Acculturation and Assimilation: A Clarification
Author(s): Raymond H. C. Teske, Jr. and Bardin H. Nelson
Source: American Ethnologist, Vol. 1, No. 2 (May, 1974), pp. 351-367
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/643554
Accessed: 15-05-2019 20:25 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/643554?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
American Anthropological Association, Wiley are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to American Ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
acculturation and assimilation:
a clarification
RAYMOND H. C. TESKE, JR.-Sam Houston State University
BARDIN H. NELSON-Texas A & M University
acculturation
process or event A single unifying thread to be found in almost all discussions of
acculturation is that it is a process as opposed to a unitary event. Thurnwald emphasizes
this point when he defines acculturation as "a process of adaptation to new conditions of
life" (1932:557). Similarly, Gillin and Raimy refer to acculturation as "those processes
whereby the culture of a society is modified as the result of contact with the culture of
one or more other societies" (1940:371), emphasizing that there are "degrees of acculturation." Several writers such as Herskovits (1937), Siegel et a/. (1953), and Spindler
(1963) have emphasized that not only is acculturation a process, but that it is a "dynamic
process.'"
individual or group process Contingent on the position that acculturation is a process is
the question of whether it is to be conceived of as an individual process or as a group
process. On the one hand, there are those scholars who implicitly treat it as a group
phenomenon. For example, Linton's definition of acculturation makes no mention of the
individual: it is taken to comprehend "those phenomena which result when groups of
individuals having different cultures come into continuous first hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups" (1940:501).
Herskovits (1937) notes that the study of acculturation is concerned with the interaction
of cultural groups. Similarly, Bogardus (1949) in discussing cultural pluralism is concerned only with culture systems and makes no reference to individual members of the
culture. Even The Social Science Research Council Summer Seminar on Acculturation
(Siegel et a/. 1 953) tacitly treats the group as a single unit when discussing acculturation
processes. Some writers, such as Devereux and Loeb (1943) in their discussion of an-
The purpose of this paper is to provide a clarification of the relationship between acculturation and assimilation through the development
of a conceptual framework. By means of a careful review of theoretically relevant literature prevalent characteristics related to each concept
are delineated and discussed in order to identify and synthesize common, as well as contrasting, elements. A comparison of these elements
or characteristics is then undertaken pursuant to proffering a clarification. In short, then, this paper seeks to compare and contrast salient
characteristics of the concepts of acculturation and assimilation in
order to clarify and delineate the relationship between them.
acculturation and assi milation 351
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
tagonistic acculturation, imply that acculturation is a group process through their treatment of the group as a single unit with no reference to the individual. Others, though
they acknowledge the individual element, still are concerned with the group as the acculturating constituent (cf. Simirenko 1966).
On the other hand, individual acculturation is also acknowledged. Dohrenwend and
Smith, for example, refer to the group as an important element in acculturation inasmuch
as group dynamics affect the opportunity for individual acculturation. However, they
explicitly emphasize that acculturation may be an exclusively individual phenomenon as
well as a group phenomenon, specifying "that individual is most acculturated who deviates farthest from the norms of the strongest, that is, the most exclusive, orders of
structural activity in his culture" (1962:35). Similarly, Spiro (1955) and Broom and
Kitsuse (1 955) acknowledge that acculturation may occur at both the group and individual levels, though they argue that the acculturation process at the individual level is affected
by the acculturation process at the group level. Other writers, such as Gillin and Raimy
(1940) and Eaton (1952), categorically emphasize that acculturation may occur at both
the individual and the group level.
In short, it is axiomatic that acculturation may be treated as either an individual
phenomenon, a group phenomenon, or both, providing care is exercised to define at
which level of analysis the scholar is operating.
In considering this position it should be emphasized that the acculturation process
may obtain between subcultural groups as well as between autonomous cultural groups.
Thurnwald, for example, has suggested that studies of the acculturation process are
applicable even for cultural enclaves within larger associations. To exemplify this position
he cites "the fact that even in the fold of Catholicism in the United States there are to be
found Polish, Italian, Spanish, and French, who all keep their own traditions"
(1932:569). Other scholars who have suggested that the acculturation process is ap-
plicable in the case of subcultures include Herskovits (1937), Dohrenwend and Smith
(1962), and Simirenko (1966), to cite but a few. Several writers have also suggested that
the concept of acculturation is most applicable for studies of American ethnic groups
which, subsequently, are treated as subcultures (cf. Herskovits 1958; Broom and Kitsuse
1955; Spiro 1955; lanni 1958; Simirenko 1966).
It should be noted that this position may at first appear to be in contrast with the
definition put forth by The Social Science Research Council Summer Seminar on Accul-
turation to the effect that "acculturation may be defined as culture change that is
initiated by the conjunction of two or more autonomous cultural systems" (Siegel et al.
1953:974). However, this position is clarified by reference first to the delimiting condition "initiated" in the definition, and second, by the statement of the seminar to the
effect that
cultural changes induced by contacts between ethnic enclaves and their encompassing societies
would be definable as acculturative, whereas those resulting from the interaction of factions,
classes, occupational groups, or other specialized categories within a single society would not be
so considered. Hence, socialization, urbanization, industrialization, and secularization are not
acculturation processes unless they are cross-culturally introduced rather than intraculturally
developed phenomena (Siegel et a/. 1 953:975).
-a position consistent with that established above.
direction One of the principal conditions necessary for this dynamic process to tran-
spire is a contact situation; that is, at least two cultural groups must come into continuous first-hand contact. This thesis is consistent throughout the literature (cf. Redfield et
352 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
a/. 1936:149; Herskovits 1958:11; Linton 1940:501; Gillin and Raimy 1940:371; to cite
only a few). Spicer, in particular, has emphasized the role of contact in acculturation.
Moreover, he argues that alternative types of contact situations lead to a wide variety in
the results of contact, thereby suggesting an important variable in the acculturation
process (1961:519). This point assists in differentiating acculturation from diffusion, the
spread of culture traits, "which, while occurring in all instances of acculturation, is not
only a phenomenon which frequently takes place without the occurrence of the type of
contact between people specified (i.e., continuous, first-hand contact) . . . but also constitutes only one aspect of the process of acculturation" (Redfield et a/. 1936:149).
Assuming continuous first-hand contact as a necessary prerequisite for acculturation, the
question then arises as to the direction the acculturation process takes. Specifically, does
this phenomenon incorporate a one-way, unidirectional process of change, or a two-way
process? And, if the former, what are the determinants of the direction this process will
take; if the latter, is the degree of change greater in one direction than in the other and, if
so, what is the determinant, or determinants, of this change?
Several writers have argued that acculturation is a unidirectional process, as opposed
to a two-way relationship. E. C. Parsons (1936), for example, distinguishes acculturation
from assimilation by suggesting that acculturation is unidirectional, whereas assimilation
constitutes a give-and-take relationship. Graves (1967), too, in reporting an investigation
of psychological acculturation in a tri-ethnic community, treats acculturation as a unidirectional phenomenon, with change occurring on the part of ethnic minorities in the
direction of a majority culture. Furthermore, many writers, while not arguing that acculturation is a unidirectional process, treat it as if it were such. In other words, in their
research or theoretical discussions, especially in regard to immigrant groups, culture
changes relevant to the one group, as well as factors contributory to such changes, are
identified and discussed with no attention given to changes, reciprocal or otherwise, in
the other group or groups. As an illustration of this point, lanni argues that time and
place should be important variables in acculturation research. He suggests that students of
groups emigrating to America from Western Europe can control for time by identifying
place of origin and concomitant conditions in America. Specifically, lanni notes that
"since contemporaries of the immigrant group remain under the old culture, it is possible
to identify cultural changes which might have come about even in the absence of contact" (1958:43). Furthermore, he suggests four time-place situations for consideration:
(1) study of the original precontact immigrant culture; (2) the conditions of contact; (3)
the present-day life of the immigrant group; and (4) the present-day culture of the
immigrants' area of origin. Thereby, "changes which took place among the immigrants
and did not take place among those who remained in the original culture are the result of
the immigrants' acculturative experience" (1958:44). No attention is given to the effect
of the immigrant group on American culture nor is it even suggested that some traits of
the immigrant group may be adopted by the American culture. On the other hand, lanni
in no way suggests or denies that a two-way acculturative process may obtain from this
situation. Numerous other examples of this point are to be found in the literature. To cite
but a few: Gillin and Raimy (1940), Devereux and Loeb (1943), Eaton (1952), Broom
and Kitsuse (1955), Spiro (1955), Samora (1956), and Silvers (1965). However, with the
exception of E. C. Parsons (1 936) and Graves (1 967), these writers do not argue for
acculturation as a unidirectional process; they simply treat it as such, failing to acknowledge any two-way, or reciprocal, acculturative initiative on the part of the other cultural
system.
acculturation and assimilation 353
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Rather than a unidirectional perspective, the literature reveals consistent justification
for viewing acculturation as a two-way, or reciprocal, process. The often-quoted definition of Redfield et a/. illustrates this position wherein acculturation is taken to compre-
hend "those phenomena which result when groups of individuals come into continuous
first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or
both groups" (1936:149, italics ours). Herskovits exhorts that "acculturation has to do
with continuous contact and hence implies a more comprehensive interchange between
two bodies of tradition" (1958:15, italics ours). Moreover, Foster (1960:6ff) has emphasized that acculturation is a two-way process, even though it has frequently been treated
as a one-way process. Analogously, writers such as Linton (1940), Siegel et a/. (1953),
Bogardus (1949), and Dohrenwend and Smith (1962) implicitly treat acculturation as a
two-way or reciprocal process.
