CHAPTER 8
KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWING: THE
JOURNEY FROM PHILOSOPHY AND
PSYCHOLOGY TO HUMAN LEARNING
P. Karen Murphy, Patricia A. Alexander, and Krista R. Muis
And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, to be explaining the verb
“to know?”. . . Thousands of times have we repeated the words “we know,” and “do not
know,” and “we have or have not science or knowledge,” as if we could understand what
we are saying to one another, even while we remain ignorant about knowledge. (Plato,
Theaetetus, trans. 2006)
In the dialogue Theaetetus, Plato captures a poignant
exchange between Socrates and a bright, if somewhat confident, young man who steps into a proverbial hole in reasoning that he has unwittingly dug
for himself. In this exchange, Socrates makes it evident to Theaetetus that “from the very beginning,”
their discussion was about “a search after knowledge, of which we are assumed to know the nature”
(Bostock, 1988, pp. 110–111). Yet, as the opening
lines of this chapter make apparent, Socrates held
that we truly know little about the nature of knowledge despite our unabashed use of the term and our
frequent claims to know this or understand that.
For this chapter, we have been tasked with a goal
that Socrates might perceive as fruitless or at least
foolhardy. That is, we have been asked to capture
the nature of knowledge and knowing and to position that nature within the discipline of educational
psychology. So that we do not follow Theaetetus
down that proverbial hole in reasoning, we immediately refute any notions that we possess truth about
knowledge and knowing or that we are purveyors of
epistemological wisdoms. In fact, what we will
endeavor to show herein is that there is not one
truth about what it means to know that has or ever
will represent the whole of our discipline, much less
other learning-related disciplines (e.g., psychology
or philosophy). Rather, there are many interpretations of the noun knowledge and many conceptual
variations of the verb to know that populate our discourse and guide our inquiries.
Indeed, even a cursory review of contemporary
philosophical, psychological, and educational literatures reveals countless conceptualizations of knowledge and knowing (Moser & vander Nat, 2003;
Reynolds, Sinatra, & Jetton, 1996). This myriad of
conceptualizations is not simply indicative of these
professional literatures but can also be found within
the ways in which educational practitioners, policymakers, and the general public use these everyday
constructs. The difficulty, of course, is that just as
Socrates admonished Theaetetus centuries ago, it is
problematic that individuals so commonly speak of
knowledge or invoke the verb to know despite
remaining relatively ignorant as to their nature. It is
for this very reason that the variability in conceptualizations of knowledge and knowing present in
everyday parlance represents a deeper concern for
educational psychologists than mere differences in
communication style.
Specifically, the ways in which individuals use
the terms knowledge and knowing can signify underlying epistemic beliefs (i.e., beliefs about knowledge
and knowing) that color perceptions and guide
DOI: 10.1037/13273-008
APA Educational Psychology Handbook: Vol. 1. Theories, Constructs, and Critical Issues, K. R. Harris, S. Graham, and T. Urdan (Editors-in-Chief)
Copyright © 2012 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
189
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
actions. For instance, this claim can be made of
classroom teachers who routinely make judgments
regarding the extent to which their students have
acquired valued knowledge or teachers who construct lessons that they believe will promote knowledge acquisition or enhance the process of knowing
(Edwards, 2007). Indeed, some have argued that
every student and every teacher has constructed a
personal theory of knowledge and knowing, however unvoiced or untested that theory might be
(Chinn, 1998).
What compounds this communication issue even
further is that there is a plethora of knowledge terms
that populate everyday discourse as well as the professional literature. Introductory educational psychology texts are replete with such terminology,
including prior or background knowledge; domain
and topic knowledge; and declarative, procedural,
and conditional knowledge, to name but a few. Yet,
this unbridled spawning of knowledge-related terms
has not resulted in any greater conceptual clarity for
the everyday users, and the situation is not appreciably better for members of the educational psychology community (Alexander, Schallert, & Hare,
1991). Thus, it is essential for us to explore the
many faces of knowledge and knowing and do so in
a manner that would contribute to a deeper and
more integrated understanding of these constructs,
lest we “remain ignorant about knowledge” (Plato,
Theaetetus, trans. 2006).
For that reason, we first look back to the historical and philosophical roots of present-day theory
and research on knowledge and knowing. We do so
by overviewing several classical philosophical theories of knowledge and knowing (e.g., foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism) and by
delineating their defining features. We then carry
those theories forward into more contemporary discussions of knowledge and knowing both in philosophy and educational psychology.
We begin our historical journey with a summary
of the types and sources of knowledge that classical
and contemporary philosophers have considered in
discussions of knowledge and knowing and then
traverse into how these constructs have been considered in learning theory. As we travel this
epistemic journey, what will become painfully
190
apparent are the profound influences and interconnections between classical and contemporary philosophical conceptualizations of knowledge and
knowing and the ways in which these constructs
have become embodied in theories of learning.
Arguably, nowhere is knowledge and knowing more
intricately intertwined within our disciplinary
heritage than in the study of human learning and in
the articulation of theories and models of learning.
For that reason, we dedicate a substantive portion of
this chapter to the complex yet critical association
between knowledge and knowing and theories of
learning.
To aid our discussion of conceptions of knowledge and knowing as represented in philosophical
theories and learning theories, we discuss each theory in turn while simultaneously positioning the
collection of theories within epistemic vector space
so that their contrasting views are more apparent.
We have found that this notion of epistemic vector
space facilitates discussion of critical differences in
views of knowledge and knowing (Alexander, 2006,
2007). This positioning also serves as a visual tool
for linking philosophical stances with contemporary
learning theories. The epistemic vector space, as
shown in Figure 8.1, is formed by the intersection of
two critical questions about knowledge and knowing. The first question, forming the horizontal axis,
focuses on the source of knowledge, whereas the
second, positioned along the vertical axis, pertains
to where knowledge ultimately resides.
Because of the importance the two aforementioned questions play in establishing the epistemic
vector space, we want to describe each question in
some detail. Specifically, the horizontal axis, or
abscissa, asks the critical question about where
knowledge derives. As we will come to see in the
historical and philosophical discussions that follow,
there are those who would hold that knowledge is
solely the construction of one’s mind and has nothing to do with physical or metaphysical reality. This
extreme position is depicted at the end of the
abscissa as “individually formed” (see Figure 8.1).
At the other extreme on the horizontal axis is
“socially derived” knowledge. Those positioned at
this extreme take the antithetical stance that knowledge is completely derived from the social, cultural,
Knowledge and Knowing
FIGURE 8.1. Representation of the epistemic vector
space formed by the intersection of positions on questions regarding the source of knowledge (horizontal
axis) and where knowledge resides (vertical axis). From
“Bridging the Cognitive and Sociocultural Approaches
in Conceptual Change Research: Unnecessary Foray
or Unachievable Feat?” by P. A. Alexander, 2007,
Educational Psychologist, 42, p. 68. Copyright 2007 by
Taylor & Francis, http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals.
Adapted with permission.
and physical world in which the individual exists.
From this perspective, all knowledge is socially constructed. It is seeded and continually fed by the
physical environment and the social and cultural
interchanges that transpire in that environment; the
mind has no independent role to play in its formation. Positioned between these two extreme points
on the abscissa are beliefs about the source of
knowledge that give some acknowledgment to both
the individual mind and the sociocultural, physical
context in which that mind is situated.
By comparison, the vertical axis, or ordinate,
addresses the question of where knowledge ultimately resides. There are those who contend that
knowledge is entirely held in the mind or brain of
the knower. We position those individuals at the
upper end of the vertical axis labeled “in the mind.”
From this more extreme position, minds are conceptualized as storehouses of knowledge, and the
process of knowing entails acquiring or possessing
knowledge, which can later be retrieved and applied
as the situation demands (Sfard, 1998). Conversely,
from the other extreme, marked as “in the environment,” knowledge is held to exist only in the world,
bound to some specific time or place or part of a
greater social consciousness. Those who position
themselves at this point on the continuum believe
that individuals may respond, react, or participate in
that knowing but that no one person can ever “possess” knowledge. Sfard fondly described those
espousing this knowledge in the context perspective
as PMs (participation metaphors) and contrasted
them with the AMs (acquisition metaphors) at the
other end of this axis who privilege the individual
mind. Between these two points are a multitude of
views about the home of knowledge and knowing
that pay homage to both the individual mind and
the sociocultural, or physical, environments as the
receptacles of knowledge. Before delving into these
views, we begin with a brief definition of philosophy’s epistemology, or theory of knowledge.
PHILOSOPHICAL MUSINGS ABOUT
KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWING: FROM
PAST TO PRESENT
The theory of knowledge, or epistemology (from the
Greek words epistem for knowledge and logos for
explanation), is the study of the nature of knowledge
and justification (Honderich, 1995; see Chapter 9,
this volume; because of the complexity and potential
unfamiliarity of some terminology in the ensuing
discussion, we have provided a glossary at the end of
this chapter (see Appendix 8.1) that defines key historical and philosophical terms marked in italics
within this section, e.g., epistemology). From the
ancient Greek philosophers, like Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle; to the medieval philosophers, like Saint
Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas; and from the
early modern philosophers, including Descartes,
Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Kant; to more contemporary philosophers like Moser, BonJour, Rorty,
Chisholm, and Dretske, attempts have been made to
answer three traditional epistemological questions:
(a) What are the limits of knowledge and justification? (b) What are the substantive conditions or
191
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
sources of knowledge? and (c) What are the defining
features of knowledge?
These three questions have resulted in centuries
of controversy over whether there is any knowledge
or justification and, if so, what the genuine sources
of knowledge include and how that knowledge is
acquired and represented. Moreover, evaluation of
the nature of knowledge concerns the analysis of
concepts that are foremost in discussions of knowledge. The two most prominent concepts are knowledge and justification. What does it mean to know
something? What does it mean for a proposition to
be justified? Justification, from an epistemological
standpoint, is ascribed to a belief, or proposition,
when that belief satisfies some evaluative norms
concerning what an individual ought to believe. Justification may include supporting reasons or evidence, which are judged by the extent to which
truth is obtained and error is avoided. As we discuss
in subsequent sections, many philosophers have
debated whether a justified belief constitutes
knowledge.
