American Political Science Review (2019) 113, 3, 658–673
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doi:10.1017/S0003055419000170
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Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy: An
Empirical Study of the American Civil War
ANDREW B. HALL Stanford University
CONNOR HUFF Harvard University
SHIRO KURIWAKI Harvard University
ow did personal wealth and slaveownership affect the likelihood Southerners fought for the
Confederate Army in the American Civil War? On the one hand, wealthy Southerners had incentives
to free-ride on poorer Southerners and avoid fighting; on the other hand, wealthy Southerners were
disproportionately slaveowners, and thus had more at stake in the outcome of the war. We assemble a dataset
on roughly 3.9 million free citizens in the Confederacy and show that slaveowners were more likely to fight
than non-slaveowners. We then exploit a randomized land lottery held in 1832 in Georgia. Households of
lottery winners owned more slaves in 1850 and were more likely to have sons who fought in the Confederate
Army. We conclude that slaveownership, in contrast to some other kinds of wealth, compelled Southerners to
fight despite free-rider incentives because it raised their stakes in the war’s outcome.
H
C
ivil wars are pervading features of human society,
despite their profound costs. Between World War
II and the new millennium alone, there were over 70
civil wars resulting in more than 16 million deaths
worldwide (Fearon and Laitin 2003). These conflicts take
lives, destroy property, and prevent the success of stable
governments. Underlying the macro-level phenomena of
civil wars are the individual decisions of millions of people
to participate in these violent conflicts.1 What leads
someone to abandon the political process and take up arms
against the state, risking personal life, property, and security for uncertain gains? In this article we study this
question in the context of the American Civil War, one of
the most destructive civil wars ever fought and “the most
Andrew B. Hall , Associate Professor, Department of Political
Science, Stanford University, andrewbhall@stanford.edu, http://www.
andrewbenjaminhall.com.
Connor Huff , PhD Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University, cdezzanihuff@fas.harvard.edu,http://connordhuff.com.
Shiro Kuriwaki , PhD Candidate, Department of Government, Harvard University, kuriwaki@g.harvard.edu, http://www.shirokuriwaki.com.
Authors contributed equally and are listed in alphabetical order. For
research assistance, we thank Nishant Karandikar, Mikhail Kolganov,
and Judy Pintor. We are grateful to Ran Abramitzky, Matt Blackwell,
Lisa Blaydes, David Broockman, Jennifer Eggert, James Feigenbaum,
Jeffry Frieden, Vicky Fouka, Steve Haber, Federica Izzo, Tyler Jost,
Sergiy Kudelia, Christopher Lucas, Shom Mazumder, Christoph Mikulaschek, Ian Morris, Jon Rogowski, Robert Schub, Jaume Sempere, Ken
Shotts, David Stasavage, Pavi Suri, Monica Duffy Toft, Gavin Wright,
participants at the Harvard Experimental Political Science Graduate
Student Conference, MPSA 2017, the Political Violence Workshop at
Harvard University, the Harvard-MIT-Tufts-Yale Political Violence
Conference, the Stanford, CIDE, and Colmex joint conference in Mexico
City, the NYU Politics and History conference, and the LSE Historical
Political Economy conference for helpful comments and suggestions.
Replication files are available at the American Political Science Review
Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RRBPUD.
Received: April 25, 2017; revised: February 10, 2018; accepted:
February 12, 2019; First published online: May 23, 2019.
1
For recent work on individual decision-making in violent conflict, see
for example Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014); Hazlett (2013); Rozenas,
Schutte, and Zhukov (2017); Weinstein (2006).
658
horrific war in United States history” (Costa and Kahn
2003, 520). Motivated by historical research on this defining period in America’s development and insights from
conflict studies about why individuals participate in
rebellions, this article investigates how personal wealth and
slaveownership affected the likelihood that Southerners
fought for the Confederate Army in the American Civil
War. Were wealthier white Southerners—who were more
likely to own slaves and therefore had higher stakes in the
conflict’s outcome than poorer white Southerners—more
or less likely to fight in the Confederate Army?
Research drawn from political science and history offers
countervailing views on whether wealth, in various forms,
should increase or decrease the propensity to fight. On the
one hand, one of the most famous historical sayings about
the American Civil War was that it was “a rich man’s war,
but a poor man’s fight.”2 The saying captures the claim that
poorer white southern men, most of whom did not own
slaves, were more likely to fight in the Confederate Army
than their wealthier slaveowning peers. Such a pattern
would be consistentwith research in political science arguing
that individuals participate in conflict in part because they
gain greater material benefits from fighting than from not
fighting, at least when personal wealth is not closely tied to
the outcome of the conflict (Berman et al. 2011; Collier and
Hoeffler 2004; Dasgupta, Gawande, and Kapur 2017; Dube
and Vargas 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys and
Weinstein 2008; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004;
Olson 1965). By this logic, wealthiersouthern men should be
less likely to participate in the conflict, both because their
wealth raises the opportunity costs to fighting and because of
the potential diminishing marginal utility of money.3
2
The origins of this saying are unknown, but it is generally thought to
refer to wealthy Southerners who agitated for rebellion yet avoided
military service (Wallenstein 1984).
3
Throughout this article we use a relatively low bar to define wealthy
and are not simply referring to the small strata of extremely prosperous plantation owners. Doing so is in line with prior research
exploring how modest increases of wealth among even the poorest
individuals affects their propensity to fight (Berman et al. 2011;
Dasgupta, Gawande, and Kapur 2017).
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Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
On the other hand, as we will argue throughout this
article, the American Civil War was a case in which
personal wealth raised individuals’ stakes in the outcome
of the conflict, potentially leading wealthier Southerners
to fight more despite the opportunity costs associated
with their participation in the conflict. Historical work
shows that free, white men of even modest means
throughout the Antebellum South often invested their
excess capital in land and slaves (McPherson 2003;
Wright 1978). The war was fundamentally fought over
the institution of slavery. We might expect that as white
farmers in the Antebellum South became wealthier, their
incentives to preserve slavery likewise rose, possibly
making them more willing to fight for the Confederacy.
This logic is consistent with research throughout political
science highlighting how individuals are motivated to
fight due to grievances against the state (Cederman,
Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Gurr 1970; Humphreys and
Weinstein 2008; Paige 1978)—in this case, grievances
against a federal government they saw as threatening an
institution that they had been socialized into and upon
which their future livelihood depended.
Empirical historical work that attempts to resolve this
debate comes to conflicting conclusions. Studying
Georgia, Harris (1998, 153) writes: “When men of the
same age and family status (such as household head, son,
or boarder) are compared, those who did not serve in the
army were wealthier, and owned more slaves, than those
who did serve.” Studying Mississippi, Logue (1993)
shows that Confederate combatants were significantly
poorer than non-combatants, on average (though with
some areas showing the opposite). Studying Harrison
County, Texas, Campbell (2000) finds that wealthier
individuals were more likely to fight for the Confederacy.
Reviewing some of this literature, Logue (1993)
describes these varying conclusions and discusses “obvious problems of scale in investigating enlistments”
(Logue 1993, 612). Limited to manual inspection,
scholars have almost exclusively studied small samples of
Confederate soldiers, often in a single county (or, in the
case of Logue (1993), a single state).4 The difficulties of
working with samples probably explain why empirical
work in this area has proved inconclusive.
To solve this problem, we take advantage of recently
digitized datasets on the entire population of the
Confederacy. We assemble individual-level data on
roughly 3.9 million free citizens in the Confederate
states alive prior to the outbreak of the Civil War. Our
dataset records information about each citizen’s wealth,
the number of slaves owned, occupation, family relationships, and, for men, an estimate of whether or not
each fought in the Confederate Army. Using this
dataset, we show that households that owned slaves
fielded more Confederate Army soldiers, on average,
than did non-slaveowning households. To understand
these patterns—and, in particular, to gauge whether
wealth and slaveownership drove people to fight for the
Confederacy, or was simply a correlate of other
4
One notable exception is Costa and Kahn (2003). Studying the
Union Army, and focusing on different questions, the authors finds
that higher-income soldiers are less likely to desert.
attributes that made people more likely to fight—we
present experimental evidence for the causal effect of
economic wealth on the propensity to fight. Using the
results of Georgia’s 1832 land lottery, which formally
randomized a meaningful amount of wealth across
white male citizens (Bleakley and Ferrie 2016; Williams
1989), we show that lottery winners’ households owned
more slaves, and subsequently fielded significantly
more Confederate Army members, than lottery losers’
households. These results are not merely because
wealth increased the number of children in a household.
