PHIL 311 Professional Ethics Spring 2021 Final Exam Below are the essay prompts for your final exam. You should submit one document – 3.5 pages total – that contain both answers (choose one from the first set, and you must answer the second). Be sure to identify which prompt you are responding to at the start of each answer. First Essay Prompts: Pick 1 of 2 (40 points total). Limit your answer to the prompt you choose to 1.5 pages. You can offer supporting quotes from relevant readings, but be sure to provide in-text citations for those quotes. You do not need to provide a full reference, provided you are using readings assigned for class. Be conscientious of basic essay writing format (include a basic thesis, along with relevant paragraph breaks). Prompt 1: Whistleblowing & Responsibility Compare and contrast the two justifications for whistleblowing (the standard theory and the complicity theory, from Davis) - what are their central similarities and differences? Which view is stronger, and why? Be precise; explain with reference to an example from one of the readings from your professional case studies assigned in class. Prompt 2: Responsibility in the Profession Explain the argument for why professionals should still have ethical responsibility despite lacking full knowledge (from Luban). Then, give two of the five obligations to prevent harm, explaining and applying both in the context of one of the readings for your professional case studies assigned in class. Second Essay Prompt: Must answer the following prompt (60 points). Limit your answer to 2 pages. You can offer supporting quotes from relevant readings, but be sure to provide in-text citations for those quotes. You do not need to provide a full reference, provided you are using readings assigned for class. Be conscientious of basic essay writing format (include a basic thesis, along with relevant paragraph breaks). Prompt 3: Ethically Responsible Professionals Drawing from the ideas we explored through the course, present an argument that answers the following question: what are the four MOST important aspects to being an ethically responsible professional? Address this question in terms of obligations to others (the people in need of expertise), and in terms of obligation to self (the person who maintains a sense of personal integrity within a structure that may make such ethical practice difficult). Present an ARGUMENT for why these four are the MOST important (you will need to be able to explain them with reference to supporting sources, and defend their importance). Personal, Professional, and Institutional Obligations WHISTLEBLOWING I* Sissela Bok Written by a prominent authority on applied ethics, this selection discusses the moral conflicts involved in employees “going public” with information about misconduct in their own organizations. Bok sees the problem of whistleblowing essentially in terms of clashes between personal and group loyalties and public interests. “Whistleblowing” is a new label generated by our increased awareness of the ethical conflicts encountered at work. Whistleblowers sound an alarm from within the very organization in which they work, aiming to spotlight neglect or abuses that threaten the public interest. The stakes in whistleblowing are high. Take the nurse who alleges that physicians enrich themselves in her hospital through unnecessary surgery; the engineer who dis closes safety defects in the braking systems of a fleet of new rapid-transit vehicles; the Defense Department official who alerts Congress to military graft and overspend ing: All know that they pose a threat to those whom they denounce and that their own careers may be at risk.. Moral Conflicts Moral conflicts on several levels confront anyone who is wondering whether to speak out about abuses or risks or serious neglect. In the first place, he must try to decide whether, other things being equal, speaking out is in fact in the public interest. This choice is often made more complicated by factual uncertainties: Who is responsible for the abuse or neglect? How great is the threat? And how likely is it that speaking out will precipitate changes for the better? In the second place, a would-be whistleblower must weigh his responsibility to serve the public interest against the responsibility he owes to his colleagues and the institution in which he works. While the professional ethic requires collegial loyalty, the codes of ethics often stress responsibility to the public over and above duties to colleagues and clients. Thus the United States Code of Ethics for Government Servants asks them to “expose corruption wherever uncovered” and to “put loyalty to the highest moral principles and to country above loyalty to persons, party, or government.” Similarly, the largest professional engineering association re quires members to speak out against abuses threatening the safety, health, and welfare of the public.† * † References have been deleted without indication. For the Code of Ethics of the National Society of Professional Engineering, see Appendix II in this book. From Sissela Bok, “Wiistleblowing and Professional Responsibility,” in the New York University Education Quarterly 11:4 (1980): 2-10. Reprinted by permission. A third conflict for would-be whistle- blowers is personal in nature and cuts across the first two: Even in cases where they have concluded that the facts warrant speaking out, and that their duty to do so overrides loyalties to colleagues and institutions, they often have reason to fear the results of carrying out such a duty. How ever strong this duty may seem in theory, they know that, in practice, retaliation is likely. As a result, their careers and their ability to support themselves and their families may be unjustly impaired. A government handbook issued during the Nixon era recommends reassigning “undesirables” to places so remote that they would prefer to resign. Whistleblowers may also be downgraded or given work without responsibility or work for which they are not qualified; or else they may be given many more tasks than they can possibly perform. Another risk is that an outspoken civil servant may be ordered to undergo a psychiatric fitness-for-duty examination, declared unfit for service, and “separated” as well as discredited from the point of view of any allegations he may be making. Outright firing, finally, is the most direct institutional response to whistleblowers. Add to the conflicts confronting individual whistleblowers the claim to selfpolicing that many professions make, and professional responsibility is at issue in still another way. For an appeal to the public goes against everything that “self-policing” stands for. The question for the different professions, then, is how to resolve, insofar as it is possible, the conflict between professional loyalty