To exemplify the justification process, let us say
that Sam believes the sky is blue. When asked why
he believes it is blue, Sam responds, “Because I can
see that it is blue.” In this case, he is justified in
believing that the sky is blue given his empirical evidence (i.e., he sees it as such). Sam, then, is epistemically justified in believing the sky is blue because
his evidence is appropriate. The concern for what is
justified (i.e., the belief) and what provides that justification (i.e., reasons, evidence, or otherwise) is
central to the nature of justification itself (Arner,
1972).
Prior to delineating epistemological positions relevant to educational psychology, it is necessary for
us to establish a priori that although we discuss various theories of knowledge separately, this should
not be taken to mean that they are mutually exclusive. Rather, there are many similarities and derivations that we could not possibly cover in a
page-constrained chapter. To simplify our task, we
have made some generalizations where necessary
but highlight what we believe to be important distinctions and similarities among them. Finally, prior
to taking the journey down the epistemological
road, we first demarcate the types of knowledge, as
192
well as the sources of that knowledge, that philosophers have described in their discussions of knowledge and knowing.
Types of Knowledge
Like educational psychologists (e.g., Alexander et
al., 1991), philosophers have identified several types
of knowledge that are either explicit or tacit (Moser,
1996). Explicit knowledge is self-conscious knowledge in which the knower is aware. For example,
explicit knowledge is something that an individual
can document, share, define, measure, or represent
in some way: knowledge that can be articulated in
formal language and includes, for example, grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, and
the exact sequences of steps or actions necessary to
accomplish or perform something. In contrast, tacit
knowledge is unconscious knowledge of which the
knower is not aware, and is defined as personal
knowledge embedded in individual experience.
According to Moser, much of our knowledge is tacit
and, in this regard, resembles many of our psychological states. Even if we become aware of that
knowledge after some reflection, it is still regarded
as tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge includes representations such as personal beliefs, perspectives,
value systems, the actual performance of skills, and
other noncodified, disembodied know-how that is
acquired through behavior and experience.
The specific types of knowledge that philosophers have discussed include various kinds, five of
which we describe here. The first is propositional
knowledge, or knowledge that something is so,
which is similar to educational psychologists’ declarative knowledge. An example of propositional
knowledge is “the capital of Canada is Ottawa.” The
second type of knowledge is nonpropositional knowledge of something, which was originally proposed
by Russell (1912/2007). According to Russell, only
objects of immediate experience are known by
acquaintance through our direct awareness of them.
For example, we have knowledge of the color of this
paper because of our direct awareness of it. A third
type of knowledge is empirical, or a posteriori, propositional knowledge, which is knowledge obtained by
experience or sensorial information. The natural and
social sciences are typically considered a posteriori
Knowledge and Knowing
disciplines, and examples include “all things fall
down on earth” (an empirical proposition about
gravity), and “water is H2O: two parts hydrogen and
one part oxygen.”
Another type of knowledge is nonempirical, or a
priori, propositional knowledge, which refers to any
knowledge that is justified independently of experience. Examples include knowledge that 12 + 18 =
30, the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled
triangle equals the sum of the squares on the other
two sides, and bachelors are unmarried. Finally, the
last type of knowledge is procedural knowledge, or
knowledge of how to do something. Examples
include knowing the method for carrying out a science experiment, writing an essay, or solving a
mathematics problem. The focus of most philosophical discussions about knowledge and knowing has
centered primarily on propositional knowledge
(Moser, 1996). For that reason, the various positions on the theory of knowledge that we present
here include considerations of propositional
knowledge.
Sources of Knowledge
Just as knowledge can be divided into several types,
philosophers have also divided knowledge according to the sources from which it arises. Whereas
some philosophers have proposed that there are four
sources of knowledge, others have argued for six.
That is, traditionally, philosophers suggested there
were four sources of knowledge: sensation (i.e.,
perception), memory, introspection, and reason
(Honderich, 1995). More recently, however, philosophers have also included testimony and inference
as plausible sources of knowledge (Bernecker &
Dretske, 2007). Here, we present five common
sources of knowledge: perception, introspection,
memory, testimony, and inference. In subsequent
sections, we detail Kant’s perspective on reason as a
source of knowledge.
Perception. Perception entails the extraction and
use of information about one’s environment and
one’s self through the senses (i.e., sight, hearing,
touch, smell, and taste). Thus, considerations of
perception as a source of knowledge include discussions of how perceived information becomes
knowledge as well as what type of reality, if any,
that information represents. Bernecke and Dretske
(2007) reported that there are several different views
on the nature of perception, but the primary division
is between direct and indirect realism. Direct realists
argue that what we are directly aware of in sense
perception are real objects, things that exist even
when we are no longer aware of them. In contrast,
indirect realists claim that although there is a world
of mind-independent objects that cause us to have
experiences, what we perceive are the effects of these
objects, which are accurate representations of some
external reality. Just like a television is a portrayal of
some other remote cause, our perception of external
objects is indirect.
Introspection. Introspection from a philosophical
perspective is similar in some ways to educational
psychologists’ notion of metacognition, with introspection being more general. Introspection, or consciousness, is the attention the mind gives to itself
and its own operations (Cassam, 1994; Dretske,
1995). When we engage in introspection, we are
attempting to figure out what we want, think, or
feel, which typically results in some self-ascription
of some psychological property, such as, “I want
food,” “I am confused,” or “I am happy.” Although
many theorists have argued the fallibility of the
mind and that introspective beliefs are subject to
misinterpretation, self-deception, and error, they do
possess some kind of epistemic authority. That is,
the thoughts, feelings, and needs that an individual
has are things that no other person can claim to
have. This is called first-person authority or privileged
self-knowledge (Dretske, 1995).
Memory and testimony. Memory, the retention
of or capacity to retain information or past experience, has been a controversial topic among philosophers with regard to whether it is a genuine
source of knowledge (Audi, 1998). Whereas some
philosophers have argued that memory only retains
and preserves knowledge, others have claimed that
memory also produces knowledge (e.g., Ginet,
1988). Those who have suggested that memory can
produce knowledge insist there are cases in which a
person first comes to know by remembering. What
passes into the mind is first a belief or datum but not
193
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
knowledge; that datum or belief must be processed
in some way (e.g., via cognitive mechanisms) before
it becomes knowledge. Alternatively, as Audi (1998)
noted, there may be cases in which an individual
might use memory to construct new knowledge.
That is, an individual may have an experience but
does not understand that experience as knowledge
at the time it occurs. After coming to understand
the concepts involved, he or she may then remember that a personal experience applies to the new
concepts learned. For example, young children are
sometimes able to describe from memory experiences that they had before they learned any language
adequate to describe those experiences (Ginet,
1988). As another example, an individual may learn
about how many windows there were in the house
in which he or she grew up by imagining walking
through the house and counting all of the windows
in each room. In this situation, that individual would
need to remember what the rooms were and what
each room looked like. In this regard, one’s memory
of something is used to create new knowledge.
In contrast to memory, some philosophers view
testimony as the primary source of the majority of
our knowledge. According to this stance, when one
learns from a teacher, for example, one may judge
that person to be a reliable source of information.
Therefore, any information from that person must
be true (Sosa, 1991), much like the authority as a
source of knowledge dimension in epistemic belief
research in educational psychology. As Reid
(1764/1997) suggested, these types of testimonial
beliefs are typically noninferential; we normally
believe what people tell us without question. Hume
and others argued, however, that testimony can be
reduced to some form of memory, perception, or
inference, which excludes testimony from being an
independent source of knowledge (Coady, 1992).
Inference. The last source of knowledge that has
received attention in philosophical discussions of
knowledge is inference. As a source of knowledge,
inference can be inductive or deductive (Bernecker
& Dretske, 2007). In a valid deduction, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises so
that it is not logically possible for the conclusion
to be false. In inductive reasoning, however, the
194
derivation of knowledge is not so straightforward.
Through inductive reasoning, we begin with a set
of observations about something (e.g., this swan is
white, and that swan is white) and derive generalizations (e.g., all swans are white) or predictions about
unexamined instances (e.g., the next swan we see
will be white).
This type of reasoning runs into obvious difficulty; unless all swans are examined, there is no
guarantee that the conclusion will be true. It is possible that we might come across a swan that is not
white. Accordingly, in a valid induction, the evidence does not entail the conclusion, unlike deductive reasoning. At best, inductive arguments make
their conclusions probable. The probability of an
inductive argument being true ranges from 0 to 1
with .50 representing an equal probability of being
true or false (Russell, 1912/2007). At a probability of
.50, one may as well guess, but as Plato and other
ancient philosophers argued, lucky guessing does
not count as knowledge.
In summary, philosophers have identified several
types of sources of knowledge, which traditionally
were sensation, memory, introspection, and reason.
Today, philosophers also consider testimony and
inference as plausible sources of knowledge. Moreover, like educational psychologists, philosophers
have also discussed various types of knowledge,
ranging from propositional (i.e., declarative) to nonpropositional knowledge and procedural knowledge.
In fact, discussions of what counts as knowledge
were primary considerations with ancient philosophers and continue to be so today. To illustrate the
various positions on what constitutes knowledge, we
next describe ancient and modern classical positions
in philosophical epistemology, beginning with Plato.
To aid readers along this historical journey, a summary of the various philosophers’ positions and
other views is presented in Table 8.1.
Ancient Classical Views: The Classical
Period in Greece (500–300 BC)
And what, Socrates, is the food of the
soul?
