Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over
SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
March 15, 2018
Illustrated Digest
Abbreviated version of Illustrated
Digest from the
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB)
Note: This version is not the official
NTSB version of either the digest or
the final report. Selected material was
removed to create this document for
use in a class assignment.
The NTSB is the independent federal agency tasked by Congress
with investigating highway, marine, rail, pipeline, and civil aviation
accidents, determining their probable causes, and making safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents.
SPC-20-02
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
The collapse
On Thursday, March 15, 2018, about 1:46 p.m., a partially
constructed pedestrian bridge in Miami, Florida,
experienced a catastrophic structural failure in the nodal
connection between truss members 11 and 12 and the
bridge deck (see photo C at right). The 174-foot-long
bridge span fell about 18.5 feet onto SW 8th Street, an
eight-lane roadway. Two of the westbound lanes below the
north end of the bridge were closed to traffic at the time
of the collapse; however, one westbound lane and all five
eastbound lanes were open. The collapsing bridge fully
or partially crushed eight vehicles, and killed one bridge
worker and five vehicle occupants. Five bridge workers and
five other people were injured.
A
The bridge was built in stages (A) in a casting yard
adjacent to SW 8th Street. (See The ABCs of ABC,
page 9). On March 10, it was moved on self-propelled
modular transporters (SPMTs) onto its support piers
(B). On March 15, an FIU parking garage camera
(D). (See From cracks to collapse, page 9).
The bridge was part of the Florida International University
(FIU) University City Prosperity Project. On the day of the
collapse, a construction crew, redacted in photos (C) and
(D), at right, was retensioning the post-tensioning (PT) rods
within member 11, one of the northernmost of the 12 truss
members connecting the bridge canopy and the deck.
The bridge span in this area already had extensive concrete
cracking that had progressed significantly in the several
days before this work was performed. These
cracks were a clear indication that the structure’s
intended load-resisting mechanisms were failing.
The engineer of record (EOR), who worked for FIGG
Bridge Engineers (FIGG), stated later that the PT rods in
member 11 were being retensioned to return the bridge to a
“pre-existing condition.”
C
But there was no way that this severely cracked bridge
could be returned to a pre-existing condition through
retensioning—the severity of these cracks indicated that
the steel reinforcement was already yielding or fracturing
and the concrete had lost some structural strength.
Although intended to be a remedial action that would
return the bridge to a previous state, retensioning the
rods located within member 11 increased demand on,
and damage to, the member 11/12 nodal region until the
distress became critical.
D
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National Transportation Safety Board
B
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
FIU pedestrian bridge project
The roles of the main participants in the bridge project are
described below. (See also Bridge project timeline, p. 6).
FIU entered into a design-build contract with Munilla
Construction Management (MCM) to construct the
bridge, and a standard professional services agreement
with Bolton, Perez and Associates Consulting Engineers
(Bolton, Perez) to administer, monitor, and inspect the
bridge as it was constructed.
MCM, the design builder, entered into a standard form of
agreement with FIGG, the design consultant, to provide
professional design and engineering services that included
final design, released-for-construction (RFC) drawings, and
specifications associated with the bridge, including that
FIGG would serve as the EOR.
FIU coordinated each of these contracts with the Florida
Department of Transportation (FDOT) and the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) because federal funds were
being expended, and FDOT had oversight, on this project.
Further, although FDOT had delegated its project oversight
to FIU, when issues arose, FDOT was called in to consult.
(See NTSB/HAR-19/02, available at www.ntsb.gov.)
FIGG entered into an agreement with the firm Louis Berger
to perform an independent peer review of the bridge plans,
as required by FDOT, which required that the design,
including calculations, be independently verified to ensure
that the bridge had sufficient capacity to support itself and
anticipated loading. Neither Louis Berger U.S., Inc., nor its
predecessor—Louis Berger Group, Inc.—was qualified by
FDOT for this type of complex concrete bridge design work.