and professional responsibility toward the outside world. The same conflicts arise to some extent in all groups, but professional groups often have special cohesion and claim special dignity and privileges. The plight of whistleblowers has come to be documented by the press and de scribed in a number of books. Evidence of the hardships imposed on those who chose to act in the public interest has combined with a heightened awareness of professional malfeasance and corruption to pro duce a shift toward greater public support of whistleblowers. Public service law firms and consumer groups have taken up their cause; institutional reforms and legislation have been proposed to combat illegitimate reprisals. Given the indispensable services per formed by so many whistleblowers, strong support is often merited. But the new climate of acceptance makes it easy to over look the dangers of whistleblowing: of uses in error or in malice; of work and reputations unjustly lost for those falsely accused; of privacy invaded and trust under-mined. There comes a level of internal prying and mutual suspicion at which no institution can function. And it is a fact that the disappointed, the incompetent, the malicious, and the paranoid all too often leap to accusations in public. Worst of all, ideological persecution throughout the world traditionally relies on insiders willing to inform on their colleagues or even on their family members, often through staged public denunciations or press campaigns. No society can count itself immune from such dangers. But neither can it risk silencing those with a legitimate reason to blow the whistle. How then can we distinguish between different instances of whistleblowing? A society that fails to protect the right to speak out even on the part of those whose warnings turn out to be spurious obviously opens the door to political repression. But from the moral point of view there are important differences between the aims, messages, and methods of dissenters from within. Nature of Whistleblowing Three elements, each jarring, and triply jarring when conjoined, lend acts of whistleblowing special urgency and bitterness: dissent, breach of loyalty, and accusation. Like all dissent, whistleblowing makes public a disagreement with an authority or a majority view. But whereas dissent can concern all forms of disagreement with, for instance, religious dogma or government policy or court decisions, whistle- blowing has the narrower aim of shedding light on negligence or abuse, or alerting to a risk, and of assigning responsibility for this risk. Would-be whistleblowers confront the conflict inherent in all dissent: between conforming and sticking their necks out. The more repressive the authority they challenge, the greater the personal risk they take in speaking out. At exceptional times, as in times of war, even ordinarily tolerant authorities may come to regard dissent as unacceptable and even disloyal. Furthermore, the whistleblower hopes to stop the game; but since he is neither referee nor coach, and since he blows the whistle on his own team, his act is seen as a violation of loyalty. In holding his position, he has assumed certain obligations to his colleagues and clients. He may even have subscribed to a loyalty oath or a promise of confidentiality. Loyalty to colleagues and to clients comes to be pitted against loyalty to the public interest, to those who may be injured unless the revelation is made. Not only is loyalty violated in whistle- blowing, hierarchy as well is often opposed, since the whistleblower is not only a colleague but a subordinate. Though aware of the risks inherent in such disobedience, he often hopes to keep his job. At times, however, he plans his alarm to coincide with leaving the institution. If he is highly placed, or joined by others, resigning in protest may effectively direct public attention to the wrongdoing at issue. Still an other alternative, often chosen by those who wish to be safe from retaliation, is to leave the institution quietly, to secure an other post, and then to blow the whistle. In this way, it is possible to speak with the authority and knowledge of an insider with out having the vulnerability of that position. It is the element of accusation, of calling a “foul,” that arouses the strongest reactions on the part of the hierarchy. The accusation may be of neglect, of willfully concealed dangers, or of outright abuse on the part of colleagues or superiors. It singles out specific persons or groups as responsible for threats to the public interest. If no one could be held responsible — as in the case of an impending avalanche — the warning would not constitute whistleblowing. The accusation of the whistleblower, moreover, concerns a present or an imminent threat. Past errors or misdeeds occasion such an alarm only if they still affect current practices. And risks far in the future lack the immediacy needed to make the alarm a compelling one, as well as the close connection to particular individuals that would justify actual accusations. Thus an alarm can be sounded about safety defects in a rapid-transit system that threaten or will shortly threaten passengers, but the revelation of safety defects in a system no longer in use, while of historical interest, would not constitute whistleblowing. Nor would the revelation of potential problems in a system not yet fully designed and far from implemented. Not only immediacy, but also specificity, is needed for there to be an alarm capable of pinpointing responsibility. A concrete risk must be at issue rather than a vague foreboding or a somber prediction. The act of whistleblowing differs in this respect from the lamentation or the dire prophecy. An immediate and specific threat would normally be acted upon by those at risk. The whistleblower assumes that his message will alert listeners to something they do not know, or whose significance they have not grasped because it has been kept secret. The desire for openness inheres in the temptation to reveal any secret, sometimes joined to an urge for self-aggrandizement and publicity and the hope for revenge for past slights or injustices. There can be plea sure, too — righteous or malicious — in laying bare the secrets of co-workers and in setting the record straight at last. Col leagues of the whistleblower often suspect his motives: they may regard him as a crank, as publicityhungry, wrong about the facts, eager for scandal and discord, and driven to indiscretion by his personal biases and shortcomings. For whistleblowing to be effective, it must arouse its audience. Inarticulate whistleblowers are likely to fail from the outset. When they are greeted by apathy, their message dissipates. When they are greeted by disbelief, they elicit no response at all. And when the audience is not free to receive or to act