aim is to briefly describe a variety of papers you might be asked to write, and talk about what you should do to make your papers as strong as possible. Finally, to augment your familiarity with various theories, I will, in the introductions to each section, not only summarize the central themes of the essays, I will also spotlight some general theoretical questions and explain how these are relevant to other issues discussed in this volume. It is important to appreciate the myriad ways in which practical moral issues are woven together by common theoretical threads. Practical ethics is not a random collection of unconnected issues, but a systematic exploration of how we can most responsibly act in a variety of practical moral contexts. Consequently, this is not a recipe book that answers all moral questions. Rather, it is a chronicle of how a number of philosophers have thought about these practical moral issues. If you absorb the information the authors supply, attend to their arguments, and consider the diverse perspectives they offer, you will find, when the course is over, that you are better able to think carefully and critically about practical and theoretical moral issues. Theorizing about Ethics When deciding what to do, we often face uncertainty over, confusions about, or conflicts between, our inclinations, desires, interests, and beliefs. These can arise even when we want to promote only our self-interests. We may not know what is in our best interests: we may have simply adopted some mistaken ideas of our parents, our friends, or our culture. For instance, were our parents Nazis we might believe that maintaining racial purity is our most important personal aim. We may also confuse our wants with our interests: we want to manipulate others for our own ends and therefore infer that caring for others systematically undermines our interests. Even when we know some of our interests, we may be unable to determine their relative importance: we may assume that wealth is more important than developing character and having close relationships. Other times we may know our interests, but be unsure of how to resolve conflicts between them: I may need to write a paper, yet want to hike the local mountain. Finally, even if I know the best choice, I may not act on it: I may know that it is in my best long-term interest to lose weight, yet inhale that scrumptious pie instead. These complications show why I can best pursue my self-interests only if I rationally deliberate about them. I must sometimes step back and think more abstractly about (a) what it means for something to be an interest (rather than a mere desire), (b) how to detect which behavior or goals are most likely to advance those interests, and (c) how to understand the interconnections between my interests (e.g., the ways that health enhances my chance of achieving other interests). Finally, I must (d) find a procedure for coping with conflicts between interests, and (e) learn how to act on the outcome of my rational deliberations. Abstraction from and theorizing about practice improves practice and helps us act more prudently. Of course, many actions do not concern simply o­ urselves; they also affect others. Some of my actions benefit others while others harm them. The benefit or harm may be direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional. I might directly harm Joe by pushing him. I might push him because I am angry with him or because I want his place in the queue. I could indirectly harm Joe by landing a promotion he needs to finance nursing care for his dying mother. Or I might offend Joe by privately engaging in what he considers kinky sex. If so, my bedroom antics affect him, although only indirectly and only because he holds the particular moral beliefs he does. Arguably it is inappropriate to say that I harmed Joe in these last two cases, although I did choose to act knowing my actions might make him unhappy or nauseated. In choosing how to behave, I should acknowledge that my actions may affect others, even if only indirectly. In these circumstances, I must choose whether to pursue my self-interest or whether to promote (or at least not set back) the interests of others. Other times I must choose to act in ways that may harm some while benefitting others. If I am fortunate, I might occasionally find ways to promote everyone’s interests without harming anyone else’s. Understanding these distinctions does not settle the question of how I should act. It only circumscribes the arena within which morality operates. Morality, traditionally understood, involves primarily, and perhaps exclusively, behavior that affects others. I say “perhaps” because some philosophers (e.g., Kant) thought that anyone who harms herself, for instance, by squandering her talents or abusing her body, has done something morally wrong. For present purposes, though, we can set this issue aside. For what everyone acknowledges is that actions that indisputably affect others should be evaluated morally – although we might disagree about how that should shape our action. We might 4 theorizing about ethics also disagree about whether and to what extent actions that affect others only indirectly should be evaluated morally. We might further disagree about whether and how to morally distinguish direct from indirect harm. Nonetheless, if someone’s action directly and substantially affects others (either benefits or harms them), then even if we do not yet know whether the action is right or wrong, we can agree that we should evaluate it morally. This discussion might suggest that most, if not all, moral decisions are complicated or confusing. Not so. Many moral “decisions” are so easy that we never think about them. No one seriously asks whether it is morally permissible to drug a classmate so she can have sex with him, whether she should steal money from her co-workers to finance a vacation on the Riviera, or whether she should knowingly infect someone with AIDS. This is not the stuff of which moral disagreement is made. We know quite well that such actions are wrong. I suspect most moral questions are so easily answered that we never ask them. Rather than discuss questions to which there are obvious answers, we focus on, think about, and debate those about which there is genuine disagreement. However, we sometimes think a decision is easy to make, when, in fact, it is not. This is an equally (or arguably more) serious mistake. We may fail to see the conflicts, confusions, or uncertainties: the issue may be so complicated that we overlook, fail to understand, or do not appreciate how (and how profoundly) our actions affect others. If we are preoccupied with our self-interest, we may not see the ways our behavior significantly affects others or else we give inadequate weight to their interests. Finally, our unquestioning acceptance of the moral status quo can blind us to just how wrong some of our behaviors and social institutions are. The Need for Theory We may think that an action is grossly immoral, but not really know why. Or we may think we know why, only to discover, upon careful examination, that we are merely parroting the “reasons” offered by our friends, teachers, parents, or preachers. There is nothing wrong with considering how others think and how they have decided similar moral questions. We would be fools not to absorb and benefit from the wisdom of others. However, anyone even faintly aware of history will acknowledge that collective moral wisdom, like individual moral wisdom, is sometimes horribly mistaken. Our ancestors held slaves, denied women the right to vote, practiced genocide, and burned witches at the stake. I suspect most of our ancestors were generally morally decent people who were firmly convinced that their actions were moral. They acted wrongly because they failed to be sufficiently self-critical. They did not evaluate their own beliefs; they unquestioningly adopted the outlook of their ancestors, political