Simplified FIU project organizational chart. Not all entities and subcontractors are shown.
As the lead partner, FIGG was responsible for managing
the design team and for acting as the single point of
contact with MCM. FIGG was responsible for completing
the final structural design and preparing contract
documents, including analysis and design of the bridge
superstructure, substructure, and foundations related
to the final construction contract documents. FIGG was
also responsible for making sure the bridge design met
required design specifications and state structural design
guidelines.
The engineer of record
FIGG was the engineering firm of record, and, as such,
employed the EOR. As Florida law states, the EOR is “a
Florida professional engineer who is in responsible charge
for the preparation, signing, dating, sealing and issuing of
any engineering document(s) for any engineering service or
creative work.” The other parties deferred to the experience
and recommendations of the EOR.
A “General Plan and Elevation” drawing from the set of
“released for construction” plans showing the proposed
structure, bearing the seal and signature of the EOR.
National Transportation Safety Board 3
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
The bridge on the day of the collapse
Nomenclature
The main span included 12 truss members aligned
along the structure’s centerline. Truss members
were numbered 1 through 12 from south to
north. A node is a connection between truss
members and the deck or canopy.
Calculation errors
Retensioning member 11
FIGG’s bridge design calculations resulted in a significant
overestimation of capacity and underestimation of
demand—in particular, interface shear demand at critical
nodes. (See Internal forces and structural failure,
pages 6–7.)
On the day of the collapse, without the required
independent peer review, FIGG attempted a remedial
action: retensioning member 11. The demand that the
retensioning placed on the node, in conjunction with the
existing forces already on the node, resulted in the
failure of the member 11/12 nodal region.
(See From cracks to collapse,
page 9.)
Structural distress
Unique, complex bridge design
The bridge design included a concrete deck and a concrete
canopy connected by a single row of concrete diagonal and
vertical truss members, which extended down the center of
the bridge. (See The bridge as designed, page 5.)
Concrete truss bridges are rare; truss bridges are typically
constructed of steel, which can more effectively carry both
compressive and tensile forces. NTSB research found
no other concrete truss bridge designs similar to the
pedestrian bridge.
Some cracking is normal in concrete. However, by the day of
the collapse, the cracks in the member 11/12 nodal region
were more than 45 times wider than is considered generally
acceptable for reinforced concrete structures.
Representatives of MCM, FIGG, FIU, FDOT, and Bolton Perez
could have stopped work or closed SW 8th Street
underneath the bridge; none did.
Cracking was first documented weeks before
the collapse. (See From cracks to collapse, page 9.)
The cracking became markedly worse immediately
after the detensioning of member 11 on March 10.
Cracking and spalling continued to worsen over the
following days, with node 11/12 further dislocating
to the north, until the bridge collapsed on March 15.
Above: Nonredundant FIU pedestrian bridge main span
(left) and exemplar redundant steel truss bridge (right).
A non-load-path-redundant structure has fewer load paths
than necessary to maintain stability following the failure
of one or more critical components, likely resulting in
collapse of the structure. With truss members in a single
plane along its centerline, this bridge was not a load-pathredundant structure.
4
National Transportation Safety Board
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
A six-worker crew was
retensioning member 11
at the time of the collapse.
The bridge as designed
Cold joint surface of nodal region 11/12
Cracks bypassed
the southernmost
two size 7 rebars
(see also,
Observed
distress, page 7).
The bridge design plans—with phased concrete
placement—resulted in cold joints between concrete
pours at the top and bottom of each truss member. A
cold joint is a discontinuity where one layer of concrete
reaches final set (hardens) before subsequent concrete
is placed. According to the American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials’ specifications
on load and resistance factor design, the LRFD Bridge
Design Specifications (AASHTO LRFD), cold joints may be
roughened to an amplitude of 0.25 inches to qualify for an
advantageous design factor. Such roughening was required
for this bridge. Intentionally roughening the cold joint would
have improved resistance to shearing forces, but even
then, node 11/12 would not have had sufficient capacity
to counteract the demand load for interface shear—and
the bridge would still have been under-designed and could
have failed. (See Internal forces and structural failure,
pages 6–7.)