on the information — when censorship or fear of retribution stifles response — then the message rebounds to injure the whistleblower. Whistleblowing also requires the possibility of concerted public response: The idea of whistleblowing in an anarchy is therefore merely quixotic. Such characteristics of whistleblowing and strategic considerations for achieving an impact are common to the noblest warnings, the most vicious personal attacks, and the delusions of the paranoid. How can one distinguish the many acts of sounding an alarm that are genuinely in the public interest from all the petty, biased, or lurid revelations that pervade our querulous and gossip-ridden society? Can we draw distinctions between different whistleblowers, different messages, different methods? We clearly can, in a number of cases. Whistleblowing may be starkly inappropriate when in malice or error, or when it lays bare legitimately private matters having to do, for instance, with political belief or sexual life. It can, just as clearly, be the only way to shed light on an ongoing unjust practice such as drugging political prisoners or subjecting them to electroshock treatment. It can be the last resort for alerting the public to an impending disaster. Taking such clearcut cases as bench marks, and reflecting on what it is about them that weighs so heavily for or against speaking out, we can work our way toward the admittedly more complex cases in which whistleblowing is not so clearly the right or wrong choice, or where different points of view exist regarding its legitimacy — cases where there are moral reasons both for concealment and for disclosure and where judgments conflict. Consider the following cases: 1. As a construction inspector for a federal agency, John Samuels (not his real name) had personal knowledge of shoddy and deficient construction practices by private con tractors. He knew his superiors received free vacations and entertainment, had their homes remodeled and found jobs for their relatives — all courtesy of a private contractor. These superiors later approved a multimillion no-bid contract with the same “generous” firm. Samuels also had evidence that other firms were hiring nonunion laborers at a low wage while receiving substantially higher payments from the government for labor costs. A former superior, unaware of an office dicta- phone, had incautiously instructed Samuels on how to accept bribes for overlooking sub- par performance.As he prepared to volunteer this information to various members of Congress, he became tense and uneasy. His family was scared and the fears were valid. It might cost Samuels thousands of dollars to protect his job. Those who had freely provided Samuels with information would probably recant or withdraw their friendship. A number of people might object to his using a Dictaphone to gather information. His agency would start covering up and vent its collective wrath upon him. As for reporters and writers, they would gather for a few days, then move on to the next story. He would be left without a job, with fewer friends, with massive battles looming, and without the financial means of fighting them. Samuels decided to remain silent. 2. Engineers of Company “A” prepared plans and specifications for machinery to be used in a manufacturing process and Company “A” turned them over to Company “B” for production. The engineers of Company “B,” in reviewing the plans and specifications, came to the conclusion that they included certain miscalculations and technical deficiencies of a nature that the final product might be unsuitable for the purposes of the ultimate users, and that the equipment, if built ac cording to the original plans and specifications, might endanger the lives of persons in proximity to it. The engineers of Company “B” called the matter to the attention of appropriate officials of their employer who, in turn, advised Company “A.” Company “A” replied that its engineers felt that the design and specifications for the equipment were adequate and safe and that Company “B” should proceed to build the equipment as designed and specified. The officials of Company “B” instructed its engineers to proceed with the work. 3. A recently hired assistant director of ad missions in a state university begins to wonder whether transcripts of some applicants accurately reflect their accomplishments. He knows that it matters to many in the university community, including alumni, that the football team continue its winning tradition. He has heard rumors that surrogates may be available to take tests for a fee, signing the names of designated applicants for admission, and that some of the transcripts may have been altered. But he has no hard facts. When he brings the question up with the director of admissions, he is told that the rumors are unfounded and asked not to inquire further into the matter. Individual Moral Choice What questions might those who consider sounding an alarm in public ask them selves? How might they articulate the problem they see and weigh its injustice before deciding whether or not to reveal it? How can they best try to make sure their choice is the right one? In thinking about these questions it helps to keep in mind the three elements mentioned earlier: dissent, breach of loyalty, and accusation. They impose certain requirements — of accuracy and judgment in dissent; of exploring alter native ways to cope with improprieties that minimize the breach of loyalty; and of fair ness in accusation. For each, careful articulation and testing of arguments are needed to limit error and bias. Dissent by whistleblowers, first of all, is expressly claimed to be intended to benefit the public. It carries with it, as a result, an obligation to consider the nature of this benefit and to consider also the possible harm that may come from speaking out: harm to persons or institutions and, ultimately, to the public interest itself. Whistleblowers must, therefore, begin by making every effort to consider the effects of speaking out versus those of remaining silent. They must assure themselves of the accuracy of their reports, checking and rechecking the facts before speaking out; specify the degree to which there is genuine impropriety; consider how imminent is the threat they see, how serious, and how closely linked to those accused of neglect and abuse. If the facts warrant whistleblowing, how can the second element — breach of loyalty — be minimized? The most important question here is whether the existing avenues for change within the organization have been explored. It is a waste of time for the public as well as harmful to the institution to sound the loudest alarm first. Whistleblowing has to remain a last alter native because of its destructive side effects: It must be chosen only when other alter natives have been considered