leaders, teachers, friends, and community. In these ways they are not unique. This is a “sin” of which each of us is guilty. The resounding lesson of history is that we must scrutinize our beliefs, our choices, and our actions to ensure that we are informed, consistent, imaginative, unbiased, and not mindlessly reciting the views and vices of others. Otherwise we may perpetrate evils we could avoid, evils for which future generations will rightly condemn us. To critically evaluate our moral views we should theorize about ethics: we should think about moral issues more abstractly, more coherently, and more consistently. Theorizing is not some enterprise divorced from practice, but is simply the careful, systematic, and thoughtful reflection on practice. Theorizing will not insulate us from error. However, it will empower us to shed ill-conceived, uninformed, and irrelevant considerations. To explain what I mean, let’s think briefly about a matter dear to most students: grades. My grading of students’ work can go awry in at least three different ways. 1 I might use an inconsistent grading standard. That is, I might use different standards for different students: Joan gets an A because she has a pleasant smile; Ralph, because he works hard; Rachel, because her paper was exceptional. Of course knowing that I should use a unified grading standard does not tell me what standards I should have employed or what grades the specific students should have received. Perhaps they all deserved the As they received. However, it is not enough that I accidentally gave them the grades they deserved. I should have given them A’s because they deserved them, not because of some irrelevant considerations. If I employed irrelevant considerations, I will often give students the wrong grades, even if, in some cases, I give them the correct grades. 2 I might be guided by improper grading standards. It is not enough that I have an invariant standard. I might have a flawed standard to which I adhere unwaveringly. For instance, I might consistently give students I like higher grades than students I dislike. If so, then I grade their work inappropriately, even if consistently. theorizing about ethics 3 I might employ the standards inappropriately. I might have appropriate and consistent grading standards, yet misapply them because I am ignorant, closeminded, exhausted, preoccupied, or inattentive. I can make parallel mistakes in ethical deliberations: 1 2 3 I might use inconsistent ethical principles. I might have inappropriate moral standards. I might employ moral standards inappropriately. Let us look at each deliberative error in more detail: 1 Consistency. We should treat two creatures the same unless they are relevantly different – different in ways that justify treating them differently. Just as students expect teachers to grade consistently, we expect others (and hopefully ourselves) to be morally consistent. The demand for consistency pervades moral thinking. A common strategy for defending our moral views is to claim that we are consistent; a common strategy for criticizing others’ views is to charge that they are not. The argumentative role of consistency is evident in the discussion of every practical moral issue. Consider its role in the Abortion debate. Disputants spend considerable effort arguing that their own positions are consistent while charging that their opponents’ positions are inconsistent. Each side labors to show why abortion is (or is not) relevantly similar to standard cases of murder. Most of those who think abortion is immoral (and likely all of those who think it should be illegal) claim abortion is relevantly similar to murder, while those who think abortion should be legal claim it differs relevantly from murder. What we do not find are people who think abortion is murder and yet wholly moral. Consistency likewise plays central roles in debates over Free Speech and Paternalism and Risk. Those opposed to censorship often argue that books, pictures, movies, plays, or sculptures that some people want to censor are relevantly similar to art that most people do not want censored. They further claim that pornography is a form of speech, and if we can prohibit it because the majority finds it offensive, then we must censor any speech that offends the majority. Conversely, those who claim we can legitimately censor pornography go to some pains to explain why pornography is relevantly different from other forms of speech we want to protect. Both sides want to show that their position is consistent and that their opponent’s position is inconsistent. 5 Although consistency is generally recognized as a requirement of morality, in specific cases it is difficult to detect if someone is being (in)consistent. Someone may appear to act (in)consistently, but only because we do not appreciate the complexity of her moral reasoning or fail to understand the morally relevant features framing her action. Nonetheless, what everyone acknowledges is that if someone is being inconsistent, then that is a compelling reason to reject her position. 2 Correct principles. It is not enough to be consistent. We must also employ the appropriate guidelines, principles, standards, or make the appropriate judgments. Theorizing about ethics is one good way to discern the best (most defensible) standards or guidelines, to identify the morally relevant features of our actions, to enhance our ability to make good judgments. Later I discuss how to select and defend these principles – how we determine what is morally relevant. 3 Correct “application.” Even when we know what is morally relevant, and even when we reason consistently, we may still make moral mistakes. Consider the ways I might misapply rules prohibiting (a) lying and (b) harming another’s feelings. Suppose my wife comes home wearing a gaudy sweater. She wants to know if I like it. Presumably I should neither lie nor intentionally hurt her feelings. What, in these circumstances, should I do? There are a number of ways I might act inappropriately. 1 2 3 4 5 I may not see viable alternatives: I may assume, for example, that I must baldly lie or else substantially hurt her feelings. I may be insufficiently attentive to her needs and interests: I may over- or under-estimate how much she will be hurt by my honesty (or lack of it). I may be unduly influenced by self-interest or personal bias: I may lie not to protect her feelings, but because I don’t want her to be angry with me. I may know precisely what I should do, but be insufficiently motivated to do it: I may lie because I just don’t want the hassle. Or, I may be motivated to act as I should, but lack the talent or skill to do it: I may want to be honest, but lack the verbal and personal skills to be honest in a way that will not hurt her feelings. These are all failings with practical moral significance. We would all be better off if we would learn how to make ourselves more attentive, more informed, and better motivated. However, although these are vitally important 6 theorizing about ethics practical concerns, they are not the primary focus of most essays in this book. What these authors do here is provide relevant information, careful logical analysis, and a clear account of what they take to be the morally relevant features of practical ethical questions. Is It Just a Matter of Opinion? Many of you may find talk of moral standards – and the employment of those standards – troubling. You may think – certainly many people talk as if they think – that moral judgments are just “matters of opinion.” All of us have overheard people conclude a debate about a contentious moral issue by saying: “Well, it is all just a matter of opinion anyway!” I suspect the real function of this claim is to signal the speaker’s desire to terminate discussion. Unfortunately this claim implies more. It suggests that since moral judgments are just opinions, then all moral judgments are equally good (or equally bad). It implies that we cannot criticize or rationally