To summarize, an examination of literature on acculturation would indicate that it is
connotatively a bidirectional process; however, because of their research or theoretical
perspectives many writers are given to treating it as a unidirectional process while not
denying its reciprocal nature. It should be acknowledged, though, that this two-way
process is not necessarily egalitarian. Furthermore, attention should be directed to several
explanations for variance in the degrees of acculturation, both with regard to unidirectional as well as bidirectional analysis. Both of these points are developed further and
illustrated in the discussion that follows.
dominance Congruent with the question of direction is that of dominance; that is,
what effect does dominance of one cultural group over another cultural group have on
the degree and direction of acculturation? Also, what implication does dominance have for
acculturation at the individual level? Several writers have addressed themselves to the
importance of dominance for understanding acculturation including Thurnwald (1932),
Linton (1940), Bogardus (1949), Dohrenwend and Smith (1962), Graves (1967), and
Foster (1960).
At the group level of analysis, dominance may be contingent on either political or
normative structures. Political dominance would imply that one cultural group is in a
position of power in the Weberian sense (Weber 1922:631). Dominance contingent on the
normative structure suggests that one cultural group is by acquiescence placed in a position of superiority by both groups. This position is in agreement with Spiro (1955), who
suggests that numerical superiority is not a necessary condition of dominance.
A paper by Dohrenwend and Smith is instructive in providing a framework for identi-
fying the extent to which one cultural group is dominant over another. They suggest that
"the relative strength of any two cultural systems in contact can be understood in terms
of the conditions of admission of its various orders of structure activities which each can
impose upon the other" (1962:31). They suggest two polar types: complete dominance
would exist when culture A can (1) recruit members of culture B into its activities in
positions of low status, (2) exclude members of culture B who wish admission to its
activities in positions of high or equal status, and (3) gain admission to activities of B in
positions of high status (see below for further discussion). The topical situation between
whites and nonwhites in the Union of South Africa is cited as an example. At the other
extreme of the continuum is parity wherein "both A and B have the ability to exclude
the other from positions of high status while at the same time, lacking the ability to
recruit the other at low statuses" (Dohrenwend and Smith 1962:32). Varying degrees of
strength and parity fall along the continuum. In general, as exemplified by these writers,
dominance is not considered a necessary prerequisite for the acculturation process to
354 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
function. Mundane as this latter point may appear, it should be emphasized because much
acculturation research takes the dominant-subdominant relationship of the groups under
investigation as given. Herein lies a fruitful area for future research, namely, how one
cultural group comes to be considered in a position of dominance, as well as how this role
is legitimated-providing, of course, that it is considered legitimate.
To further emphasize the view that dominance is not a necessary prerequisite for
acculturation, though it may be an important variable in explaining acculturation rates
and direction, attention is directed to Bogardus' discussion of cultural pluralism. Bogardus suggests that there are three types of acculturation. Blind acculturation occurs when
people of different cultures live near one another and culture patterns are adopted on a
chance, hit-or-miss basis. Imposed acculturation implies one people's suppression of
another people's culture and the forced imposition of its own behavior patterns and ideas.
The third type, democratic acculturation, occurs when representatives of cultures view
one another's cultures with respect. In the latter type, in general, no forced acceptance of
culture occurs. It is in this latter situation that Bogardus suggests that culturalpluralism
prevails, defined as "the functioning of two or more culture systems at the same time
within the same national unit of human society" (1949:125). The major impetus is that
where cultural pluralism prevails, this "makes possible a free and full development of all
constructive culture patterns and it points toward the development of a culture system
superior to current systems" (1949:125). As with Dohrenwend and Smith (1962), no
deterministic orientation delimiting acculturation to instances of dominant-subdominant
relationships is asserted. Rather, such a position is controverted by these and other
scholars.
Although it does not speak directly to the problem of dominance affecting the degree
and direction of acculturation, it is of heuristic value to interject here Linton's concept of
directed culture change referring to "those situations in which one of the groups in
contact interferes actively and purposely with the culture of the other" (1940:502).
Similarly, Foster has developed the concept of culture conquest in his analysis of the
influence of Spanish culture on the New World. Culture conquest identifies those situa-
tions in which the government (or the agent of the government) of one cultural group
"has some degree of military and political control over the recipient people, and . . . this
control is utilized to bring about planned changes in the way of life of this group"
(1960:11). Foster notes, however, that acculturation still occurs through two types of
processes: the "formal," which applies to those situations in which individuals in
authority play a positive planning role, and the "informal," which results from individual
contact between members of the two culture groups. Also, Thurnwald (1932) and Bogardus (1949)-see imposed acculturation previously cited-refer to the ability of one group
to force the acculturation of another group to its culture. Furthermore, Thurnwald
(1 932) suggests that if conflict between cultural groups is to be avoided, one group must
be considered in a superior position-especially if groups are meeting for the first time.
Here, too, dominance plays an important role in determining direction and degree of
acculturation.
At the individual level of analysis, the effect of dominance on degree and direction of
acculturation would perforce be contingent on the relationship of the cultural groups.
This position is supported by the preceding discussion of Dohrenwend and Smith (1962)
and Bogardus (1949). Furthermore, Gillin and Raimy have suggested that the interplay
between culture and personality must be emphasized, maintaining that "neither the
individual nor the cultural configuration can be meaningfully understood except by
reference to the other" (1940:372).
acculturation and assimilation 355
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Assuming, then, that when a dominant-subdominant relationship exists between two
cultural groups, this relationship does affect the direction and degree of acculturation, the
question still remains as to the direction and the degree of acculturation. With regard to
forced acculturation, combined with a position of excessive dominance on the part of one
cultural group, it follows that acculturation will be greater in the direction of the
dominant group-at least to the extent that acculturation occurs. However, as noted
below, the dominated group may successfully resist acculturation to an extensive degree.
In all other cases, the literature suggests that acculturation is greater in the direction of
the dominant group than in the direction of the subdominant group (cf. Young 1929;
Hughes 1933; Hedin 1934; Wood 1943; Gist 1967; Press 1969; McQueen 1968; Graves
1967). This latter point, however, must be weighed in view of the research bias toward
unidirectional acculturative patterns as noted previously. Regretfully, therefore, no conclusive position concerning the influence of dominance on acculturative patterns can be
asserted at this time.
values and the out-group A salient concept related to understanding the acculturation
process is that of values. Specifically, the question raised is whether or not the acculturation process is contingent on a change in, or acceptance of, value structures. A congruent
question concerns orientation toward the out-group, that is, is the acculturation process
contingent on a positive orientation by the acculturating group toward the out-group? At
the group level of analysis the evidence would suggest that although acculturation may
provide for a change in value orientation, and even adoption of values, this is not a
necessary condition for acculturation to exist. Linton (1 940), for example, in reference
to enforced acculturation, suggests that although the adoption of certain cultural elements can be accelerated by enforcement, accompanying values and attitudes cannot be
forced. Furthermore, he suggests that even though cultural elements may be accepted
into a dominated group, they frequently are adapted to fit the culture of this group, that
is, their cultural meaning may be changed. Similarly, Thurnwald has argued that in the
process of adoption selected objects, ideas, or institutions "may acquire a different mean-
ing in the new culture" (1932:566).
Substantive support for this position is to be found in the works of several writers, two
of which are cited here for exemplification. Noting that acculturation of all types is "the
outcome of a bilateral challenge resulting from socio-cultural contact," Devereux and
Loeb (1943:146) provide a framework for the delineation and analysis of what they term
antagonistic acculturation. This framework centers on two reference points: "(1) the
distinction between resistance to borrowing and resistance to lending; (2) the distinction
between resistance to borrowing or lending of specific cultural items as such, and resis-
tance to, or antagonism toward, the prospective lender or borrower" (1 943:1 34). In this
regard the writers present a three-part typology to define possible outcomes when a new
trait is adopted: (1) modification to fit the adopting culture; (2) undermining the social
structure with rejection after a trial-period; and (3) a freefloating situation, that is, the
trait fails to become an integral part of the social structure. Also worthy of note for this
discussion are some suggested reasons for resistance to acculturation. Specifically, these
are a desire to maintain cultural and ethnic distinctiveness and the in-group/out-group
distinction. The latter includes resistance to borrowing because of a resistance to identification with the out-group and resistance to lending because lending would force the
borrower into relationships with the in-group of the lender. These reasons for resistance,
incidentally, are operative both within cultural groups, e.g., between subcultures or ethnic
groups, as well as between distinct cultural groups.
356 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Of specific import for this discussion is the argument by the writer that a distinction
must be made between the adoption of the means associated with another culture and the
ends associated with that trait or complex. It is in terms of this distinction that the
concept antagonistic acculturation is conceptualized; namely, as resistance to the adoption of the goals of the out-group. Three types of antagonistic acculturation are suggest-
ed: (1) defensive isolation; (2) "the adoption of new means without a corresponding
adoption of the relevant goals . . . the new means are adopted in order to support existing
goals, sometimes for the specific purpose of resisting the compulsory adoption of the
goals of the lending group" (Devereux and Loeb 1943:140); and (3) "dissociative nega-
tive acculturation, that is, the creation of new cultural items of the 'means type,' which
are purposely at variance with, or the reverse of, the life-techniques of the group from
which the group under study wishes to dissociate itself" (Devereux and Loeb 1943:143)
for the purpose of preserving existing goals. The distinctive character of antagonistic
acculturation is delineated in the abstract wherein the writers state that "whiie response
to means and techniques may seem positive, response to goals and ends is frequently
negative" (Devereux and Loeb 1943:133).