and rejected. They may be rejected if they simply do not apply to the problem at hand, or when there is not time to go through routine channels, or when the institution is so corrupt or coercive that steps will be taken to silence the whistleblower should he try the regular channels first. What weight should an oath or a promise of silence have in the conflict of loyalties? One sworn to silence is doubtless under a stronger obligation because of the oath he has taken. He has bound himself, assumed specific obligations beyond those assumed in merely taking a new position. But even such promises can be overridden when the public interest at issue is strong enough. They can be overridden if they were obtained under duress or through deceit. They can be overridden, too, if they promise something that is in itself wrong or unlawful. The fact that one has promised silence is no excuse for complicity in covering up a crime or a violation of the public’s trust. The third element in whistleblowing — accusation — raises equally serious ethical concerns. They are concerns of fairness to the persons accused of impropriety. Is the message one to which the public is entitled in the first place? Or does it infringe on personal and private matters that one has no right to invade? Here, the very notion of what is in the public’s best “interest” is at issue: “Accusations” regarding an official’s unusual sexual or religious experiences may well appeal to the public’s interest without being information relevant to “the public interest.” Great conflicts arise here. We have witnessed excessive claims to executive privilege and to secrecy by government officials during the Watergate scandal in order to cover up for abuses the public had every right to discover. Conversely, those hoping to profit from prying into private matters have become adept at invoking “the public’s right to know.” Some even regard such private matters as threats to the public: they voice their own religious and political prejudices in the language of accusation. Such a danger is never stronger than when the accusation is delivered surreptitiously. The anonymous accusations made during the McCarthy period regarding political beliefs and associations often injured per sons who did not even know their accusers or the exact nature of the accusations. From the public’s point of view, accusations that are openly made by identifiable individuals are more likely to be taken seriously. And in fairness to those criticized, openly accepted responsibility for blowing the whistle should be preferred to the denunciation or the leaked rumor. What is openly stated can more easily be checked, its source’s motives challenged, and the underlying information examined. Those under attack may otherwise be hard put to defend themselves against nameless adversaries. Often they do not even know that they are threatened until it is too late to respond. The anonymous denunciation, moreover, common to so many regimes, places the burden of investigation on government agencies that may thereby gain the power of a secret police. From the point of view of the whistle- blower, on the other hand, the anonymous message is safer in situations where retaliation is likely. But it is also often less likely to be taken seriously. Unless the message is accompanied by indications of how the evidence can be checked, its anonymity, however safe for the source, speaks against it. During this process of weighing the legitimacy of speaking out, the method used, and the degree of fairness needed, whistleblowers must try to compensate for the strong possibility of bias on their part. They should be scrupulously aware of any motive that might skew their message: a desire for self-defense in a difficult bureaucratic situation, perhaps, or the urge to seek revenge, or inflated expectations regarding the effect their message will have on the situation. (Needless to say, bias affects the silent as well as the outspoken. The motive for holding back important information about abuses and injustice ought to give similar cause for soul-searching.) Likewise, the possibility of personal gain from sounding the alarm ought to give pause. Once again there is then greater risk of a biased message. Even if the whistieblower regards himself as incorruptible, his profiting from revelations of neglect or abuse will lead others to question his motives and to put less credence in his charges. If, for example, a government employee stands to make large profits from a book exposing the iniquities in his agency, there is danger that he will, perhaps even un consciously, slant his report in order to cause more of a sensation. A special problem arises when there is a high risk that the civil servant who speaks out will have to go through costly litigation. Might he not justifiably try to make enough money on his public revelations — say, through books or public speaking — to off set his losses? In so doing he will not strictly speaking have profited from his revelations: he merely avoids being financially crushed by their sequels. He will nevertheless still be suspected at the time of revelation, and his message will therefore seem more questionable. Reducing bias and error in moral choice often requires consultation, even open de bate: methods that force articulation of the moral arguments at stake and challenge privately held assumptions. But acts of whistleblowing present special problems when it comes to open consultation. On the one hand, once the whistleblower sounds his alarm publicly, his arguments will be subjected to open scrutiny: He will have to articulate his reasons for speaking out and substantiate his charges. On the other hand, it will then be too late to retract the alarm or to combat its harmful effects, should his choice to speak out have been ill-advised. For this reason, the whistleblower owes it to all involved to make sure of two things: that he has sought as much and as objective advice regarding his choice as he can before going public; and that he is aware of the arguments for and against the practice of whistleblowing in general, so that he can see his own choice against as richly detailed and coherently structured a background as possible. Satisfying these two requirements once again has special problems because of the very nature of whistleblowing: the more corrupt the circumstances, the more dangerous it may be to seek consultation be fore speaking out. And yet, since the whistleblower himself may have a biased view of the state of affairs, he may choose not to consult others when in fact it would be not only safe but advantageous to do so; he may see corruption and conspiracy where none exists. Chapter 1 r TheNatureof Morality 45 ;tions .at business and ,f amoral busir mJth? Do you ,ct the "Three much unethical rday?What hapBreakers?Can is