do you think the policy of Great Terror, culminating in the 1937 show trials, history homework help
Discussion Question:
Based on your understanding, do you
think the policy of Great Terror, culminating in the 1937 show trials,
demonstrates the strength or weakness (i.e., fear) on the part of the
Soviet leadership? Please refer to specific events in your answer.The Great Terror
In the near aftermath of the
successful, at least statistically, first 5-Year Plan, the Soviet
communist party convened a meeting in 1934 that was dubbed the “Congress
of the Victors” to celebrate having achieved breakthrough in
modernizing the economy. The tone of the speeches suggested a
relaxation in the country’s administration and policing. As Stalin
famously put it in his keynote speech, “Life has become better,
comrades, life has become more joyful.”
To the contrary, life for many Soviet
citizens became more fearful in the late 1930s in an era known as the
“Great Terror.” Although this was a complex process, the single event
that acted as a catalyst for the terror was the assassination in 1934 of
Sergei Kirov, the leader of the Leningrad party organization,
supposedly by a disgruntled ex-party member who supposedly confessed to
conspiring with foreign fascist elements. We must say “supposedly”
because no one believes this version to be totally accurate. Many
assume that Stalin had some role in the assassination, perhaps even
ordering it himself, because he suspected that the party wanted him as
general secretary with Kirov, but no solid evidence to support this
version has been produced.
As a result of the official version,
party organizations were ordered to audit their membership records and
strike off non-active names. Actually, since the early 1920s the party
had frequently “purged” their rolls in similar fashion, but events took a
much more sinister tone in 1934. In addition to establishing their
identities, members were called upon to give testimonials of their
loyalty to the party and to engage in self-criticism of their
shortcomings. The process passed to the control of the state security
organization, the NKVD, which seemed to eclipse the party itself as the
symbolic leading institution of the state.
Perhaps owing to theories of his
involvement in the Kirov assassination, the Great Terror had at one time
been interpreted primarily as Stalin’s campaign to settle personal
scores with rivals and old enemies, but that hardly explains the
process. The Terror culminated in series of great show trials in which
leading Bolsheviks from the 1910s and 20s, many of whom had clashed
with Stalin, confessed to their participation in fantastic global
conspiracies with German fascists, Japanese militarists, British
aristocrats, and, centrally, Leon Trotsky, to destroy the Soviet
state. But the terror extended far greater than this. At the height
of the Terror in 1936-38 approximately 750,000 individuals were
summarily executed and millions more arrested and exiled – and we must
also consider the family members of those executed or exiled as victims,
as they were also tainted for their relations to “enemies of the
people.” Even Stalin did not have that many old scores to settle.
One theory for the terror, which is
perhaps more chilling than the Stalin-centered interpretation, is that
terror became bureaucratized. In other words, the NKVD approached its
task as economic officials approached their plan targets. "If the
leadership wants us to find 10,000 enemies of the people in Yakutsk,
then we had better find 10,000 enemies of the people in Yakutsk, but, it
would be even better if we found 15,000." Moreover, NKVD officials
themselves often fell victim to the terror, so replacements quickly felt
pressure to outperform their predecessors by finding 20,000 enemies of
the people.
Another disturbing theory for the
terror is that it had popular support. Some scholars have pointed it
that the terror was directed primarily at the upper levels political and
administrative apparatuses and that the lower levels of the population,
particularly in the regions took a certain degree of Schadenfreude in
seeing those they held responsible for the hardships of
industrialization and collectivization get their comeuppance. Moreover,
the primary “evidence” collected against supposed enemies of the people
came from personal denunciations, and many Soviet citizens saw
denunciation as a strategy for eliminating a boss or workplace rival.
Social historians have pointed out that at the same time as the terror,
millions of Soviets achieved social advancement into the managerial
ranks.
Resources:
General Descriptions:
http://spartacus-educational.com/RUSnkvd.htm
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/russia-1900-to-1939/the-show-trials-in-the-ussr/
Primary Documents:
Speech by Ordzhonikidze, Commissar of Heavy Industry: http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1936-2/the-great-terror/the-great-terror-texts/ordzhonikidze-speech/
Transcript of Bukharin trial testimony: http://art-bin.com/art/obukharin.html
Scholarly Articles (Available via UMUC Library):
Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 1930s, The Journal of Modern History, 1996, Vol. 68, No. 4, pp. 831-866.
Hiroaki Kuromiya, "Stalin’s Great Terror and International Espionage,"Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2011, Vol. 24, pp. 238–252.
Kevin McDermott, "Stalinism ‘From Below’?: Social Preconditions of and Popular Responses to the Great Terror," Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 2007,Vol. 8, Nos. 3–4, pp. 609–622.
David Shearer, "Social Disorder, Mass
Repression, and the NKVD during the 1930s," 2001, Vol. 42, pp. 505 -
534
(file:///C:/Users/Paul/Downloads/monderusse-99-42-2-4-social-disorder-mass-repression-and-the-nkvd-during-the-1930s%20(1).pdf)
Peter Whitewood, "Toward a New History of the Purge of the Military, 1937-38," Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2011, Vol. 24, pp. 605–620.