Precarity North and South:
A Southern Critique of Guy Standing
Ben Scully, University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa
ABSTRACT
Guy Standing is among the most provocative and influential analysts of the rise of precarious work
around the world. His writing is part of a wave of global labour studies that has documented the
spread of precarious work throughout the Global North and South. However, this article argues that
by treating precarity around the world as a single phenomenon, produced by globalisation, the work
of Standing and others obscures the different and much longer history of precarious work in the
Global South. This article shows how many of the features that Standing associates with the
contemporary “precariat” have long been widespread among Southern workers. This longer history
of precarity has important implications for contemporary debates about a new politics of labour,
which is a central focus of Standing’s recent work.
KEY WORDS
precariat; precarious work; precarity; South Africa; Global Labour Studies
Introduction: Precarious Work North and South
The past decade has witnessed the flowering of globally oriented labour studies (Burawoy, 2009;
Munck, 2010; Waterman, 2012). This new wave of scholarship is not unprecedented in its focus on
workers in the Global South. Indeed, some prominent voices in today’s global labour studies were
previously key participants in what was called “new international labour studies” (NILS) in the 1980s
(Munck, 1988). Yet while there are continuities between NILS and contemporary global labour
studies, in a certain sense the intellectual projects underlying these two bodies of literature are the
inverse of one another. The aim of NILS and much other earlier work on Southern workers was, as
Ronaldo Munck (2009: 617) has put it, to “mainstream” fields of inquiry that were then
compartmentalised as “third world studies”. NILS-oriented scholarship insisted that “the study of
labour in India, Latin America or South Africa was ... as important as what [was] then called
‘metropolitan’ labour studies” (Munch, 2009: 617). In other words, NILS argued that scholars should
treat Southern workers as similar to their Northern counterparts, recognising their agency and their
importance to economic and political developments within their countries.
The global labour studies of today is much less likely to argue that the Southern working class
resembles, or will come to resemble, the working class of the North. Scholars now increasingly
recognise that “[t]he long-cherished idea that the nations of latecomers in the process of
transformation will follow in the footsteps of the frontrunners, has not proven to be valid” (Breman
and Van der Linden, 2014: 937). Instead, many scholars have reached the opposite conclusion. As
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 160
Jan Breman and Marcel van der Linden (2014: 937) put it, it increasingly seems that “the West is
more likely to follow the Rest than the other way around”. This realisation has finally pushed labour
scholarship beyond its traditional focus on organised, formally employed workers. Precarious work
has become a central focus of the field as scholars attempt to both analyse the present and
understand the seeming future of work across much of the world.
This global focus is a welcome antidote to the parochialism and Euro/US-centrism of
mainstream labour studies, and indeed of much mainstream social science more broadly (Connell,
2007; Burawoy, Chang and Hsieh, 2010; Bhambra, 2014). However, as precarity has come to be
analysed as a global phenomenon, there has been a tendency to employ a somewhat simplistic
assumption of global convergence. While precarious work has been on the rise throughout the
world, fundamental differences in the histories of work, and of workers, in the Global North and
Global South should caution against viewing precarity as a universal phenomenon whose meanings
and implications are cognate for workers everywhere.
This article presents a critique of the work of Guy Standing, who has written some of the
most influential analyses of precarious work as a global phenomenon (Standing, 2011, 2014). His
ideas and terminology have influenced debates about contemporary work around the world.
However, his work also provides an example of the problematic tendency to universalise the causes
and effects of precarious work. In his most recent book A Precariat Charter: From Denizens to Citizens,
he explicitly turns to the question of formulating a new politics of labour for the precarious age
which can replace what he sees as the increasingly obsolete politics of the “old” working class.
Standing deserves praise for this model of politically engaged research. Unlike most critical
scholarship that stops at diagnosing problems, he has the intellectual courage to advance clear
positions about potential solutions to the crisis facing many of the worlds’ workers. However, in
doing so he brings into relief many of the problems with simplistic assumptions of global
convergence.
In part, Standing’s simplification of geographic and historical diversity is understandable. It is
the natural inclination of someone making a call for a specific programme of political action.
However, an understanding of the different histories of work in the North and South is not merely
a matter of academic “correctness”. The central argument of this article is that, by ignoring the
much longer history of precarious work in the Global South, Standing and others blind themselves
to important lessons from and examples of anti-precarity labour politics among Southern workers.
The article begins by examining the Eurocentric historical narrative that lies behind Standing’s
idea of precarity. It shows how he contrasts precarious work with a non-precarious past defined by
stable employment, welfare provisions and other features of Northern countries’ histories which are
virtually unknown in the history of Southern countries. The next section considers three of the ten
“defining features” that Standing uses to describe contemporary precarious work, namely a
“detachment from labour”, “distinctive relations of distribution”, and “distinctive relations to the
state”. In Southern countries these are not recent products of contemporary precarity, but longstanding features of wage work; they have shaped workers’ politics from the colonial era, through
the period of post-independent development, and into the neo-liberal present. The final section
describes how this longer experience of precarity in the South has shaped a distinctive Southern
labour politics. In particular, it highlights new forms of organising, labour’s use of social coalitions
to push for the opening of democratic spaces, and demands for new forms of social protection, all
of which have defined labour politics of the South in the neo-liberal era. It has become especially
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 161
important to understand this Southern politics, since Northern workers are now facing similar forms
of precarity and looking for new political strategies to build labour movements of the present and
future.
The Eurocentric Narrative: A Golden-age Past versus the Precarious
Present
In contemporary labour studies, precarious work is generally associated with the globalisation era.
Standing makes the association between globalisation and precarious work explicit. He argues that
“globalization ... has generated a [new] class structure, superimposed on earlier structures” in which
the precariat has emerged as the key class. While most of Standing’s examples of precarious work
and the precariat class come from Europe, he does make some references to Southern countries,
especially China and India. For example, Foxconn in China, with its “flexible manufacturing” model,
is held up as an exemplar of how globalisation is remaking the global experience of work (Standing,
2014: 47).