scum" underinesspeople are ; is a practice r" in businesstorgedin anyway? rere is notling ificing the botble with his rantee tfrat ne" (p.40)? ReadingMORAL RNSPoNSIBILITY IN THE ACN OF BUREAUCRACY Devro LuneN,Ar-eNSrnuor,en, eNo DevroWassnnuaN Large bureutcratic organizafiors frequently d;Iute an indioid.ual\ serce of moral responslbl,llty, and mernbersof such mganizntions are oll too likely to acquizscein organizational misconduct. Orle reasonfor this is that irsid.e the organization krwwledge can be sofragwnted that an lndloldad nuy be partially or whally igwrant of ushatthz mganizntion is doing. Daoid Luban, Nan Strudle4 and Daoid Wassermand.anhw thb problem. Whcreas most moral theoriesprewppose that thc moral agent krwtos that a ilzcision mtst be made and uhat clloices are aoailabl.e,these wtlwrs erplore tltz moral resporxibilitizs of indfui&tals in organizatinnal sihtotions in uhbh they lack thls krcutbdge. such supposedly independent professionals as physicians and lawyers practice in large organizations to an ever-increasingextent. The HMO has replaced the family physician,and the new graduates of today'slaw schoolsjoin firms, of which the largest now employ over a thousand lawyers, rather than h*gng out a shingle. The problems of professional and businessethics have thus become the problems of supervisorsand subordinatesin organizational settings. Indeed, in a culture such as ours, where our first question to each other is often not "How do you do?" but "What do you do?" the ethics of the workplace has enormous impact on how we think of morality in general. To a great extent, ethics in the organizational setting has come to define ethics as a whole. We speakof team players and loose cannons, leaders and followers, as categories of moral judgmeni and not simply of social description. The Organization Man and the Other-DirectedSociety The transformatior: of the workplace appears to have wrought a transformation in values, replacing individual responsibility and internal norms with group identiffcation and external norms. As the postwar American economy assumedits contemBACKGROUND OFTHEPROBLEM porary form, several leading social scientists and The bureaucratic fragmentation of knowledge and commentators explored the psychologyof "The Ordilution of responsibfuty are pervasive phenimena ganization Man," in the famous title of William H. in modern society.To set the stagefor our analysis, Whyte's book. Whyte used this term to describe we first describe the scope of the problem and "the ones of our middle classwho have left home, briefly review some of the research, commentary spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of and debate it has provoked. We conclude this back- organization li[e."r He ascribed to them the "social ground section by discussingthe researchmost rele- EtlLic," which includes "a belief in the group as the vant to our own concerns, the Milgram studies of source of creativity" as well as "a belief in 'belongdestructive obedience to authoritv. ingness'asthe uliimate need of the individual,;2 David Riesman described middle-classAmericans as a "Loneiy Crowd," and elaborated a famous TheCollectivization of the Workplace typolog" of characters.In Riesman'sscheme,peoMost work in modern society is done by organizaple of premodern societieswere tradition-direaed, Uons:colporations, governments,hospitals,founand the sanction for deviation was sharne;in early dations,universities, accounting ffrms, armies. Even modern societies people were inner-directed, guided by an internal moral compass, acquired Excerpted by permission from David Lubar, Alan Strudler, and in childhood, which induces guilt when one deviDavid Wasserman, "Moral Responsibility ir the Age of Bureaucracy,"Mi.chigan Law Retiats g0 (August 1992). @ 1992 Michiates. In contemporary society, however, we have gan Law Review Association. become other-directed: our "contemDoraries are 46 andBusiness PartOner MoralPhilosophy the source of direction for the individual. . . . [T]he process of paying close attention to the signals from others . . . remainfs] unaltered throughout life."3 For other-directed indlviduals, the sanction for deviance has changed: "As against guilt-andshame controls, though of course these survive, one prime psychologicallever of the other-directed person is a diffuse anxiety."a Sociologist Robert Jackall conducted interviews with 143 managersin sev-eralcontemporary American corporations.In the anxiety-ridden world of middle management, "fm]anagers have a myriad of aphorisms that refer to how tJrepower of CEOs, magnified through the zealous efforts of subordinates,affects them. . . . 'When he sneezes,we all catch [One such maxim is] colds'. . . ."5Jackallcomments: As a result, independent morally evaluative judgments get subordinated to the social intricacies of the bureaucratic wor\rlace. Notions of morality that one might hold and indeed practice outside the workplace . . . become irrelevant. . . . Under certain conditions, such notions may even become dangerous. For the most part, then, they remain unarticulated lest one risk damaging crucial relationships with signiffcant individuals or groups.6 HistoricalPerspective The collectivization of the workplace and t}e threat it poses to traditional moral values are hardly new phenomena; they have been recognized, and lamented, for the past 150 years.The erosion of in&vidual responsibility and the evils of bureaucracy have engagedconservativewriters since tle advent of the industrial revolution. Over a century ago, Karl Marx likewise criticized what he called "the real mindlessnessof the state." "The bureaucracy is a circle from which no one can escape," Marx contended. "The highest point entrusts the understanding of particulars to the lower echelons, whereas these, on the other hand, credit the highest with an understan&ng in regard to the universal; and thus they deceiveone another."TIn 1932, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote his classic treattse Moral Man and lm:nwral Society, in which he argued that [i]ndividual men may be moral. . . . They are endowed by nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind, the breadth of which may be extended by an astute social pedagory. . . . But all tlese achievements are more difffcult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups. In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence,less abi-lityto comprehend the needs ofottrers and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal relationships.s Niebuhr's argument recognizes that the increasing organization of society will be accompaniedby a dilution of morality. . . . lTlhe problems Marx and Niebuhr &scussed in a theoretical vein came to life in the most horrible way possibleduring World War II, where ostensibly civilized human beings tortured and slaughtered