Increases in wealth caused individuals to be more likely
to fight for the Confederate Army 30 years later,
probably in part since these increases came mostly in the
form of slaves which increased the perceived stakes
associated with the American Civil War.
In the final set of analyses, we try to understand why
incentives to free-ride did not override the increasing
stakes associated with the conflict’s threat to end the
institution of slavery. Even though slaveowners as
a whole had incentives to fight against the Union, any
individual slaveowner would also face incentives to
shirk and avoid risking death in war. We document
aggregate patterns at the county-level that suggest local
communities organized to encourage collective mobilization, although interpretations become inevitably
more speculative. There is a strong, positive association
between the county-level fighting rates of slaveowners
and non-slaveowners, suggesting locality-level effects
like social pressure played a role in overcoming the
incentives to free-ride. The fighting rate among nonslaveowners does not increase with the prevalence of
slaveowners in several Confederate states, however,
suggesting that such local pressure may not have been
enough to induce poor Southerners to fight in all cases.
The article contributes to the broader literature on why
individuals choose to participate in violent rebellion by
assessing an important historical debate in a case that
continues to receive considerable popular attention but
which falls in between political science’s subfields. Wealthy
individuals throughout the Southern Confederacy were on
average more likely to be slaveowners. Thus, the main
finding of this study—that wealthier slaveowners were on
average more likely to fight for the Confederate Army than
non-slaveowners—demonstrates how the individuals who
had the greatest stake in the continuation of the institution
of slavery were the most likely to fight in defense of it. This
evidence is consistent with the argument that the increasing
stakes of the conflict, which threatened to end slavery,
overrode the incentives for wealthy slaveowning Southerners to free-ride and avoid paying the costs of war.
Although wealth may in many cases reduce an individual’s
propensity to engage in violent conflict, it may increase it
when it is associated with higher personal stakes in the
outcome of the conflict.
WEALTH, SLAVEOWNERSHIP, AND
FIGHTING FOR THE CONFEDERACY
While citizens fight in war for many distinct reasons
(Levi 1997), rational-choice models and historical
659
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Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
accounts both indicate that personal wealth is a crucial
factor that could have shaped the decision to fight for the
Confederacy. Strategic models capture the individual
citizen’s choice to fight as a tradeoff between the returns
to his normal labor and the selective benefits of fighting
(Grossman 1991). Historical accounts of the Antebellum South also highlight the stark economic inequalities
among whites that developed in tandem with the slave
economy (Merritt 2017). Summarizing the literature on
fighting in the American Civil War, however, leads to
countervailing predictions for whether wealthier individuals would be more or less likely to fight.
Before describing these divergent predictions, we
first need to emphasize that the decision to fight for the
Confederate Army was an actual choice. The Confederacy implemented the first compulsory draft in
North American history (McPherson 2003, 430),5 so it
would seem at first that Southerners had little choice in
fighting. In reality, there were many ways to avoid the
draft. Wealthy citizens could pay to avoid service, and
the draft “was not uniformly administered” (Ambrose
1962, 264). Later in the war, men who owned more than
20 slaves were exempt from the draft altogether.
Perhaps more importantly, many people rich and poor
simply avoided the draft. In Northwest Georgia—a region important to this article, because it is home to
the land allocated through the land lottery we study
later—draft dodging was so rampant that the Confederate Army was dispatched to round up reluctant soldiers
(Sarris 2006, 88). These efforts were largely futile. Some
men joined only to desert at the first opportunity; some
simply refused and chose to serve time in prison; others
were hidden in their homes or by neighbors; and many
others melted into the woods when the army came near
(McPherson 2003, 432). As recounted in Sarris (2006,
89), W. A. Campbell, a former Confederate officer,
returned home to Fannin County, Georgia, to find “a
very large majority of the people now here, perhaps twothirds, are disloyal … not 1/2 dozen men have gone into
the service.” In many parts of the Confederacy, especially
in areas more ambivalent toward secession, concerns that
individuals could “sabotage the Confederate conscription” were widespread (Sarris 2006, 90). Indeed, the state
government of Georgia, led by Governor Joe Brown and
his lieutenant, Adjutant and Inspector General Henry C.
Wayne, “obstructed conscription in every way they
could” (Scaife and Bragg 2004, 3).
In a landmark study on fighting in the Civil War,
McPherson (1997, 5) sums up how men joined the fight:
“[M]ost Union and Confederate soldiers were neither
long-term regulars or draftees, but wartime volunteers
from civilian life whose values remained rooted in the
homes and communities from which they sprang to arms
and to which they longed to return.” Thus, despite the
Confederacy’s best efforts to conscript soldiers, for
many, the decision to fight for the Confederacy was
a choice. Given this choice, how then should we expect
an individual’s wealth to shape his decision to fight?
5
For more information on the history of conscription in America and
other Anglo-Saxon countries, see Levi (1996, 1997).
660
Why the Wealthy Might Fight Less:
Opportunity Costs and Incentives to Free-Ride
A range of historical research on the American Civil
War claims that wealthier individuals were on average
less likely to fight than their poorer compatriots, in large
part because wealthier individuals had both the
incentives and opportunity to free-ride on their poorer
southern compatriots and avoid paying the costs of war.
Prior research highlights a number of historical institutions that seemingly incentivized poorer individuals
to fight, while allowing wealthier Southerners to avoid
it. For example, throughout the Civil War both the
Confederate and Union armies used enlistment
bonuses, generally known as bounties, to recruit soldiers. In early 1861, enlistees received a 10-dollar
bounty (Scheiber 1969, 229). Later in the year, the
Confederate Congress approved a 50-dollar bounty for
individuals who re-enlisted (McPherson 2003, 430).
These bounties apparently sought to induce poor
individuals to fight by increasing the monetary payoff to
enlisting. The prevalence of such monetary rewards
targeted toward the poor is consistent with research that
argues higher levels of personal wealth make individuals less likely to participate in rebellion (Berman et al.
2011; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Dasgupta, Gawande,
and Kapur 2017; Dube and Vargas 2013; Fearon and
Laitin 2003; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004;
Olson 1965). These authors argue that individuals
participate in conflicts after weighing the material
benefits they can obtain from fighting against the
benefits from staying out of the conflict. In this view,
wealthier individuals may be more reluctant to fight
because of more valuable outside options: their regular
source of income is larger than their payoff to fighting.
Moreover, with diminishing marginal returns of additional wealth, the bounties would incentivize poorer
individuals more than wealthier individuals.
Other conscription rules appear to have provided
wealthier individuals the opportunity to avoid fighting.
The rules, which angered many poorer individuals
throughout the Southern Confederacy (Harris 1998,
150), took a number of forms, including the ability to pay
someone to fight in one’s stead6 and the exemption of
individuals owning 20 or more slaves from the draft.7
These rules were explicitly set up to encourage the poor,
most of whom did not own slaves, to join the Confederate Army and to excuse the wealthy from doing so. In
short, wealthier individuals had the means to avoid the
risks of war. This body of evidence suggests that we
should expect wealthier individuals to be on average
less likely to fight.
6
Noe (2010, 2) estimates that as much as nine percent of Confederate
enlistees were induced to serve as substitutes for other Southerners
who sought to avoid fighting. Indeed, the policy led some wealthy
individuals to advertise in newspapers for substitute enlistees (Moore
1924, 30).
7
This latter policy generally exempted one man, owner or overseer,
on plantations of twenty or more slaves (Ambrose 1962, 265; Harris
1998, 150).
Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
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Why the Wealthy Might Fight More:
Increased Stakes
Alternative arguments suggest instead that increasing
wealth made Southerners more likely to fight, because
southern wealth depended so heavily on the preservation
of slavery. Historical accounts stress that excess wealth in
the Antebellum South was overwhelmingly invested in
slaves.8 Most southern white men were farmers, and
farmers by and large sought to own slaves. Surveying the
economy of the Cotton South, Wright (1978, 141) concludes that “even the smaller [slave]holder would find his
financial portfolio dominated by the value of his slave
property.” Thus, for southern white men in the Antebellum period, individual increases in wealth would likely
tie them even more tightly to the institution of slavery.
That slavery permeated the economic decisions of the
Southerns cannot be over-emphasized: “Across the
South, slaveowners formed a class of great wealth with
a distinctive unity of economic interest—not necessarily
on policies concerning the economics of slavery, but in
slavery itself” (Wright 1978, 143).
Because the American Civil War centered on the
future of slavery, Southerners who invested in this institution might perceive the stakes of a Confederate
defeat to be higher than non-slaveowners.9 Secessionists throughout the South worried a great deal about
whether non-slaveowning whites would support secession (McPherson 2003, 242), precisely because they
seemingly lacked the obvious economic motivation that
slaveowners possessed. For this reason, the motivations
of non-slaveowners to fight a war over slavery have long
been debated. Ambrose (1962, 259) speaks of “yeomen,” small farmers without slaves, who were the
majority of the southern white population, as “often
unresponsive or downright hostile to their country’s
cause.” A poor North Carolina woman quoted in the
article wrote a letter to her governor requesting her
husband be discharged from the Confederate army,
writing: “I would like to know what he is fighting for…he
has nothing to fight for…I don’t think that he is fighting
for anything only for his family to starve” (267).
Studies of Southerners who opposed seceding from
the Union further support the argument that nonslaveowners perceived the stakes of the conflict to be
lower than did slaveowners. Studying the “up-country”
areas of the South, where opposition was most concentrated, Tatum (2000, 4) writes that “[a]lthough many
of the up-country dwellers hoped some day to own
slaves, they had relatively few at that time, and therefore
had little to lose by emancipation.” Consistent with this
claim, Wooster (1977) presents evidence across the 15
8
In 1860, 80 percent of total wealth held by Southerners were in the
form of land and slaves (Bleakley and Ferrie 2016; Ransom and Sutch
2001).
9
It is possible that, for many, this perception evolved from the time of
Lincoln’s election through to the heights of the war. Initially, Lincoln
and the Republicans were careful to confine their opposition only to
the expansion of slavery, and not to its continued existence in slave
states. Some, like the so-called “Fire-eaters” who had been advocating
secession well before Lincoln’s election, found these claims noncredible. As the war grew, the threat became clearer.
secession conferences held by southern states at the
beginning of the Civil War that delegates from counties
with more slaves were more likely to support secession,
while areas with fewer slaves were less likely to support
secession. McPherson (2003, 242) also observes that
“[i]n the conventions, delegates supporting delay or
cooperation owned, on average, less wealth and fewer
slaves than immediate secessionists.” The secession,
Wright (1978, 41) concludes, “was essentially a slaveholder’s movement.”
Such accounts suggest that wealthier Southerners
were more likely to own slaves and thus perceive the
stakes of the conflict to be higher than their poorer
southern compatriots. Slaveowners might perceive the
stakes of the conflict to be higher due to a number of
factors. They likely perceived that preserving the
slavery system was important to their economic wellbeing. Alternatively, or additionally, their direct experience of being socialized or indoctrinated into the
institution of slavery increased their commitment to
perpetuating it.10 Regardless of the mechanism underpinning this stakes-based argument, we should expect slaveowners to perceive the stakes of the Civil War
to be higher, and thus be more likely than poorer nonslaveholding Southerners to fight for the Confederate
Army. The evidence we present is largely consistent
with this expectation.
Alternative Arguments for Why the Wealthy
Might Fight More
It is also theoretically important to consider alternative
explanations of fighting that do not involve stakes but
nonetheless predict a positive effect of wealth on
fighting. For example, we might suspect that for
wealthier slaveowners, their increased wealth reduced
the costs associated with abandoning their farms to fight.
Indeed, many in the South felt that the rich could better
afford to fight. Harris (1998, 149) reasons that “[p]oor
men and women, for obvious reasons, saw the issue of
conscription in a different light from that of the rich. …
[the draft] was bound to affect the families of slaveless
farmers much more than those who still had someone to
plow and harvest.” We might suspect, then, that
slaveowners were able to rely on slave labor to offset the
potential costs associated with their own absence from
regular business. This would lead to wealthier individuals being more likely to fight on average, but not
necessarily because the perceived stakes of the conflict
had increased.
Another cost-based explanation that does not rely on
stakes comes from the expectation that wealthier
individuals held higher ranks within the Confederate
Army (Logue and Barton 2007, 256). If individuals with
higher ranks suspect that they are on average less likely
to be killed in combat, then we might expect them to
have lower expected costs associated with their participation in the conflict. These perceptions of the
10
For recent research on how socialization affects the choice to
participate in violent conflict, see, for example, Horgan et al. (2017);
Green (2017).
661
Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
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TABLE 1. Overview of Data Collection
Observations in original source
Observations in merged dataset
Free citizens (census)
3,909,122
Households (census)
746,506
Slaves (slave schedule)
2,574,602
Slave owners (slave schedule) 263,743
Confederate names (roster)
704,650
Total free citizens
Total households
Merged slaves
Merged slave owners
Merged confederate names
1
N
merge
M
N
merge
3,909,122
746,506
1,811,224 1,526,482 1,568,472
193,785
193,785
193,785
1,393,589
773,064.6
Note: Each number is the number of observations for the corresponding variable. The left panel summarizes the variables captured in our raw
data, with the respective source in parentheses. The right panel summarizes the counts in the dataset we construct after multiple matches.
The dataset starts from the 1850 Census and then matches in data from the Slave Schedules and the Confederate Rosters by name and
geography. Two specifications account for the issue of name duplicates during the merge N1 and M
N , and result in different estimates of the
effective size of merged data. The Appendix provides detailed documentation.
differential costs of fighting could then make them on
average more likely to fight.
We consider these possibilities empirically toward the
end of this article by looking at the rates of fighting for
the Confederate Army in 1861, the first year of the Civil
War. Since in the early stages of the war many Southerners thought that the war would be over quickly, we
might expect these costs concerns to weigh less prominently in their decision in the first year of the war. We
find that wealthier individuals still fought at higher rates,
even focusing on only fighting in the first year. While this
by no means rules out these alternative mechanisms, the
results do provide suggestive evidence consistent with
the stakes-based mechanism.
HISTORICAL DATA ON
CONFEDERATE CITIZENS
To test the countervailing theoretical predictions
for how wealth affected individual’s propensity to fight
for the Confederate Army in the American Civil
War, we constructed a new dataset of nearly the entire
military eligible population of the Confederacy. The
dataset links three sets of publicly available sources of
individual-level information: The 1850 US Census of
free citizens, the 1850 Slave Schedule, and state rosters
of Confederate Army membership. In the remainder of
this section we outline each data source and how they
were linked together.
The left panel of Table 1 summarizes our sources of
data. We start from the full US Census of 1850, which
contains the names for all individuals, along with their
age, occupation, and place of birth.11 We limit our
analysis to the eleven Confederate states, Alabama,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
11
We obtained the preliminary version of the Census from IPUMS
(Minnesota Population Center 2015), who have digitized all fields of
the 1850 Census. The US Census bureau has conducted a federal
census every 10 years since 1790, but the 1850 Census is notable for
being the first census that recorded personal information of all free
white members of a household, instead of only the household head.
Enumerators also started to record many social statistics for the first
time in 1850. Although the 1860 Census is closer to the Civil War, the
extent of digitization lags behind that of 1850.