I n an empirical vein Eaton's concept of controlled acculturation provides additional
support for the position described above. Controlled acculturation is conceptualized as
"the process by which one culture accepts a practice from another, but integrates the new
practice into its own existing value system. It does not surrender its autonomy or separate
identity, although the change may involve a modification of the degree of autonomy"
(1952:338). Drawing upon data collected in the course of an investigation into the social
structure of the Hutterites, Eaton demonstrates the ability of this group to maintain an
autonomous social system, yet incorporate into the culture traits, behavior patterns, and
so forth, of the surrounding culture. Furthermore, he demonstrates their ability to integrate these cultural elements into their own value system.
Each of these writers, Devereux and Loeb, deductively, and Eaton, inductively, supports the position that the acculturation process is not contingent on changes in, nor
adoption of, values. On the other hand, they do not deny the possibility of adopting or
acculturating values or value systems. Moreover, there is evidence that acculturation is not
dependent on a positive orientation toward an out-group.
At the individual level it is again evident that the acculturation process is affected by
acculturation at the group level. Subsequently, it is suggested that although acculturation
may provide for a change in value orientation, and even adoption of values, this is not a
necessary condition for acculturation to occur. Spiro (1955), for example, has suggested
that individual acculturation may involve changes in external behavior patterns of the
individual without corresponding personality changes. In this same regard, Gillin and
Raimy (1 940) have suggested that there are three salient manifestations of acculturation
which are commonly recognized. These are (1) the material culture or traits, (2) institutional changes, and (3) changes in personality structure. Although they emphasize the
importance of taking into account the influence of acculturation on personality and
personality change, as well as changes in self-identity and members of the group, these
writers note that such changes are in addition to the adoption of material traits and
changes in institutional structures.
Albeit some scholars such as Graves (1967) would argue that acculturation must
necessarily exercise a dependent relationship with a change in values, as well as a positive
orientation toward the out-group, this position does not follow theoretically, empirically,
or in view of an analysis of acculturation literature. The consistent reference in the
literature to adoption of material traits unaccompanied by values in the out-group is
acculturation and assimilation 357
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
sufficient to demonstrate that a change in values is not a prerequisite for the accultura-
tion process to be operative. Scholars such as Linton (1940) and Devereux and Loeb
(1 943) have argued the theoretical possibility of acculturation occurring without value
change. Furthermore, Devereux and Loeb have posited that selected elements of the
out-group may be adopted in order to support and maintain the in-group's social and
value systems. Eaton (1952) has demonstrated empirically that an autonomous cultural
group, in this case the Hutterites, may practice selective acculturation in order to protect
its own values.
It should be emphasized, however, that this position does not deny the acculturation
of values nor the possibility of a positive orientation toward the out-group and its values.
For, if the acculturation process includes adoption of material traits, behavior patterns,
norms, institutional changes, and so forth, it certainly follows that coterminous values
may be acculturated as well.
A final point in this regard, then, concerns the question of acceptance by the outgroup. Specifically, is acceptance by the out-group necessary for acculturation to occur
within the in-group? In view of the preceding discussion it does not follow that acceptance
by the out-group, nor a positive orientation by the out-group, is necessary.
In summary, several salient characteristics of acculturation may be asserted. (1) Acculturation is a process, not an end result. (2) This process may be conceived of both as a
group phenomenon and as an individual phenomenon; however, acculturation at the
individual level is generally influenced by conditions of acculturation at the group level.
Furthermore, this process is operative between subcultures as well as between autono-
mous cultural groups. (3) Although acculturation is frequently treated as a unidirectional
process and may be considered as such in the ideal-type sense, it definitely is a bidirec-
tional process, that is, it is a two-way, reciprocal relationship. (4) Direct contact is a
necessary prerequisite in order for acculturation to occur. (5) Dominance is a salient
factor in determining direction and degree of acculturation, though the relationship of
dominance to direction and degree of acculturation is unclear. On the other hand, ac-
culturation may occur in the absence of a dominant-subdominant relationship. (6) Ac-
culturation is not contingent on a change in values, although values may be acculturated.
(7) A positive orientation toward the out-group on the part of the acculturating group or
individual is not a necessary condition. (8) Acceptance or a positive orientation by the
out-group toward the acculturating group is not required. (9) Acculturation is not contingent on change in reference group orientation.
assimilation
Having delineated the primary elements and characteristics of the acculturation
process, attention is now focused on a similar analysis of assimilation. An underlying
assumption guiding the discussion which follows is that acculturation and assimilation are
separate processes. Furthermore, though they may be interrelated-a point discussed in
detail later-they are not interdependent. Admittedly, this assumption may appear to the
reader as tautological, but there is ample evidence in the literature-as demonstrated
below-that frequently these concepts have been treated as one and the same or, at times,
as stages of one another.
process or result As with acculturation, assimilation is consistently treated as a process.
Gumplowicz (1883), one of the early scholars to address himself to assimilation, considers it to be a dynamic force in society. Park and Burgess, writing on "Assimilation" in
358 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
their Introduction to the Science of Sociology, identify it as "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and
attitudes of other persons or groups; and, by sharing their experience and history, are
incorporated with them in a common cultural life" (1924:735, italics ours).
Two decades earlier Simons (1901:791) emphasized that assimilation is not to be
conceived of as a result, but as a.process. Similarly, Hirsch (1942) has argued that
assimilation is not a specific concept that can be dichotomized; rather, assimilation is a
process, continuous in nature and varying in degree. Others who have supported the
position that assimilation is a process include Duncan (1929:185), Woolston (1945:416),
Johnson (1 963:296), and Gordon (1 964:71).
With regard to assimilation as process it should also be noted that, as in the case of
acculturation, direct contact is required. Park and Burgess (1924:736-737), for example,
stress the importance of contact in the assimilation process. Consonant support for this
position is found in Simons (1901:800) and Dohrenwend and Smith (1962:35).
values, identity, and the out-group However, the assimilation process differs from
acculturation in at least two specific respects. First, whereas acculturation does not
require out-group acceptance, assimilation does require such acceptance. Second, unlike
acculturation, assimilation requires a positive orientation toward the out-group. Further-
more, it requires identification with the out-group. Each of these points is developed
more fully later.
The first point of differentiation, that assimilation requires acceptance by the outgroup, is adequately supported in the literature. For example, Park and Burgess, in their
definition of assimilation, note that it is a process "in which persons and groups acquire
memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups; and by sharing in their
experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life"
(1924:734, italics ours). In a subsequent apology in the Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Park notes that "in the United States an immigrant is considered assimilated as
soon as he has acquired the language and the social ritual of the native community and
can participate, without encountering prejudice, in the common life, economic and
political" (1930:281). A similar position is established by Hirsch who, after a careful
review of the literature on assimilation, suggests that assimilation is "the process of
becoming a member of a community" (1942:39). Becoming a member of a community,
then, is correlative to acceptance by that community. Of course this is not to say that
interaction with that community cannot occur without acceptance by the community.
Also, lack of membership in the community does not prohibit acculturation from occurring.
Empirically, support for this position is well-documented by Spiro (1955) who, after
having carefully surveyed the literature related to acculturation of American ethnic
groups, notes a distinctive difference between acculturation and assimilation-that as-
similation is dependent on acceptance by the dominant group. Similarly, Dohrenwend
and Smith in their paper "Toward a Theory of Acculturation" suggest that "in assimilation, the contact situation is marked by recruitment of members of culture A into the
structured activities of culture B in positions of equal status" (1962:35). These writers,
too, emphasize the distinction between acculturation, which does not require out-group
acceptance, and assimilation, which does require such acceptance. Further support for
this position is found in a paper by Broom and Kitsuse in which they argue that "access
to participation in the dominant institutions is a precondition for the validation of
acculturation and assimilation 359
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
acculturation and consequently for assimilation" (1955:48). Finally, the writers emphasize that regardless of the degree of acculturation, assimilation does not occur until such
time as the acculturation is accompanied by acceptance on the part of the host society.
A further point in this connection concerns the manifestation of acceptance by the
out-group. More specifically, what constitutes "out-group acceptance" with respect to
assimilation? Park and Burgess (1924:736-737) provide a meaningful explanation when
they suggest that assimilation incorporates both secondary and primary group contact,
whereas acculturation only requires contact of a secondary group nature. I n other words,
out-group acceptance may be considered to have been initiated when the individual or
group is permitted interaction in primary social relations. Significantly, whereas assimilation is to be treated as a process, the extent to which an individual or group is permitted
to participate in primary group relations then serves as a measure of out-group acceptance
and, hence, the degree of assimilation.