twelve million men, women, and children in extermination camps. The names of the camPsAuschwitz, Treblinka, Majdanek-have become slmonymouswith the incomprehensible willingness of ordinary human beings to do anlthing, no matter how atrocious,when ordered to do so by those in authority. Here, again, an explanation may be offered in terms of the division of responsibility within groups. Consider a historian's description of the euthanasiaprogram Hitler ordered to eliminate mentally retarded, handicapped, or genetically ill Germans (individuals Hider called "uselesseaters"): The euthanasia program . . . demonstrated how, through fragmentation of authority and tasks, it was possible to fashion a murder machine. Hitler had enunciated an offhand, extra-iegal decree, and had not wanted to be bothered about it again. Brandt had ordered the "scientific" implementation of the program and, like Hider, wished to hear no complaints. The directors and penonnel of krstitutiorx rationalized that matters were out of their han& and that they were just fflling out questionnaires . . . , &ough in realityeach form was the equivalent ofa death warrant. . , The oersonnel at the end of the line excusedt}emselves on tf,e basis that they were under compulsion, had no power of decision, and were merely performing a function. Thousands ofpeople were involved, but each considered himself nothing but a cog in the machine and reasoned that it was the machine, not he, that was responsible.s The horrors of Nazism are without parallel, but the bureaucratic pattern of organization that fragments the knowledge required for moral decisionmahng is common to large institutions throughout contemporary society. Jackall describes the tlpical corporate strucfure in terms not unlike those Marx used to characterize "&e real mindlessnessof the state": Power is co chief execut centralized' its is pushe possible. ... [P]ur authority to Moreover, p burden of knowledge. . . [Mid given stratel go wrong.lo Hannah Are nomenon as alongside th one (monar( rule by the f (democracy) the latest an minion: bun bureaus in v ther the few which could accord with 9Tanny as g( itself, rule b1 since tlere i: swer for whe ize responsit Such rumors exaggerated; of familiarity. peared in liul In his opinio noted: The project particular qt partment, tl plains that t quality contr partment rel ager was the on that quesl quesuons Po able by anyo: One must no' of fragmentt and cynically utives in the 1 r TheNatureof Morality 47 Chapter f,r human societies foup there is less :, less capacity for prehend the needs ained egoism than 'up, reveal in their hat tle increasing ompanied by a dirJiebuhr discussed the most horrible , where ostensibly and slaughtered children in exterof the campsk-have become ,nsiblewillingness rything, no matter r so by those in au)n may be offered ronsibility within escription of the rred to eliminate or genetically ill [ "uselesseaters"): ated how, through it was possible to enunciated an offsanted to be bothed the "scientific" e Hider, wished to enonnel of instituoftheir hands and 'ires...,thoughin death warrant. . . . rcused tlemselves mpulsion, had no brming a firnction. rt each considered : and reasoned that ronsible.s t parallel,but the rn that fragments I decisionmaking oughoutcontemhe typical corpothoseMarx used ressofthe state": Power is concentrated at the top in the person of the chief executive of{icer (CEO) and is simultaneously decentralized; that is, responsibility for decisions and profits is pushed as far down the organizational line as oossible. . . . [P]ushing details down protects the privilege of authority to declare that a mistake has been made. . . . Moreover, pushing down details relieves superiors of the burden of too much knowledge, particularly guilty knowledge. . . [Middle managers] become t]re "point men" of a given stratery and the potential "fall guys" when things go wrong.ro same skepticism that greeted German offfcials who "didn't know." Despite this healthy skepticism, however, we remain convinced that fraqmented knowledge is a genuine phenomenon thaiwe cannot simply &smiss as a lame excuse. The Psychology of DestructiveObedience Social scientists have labored to understand the Holocaust and to answer the all-important question whether it could occur in other settings. Stanley Milgram conducted perhaps the most silnificantHannah Arendt described the bureaucratic pheand certainly t}re most famous---experimental studnomenon as a novel form ofgovernance appearing ies to address this issue. Milgram's erperiments alongsidethe classical distinction among rule by underscore our thesis because they illustrate the one (monarchy), rule by "the best" (aristocracy), ways in which social and institutional pressures to rule by the few (oligarchy), and rule by the many obey reinforce, and are reinforced by, tie fragmen(democracy).She wrote of tation of knowledge in modern bureaucraciesand the latest and perhaps most formidable form of. . . dootler large organizations. minion: bureaucracy or the rule of an intricate qystem of In Milgram's experiments, volunteers in a Yale bureaus ia which no men, neither one nor ttre best, neiUniversity experiment were ordered by the experither the few nor ttre many, can be held responsible, and menter to administer gradually increasing electric which could be properly called rule by Nobody. (If, in accord with traditional political thought, we identifr shocks to another "subject" (actually a confederate q.Tanny as government that is not held to give account of of the experimenter), ostensibly to study the effect itself, nrle by Nobody is clearly the most lrannical of all, of punishment on learning. As the "shocks" insince there is no one left who could even be asked to arcreased in intensity, the confederate displayed inswer for what is being done. It is . . . impossible to localcreasing discomfort, demanded that the experiment ize responsibility and to idenUfr the enemy. . . .)rr stop, screamed with pain, complained of a heart Such rumors of the demise of responsibility may be condition, and ffnally fell silent as if he were unconexaggerated;yet Arendt's description has the ring scious.rs In this original experiment, sixty-five perof familiarity. A graphic contemporary analogue ap- cent of the subjects went all the way, administering peared in litigation surrounding the Dalkon Shield. the highest possible, potentially lethal, level of In his opinion, Federal Judge Frank Theis angrily shock. Those subjects who administered the maxinoted: mum shock erpressed geat &scomfort at the cruel The project manager for Dalkon Shield explains that a task they were assigned;many of them berated the particular question should have gone to the medical deexperimenter, protested, or insisted that they would partment, the medical department representative exnot proceed