Not enough rebar in node 11/12
Voids in node 11/12
Because of FIGG calculation errors, too little steel rebar
was embedded in the concrete between the base of
member 11 and the deck. In addition, the structural crack
that began forming on February 24 (see inset photo,
February 24, page 4) passed above the two southernmost
size 7 rebars. So, a portion of the crack, which became a
failure point, bypassed 25 percent of the reinforcing steel
that was intended to offer interface shear resistance at the
base of member 11. (See Structural distress begins in the
casting yard, page 6.)
The main span structure included nonstructural elements
(hollow pipes) within the concrete. These hollow pipes
passed through the member 11/12 nodal region and acted
as voids within the concrete mass. The voided areas
exhibited a lower stiffness than concrete and were less
able to resist applied loads than a monolithic concrete
region. The member 11/12 nodal region’s nonstructural
voids made it less able to resist applied loads, which
contributed to the destabilization of this node through
overstress and the subsequent collapse of the main span.
The FIU pedestrian bridge collapsed before construction
was finished. Although designed to look like a cable-stayed
bridge, it was, in fact, a nonredundant, single-load-path,
concrete truss bridge. The section under construction that
collapsed extended 174 feet from the the south pier to the
pylon pier, with an elevated walking deck 18.5 feet above
SW 8th Street. The overall bridge design also included a
99-foot back span that had not yet been constructed. This
back span was part of the overall bridge design and was
designed to connect to the main structure from the pylon
pier at member 12, over the Tamiami Canal, ending at the
north pier.
The back span that was never built
Although the design should have allowed member 11 to
resist the shear forces on its own, additional resistance
could have been provided later in the construction
sequence. Once the back span had been built, the
horizontal force component from diagonal member 14
would have been pushing south toward vertical members
13 and 12, helping counteract or resist the northward force
in truss member 11 at the 11/12 nodal region.
Back span
(not in place;
members 13 and
14 are labeled)
Main span, shown in
orange, and sections
not yet in place,
shown in gray
Because the back span had not yet been constructed,
however, the northward shear force caused by the
structure’s self-weight and the retensioning of
member 11 was able to push through the bottom of
member 12 and the diaphragm, causing the bridge to
collapse.
National Transportation Safety Board 5
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
On February 24, 2018, a distinct
cracking sound was heard,
and a crack was observed and
documented at the intersection of
truss member 11 and the deck.
Internal forces and structural failure
Axial and component forces
In this bridge, the vertical, or downward, component force
provided a clamping effect across the cold joint between
member 11 and the deck. The horizontal, or northward,
force provided a shear force at the cold joint, pushing
the bottom of member 11 toward the north. Unique to
node 11/12:
PT rods generated vertical clamping force and horizontal
shear force
32-degree angle produced 60 percent larger horizontal
shear than vertical clamping force
Structural distress begins in the
casting yard
Because of the errors in FIGG’s design calculations,
the total amount of reinforcing steel needed was
underestimated. Only a 4.8-square-inch, cross-sectional
area of reinforcing steel was resisting the northward
shear force pushing the bridge deck. An additional
13-square-inch cross-sectional area of reinforcing steel in
the interface shear reinforcement area should have been
provided.
On February 24, 2018, a distinct cracking sound was
heard, and a crack was observed and documented at the
intersection of truss number 11 and the deck.
The early cracking at this node under partial loading aligns
with the significant overestimation of capacity assumed by
FIGG. (See Not enough rebar in node 11/12, p. 5.)