Despite these references to contemporary Southern precarity, the historical narrative that
Standing presents comes from a clear Northern perspective. Because he views precarious work as a
product of the globalisation era, most of the story he tells takes place from the 1980s to the present.
However, there is a longer history which is implicit in the contrast he frequently draws between
contemporary precarity and an earlier era of secure wage work. He recognises that there has always
been “insecure”, “uncertain” and “volatile” labour. However, he argues, in the past these forms of
work were the exception, whereas today they are the norm (Standing, 2014: 17). In this more secure
past the working class was defined by “proletarianisation” which signified a “reliance of mass labour,
reliance on wage income, absence of control or ownership of the means of production, and
habituation to stable labour” (Standing, 2014: 15).
For Standing, it is this bygone golden age of secure work which produced the specific form of
labour politics which has now become obsolete:
From the nineteenth century up to the 1970s, the representatives of the proletariat – social
democratic and labour parties, and trade unions – strove for labour de-commodification
through making labour more ‘decent’ and raising incomes via a shift from money wages to
enterprise and state benefits. ... All labour and communist parties, social democrats and
unions subscribed to this agenda, calling for ‘more labour’ and ‘full employment’, by which
was meant all men in full-time jobs (Standing, 2014: 15–16).
Of course, even in the Global North, this old labour politics was often a guiding vision rather than a
widespread reality. Significant portions of the Northern working class were never incorporated into
the kind of institutions Standing describes. But it is accurate to say that Northern labour politics was
shaped by this vision, even where and when it wasn’t fully realised.
In the Global South, by contrast, it can be said that, despite significant variation, there were
very few places where a golden age comparable to the one that Standing describes ever seemed like a
possibility for more than a tiny portion of the working class. For workers in much of the former
colonial world, precarity is not new, but has been a defining feature of work throughout the colonial
past and into the present era of national independence. In the period that Standing identifies as the
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pinnacle of “old” working class politics, the late nineteenth to the mid twentieth centuries, workers
in much of the Global South were struggling against colonial occupation. Colonial work regimes
were more likely to be violent, despotic and repressive than secure and stable. Yet this repression
was not limited to the workplace. As a result, the politics of labour that emerged in the colonial
world was always broader and less focused on the workplace than the “old” working class politics
that Standing describes.
Because of this different history, the narrative that frames the precarious present as a decline
from a golden age in the past is inadequate for understanding contemporary work and the
contemporary politics of labour in the South.
The next section of this article turns to some of the key features that, for Standing, define
contemporary precarious workers. I draw on both recent and historical scholarship on Southern
labour, as well as my own research on precarious work in South Africa and elsewhere, to show that
many of the features that Standing associates with today’s precarious workers were experienced by
Southern workers long before the globalisation era. As a result, the politics of work in the Global
South, which has emerged under these conditions of precarity, can provide a lesson to those like
Standing who hope for a reformulation of traditional labour politics in the North.
Three Features of the Precarious Past of Southern Workers
In A Precariat Charter, Standing presents ten “defining features” that set the precariat apart as a
distinct contemporary class. While a case could be made that all ten features were experienced by
workers in the Global South before globalisation, this section focuses on three features: detachment
from labour, distinctive relations of distribution, and distinctive relations to the state. These three
features are used to show that the longer experience of precarity in the South has shaped a distinct
politics of Southern labour, which holds important lessons for contemporary struggles against
precarious work around the world.
By speaking about the experiences of “Southern workers” as a whole, there is a risk of
reproducing the same over-simplification that this article criticises in Standing’s analysis. The
following is not meant as an account of the experiences of all Southern workers, just as the
generalised “decline from a golden age” narrative should not be assumed to apply to all workers in
the North. The purpose here is to show how a generalised history of precarity from a Southern
perspective points to forms of both historical and contemporary labour politics which are obscured
by the Eurocentric narrative.
Detachment from labour
Standing argues that:
Those in the precariat are more likely to have a psychological detachment from labour,
being only intermittently or instrumentally involved in labour, and not having a single
labour status – often being unsure what to put under ‘occupation’ on official forms….
They are therefore more likely to feel alienated from the dull, mentally narrowing jobs they
are forced to endure and to reject them as a satisfying way of working and living (Standing,
2014: 23–24).
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For Standing this detachment from labour sets precarious workers apart from members of the
“old” working class, whose identities were firmly and unambiguously built around their roles as
workers. However, this sort of “attachment” to labour was never universal. It was limited to a
very specific period of history, and primarily in Northern countries. Detachment from labour, far
from being a recent phenomenon, has been the norm for most workers throughout the history of
capitalism. Even within Europe, peasants and early industrial workers exhibited a fierce resistance
to dispossession and proletarianisation. As Michael Burawoy (1982: s9–s10) has argued “popular
class struggles of the 19th century [in Europe arose] not where proletarianization and deskilling
had advanced the most, but where they were being resisted”. This resistance to proletarianisation
suggests a strong detachment from, even a rejection of, the experience of wage labour. While
such resistance was marginal in the North during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it has
remained central to the labour politics of workers in the Global South. Semi-proletarian Southern
workers who fight to maintain access to non-wage income sources display exactly the kind of
“intermittent” and “instrumental” approach to labour that Standing associates with the
contemporary precariat. However, this detachment from labour of today’s Southern workers is
part of a long legacy of distinct forms of labour struggle, and is not simply a product of
globalisation or contemporary precarity.