Surely, I said, knowledge is the food
of the soul; and we must take care, my
friend, that the Sophist does not deceive
Knowledge and Knowing
TABLE 8.1
A Summary of the Ancient and Modern Classical Views of Knowledge
Justification of
Where knowledge
Person or stance
Views of knowledge
and reality
Source of knowledge
knowledge
resides
Plato (427–347 BC)
There are three necessary and
sufficient conditions for
knowledge: justification,
truth, and belief. Knowledge
is justified true belief and
represents an objective
reality (i.e., an imperceptible
world of eternal ideas).
Knowledge represents a
mirror image of reality
(i.e., perceptible world of
concrete objects).
Knowledge is constructed from
the ground up; no belief can
be justified as knowledge
unless it is founded on a
basic principle. Knowledge
must be certain.
Knowledge differs from belief.
Knowledge is accompanied
by belief but is not identified
with it. Knowledge is direct
awareness of some fact.
Knowledge is traceable to
elements of experience and
must be verifiable through
experience or observation.
Knowledge results from the
organization of perceptual
data on the basis of inborn
cognitive structures.
Reason
Rationalism
Internal, in the mind
Perception (direct
realism)
Empiricism
External, in the
environment
Rationalism, but
observation and
hypothesis testing
also important
for knowledge
acquisition
Perception (indirect
realism)
Rationalism
Internal, in the mind
Empiricism
External, in the
environment
Perception
Empiricism
External, in the
environment
Intuition and
understanding
Intuition and
understanding
Internal, in the mind
Aristotle (384–322 BC)
René Descartes
(1596–1650)
John Locke
(1632–1704)
Logical positivism/
behaviorism
(1920s–1950s)
Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804)
us when he praises what he sells us. . . . If
therefore you have understanding of
what is good and evil, you may safely buy
knowledge. (Plato, trans. 2004, p. 159)
Plato. In the dialogue between Plato and Socrates
just quoted, Plato discusses whether virtue can be
taught and whether it counts as a branch of knowledge. Socrates’s fear was that virtue could not be
taught and that if ignorance was considered evil,
then it was an ignorance of the soul and an inability
to understand. Plato warns Socrates that we must
be careful about what we consider knowledge, for if
we are wrong, then certainly we are ignorant—and
thus, evil. Plato then postulates that we must be
able to make the distinction between knowledge
and belief, and if we can, then we can buy knowledge. In this regard, the “purchasing” of knowledge
reflects Plato’s belief that individuals do not actively
construct knowledge but rather passively consume
knowledge. This belief in a passive acquisition of
knowledge was prominent in many of the ancient
classical views.
Ancient classical views, which can be traced back
to Plato’s Theaetetus and The Republic, claim that
what distinguishes knowledge from true belief and
lucky guessing is that knowledge is based on justification (Everson, 1990). In The Republic (trans. 1993),
195
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
Plato suggested that for a proposition to be considered knowledge, it should be free from error. To
Plato, the major concern about the nature of knowledge was what distinguished knowledge from belief
(doxa in Greek). Returning to his original ideas in
Meno (trans. 2005) and Theaetetus, Plato contemplated that true belief can be construed as knowledge by justifying it by means of reason (i.e.,
rationalism) or cause, but he failed to provide an
adequate account of what that cause or reason might
sufficiently entail (Burnyeat, 1990; Woodruff,
1990). In Theaetetus and Meno, Plato proposed that
propositional knowledge has three individually necessary and sufficient conditions: justification, truth,
and belief. These three conditions have led to the
traditional analysis of propositional knowledge: You
know that P if and only if you have a justified true
belief that P (Moser, 1996). Using formal logic, the
standard analysis of propositional knowledge can be
expressed in the following syllogistic form:
1. P is true.
2. S believes that P.
3. S is justified in believing that P.
That is, knowledge requires three conditions: a
belief condition, a truth condition, and a justification
condition. Not only must the belief and truth conditions be satisfied, but also the satisfaction of the
belief condition must be appropriately related to the
satisfaction of the truth condition. This requirement
leads to the justification condition for knowledge,
wherein the condition excludes coincidental phenomena such as lucky guessing (Moser, 1996). From
this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition,
justified true belief (Everson, 1990; Rorty, 1996).
Aristotle. Even as a pupil of Plato, Aristotle’s position on the justification of knowledge stood in contrast to the Platonistic view. Specifically, although
Aristotle was aware of challenges to claims of
knowledge, the justification of knowledge claims in
response to such challenges was at best peripheral
to Aristotle’s concerns. Aristotle did not argue that
knowledge is possible but, assuming its possibility,
attempted to understand how it is realized in various fields of mental activity and how the states in
which it is realized relate to other cognitive states of
196
the individual. Aristotle thus placed more emphasis
on empirical methods (i.e., empiricism) for gathering knowledge but accepted Plato’s view that such
knowledge is an apprehension of necessary and universal principles (Taylor, 1990).
Skepticism. Although many philosophers
attempted to answer the traditional questions that
arose from the standard analysis, one ancient school
of thought refused to grant that there is any knowledge or justification (Sosa, 1994). Influenced by
Socrates’s observation, “All I know is that I know
nothing” (Popkin, 2003, p. xvii), the Greek skeptics challenged the belief that humans can acquire
knowledge or be justified in knowing. Their challenges led to a set of arguments to establish that
(a) no knowledge is possible, or (b) there is insufficient and inadequate evidence to determine if
any knowledge is possible; thus, judgment on all
questions about knowledge should be suspended
(Popkin, 2003). After maintaining its status for
over 2 centuries, skepticism ended as a school, but
its challenges have been long influential, as evidenced in writings from modern philosophers, such
as Descartes and Kuhn, to more contemporary pragmatist philosophers like Rorty (Sosa, 1994).
Modern Classical Views: The Era of
European Colonization (1600–1800)
Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).
(Descartes, Meditations)
Descartes’s rationalism: The beginning of a foundationalist philosophy. Following the Renaissance,
two main epistemological positions were dominant
in philosophy: rationalism and empiricism (Packer
& Addison, 1989). Descartes, the originator of modern rationalism, focused on the need for the mind to
examine itself both actively and systematically, emphasizing the analysis of reason and logic (Cottingham,
2008). That is, Descartes challenged previous conceptions of a passive acquisition of knowledge and further
proposed that knowledge must be certain. This notion
of certainty led to the development of what is known
today as foundationalism.
More generally, Descartes viewed mathematics as
a paradigm for all human understanding, which led
to the development of his Cartesian science and
Knowledge and Knowing
dualism (i.e., Cartesian meaning that which relates
to Descartes and his ideas). The foundation of Descartes’s science was that of innate ideas, primarily
those of mathematics. He argued that these innate
ideas were reliable given that God implanted those
ideas in our minds at birth, hence, innate. Moreover,
he believed that to improve understanding of scientific phenomena, wherever possible, attempts should
be made to reduce those phenomena to quantitative
descriptions of arithmetic and geometry (Cottingham, 2008). That is, Descartes proposed to mathematize science and described the material world as
an indefinite series of variations in shape, size, and
motion, which he called res extensa (i.e., extended
substance; Cottingham, 2008). This extended substance included all physical and biological events
and complex animal behavior.
There was, however, one exception to this rule of
reducing phenomena to quantitative descriptions:
namely, conscious experience. Descartes argued that
thought was distinct from matter, which subsequently led him to propose a dualism between mind
and body, now famously known as his Cartesian
dualism. According to Descartes, the mind and body
have nothing in common; in contrast to the body,
the mind is invisible, indivisible, and immortal. He
construed the mind as a res cogitans, or thinking
substance, which is entirely independent of the res
extensa. Moreover, each individual is a unique
“thinking substance” and, as Descartes described,
this “I,” that is to say, the mind by which I
am what I am, is wholly distinct from the
body, and is even more easily known than
the latter, and as such, that although the
latter were not, it would still continue to
be all that it is.
Hence, “I think, therefore I am.” (Descartes,
1637/2008, p. 27)
Additionally, in his famous simile representing
his Cartesian system, he described philosophy as a
tree: The roots of the tree are metaphysics, the trunk
physics, and the branches various sciences (Cottingham, 2008). This analogy captures three important
aspects of his Cartesian system. First, in contrast to
Aristotelian conceptions of the sciences as a series of
separate and unrelated disciplines, the roots captured
Descartes’s view that all knowledge is essentially
united and linked together. The second aspect, the
tree, reflects his belief that the utility of philosophy
should not be for its theoretical musings but rather
for its pragmatic purposes; that is, the knowledge
that we achieve should be useful in life, and knowledge should be gathered from the practical sciences
(i.e., the branches).
Finally, Descartes’s likening of metaphysics to
the root of the tree captures the primary tenet of
foundationalism—that knowledge must be constructed from the ground up and that no belief can
be justified as knowledge unless it is founded on a
basic principle (Cottingham, 2008). Although Descartes is typically labeled as a rationalist, he also suggested that we cannot rely solely on reason alone
given the mind’s imperfections. Rather, he considered
empirical observation, hypothesis testing, and quantitative explanations as playing an important role in
the construction of knowledge. Nonetheless, central
to his philosophy was that the fundamental building
block of knowledge was innate (i.e., inborn) ideas,
chiefly those of mathematics (Cottingham, 2008).
Locke’s empiricism: The basis for logical positivism. In contrast, Locke, the founding father of
modern empiricism, disagreed with Descartes’s
views about extended and thinking substances.
Locke maintained that none of our ideas are innate;
rather, the mind at birth is like a tabula rasa, or
blank tablet, and all of our ideas are derived from
experience (Wolterstorff, 1996). These ideas, however, do not automatically make up our knowledge,
thus knowledge is not derived from our senses.
Rather, knowledge is a product of reason that works
through the connections between those ideas,
which are acquired through experience. Locke further argued that all ideas and knowledge could be
accounted for by examining the ways in which the
mind processes information via sensation and reflection (e.g., self-awareness).