662
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. Next, we collected the full 1850 Slave Schedules
of these states.12 The Slave Schedule records minimal
demographic information for 2,574,602 slaves under the
name of 263,743 owners, each of whom is identified by
last name, first name (or initial), and county of residence.
Finally, we gathered the state rosters for all Confederate
Army soldiers in the same eleven states.13 These rosters
contain a limited set of information about soldiers including their name, state, year of enlistment or conscription,14 and unit. This data collection effort resulted
in 1,496,931 records that contain 704,650 unique state and
soundex-encoded name combinations.
We linked individuals across the three sets of data
described above, starting from the 1850 Census. We
declare an individual in the Census a match with
a slaveowner name in the Slave Schedule if the two
household head’s soundex-encoded full name,15 state,
and county are the same. Throughout, we take the
unique serial number assigned to Census households in
our digitized dataset as our identifier.16 The total
number of slaves is then the number of slave records
associated with a Census household. Next, we link
individuals in the 1850 Census to the Confederate
rosters by taking all men in the Census and declare that
individual a match with a Confederate roster entry if his
last name, first name, and state are exactly the same in
both sources, again in soundex encoding.17 The total
12
We gathered the slave schedule by scraping a freely available
version on one of many genealogy websites, focusing on the Confederate states.
13
Like the Slave Schedule, we scraped the online digitized index of the
National Archive’s Compiled Records (National Archives 2018).
14
The same individual found in multiple years in different units is
given multiple records.
15
We first match on full first name, and then match the remaining by
first initial.
16
The data maintainer IPUMS (Minnesota Population Center 2015)
has constructed the serial numbers that aim to determine unique
households.
17
Because we take all men alive in 1850, some men may have been too
young or too old to fight in the Confederate army ten years later.
However, because there exists no strict age limit on eligibility, we
consider all ages. Results are similar using the eligibility requirements
for conscription, i.e., restricting to men who would be 18 to 45 during
the war.
Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
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TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Two Populations Examined
Family
Proportion men
Proportion child (of household head)
Average household size
Geography
Proportion households in Georgia
Proportion households in Alabama
Proportion households in Mississippi
Socioeconomic
Proportion white
Proportion households in urban area
Proportion households headed by farmer
Wealth
Average total real-estate property wealth
Median total real-estate property wealth
Prop. households owning at least one slave
Sample size
Number of individuals
Number of households
Number of counties
All Confederate
states
Lottery sample
control group
Lottery sample
treatment group
0.499
0.556
5.527
0.526
0.709
8.235
0.530
0.713
8.387
0.119
0.098
0.069
0.731
0.155
0.039
0.726
0.155
0.042
0.971
0.071
0.548
0.999
0.012
0.870
0.999
0.017
0.874
1,142
0
0.218
2,088
700
0.374
2,125
660
0.406
3,909,122
746,506
692
90,438
11,439
388
15,862
1,975
234
Note: Summary statistics on the demographic variables. The leftmost column shows the full-count data of free citizens in the 1850 Census
discussed first. The next two columns show the subset explored affected by the land lottery discussed later in the article. For these two
columns the binary specification of treatment is used to separate the treatment and control; see text for other specifications. All values are from
1850.
number of soldiers is the total number of members in any
1850 household who match to the Confederate rosters.
Appendix figures illustrate the geographic distribution
of our slaveownership and Confederate Army membership variables by county.
In the right panel of Table 1, we summarize the results
of the matching procedure by the resulting number of
observations. The key challenge is to correctly locate
slaveowners and Confederate soldiers in the Census. As
the fourth row shows, we are able to locate 75 percent of
slaveowners in the contemporaneous Census through
our matching procedure. We discuss how the remaining
matching error may affect our results in the Appendix.
The final row shows the result of matching Confederate
names to the Census. The roster has 704,650 distinct
name-state combinations, yet we join these distinct
names to almost 1.4 million records in the census. The
discrepancy is largely due to common names within
state. We address the issue of multiple roster entries
matches by creating two weighting schemes that downweight duplicate names. The N1 column in Table 1
provides the effective number of soldiers we find in
the census once we downweight each duplicated record
by how many times it is duplicated in the Census (“N”).
The M
N column does the same, except here we also upweight the N1 specification based on duplicates in the
Confederate roster (“M”) as well. In the Confederate
rosters, the number of name duplicates within the
geographic unit is sufficiently large that we prefer either
the unweighted specification or the M
N specification.
WHO FOUGHT FOR THE CONFEDERACY?
DESCRIPTIVE FACTS
The data described in the previous section provide
important individual-level information about Southern
residents in 1850. In the first column of Table 2 we
present key descriptive statistics about our populationbased sample. The population is largely comprised of
rural farmers. Households of free citizens on average
include 5.5 family members, and about a fifth of all free
households are estimated to own at least one slave. To
examine the association between wealth and fighting,
we first focus on two key pre-war measures of wealth:
the number of slaves owned by an individual’s household and the value of real-estate property, both
reported in the 1850 Census.
Figure 1 presents the average number of people who
served in the Confederate Army, per household, across
bins of the number of slaves owned by the household.
The four bins roughly correspond to the four quartiles of
a household’s slaveownership. Because many households owned no slaves, the first bar represents just this
subset of the data. The next three bars divide the
slaveowning households into thirds.
Three patterns emerge from this simple summary.
First, the propensity to fight in the Confederate Army
is lowest for those households owning no slaves.
Second, while the jump from being a non-slaveowner
to being a slaveowner predicts a large increase in army
membership rates, further increases in the number of
slaves are associated with more modest increases.
Indeed, using a multivariate regression that includes
663
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Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
FIGURE 1. Slaveownership and the Propensity
to Fight for the Confederacy
FIGURE 2. Real-Estate Property Wealth and the
Propensity to Fight for the Confederacy
Note: Households without slaves provided Confederate Army
soldiers at a lower rate than households with slaves. The number
of households in each bin indicated in parentheses. Error bars
indicate 95 percent confidence intervals.
Note: Households without real-estate property wealth provided
Confederate Army soldiers at a lower rate than households with
real-state property wealth. Error bars indicate 95 percent
confidence intervals.
slaveownership both as a binary variable and linearly
interacted with the total number of slaves a household
owns (and controls for property values), we estimate
that becoming a slaveowner is associated with an increase of 0.12 soldiers, whereas conditional on owning
slaves at all an additional slave is associated with an
increase of only 0.017 soldiers (See Appendix). Still,
both coefficient estimates are distinguishable from
a null association.
Third, and perhaps most strikingly, the overwhelming
majority of the Confederate Army were not slaveowners.
Indeed, according to our estimates, there were more nonslaveowning households who nevertheless provided
Confederate soldiers (410,646 households) than there
were slaveowning households in total (193,785 households). This prevalence of non-slaveowners in the army
may have led some observers to infer that nonslaveowners were just as likely, if not more likely, than
slaveowners to fight. Instead, non-slaveowner’s rate of
fighting in the Confederate Army was substantially lower.
Next, we consider wealth as proxied by real-estate
property value—the only indicator of wealth besides
slaveownership available for 1850. We again divide
households into four bins, the first for non-property
owners and the latter three for three terciles in terms of
real-estate property wealth. Figure 2 shows that
households reporting no real-estate value fought in the
Confederate Army at a lower rate than those possessing
some real-estate wealth. Like slaveownership, the
starkest difference is between households owning no
property and owning at least some property.