6
National Transportation Safety Board
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
Observed distress
Bridge design errors: overestimating capacity, underestimating demand
The growing structural cracks were clear signs that the
bridge was in distress and failing. (See From cracks to
collapse, page 9.) On March 10, the span was moved from
the casting yard, on SPMTs, to its support piers. Then
post-tensioning in member 11 was removed, and the
concrete distress previously observed in the 11/12 nodal
region immediately and significantly increased.
FIGG used four analytical models to
determine the demand on the superstructure,
each representing the bridge at various
stages of completion. Postcollapse, to
analyze the FIGG demand values, the FHWA
completed four separate structural analyses
of the bridge during the specific construction
stage when the collapse occurred.
The cracking demonstrated three types of structural failure:
cracking consistent with an inadequate interface
shear connection between the bottom of member 11
and the deck
cracking consistent with punching shear surrounding
the base of member 12 due to the nodal region
beginning to push northward from the bridge deck
flexural cracking on the north face of member 12, also
due to the nodal region beginning to dislocate from
the bridge deck
The FHWA’s postcollapse analysis
determined that the FIGG calculations
underestimated the interface shear demand
at node 11/12 by 46 percent; the actual
demand was nearly twice what FIGG
calculated. (The demand at other nodes was
also miscalculated; for node 10/11 demand was nearly
10 times what FIGG calculated). See figure at right.
FIGG should have considered the loadings from all critical
construction stages when designing the pedestrian bridge
and determining the governing interface shear demands.
During its design process, FIGG had available model
results with nodal region demands that exceeded those
acting on the bridge at the time of collapse, but neglected
to use them.
FIGG made two substantial errors in its interface shear
calculations, resulting in a significant overestimation of
capacity. FIGG did not use the lower bound load factor for
determining the governing clamping force across the
interface shear surface. In addition, non-permanent loads
were included in determining clamping force across the
interface shear surface, which resulted in the amplification
of the effects of those forces.
FIGG also made significant errors in the calculation of
demand. The interface shear demand error on the critical
node could have been identified (during the design process
to double check the results of the computer models) by a
simple “back-of-the-envelope” calculation to approximate
the horizontal shear demand (as shown below).
The five hollow pipes within the 11/12 nodal region and
diaphragm acted as voids within the concrete mass,
subjecting the surrounding concrete to higher stress
concentrations and the unanticipated redirection of the
load path.
The shear plane under member 11, and the lower portion
of member 12—a vertical column from the diaphragm to
the canopy—temporarily resisted the northward dislocation
of the node. Ultimately, however, the bridge collapsed. The
demand placed on the 11/12 nodal region simply exceeded
the capacity of the structure.
National Transportation Safety Board 7
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
A catastrophe years in the making
The collapse of the FIU pedestrian bridge traced back long
before the afternoon of the collapse, to FIGG’s bridge
design errors. (See Bridge design errors, page 7.)
One such error was that FIGG assigned the bridge
a redundancy factor of 1.0, indicating a redundant
structure. (See Unique, complex bridge design, page 4.) A
factor of at least 1.05 would have been consistent with
existing nationally recognized guidance. However, even a
redundancy factor of 1.05 would not have prevented the
collapse.
There is no AASHTO or FDOT guidance on redundancy
specific to concrete structure design. In addition, AASHTO’s
LRFD Guide Specifications for the Design of Pedestrian
Bridges (AASHTO 2009) does not discuss redundancy.
Our investigation found that redundancy guidelines for
pedestrian and concrete truss bridges are needed.
Once the designs and bridge plans were completed, FIGG’s
errors should have been caught and corrected, but a
thorough independent peer review of the complex bridge
design1 never happened. FIGG initially planned to use
another of its own design offices for this review. When FIGG
was reminded that FDOT required an external reviewer, the
company hired Louis Berger, a firm not prequalified for this
work type, despite its claim to the contrary.