In this regard, Locke’s empiricism about ideas
was in some ways influenced by a rationalist perspective about knowledge. However, the main distinction between Descartes and Locke is that Locke
maintained that the materials that make up knowledge come from the external world, not internally
197
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
from our minds. For example, he described the primary qualities of objects in the world, such as solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number, as
ideas being resemblances of these qualities (Packer
& Addison, 1989). Locke’s account, then, is one
that positions knowledge acquisition as being passive, of the mind as being blank at birth but, over
time, filled with ideas through experiences, which
mirror an external reality. His views of knowledge
and belief differ, wherein knowledge is typically
accompanied by belief but is not identified with
belief. Rather, knowledge is a direct or explicit
awareness of some fact, the perception of some
agreement or disagreement among things. In contrast, belief consists of taking some proposition to be
true whether or not one is aware of the corresponding fact (Wolterstorff, 1996). Therefore, according
to Locke, only that which we perceive through our
senses can be considered knowledge; all else is mere
belief (Wolterstorff, 1996).
“Empiricisms” and “rationalisms.” Both
Descartes’s and Locke’s accounts of rationalism and
empiricism, respectively, influenced the development of other derivations of these theories resulting in various rationalisms and empiricisms. For
example, one philosophical movement inspired by
Locke’s empiricism was logical positivism, which
began in the 1920s and flourished until the 1950s.
These “radical empiricists” believed that knowledge was traceable to elements of experience and,
therefore, must be verifiable through experience or
observation (Audi, 1999). The verifiability criterion
reflected radical empiricists’ view that ideas are
composed of simple, traceable elements in experience. Radical empiricists argued that if thoughts
(i.e., what they called mentalistic expressions) about
the empirical world are developed from ideas, then
all thoughts about the world must represent some
form of experience. Thus, verification of knowledge
occurs when those thoughts can be observed.
Take, for example, that Megan sees a table in
front of her. For that table to be meaningful, it must
be possible for Megan to accumulate evidence or
justification that would guarantee the existence of
the table, which would make it impossible for the
table not to exist. As another example, let us say that
198
Paula believes that all swans are white. To justify
this belief as knowledge, Paula must confirm that
all swans are white by looking for white swans.
When she sees several white swans in a row, she
has justified this belief with confirmatory evidence.
Of course, this type of justification is vulnerable to
many objections, as it is doubtful that any set of
observations could ever conclusively verify them.
Given the weakness of the extreme version of the
verification principle, most logical positivists
adopted a foundationalist epistemology, wherein all
justified beliefs rely on beliefs that are noninferentially justified. Noninferentially justified beliefs
include beliefs that are described as basic or selfevident; they do not require further justification and
are merely accepted as knowledge without justification. This foundationalism drove most positivists to
adopt an extreme reductionism, the view that very
complex statements about the physical world could
be reduced to their constituent parts, which could
be expressed as statements about sensations (Audi,
1999). These statements, in turn, represent mentalist expressions, or thoughts, which can be further
reduced to human behavior.
Thus, logical positivists who reduced talk to
human behavior were known as logical behaviorists
(see Figure 8.2 for placement of logical behaviorism
along the epistemic vector space). These logical
behaviorists further claimed that statements containing mentalistic expressions can be translated
into some publicly testable and verifiable statements
that describe behavior and bodily processes. Accordingly, logical behaviorism, and logical positivism in
general, undergirded psychology’s scientific behaviorism, which was first proposed by Watson and
later expanded by Skinner (Audi, 1999).
According to Packer and Addison (1989),
although Descartes’s and Locke’s accounts of the
nature of knowledge, and variations of them, seem
at opposite ends of the spectrum, they share
assumptions about knowledge. The first commonality is a dualistic view of the mind and world as two
distinct bodies. The second commonality is a belief
that they had identified the genuine source of
knowledge and that physical science provided a
clear and satisfactory model for all analytical
inquiry. Differences, however, can also be clearly
Knowledge and Knowing
Existentialism
Structuralism
Coherentism
Foundationalism
Contextualism and Pragmatism
Direct Realism
That is, rationalists argued for a construction of
knowledge that was built on the creation of meaning
through the use of formal mathematical equations
and representations (e.g., syntax) rather than
through individuals’ experiences. Illustrations of
these formal abstractions continue today, as can be
seen in the following mathematical representation of
the human respiratory control system by the Henderson–Hasselbalch equation, which describes the
relationship between pH (the acidity of a solution),
carbon dioxide concentration, and the salts of carbonic acid:
pH = pK ⫹ log(HCO3⫺)/(CO2)
Logical
Positivism/Behaviorism
Postmodernism
FIGURE 8.2. The positioning of philosophical theories within epistemic vector space formed by the intersection of positions on questions regarding the source
of knowledge (horizontal axis) and where knowledge
resides (vertical axis). From “Bridging the Cognitive
and Sociocultural Approaches in Conceptual Change
Research: Unnecessary Foray or Unachievable Feat?” by
P. A. Alexander, 2007, Educational Psychologist, 42, p.
68. Copyright 2007 by Taylor & Francis, http://www.
tandf.co.uk/journals. Adapted with permission.
articulated. For example, empiricists like Locke
assumed that the process of scientific inquiry was
value free, interpretation free, and uninfluenced by
human concerns or practices. Its primary goal was
to discover lawful generalizations about events in an
objective universe. Empiricists argued that the foundation for scientific inquiry lies in the form of independent entities with absolute properties,
unquestionable observables that are mapped directly
onto the senses. They further contended that the
structure of knowledge includes statements of regularities among data that are in the form of causal
laws. If these structures correspond with reality,
then they are justified knowledge.
In contrast, rationalists like Descartes attempted
to restructure human knowledge and experience
into formalistic abstractions that give greater credence to those formal syntactical structures than to
the experiences themselves (Triadafillidis, 1998).
Rationalists also believed that mathematical representations of knowledge could illuminate the structure and function of the universe and bring order to
the chaos and insecurity of human existence by
translating the real world into the arithmetical. Their
dependence on such formalism was a result of their
belief that the senses can be deceiving (e.g., we can
hallucinate). That is, rationalists argued that because
the senses can be deceiving, we may be misled to
believe that sensory qualities mistakenly represent
real qualities, which would not lead to knowledge.
Thus, the underlying structure of knowledge is
assumed to be formal, written in the form of mathematical axioms and principles, and composed of syntactical rules and elements (Triadafillidis, 1998). For
rationalists, the foundation of knowledge includes
formal structures underlying appearances, and justification is provided by consistent procedures of formal logic (Packer & Addison, 1989).
A priori and a posteriori knowledge. The debates
between rationalists like Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz, and empiricists like Locke, Berkeley, and
Hume, continued throughout the 17th and 18th
centuries. A primary concern at the time was what
counted as genuine knowledge (Moser, 1996).
Rationalists contended that all genuine knowledge is
a priori, whereas empiricists argued that all knowledge was a posteriori. A priori knowledge is that
which is independent of experience. Within this
position, a belief is justified a priori if its epistemic
justification does not depend on any sensory,
introspective, or other type of sensory experience.
199
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
Moreover, for the acquisition of knowledge, an a
priori concept or idea is one that is not derived from
experience and does not require any experience for
that concept or idea to be realized; rather, concepts
are innate (i.e., inborn; BonJour, 1998).
In contrast to a priori knowledge, knowledge
that is considered a posteriori (i.e., empirical)
depends on external experience. From this perspective, a belief is justified if its epistemic justification is
contingent on experience. Experience may include
sensory or introspective experience as well as kinesthetic experience. Similarly, a posteriori or empirical
knowledge is a concept or idea that is derived
directly from experience via a process of abstraction
(BonJour, 1998).
the mind does not passively receive sense data but
instead actively assimilates and structures that data.
Individuals, therefore, know objective reality to the
extent that reality conforms to the fundamental
structures of the mind. From this, Kant declared
that there were two independent and equally necessary sources of knowledge: intuition (i.e., the sensory aspect of experience) and understanding (i.e.,
the faculty of concepts and judgment). He argued
that knowledge results from the organization of
perceptual data on the basis of inborn or innate cognitive structures, called categories, which include
space, time, objects, and causality. These categories,
which exist a priori, therefore structure all perceptions (deVries, 1991).
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: Unifying rationalism and empiricism. Near the end of the 18th
century, Kant aimed at reconciling modern empiricism and rationalism by bringing them together to
form one coherent framework. In his Critique of Pure
Reason, Kant (1781/1998) viewed both positions
as inherently wrong and argued that both made a
similar mistake. Specifically, both schools of thought
assumed there was only one source of knowledge.
The rationalists intellectualized sensation, treating
sensation and perception as confused episodes of
thought, whereas the empiricists sensationalized
thought, treating pure thought as instances of weak
perception. Like many empiricists, Kant distrusted
the rationalists’ declarations of knowledge about
the natural world being based solely on speculative rationalist accounts. To him, claims based on
pure reason could as readily be contradicted by
logical argument as they could be supported by logical argument (Tarnas, 1991). However, like many
rationalists, Kant believed that anything that existed
beyond sensory experience, such as God or the
infinity of the universe, was inevitably entangled in
a contradiction or illusion.
To reconcile these two positions, Kant’s solution
was to propose that Descartes’s mind–world dualism was indeed vindicate but not as originally presumed. Rather, the mind–world correspondence
could be conceived of in a critical sense, wherein the
natural world was a world already ordered by the
mind’s own cognitive apparatus. In this regard,
The consequences of Kant’s revolution. According
to Tarnas (1991), the epistemological consequences
of Kant’s reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism had a profound influence not only on philosophy but also on science, religion, metaphysics,
and the modern mind. First, Kant had rejoined
the knower and the known, which were previously treated as distinct entities. This marriage of
the knower and the known, however, resulted in a
divorce between the knower and objective reality, to
the object itself. In this regard, individuals had no
way of knowing whether knowledge had some fundamental relation to a universal reality or whether
it was merely a human reality. Knowledge was now
viewed as necessarily subjective and limited to the
phenomenal; individuals no longer had insight into
the transcendent or into any such world.