Africa is the region where resistance to wage work has been most extensively analysed
(Hyden, 1980; Cooper, 1987; Bundy, 1988). According to Bill Freund (1988: 30–31), “For African
workers, total commitment to a proletarian life-style was rarely the most attractive of options. …
Wage labour was most desirable when it could be combined with systematic exploitation of
subsistence production on a household basis at the same time”. But Southern workers’ resistance
to full proletarianisation was not limited to Africa, nor to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Shaohua Zhan and Lingli Huang (2012) have shown how the labour shortage in China’s
coastal industrial cities which has pushed up urban wages over the past decade is driven largely by
rural workers choosing to remain in rural areas, relying on a mix of income from rural employment,
their own agricultural production, and non-farm rural business activities. For Zhan and Huang this
reliance on non-wage income represents an alternative source of bargaining power among Southern
workers. Liliana Goldin finds a similar reluctance to abandon rural connections among maquiladora
workers in Guatemala, who use the practice of “turning over”, or periodically quitting jobs to return
to rural homes to “show that they are still in transition, not fully proletarianized, but keeping a foot
in agricultural practices. As such, turnover can be construed as an expression of resistance to a
version of capitalism that does not fit with expectations of a modern, better life, removed from
agriculture (Goldín, 2011: 151).
Michael Levien’s (2012) work on peasant resistance to land dispossession in contemporary
India provides another example of fights against full proletarianisation. Levien focuses on the
widespread “land grabs” in India which appropriate rural land for uses – such as high-end housing
estates, commercial property developments, and offices for IT support companies – which offer few
benefits to the poor land owners who are dispossessed. These land grabs have become flash points
of conflict and resistance because many “Indian farmers ... can see – quite rightly – that the types of
development proposed for their farmland will create no place for them, or at least not a good
enough place to warrant surrendering their land” (Levien, 2012: 965–966).
All of these examples of contemporary workers’ detachment from labour have very little in
common with the underemployed urban youth who constitute a significant portion of the
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 164
precariat movements of Europe. For these Southern workers, the detachment from labour that
modern precarious work creates is not a “problem” for existing forms of labour politics. These
workers are able to draw on an alternative “old” politics of labour in the Global South, which has
long seen wage labour as disempowering. There is a continuity between peasant resistance to
proletarianisation and dispossession in nineteenth-century Africa and the contemporary practice
of “turning over” among maquiladora workers in Central America.
These examples also show how, in the South, detachment from labour is intricately related
to an attachment to land. Throughout the long history of precarious work in the South, workers
have often seen access to land and other forms of non-wage income as a form of resistance and a
basis for autonomy. One implication of this is that a significant portion of Southern workers have
long histories of complex mixed-livelihood strategies. This fact is important to keep in mind when
considering the Southern perspective on another of Standing’s defining features of the precariat,
what he calls their “distinctive relations of distribution”.
Distinctive relations of distribution
By highlighting the contemporary precariat’s “distinctive relations of distribution, or
remuneration”, Standing (2014: 18) is referring to what he sees as an increased commodification
of precarious workers’ livelihoods, as they lose access to social income and come to rely
increasingly on wages earned in the labour market. He contrasts this with the decommodification
that marked the experience of workers in the twentieth century, when “the trend was away from
[reliance on] money wages, with a rising share of social income coming from enterprise and state
benefits” (Standing, 2014: 18).
However, this decommodification was a feature of Northern states and does not accurately
capture the historical experience of Southern workers. As Kevin Harris and I (2015) have argued,
although commodification of livelihoods is generally associated with the neo-liberal era, in many
important respects the mid-twentieth-century developmental era was a period of widespread
commodification for Southern workers. In the period of state-led development, Southern states
aimed to foster capitalist growth by transferring labour from rural and agricultural settings to the
urban and industrial sectors. Industrialisation and urbanisation were processes which diminished
workers’ access to non-wage income on a grand scale in the middle of the twentieth century. So
the picture was significantly different in the South in the era during which Standing argues the
“trend” for workers was “away from money wages” and towards “social income”.
That is not to diminish the fact that Southern workers’ crisis of livelihoods was made worse
by policies of the neo-liberal era. As Harris and I have put it, “Post-war development policies had
already increased mass reliance on markets for income and social reproduction, but by removing
market regulations and social protections, neoliberal policies turned these vulnerabilities into fullblown crises” (Harris and Scully, 2015: 424). However, because the starting point of Southern
economies was not widespread security and stability, the effect of neo-liberal policies on the class
structures in these countries is not the same as in the North.
Standing argues that the decline of access to social incomes has fragmented the class
structure, separating the precariat from the more privileged old working class who retain some of
the security and protection that was associated with stable twentieth-century labour. In most of
the South, decommodified social protection was never widely available in the twentieth century.
Therefore, even relatively secure wage workers have long had a tendency to rely on complex
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livelihood strategies that combine wages with non-wage income sources such as subsistence
production (of both food and other reproductive needs), petty commodity production for the
market, small-scale trading, as well as solidarity and reciprocity in various forms. This is not meant
to suggest that Southern workers have been naturally altruistic or inherently cooperative.
Especially in the contemporary period, a great deal of research has shown how increasing
precarity has fractured networks of support and mutuality (Mosoetsa, 2011; Bähre, 2014).
However, it is a fact that, in the face of the precarious economic realities that Southern workers
have faced for generations, pooling of household income has been a key economic strategy for
survival.
In the South, the class structure cannot be easily divided into those who retain access to
secure wages and social protections and those who are precarious. In order to understand how
precarious forms of employment have affected the class structure, it is necessary to analyse how
the complex livelihood strategies of Southern workers have changed as work has become less
secure. Obviously, this question does not have a single answer that applies to the entire Global
South. However, my own research and that of others looking at this question in South Africa
point to a very different contemporary class structure than the “fragmented” model that Standing
posits. As Claire Ceruti (2013: 104) has argued, summarising her analysis of the class structure in
Johannesburg’s largest township, “understanding class in Soweto in an era of work restructuring
requires primarily a consideration of how the worlds of work are mixed at the level of the
household”. Furthermore, she argues, the instability of those who do have formal wage work
means that individuals frequently “move between different worlds of work over the course of
their lifetime” (Ceruti, 2013: 112). The combination of “mixed” households and work status
instability mean the fragmented class structure that Standing identifies is not readily apparent in
this part of Johannesburg.