scrutinize our (or anyone else’s) moral judgments. After all, we don’t rationally criticize mere opinions (“I think Dominos serves the best pizza in town” or “I prefer purple walls in a kitchen”). However, even if no (contentious) moral judgment were indisputably correct, we should not infer that all moral judgments are equally (un)reliable. Although we have no clear way of deciding with certainty which actions are best, we have excellent ways of showing that some actions are morally defective. For instance, we know that moral judgments based on misinformation, shortsightedness, bias, lack of understanding, or wholly bizarre moral principles are flawed. Conversely, judgments are more plausible if they are based on full information, careful calculation, astute perception, and if they have successfully survived the criticism of others in the marketplace of ideas. Consider the following analogy: No grammatical or stylistic rules will determine precisely the way I should phrase the next sentence. However, from that we should not conclude that I may properly use just any string of words. Some arrangements of words are not sentences and some grammatically complete sentences are gibberish. Other sentences might be grammatically well formed – even stylish – yet inappropriate because they are disconnected from the sentences that precede or follow them. Many other sentences are grammatically well formed, relevant, and minimally clear, yet may be vague or imprecise. Others may be comprehensible, relevant, and generally precise, yet still be gaudy or at least bereft of style. Still others may be wholly adequate, sufficiently adequate so that there is no strong reason to prefer one. A few may be brilliant. No grammar book will enable us to make those distinctions or identify a uniquely best sentence. Nonetheless, we have no problem distinguishing the trashy or the unacceptably vague from the linguistically sublime. In short, we needn’t think that one sentence is uniquely good to acknowledge that some are better and some are worse. Likewise for ethics. We may not always know how to act; we may find substantial disagreement about some highly contentious ethical issues. However, that does not show that all moral views are ­created equal (LaFollette, 1991). We should also not ignore the obvious fact that ­circumstances often demand that we act even if there is no (or we cannot discern a) uniquely appropriate moral action. Nonetheless, our uncertainty does not lead us to think that – or act as if – all views were equal. We do not toss a coin to decide whether to remove our parents from life support, whether to save a small child drowning in a pond, or whether someone charged with a felony is guilty. We (should) strive to make an informed decision based on the best evidence and then act accordingly, even if the best evidence does not guarantee certainty. To make an informed decision we should understand the relevant issues, take a longer-term perspective, set aside irrational biases, and inculcate a willingness to subject our tentative conclusions to the criticisms of others. We should not bemoan our inability to be certain that we have found the uniquely best action; we must simply make the best choice we can. We should, of course, acknow­ ledge our uncertainty, admit our fallibility, and be prepared to consider new ideas, especially when they are supported by strong arguments. However, we have no need to embrace any pernicious forms of relativism. That would be not only misguided, but a moral mistake. The Role of Theory Even when people agree that an issue should be evaluated by criteria of morality, they may disagree about how to evaluate it. Using the language of the previous section, they may disagree about the best principles or judgments, about how those are to be interpreted, or about how they should be used. Anti-abortionists argue that abortion should be illegal because the fetus has the same theorizing about ethics right to life as a normal adult, while pro-abortionists argue that it should be legal since the woman has the right to decide what happens in and to her body. Supporters of capital punishment argue that executions deter crime, while opponents argue that it is cruel and inhumane. Those who want to censor pornography claim it degrades women, while supporters argue that it is a form of free speech that should be protected by law. In giving reasons for their judgments, people cite some features of the action they think explain or support their evaluation. This function of reasons is not confined to ethical disagreements. I may justify my claim that “Fargo is a good movie” by claiming that it has welldefined characters, an interesting plot, and the appropriate dramatic tension. That is, I identify features of the movie that I think justify my evaluation. The features I cite, however, are not unique to this movie. In giving these reasons I imply that “having well-defined characters” or “having an interesting plot” or “having the appropriate dramatic tension” are important characteristics of good movies, period. That is not to say these are the only or the most important characteristics. Nor is it yet to decide how weighty these characteristics are. It is, however, to say that we have a reason to think that a movie with these characteristics is a good movie. You can challenge my evaluation of the movie in three ways: You can challenge my criteria, the weight I give those criteria, or my claim that the movie satisfies them. For instance, you could argue that having well-defined characters is not a relevant criterion, that I have given that criterion too much weight, or, that Fargo does not have well-defined characters. In defense, I could explain why it is a relevant criterion, why I have given the criterion the appropriate weight, and why the movie’s characters are well developed. At this point we are discussing issues are two different levels. We are debating both the criteria of good movies and how to evaluate a particular movie. Likewise, when discussing a practical ethical issue, we are discussing not only that particular issue but also underlying theoretical perspectives. We do not want to know only whether capital punishment deters crime, we also want to know whether deterrence is morally important, and, if so, just how important. When theorizing reaches a certain level or complexity, we begin to speak of someone’s “having a theory.” Ethical theories are simply formal and more systematic discussions of second level, theoretical discussions. These are philosophers’ efforts to identify the relevant moral criteria, the weight or significance of each criterion, and to offer some guidance 7 about how to determine whether an action satisfies those criteria. In the next section, I will briefly outline the more familiar ethical theories. But before I do, let me first offer a warning. In thinking about ethical theories, we may be tempted to assume that people who hold the same theory will make the same practical ethical judgments, and that people who make the same practical ­ethical judgments must embrace the same theory. Neither is true. It is not true of any evaluative judgments. For instance, two people with similar criteria for good movies may differently evaluate Fargo, while two people who loved Fargo may have (somewhat) different criteria for good movies. Likewise for ethics. Two people with different ethical theories may nonetheless agree that abortion is morally permitted (or grossly immoral), while two adherents of the same moral theory may differently evaluate abortion. Knowing someone’s theoretical commitments does not tell us precisely what actions she thinks right and wrong. It tells us only how she thinks about moral issues; it identifies her criteria of relevance and the weight she gives to each. Main Types of Theory Two broad classes of ethical theory – consequentialist and deontological – have shaped most people’s understanding of ethics. Consequentialists hold that we should choose the