A second long-term consequence of Kant’s position was that it repositioned the individual from the
center of the universe to the genuine cognition of that
universe. That is, Kant placed individuals back to the
center of their universe by virtue of the mind’s central
role in constructing knowledge. By doing so, Kant
humanized science but removed it from any certain
foundation of knowledge independent of the human
mind. Knowledge was now grounded in the human
mind, ennobling it as the new epistemological center.
Despite this shift, it also became apparent that because
knowledge was subjectively constructed, it was relative to the intellectual certainties of other eras and to
the world itself (Tarnas, 1991). The result was a rude
200
Knowledge and Knowing
awakening: Kant had effectively eliminated any pretensions of certain knowledge. Knowledge was no
longer absolute and timeless, and the mind could no
longer be relied on as an accurate judge of reality.
Subsequent philosophical developments now had
to take this epistemological shift into consideration.
From this point on, philosophy was largely concerned
with the clarification of epistemological problems, the
analysis of language, the philosophy of science, and
the analysis of human experience. The philosophical
enterprise was redirected toward the analysis of linguistic problems and scientific and logical propositions. We describe these contemporary philosophical
positions on knowledge and knowing next.
Contemporary Stances on Knowledge
and Knowing: 1800 AD to the Present
Our knowledge is a receding mirage in an
expanding desert of ignorance. (Durant,
n.d., para. 2)
According to Tarnas (1991), by the 19th and 20th
centuries, science was thought to be the only discipline that could rescue the Kantian mind from
uncertainty. During this time, science achieved a
golden age with widespread institutional and academic research, and with practical applications proliferating with the integration of science and
technology. Optimism grew with regard to the
resurgence of the certainty of knowledge, particularly as the scientific method improved its precision
in measurement and explanatory powers. The consequences of Kant’s epistemological revolution
seemed to have come to an end, and a new sense of
intellectual progress emerged. Misconceptions and
ignorance of past eras were left behind, and new
philosophical positions about knowledge and knowing were born. Two of the influential stances that
emerged during this time were foundationalism and
coherentism. Although variants of each framework
have been identified, there are common central
tenets for each, which we highlight here.
Traditional foundationalism. The central thesis
of traditional foundationalism is the claim that certain beliefs, called basic beliefs, have some degree of
epistemic justification; they do not depend on the
justification of other beliefs but are somehow intrin-
sically justified (BonJour, 1978). These noninferential
(i.e., foundational) beliefs form the foundation on
which all other knowledge rests. As Steup and Sosa
(2005) highlighted, there are three features of basic
beliefs: They are noninferential, they must be justified, and they include a nondoxastic justification.
First, by definition, they cannot be inferential beliefs
because otherwise they would not be basic beliefs.
Second, these beliefs must be justified because otherwise they could not serve as the justifier for all
other nonbasic beliefs. However, the justification of
these beliefs must be nondoxastic; that is, justification must come from a source other than beliefs.
Traditional foundationalist perspectives simply
assumed these basic beliefs were justified intuitively
or by some act of God.
As an example, let us say that we believe that
Socrates was a person and that all people are mortal.
From this, we might form a new belief that Socrates
was mortal. If our two existing beliefs, that Socrates
was a person and people are mortal, were themselves justified, then via this inference, we have
acquired a newly justified belief (i.e., Socrates was
mortal). At some point, of course, one cannot possibly justify all beliefs via other beliefs (i.e., a doxastic
justification). This necessitates the need for nondoxastic beliefs (i.e., justified via nonbeliefs), or basic
beliefs.
Another central tenet to the traditional foundationalist view is that beliefs serve as the only viable
and sufficient means of justification. Accordingly,
this view of knowledge and justification, as Descartes
proposed, can be construed as a two-tiered structure.
Variants on foundationalism differ, however, on two
aspects regarding the explanations of (a) the nature
of foundational knowledge and justification and (b)
how foundational knowledge is transferred to inferential (i.e., nonfoundational) beliefs. Descartes’s position, called radical or strong foundationalism, for
example, requires that foundational beliefs be certain,
which then guarantees the justification of the nonfoundational beliefs they support (Moser, 1996).
Traditional coherentism. Similar to traditional
foundationalism, traditional coherentist views of
knowledge agree that knowledge claims are constructed from beliefs. Because both foundationalism
201
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
and coherentism rely on beliefs for justification and
because their sources of justification are internal to
the individual, these two positions are characterized as doxastic, or considering the only viable and
sufficient means of justification as via one’s beliefs.
Coherentists disagree, however, that certain beliefs
are intrinsically justified. That is, the coherentist
thesis is that not all knowledge rests on the foundation of noninferential knowledge. Rather, in place of
Descartes’s knowledge like a foundational tree simile
to describe the structure of knowledge, coherentists characterize their position with a metaphor that
models knowledge as a ship at sea whose seaworthiness rests on how well that ship is built and held
together. In essence, coherentist theories of knowledge propose that beliefs are justified as knowledge
by their relations to other beliefs, that is, by belonging to a coherent system of beliefs (Moser, 1996).
Philosophical problems for traditional foundationalism and coherentism. Here, we consider three
philosophical conundrums that pertain to knowledge and knowledge perspectives: the epistemic
regress problem, the Gettier problem, and internalism versus externalism.
The epistemic regress problem. A major distinction between foundationalist and coherentist theories of knowledge is typically delineated in terms
of their response to the epistemic regress argument
(Moser, 1996). This argument, which originated in
Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Ross, 1951), results
in the following issue for justification. Given any
justified belief, P, this belief occurs in an evidential
chain including at least two links: (a) the evidence
or supporting link and (b) the supported link or justified belief. Evidential chains result in four possible
outcomes: circular chains, endless chains, chains
ending in unjustified beliefs, or chains anchored in
foundational beliefs that do not derive their justification from other beliefs.
The crux of the regress argument is the issue of
whether all justification could be inferential. Stated
another way, if P is justified by another justified
belief, B, then how is B allegedly justified? Also, if B
is justified by another justified belief, A, then how is
A justified? We see quickly that we have a circular
chain if A is justified by B and vice versa. Conversely,
202
for the endless chain, if each belief is justified via
another belief ad infinitum, we encounter the
epistemic regress problem (Moser, 1996).
Realistically, it is implausible for anyone to reason his or her way through this regression. To
respond to this issue, some philosophers have
argued three possibilities to end the regress: (a)
explain why an endless regress of required justifying
beliefs is not problematic, (b) demonstrate how to
end the regress, or (c) accept the skeptical position
that inferential justification is not possible. Traditionally, coherentist theories were incapable of demonstrating a satisfactory end to the regress problem,
whereas traditional foundationalists were via the
noninferential beliefs, or basic beliefs, that provide
justification for inferential beliefs (BonJour, 1978).
The Gettier problem. A second substantial issue
for both traditional foundationalist and coherentist
theories of knowledge, and all doxastic theories of
knowledge, was brought to the forefront in discussions of theories of knowledge when Gettier (1963)
published “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” In
this paper, he challenged the traditional analysis of
propositional knowledge, which claims that what
distinguishes knowledge from lucky guessing is that
it is based on some form of justification, evidence,
or supporting reason that qualifies knowledge as a
justified true belief (Bernecker & Dretske, 2007).
To demonstrate that the traditional analysis of
knowledge was inadequate, Gettier presented two
examples wherein a person has justified true belief
but lacks knowledge, both of which have the following pattern: Suppose Jordan walks into a coffee
shop and believes that he sees Avery, called P, which
happens to be false. Jordan bases his belief that
Avery is in the coffee shop, called Q, because he sees
her there. Whom he saw, however, was Avery’s twin
sister, Graysen, who was with Avery at the coffee
shop. Avery just happened to be at a table around
the corner where Jordan could not see her. In this
case, Jordan is justified in believing Q, that Avery is
at the coffee shop because he erroneously sees her
there (i.e., evidence P). Q is also true, Avery really is
at the coffee shop, but he does not know that she is
there because his belief that he sees her is false (i.e.,
he actually saw Graysen). That is, Gettier claimed
that Jordan does not know that Q given that P is
Knowledge and Knowing
actually false, ergo knowledge cannot be identified
with justified true belief. In short, the Gettier problem reveals the issue of cases in which a person has
a justified true belief but lacks knowledge.
According to Bernecker and Dretske (2007),
responses to this problem were overwhelming. Some
philosophers claimed that Gettier-style counterexamples were flawed and failed to identify some
important aspect of justification, whereas others
accepted the challenge and amended the traditional
analysis of knowledge by proposing additional conditions on knowledge designed to avoid the possibility of justification based on a false belief (i.e.,
nondoxastic theories). Still others made attempts to
change the existing conditions rather than adding
more conditions (i.e., doxastic theories).
Internalism versus externalism. Since Gettier’s
(1963) paper, nondoxastic frameworks have developed, and major revisions to traditional foundationalism and coherentism perspectives have populated
the contemporary philosophical literature. Taken as
a whole, all frameworks, whether doxastic or nondoxastic, can be divided into two positions in terms
of whether the additional or alternative conditions
for justification are based on internalism or externalism. Internalism refers to the notion that everything
necessary to provide justification for a belief must be
internal to the individual. BonJour and Sosa (2003)
argued that for internal justification, an individual
must be consciously aware of the claims, reasons, or
other evidence to be epistemically justified. In other
words, epistemic justification is internal if one can
identify directly, perhaps through reflection of one’s
mental properties or attitudes, what one is justified
in believing. For example, a flock of Canada geese
have just landed on the waterfront at Sandra’s house.
Sandra calls Dermot to tell him that the geese have
landed, which makes her joyous, as this is one sign
of the return of warmer weather. The information
that Sandra has imparted to Dermot is now knowledge of which he is aware, based on her testimony.
This knowledge is considered as justified internally;
by knowing that the geese are on her waterfront,
Dermot also knows or is aware of that knowledge on
the basis of Sandra’s testimony.