[I]n the case of Soweto, many unemployed and informal workers rub shoulders with the
employed in former council housing. Out of all the categories of waged employees, only
teachers and nurses were completely absent from shack settlements. Trade union members
were present in both squatter settlements and in areas dominated by people with steady
jobs. Any of these individuals could form a node in a network to link one world of work
with another (Ceruti, 2013: 122).
My own research on workers’ household livelihoods in South Africa suggests that Ceruti’s findings
are applicable beyond Soweto as well. Using data from a nationally representative household
survey, the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), I identified two sets of what could be
considered relatively “secure” or “stable” workers, namely formal workers and unionised workers.
Table 1 analyses the membership of these relatively better-off workers’ households. Specifically, it
identifies the percentage of formal or unionised workers’ households which also contain an
unemployed member, an informally employed member, or a member who receives a government
social grant.
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 166
Table 1: Security and precarity within households
As the rightmost column indicates, the majority of “secure” workers live in households that
contain at least one precarious member. Given the volatility of the South African labour market, it
is likely that even more “secure” workers’ households would contain precarious members if we
looked across time, rather than at the snapshot that the data used here provides.
The workers’ households described in Ceruti’s and my own research suggests a very
different relationship between precarious and more secure workers than the one that Standing
presents. Members of Standing’s precariat are a new and separate class because they have lost
access to sources of non-wage income while a more privileged, but shrinking, section of the
working class has retained the security provided by enterprise and state benefits. In South Africa,
the rise of precarity does not seem to have driven sections of the working class apart to the same
degree. Instead, precarious workers and the unemployed live their social and economic lives
alongside many of the remaining formally employed workers. Their interdependence signals a
material link between precarious workers and formal wage work. At the same time, formal
workers’ ties to their precarious family members likely make their economic situations less stable
and secure than they seem if we look only at the workplace.
Neither Soweto nor South Africa as a whole can tell us about the experiences of all
Southern workers. But these examples do show how the transformation of work in the era of
globalisation has not had the fragmenting effects on all of the working class that Standing
suggests. This seems especially likely for Southern workers who have relied on livelihood
strategies that mixed wage-income with various non-wage sources of income since long before
the period of globalisation. To use Standing’s phrase, the “relations of distribution” for precarious
and more secure workers have not necessarily become distinct from one another. This has
important implications for the prospects of anti-precarious labour politics.
Distinctive relations to the state
For Standing, a third defining feature of the contemporary precariat is their “distinctive relations
to the state”. Specifically, he argues that members of the precariat lack a range of basic rights
which the state has historically provided to its citizens. Standing argues, therefore, that members
of the precariat are modern-day denizens, or individuals who lack full citizenship rights. The
implication is that strong and universal forms of citizenship were a feature of political life before
the rise of precarious work. Again, while this narrative is partially applicable to the Global North,
the history in the South is markedly different.
In the mid twentieth century, the citizenship rights enjoyed by Northern workers reached an
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apex with the construction of Northern welfare states. As Standing notes through his discussion
of T.H. Marshall, twentieth-century Northern welfare states clearly linked the rights of citizenship
with citizens’ roles as workers (Standing, 2014: 2–3). In contrast, for the first half of the twentieth
century, the majority of Southern workers were denied almost all citizenship rights under various
forms of colonial government. The wave of independence in the middle of the century did
transform these workers from subjects into citizens. However, their relationships to their new
states rarely included rights based on their identity as workers.
For Southern workers, the “social compact” of the mid twentieth century was not built
around social protection, but around the promise of national development McMichael, 2011).
Security and stability were not entitlements of citizenship, but future goals which would be
achieved through successful national development. This produced a very different type of politics,
and a different relationship to the state, among Southern workers. Sakhela Buhlungu’s argument
about the emergence of the African labour movement could be applied to unions in many parts
of the Global South:
The ubiquitous hand of the colonial system, including at the workplace, meant that the
emergence of trade unions was more than merely a response to conditions of economic
exploitation by employers. It was simultaneously a response to the conditions of political
oppression created by colonialism.... African trade unions were therefore economic and
political creatures from the early days of their existence (Buhlungu, 2010: 198).
Even after independence, the development imperative that animated the politics of new countries
meant that Southern workers were more likely to be subject to government repression and control
than to be beneficiaries of class-based rights like their Northern counterparts. The few examples
of significant developmental social protection, such as the guaranteed employment of China’s
“iron rice bowl”, differed sharply from the democratic and citizenship-expanding welfare systems
of the North. Anti-democratic labour relations were a standard feature of Southern states
pursuing development. As Gay Seidman put it:
Where it has occurred, capitalist industrialization in the Third World has generally been
marked by intensified inequalities: states seeking to attract or retain capital have often
turned to political and labor repression, postponing both democracy and redistribution in
the effort to promote growth (Seidman, 1994: 8).
Seidman’s comparative study of labour movements in Brazil and South Africa provides one of the
clearest analyses of the way in which this specific “relation to the state” produced a different class
politics among Southern unions. Seidman shows how unions in these countries adopted strategies
of social movement unionism (see also Webster, 1988), which linked workers’ demands to broader
social and political issues. Her comparison aims to uncover whether there is “something in the
organization of newly industrializing societies that stimulates social movement unionism”
(Seidman, 1994: 3). Based on her own work and subsequent research on Southern unions’ politics,
the answer seems to be yes.
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 168
Conclusion: Anti-precarity Politics of the Global South
Standing’s writing on the rise of precarious forms of work constitutes one of the most
thoroughgoing accounts of transformations that have taken place in the world of work over the
past three decades. The Southern critique of his work that is presented here is not meant to deny
the importance of the very real trends that he has identified. However, taking a Southern
perspective on the history of precarious work does call into question some of the political
implications of his findings in Southern countries. The heart of A Precariat Charter is a call for a
new form of class politics, which can replace the outmoded politics of what Standing repeatedly
calls the “old working class”. The above discussion has tried to show that the old working class of
the South is quite different from the one Standing has in mind.