available action with the best overall consequences, while deontologists hold that we should act in ways circumscribed by moral rules or rights, and that these rules or rights are defined (at least partly) independently of consequences. Since this book includes a separate section on Ethical Theory, this exposition will be brief. Nonetheless, these descriptions should be sufficient to help you understand the broad outlines of each theory. Consequentialism Consequentialists claim that we are morally obligated to act in ways that produce the best consequences. It is not difficult to see why this is an appealing theory. It employs the same style of reasoning we use in purely prudential (self-interested) decisions. If you are trying to select a major, you will consider the available options, predict which one will likely lead to the best overall outcome, and then choose that major. If you are trying to decide whether to keep your present job or take a new one, you 8 theorizing about ethics will consider the consequences of taking each (working conditions, location, salary, chance of advancement, how the change might alter your personal and family relations, etc.), and then choose the one with the best overall consequences. Despite these similarities, prudence and morality are importantly different. Whereas prudence requires that we wisely advance only our own personal interests, consequentialism requires us to consider the interests of all affected. When facing a moral decision, we should consider available alternative actions, trace the likely consequences of each alternative for all affected, and then select the one with the best overall consequences. Of course, a consequentialist need not consider every consequence of an action, nor must she consider them all equally. Two consequences of my typing this introduction are that I am strengthening the muscles in my hands and increasing my eye–hand coordination. However, barring unusual circumstances, these are not morally relevant: they are neither a means to nor a constituent of my or anyone else’s welfare, happiness, or well-being. That is why they play no role in moral deliberation. However, different consequentialists profoundly disagree about whether or how much some consequence is morally relevant. That is why any adequate consequentialist theory must specify (a) which consequences are morally relevant (i.e., which we should consider when morally deliberating), and (b) how much weight we should give them. Utilitarians, for instance, claim we should choose the option that maximizes “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” They also advocate complete equality: “each to count as one and no more than one.” Of course we might disagree about exactly what it means to maximize the greatest happiness of greatest number; still more we might be unsure about how this is to be achieved. Act utilitarians claim that we determine the rightness of an action if we can decide which action, in those circumstances, would be most likely to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Rule utilitarians reject the idea that moral decisions should be case-by-case (see Hooker, in Euthanasia). On their view, we should decide not whether a particular action is likely to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but whether a particular type of action would, if done by everyone (or most people), promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This theory is discussed in more detail by Shaw (Ethical Theory). Deontology Deontological theories are most easily understood in contrast to consequentialist theories. Whereas consequentialists claim we should always strive to promote the best consequences, deontologists claim that our moral obligations – whatever they are – are in some ways independent of consequences. Thus, if I have obligations not to kill or steal or lie, those obligations are not justified simply on the ground that following such rules will always produce the best consequences. That is why many people find deontological theories so attractive. For example, most of us would be offended if someone lied to us, even if the lie produced the greatest happiness for the greatest number. I would certainly be offended if someone killed me, even if my death might produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number (you use my kidneys to save two people’s lives, my heart to save someone else’s life, etc.) The rightness or wrongness of lying or killing cannot be wholly explained, the deontologist claims, by its consequences. Of course deontologists disagree about which rules are true and about how to determine them. Some claim abstract reason shows us how we should act (Kant, 2002). Others talk about discovering principles that are justified in reflective equilibrium (e.g., Rawls, in Economic Justice), while some claim we should seek principles that might be adopted by an ideal observer (Arthur, in World Hunger). These theories are discussed in more detail by McNaughton and Rawling (Ethical Theory). Alternatives There are numerous alternatives to these theories. To call them “alternatives” does not imply that they are inferior, only that they have not played the same role in shaping contemporary ethical thought. Two are especially worth mention since they have become highly influential in the past two decades; they also play pivotal roles in several essays in this book. Virtue theory Virtue theory predates both consequentialism and deontology as a formal theory. It was the dominant theory of the ancient Greeks, reaching its clearest expression in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. For many centuries it was neither discussed nor advocated as a theorizing about ethics serious competitor. But by the late 1950s, it was starting to reappear in the philosophical literature (the history of this re-emergence is traced in the essays reprinted in Crisp and Slote (1997). Much of the appeal of virtue theory arises from the perceived failings of the standard alternatives. Deontology and consequentialism, virtue theorists claim, put inadequate (or no) emphasis on the agent – on the ways she should be, or the kinds of character she should develop. Relatedly, they fail to give appropriate scope to personal judgment and put too much emphasis on following rules, whether deontological or consequentialistic. Certainly, on some readings of deontology and utilitarianism, it sounds as if advocates of these theories believed that a moral decision was the mindless application of a moral rule. The rule says: “Be honest,” then we should be honest. The rule says: “Always act to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” then we need only figure that out which action has the most desirable consequences, and then do it. Ethics thus seems to resemble math. The calculations may require patience and care, but they do not depend on judgment. Many advocates of the standard theories find these objections by virtue theorists telling and, over the past two decades, have modified their respective theories to (partially) accommodate them. The result, says Rosalind Hursthouse, is “that the lines of demarcation between these three approaches have become blurred . . . . Deonto­ logy and utilitarianism are no longer perspicuously identified by describing them as emphasizing rules or consequences in contrast to character” (1999, p.4). Both put more emphasis on judgment and character. For instance, Hill, who is a deontologist, describes the proper attitude toward the Environment in a way that emphasizes excellence or character, while May and Strikwerda (Sexual and Racial Discrimination), who do not generally embrace virtue theory, emphasize the need for men to feel shame for their complicity in the rape of women. However, although judgment and character may play increasingly important roles in contemporary versions of deontology or consequentialism, neither plays the central role it does in virtue theory. This is evident, for instance, in