September 5, 2013
DOT notifies FIU of
$11.4 million TIGER grant
award to build bridge
Louis Berger did not evaluate the nodes of the bridge truss
where they connected with the bridge deck and canopy
or consider the multiple stages the bridge construction
involved.
As soon as the bridge had to support its own weight,
cracks appeared at the under-designed nodes, particularly
node 11/12. Over the next 19 days, the cracks grew until
the bridge collapsed, raising the issue of FIGG’s failure to
properly evaluate the obvious structural distress and to
recognize that the load-resisting mechanisms were failing.
FIGG—which employed the EOR—repeatedly reassured
other bridge team members that the cracking was not a
safety concern. Other team members deferred to FIGG.
(See ‘Not a safety concern’, page 10.)
The morning of the collapse, despite not knowing the
reason for the cracking, FIGG briefed the bridge project
team on a plan to retension member 11, reasoning that it
was a way to “go one step backwards” (that is, return the
bridge to an earlier state). Instead, this retensioning action
further overstressed the member 11/12 nodal region and
resulted in failure. (See Internal forces and structural
failure, pages 6–7; Stuctural distress, page 4.)
In summary, because the design calculations were
wrong, the bridge collapsed. Because nobody took action
despite clear signs of structural distress, the collapse
killed six people and injured ten.
Bridge project timeline
June 5
Grant agreement
executed between
FHWA, FIU, and FDOT
June 23
Original LAP agreement
executed by
FIU and FDOT
November 10
FDOT recommends
to the FHWA that the
design-build contract
be awarded to MCM
November 16
FHWA concurs with
the selection of MCM
1 The request for proposals stated that “Prior to submittal to the OWNER (FIU), bridge plans shall have a peer review analysis by an independent engineering firm not involved with the production of the design or plans,
prequalified in accordance with Chapter 14-75.”
8
National Transportation Safety Board
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
April 28, 2016 through November 8, 2017
The ABCs of ABC
Timespan during which design and
design calculations were completed
April 28, 2016: MCM enters
into a design-builder and
design-consultant contract with
FIGG; FIGG to serve as EOR
June 30: FDOT reminds FIGG
that an independent peer review
performed by an independent
engineering firm is required
July 6: Louis Berger confirms it
is FDOT-prequalified for complex
bridge design–concrete (it was not)
August 10: Louis Berger
to FIGG: “…a lesser fee
may be associated
with less effort/value”
August 11–12 (emails): FIGG/
Louis Berger: original scope of
work unchanged, fee reduced from
$110K to $61K. Timeframe also
reduced, from 10 weeks to 7
September 13: FIGG submits
foundation plans to FDOT
September 23: FIU enters into
a contract with Bolton, Perez to
administer, monitor, and inspect the
pedestrian bridge
The FIU pedestrian bridge was designed to be cast in sections in a yard adjacent to
SW 8th Street (A and B), then moved into place on the concrete piers using SPMTs (C).
April 17, 2017
November 6, 2017
September 29: FIGG submits
substructure plans to FDOT
February 10, 2017: FDOT
receives FIGG’s submission of
superstructure plans
December 12
FIGG requests the closing of SW 8th Street on behalf
of MCM, for movement of the precast bridge span
January 14
FIU signs design-build
contract with MCM
From cracks
to collapse
Accelerated bridge construction (ABC) broadly refers to a method of bridge construction
that focuses on minimizing the disruption of traffic when building new bridges and uses
planning, design, materials, and methods to reduce onsite construction time.