The patterns apparent from the population averages
are informative, but many other variables may confound
the association between a household’s slaveownership
(or property wealth) in 1850 and the number of soldiers
the household fields a decade or more later. In the
Appendix, we attempt to account for observable confounders by estimating regressions with other controls,
fixed effects, and allowing for correlated errors within
relevant groups. The three patterns in Figure 1 are robust
to including fixed effects and clustering standard errors
by last name, a proxy of the socioeconomic status of
a family’s heritage, as well as to fixed effects and clustered
standard errors for county.18 The regressions also indicate that the bivariate relationship between positive
real-estate wealth and fighting presented in Figure 2 may
in fact be driven by slaveownership. A regression with
both property wealth and slaveownership as predictors
estimates the coefficient on the amount of property
wealth (as opposed to whether one owns or does not own
property) to be substantively close to zero.19
In summary, our data collection and record linkage
allow us to comprehensively examine the relationship
between wealth and fighting, controlling for observable confounders. Wealthier households in 1850
fought at higher rates during the Civil War. Further
scrutiny suggests that it is a particular form of
wealth—slaveownership—that is positively associated
with fighting. In the following section, we proceed to rule
out unmeasured confounders by focusing on a subset of
our sample that received a random shock of wealth.
664
WEALTH INCREASES PROPENSITY TO
FIGHT: THE GEORGIA LAND LOTTERY
Did southern white men fight in the Confederate Army
because they were wealthy and owned slaves, or are these
variables simply correlated with other attributes that
made these men more likely to fight? We now turn to an
18
The positive association between wealth in the form of slaveownership and fighting also holds when we take as our outcome
variable the fraction (instead of counts) of a household’s male residents that are soldiers. This accounts for the understandable concern
that larger households simply have more sons available to fight.
19
The two measures of wealth are correlated at 0.34, rendering accurate estimation of both coefficients somewhat difficult.
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Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
experimental design that leverages a large-scale lottery in
the state of Georgia in which plots of land, worth a considerable amount of money, were randomly allocated to
white men 29 years prior to the outbreak of the Civil War.
Conducted eight times during 1805–33, the lotteries
were unique, widely popular among its white citizens,
and covered a vast area of contemporary Georgia
(Weiman 1991). We focus on the sixth lottery of Georgia, held in 1832, because of its outsized scale and its
proximity in time to the Civil War. The 1832 land lottery,
also known as the Cherokee Land Lottery, distributed
Cherokee Nation territory (the northwest of contemporary Georgia) to white citizens of Georgia. The lands
were forcefully taken from the Cherokees in infamous
fashion, and the rights to the land became even more
controversial after a gold vein was discovered in the area
around 1829 and white settlers inundated Cherokee
territory to strike gold. The 1832 lottery distributed land
which the Georgia state legislature declared as “Cherokee County” in December 26, 1832, shortly after
President Jackson won re-election. Following carefully stipulated rules set by the state legislature,20 the
surveyor office carved out land lots roughly 160 acres
each to be made available to any lottery winner for
a processing fee of $18.21 Unclaimed land would eventually return to the ownership of the state of Georgia.
After eligible citizens registered for the lottery by
sending their names to the governor’s office in Milledgeville, Georgia, commissioners conducted the lotteries in a doubly-randomized process (Williams 1989).
Lottery organizers set up two large drums called “wheels.”
One wheel for names contained slips of paper for every
registrant for the lottery. The second wheel for land
contained a slip of paper for every parcel of Cherokee
Nation land up for lottery. Commissioners simultaneously
drew one slip of paper from each of the two wheels, so that
both whether or not a person won the lottery, and the
exact location of the land were randomized. Eligibility
requirements remained roughly consistent across all eight
lotteries. Household heads 18 years or over, with a minimum three-year residence in Georgia and US citizenship,
were all covered (Georgia Archives 2018). Winners of
previous lotteries were excluded. Certain groups, most
notably those with a spouse and children, were advantaged by having two draws at the lottery.
While the lottery distributed wealth in terms of land, its
practical effect was to increase the winner’s monetary
wealth that could then be used for other purposes. Historical evidence suggests that richer citizens eagerly
bought off lotteried land from winners of the lottery, effectively creating a private market for land. Indeed, “Even
mediocre land could probably be sold for $25 or $50,
probably enough to exempt [a yeoman household head
who won the lottery] from ever paying taxes again … If he
hit the jackpot and won a piece of prime cotton land worth
several hundred dollars, then he could quickly rise up the
ranks and perhaps even buy a slave” (Weiman 1991, 857).
20
For the full text of the resolution, see Georgia Legislative Documents (1830).
21
For reference, the wholesale price of raw cotton in 1832 was $9.40
per 100 pounds (United States Census Bureau 1975, 209, E126).
Identifying the Winners and Losers of the
Land Lottery
To analyze the lottery, we first use a digitized dataset of
lottery winners’ names (Smith 1838), which includes
their self-reported place of residence and a symbol for
whether the winner paid the fee and claimed the land he
won at the time of publication. This results in information on 18,219 unique individuals. The records of
lottery winners are an official census (not self-reported),
“all carefully copied from the originals in the Executive
Department and the office of the Surveyor General,
designating also the lots which have been granted”
(Smith 1838, iii). We will then define our experimental
population as a specific subset of the 1850 Census which
reasonably could have entered the lottery and had the
same number of draws. Finally, we seek the names of the
lottery winners among this subset of predicted entrants.
Identifying the counterfactual lottery losers is key to
examining the causal effect of winning the lottery. In an
ideal world, we would obtain the entire population of
lottery entrants and then directly compare those that lost
with those that won. Unfortunately there is no available
list of state-wide lottery losers; instead, we adopt the
same method used in recent research conducted in
economics on the monetary and educational effects of the
same land lottery (Bleakley and Ferrie 2016). We
identify a subset of individuals who were eligible for
exactly two draws from the land lottery in the 1850
Census, using a set of pre-treatment characteristics that
all but ensures the individual was eligible. Because the
lottery was popular and estimates suggest more than 97
percent of those eligibles entered (Bleakley and Ferrie
2016, Appendix A), we then assume that such eligibles
entered the lottery, or at least are equivalent in their prelottery characteristics and potential outcomes to those
who entered and subsequently won. Specifically, starting
from the same observational dataset from the previous
section, we take all male household heads born before
1814 who had a child (alive in 1850) in Georgia between
1829 and 1832. Individuals who we find in the list of
winners are labeled as treated, while those that do not
match we label as control. In the Appendix, we show that
treated and control households are similar in terms of the
pre-treatment characteristics we are able to measure.
Astute readers will notice at this point that we are
defining our counterfactual pool (1832 lottery losers)
using post-treatment observations (1850 Census observations). In line with the empirical strategy presented in
Bleakley and Ferrie (2016), we assuage these concerns in
two ways. First, because we use a full-count dataset of the
entire Southern United States, outcomes are observed
even for individuals who moved away from Georgia.
Second, treatment could affect individual wellness or
longevity, so that lottery winners are more likely to still be
alive and in the Census in 1850 than lottery losers. The
resulting comparison among surviving lottery winners
and losers could then be biased if, for example, the subset
of losers who are still alive in 1850 are those who for other
reasons became wealthier or higher status. We suspect
this issue is relatively minor because the treatment was
not so large as to affect longevity dramatically.
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Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
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FIGURE 3. Distribution of Inferred Lottery Entrants in the 1850 Census Analyzed
Note: The map counts the number of 1850 Census household heads per county who we identified as lottery entrants in 1832 (A strict subset of
the total lottery entrant population). Counties outlined in the inset graph outlines former Cherokee county, the ownership rights of which the
Georgia state government distributed by lottery in 1832. Most lottery winners’ households are still concentrated in Georgia 18 years after the
land lottery, though some households have moved west.
Nevertheless, in order to address this concern, we also
applied our assignment mechanism to the 1830 Census,
finding similar rates of treatment assignment. Although
the 1830 Census is not digitized to an extent that we can
test our specific hypotheses, retrieving similar aggregate
match rates from a pre-treatment dataset is encouraging
evidence that treatment did not affect longevity in a way
that would subsequently affect our estimates.
We identify lottery winners by computing the phonetic distance of both first and last names between the
two data sources. This metric allows us to sidestep
potential issues involving variation in spelling, transcription errors, and enumerator spelling errors, which
might lead the same individual to have his name spelled
slightly differently in the 1832 winners’ list and the 1850
Census.22 Traditional exact matching will falsely declare such cases as negative matches. We use a phonetic
distance metric informed by the historical evolution of
languages, implemented in the R package alineR
(Downey et al. 2008; Downey, Sun, and Norquest,
2017). We declare two names a match if the “aline”
distance of the first and last names are both less than 0.05
(where distance ranges from zero to one).