Hursthouse’s discussion of Abortion and in her essay on virtue theory (Ethical Theory). However, some critics think virtue theory is irreparably flawed, for example, Doris 9 (Punishment). He claims that any robust virtue theory rests on a defective moral psychology. Feminist theory Historically most philosophers were men; most embraced the sexism of their respective cultures. Thus, it is not surprising that women’s interests and perspectives played no role in the development of standard ethical theories. Does that mean these theories are useless? Or can they be salvaged? Can we merely prune Aristotle’s explicit sexism from his theory and still have an Aristotelian theory that is adequate for a less sexist age? Can we remove Kant’s sexism and have a non-sexist deontology? In the early years of feminism, many thinkers thought so. They claimed that the standard ethical theories’ emphasis on justice, equality, and fairness offer all the argumentative ammunition women need to claim their rightful place in the public world. Others were not so sure. Carol Gilligan (1982) argued that women have different moral experiences and different moral reasoning, and that these differences must be incorporated into our understanding of morality. She advocated an “Ethics of Care,” which she claimed best exemplified women’s experience and thinking. However, other feminists claimed this view too closely resembles old-fashioned views of women. What we need instead, they claim, are theories that have a keen awareness of gender and a concern to develop all people’s unique human capacities (Jaggar, 2000). Observe the ways that issues concerning women are discussed (Sexual and Racial Discrimination, Affirmative Action, and Abortion, Free Speech, and Family and Sexuality). See whether the reasons used differ from those employed in other essays. If so, how? Conclusion As you read the following essays, you will see how these different ways of thinking about ethics shape our deliberations about particular moral issues. Be alert to these theoretical differences. They will help you better understand the essays. Also pay close attention to the section introductions. These highlight the theoretical issues that play a central role within that section. 10 theorizing about ethics References Crisp, R. and Slote, M. A. (eds.) (1997) Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilligan, C. (1982) In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hursthouse, R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaggar, A. M. (2000) “Feminist Ethics.” In H. LaFollette (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 348–374. Reading Philosophy Reading philosophy differs from reading science fiction or the daily newspaper. The subjects are different; the purposes are different; the styles are different. Science fiction attempts to transport us imaginatively to distant worlds of larger-than-life heroes and villains. It aims to entertain us, to divert us from the doldrums of our daily lives, and perhaps even to empower us: having seen the glories or evils of worlds not yet experienced, we may be better equipped to live in our everyday world. Science fiction achieves these aims by spinning a convincing narrative of creatures living in previously unknown worlds; it evokes our imaginative powers through expressive language. Newspapers inform us of significant political, social, cultural, economic, and climatic events. Once we are informed, we can presumably make better decisions about our leaders, our finances, and our social lives. The media typically achieves these aims by giving us the facts, just the facts. They usually present these facts in a pithy writing style. Philosophers have neither the direct aims of the journalist nor the airy aims of the science fiction novelist. Their primary function is not to inform or to inspire, but to help us explore competing ideas and the reasons for them. The philosopher achieves these aims by employing a writing style that tends to be neither pithy nor expressive. The style likely differs from any to which you are accustomed. Philosophical Language While the reporter and the novelist write for the public, philosophers usually write for one other. Thus, while most newspapers and some science fiction are written for an eighth grade audience, philosophical essays are written for people with university training. That is why you will need a more robust vocabulary to understand a philosophical essay than you will to understand the latest novel or a column in the local paper. So keep a dictionary handy to look up “ordinary” words you may not yet know. You will also face an additional problem with these essays’ vocabularies. Philosophy, like all academic disciplines, employs specialized terms. Some of these are familiar words with specialized meanings; others are words unique to the discipline. To fully grasp philosophical writing, you will need to understand both. Do not despair. Often you can roughly determine the term’s meaning from its context. If, after doing your best, you still cannot understand its meaning, ask your instructor. Most of these words can be explained in a clear, non-technical way. You can also consult the online philosophical dictionary (see the link on this book’s supporting web page: www.hughlafollette.com/eip3/). Philosophical writing also tends to be more complex than the writings of reporters and novelists. Occasionally it is more complex than it needs to be: the author may not know how to write clearly. Sometimes the essay seems more complex than it is since the author wrote decades or even centuries ago when most writers penned long, intricate sentences. You can often break down these long sentences into their component parts, for example, by treating a semicolon as a period. You may also need to reread the essay several times to get a sense of the author’s rhythm, much in the way that you may need to listen to a musician several times before you find it easy to appreciate her music and understand the lyrics. Often, though, the writing is complex simply because the ideas expressed are complex. We cannot always render profound thoughts into intellectual pabulum. The 12 reading philosophy only way to grasp such essays is to generally improve one’s reading skills, in large part by reading and rereading essays until you understand them. The Centrality of Argument Philosophical writing is complex also because it contains and evaluates arguments. Philosophers forward their own arguments and critique the arguments of others. “Arguments,” in this context, have a particular philosophical sense: An argument is a connected series of statements with some central claim the writer is trying to defend (the conclusion), supported by evidence (the premises) the author offers on behalf of the conclusion. The evidence philosophers use varies. They may proffer empirical data, forward imaginative examples, pose suggestions, and critique alternatives. Make certain you have identified the author’s conclusion and her premises before you evaluate her work. Do not fall into the trap of judging that an argument is bad simply because you dislike the conclusion. This tendency to dismiss views we dislike helps explain philosophers’ concern with arguments. Each of us is constantly bombarded with claims. Some of these claims are true, some false. Some offer sage wisdom; some, dreadful advice. How do we distinguish the true from the false, the wise from the stupid – especially when the topic is a controversial moral, political, and social issue? How do we know the proper moral response to abortion, world hunger, same-sex marriage, and affirmative action? Do we just pick the one we like? The one our parents, preachers, teachers, friends, or society advocate? Often that is exactly what we do. But we shouldn’t. Even a cursory glance at history reveals that many horrendous evils were committed by those who embraced their views steadfastly and uncritically. Most Nazis, slave holders, and commanders of