February 5–6
FDOT approves general-use permit including bridge
movement plans, as-needed two-lane blanket road
closure for westbound traffic
See From cracks to collapse, below
February 23–25
Formwork removal; structural
cracking first documented
From mid-January to mid-February
Tensioning tendons and rods
Tensioning example:
workers on top of
canopy stressing
PT rods in diagonal
supports
February 24
Crack
found in
member
11/12
nodal
region
March 10
Morning: SPMT move
of main span
Afternoon:
Detensioning
of PT rods
Significant cracking
progression
during
detensioning
of PT rods
March 15 (times are approximate) 8:00
a.m.: FIGG EOR observes cracking
9:00 a.m.: FIGG meeting with FIU, MCM,
FDOT, and Bolton Perez
After 9:00 a.m.: Retensioning of PT rods
1:46 p.m.: Bridge collapse
National Transportation Safety Board 9
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
An omission in the
construction plans
Finally, the structural performance of interface shear
surface between the bridge deck (or walkway) and the
lower ends of the truss diagonals was partially dependent
on the roughness of the substrate concrete.
The FIGG design calculations were based on an
intentionally roughened interface. FIGG was contractually
required to deliver final, complete construction plans to
MCM. FIGG’s construction plans did specifically direct
MCM to intentionally roughen some interfaces in other
locations in the bridge. However, FIGG’s plans failed to
direct MCM to intentionally roughen any of the interface
surfaces between the bridge deck and the diagonals.
Even if the cold joint surface of nodal region 11/12 had
been roughened as the bridge design assumed, node 11/12
would not have had sufficient capacity to counteract the
demand load for interface shear—and the bridge would still
have been under-designed and could have failed.
‘Not a safety issue’
Selected communications and
photographs related to observed cracks
in member 11/12 nodal region.
March 13 at 11:17 a.m.
March 13
9:45 a.m.
Email from FIGG design manager to MCM:
“We do not see this as a safety issue”
4:13 p.m. Voicemail from FIGG EOR to FDOT: “But from
a safety perspective, we don’t see that there’s
any issue there, so we’re not concerned about
it from that perspective”
March 14 at 1:50 p.m.
March 13 at 11:18 a.m.
5:18 p.m. Email from FIGG design manager to MCM:
“Again, we have evaluated this further and
confirmed that this is not a safety issue”
March 14
10:50 a.m. Email from MCM to Structural Technologies:
“FIGG has further evaluated and confirmed that
the cracks encountered on the diaphragm do
not pose a safety issue and/or concern”
March 13 at 11:25 a.m.
March 15
9:00 a.m.
Presentation by FIGG EOR at meeting with
FDOT; FIU; MCM; Bolton, Perez (and others):
“And, therefore, there is no safety concern
relative to the observed cracks and minor
spalls”
Meeting minutes prepared by Bolton, Perez:
“FIGG assured that there was no concern with
safety of the span suspended over the road”
Meeting minutes prepared by FIGG:
“Based on the discussions at the meeting, no
one expressed concern with safety of the span
suspended over the road”
10 National Transportation Safety Board
March 14 at 1:51 p.m.
March 15 at 10:55 a.m.
March 13 at 1:02 p.m.
March 15 at 10:55 a.m.
March 14 at 1:42 p.m.
Photo sources:
MCM; Bolton, Perez;
FIU Associate Vice-President of
Facilities Management
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
Page intentionally blank.
National Transportation Safety Board 11
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
Glossary of terms
Accelerated bridge construction (ABC): Construction that
uses innovative planning, design, materials, and methods
in a safe and cost-effective manner to reduce onsite
construction time when building new bridges or replacing or
rehabilitating existing bridges.
Axial force: The compression or tension force acting in a
structural member.
Blister: A concrete block cast on the top or side of a
concrete member that typically provides access to a posttensioning anchorage.
Canopy: Top horizontal member of the FIU pedestrian
bridge.
Cantilever*: A structural member that has a free
end projecting beyond a support; or a length of span
overhanging a support.
Capacity: Ability of a structure to resist applied loads.
Chord*: A generally horizontal member of a truss.
Clamping force: The compressive (vertical) force that
contributes to interface shear resistance.
Cold joint: A joint or discontinuity resulting from a delay in
concrete placement of sufficient duration that the freshly
placed concrete cannot intermingle with the previously
placed, already hardened, concrete.