The second point of differentiation, that assimilation, unlike acculturation, requires a
positive orientation toward the out-group and, furthermore, that it requires identification
with the out-group, is also supported in the literature. As early as 1901 Simons, in
reviewing the scant literature on assimilation at that time, noted that assimilation requires
a "psychic condition necessitating a consciousness of kind" (1901:800). Similarly, Park
and Burgess (1924), in their classic discussion of assimilation, argue that a "unity of
thought" is required. They also emphasize that assimilation is dependent on internal
changes and not external changes alone. In this same regard, Woolston argues that assimilation is more than "simply making individuals alike in appearance or manners"
(1945:416); rather, it incorporates the idea of "cooperative culture," where individualsin this case immigrants-come to be part of an association, as well as contributing to the
correction and improvement of this association. Assimilation, then, occurs when "an
individual who enters into [social ] relations absorbs social meaning from them and transmits its significance to others" (Woolston 1945:424). As with Park and Burgess, Woolston
also emphasizes that the assimilation process comprehends internal change, rather than
external change alone.
Further support is provided by Johnson who argues that whenever the term assimilation is used, care must be exercised to distinguish between external assimilation and
subjective assimilation. The term external assimilation is introduced to denote the manifest changes which lead to similarity of appearance and actions, whereas subjective assimilation "extends to the psychological life of the immigrant who seeks to identify"
(1963:295). Johnson posits that external and subjective assimilation occur independent
of one another, and that they may occur in varying degrees. Subsequently, the writer
presents a definition of assimilation that takes into account both the external and the
subjective aspects of assimilation:
assimilation is defined here as a process of change during which the immigrant seeks to identify
himself in various respects with members of the host group and becomes less distinguishable
from them. Both external and subjective assimilation form the components of the process. One
without the other is only partial assimilation (Johnson 1963:296).
Utilizing data collected among Polish immigrants to Australia, Johnson demonstrates that
external indicators, such as language and naturalization, were not significantly correlated
with subjective factors of assimilation.
It has been demonstrated previously that acculturation may occur without a subsequent change in the orientation of a cultural group; that is, a positive orientation toward
the out-group is not a necessary condition of acculturation. The converse of this principle
may be applied to assimilation. Linton, for example, implies the necessity for a positive
360 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
orientation toward the out-group when he notes that "certain individuals in the socially
inferior group may not desire to be assimilated and may emphasize the distinctive features of their own culture on that account" (Linton 1940:513, italics ours). Broom and
Kitsuse provide implicit support for this view in their discussion of validation of acculturation in which they note that "they [ethnic groups in an open society] then have the
alternatives of maintaining a peripheral position in the social order or venturing the risks
and rewards of validating their acculturation" (1 955:44). More explicitly, reinforcement
for this position is found in a discussion by Eaton of controlled acculturation in which
assimilation is taken as
a process of acculturation, in which an individual has changed so much as to become dissociated
from the value system of his group, or in which the entire group disappears as an autonomously
functioning system. Acculturation, on the other hand, is reserved for those changes in practice
or beliefs which can be incorporated in the value structure of the society, without destruction
of its functional autonomy (1 962:339).
To recapitulate, there is sufficient support, both tacit and explicit, for the position
that assimilation requires both a positive orientation toward, and an identification with,
the out-group on the part of the assimilating individual or group, and that assimilation is
contingent on acceptance by the out-group. Furthermore, there is also evidence that
assimilation comprises a subjective, or internal, change as well as an external change. This
suggests that assimilation involves changes in values. Whereas it was concluded that values
may be an element of acculturation, but that change in, or acceptance of, values is not a
necessary condition for acculturation to occur, it does follow from the preceding discussion that a change in value orientation is required for assimilation to occur-namely, a
positive orientation toward, and identification with, the values of the out-group. This
must be distinguished from the relationship of values to acculturation, such that selected
traits, behavior patterns, institutions, and so forth of group B come to be valued by group
A or its members without a proximate change in reference group.
In view of the preceding discussion, it may be postulated that if assimilation is to
occur, there must be a change in the reference group such that group A, or a member of
group A, holds a positive orientation toward group B and, congruently, values membership in that group. Furthermore, group B then becomes group A's, or a member of group
A's, reference group and subsequent source of value orientations.
individual or group process It has been previously demonstrated in this paper that
acculturation may be viewed as either an individual process or a group process, providing
care is exercised to define at which level of analysis the scholar is operating. The obverse
question should also be approached as to whether assimilation is to be treated as a group
process, an individual process, or possibly both.
Some writers inferentially support the view that the assimilation process is strictly an
individual phenomenon. Woolston, for example, suggests that assimilation occurs when
"an individual who enters into [social] relations absorbs meaning from them and transmits its significance to others" (1945:424, italics ours). Similarly, Johnson (1963), Heiss
(1969), and Dohrenwend and Smith (1962) restrict their discussions of assimilation to
the individual level. On the other hand, scholars such as Simons (1901) and Siegel (1953)
restrict their discussions of assimilation to the group level, thereby implying that it is a
group process.
Park and Burgess (1924:735) combine both positions by suggesting that assimilation
incorporates "groups and persons," as does Hirsch who, after systematically analyzing the
relevant literature concerning assimilation, asserts that "the agents in this [assimilation]
acculturation and assimilation 361
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
process are either persons or groups" (1 942:36). Duncan (1929), writing in Publications
of the American Sociological Society, provides further support for the position that
assimilation involves both individuals and groups. Gordon (1964), writing on the nature
of assimilation, also treats it as both an individual and a group phenomenon; however, he
tends to move between the two levels indiscriminately-though this may be due in part to
his emphasis on ideal types without sufficient reference to empirical data.
The references cited above would suggest, then, that the assimilation process may be
treated as either an individual or a group phenomenon. There is more than sufficient
evidence that assimilation is an individual phenomenon. Furthermore, in light of the
earlier discussion concerning reference group change and out-group acceptance, assimilation is clearly an individual phenomenon. On the other hand, even though the references
uted provide tacit support for assimilation as a group process, further explication is
needed on this point.
An important distinction which should be considered here is that of isolated groups as
opposed to reinforced groups. For in light of the earlier discussion of reference group
change and out-group acceptance, consideration of group assimilation must be in terms of
a "collective conscience." A group which assimilates must not only be accepted by the
out-group; it must also identify with it. Therefore, in the case of reinforced groups, that
is, groups that continually receive reinforcement from a larger parent cultural group, it is
not possible to speak of group assimilation. For example, the Mexican-American subculture continually receives reinforcement by way of immigrants from Mexico. Hughes'
(1933) discussion of the French-Canadians, as well as Antonovsky's (1956) investigation
of second-generation Jewish males, provide additional examples of cultural groups or
subcultural groups whose culture is continually being reinforced by contacts with representatives of the parent culture. Similar examples are to be found among other immigrant groups to America, Australia, and so forth. In such cases it is only possible, then,
to speak of individual rather than group assimilation.
On the other hand, cultural group isolation does not necessarily lead to group assimila-
tion. (By cultural group isolation is meant that the group is removed from either a
supporting cultural or subcultural group.) In actuality, isolated cultural groups may
develop in several ways. The group may resist assimilation as a whole. This possibility is
exemplified by the Hutterites' use of controlled acculturation (Eaton 1 952) and by
Devereux and Smith's (1943) discussion of antagonistic acculturation. This is not to
suggest, of course, that individual members of these groups may not assimilate into
another group. Furthermore, it is possible that the attrition rate from individual assimila-
tion may be so extensive as to effect the dissolution of the cultural group. The profligation of the Russian Molokan community in Los Angeles illustrates the latter possibility
(Young 1929). Without reinforcement, except through procreation, this distinct cultural
group ceased to exist as succeeding generations assimilated into the broader community.
It should be noted, however, that although in the final analysis the entire membership of
the Russian Molokan community assimilated, this was the result of individual attrition
and not a movement by the group in toto.
The converse situation is that of a cultural group which collectively identifies with an
out-group and desires to assimilate. The Anglo-Indians (of India) epitomize this situation
(Hedin 1934; Gist 1967). However, even in this instance individual members may be
accepted into the out-group much faster than the collectivity.
It should also be noted that situations prevail in which individuals are not associated
with a distinct culture group, yet conceivably they may identify with and desire to
assimilate into a specific culture group. This situation is illustrated by the mulattoes in
362 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
the United States (cf. Reuter 1917; Stonequist 1935), the mestizos, of Brazil (Slotkin
1943), and the hybrids of Hawaii (Smith 1934). It is also possible that these unassimilated individuals may form a new, distinct cultural group-particularly if assimilation
is precluded-as did the Russian creoles in Alaska (Wood 1943) and, in recent years, the
Eurasians of India (Gist 1967).
Finally, there are situations such as that of the Negro population in the United States
wherein there exists no distinct or identifiable cultural group per se and, therefore, it is
not possible to speak of group assimilation, although reference may be made to the rate
of assimilation with respect to individual group members.