In contrast, externalists deny that such access to
internal mental states or attitudes is always available
or that individuals can always be aware of the basis
for one’s knowledge or beliefs (BonJour & Sosa,
2003). They argue that something other than mental
states must serve as justifiers of one’s knowledge.
That is, externalism stipulates that an individual is
justified in believing a proposition if and only if that
belief is produced or sustained by a process or
method that is reliable. Returning to the Canada
geese example, externalists would argue that Dermot’s belief that the geese have landed on Sandra’s
waterfront falls short of knowledge. Without external justifiers, Dermot cannot claim that he knows
anything about the geese. Why might this be the
case? Externalists would argue that Sandra might be
an unreliable source, perhaps because her eyesight is
poor (e.g., the birds were ducks not geese) or that
she is known to lie about such things (i.e., Sandra is
a compulsive liar). If, however, a journalist happened to be taking photos of the very geese that
landed at Sandra’s waterfront, and later featured
those photos in the local newspaper, then Dermot
would be justified in believing that the geese had
landed.
In summary, internalism preserves an accessibility requirement on what gives rise to justification,
whereas externalism does not. In particular, current
debates over internalism versus externalism concern
what sort of access, if any, individuals have to judge
the validity of their cognitive processes to provide
support for their beliefs. Validation of those cognitive processes is judged based on preestablished
norms. In contrast, externalists judge the validity of
cognitive processes based on external standards like
scientific theories and externally derived data
(Moser, 1996).
Contemporary modern and postmodern stances.
Today, countless contemporary theories of knowledge and knowing can be found throughout the
philosophical literature. Each one establishes its
commitment to some version of empiricism (the
majority of them adopt empiricist accounts; Tarnas,
1991), rationalism, or some combination of the two.
Each framework also adopts an internalist or externalist perspective and declares allegiance to one of
the principal stances or argues that beliefs and justification should be eliminated from considerations
203
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
of knowledge altogether. Moreover, each of the principal stances can be categorized into modernist or
postmodernist accounts of knowledge and knowing.
In its broadest sense, modernism refers to qualities pertaining to thought, character, or practice.
More specifically, it describes a set of cultural tendencies and movements that arose in Western society in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to move
away from more traditional forms of art, literature,
religion, social organization, and architecture. Traditional practices were becoming outdated with the
rise of new technologies and new social and political
conditions of an emerging industrialized society
(Tarnas, 1991). Examples of contemporary modernist stances include foundationalism, coherentism,
direct realism, probabilism, reliabilism, pragmatism,
contextualism, infinitism, structuralism, evolutionary epistemology, and virtue epistemology.
In contrast to modernism, postmodernism, literally meaning after modernism, is a reaction against
modernism and its values and assumptions. Like
modernism, postmodernism broadly refers to cultural tendencies and perspectives, with critical theory as a central point of reference. Moreover,
whereas modernism is more concerned with identity, unity, and certainty, postmodernism is often
associated with separation, uncertainty, and skepticism (Tarnas, 1991). Examples of postmodern
stances include existentialism, Marxism, feminism,
hermeneutics, poststructuralism, and postempiricist
philosophy of science (Tarnas, 1991).
Clearly, to articulate each of these principal stances
is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we delineate those that have either directly or indirectly, via
the development of other theories, influenced theories
of learning within educational psychology. These
include foundationalism, coherentism, contextualism,
pragmatism, structuralism, and postmodernist frameworks. A summary of each of these six principal
stances is presented in Table 8.2. Moreover, as
TABLE 8.2
A Summary of Contemporary Views of Knowledge
Principal stance
Views of knowledge
Justification of knowledge
Foundationalism
Knowledge is derived from beliefs. Certain beliefs
possess a degree of epistemic justification, which
does not depend on the justification of other beliefs.
Knowledge is derived from beliefs. Knowledge involves
a higher order processing of lower order information.
We certify whether that information is trustworthy in
terms of our own knowledge and experiences.
A statement or claim is considered knowledge if
a person is able to meet certain objections; the
objections must be met, and whether they are met is
relative to certain goals.
Inferential beliefs are justified via minimally
warranted noninferential beliefs or justification
via reliable nonbelief.
The entire system of beliefs is justified via its
relations to an appropriately structured system
of beliefs.
Coherentism
Contextualism
Pragmatism
Knowledge is irreducibly individual, social, fallible, and
socially constructed and cannot be separated from
doing.
Structuralism
Knowledge is organized by communication and
exchange and represents a social rationality. Social
phenomena are explained via a comprehensive
elaboration of their structures.
Knowledge is subjectively determined by multiple
factors and is tentative and fallible. Knowledge is
interpretation mediated by signs and symbols and
constituted by historically and culturally variable
predispositions.
Postmodernism
204
The objections must raise reasonable doubt
and responses to those objections must
meet the standards of the referent group.
When objections are satisfactorily met, then
knowledge is justified.
Criteria for what is considered knowledge must be
determined as a function of the goals sought,
values instantiated, its usefulness, and the
community.
Knowledge is derived by inference and deduction
from observed empirical data, not by direct
observation.
Knowledge and Knowing
mentioned previously, we position these influential
stances in epistemic vector space along the two continua (see Figure 8.2) pertaining to where knowledge
resides (i.e., in the mind or the environment) and how
knowledge is constructed (i.e., individually or
socially).
Foundationalism. Contemporary variations of
foundationalism differ on many important aspects
of knowledge, particularly on how they address the
regress problem. However, the central tenet for all
remains the same: Certain beliefs possess a degree
of epistemic justification that does not depend,
inferentially or otherwise, on the justification of
other beliefs. Rather, justification is immediate or
somehow intrinsic (BonJour, 1978). One popular
foundationalist framework, which contrasts itself
to Descartes’s strong take on basic beliefs, is called
weak or modest foundationalism; proponents
include Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Weak
foundationalism allows for certain beliefs to have
some independent epistemic justification, which
does not arise from inference or coherence. Rather,
these foundational beliefs have a low degree of warrant, insufficient by itself to satisfy the justification
condition for knowledge.
These minimally warranted beliefs must be augmented in some way if knowledge is to be achieved,
and the usual appeal is to coherence with other minimally warranted beliefs. Other appeals include justification by nonbelief, and justification by a reliable
nonbelief (e.g., perception, memory, or introspection). By combining beliefs into larger coherent systems, the degree of warrant is gradually enhanced
until knowledge is finally achieved (BonJour, 1978).
Weak foundationalism then, as presented in this
example, represents a hybrid between traditional
foundationalism and coherentism. How we position
this perspective in Figure 8.2, then, is reflective of
weak foundationalists’ belief that knowledge is
internally derived through our interactions with the
environment and stored in the mind.
Coherentism. Like contemporary foundationalism, the central tenet of coherentism and its focus
on the standard analysis of knowledge has not
changed (Lehrer, 1986). Rather, what has changed
is the content, and today, there are two kinds of
coherent theories of knowledge: those that focus
on coherence for justification and those that are
doubly coherent wherein both justification and
truth require coherence. (We focus here solely on
coherence for justification.) In response to the
epistemic regress problem, coherentists stipulate
that beliefs are not the primary locus of justification; the entire system of beliefs is justified via
their relations to an appropriately structured system of beliefs. One type of approach is explanatory
coherentism, which defines coherence as a function
of what makes for a good explanation. As BonJour
and Sosa (2003) noted, there are five features that
provide a good account of a coherent justification:
logical consistency; the extent to which the system
of beliefs is probabilistically consistent; the extent
to which inferential connections exist between
beliefs in terms of the number of connection as
well as their magnitude; the inverse of the degree
to which the system is divided into unrelated, disconnected subsystems of beliefs; and the inverse of
the degree to which the system of beliefs includes
unexplained anomalies.
As Lehrer (1986) argued, a fundamental feature of
human knowledge is that we have the capacity to discern whether the information we process by means of
our senses is to be trusted. The trustworthiness of
information is determined when the probability of
that information being veracious is high and the
probability of error is small. Moreover, coherentists
assert that it is not solely the acquisition of information but our ability to certify whether that information is trustworthy in terms of our own knowledge
and experiences that is the hallmark of human
knowledge. Such knowledge, therefore, involves a
higher order processing of lower order information,
and the essential aspect of human knowledge is that
it is metaknowledge. Given the personal metaknowledge and judgment of information aspects of a coherentist perspective, we have positioned this stance in
Figure 8.2 in the individually formed quadrant for
where knowledge is derived and in the mind for
where knowledge resides.
Contextualism. In contrast to the normative,
doxastic foundationalist and coherentist stances,
contextualism denies that there are basic beliefs that
205
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
provide justification for other inferential beliefs and
that coherence is sufficient for justification (Annis,
1996). Contextualists have argued that both these
theories fail to consider contextual parameters
essential to justification. Notable contextualists
include Dewey, Popper, Austin, and Wittgenstein
(Audi, 1999). The basic premise of contextualism
is that of a person’s ability to meet certain objections; the objections must be met, and whether they
are met is relative to certain goals. In one situation,
accepting a statement as knowledge may be reasonable, whereas in another situation, it may not be reasonable. Thus, contextualists propose two primary
epistemic goals: having true beliefs and avoiding
having false beliefs. Moreover, subgoals include simplicity, conservation of existing beliefs, and maximization of explanatory power (Annis, 1996).
Given these goals, we can now assess how a
statement may or may not be justified as knowledge.
Take the following example: If Carson claims that
some statement h is true, then we may object that
(a) Carson is not in a position to know h or (b) that
h is false. Consider (a). Suppose we ask Carson how
he knows h and that he responds by giving us various reasons e1, e2, . . . en to support the truth of h.
We may object that one of Carson’s reasons, ei, does
not provide adequate support or that all of his reasons including his responses to our subsequent
objections do not provide support, or we may be satisfied with one or more of his reasons to say that he
does not know h, that h is false (in the first two
cases), or that Carson does in fact know h. Alternatively, there may be situations (i.e., contexts)
wherein he is not required to provide support or
give reasons for his claim that h is true. For example, if he tells us that it is sunny today, we usually
do not require reasons. However, in some situations,
Carson may not be a reliable source (e.g., he says it
is sunny every day regardless of the actual weather),
so we deem him not in a position to know h.