Compression*: A type of stress involving pressing together,
which tends to shorten a member; the opposite of tension.
Compression member: Any structural member subjected
to a compressive force. In a truss bridge, some structural
members (chord or diagonal) are always under
compression; some are always under tension; and some,
depending on the configuration of the structure and the
loading, change from compression to tension and vice
versa.
2
Concrete truss bridge: The FIU bridge was designed
as a two-span, single-plane concrete truss containing
longitudinal, transverse, and truss member post-tensioning.
The truss structure was complemented architecturally with
a central pylon and steel pipe stays. Concrete truss bridges
are exceedingly rare. Research has revealed no other
designs similar to the FIU bridge. Generally, truss bridges
are constructed primarily of steel.
Curing*: A process that begins immediately after concrete
is placed and finished, and involves maintaining moisture
and temperature conditions throughout the concrete for an
extended period of time.
Dead load*: Static load due to the weight of a structure
itself; also referred to as self-weight.
Deck*: Portion of a bridge that provides direct support
for vehicular and pedestrian traffic, supported by a
superstructure.
Demand: Design loads imposed on structural members that
need to be resisted or supported by the structure.
Horizontal component: Shearing force on the interface
shear surface at the end of an inclined or vertical truss
member.
Load*: A force carried by a structure component.
Member*: An individual angle, beam, plate, or built-up piece
intended to become an integral part of an assembled frame
or structure. Members are the major structural elements of
the truss (chords, diagonals, and verticals).
Node (or nodal region): Located at any part of a bridge in
which truss members (chords, diagonals, and verticals) are
connected. In the FIU bridge, the canopy was the top chord,
and the deck was the bottom chord.
Design-build: A system of contracting whereby one entity
performs both architectural/engineering design and
construction under a single contract.2
Nonredundant structure: A structure with fewer load paths
(or main supports) than necessary to maintain stability
following the failure of a critical component, likely resulting
in its collapse.
Diagonal*: A sloping structural member of a truss or bracing
system. The FIU bridge diagonals connected the bridge
canopy and the bridge deck.
Pier*: A substructure unit that supports the spans of a
multispan superstructure at an intermediate location
between its abutments.
Diaphragm*: A transverse member placed within a member
or superstructure system to distribute stresses and improve
strength and rigidity.
Post-tensioning: A method of prestressing concrete using
steel rods or strands that are stretched after the concrete
has hardened. This stretching puts the concrete in
compression, with the compressive stresses intended to
counteract tensile (tension) forces experienced by the
concrete.
Distress: A physical manifestation of deterioration that
is apparent on or within a structure, including cracking,
delamination, and spalling of concrete.
Falsework*: A temporary wooden or metal framework built
to support the weight of a structure during construction and
until it becomes self-supporting.
See the Design-Build Institute of America website, accessed September 23, 2019.
12 National Transportation Safety Board
Interface shear surface: The contact area between two
concrete elements that transfers opposing forces across the
joint. In the case of a cold joint, the roughness (friction) and
associated cohesion across the interface shear surface and
the magnitude of the forces compressing the two surfaces
provide resistance to interface shear.
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
Post-tensioning (PT) rod: Prestressing steel rod inside a
plastic duct or sleeve, positioned in the formwork before the
placement of concrete. PT rods are large-diameter threaded
rods secured with large nuts and anchor plates to lock their
ends in place so they can be tensioned and/or detensioned
as necessary. A PT rod is tensioned after the concrete has
gained strength but before service loads are applied to the
structure.
PT tendon: Strand of PT wire that is tensioned, then held
taut by clamps at each end, and typically cannot be
detensioned without cutting the strands. PT tendons were
located in the main span bridge deck and canopy.