In summary, the assimilation process may be treated as either a group or an individual
phenomenon. However, group assimilation can only be considered in the sense of a
"collective conscience"; otherwise, one can only speak of an attrition rate of individual
members who are assimilating. Furthermore, in the case of cultural groups which are
continually reinforced-such as the Mexican-American subculture-group assimilation is
not feasible. On the other hand, cultural group isolation, though imperative for group
assimilation, does not necessarily dictate that group assimilation will occur. However, it is
conceivable that the attrition rate will be so extensive as to lead to the dissolution of an
isolated cultural group. Finally, there are situations wherein there exists no distinct or
identifiable group, thereby making it impossible to speak of group assimilation, although
reference may be made to the rate of assimilation of group members.
direction and dominance A final salient point about assimilation is its directional
quality. Specifically, is assimilation to be related as a unidirectional process or as a
two-way relationship? Two sources address this problem directly; both support the unidirectional position. Simons states that "there are two elements concerned in the process
of assimilation-the active and the passive-the assimilating people and those being assimilated" (1 901 :803), suggesting that assimilation involves movement from one cultural
group to another. Simons continues by stating that "consequently assimilation has a dual
character-is more or less reciprocal in its action-a process of give and take to a greater or
less degree" (1901:803); this reference to reciprocity supports the previously established
position that assimilation requires both a change in reference group and acceptance by
the out-group, but does not deny that assimilation is a unidirectional process. The second
source, the report of The Social Science Research Council seminar on acculturation, is
even more explicit in this regard, noting that "assimilation implies an essentially unilateral
approximation of one culture in the direction of the other" (Siegel eta!. 1953:988).
Much of the literature consistently implies that assimilation is a unidrectional process.
The previously quoted definition of Park and Burgess (1924:735) and their subsequent
discussion so implies. Gordon (1 964:60-83), in his deliberation of the nature of assimilation, consistently treats it as a one-way process. Similarly Duncan (1929), in his discussion of the process of assimilation among immigrants to America, implies that it is
unidirectional, as do Broom and Kitsuse (1955:48), Eaton (1952:329), Spiro
(1955:1244ff.), Dohrenwend and Smith (1 962:35ff.), and Woolston (1945). Furthermor
with the exception of one writer, E. C. Parsons (cited in Herskovits 1958:7-11), no
support was found for the position that assimilation may be considered a two-way
process. Parsons, incidentally, suggested that the major distinction between acculturation
and assimilation is that the former is a one-way process while the latter is a two-way
process-a position which may be summarily dismissed on the basis of evidence already
cited in this paper.
acculturation and assimilation 363
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The references cited so far and the discussion in this paper suggest that assimilation is a
unidirectional rather than a two-way process. If assimilation requires a change in
reference group, as well as acceptance by an out-group, then it is axiomatic that assimilation at the individual level is unidirectional. While an out-group can become the individual's reference group and can accept or not accept the individual, it is not conceivable that
the converse may obtain. This does not, of course, preclude the possibility that individual
members of group A may assimilate into group B while at the same time individual
members of group B are assimilating into group A.
The same principle applies at the group level. Providing that an isolated cultural group
collectively desires assimilation into another group, designated as the "host group" by
Johnson (1963), then assimilation must be unidirectional, that is, in the direction of the
host group. It does not follow that the host group may reciprocate. In other words, one
group assimilates and the other group accepts or rejects.
In considering direction, brief attention should also be paid to the role of dominance
in the assimilation process; however, as in the case of acculturation, writers usually take
the role of dominance as given; that is, that assimilation always occurs in the direction
of a dominant group (cf. Simons 1901; Broom and Kitsuse 1955; Spiro 1955). Regrettably, empirical evidence concerning the role of dominance, both with respect to rate and
direction (i.e., from subdominant to dominant and the converse), is lacking. Nevertheless,
at the individual level it is self-evident that though dominance may be a deterrent to
assimilation, it is still conceivable that members of either a subdominant or dominant
group may assimilate into the other group-whether dominance is based on power or a
normative structure (see above). Furthermore, at the group level there is no reason to
assume that a dominant group would assimilate into a subdominant group. Other than
these cursory observations the role of dominance in assimilation remains unresolved and,
as with acculturation, should prove a fruitful area for future investigation.
summary
The salient congruities and differences in the characteristics of acculturation and
assimilation are delineated in Figure 1. Based on these factors several conclusions may be
drawn concerning the relationship of these two concepts. Initially it may be postulated
that acculturation and assimilation are separate processes. Assimilation is not, as some
have suggested or implied, a phase or end-product of acculturation (cf. Gordon 1 964:71;
Redfield et a!. 1936:149; Eaton 1952:339); rather, it is a separate and distinct process.
This is not to deny, of course, that assimilation is dependent on acculturation, as evidenced by the required adoption of out-group values. On the other hand, considering the
two necessary conditions of reference group change and acceptance by the out-group, it
can readily be demonstrated that assimilation is not dependent on some nth degree of
acculturation, nor does assimilation necessarily follow after some evanescent stage of
acculturation has been experienced. It is evident, for example, that there are individuals,
as well as groups, who may be highly acculturated in terms of some given out-group and,
furthermore, these individuals or groups may strongly identify with and seek to assimilate
into the out-group. If, however, they are not accepted by the out-group, then assimilation
has not begun. For example, the Eurasian community of India was highly acculturated in
terms of British culture and sought to assimilate into the British community, yet was
denied membership (Gist 1967). A similar situation may be found among JapaneseAmericans (Broom and Kitsuse 1955), as well as many Negro-Americans. The antithesis
of this situation would be low or limited acculturation, but a high degree of assimilation.
364 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ACCUL
TURA
TION
ASSIMILA
TION
1. A dynamic process A dynamic process
2. May be treated as either an individual May be treated as either an individual
or a group process or a group process
3. Involves direct contact Involves direct contact
4. Two-way, that is, may occur in Unidirectional
both directions
5. Does not require change in values, Change in values required
though values may be acculturated
6. Reference group change not required Reference group change required
7. Internal change not required Internal change required
8. Out-group acceptance not required Out-group acceptance required
Figure 1. Comparison of the salient characteristics of acculturation and assimilation.
For example, artists or scientists immigrating to America may be accepted on an equal
footing in American society, yet be poorly acculturated (cf. Silvers 1965).
A third possibility is that of an individual who is accepted by the out-group, and
possibly is even highly acculturated in terms of the out-group, but does not change his
reference group. Siu has exemplified such a type in "the sojourner," defined as "a
stranger who spends many years of his lifetime in a foreign country without being
assimilated by it" (1952:34). Examples include the foreign missionary, foreign students,
diplomats, research anthropologists, and international journalists.
In summary, then, it may be concluded that: (1) acculturation and assimilation are
separate, distinct processes; (2) acculturation may occur independently of assimilation;
(3) acculturation is a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for assimilation to
occur; and (4) the extent to which acculturation must occur before assimilation begins is
indefinite.
references cited
Antonovsky, Aaron
1956 Toward a Refinement of the "Marginal Man" Concept. Social Forces 35:57-62.
Bogardus, Emory S.
1949 Cultural Pluralism and Acculturation. Sociology and Social Research 34:125-1 29.
Broom, Leonard, and John 1. Kitsuse
1955 The Validation of Acculturation: A Condition to Ethnic Assimilation. American Anthropologist 57:44-48.
Devereux, George, and Edwin M. Loeb
1943 Antagonistic Acculturation. American Sociological Review 8:133-147.
Dohrenwend, Bruce P., and Robert J. Smith
1962 Toward a Theory of Acculturation. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 18:30-39.
Duncan, H. G.
1 929 A Study of the Process of Assimilation. Publications of the American Sociological Society
23:1 84-1 87.
Eaton, Joseph
1952 Controlled Acculturation: A Survival Technique of the Hutterites. American Sociological
Review 17:331 -340.
acculturation and assimilation 365
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Foster, George M.
1 960 Culture and Conquest: American Spanish Heritage. Chicago: Quadrangle.
Gillin, John, and Victor Raimy
1 940 Acculturation and Personality. American Sociological Review 5:371-380.
Gist, Noel P.
1967 Cultural versus Social Marginality: The Anglo-Indian Case. Phylon 28:361-375.
Gordon, Milton M.
1964 Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Graves, Theodore D.
1967 Psychological Acculturation in a Tri-ethnic Community. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 23:337-350.
Gumplowicz, Ludwig
1883 Der Rassenkampf. Innsbruck: Wagner.
Hedin, Elmer L.
1934 The Anglo-Indian Community. American Journal of Sociology 40:165-179.
Heiss, Jerold
1969 Factors Related to Immigrant Assimilation: Pre-migration Traits. Social Forces 47:422-428.
Herskovits, Melville J.
1937 The Significance of the Study of Acculturation for Anthropology. American Anthropologist
39:259-264.
1941 Some Comments on the Study of Acculturation. American Anthropologist 43:1 -1 0.
1 958 Acculturation: The Study of Culture Contact. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.
Hirsch, Walter
1942 Assimilation as Concept and Process. Social Forces 21:35-59.
Hughes, Everett C.
1933 The French-English Margin in Canada. American Journal of Sociology 39:1-11.
lanni, Francis A.
1958 Time and Place as Variables in Acculturation Research. American Anthropologist 60:39-46.
Johnson, Ruth
1963 A New Approach to the Meaning of Assimilation. Human Relations 16:295-298.
Linton, Ralph
1940 The Distinctive Aspects of Acculturation. In Acculturation in Seven American Indian
Tribes. New York: Appleton-Century. pp. 501-520.
McQueen, Albert J.
1968 Education and Marginality of African Youth. Journal of Social Issues 24:179-194.
Park, Robert E.
1930 Assimilation, Social. In Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Volume 11. New York: Mac-
millan. pp. 281-283.
Park, Robert E., and Ernest W. Burgess
1924 Assimilation. In Introduction to the Science of Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. pp. 734-783.
Parsons, E. C.