Naturally, it would be too strong a condition to
require that a person meet all possible objections.
For example, one person may object by stating that
in some distant time, new evidence may arise as a
result of advances in our scientific knowledge,
which would call into question the truth of statement h. If Carson had to meet the objection, he
206
would have to be in a better epistemic position than
his current situation, as would the objector. As contextualists argue, this is not reasonable. Rather, any
objections that are raised must be raised in the present context with evidence that is currently available
(Annis, 1996). Moreover, any objections that are
raised must be an expression of real doubt. As
Dewey (1949/1989) noted, it is only when “jars,
hitches, breaks, blocks . . . incidents occasioning an
interruption of the smooth, straightforward course
of behavior” (p. 282) occur that doubt arises.
One final, central feature of contextualism that
we present here is the notion of the social nature of
justification. That is, when we ask if Carson is justified in believing h, this has to be considered relative
to an issue context. For example, we ask Carson, a
nonmedically trained person, what is the cause of
polio? If his response is that a virus causes polio and
that he read that information in a paper by a medical
professional, then we accept this as reasonable evidence. If, however, the context is an examination for
a medical degree, then this answer would be deemed
unacceptable and inadequate. In the examination
situation, we would expect much more than a simple response. Thus, the issue context determines the
level of understanding and knowledge that a person
must exhibit and establishes an appropriate objector
group. In our example of the examination situation,
the appropriate objector group would be medically
trained, qualified examiners.
Key to the justification of knowledge, then, is the
social information—the beliefs, information, and
theories currently available—that plays an integral
part in determining what objections will be raised
and how to respond to them, as well as what
responses the objectors will accept (Annis, 1996).
To determine whether an individual is justified in
believing something to be true, we must consider
the standards of justification of the community of
people to which that individual belongs. It follows
that justification must be naturalized given that we
cannot neglect the social practices and norms of justification of the referent group (Annis, 1996).
Because of this social influence, we position contextualism, along with pragmatism, in Figure 8.2 along
the social dimension for how knowledge is derived.
However, because of the focus on the individual, we
Knowledge and Knowing
place contextualism along the mind dimension for
where knowledge resides.
Pragmatism. One movement that influenced contextualism was that of pragmatism. Formulated by
Pierce in the early 1870s and further elaborated by
James, Dewey, and Mead around the turn of the 20th
century, pragmatism stresses the relation of theory
to praxis, knowledge and action, and facts and
values (Putnam, 1995). Emphasis on the reciprocity of knowledge and action follows from its postDarwinian understanding of human experience,
which includes cognition as a developmental process. According to pragmatists, concepts are habits
of belief, and knowledge cannot be considered true
by epistemic criteria alone; the adequacy of such criteria must be determined as a function of the goals
sought and values instantiated (Putnam, 1995).
Moreover, knowledge is confirmed in the course of
experience, which is fallible and subject to further
revision.
The pragmatic philosophy, particularly James’s
and Dewey’s views of knowledge and their criticisms
of the assumption that there should necessarily be
theories about such matters, has been interpreted by
some scholars as a reaction against the Kantian epistemological tradition (Rorty, 1996). Rather than
make philosophy a foundational discipline, James
and Dewey requested liberation of knowledge,
value, morals, beliefs, and culture from Cartesian
quests for certainty and from the Kantian grounding
of thought in a permanent ahistorical matrix. Simply
put, their pursuit was one of saying something useful about truth. That is, James and Dewey viewed
knowledge as instrumental, a device for organizing
experience. They claimed that knowledge and values, which arise in historically specific cultural situations, should be appropriated only when they
satisfactorily resolve problems and are judged worthy of keeping. Knowledge, then, is irreducibly individual and social and proposes as criteria the value it
brings, which is determined by all individuals
affected by the actual or projected outcomes (Putnam, 1995).
According to Rorty (1996), although Dewey and
James did not have specific theories of knowledge
per se, their portrayals of knowledge, truth, and
belief can be characterized as three central doctrines, which encapsulate pragmatism. First, pragmatism is antiessentialism (i.e., all things cannot be
precisely defined or described) applied to notions
like knowledge and truth. As James (1890/1950)
argued, truth does not have an essence: “There is no
property ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing. The
same property which figures as the essence of a
thing on one occasion becomes a very inessential
feature on the other” (p. 959). Given this antiessentialism, then, it is useless to be told that truth corresponds to reality. It is practice rather than theory,
and action rather than contemplation, wherein
knowledge is pragmatic (Rorty, 1996). We are more
likely to decide what to do when the contemplative
mind is presented with stimuli rather than decide
whether its representation is accurate.
A second central doctrine of pragmatism is that
there is no epistemological difference between truth
about what ought to be and truth about what is and
that the pattern of all scientific inquiry is deliberation concerning the relative attractions of various
concrete alternatives (Rorty, 1996). That is, pragmatists criticize the traditional Platonic pursuit of
describing beliefs as true via mechanical procedures,
of searching for a way to avoid deliberation and simply accepting claims as true without contemplation.
Rather, as Dewey (1929) suggested, we need to
break from the traditional “spectator theory of
knowledge” (p. 215) and the false problems to
which it gives rise. What Dewey meant by a spectator theory of knowledge is that of the passivity of the
knower before the object, or the photographic view
of knowing. To Dewey, knowing cannot be separated from doing.
The third characterization that Rorty (1996) presented as fundamental to pragmatism is the doctrine
that there are no constraints on inquiry with the
exception of conversational ones—constraints by
inquirers within our community. Like the contextualist stance, then, our cultural and social practices
are important considerations to what constitutes
knowledge, knowledge that has some pragmatic use.
Moreover, objections to that knowledge may be
raised, and knowledge is constrained to the extent
that even under the condition that all objections
raised are satisfactorily addressed, that view still
207
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
might be false. Thus, pragmatists claim that there is
no method for knowing when one has reached the
truth or when one is closer to it than before. Rather,
what is important to the pragmatist then is a sense
of community, an identification with that community wherein our intellectual heritage is heightened
when we construe the community as ours rather
than nature’s, shaped rather than found, and one
among many that have been constructed over time
and will continue to be reconstructed. Finally, as
Rorty (1996) stated, “In the end, the pragmatists tell
us, what matters is our loyalty to other human
beings clinging together against the dark, not our
hope of getting things right” (p. 225).
Structuralism. Like contextualism and pragmatism, the structuralist movement from the 1950s
through the 1970s also acknowledged the importance of the social aspect of knowledge. Influenced
by Kant’s work, structuralism is typically perceived as
deriving its organizing principles from de Saussure,
the founder of structural linguistics, which were
then further developed by Lévi-Strauss, the founder
of modern structuralism (Williams, 1999). Inspired
by Durkheim’s notion of a social fact, Saussure
viewed language as the repository of discursive
signs shared by a given linguistic community. LéviStrauss further proposed that society is organized by
communication and exchange, whether it is information, knowledge, myths, or members themselves.
The organization of social phenomena could therefore be explained via a comprehensive elaboration
of their structures, which collectively give evidence
to a deeper and all-inclusive social rationality. The
social structures are then revealed by inference and
deduction from observed empirical data (Williams,
1999). Sense data are meaningless without interpretation. Thus, the role of the individual as interpreter
of data becomes a central focus that was clearly
absent in the traditional rationalist perspective.
According to Packer and Addison (1989), the
structuralist aim is to reconstruct a competence or
deep social structure that underlies performance.
These social structures are revealed by inference and
deduction from the observed empirical data and not
by direct observation. Moreover, because these
structures are models of specific relations, which in
208
turn communicate the various properties of the
component elements in question, the structural
analysis is both readily formalizable and susceptible
to a wide range of applications. Examples of more
contemporary structuralists include Chomsky,
Piaget, and Kohlberg. For Chomsky, who studied
language; Piaget, who examined the domain of operational intelligence; and Kohlberg, who looked at
the realm of moral judgment, the aim was to provide
an orderly reconstruction that introduced intelligibility into areas pervaded by ambiguity and error
(Packer & Addison, 1989). Because of the focus on
the individual as interpreter, we position structuralism in Figure 8.2 along the mind dimension for
where knowledge resides. However, because of the
focus of social rationality and society, we have
placed this stance along the social dimension for
how knowledge is derived.
Postmodernist views. By the 1980s, a number
of individuals were discontent with contemporary
modernist and structuralist views and with the belief
that science brought the certainty of knowledge to
the world around us. In particular, two developments had occurred over the course of the 20th century, which radically changed the course of scientific
history. First, several major developments occurred
in physics, including Einstein’s general theories of
relativity and the formulation of quantum mechanics. Among others, these developments seriously
questioned the long-established certainties of
Newtonian physics (Tarnas, 1991). By the end of the
20th century, physicists were no longer able to come
to a consensus regarding how existing evidence
should be interpreted with respect to defining the
nature of reality. With relativity theory and quantum
mechanics, the certainty of the old paradigm was
shattered, and Kant’s skeptic concern over the mind’s
capacity for certain knowledge resurfaced once
again. This time, however, philosophers challenged
the Kantian tradition in its entirety, realizing that
the categories of space, time, and substance were no
longer applicable to all phenomena. Knowledge was
now standing on shaky ground.
This disenchantment that pervaded Western
Europe and North America led to discussions
beyond structuralist and modernist theories. To a
Knowledge and Knowing
greater extent than the various modern theories,
postmodernist perspectives are profoundly complex
and ambiguous, but generalizations can be made
despite their complexities. The central figure in
postmodernism was Nietzsche, who adopted a radical perspectivism, sovereign critical sensibility, and
ambivalence toward the emerging nihilism in Western culture (Tarnas, 1991). Today, postmodern
positions vary considerably depending on the context but may be considered as an open-ended, indefinite collection of attitudes shaped by various widely
known positions, including existentialism, Marxism,
feminism, and hermeneutics. Influential theorists
include Kuhn, with his conception of paradigms;
Derrida; Althusser; Baudrillard; Foucault; Nietzsche;
and Heidegger, to name a few (Audi, 1999).