Russian gulags did not think they were immoral; they assumed they were doing the right thing. They simply accepted their society’s views without subjecting them to rational scrutiny. That we should not do. At least not if we are responsible individuals. After all, people’s lives, welfare, and happiness may depend on our decisions, and the decisions of people like us. What is our option? We should seek conclusions ­supported by the best evidence. We should examine the reasons offered for alternative beliefs. Doing so will not insure that we make the best decision, but it will increase the odds that we do. It will lessen the possibility that we make highly objectionable decisions, decisions we will later come to regret. Philosophers offer arguments for their views to help themselves and others make better decisions. Most people are unaccustomed to scrutinizing arguments. Since most of us were taught to believe what our parents, our priests, our teachers, and our pals told us, we are disinclined to consider the arguments of others seriously, or to rationally criticize our own views. Moreover, although all of us have offered some arguments for our views, we have rarely done so with the care and depth that are the staples of good philosophy. Philosophers strive to offer a clear, unambiguous conclusion supported by reasons that even those disinclined to believe her conclusions are likely to find persuasive. That is not to say that philosophers never make bad arguments or say stupid things. Of course we do. However, it is to say that the explicit aim of philosophy is a clear, careful, assessment of the reasons for and against ours and others’ views. That is why a key to understanding philosophy is being able to spot arguments, and then to critique them. That is something you will learn, at least in part, by practice. Looking at Others’ Views Since part of the task of defending one’s view is to show that it is rationally superior to alternatives, a philosopher usually not only (a) provides arguments for her view, she will also (b) respond to criticisms of that view, and (c) consider alternative perspectives. Sometimes those other views and criticisms are advocated by a specific philosopher whose work the author cites. Often, though, the view the author discusses is not that of any particular philosopher, but rather the view of some hypothetical advocate of a position (e.g., conservatism or theism or pro-life). This is often double trouble for a student. You may be unfamiliar with the view being discussed. Since you do not know if the view has been accurately represented, you cannot judge if the criticisms (and responses to them) are telling. Worse, you may have trouble distinguishing the author’s view from the views of those she discusses. If you read quickly, and without concentrating, you may be confused. However, usually you can distinguish one view from the other if you read the essay carefully. Most authors give argumentative road signs indicating reading philosophy when they are defending a view and when they are s­ tating or discussing another’s view. Of course the student may miss these signs if she does not know what to look for. But simply knowing that this is a common strategy should make it easier. You can also look for specific cues. For instance, philosophers discussing another’s views may use the third person to indicate that someone else is speaking (or arguing). At other times the author may explicitly say something like “others may disagree . . .” and then go on to discuss that person’s view. In other cases the signs may be more subtle. In the end there is no single or simple way to distinguish the author’s view from other views the author is discussing. However, if you read the essays carefully, using the strategy just outlined, you will increase the likelihood that you will not be confused. The Rational Consequences of What We Say The philosopher’s discussion of examples or cases – especially fictional cases – sometimes confuses students. The use of such cases, though, builds upon a central pillar of philosophical argument, namely, that we should consider the implications or rational consequences of our beliefs and actions. The following example explains what I mean. Suppose a teacher gives you an “A” because she likes you, and gives Robert – your worst enemy – an “F” because she dislikes him. You might be ecstatic that you received an “A”; you may also be thrilled to know that your worst enemy failed. However, would you say that what the teacher did was morally acceptable? No. There are implications of saying that, implications you are loath to accept. If you said that the teacher’s reason for giving those grades was legitimate, you would be saying that teachers should be able to give students they like good grades and students they dislike bad grades. Thus, you would be rationally committed to holding that if you had a teacher disliked you she could legitimately fail you. That, of course, is a consequence you are unwilling to accept. Therefore, you (and we) we have reason to suspect that your original acceptance of the teacher’s grading scheme was inappropriate. This is a common argumentative strategy. Trace the implications – the rational consequences – of a person’s reasons for action. and then see if you (or others) would be willing to accept those consequences. 13 A Final Word These suggestions will not make reading philosophical essays easy. My hope, though, is that they will make it easier. In the end the key to success is practice. If you have never read philosophical arguments before, you are unlikely to be able to glance at the essay and understand it: you will likely miss the central idea, its relation to alternatives, and you will almost certain fail to comprehend the author’s argument. To fully understand the essay, you must read the assignment carefully and more than once. Most essays are too difficult in style and content for you to grasp in a single reading. Not even most professional philosophers can do that. Here is a good strategy: Read the essay once. Identify confusing or unusual terms. Try to get a general sense of the argument: What is the point the author wants to establish, what reason does she offer for this claim? What arguments does she discuss? Identify the points about which you are still unclear. After you have a ­general sense of the essay, reread it more again, more carefully. Strive for a thorough understanding of the argument. Come to class prepared to ask the teacher to clarify your confusions about the author’s views. If you are accustomed to reading an assignment once – and then only quickly – this expectation will seem overly demanding. Yet, it is important that you learn to read carefully and critically. Herein lies the key to success: persistence and practice. There may be times you find the reading so difficult that you will be tempted to stop, to wait for the instructor to explain it. Yield not to temptation. Press on. It is better and more rewarding to understand the reading for yourself. Think, for a moment, about what happens when someone “explains” a joke that you could (with time and effort) have understood on your own. It spoils the joke. Learning to read more complex essays is a skill, and, like any skill, it is not acquired all at once or without effort. Little in life that is valuable is acquired effortlessly. Getting in physical shape requires vigorous e­ xercise and more than a little perspiration. Establishing and maintaining a vibrant relationship requires effort, understanding, and sacrifice. Learning to play a musical instrument does not come quickly, and is, at times, exceedingly frustrating. Learning to read sophisticated essays is no different. If you persist, however, you will find that with time it becomes easier to read and understand philosophical 14 reading philosophy essays. The payoff is substantial and enduring. You will better understand the day’s reading assignment, which will most assuredly improve your grade. But