with the experiment-all the while plains that the question was really the bailiwick of the continuing to flip the switches. quality control department, and the quality control deMilgram conducted a number of important partment representative explains that the project manager was the one with the authority to make a decision variations on the original experiment, several of on that question. . . . [Ih is not at all unusua] for the hard which suggest the role that incomplete and fragquestions posed in Dalkon Shield casesto be unanswermented knowledge may play in facilitating destrucable by anyone from Robins [the manufacturer].rg tive obedience and the abdication of individual One must not be naive, of course: often t}le defense responsibility. In one version, the experiment was of fragmented knowledge will be entered falsely removed from the arxiety-relieving auspicesof Yale and cynically, as a form of liability screening. Exec- to a seedy-looking storefront operation in nearby utives in the hot seat should be treated with the Bridgeport. Less able to reassurethemselvesthat ry 48 PartOner MoralPhilosophy andBusiness the experimenters knew what they were doing, fifty-three percent ofthe subjects refused to go all the way. This suggeststhat compliant subordinates often believe that their qualms are merely the result of incomplete understan&ng, and assumethat tlose in charge have good reasonsfor what they are doing. The rate of compliance also declined when the subject could seethe victim, and declined even further when the subject was actually required to hold the victim's hand on the contact-plate. In tlis latter version of the experiment, seventy percent of the subjects stopped before administering the maximum level of shock.. . . Another form of ignorance that appears to have played a significant role in Milgram's experiments was t-heabsenceof a clear-cut moment of decision. Few subjects would have hesitated to give a mild, tingling shock; most probably would have refused to give an initial shock of maximum voltage. The gradual escalation of voltage was insidious because it deprived subjects ofan obvious stopping point, encouraging them to defer resistanceuntil tley saw themselves as committed, or as compromised. This hnd of slippery slope may characterize many of the decisions made in contemporary organizations. Another variant of the Milgram experiments, however, provides some encouragement that resistance and reform may be possible ia organizational settings. In this study, the subject was assignedto a team administering the shocks, while the other team members were really confederates of the experimenter. Milgram discovered that compiiance was extraordinarily sensitive to peer pressure. When the otler team members refused to proceed with the experiment, only ten percent of the subjects remained obedient to the erperimenter and "went all the way." Conversely, when a teammate rather than the subject took charge ofphysically administering the shock, 92.5Voof the subjects went along with the experiment up to the maximum shock. In Niebuhr's terms, we may think of moral man made less moral by an immoral society, but m.oremoral by a society of his betters. . . . The Milgram studies, then, suggestthe role of imperfect and fragmented knowledge in organizational misconduct. The less individuals appreciate the consequencesof tleir acts, the need to decide, and the available alternatives, the easier it will be for them to engagein destructive obedience. Milgramt experiments suggest that the fragmentation of knowledge promotes organizational wrongdoing by blunting the edge of moral conflict. Although Milgramt research focused on subordinates, parallel problems arise for supervisors. As we have seen,bureaucratic strucfures serye to deny supervisorsknowledge of operational details, blunt their awarenessofharsh consequences,and help them rationalize what they cannot ignore. The result is the deep paradox of the "rule by Nobod/': when neither superiors nor subordinates may be held responsible,we face an uncanny situation in which responsibility has seemingly been conjured out of existence. Thelnadequacy of EthicalTradition Theory andPhilosophical . . . We believe that the specter of fragmented knowledge, divided responsibility, ambiguous orders, and unknown consequencesis inadequately addressedin the moral discourseof Western societies. Virtually every approach to normative ethics, from the Ten Commandments to the latest wrinkles in philosophy journals, focusesprimary attention on moral problems in which fourkrmobdge conditions are satisfied-knowledge conditions that are frequently absent ln individual decisionmaking and almost never found in organizational settings. Firsf, the decisionmaker recognizes that he or she has come to a fork in the road: The decisionmaker knows that adecision must be made. Do I or don't I cheat on the examination? Do I or don't I protest when I hear an acquaintancetell an antiSemitic joke? Situations such as these are readily identi{iable as moral decisions. Typically, when we face one of these questions,we know that we face it. Second,the decisionmaker recognizesthat he or she must make the choice in a fairly short, distinct period of time: The decisionmaker knows when a decision must be made, or at least by wben it must be made. The examination is tomorrow: I must confront the acquaintance about his anti-Semitic joke now or never. Third number maker kr: ple, a lar services Iogue he talk the < the clien Fourt' needed t knows rp, situationr ories of r allow us various r mendati, merely tr These of moral must be rohat cht make thr steal" an imperati the greal preceptr are direr conditior cal syste even im what tht of moral Ignor philosop the pher plicitly c cases:c( deniabil themsel. place mr a state o reers ha addresse In an four lno juncture individu Chapter 1 r TheNatureof Morality 49 re need to decide, Leeasier it will be e obedience, MilLhefragmentation ional wrongdoing rflict. focused on suboror supervisors. As ures serve to deny onal details, blunt uences, and help rt ignore. The rerule by Nobody": rrdinates may be :anny situation in y'y been conjured dition rr of fragmented y, ambiguousor:sis inadequately , of Westernsocinormativeethics, ie latestwrinkles mary attention on wledgeconditiors ions that are freonmakingand alI settings. gnizesthat he or rd:The decisionbe made.Do I or ? Do I or don't I rnce tell an antitheseare readily ryically,when we >wthat we faceit. rgnizesthat he or rly short,distinct er knowstohena .by whenit must ,InorrowiI must his anti-Semitic Thi.rd, the decisionmaker confronts a small number of well-defined options: The decisionmaker knows what choicesare available. For example, a lawyer, learning that her client is using her services to pelpetrate a fraud, can quickly catalogue her options: do what the client