The Southern old working class shared many of the characteristics of the precariat, which
Standing identifies as the “emerging” class of the twenty-first century. This recognition is
important for thinking about the possibilities of a potential anti-precarity labour politics in both
the North and the South. As Standing notes, citing Przeworksi (1985), “[old] working class politics
were defined and shaped through struggles and not clearly perceived beforehand” (Standing, 2014:
133). Similarly, the politics of anti-precarity has already begun to emerge in the South in a number
of important respects. Simplistic assumptions of convergence between the experience of work,
class structure and labour politics in the North and South obscure important lessons that can be
drawn from Southern workers’ long history of struggles against precarity.
This article has argued that a narrative which frames precarious work in contrast to a secure
past is inaccurate for most workers in the Global South. Yet despite the long-standing existence
of precarious work in the Global South, the era of globalisation and neo-liberalism are important
to any periodisation of Southern labour. In the North the period of the 1980s to the present has
witnessed the steady erosion of work security and the subsequent undermining of what Standing
calls the “old” politics of labour. The same period in the South has seen the emergence of new
forms of labour politics through which workers confronted precarity in the workplace and
beyond. The social movement unionism that Seidman identified in South Africa and Brazil was
part of this new politics of Southern labour. Later research has shown that these new tactics and
strategies were not limited to a few countries. In fact, the 1980s and 1990s were a period of
innovation and militancy for workers in many parts of the Global South (Minns, 2001; Silver,
2003; Kraus, 2007; Ford, 2009). If one had to identify a golden age of unionism in the South, the
1980s and 1990s are much stronger candidates than the mid twentieth century. Some of these late
twentieth-century developments faced challenges in the early part of the twenty-first century. Yet
even in the current period, across the Global South, there continues to be a proliferation of both
old-style labour politics in the form of industrial strikes and union organising (Butollo and Ten
Brink, 2012; Chinguno, 2013; Anner and Liu, 2015) and innovative new forms of collective action
among vulnerable workers (Chun, 2009; Agarwala, 2013; McCallum, 2013).
Because of the narrative of decline which frames most discussions of labour in the
contemporary era, these developments are often characterised as relatively futile struggles of
hyper-exploited precarious workers. Yet the struggles of Southern workers in the last thirty years
have achieved a range of meaningful gains. Jon Kraus’ and his colleagues’ analysis of unions’ role
in the wave of democratisation that took place across Africa in the 1980s and 1990s provides a
concrete example of workers winning historic victories during a period in which many scholarly
narratives dismiss the political potential of labour (Kraus, 2007). The labour movements that
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 169
drove this political transformation were not simply a delayed version of mid twentieth century old
working class politics of the North. They involved demands beyond wages and welfare, most
notably for expanding democratic political space. They also involved broad social coalitions that,
in many countries, linked relatively secure formal-sector workers with the precarious majority.
Another success of Southern workers in the era of their supposed irrelevance can be seen
in the increased access to state provision of welfare that has taken place in the past twenty years.
As Kevan Harris and I discuss extensively elsewhere (Harris and Scully, 2015), the period since
1990 has seen a massive expansion of various forms of social protection in countries across the
Global South. In direct contrast to the narrative that Standing presents for Europe, which focuses
on the erosion of social protection and citizenship rights, states across the Global South have
expanded welfare entitlements on an unprecedented scale. Flagship programmes such as the Bolsa
Família in Brazil, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India, the Di Bao in China,
and the Old Age Pension in South Africa have become models for other Southern countries to
emulate. Such entitlements, which were virtually unknown for Southern workers in the mid
twentieth century, are now on the books, or at least on the political agenda, in countries across the
Global South (Barrientos, 2013). In most instances such welfare entitlements have been driven by
demands from below, and their implementation has created new political alliances between parties
and movements of both formal and precarious workers (Harris and Scully, 2015). These
programmes are inadequate to provide the level of security associated with the Northern welfare
states of the mid twentieth century. However, their growth from non-existence to ubiquity in the
period that Standing associates with the hollowing out of citizenship rights illustrates the very
different trajectories of labour politics and precarity in the North and South. As James Ferguson
(2015: 207) speculates, it seems plausible that “we are now witnessing the beginnings of a new
kind of politics – a distributive politics – that is potentially quite a radical one”.
These examples are not meant to diminish the reality of vulnerability and precarity which
contemporary Southern workers face. They do, however, highlight the problematic tendency to
analyse Southern workers through historical and political lenses derived from the Northern
experience. Valuable insights can be gained from a comparison of workers across the world, and
analyses such as Standing’s, which thoroughly documents transformations in organisation of work,
have an important role to play in that project. The precarious forms of work he describes are
experienced by workers across the world. However, to better understand the possibilities for antiprecarity labour politics, this contemporary precarity must be situated within the distinctive
historical struggles of Southern workers.
REFERENCES
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
BEN SCULLY is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand in
Johannesburg, South Africa. He researches and publishes on precarious work, trade unions and
social policy with a focus on South Africa. Since 2015 he has served as an editor of the Global Labour
Journal. [Email: Ben.Scully@wits.ac.za]
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 172
EDITOR’S NOTE
Ben Scully was invited to contribute to this Special Issue before he became an editor of the Global
Labour Journal. Since becoming editor he has been recused from all editorial decisions relating to this
Issue.
Global Labour Journal, 2016, 7(2), Page 173
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
Sean Hill II
Abstract: Guy Standing’s theory of precarity fails to account for the myriad ways in which people of African descent, specifically Black Americans,
experienced precarity prior to the rise of neoliberalism. This facilitates
Black Americans remaining an eternal precariat class and also undermines
the multiracial, progressive coalitions that could assist in solving precarity.
Were Standing’s theory to center those who, both historically and contemporaneously, have been most marginalized, his theory and recommended
solutions would be more comprehensive. The intersectional approach of
the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), and the transformative effect it
is having upon law practice, can guide us in the development of a more
robust theory of precarity that produces sustainable solutions and change.