1936 Mitla, Town of Souls. University of Chicago Publications in Anthropology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Press, Irwin
1969 Ambiguity and Innovation: Implications for the Genesis of the Culture Broker. American
Anthropologist 71:205-21 7.
Redfield, Robert, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits
1936 Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation. American Anthropologist 38:149-1 52.
Reuter, E. B.
1917 The Superiority of the Mulatto. American Journal of Sociology 23:38-106.
Samora, Julian, and William N. Deane
1956 Language Usage as a Possible Index of Acculturation. Sociology and Social Research
40:307-311.
Siegel, Bernard J., Evon Z. Vogt, James B. Watson, and Leonard Broom
1953 Acculturation: An Exploratory Formulation. American Anthropologist 55:973-1002.
Silvers, Ronald J.
1965 Structure and Values in the Explanation of Acculturation Rates. British Journal of Sociology 16:68-79.
Simirenko, Alex
1966 Mannheim's Generational Analysis and Acculturation. British Journal of Sociology
17:292-299.
Simons, Sarah E.
1901 Social Assimilation. American Journal of Sociology 6:790-822.
366 american ethnologist
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Siu, Paul C. P.
1952 The Sojourner. American journal of Sociology 58:34-44.
Slotkin, J. S.
1943 The Status of the Marginal Man. Sociology and Social Research 28:47-54.
Smith, William C.
1934 The Hybrid in Hawaii as a Marginal Man. American Journal of Sociology 39:459-468.
Spicer, Edward H., Ed.
1961 Perspectives in American Indian Culture Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Spindler, George D.
1963 Education and Culture: Anthropological Approaches. New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston.
Spiro, Melford E.
1955 The Acculturation of American Ethnic Groups. American Anthropologist 57:1240-1 252.
Stonequist, Everett V.
1935 The Problem of the Marginal Man. American journal of Sociology 41:1-12.
Thurnwald, Richard
1932 The Psychology of Acculturation. American Anthropologist 34:557-569.
Watson, James B.
1963 Caste as a Form of Acculturation. Southwestern journal of Anthropology 19:356-379.
Weber, Max
1922 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tubingen: J. C. Mohr.
Wood, Margaret Mary
1943 The Russian Creoles of Alaska as a Marginal Group. Social Forces 22:204-208.
Woolston, Howard
1945 The Process of Assimilation. Social Forces 23:41 6-424.
Young, Pauline V.
1929 The Russian Molokan Community in Los Angeles. American journal of Sociology
35:393-402.
Date of Submission: August 24, 1973
Date of Acceptance: November 6, 1 973
acculturation and assimilation 367
This content downloaded from 137.110.91.8 on Wed, 15 May 2019 20:25:03 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
chapter 9
Culture and Education
By this point in the volume, the need for dialogue in public spaces
may seem obvious. But having this conversation occur in shared, respectful, and productive ways is not easy in diverse, pluralistic settings. It may
be even more difficult in those settings where differences in race, gender,
sexual orientation, and language are awarded pride of place or position. In
this chapter Sonia Nieto advances the conversation about the educational
implications of some of the ideas we grappled with in Part Two: if
democracy involves people creating common and uncommon worlds in
order to define themselves and live together, what are some of the horizons of significance available for this kind of education? Nieto captures
the challenge as how to live together and thrive amidst what seems
inevitable interracial misunderstanding and conflict explained by
differences in ethnicity, color, language—often referred to as cultural
differences.
Nieto reminds us that culture is not a given, but a human creation,
dependent on particular geographical, temporal, and sociopolitical contexts and therefore vulnerable to issues of power and control. She unpacks
some of the features that follow from this understanding—culture
as dynamic, multifaceted, embedded in context, influenced by social,
economic, and political factors, socially constructed, learned,
and dialectical—often drawing on her personal experience to illustrate
her points.
Sonia Nieto is Professor Emerita of Language, Literacy, and
Culture in the School of Education, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst. Her books include Affirming Diversity: The Sociopolitical
Context of Multicultural Education (5th edition, 2008, with Patty Bode),
What Keeps Teachers Going? (2003), and the edited volumes Puerto Rican
Students in U.S. Schools (Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), Why We Teach
(Teachers College Press, 2005), and Dear Paulo: Letters from Those Who
Dare Teach (Paradigm Publishers, 2008). She has taught at the elementary grades through graduate school and continues to speak and
write on multicultural education, teacher preparation, and the education of Latinos and other culturally and linguistically diverse student
populations.
127
128
culture
and
education
Culture and Education1
sonia nieto
[We] are not simply bearers of cultures, languages, and histories, with a duty to
reproduce them. We are the products of linguistic-cultural circumstances,
actors with a capacity to resynthesize what we have been socialized into and to
solve new and emerging problems of existence. We are not duty-bound to
conserve ancestral characteristics which are not structurally useful. We are both
socially determined and creators of human futures.2
The term culture can be problematic because it can mean different
things to different people in different contexts. For instance, culture is
sometimes used as if it pertained only to those with formal education
and privileged social status, implying activities such as attending the
opera once a month. In the present day, it generally is acknowledged
that culture is not just what an elite group of people may do in their
spare time, but there are still various and conflicting ideas of what it
actually means in everyday life. Among many Whites in the United
States, for instance, culture is thought to be held exclusively by those
different from them. As a consequence, it is not unusual to hear people,
especially those of European background, lament that they do not
“have” culture in the same way that African Americans, Asian Americans, Native Americans, or other groups visibly different from the
dominant group “have” it. In other cases, culture is used interchangeably with ethnicity as if both simply were passed down constant and
eternal from one generation to the next. At still other times, culture can
mean the traditions one celebrates within the family, in which case it is
reduced to foods, dances, and holidays. Less often is culture thought of
as the values one holds dear, or the way one looks at and interacts with
the world.
In this chapter, I will explore the complex relationship between
culture and education. First, I will define culture through a number of
interrelated characteristics that make it clear that culture is more than
artifacts, rituals, and traditions. In fact, it is becoming increasingly
indisputable that culture and cultural differences, including language,
play a discernible role in power relationships and how children identify
Reprinted by permission of the Publisher. From Sonia Nieto, The Light In Their Eyes:
Creating Multicultural Learning Communities, New York: Teachers College Press, © 1999
by Teachers College, Columbia University. All rights reserved.
nieto
129
with their schools. I will consider how culture and language influence
the quest for culturally democratic learning environments by looking at
some of the cultural discontinuities between school and home expectations of students from various backgrounds.
Defining Culture
Previously, I have defined culture as “the ever-changing values,
traditions, social and political relationships, and worldview created,
shared, and transformed by a group of people bound together by a
combination of factors that can include a common history, geographic
location, language, social class, and religion.” As is clear from this
definition, culture is complex and intricate; it includes content or
product (the what of culture), process (how it is created and transformed), and the agents of culture (who is responsible for creating and
changing it). Culture cannot be reduced to holidays, foods, or dances,
although these are, of course, elements of culture. This definition also
makes it clear that everyone has a culture, because all people participate in the world through social and political relationships informed
by history as well as by race, ethnicity, language, social class, gender,
sexual orientation, and other circumstances related to identity and
experience.
At least two issues need to be kept in mind if culture is to have any
meaning for educators who want to understand how it is related to
learning. First, culture needs to be thought of in an unsentimental way.
Otherwise, it is sometimes little more than a yearning for a past that
never existed, or an idealized, sanitized version of what exists in reality.
The result may be an unadulterated, essentialized “culture on a pedestal” that bears little resemblance to the messy and contradictory culture
of real life. The problem of viewing some aspects of culture as indispensable attributes that must be shared by all people within a particular
group springs from a romanticized and uncritical understanding of
culture. For instance, I have heard the argument that poetry cannot be
considered Puerto Rican unless it is written in Spanish. Thus, the
Spanish language becomes a constitutive characteristic of being Puerto
Rican. While there is no argument that speaking Spanish is an important and even major aspect of Puerto Rican culture, it is by no means a
prerequisite for Puerto Ricanness. There are hundreds of thousands of
Puerto Ricans who identify themselves first and foremost as Puerto
Rican but who do not speak Spanish due to the historical conditions in
which they have lived.
130
culture
and
education
The second consideration to be kept in mind is that the sociopolitical context of culture needs to be acknowledged. That is, cultures do not
exist in a vacuum, but rather are situated in particular historical, social,
political, and economic conditions, and therefore they are influenced by
issues of power. The claim of Whites that they do not have a culture is
a case in point. Whites frequently do not experience their culture as a
culture because as the officially sanctioned and high-status culture, it
“just is.” Therefore, when Whites say that they do not “have” a culture,
they in effect relegate culture to no more than quaint customs or
colorful traditions. This stance is disingenuous at best because it fails to
observe that Whites as a group participate disproportionately in a
culture of power3 based simply on their race; access to this power is not
available to those who are not White (nor, it should be stressed, is it
shared equally among Whites).
In what follows, I describe a set of attributes that are key to understanding how culture is implicated in learning, and how these notions of
culture complicate a facile approach to multicultural education. These
characteristics are complementary and interconnected, so much so that
it is difficult to disentangle them from one another. I do so here only for
purposes of clarity, not to suggest that they exist in isolation. The
characteristics I review here include culture as dynamic; multifaceted;
embedded in context; influenced by social, economic, and political factors; created
and socially constructed; learned; and dialectical.