more important, you will also expand your vocabulary and hone your reading skills. You will increase your ability to understand more complex and important writing. Most of the world’s great books are inaccessible to those with minimal reading and argumentative skills. Learning to read methodically, critically, and in depth will expand your mental horizons. It will increase your understanding of others’ views. And it will enhance your ability to refine and defend your own views. Writing a Philosophy Paper Having read the introductory section, Reading Philosophy, and the first assigned readings, you have doubtless inferred that although writing a philosophy paper somewhat resembles writing papers for other classes, they also differ in significant ways. They are similar inasmuch as all require you to have mastered basic writing skills. You need a robust yet subtle vocabulary; you should have mastered important grammatical rules and the basics of punctuation; you need to write clear and precise sentences; you should organize sentences into a coherent paragraph; finally you must arrange paragraphs so that the reader can follow your exposition or argument. Yet they differ inasmuch as their aims, style, and vocabulary typically differ. Philosophy papers are not standardly research papers: you will not merely ­catalogue what this or that philosopher said about a particular topic. Nor are philosophy papers opinion pieces in which you merely state your view. Most professors require you to evaluate texts or the author’s ideas, or to defend your own view. Finally, philosophers may use unfamiliar words or use familiar words in unfamiliar ways. Of course not all papers required by all philosophy professors are identical. They will usually vary between an introductory or upper division course; they sometimes vary between early or late in the course. To have a shot at writing a good essay, you must be attuned to your professor’s specific requirements. Despite this variation, there are common forms of philosophical essays; I offer some guidance on how to write the most familiar ones. The Most Common Types Expository papers Sometimes, especially early in a course, your professor may ask you to write an expository paper. In it you will identify the author’s central claim or thesis in the essay or book chapter (hereafter, just “essay”) – the bottom line that the author wants you to believe. Then you must identify her reasons for that thesis. Finally, you should explain how the author thinks the reasons support her thesis. It is tempting to think that an expository paper is merely a summary of what the author said. It is not. You cannot just go through the essay, listing ideas the author discusses or evaluates. Not every element of an essay is equally important to isolating the author’s thesis or supporting argument. To write a good expository paper you must distinguish what is central from what is peripheral in the essay. Moreover, sometimes your paper should not present the author’s points in the same order in which she did. In some essays, the thesis is stated at the beginning and the reasons for that thesis come later. In others, it may be stated at the end and be preceded by the premises; though not as commonly, the thesis may be somewhere in the middle of the essay, with some premises before the conclusion and some after it – in particular if the author expressly considers some likely objections to her view. You must extract the essay’s essence and explain it so that someone who has not read the original essay can, by reading your paper, broadly grasp what the author said. You cannot do that after reading the essay once. You will have to read it multiple times, underline key ideas, and 16 w r i t i n g a p h i l o s o p h y pa p e r make notes. Then you should present her thesis and ­evidence in ways that are as charitable as possible, in ways that make author’s thesis and supporting argument as appealing as can be. There are two principal reasons your professor may ask you to write an expository paper. One, she wants you to understand the ideas and reasoning of important thinkers, the structure of influential arguments. Two, a careful exposition of the author’s views is a prerequisite for evaluating those views. All too often we quickly read and may dismiss an author’s thesis simply because we do not like it. That is never a good reason to reject a thesis. We must look at the reasons she offers for the thesis, and decide if her evidence is true, or at least plausible, and whether its truth gives us reason to embrace that thesis. Critical papers More commonly, your professor will ask you to write a critical paper. Many people assume that a criticism is some form of condemnation of the author’s (or speaker’s) views. However, the term “critical” here simply means “evaluative.” Evaluations can be positive as well as negative. The precise nature of these papers varies. So heed the express directions of your professor. Generally, there are three main types of critical papers. Compare and contrast Some professors may ask you to “compare and contrast” the ideas of two or more authors. In so doing, the professor is not asking you for a research paper, nor is she ­asking for an expository paper. You cannot fulfill your professor’s requirement by submitting essentially two expository papers combined into one. The task is more critical (evaluative). To compare and contrast two views you must first understand each. Having understood them, you must then identify the ways in which the authors’ views are similar and different. They may vary in numerous ways. Perhaps the most common are the following: they might reach different conclusions, either because their premises are different (e.g., Marquis; Little, Abortion) or because they evaluate more or less the same evidence differently (e.g., LaFollette; Hughes and Hunt on gun control, Paternalism and Risk). Or they may reach the same conclusion in different ways. One might be a consequentialist and the other a deontologist (see the introduction Theorizing about Ethics). Their theoretical differences lead Singer and Pogge to reach similar views about world hunger in very different ways, while leading Warren and Little to reach roughly similar views on Abortion in different ways. Criticizing a view Some professors will ask (or permit) you to evaluate a single author’s views. This is a two-step process. First, you must do what you would do in an expository paper: You must identify the author’s thesis (conclusion) and her premises and then show how she thinks these premises support the conclusion. Second, you must evaluate her view. Whether positive or negative, this can take one or more of the following forms: (a) you can explain why you find the premises false (or true) or at least not obviously true (obviously false); (b) you can explain why the premises are (or are not) relevant to the conclusion (something you will find, upon reading many of the essays, is more common that you might suppose); or (c) you will explain why the premises, if true, are sufficient (insufficient) to guarantee the truth of the conclusion. I will say more about each of these steps in the following section. Defending your own view In a critical paper where you defend your own view, you first need a clear thesis, a succinct statement (standardly a single sentence) of your view. It should be simple, clear, and unambiguous: “I support the legalization of physician assisted suicide”; “I contend that the recreational use of marijuana, but no other currently banned drugs, should be decriminalized”; “I oppose the legalization of gay marriage”; “Like Hardin, I think we have no obligation to feed starving people in the world; indeed, doing so is positively immoral.” I often encourage a student to underline her thesis. In doing so you inform your readers of the view that you hold; thus, the readers know better how to interpret your other claims. It also reminds you, while you are writing your paper, what your thesis