Keywords: intersectionality, Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), critical
race theory, Black Lives Matter, movement lawyering, National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL)
Two hundred and twenty-eight years. It’s just shy of the 240 years that
America has celebrated as an independent nation. It also happens to be
the number of years it would take the average Black American family to
build the same wealth as their white counterparts (Asante-Muhammed et
al. 2016). This is the financial state of the Black community as it bids farewell to the first Black president and steels itself for the promised dangers
of the Trump administration.
The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), launched with the 2013 tweet
#BlackLivesMatter, has become a channel for many Black Americans to
voice their dissatisfaction with a country that, for all of its rhetoric of “freedom” and “equality,” cannot solve long-standing disparities between its
white and Black citizens.
WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 45: 3 & 4 (Fall/Winter 2017) © 2017 by Sean Hill II. All rights reserved.
94
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
95
Yet a few years before the inception of M4BL, Guy Standing (2011a)
proposed an explanation for the ever-increasing wealth disparities seen
not just in the United States but around the globe. It is a concept that he
calls “precarity.” The “precariat,” Standing (2011a) claims, is an emerging
class of people denied the security and protections associated with the
postwar Keynesian era—a livable wage, unionization, opportunities for
training and advancement, etc.—as a result of neoliberal policies that encourage the privatization of social services and reliance on a transnational,
unskilled labor force. “Precarity,” according to Standing (2011a), is a relatively new phenomenon, the result of countries rejecting the policies of
the Keynesian welfare state in favor of neoliberalism’s calls for fewer government interventions on behalf of the proletariat. In Standing’s (2014,
2011b) opinion, if we are to solve the issue of precarity, then political leaders must embrace policies that are sensitive to the plight of the precarious
class, like the provision of a basic income and other progressive measures.
Yet when we examine the United States through the lens of precarity, we encounter a glaring contradiction—namely, that Black Americans
have had the markers of precarity since the country’s inception through
to the present day. Their existence as a precarious class in fact preceded
neoliberalism. The last several decades are only unique in that the pool
of precarious persons has now expanded to include white Americans and
others of European descent, the lives that have “mattered” both historically
and contemporaneously. It is this small subset of the precarious class that
Standing is seemingly describing in his scholarship: newly exposed to the
job insecurities of capitalism and especially susceptible to the appeals of
fascist leaders.
I will spend the first part of this article briefly exploring the ways in
which people of African descent have been a perpetual precarious class in
America. I will then proceed to identify the inherent dangers of failing to
account for their precarious status. And in the final section, I will examine
how M4BL can guide us toward eliminating precarity both in America and
on the global stage.
Mapping Precarity in the Black American Community
Precarity, in Standing’s estimation, is a contemporary phenomenon, the
product of industrial nations adopting, exporting, and imposing neoliberal policies on a global scale. Whereas the proletariat, which preceded
96 Sean Hill II
the precariat, was able to secure the seven forms of labor-related security—adequate income-earning opportunities, protection against arbitrary dismissal, the opportunity to gain skills through apprenticeships
or employment, etc.—the precariat is said to lack all of these securities
(Standing 2011a, 10–13). In a world that prioritizes the use of a transnational, cheap labor force, they cycle in and out of short-term, low-wage
jobs that have little to no opportunity for advancement. According to
Standing, they lack a work-based identity and do not feel part of a “solidaristic labour community,” which only serves to intensify “a sense of
alienation and instrumentality in what they have to do” (2011a, 12).
They are “denizens” in that they are denied at least one of the rights afforded true citizens, e.g., civil, cultural, social, economic, and political
rights (14, 87–88, 93–96).
Yet Black Americans carried all of these markers of precarity before
neoliberalism assumed global proportions. Take, for example, Standing’s (2011a) position that today’s precarious classes are defined by an
inability to unionize, and the denial of basic employment and income
securities associated with the labor movement of the postwar era. This
stance presumes there was an era when all or a majority of the members of the proletariat had equal access to the protections and security
of union membership. An examination of America’s labor movement,
however, shows concerted, intentional, and altogether successful efforts
by white laborers to exclude their Black counterparts from unions and
their related rewards (Velez 2015; Honey 1999). As late as 1968, Black
Americans were forced to create alternative union collectives because
the AFL-CIO unions remained deeply discriminatory and persistently
denied admission of Blacks to the higher ranks of leadership (Georgakas and Surkin 1998). Across all seven forms of labor-related security
that Standing enumerates, history shows us that Black Americans have
not just fared far worse than white members of the working class, they
have also more often than not found themselves without any of the labor
protections that the precariat class is only now said to be lacking (Perea
2011; Moreno 2006; Kropp 2002).
Similarly, Black Americans have occupied the role of denizens since
first arriving on America’s shores as slaves, and even after their de jure release from bondage (Blackmon 2008). The era of Jim Crow, which followed on the heels of abolition, rested firmly on the denizen status of Black
Americans, who were not treated equally before the law, not protected
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
97
against crime and physical harm, not entitled to income-earning activity,
and not granted an equal right to vote (Woodward 1974), all of the rights
Standing claims are critical to a nonprecarious existence (2011a, 14). This
denizen status has only continued, unabated, in the age of neoliberalism,
with our ever-growing prison and policing systems acting as the primary
vehicles for the routine denial of basic rights to Black Americans (Hinton 2016; Alexander 2010). In the last several decades, we have seen voter
suppression transform into pervasive felony disenfranchisement (Davidson 2016), rampant discrimination in housing access (Coates 2014), and
severe employment disparities (Desilver 2013) that undercut any claims
of equal access to the various forms of state-sponsored social protection.
Capitalism, which finds its origins in the slave trade, demanded Black
Americans occupy the role of denizens (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992).
Given that Standing counts people of African descent amongst today’s
precariat (2011a, 86), it follows that their denizen status has continued
uninterrupted since chattel slavery into the present.