To account for multiple matches, we consider three
specifications of treatment status based on this phonetic
distance metric, roughly equivalent to our procedure in
22
The computational costs of computing phonetic distance for the
entire Census is prohibitive, and thus was not available for the data
construction in the larger, observational dataset.
666
the construction of our observational dataset. In the
binary specification, we assign the treatment indicator
by examining whether a name in our eligible population
corresponds one-to-one with a name in the lottery
winners’ list. The N1 [following Bleakley and Ferrie
(2016)] and M
N specification attempt to account for duplicate names by down-weighting multiple matches.
These three specifications identify treated individuals
among the eligible population with a range of coverage.
The N1 specification generates a 19 percent treated
sample, whereas the binary specification gives 15 percent and the M
N specification gives 26 percent.
All of this leaves us with 13,414 individuals (or about
2.6 percent of the population of Georgia in 1830) from the
Census. These individuals combined with their 1850
household members amount to 106,300 individuals (or
about 2.7 percent of the southern free citizens) in our
dataset. Figure 3 presents the geographic distribution of
these eligible individuals across the Antebellum South in
1850. The center and right columns of Table 2 introduced
earlier compares the demographic characteristics of this
sample, separated by the binary treatment indicator. The
sample of lottery entrants are understandably concentrated in Georgia, although nearly a quarter of them are
estimated to have moved to another state by 1850.23
23
In the Appendix, we consider the possibility that lottery winner’s
migration patterns coincided with places of major Civil War battles,
which could stand as an alternative explanation for the findings we
present.
Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
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FIGURE 4. 1832 Lottery’s Effects on Slave Wealth and Real Estate Property Wealth in 1850
Note: Winning the land lottery increased both the average number of slaves a household owned, and the proportion of households that owned
at least one slave. In contrast, the land lottery’s effects on overall wealth seem to be driven by slavery wealth, as there is no discernible
increase in real-estate wealth. Each panel shows the estimated means for a given dependent variable, among each treatment group. Error
bars show 95 percent confidence intervals using robust standard errors.
Among the winners we examine, 48.4 percent were
recorded as having claimed the land. The relatively low
uptake is likely due to the variation in land values and
the market dynamics described earlier. Accounts of the
implementation of the lottery finds that spectators and
mining companies were keenly aware of the value of the
particular lots of land being lotteried away. As soon as
the state announced the winner for a valuable lot, these
buyers flocked to give their bids (Williams 1989). In
contrast, citizens who won less valuable land, despite
winning the lottery, perhaps felt it was not worth even
the fee to claim the land (Weiman 1991, 842). The state
extended the deadline for a winner to claim their land
several times, further incentivizing winners to wait for
a favorable offer.
Estimation
Our experimental analyses compare 1850 household
members whose household head won the 1832 land
lottery to 1850 household members whose household
head reasonably entered the 1832 lottery but lost. The
randomized nature of the lottery allows us to estimate
causal effects at the household level using a simple OLS
equation of the form
Yi ¼ b0 þ b1 Won Lotteryi þ Xi> g þ «i ;
(1)
where Yi is an outcome variable for household i. The
treatment of the 1832 father winning the lottery,
denoted by Won Lotteryi, is also realized at the
household level. This variable stands in for any of the
three treatment variable specifications discussed above.
The vector Xi stands in for an optional vector of control
variables. The coefficient b1 estimates the average effect of winning the lottery. Because 52 percent of those
who won did not claim, the coefficient represents a dilution of the average effect of actually reaping the
benefits of winning the lottery. In the following analyses
we present estimates of winning the lottery (b1), but
note that the estimated effect of wealth among those
who actually consumed it is roughly twice that of b1,
computed by instrumenting the choice to claim with the
randomized result of the lottery.24
EFFECTS OF RANDOMIZED LAND LOTTERY
ON SLAVEOWNERSHIP AND FIGHTING
We now present experimental estimates on both
slaveownership and fighting.25 We find a large positive
effect of winning the land lottery on slaveownership at
the household level. The first two panels of Figure 4
show that households whose fathers won the 1832 lottery had on average 0.94 more slaves in 1850, and were
6.4 percentage points more likely to own slaves at all,
compared to households whose fathers did not win. This
represents a substantial difference in the number of
slaves owned by individuals who won the lottery
compared with those who lost. Substantively, this
provides direct evidence supporting accounts of individuals throughout the Antebellum South investing
their newly acquired wealth in purchasing slaves.
The next two panels of Figure 4 show modest effects
on the amount of real-estate property wealth owned by
individuals who won the Georgia land lottery as
recorded in the 1850 Census. We find that average
24
As we noted, a winner’s choice whether or not to claim the land he
won was almost certainly not random. Given that the lottery assigned
not only winners but pre-defined parcels of land randomly, such
sorting of treatment compliance does not interfere in our estimation of
the complier average treatment effect.
25
When not otherwise stated, we use the N1 indicator for treatment
though as we show in Table 3, results are substantively similar regardless of the indicator used.
667
Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
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FIGURE 5. 1832 Lottery’s Effects on Confederate Army Membership in 1860s
Note: Winning the land lottery increased both household’s average number of men in the Confederate Army (both as an average count and as
a fraction of men in the household) as well as the proportion of households containing at least one soldier. Each panel shows the estimated
means for a given dependent variable, among each treatment group. Error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals using robust standard
errors.
household real-estate value in the Census was roughly
$150 higher for lottery winners than for lottery losers. In
contrast, the proportion of households with any property wealth is approximately the same for lottery winners and losers. These modest effects on real-estate
wealth again suggest that most excess capital was
invested in slavery. Indeed, Bleakley and Ferrie (2016)
estimate a meaningful effect of the lottery on total
wealth, and they find that these effects are primarily
concentrated in slavery rather than real estate. Like
southern white men more generally, winning families in
our sample appear to have invested much of their
newfound capital in slavery.
Next, we trace these effects through to fighting in the
Confederate Army. Figure 5 shows our main result,
demonstrating that households whose fathers won land
in 1832 on average had 0.3 more men fight in the Confederate Army, and were roughly four percentage points
more likely to have a male household member fight in the
army at all. The point estimates are substantively large
and statistically distinguishable from zero.
Table 3 presents our main results across specifications.26 The first column in the top panel shows the
estimated effect on the average number of Confederate
soldiers in the household, for the binary and N1
26
We also note that our main results are also robust to our two
approaches to the issue of record linkage, as presented in the Appendix. Similar to the previous section, we re-estimate the same
quantities only using the set of households in the 1850 census whose
head had a name unique in the state, and also use the M
N weighted
estimator. The estimated effects of winning the lottery on fighting in
the Confederate army are similar using this with these two sets of data.
668
treatments, respectively. This estimate shows that
winning the lottery led to an average increase of 0.3 in
the number of soldiers in the household who fought for
the Confederate Army.
We also estimate the same quantity with fixed effects
for the last name, or with fixed effects for the first name,
following Bleakley and Ferrie (2016). The purpose of
these name-based fixed effects is twofold. First, they
address concerns that results are driven by the conduciveness of certain names to match across data sources.
Second, they also account for unobserved confounders
that vary across lineages, which are proxied by name.
The second column of Table 3 adds fixed effects for
soundex-coded household head’s last name as in
Bleakley and Ferrie (2016); in the final column, we
instead use fixed effects for soundex-coded household
heads’ first names. In both cases, estimates are roughly
unchanged.27 The middle and bottom panels repeat
these same specifications for our alternative outcome
variables—the probability that at least one male
member fought (middle panel), and the fraction of free
men who fought in the Confederate Army (bottom
panel). Again, we find consistent and large results.
The outcome measure in the bottom panel is particularly important because it helps refute an alternative, fertility-based explanation of our findings.