is. Every sentence in your paper should either elucidate or defend that thesis. If it does not, you should discard that sentence. To defend your thesis, you should employ the principles mentioned in the previous section, as well as in the introduction READING PHILOSOPHY. First, the evidence you offer for your thesis should be true or highly plausible. If the evidence is questionable, then offer a ­secondary argument supporting the truth of the main premises. Second, show how the truth of these premises would support the truth of the conclusion. If there is w r i t i n g a p h i l o s o p h y pa p e r uncertainty about the relevance of the premises, offer a secondary argument showing that they are relevant. This might seem to be a rare concern. It is actually quite common. Many practical issues – for example, abortion (does it morally matter that the zygote is genetically human?) and capital punishment (does it matter morally if executing some criminals saves money?) – hinge on disagreements about proffered premises’ relevance. Third, you should show that the premises are sufficient to support the conclusion. For example, most mammals feel pain and have rudimentary emotions. This seems relevant to questions about how we should treat them (few people think it is legitimate to peel off a conscious dog’s skin for fun). Nonetheless, people dispute whether this evidence is sufficient to show that animal experimentation or eating animals is morally impermissible in ordinary circumstances. So you may need secondary arguments showing that your evidence is sufficient. It is not enough, however, to just provide a positive argument for your view; you must also show why it is superior to plausible alternatives. To do that, you must first explain these alternatives much as you would in an expository paper. As in those papers, you must be fair to these positions. Do not find the wackiest proponent of opposing views or describe the views in ways that no sane person would embrace. If you do, you commit the Straw Man Fallacy. Even a weakling can whip a straw man; that is not a significant accomplishment. It is a significant achievement to best an attractive statement of the opposing position. This way of describing the process might suggest that philosophical thinking and writing are highfalutin rhetorical debates where the aim of each side is to win. It is not. The aim is to seek truth (Mill, 1985, ch. 1). To do that we must find the view that is the most rationally defensible. It may be that after careful deliberation that our view is, in fact, superior to alternatives. But often we discover that our view is flawed either in whole or in part. Writing We cannot write a good expository or critical paper ­without significant writing skills: a robust vocabulary, the ability to use proper grammar and punctuation, the talent to compose clear, precise, and engaging sentences, the craft to organize sentences into a coherent paragraph, and the knowledge of how to organize those paragraphs into a clear expository or critical paper. I find that is not 17 obvious to a number of students, since, unfortunately, some of their previous teachers did not explain the importance of each skill, nor did they help students learn how to improve their writing. So let me say a bit about each element, suggest what the key to improving your writing is, and recommend a short text. Vocabulary Most of us were not asked or expected to systematically expand our vocabularies once we left middle (and ­perhaps even elementary) school. Still, most of us continued to learn new words, even if less systematically. We found we could often discern the meaning of a new word by its context. Then some teachers would occasionally introduce the meanings of words in their classes, either in a lecture or in response to students’ questions. They encouraged us to look up the meaning of words we did not know. Unfortunately, I suspect that most of us ignored that prudent advice; hence, our vocabularies are less rich than they could and should be. This dampens our understanding of the views ­forwarded by others, and limits our ability to clearly and persuasively forward our own views. If we read an essay where we do not know the meaning of key terms, then we will not understand or, even worse, incorrectly think we do understand, what she says. To communicate effectively with others, we must choose our words carefully. Unfortunately, we are often insufficiently attentive to words’ precise meanings; hence, we use the wrong word. This happens in three ways. One, having heard others use a word, we surmise what it means from the context; it is just that we infer badly. So we use the word in the wrong way or in the wrong context. Two, sometimes we go further and commit a category mistake. We use a word in a way that is not merely inappropriate; in context it does not make sense. If I said “The octagon dances,” or “The table believes,” I am uttering gibberish. Octagons are not the kinds of things than can dance (or not dance); tables are not the kinds of things that can hold (or fail to hold) beliefs. These are paradigm examples of category mistakes. These examples are obvious, so obvious that we might assume that people rarely (or never) commit a category mistake. Unfortunately, that is not so. We are especially prone to this error when we are acquiring a new vocabulary. If someone is not familiar with the technical use of words like “arguments” or “premises” or “evidence,” she might mistakenly use them in inappropriate ways (“the argument is true” or “the evidence is valid”). 18 w r i t i n g a p h i l o s o p h y pa p e r Three, we sometimes think that since our thesaurus identifies two words as synonyms, then we can use the words interchangeably. Not so. The differences between them may seem minor, yet are often sufficiently significant that using one word rather than the other distorts what we try to say. For instance, there is a variety of adjectives we can use to describe objectionable behavior: unkind, insensitive, untoward, inappropriate, tacky, short-sighted, uncouth, or mean-spirited. Although these words each identify some flawed behavior, they are not identical. It might be appropriate to describe some morally objectionable behavior as “tacky” but not “shortsighted” or “insensitive” but not “mean-spirited.” We need to say what we mean. Vagueness and ambiguity Sometimes we use words that are inexact in context, and thus fail to express ourselves clearly. That is, our writing can be vague or ambiguous. Sometimes we treat these as synonyms; they are not. They are two wholly different forms of imprecision, and thus, the ways to resolve this imprecision differ. Vagueness A word or phrase is vague in context if there is a range of related possible meanings, and, in that context, we need a more precise word. Most words are potentially inexact: tall, smart, close, long, ignorant, risky, challenging, and so on. In many contexts these words are precise enough to communicate. If I describe myself to someone who will be meeting at the a...
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Running head: EUTHANASIA

Euthanasia
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EUTHANASIA

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Today, euthanasia exists as a controversial practice in the healthcare sector. Different
types of euthanasia generating debates in modern society are passive euthanasia, physicianassisted suicide, and active euthanasia. Generally, euthanasia involves committing acts that offer
patients an opportunity for an induced death. Notably, euthanasia is an ethical practice that
liberates terminally ill patients from excruciating pain, psychological suffering, and financial
burdens.
Euthanasia practice is majorly founded on the ethical principles of autonomy and
utilitarianism. Autonomy is regarded as a crucia...

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University of Maryland

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