asks,try to talk the client out of the plan, blow the whistle on the client, or resign. Fourth, the decisionmaker has the information needed to make the decision: The decisionmaker lcnowsuhat is need.edto make the choice. Even in situations of radically incomplete information, tlleories of rational decisionmahng under uncertainty allow us to assign probabillty-estimates to these various outcomes in order to generate a recommendation, though that recommendation may be merely to flip a coin. These, then, are the four lnowledge conditions of moral decisionmaking: we know that a decision must be mad,e,tphen a decision must be made, what choices are available, and,ushatis needed to make the choice, From the Biblical "Thou shalt not steal" and the Golden Rule, to Kant's categorical imperative and the utilitarian injunction to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, the core precepts of the major systemsof ethical thought are directed to agents who satisfz the knowledge conditions. If the conditions are not satisfied, ethical systemsgenerally respond with mitigation or even immunity: forgiving those who "know not what they do" is basic to Western understandings of moral responsibility. Ignorance can, ofcourse, be culpable; but most philosophers and legal theorists who aclnowledge the phenomenon of culpable ignorance have implicitly confined it to a small range of exceptional casesiconspirators who attempt to preserve their deniability, or drunks who have willfully stupefted themselves. The possibility that the modern workplace may place millions of or&nary individuals in a state of culpable ignorance throughout their careers has never, to our knowledge, been explicitly addressedin moral theory. In an organizational setting, one or more of the four knowledge conditions tlpically fails at a critical juncture. As the Milgram erperiments illustrated, in&viduals in bureaucratic settings may not fully ap- preciate that a decision must be made, understand when it should be made, realize what choices are open to them, and comprehend what the consequences of different choices will be. A law firm associate asked to research a small point of law or a junior architect asked to design a detail may have no idea that the project as a whole raisesdeep questions of professional ethics. Even if they have their suspicions,it is often impossible to pinpoint a moment of truth when the decision must be made. No clear list ofoptions, or even clear understanding of who to speak with, may exist, and the subor&nate may never believe she has sufffcient information to fashion a solution. The failure of these lcrowledge conditions is created or maintained by organizational structure. Typically, supervisors parcel out subtasksto a number of subordinate employees.None of the subordinates may have more than the most general idea of what the entire project is about, while the supervisor may know nothing about the details of each subordinate'ssubtasks.No member of the organization might recognize a moral problem, because the problem arises not from what anyone member ofthe team is doing, but rather from all their actions put together. The fact that each is merely a member of a team lulls them into a senseof security, so that they feel no pressing need to find out more about what is going on. Though they may resolve not to be "good Germans" at the moment of truth, the moment of truth never arrives. This, then, is t}re central philosophical question that the problem of fragmented knowledge raises: Is it possible to formulate satisfac-toryprinciples of indioidual responsibilitg when any or all of the four knouledge conditions presupposed by standard mnral theoriesfail? WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY . . . At bottom, four approachesexist to the problem of "deeds witlout doers." First, we can simply accept as a tragic fact of modern existence&at organizational wrongs may be committed for which no one-neither individuals nor the organizationcan rightly be held responsible. Mor:e optimistically, we can either hold the organization itself 50 PartOner MoralPhilosophy andBusiness We would do better to focus on the driving aspect of the drunk driving analogy.Driving is a valuable activity, and our licensing procedures are designed to make it widely available. Because of the lethal potential of the automobile, however, the privilege ofdriving hinges on an exerciseofalertness,caution, and self-restraint ttrat we do not require of pedestrians or passengers.We allow pedestrians and passengersto impair their reflexes and Extending Individual Responsibility judgment with alcohol, but we treat it as a legal and The simplestway of extendingthe concept of culpa- moral offense for a driver or prospective driver to ble ignorance to situations in which the lanowledge do so. Analogously,becauseofthe great potential for conditions fail is to invoke an analogy to drunk driving. By the time a driver has had six drinks, he may harm arising from the division oflabor and fragno longer have the refexes or judgment to avoid an mentation of knowledge in a colporate or bureauaccident, and thus in one sensehe is not responsible cratic organization, employees may acquire duties for what he does behind the wheel. Obviously, far more demanding than doing no evil. They must though, we do hold him responsible.Why? The an- look and listen for evil and attempt to thwart it if swer seemssimple enough, although we agree that t}ey &scover it. These duties, however, are not as once he became drunk he lost effective control of limited and well-defined as those imposed on the his actions, we blame him for becoming drrnk ln the driver. We erpect prospective drivers to "just say first place. Though he was not fully responsible at no," but we cannot erpect organizationalemploythe time of the accident, it was his own fault that he ees to know everything about the operation in was not responsible.In Aristode'swords, "when one which they are involved. While drinking is a gratuhas once let go of a stone, it is too late to get it itous impediment to driving, fragmented knowlback-but the agent was responsible for throwing it, edge inheres in the structure ofthe organization because the origin of the action was in himself."la itself. We are Ieft with a question that does not arise Analogously,we may agree that individuals in in the context of drunk driving: What and how organizational settings often do not know enough much precaution do we require of the individual to be held responsible for organizational wrongdo- employee? We cannot answer t}is question definitively, but ings and yet we insist that they should have known. They were willfully blind. Thus, for example, if an we can begin by suggestingseveral obligations that SS officer claimed that he did not l
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