Wealthier households might simply have had more
sons, and therefore more chances to field soldiers.
Winning the lottery indeed increased fertility, as
27
Results are also highly similar including both sets of fixed effects.
We do not present these for brevity.
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Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
TABLE 3. Effect of Winning 1832 Lottery on
Household Confederate Army Membership
No FE
Last name
FE
First name
FE
Number of confederate soldiers in household
Won lottery
0.31
0.16
0.29
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
Won lottery N1 Þ
0.33
0.20
0.29
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.06)
Probability at least one son fights
Won lottery
0.041
0.020
(0.01)
(0.01)
1
0.042
0.024
Won lottery NÞ
(0.01)
(0.01)
0.037
(0.01)
0.034
(0.01)
Fraction of sons who fight
Won lottery
0.057
(0.01)
1
Won lottery NÞ
0.063
(0.01)
0.049
(0.01)
0.047
(0.01)
0.027
(0.01)
0.035
(0.01)
Note: Each cell is a regression coefficient. Sample size in all
regressions is 13,414 households. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Outcome variable in top panel is the number of
registered Confederate soldiers in the household. Outcome
variable in middle panel is fraction of sons in household who fight
in Confederate Army. Outcome variable in bottom panel is indicator for whether at least one son in household fights in Confederate Army. Columns indicate the use of fixed effects (FEs).
Estimates in first row of each panel use the binary treatment indicator based on unique name matches. Estimates in second row
of each panel include non-unique name matches, where the
treatment variable takes the value N1 for a lottery winner name
matched to N households in 1850 Census.
TABLE 4. Effect of Winning 1832 Lottery on
Fertility
Number of sons
Won lottery
Won lottery
1
N
No FE
Last name
FE
First name
FE
0.11
(0.04)
0.10
(0.04)
0.09
(0.05)
0.08
(0.05)
0.13
(0.05)
0.13
(0.05)
Note: Each cell is a regression coefficient with the number of sons
as an outcome, and formatted in the same way as Table 3. Sample
size in all regressions is 13,414 households.
Table 4 shows. While the lottery’s average effect on
household size is smaller in magnitude than the
fighting effects in the top panel of Table 3, directly
addressing the extent to which this alternative
mechanism is driving our results requires some care
because fertility is an intermediate outcome (in 1850)
between the treatment (in 1832) and the main outcome of interest (between 1861–65). We therefore
assess the lottery’s effects on the propensity of
fighting, measured by the number of soldiers as
a proportion of the household’s total number of men.
These specifications still show positive effects on
fighting. As a share of all men in each family, winning
households’ male members joined the Army at a rate
roughly six percentage points higher than that of
losing households’ male members. We also reestimate the model controlling for household size
directly, while acknowledging that this may induce
some additional post-treatment bias (Rosenbaum
1984). Estimates of the lottery’s effect on the number
of soldiers for the average-sized household presented
in the Appendix are attenuated by about 20 percent
but remain statistically distinguishable from zero, and
our results for other two outcome measures are virtually unchanged.
Taken together, the experimental evidence bolsters
our observational findings, and further suggests that
wealth increased the propensity for Southerners to fight
in the Civil War because it led them to become slaveowners. On average, lottery winners used their newfound wealth to buy slaves, and not to invest in more real
estate. As a result, when war broke out, winning
households were more invested in the war’s outcome
than were losing households, and they fought at higher
rates. While other forms of wealth not contingent on
a conflict’s outcome may only raise opportunity costs
and not encourage fighting, wealth that a conflict directly threatens appears to lead individuals to fight at
higher rates.
DIFFERENTIAL COSTS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM
The stakes-based mechanism is not the only way
through which wealth, translated into slaveownership,
might increase the propensity to fight. As we have
discussed in our theoretical overview, one alternative
potential explanation is differential costs: the opportunity costs from abandoning regular business might be
lower for slaveowners than for non-slaveowners. In
addition, if wealthier slaveowners estimate the costs of
participating in conflict to be lower because they would
enter the military at higher ranks than their poorer
southern compatriots, this would also lead to a positive
effect of wealth and slaveownership that does not
operate through heightened stakes.
In order to better understand whether differential
costs are solely responsible for the effect we observe, we
limit our attention to 1861, the first year of the war,
before the Confederacy officially began conscription on
May 16, 1862. At the onset of the conflict, many people
on both sides of the conflict believed that the war would
be both short and easy, likely lasting just a few battles.
This sentiment is captured by the writings of an Alabama soldier fighting for the Confederate Army, who
asserted, in 1861, that the war would be over by the next
year since “we are going to kill the last Yankey before
that time if there is any fight in them still” (McPherson
2003, 333). Given this sentiment, we should expect
individuals who joined the Confederate Army at conflict onset to be less concerned about the costs associated
669
Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
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TABLE 5. Effect of Winning 1832 Lottery on Fighting at Different Stages of the Civil War
Number of soldiers
Fraction of men
At least one
Overall
1861
Overall
1861
Overall
1861
0.33
(0.05)
0.38
(0.04)
0.063
(0.01)
0.081
(0.01)
0.042
(0.01)
0.071
(0.01)
Note: Each cell is a regression coefficient. All specifications do not use fixed effects and use the N1 treatment specification.
Lottery effects on fighting throughout the War are similar compared to the fighting only recorded in 1861. Each pair of columns compare the
effect of winning the 1832 Lottery on one of the three metrics of army membership, corresponding to the panels in Table 3. The comparison is
between fighting for all years (as already presented in Table 3) versus fighting only in 1861, as recorded by the roster record.
with leaving their farms unattended for extended
periods of time, since they expected to be home again by
the following year. Moreover, this optimism at conflict
onset would lead individuals selecting into the military
to perceive the costs of fighting to be low. As one
Mississippian put it, he joined the Confederate Army
“to fight the Yankies—all fun and frolic” (McPherson
2003, 332). Many volunteers at the war onset enlisted in
contractual obligations “which ranged from
three months to one year” (Levi 1997, 62). We expect
that in this first year of war, individuals would be less
concerned about the costs associated with leaving their
farms unattended, since they expected to be home again
by the following year.
Based on this logic, if this differential cost argument
were correct, we might expect to observe a smaller or
null effect of winning the lottery on fighting in 1861.
However, we find that winning the lottery caused higher
rates of fighting even in 1861 (Table 5); in fact, the point
estimate is a bit larger for 1861 than for subsequent
years. While this does not conclusively rule out the
possibility that differential costs affect the choice of
fighting for the Confederate Army, it does lend support
to the argument that slaveowners were more likely to
fight because they perceived the stakes of the conflict to
be higher.
DID LOCAL COMMUNITIES
ENCOURAGE FIGHTING?
Having laid out both observational and experimental
evidence for the causal links between wealth, slaveownership, and fighting in the Confederate Army, we
now turn to more speculative evidence for how and why
the stakes of the conflict associated with the potential
end to the institution of slavery overrode the incentives
for the wealthy to free-ride and avoid paying the costs of
war. Although we have explained why owning slaves
might cause individuals to perceive the stakes of the
conflict to be higher, the results do not directly reveal
why any individual actually chose to fight. For any one
individual, the risk of death in war would seem to make
joining the Army fundamentally at odds with selfinterest, no matter the increased stakes.
Historical accounts suggest that local communities
organized together to encourage white southern men to
670
fight, while also isolating and punishing shirkers.28
Sarris (2006, 52) describes for example how in Georgia,
“communities rallied to support the soldiers,” offering
“parades and public displays supporting their departing
soldiers, ceremonies that were designed to reinforce the
commonality of interests among the men, women and
children…” The account continues, “Indeed, one of the
first acts of the secession convention was to establish
a formal definition for treason. Confederate loyalty was
a statewide obsession…” (Sarris 2006, 57). As the main
supporters of secession, slaveowners were at the center
of these efforts. By contrast, in many areas, poor, nonslaveowning whites had been against secession (Merritt
2017, 300). Being wealthier and more prominent in their
communities, slaveowners likely found it harder to
shirk. Contributing soldiers to the war effort may have
been only one out of the many ways slaveowners
worked to induce other Southerners to fight.