Although there is little agreement on a central
tenet of postmodernism, its varieties all disagree
with foundationalism, essentialism, and realism.
That is, postmodern views are typically regarded as
antiepistemological and antirealistic and reject positions that present knowledge as accurate representations as a correspondence to reality. Postmodern
views further reject principles, final vocabularies,
and descriptions that are thought to be binding
across all times, persons, and places. In addition to
being against everything modern, postmodernists
also oppose dualisms and being labeled as relativists
and skeptics (Tarnas, 1991).
As Tarnas (1991) highlighted, other shared principles that have emerged include postmodernists’
recognition of the plasticity and constant change of
knowledge. They also stress the importance of concrete experience over fixed abstract principles and
believe that no single a priori thought system should
dominate belief or investigation. Postmodernists
have argued that knowledge is subjectively determined by multiple factors, and things in themselves
are neither comprehensible nor positable. Further,
postmodernists stress that all knowledge and
assumptions must be continually subjected to direct
testing. Those in search of advancing knowledge
must be tolerant of ambiguity and pluralism and
recognize that knowledge is tentative and fallible
rather than absolute and certain. Postmodernists
further claim that in the process of knowing, the
individual can never be disengaged from the body or
the world, and thus knowledge can never be wholly
objectified.
Moreover, postmodernists have argued that
although knowledge may be bound by innate subjective structures, with a degree of indeterminacy
and imagination, there is an element of freedom of
cognition. Thus, there is a relativized critical empiricism and a relativized rationalism; both are essential
to rigorous investigation, but neither can produce
anything absolute or foundational. All human
knowledge and understanding is interpretation,
which is mediated by signs and symbols and constituted by historically and culturally variable predispositions influenced by human interest. The human
mind cannot stand outside the world, nor can the
world exist as a thing in itself. In this regard, in Figure 8.2, we have positioned postmodernism along
the extreme ends of the environment for where
knowledge resides and is socially derived.
In summary, over the history of philosophical
thought, many views have been presented, views
that have been challenged and revised and that have
influenced the development of other theories of
knowledge and knowing. Theories have ranged from
describing knowledge as being derived from internal
sources to external sources, and from beliefs being
the focus of justification to nonbelief objects as necessary for the justification of knowledge. Philosophers have also debated whether individuals are
passive recipients of knowledge or are capable of
constructing knowledge and whether that knowledge reflects a real, objective world or a world that is
a social construction relevant only to those situated
within that context.
Finally, theories of knowledge have progressed
from describing knowledge as fixed and certain to
more contemporary explanations of knowledge as
tentative and fallible. Clearly, to define knowledge
has not been a simple task, and over the course of
history, no one position has dominated as the hegemony of knowledge. Like the philosophical literature, the history of conceptualizations of knowledge
and knowing within the educational psychology literature has also been a clashing of positions, a battle
over which theoretical orientation holds sway over
the members of the psychological community. We
describe these various positions next.
209
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
EXAMINING KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWING
THROUGH THE LENS OF LEARNING
THEORIES
In this section, we look critically at varying and even
contrasting views of knowledge and knowing that
individuals or communities of practice may espouse.
Moreover, we do so through the lens of learning theories. Our rationale for framing this more detailed
exploration of knowledge and knowing within the
context of learning theories is threefold. For one,
although we have duly acknowledged the flood of
knowledge-related terms that inundate the professional literatures within education generally and
educational psychology more particularly, scholarly
writings already exist that offer an encyclopedic
examination of these terms (Alexander et al., 1991;
de Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1996; Murphy &
Alexander, 2004; Murphy & Woods, 1996; Schraw,
2006). Thus, we find no compelling need to revisit
that well-trodden territory in this particular treatise.
Beyond this rather pragmatic rationale, however,
lies more compelling reasons for the unique
approach to the analysis of knowledge and knowing
that we take herein. In particular, as Alexander,
Murphy, and Greene (see Chapter 1, this volume)
strongly argue, a focus on human learning being a
defining feature of educational psychology since its
birth at the dawn of the 20th century remains a pillar of the discipline even today. Nonetheless, as with
the constructs of knowledge and knowing, it might
be argued that the level of understanding as to what
constitutes each of these learning theories is oftentimes not fully reflective of their complex, multifaceted nature. Indeed, it sometimes seems that the
passion and commitment with which individuals
proclaim themselves to be constructivists, socioculturalists, or not behaviorists belie the limited conceptual understandings that fuel such strong
ideological stances (Harris & Alexander, 1998).
This aforementioned paradox of high commitment and low knowledge can also come with
oversimplified notions about how learning theories represent or value the nature of knowledge or
the process of knowing and can potentially lead
to judgments that one theoretical orientation is
somehow good and another bad. Consequently,
210
by juxtaposing the discussion of knowledge and
knowing to a consideration of learning theories,
we have the goal not only of delineating the
nature of knowledge and knowing further but
also of enriching understanding about key learning theories and what assumptions about knowledge and knowing each make. It is, therefore, our
hope that those within the educational research
community and the community of practice are
better equipped to reflect critically and analytically on their own beliefs about knowledge and
knowing and how such beliefs align with their
espoused orientations toward learning.
Finally, and related to the prior rationale, it is
our contention that much is to be gained in this
chapter by examining notions about knowledge and
knowing represented in individual learning theories
(e.g., behaviorism or socioculturalism) while simultaneously positioning the collection of theories
within epistemic vector space so that their contrasting views of knowledge and knowing are more
apparent. We recognize that there are specific chapters in this volume dedicated to select learning theories, including constructivism (see Chapter 3, this
volume), information processing (see Chapter 4,
this volume), and sociocultural and situated theories
(see Chapter 6, this volume). There is also an
extended exploration of epistemology (see Chapter
9, this volume). Yet, our intention is to consolidate
and integrate these components to illuminate distinctions in the nature of knowledge and in the process of knowing that might otherwise be overlooked.
Sometimes those distinctions are subtle and not
readily identified, whereas at other times, they are in
sharp contrast.
Of course, as suggested, one of the reasons that
the differences in perspectives on knowledge and
knowing are nontransparent to the educational
researcher or practitioner is because learning theories are often dealt with in isolation, as in the case of
the current volume, or viewed antithetically (Bredo,
1996). Thus, individuals are exposed to behaviorism
with its emphasis on the conditioning of human
actions, seemingly divorced from knowledge or even
thought. This learning orientation is set against
some cognitive or constructivist perspectives, cast in
terms of information processing or as knowledge
Knowledge and Knowing
construction, which are seemingly disembodied
from human behavior. So depicted, the pivotal role
of knowledge and knowing in their differentiation is
not expressly stated, nor are any potential epistemic
similarities between these theoretical orientations
given due consideration.
Yet, it is not facilitative to cast views of learning,
or knowledge and knowing for that matter, in overly
simplistic or even dichotomous terms. Rather, from
an epistemic standpoint, one point of separation
among learning theories is the emphasis placed on
the universe within and without the human mind,
that is, within the confines of the individual’s mind
or within the sociocultural or physical context in
which that individual is situated. For instance, do
proponents of a given learning theory assume that
knowledge resides in the mind of the knower or in
the environmental context? Moreover, is their focus
within the theory on the one (i.e., the individual
mind) or the many (i.e., groups, society, or culture)? Further, how is the process of knowing conceptualized? Do adherents of learning theories
regard the mind of the individual as the sole source
of knowledge, or do they contend that all knowledge is socially derived or some amalgam of these
two polar views? In building our epistemic vector
space, we have endeavored to consider such fundamental questions about knowledge and knowing.
We have done so by casting learning theories within
the quadrants formed by two intersecting lines (see
Figure 8.3).
In what follows, we examine knowledge and
knowing within six different theoretical frameworks: behaviorism, information processing, radical
constructivism, social constructivism, socioculturalism, and situated cognition. In considering the
placement of these learning theories in our vector
space of source of knowledge X where knowledge
resides, we were forced to make several governing
decisions. For one, we have chosen to sharpen the
boundaries that exist between the various theories
to make their boundaries more apparent.
In reality, delineations and interpretations of
these theories are often more vague and fuzzier.
Further, the placement of each learning theory
should be regarded as only an approximation, an
important caveat in interpreting the discussion that
ensues. In light of the inevitable theoretical variance
among those ascribing to any given theory, it is to be
expected that there would be variability in how specific proponents of that theory would position themselves within the epistemic matrix. Our goal herein
is to focus our placements of the various theories
with an eye toward between-group differences more
than on within-group differences.
Truthfully, what is proposed in Figure 8.3—our
mapping of the six learning theories in epistemic
vector space—represents a compromise among the
authors of this chapter, a compromise reached after
prolonged discussions. We appreciate that proponents and opponents of these theoretical perspectives rarely achieve consensus when it comes to
questions about knowledge and knowing. Moreover,
formal theories, like our personal theories, are not
set in stone but are fluid and dynamic, and we fully
expect these theories to morph over time.
Radical constructivism
Information processing
Social constructivism
Socioculturalism
Behaviorism
Situated cognition
FIGURE 8.3. The positioning of six established
learning theories within epistemic vector space. From
“Bridging the Cognitive and Sociocultural Approaches
in Conceptual Change Research: Unnecessary Foray
or Unachievable Feat?” by P. A. Alexander, 2007,
Educational Psychologist, 42, p. 68. Copyright 2007 by
Taylor & Francis, http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals.
Adapted with permission.
211
Murphy, Alexander, and Muis
Behaviorism
Skinner’s reconceptualization of “knowledge” can be stated simply as that knowing is behaving, and it exists, as any other
behavior, only as it occurs. (McCorkle,
1978, p. 46)
Countless volumes on learning theory o...
Purchase answer to see full
attachment