Rebar: Reinforcing steel bars often used in concrete
structures for added strength and stability. Standard
rebar classifications rate the bars by diameter as
follows:
size 4 = 0.50 inch
size 5 = 0.625 inch
size 6 = 0.75 inch
size 7 = 0.875 inch
size 8 = 1.0 inch
size 9 = 1.128 inch
size 10 = 1.27 inch
size 11 = 1.41 inch
Redundancy: The capability of a bridge structural system to
carry loads after damage to, or the failure of, one or more of
its members.
Reinforced concrete: Concrete to which steel is embedded
such that the two materials act together in resisting forces.
The reinforcing steel (rods, bars, tendons, etc.) helps to
absorb the stresses in a concrete structure.
Self-propelled modular transporter (SPMT): A platform
vehicle with a large array of wheels. SPMTs are used to
transport massive objects—such as large bridge sections,
oil refining equipment, and motors—that are too big in scale
or too heavy for truck transport.
Shear: A force that causes parts of a material to slide past
one another in opposite directions.
Shim stack: Multiple layers (or plates) of a material (a shim)
stacked to provide support—in this case, to support the main
span during permanent placement; a shim plate is a single
layer.
Span: Horizontal space between two supports of a
structure. A simple span rests on two supports, one
at each end, the stresses on which do not affect the
adjoining spans. A continuous span consists of a series of
consecutive spans (three or more supports) that are rigidly
connected (without joints) so that bending moment and
shear are transmitted from one span to another.
Tension truss member: Any member of a truss that is
subjected to tensile (tension) forces. In a truss bridge,
some structural members are always under compression;
some are always under tension; and some, depending
on the structural configuration and loading, change from
compression to tension and vice versa.
Transverse: Perpendicular to the longitudinal axis; a
transverse member helps distribute stresses and improves
strength and rigidity.
Truss: A bridge superstructure made up of members whose
ends are linked at nodes. The structure is composed of
connected elements, typically forming triangular units,
where the members act as a single object.
Specifications*: A detailed description of requirements,
materials, and tolerances for construction that are not
shown on drawings; also known as “specs.”
Vertical component: Compressive or clamping force on the
interface shear surface at the end of an inclined or vertical
truss member that contributes to interface shear resistance.
Substructure: Bridge structure that supports the
superstructure and transfers loads from it to the foundation;
main components are abutments, piers, footings, and
pilings.
Vertical truss member: A vertical member connecting the
upper and lower chords at nodes.
Superstructure: Bridge structure that receives and supports
traffic or pedestrian loads and, in turn, transfers those loads
to the substructure; includes the bridge deck, structural
members, parapets, handrails, sidewalk, lighting, and
drainage features.
Tendon: A prestressing steel cable, strand, or bar that
provides a clamping load to produce compressive stress to
balance tensile stress.
Tension*: Stress that tends to pull apart material; the
opposite of compression.
*Taken from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Bridge Inspector’s Reference Manual.
National Transportation Safety Board 13
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
14 National Transportation Safety Board
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
National Transportation Safety Board 15
Pedestrian Bridge Collapse Over SW 8th Street, Miami, Florida
The NTSB is an independent federal agency
that investigates marine, rail, pipeline,
highway, and aviation accidents, determines
their probable causes, and makes
recommendations to improve safety.
The FHWA provided the NTSB with a 3D printed model during the NTSB’s investigation. The 3D printed model of node
11/12 illustrates the movement of members 11 and 12 to the north (with respect to the deck) that initiated the collapse
of the pedestrian bridge.
16 National Transportation Safety Board
PEDESTRIAN BRIDGE COLLAPSE
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March 15, 2018: a partially constructed pedestrian bridge in Miami, Florida,
experienced a catastrophic structural failure
· 174-foot long bridge fell 18.5 feet onto SW gth street
6 of the 8 lanes of the street were open to traffic
I bridge worker and 5 vehicle occupants were kill; 5 workers and 5 others
were injured; 8 vehicles were crushed
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted an
investigation.
A summary of NTSB's findings are posted on Blackboard in a Folder called
“Assignment I” along with these slides.
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