I am not the first to identify precarity and precarious classes as preceding neoliberalism. In Precarious Existence and Capitalism: A Permanent
State of Exception, Tayyab Mahmud makes the compelling argument that
precarity “is an unavoidable historical and structural feature of capitalism”
(2015, 701) and that neoliberalism has simply served the dual role of expanding and deepening precarity. This expansion has resulted in what he
calls the “hyper-precarious,” a labor pool of undocumented immigrants
that is “large, flexible, super-controlled and super-exploited” (722). He
explains that, “Dislocated from their spaces and communities of affiliation, these workers have to contend with low wages, low-status work, denial of labor rights, political disenfranchisement, state repression, racism
and xenophobic nativism” (723). The racist ideologies underlying their
oppression “help keep the attention of relatively privileged sections of the
working classes away from the crisis of global capitalism . . . undermin[ing]
unity and coalition building among the working classes” (724).
While Mahmud does the necessary and critical work of demonstrating capitalism’s longstanding reliance on precarity, like Standing, he does
not address the perpetual status of Black Americans as a precarious class.
He begins the work of defining a new, hyperprecarious class when Black
Americans have also been exhibiting the signs of hyperprecarity for centuries, including being relegated to low-wage work, and being subjected
to political disenfranchisement, state repression, and racism. And the rac-
98 Sean Hill II
ist ideologies he identifies as being responsible for division within today’s
working classes were used in nearly identical fashion to divide Black and
white workers in America before the rise of neoliberalism (Honey 1999).
In the next section, I will identify the inherent risks in failing to acknowledge people of African descent as the persistent precariat class. I will
then proceed to identify one way forward in efforts to eradicate precarity
for good: the platform and demands of those in M4BL.
The Dangers and Pitfalls of Failing to Acknowledge Black Americans as a
Perpetual Precarious Class
Failing to account for Black Americans’ perpetual state of precarity has
several consequences, some obvious and others discrete. Chief amongst
these consequences is that it facilitates Blacks remaining an eternal precariat class. Following Standing’s lead, American precarity, for example, is
being cast as an altogether new phenomenon whose effects are being felt
primarily (if not exclusively) by the white working class (Patton 2016).1
There is no shortage of pieces on what Hillary Clinton and the Democrats
did wrong in their appeals to the white working class, and what Donald
Trump got right (Leonard 2017; Kilibarda and Roithmayr 2016; Eisler
2016). This provokes a conversation that is exclusively about what needs
to be done to make the lives of white Americans better, rather than the lives
of Black people or the millions of hyperprecarious individuals residing
within America’s borders (Patton 2016). Policies are recommended and
applied on the basis of what a small subset of the precarious class—white
people—wants or needs, rather than on what would be best for the entire
precarious class (Stephanopoulos 2015; Hutchison 2010). This, in turn,
allows for the ever-greater concentration of wealth and resources in white
communities (precarious or otherwise), while capitalism and its brother, neoliberalism, continue uninterrupted and unabated, using Blacks and
undocumented persons as a perpetual pool of cheap labor. Believing precarity has been solved (at least for them), whites become susceptible to
messages from neoliberals and fascists alike, that Blacks and other hyperprecarious persons have an innate dysfunction that explains their lack of
basic labor-related securities, like steady employment and wages (Franke
2016). These inaccurate and racist tropes distract white members of the
precariat and ensure they do not interrogate the neoliberal systems that
are crushing their own communities (Mahmud 2015, 724). This, in turn,
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
99
allows Black Americans’ status as denizens to be further justified, exploited, and entrenched.
A failure to examine African-descended peoples as a precarious class
also normalizes whites’ routine selection of racist and xenophobic fascists
whenever the privileges temporarily afforded them as white members of
the precarious class (like unionization, a livable wage, social welfare programs, etc.) are at risk of being made available to other members of the
precarious class.2 Standing speaks of migrants, Black and otherwise, being
convenient scapegoats when neoliberal policies prove ineffective (2011a,
90–102), but there is no analysis of how such scapegoating also serves to
concretize what it means to be white. This phenomenon is worthy of its
own full analysis and explanation, given that the white precariat’s reliance
on a shared white identity produces not just fascist leadership but also
leadership that is deeply invested in the oppression of Blacks and other
ethnic minorities (Adichie 2016; Morrison 2016; Painter 2016). It is the
type of leadership that produced a system which routinely and disproportionately cages Black and brown bodies (Alexander 2010), and that routinely exports war and terror on a global scale (Selby 2016). Breaking this
cycle requires an analysis that accounts not just for the degree of precarity
class members experience based on race and ethnicity but also for how
each subset of the precarious class reacts to their precarity, particularly in
the context of political choices and decisions.3
Finally, failing to acknowledge and name Black people as a perpetual precarious class is undermining the ability of progressives to build
the broad, multiracial coalitions necessary to end neoliberalism (Glaude
2016; Laymon 2016). Because Standing’s (2014) and others’ sense of
precarity is divorced from race, it results in policy recommendations and
political platforms that are sensitive to class, exclusively, as opposed to
class and race. The Sanders campaign was routinely criticized for taking
an exclusively class-based approach (Thrasher 2016; Coates 2016), with
some commentators drawing connections between his primary loss and
a failure to make specific, race-based appeals to Black Americans (Starr
2016). An exclusively class-oriented approach will lose even greater traction in the wake of the Obama administration, which regularly claimed
that promulgating and implementing policies on the basis of class would
inevitably result in benefits to Blacks, who make up a disproportionate
number of the precariat (Darity Jr. 2016). But with recent studies showing that Black households would have to save 100 percent of their in-
100 Sean Hill II
come for three consecutive years just to close the Black-white wealth gap
(Hamilton et al. 2015), it is becoming increasingly difficult to convince
Black Americans that their full citizenship—including labor security
and basic civil rights—will be realized through policies claiming to help
the entire precarious class but which only help a specific subset: whites
(Taylor 2017).
The next part of this article will examine how M4BL and the broader
demands being made by Black Americans can help guide our visions for a
future free of exploitative capitalism and, thus, precarious classes.