Culture Is Dynamic
Culture does not exist outside of human beings. This means that
cultures are not static relics, stagnant behaviors, or sterile values. Steven
Arvizu’s wonderful description of culture as a verb rather than a noun
captures this essence of culture beautifully.4 That is, culture is dynamic,
active, changing, always on the move. Even within their native contexts,
cultures are always changing as a result of political, social, and other
modifications in the immediate environment. When people with different backgrounds come in contact with one another, such change is to be
expected even more.
But cultural change is not simply a one-way process. The popular
conception of cultural change is that it is much like a transfusion: As one
culture is emptied out of a person, a new one is poured in. In this
conception, each culture is inert and permanent and human beings do
not influence the process to any significant degree. But the reality is that
cultures are always hybrids, and people select and reject particular elements of culture as suitable or not for particular contexts. Cultural
nieto
131
values are not gotten rid of as easily as blood. Nor are new ones simply
infused. For instance, there is ample ethnographic evidence that in spite
of the enormous political, social, and economic changes among Native
Americans in the past one hundred years, their child-rearing practices,
although they have, of course, changed, have also remained quite
stable.5 Likewise, among immigrants to the United States, there are
indications that ethnic values and identities are preserved to some extent
for many generations.6
In some ways, we can think of culture as having both surface and
deep structure, to borrow a concept from linguistics (Chomsky 1965).7
For instance, in previous research,8 when interviewing young people
of diverse backgrounds I was initially surprised by the seeming homogeneity of the youth culture they manifested. That is, regardless of
racial, ethnic, or linguistic background, or time in the United States—
but usually intimately connected to a shared urban culture and social
class—the youths often expressed strikingly similar tastes in music,
food, clothes, television viewing habits, and so on. Yet, when I probed
more deeply, I also found evidence of deeply held values from their
ethnic heritage. For example, Marisol, a young Puerto Rican woman,
loved hip hop and rap music, pizza, and lasagna. She never mentioned
Puerto Rican food, and Puerto Rican music to her was just the “oldfashioned” and boring music her parents listened to. Nonetheless, in
her everyday interactions with her parents and siblings, and in the
answers she gave to my interview questions, she reflected deep aspects
of Puerto Rican culture such as respect for elders, a profound kinship
with and devotion to family, and a desire to uphold important traditions such as staying with family rather than going out with friends on
important holidays. Just as there is no such thing as a “pure race,”
there is likewise no “pure culture.” That is, cultures influence one
another, and even minority cultures and those with less status have
an impact on majority cultures, sometimes in dramatic ways. Rap
music, with its accompanying style of talk, dress, and movement, is a
notable example among young people of diverse backgrounds in urban
areas.
In terms of schooling, the problem with thinking of culture as
static is that curriculum and pedagogy are designed as if culture indeed
were unchanging. This issue was well expressed by Frederick Erickson,
who has argued that when culture is thought of as fixed, or simply as
an aesthetic, the educational practice derived from it supports the
status quo. This is because reality itself can then be perceived as inherently static. Erickson goes on to say, “When we think of culture and
132
culture
and
education
social identity in more fluid terms, however, we can find a foundation
for educational practice that is transformative.”9 The view of culture as
dynamic rather than fixed is unquestionably more befitting a conception of multicultural education as liberating pedagogy based on social
justice.
Culture Is Multifaceted
Closely related to the dynamic nature of culture is that cultural
identifications are multiple, eclectic, mixed, and heterogeneous. This
means, for one thing, that culture cannot be conflated with just ethnicity
or race. As an example, Mexican or Mexican-American culture may
be familiar to us because it concerns an identity based primarily on
ethnicity, the best-known site of culture. But one also can speak, for
instance, of a lesbian culture because, as a group, lesbians share a history
and identity, along with particular social and political relationships.
Thus, one can be culturally Mexican American and a lesbian at the same
time. But having multiple cultural identities does not imply that each
identity is claimed or manifested equally. A wealthy light-skinned
Mexican-American lesbian and a working-class Mexican-American
lesbian may have little in common other than their ethnic heritage and
sexual orientation and the oppression that comes along with these
identities. People create their identities in different ways: While one
Mexican-American lesbian may identify herself first and foremost ethnically, another may identify herself as a lesbian, a third as both, and a
fourth primarily as a member of the working class.
Because culture is not simply ethnicity, even among specific cultural
groups there are many and often conflicting cultural identities. Skin
color, time of arrival in the United States, language use, level of education, family dynamics, place of residence, and many other differences
within groups may influence how one interprets or “lives” a culture.
Further, the intersection of ethnicity and social class, or what Milton
Gordon (1964) termed ethclass,10 is a key factor in defining culture. For
instance, as a young girl I was surprised to meet middle-class Puerto
Ricans when I spent a summer in Puerto Rico. Given my experiences
until that time as a member of an urban U.S. Puerto Rican family that
could best be described as working poor, I had thought that only Whites
could be middle-class. Although I spoke Spanish fairly well and thought
of myself as Puerto Rican, I discovered that in some ways I had more in
common with my African-American peers in my Brooklyn neighborhood and school than with the middle-class Puerto Ricans I met on the
island. I began to see that my Puerto Rican culture was in fact quite
nieto
133
different from Puerto Rican culture as defined on the island. Years later
I understood that these differences had to do with location, experience,
and social class.
Another important aspect of identity has to do with how interactions
with people of other cultural groups may influence culture and identity.
This is certainly the case in urban areas, where the identities of young
people of many diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds defy easy categorization. Shirley Brice Heath has suggested that young urban dwellers
in the United States are creating new cultural categories based on
shared experiences because, according to her, these young people “think
of themselves as a who and not a what.”11 They engage not only in
border crossings, but also in what Heath called “crossings and crisscrossings.”12 Given the growing presence of people in the United States
who claim a biracial, multiracial, or multiethnic identity, ethnicity alone
is unable to fully define culture. The multiple identities of youths have
important and far-reaching implications for the development and
implementation of multicultural education: It is evident that simplistic
and bounded conceptions that focus just on specific racial or ethnic
groupings fail to capture the realities of many urban youths who live
with complicated and heterogeneous realities.
Culture Is Embedded in Context
To say that culture is embedded in context is to say that it invariably
is influenced by the environment in which it exists. The culture of
Japanese students in Japan is of necessity different from that of Japanese
immigrant students in the United States or of Japanese immigrant
students in Peru or Brazil. When culture is presented to students as if it
were context-free, they learn to think of it as quite separate from
the lives that people lead every day. It is what Frederick Erickson (1990)
has described as the fragmenting of people’s lives “as we freeze them
outside time, outside a world of struggle in concrete history.”13 Culture
is commonly decontextualized. In the United States, decontextualization typically occurs in the school curriculum and in media images
outside of school. A notable case is that of Native Americans, who
customarily have been removed from their cultural and historical rootedness through images that eternalize them as either noble heroes or
uncivilized savages, and typically as a combination of both.14 On the
other hand, the history of oppression, dehumanization, resistance, and
struggle of the many Indigenous Nations rarely is studied in schools. If
there is any doubt about the image of Native Americans held by most
non-Indian children in the United States, ask even six-year-olds and
134
culture
and
education
they will provide in precise detail the most stereotypical and ahistorical
portrait of Indians, as Erickson noted, “outside time.”15 If these children
happen to live in a geographic region where there are no reservations or
large concentrations of Native Americans, they often are shocked to
learn that Native Americans are still around today and that they are
teachers, or truck drivers, or artists. Even when Native Americans are
included in the curriculum as existing in the present, the idyllic images
of them tend to reinforce common stereotypes. For instance, while we
may be happy to show students pictures of powwows, we are less likely
to discuss how reservations have been used as toxic dumping sites.
A further example of how culture is influenced by context will
suffice. Puerto Ricans generally eat a great deal of rice in many different
manifestations. Rice is a primary Puerto Rican staple. There is even a
saying that demonstrates how common it is: “Puertorriqueños somos
como el arroz blanco: Estamos por todas partes” (Puerto Ricans are like
white rice: We are everywhere), an adage that says as much about rice as
it does about the diaspora of the Puerto Rican people, over half of whom
live outside the island. As a rule, Puerto Ricans eat short-grained rice,
but I prefer long-grained rice, and other Puerto Ricans often made me
feel practically like a cultural traitor when I admitted it. I remember my
amazement when a fellow academic, a renowned Puerto Rican historian, explained the real reason behind the preference for short-grained
rice. This preference did not grow out of the blue, nor does any particular quality of the rice make it inherently better. On the contrary, the
predilection for short-grained rice was influenced by the historical
context of Puerto Ricans as a colonized people.
It seems that near the beginning of the twentieth century when
Puerto Rico was first taken over by the United States among the spoils
of the Spanish-American War, there was a surplus of short-grained rice
in the United States. Colonies frequently have been the destination for
unwanted or surplus goods from the metropolis, so Puerto Rico became
the dumping ground for short-grained rice, which had lower status than
long-grained rice in the United States. After this, of course, the preference for short-grained rice became part of the culture. As is true of all
cultural values, however, this particular taste was influenced by history,
economics, and power, which will be further elaborated in what follows.