To investigate the possibility of community-level mobilization, we compare fighting rates among slaveowners
and non-slaveowners across geographical contexts, aggregating household-level information on slaveownership and fighting for each of the 692 counties. If the
decision to fight were driven by contextual factors beyond
an individual’s slaveownership, the fighting rate of nonslaveowners and slaveowners would be positively correlated. In contrast, if slaveowners and non-slaveowners
coordinate their behavior separately, their rates of
fighting may be uncorrelated, and if wealthy slaveowners
compelled non-slaveowners fight while avoiding fighting
themselves, the two rates may be negatively correlated.
Figure 6 plots these two quantities and exhibits a tight
correlation of 0.82. In counties where more nonslaveowners fight, more slaveowners fight, too. Consistent with our main findings, slaveowners also fought at
higher rates than the non-slaveowners in their own
counties, as the clustering of points above the 45-degree
line makes clear. These relationships exist within each of
the eleven states, suggesting the pattern is not driven
simply by differences between states. While wealth in the
form of slavery encouraged individual households to fight,
contextual factors likely played a widespread role as well.
Was the prevalence of slavery, and thus the prevalence of households with higher stakes in the war, one
28
For work on how rebels overcome this collective-action problem,
see, for example, Lichbach (1998) and Moore (1995).
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Wealth, Slaveownership, and Fighting for the Confederacy
FIGURE 6. County-Level Fighting Rates of
Slaveowners and Non-Slaveowners
Note: Each point is a county’s rate of fighting in the Confederate
Army among non-slaveowning households, compared to the
county’s fighting rate among slaveowning households. A 45degree line, which would denote that slaveowning and nonslaveowning households fought at equal rates, is added for clarity.
The two are tightly correlated, suggesting community-level
factors. Slaveowning households fielded more Confederate
soldiers than the non-slaveowning households in the same
county, consistent with our main findings.
such contextual factor? If local community pressure had
induced both slaveowners and non-slaveowners to fight,
then counties with more slaveowners ought to be more
effective at inducing non-slaveowners to fight, all else
equal. The caveat is that with observed fighting rates at
the county-level, our average non-slaveowner may vary
in various unobservable ways in counties with different
prevalence of slaveowning households.
The relationship between a county’s slaveownership
and its fighting rates among non-slaveowning households are shown in Figure 7. As the figure shows, this
relationship varies considerably across states. In Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, non-slave owning households were more likely to fight in counties with more
slaveowners (in 1850). But in Arkansas, North Carolina,
and Virginia—states in the mountain south where
historians have documented opposition to the Civil
War—non-slaveowners appear less likely to fight as the
prevalence of slaveowners in their states increase. If the
high stakes in the war’s outcome compelled slaveowners
to engage in community pressure to increase war participation, its effectiveness may have not been sufficient
to overcome the poor’s disincentive to fight in a number
of key states.
A full account of how locality-specific forces compelled slaveowners and non-slaveowners to participate
in the conflict is beyond the scope of this article.
However, in this section we have presented suggestive
evidence that social forces beyond an individual
household’s perceived stakes in the war were at play.
These forces may have helped to translate individuals’
perceived stakes into costly behavior.
FIGURE 7. Fighting Rates for Non-Slaveowners Across County-Level Slaveownership Rates
Note: Each county is plotted twice: the estimated proportion of men in non-slaveowning households who fought (in solid white points, with
linear fit overlayed) and the estimated proportion of men in slaveowning households who fought (in gray points). In the northern Confederate
states of Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia, counties with more slaveowners had fewer proportion of non-slaveowning men fighting. In
the southern states of South Carolina, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, counties with more slaveowners had a larger proportion of slaveowning
men fight. States ordered by the magnitude of the slope coefficient of slaveownership on non-slaveowning fighting rates, printed at the bottom
of the graph.
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Andrew B. Hall, Connor Huff, and Shiro Kuriwaki
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CONCLUSION
In this article, we have explored how individual wealth,
in the form of slaveownership, affected the likelihood
Southerners fought for the Confederate Army in the
American Civil War. We have found consistent evidence that slaveownership increased individuals’ propensity to fight—in contrast to patterns found in
previous research studying other conflicts and other
kinds of wealth—because it was a form of wealth directly threatened by the war. Wealthy slaveowners who
perhaps would have avoided fighting in other conflicts
fought at higher rates in the American Civil War because the stakes of the conflict were high for them.
We developed two main empirical strategies to arrive
at this conclusion. In the first, we used data on almost
every citizen of the Confederacy to show that slaveowners fought in the Confederate Army at higher rates
than non-slaveowners. To understand whether these
observational patterns were causal, in the second approach, we then focused on a randomized lottery run by
the state of Georgia. We showed that the households of
lottery winners owned more slaves, and, perhaps as
a consequence, were more likely to have sons fight in the
Confederate Army.
Our findings speak to the old saying that the Civil War
was a “rich man’s war but a poor man’s fight.” In some
sense, this saying is accurate. The Confederate Army
was majority comprised of non-slaveowning individuals. On the other hand, we found that slaveowners
fought at higher rates than non-slaveowners, and that
relatively modest increases in wealth and in slaveownership made southern white men more likely to
fight, not less. The familiar observation that many
soldiers were non-slaveowners largely reflects the fact
that most Southerners were not slaveowners, but it does
not imply that non-slaveowners supported the Confederacy more enthusiastically—in fact, nonslaveowners were measurably less enthusiastic.
In addition to helping shed light on historical
understandings of the Antebellum South and Confederacy, our findings highlight potential areas for subsequent investigation. Future research could more
explicitly theorize and empirically test the circumstances under which individual perceptions of the increasing stakes of a conflict overcome the incentives to
free-ride. While our results indicate that the Confederate South was one such case, the same may not hold in
other contexts with different historical features. For
example, in cases where social pressure is less effective—the Confederacy was, arguably, an unusually
martial culture that placed a particularly high value on
military service, making social pressure a strong mobilizing force—the community links driving both rich
and poor alike to fight might be less operative. This
might make it easier for wealthy individuals to pay
people to fight in their stead and also reduce their
incentives to enlist in order to encourage poorer community members to fight alongside them.
We also hope that this article demonstrates the
benefits of linking the study of conflict to the study
of American politics and history. Perhaps because
672
America’s internal violent conflicts fall into an unclear
zone between the fields of American Politics, Comparative Politics, and International Relations, the
subject often seems neglected. But the violent conflicts
of America’s past have much to teach political scientists,
both about conflict and about American political development. Moreover, as demonstrated by our ability to
gather individual-level information on roughly 3.9
million Confederate citizens for this study, new efforts
by archivists and genealogists offer unprecedented ways
to study American political history on a comprehensive
scale. In our view, this represents an opportunity to
study fundamental questions about individual-level
decision-making in key historical moments at both
a scope and level of detail not previously possible.
The American Civil War was an incredibly destructive conflict, fought over a singularly horrifying
institution, slavery. As other research shows, the ideas
and motivations shaping why Southerners fought for the
Confederacy did not die when the Civil War ended; they
may have played a central role in shaping the long-run
development of modern America (Acharya, Blackwell,
and Sen 2018; Key 1948). Understanding why individuals would willingly risk their own lives to fight to
preserve slavery remains an important question, so that
we can understand the conditions under which political
extremism does or does not lead to violent conflict. No
doubt, there are many explanations, and no single answer. In this article, we have used large-scale data on the
Confederacy to shed light on one key component of
the answer: the economic reality of individual stakes
in the institution of slavery. Contrary to some conventional wisdom, wealthier people joined the Confederate Army at higher rates than poorer people,
probably because they had the most to gain from preserving a system of slavery that prioritized their own
well-being over the freedom and well-being of others,
and the most to lose from the system’s destruction.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please
visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000170.
Replication materials can be found on Dataverse at:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/RRBPUD.
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