Culture Is Influenced by Social, Economic, and Political Factors
As is evident from the above, intimately related to the fact that
culture is bound to a particular context is that it is greatly influenced by
the political, historical, and economic conditions in which it is found. It
nieto
135
exists not in isolation but through concrete relationships characterized
by differential access to power. As a result dominant social groups in a
society often determine what counts as culture. This is why, for
example, a dominant cultural group unabashedly can designate itself as
“the norm” and others as “culturally deprived.”16 Those who are so
designated may not necessarily see themselves in this way, but naming
by others takes on great power; eventually many of those who are
designated as “culturally deprived” may learn to believe it. Yet “culturally deprived” actually means simply that the group in question does not
share in the culture—and consequently in the power—of the dominant
group. The paradox of this stance is that while many Whites see themselves as culturally neutral or “cultureless,” at the same time they insist,
through constant messages in the dominant ideology, that theirs is the
valued and valuable culture.
The theories of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu are significant here.
According to him, it is not simply money, or economic capital, that
determines one’s standing in the social structure; equally important are
what he has termed social capital and cultural capital. Social capital is made
up of social obligations and networks that are convertible into economic
capital. Cultural capital, which is more immediately important to us here,
can be defined as the acquired tastes, values, languages and dialects, or the
educational qualifications that mark a person as belonging to a privileged
social and cultural class. Just as in the case of learning one’s native culture
and language, cultural capital is acquired in the absence of any deliberate
or explicit teaching; it is therefore unconsciously learned. The initial
accumulation of cultural capital, in the words of Bourdieu, is “the best
hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital.”17
In essence, then, culture is deeply entangled with economic and
political privilege. That is, the tastes, values, languages, and dialects that
have the greatest status are associated with the dominant social class not
because these tastes, values, languages, or dialects are inherently better but
because they have higher social prestige as determined by the group with the
greatest power. As a case in point, for many years linguists have proposed
that Black English is a rich and creative variety of English, as logical and
appropriate as standard English for purposes of communication.18 Yet
the conventional wisdom still common among teachers is that Black
English is simply “bad English.” Thus, rather than building on students’
native discourse—what has been termed additive bilingualism19—most
teachers simply attempt to eradicate Black English and replace it with
standard English, a subtractive form of bilingualism. On the other hand,
when expressions from Black English make their way into standard
136
culture
and
education
English because they are used by middle-class Whites, they immediately take on a higher social status and thus become acceptable.
The example of Black English underscores the impact that culture
may have on learning and academic achievement. Most schools are
organized to reflect and support the cultural capital of privileged social
and cultural groups; in the United States, that group is middle class, or
upper class, English-speaking Whites. As a result of their identity and
upbringing, some children arrive at the schoolhouse door with a built-in
privilege because they have learned this cultural capital primarily in the
same way as they have learned to walk, that is, unconsciously and
effortlessly. Their culture, in this case, the variety of English that they
speak, seems both natural and correct. Yet as suggested by Carol Lee
and Diana Slaughter-Defoe, because of the low prestige of Black
English, “the influences of language on learning for African Americans
are both complex and problematic.”20
This example also places in bold relief the arbitrary nature of cultural capital. Paulo Freire captured the frivolous essence of such designations when he asked, “When did a certain form of grammar become
‘correct’? Who named the language of the elite as ‘correct,’ as the
standard?” He answered his own question by stating, “They did, of
course. But, why not call it ‘upper-class dominating English’ instead
of ‘Standard English?’ That authentic naming would reveal, instead of
obscure, the politics of power and language in society.”21 Further on, in
discussing the same topic, he added, “This so-called ‘standard’ is a deeply
ideological concept, but it is necessary to teach correct usage while also
criticizing its political implications.”22
One could envision another, quite different, scenario. If, for instance,
through some extraordinary turn of events, working-class African
Americans were to become the esteemed social group in the United
States, Black English probably would become the new standard. In turn,
schools would make certain that the curriculum, texts, and other materials would reflect this new form of cultural capital; in addition, only
those teachers who were intimately familiar with Black English and who
considered it an innately superior variety of English would be hired.
Accordingly, the children of working-class African-American homes
would enter school with a built-in advantage compared with other
children, who would be considered “culturally deprived” because they
did not have the cultural capital of Black English. As far-fetched as this
scenario is, given current economic and political realities in the United
States, it serves as a graphic example of the capricious nature of determining whose culture becomes highly valued.
nieto
137
Culture Is Created and Socially Constructed
As discussed previously, culture often is thought of as a product-inplace, and as something handed down that must be kept the way it is. Not
only does this result in a static view of culture, but it also implies that
culture is already finished. As we have seen, culture is constantly evolving,
and the reason that it evolves is because human beings change it. The action
of people on culture takes place in big ways and small, by everyday people
and by those who have power. When Jonathan Kozol went to Cuba in the
mid-1970s to research the successful massive literacy campaign that had
just taken place, he spoke with young people in schools, many of whom
had been the teachers of the peasants who learned to read. He was awed
by the young people’s responses when he asked them what was meant by
history. He recounted that when he had asked that same question of
students in Schenectady, New York, the answers had been fairly uniform:
“History is everything that happened in the past and is now over. . . . History is what is done by serious and important people.”23 In contrast, when
he asked young people in Cuba the same question, their answers were
starkly different: “It is the past, but there are things that we do now which
will be part of history someday.”24 These young people saw that history
was not just what was written in history books, or the actions of “important people” in conquest, war, or politics. What they had done in the
literacy campaign was also history.
In the same way, culture is what we do every day. Cultures change as
a result of the decisions that we, as cultural agents, make about our
traditions, attitudes, behaviors, and values. Were it not so, we would
forever be mere pawns or victims of the actions of others. Sometimes, of
course, cultural values develop as a result of victimization. The previous
example of short-grained rice is a case in point. But even here, people
took what they were given and made it a positive value. Without such
valuing, short-grained rice would not have become part of the culture.
The cuisine of poor people throughout the world is another illustration
of how culture is created. Poor people often get nothing but leftovers,
the parts of animals or plants that nobody else wants. What they have
done with these remains has sometimes been nothing short of extraordinary. This is cultural creation in action. Put another way, in the words
of Frederick Erickson: “Culture can be thought of as a construction—it
constructs us and we construct it.”25 Culture, then, is not a passive
legacy, but an active operation that takes place through contact and
interactions with others. Culture is a social construction because it
cannot exist outside of social contact and collaboration.
138
culture
and
education
Culture Is Learned
Closely related to the fact that culture is created and socially constructed is the fact that it is learned. That is, culture is not handed down
through our genes, nor is it inherited. This is very clear to see, for
example, when children from a particular ethnic group (for instance,
Korean) are adopted by families from another ethnic group (usually
European American). Although the children may still be considered
ethnically and racially Korean, they will in all likelihood be culturally
European American, unless their parents made a conscious and determined effort to teach them the culture and history of their heritage
while raising them, or the children themselves later decide to educate
themselves.
Culture, especially ethnic and religious culture, is learned through
interactions with families and communities. It usually is not consciously
taught, or consciously learned. That is why it seems so natural and
effortless. Although this process does not hold true of all cultures—for
example, deaf or gay culture—we predictably learn culture while sitting
on our mothers’ or grandmothers’ laps, standing by our fathers, listening to the conversations of family members around us, and modeling
our behavior on theirs. In fact, most people do not even think about
their culture unless it is in a subordinate position to another culture
or—if they belong to a majority culture—until they leave the confines of
home and are no longer part of the cultural norm.
That culture is learned is also apparent in the very concept of
biculturalism. Bilingual education, for instance, very often is called
bilingual/bicultural education because it is based on the principle that one
can learn two languages and two cultural systems in order to function
and even to succeed in different linguistic and cultural contexts. This
point was made in research by Gloria Ladson-Billings.26 Of the eight
teachers she identified as successful with African-American youths,
three were White, and of them, one had a White culture of reference,
another a bicultural culture of reference, and the third an AfricanAmerican culture of reference. However, becoming bicultural is not as
simple as discarding one set of clothes for another. Because culture is
complex, “learning” a culture that is not one’s native culture is an
exceedingly difficult task, one accomplished only through direct, sustained, and profound involvement with it. Because most teachers in the
United States have not been through this process, it can be difficult for
them to understand how excruciating the process is for their students.
Furthermore, it is difficult to become bicultural in an untroubled sense
nieto
139
because it means internalizing two cultural systems whose inherent
values may be diametrically opposed.
In the United States, it is generally only students from dominated
cultures who need to become bicultural as a requirement for academic
and societal success. That they do so is a testament to great strength and
resiliency. The fact that these newcomers, in spite of being young,
feeling isolated, and facing what can be terrifying situations in unfamiliar environments, nonetheless can incorporate the cultural motifs of
disparate values and behaviors says a great deal about human tenacity.
What they accomplish might best be thought of as critical biculturalism,
a biculturalism that is neither facile nor uncomplicated, but full of
inconsistencies and challenges.
Culture Is Dialectical
Culture often is thought of as a seamless web of interrelated and
mutually supportive values and behaviors, yet nothing could be further
from the truth. Because they are complex systems that are created by
people and influenced by social, economic, and political factors, cultures
are also dialectical, conflicted, and full of inherent tensions. A culture is
neither “good” nor “bad” in general, but rather embodies values that
have grown out of historical and social conditions and necessities. As
individuals, we may find elements of our own or others’ cultures uplifting or repugnant. That culture is dialectical does not mean th...
Purchase answer to see full
attachment