The Movement for Black Lives and the Fight to End Precarity
The most troubling aspect of Standing’s theory of precarity is that it makes
little to no distinction between those who have, for centuries, been relegated to the precariat versus those who are newly experiencing precarity. This
then produces restrictive solutions that are exclusively class-oriented and
do not address the broader systems and institutions responsible for precarity. Standing’s (2014) universal basic income, for example, may raise
the standard of living for certain precariat members, but such changes are
nominal and temporary where racism, sexism, and ableism continue to
relegate certain individuals to the precariat while elevating others (Gaddis 2014; Bessler 2014). Standing’s theory of precarity could be more robust were he to adopt an intersectional approach that acknowledges the
differing degrees of marginalization members of the precariat experience
according to their identities. Intersectionality encourages us to center the
experiences of those who are the most marginalized, which in turn allows
for comprehensive solutions and the reimagining of existing, oppressive
institutions and systems (Crenshaw 1991). M4BL offers guidance in developing a more robust theory of precarity in two ways. First, it does so
by modeling an intersectional approach in both form and substance, and
second, through the transformative effect it’s having upon legal practice
and how privileged professionals work to amplify the voices of precarious
communities.
M4BL evinces intersectionality in terms of its organizational and leadership structure, as well as in terms of its policy platforms. Not only was
the movement itself founded by three Black women, two of whom identify
as queer, unlike its predecessor movements, the M4BL does not have a
central body or figurehead. Instead, it is a loosely affiliated network of or-
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
101
ganizations, collectives, and individuals invested in eradicating anti-Black
racism. This loose affiliation is more than just a pragmatic response to state
surveillance and continued efforts by the state to discredit movements
by discrediting their leaders; it is also an egalitarian approach that facilitates shared decision-making and prioritizes the leadership of individuals marginalized within the Black community itself, specifically women
and those identifying as LGBTQI (Kelley 2017; Teuscher 2015). This
approach stands in sharp contrast to narratives and structures that centered cisgender men during the Civil Rights and Black Power movements
(Chatelain and Asoka 2015). It also provides a radical vision and model
of what leadership that is not steeped in violence and patriarchy can be,
taking Standing’s basic income solution one step further by actually building alternative institutions rather than recommending a nominal change in
existing policies or leadership.
In the realm of policy, the M4BL launches campaigns and issues demands that accommodate and are sensitive to those who are especially
marginalized, namely cisgender and trans* women. While major news
outlets almost exclusively focus on Black men killed by law enforcement
and vigilantes, the collectives and organizations affiliated with the M4BL
intentionally and routinely engage in protests and campaigns that highlight the alarming number of Black women and girls harmed and killed
by the police each year (McClain 2015). In August of 2016, fifty of these
organizations came together to release a platform entitled “A Vision
for Black Lives,” replete with demands and policy recommendations to
achieve Black liberation (Newkirk 2016). A countless number of the
demands—such as the call to abolish prisons or to expand protections
for workers—are premised on the discriminatory and disproportionate
effects certain policies have on Black women and girls (Movement for
Black Lives 2016a). In fact, nearly all of the policy recommendations
appearing in Kimberlé Crenshaw’s “Say Her Name” report (Crenshaw
and Ritchie 2015), which was specifically intended to help stakeholders
address Black women’s unique experiences of profiling and policing, also
appear throughout the Vision for Black Lives platform (Movement for
Black Lives 2016b).
In addition to modeling an intersectional approach, the M4BL is having a transformative effect upon the practice of the law. This is especially
relevant given that the provision of Standing’s basic universal income
does nothing to transform existing institutions and systems responsible
102 Sean Hill II
for precarity, nor does it offer an alternative to those same systems. The
legal system is often understood as a vehicle for protecting the wealthy at
the expense of the indigent and precarious, and existing methods of legal
practice, such as impact litigation and direct legal services, are prone
to that particular criticism (Freeman and Freeman 2016; Ashar 2008,
362–64). M4BL, however, is breeding a new type of attorney known as a
movement lawyer. These are lawyers who work in collaboration with collectives and movement leaders, to help them build their own power and
capacity so as to effectuate sustainable change (Freeman 2015). In sharp
contrast to Standing’s theory of precarity, these lawyers center and defer
to community members themselves in addressing racial and economic
disparities.
The New York Chapter of the National Conference of Black Lawyers,
which I cochair, offers an excellent example of this new style of lawyering in the form of its Mass Defense Network. Rather than litigate a series of police brutality cases or launch a campaign for a state or federal
change of policy, our affinity group instead created a network of legal
observers and defense attorneys that provides legal support to Blackled collectives. This network was a direct outgrowth of what collectives,
themselves, said they needed: first, to have culturally competent, Black
and brown legal observers to observe police conduct while protesters
engage in protest and other constitutionally protected conduct, and second, to have defense attorneys that aren’t just zealous advocates but are
sensitive to protesters’ unique needs as members of larger collectives.
Fulfilling these responsibilities amplifies the voices of Black communities by contributing to their having greater confidence and security when
in the field (contrary to the chilling effect heavy police presence and
criminalization are intended to have on protest). Further, this approach
ensures grassroots and movement leaders can continue to build awareness and power within communities, rather than face incapacitation as
a result of undue arrest and over-incarceration. Those directly impacted
by issues of anti-Blackness remain in the fore while attorneys remain in
the background. They instruct the bar on what they need, limiting the
co-optation and hollow reform traditionally affiliated with the law (Siegel 1996). Were Standing to take a similar approach, by centering the
voices of those historically relegated to the precariat, both his theory of
precarity and recommended solutions would set the foundation for solving rather than entrenching precarity.
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
103
Conclusion
In 2012, three Black women reignited the movement for Black liberation
and self-determination with the compelling declaration and hashtag:
#BlackLivesMatter. The demand—that the world stop treating the lives
of Black people and others of African descent as disposable, and instead
vest them with the dignity and respect reserved exclusively for those of
European descent—sprang from the acquittal of George Zimmerman
for the extrajudicial killing of seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida (Garza 2014). According to the proponents of what is now
broadly termed the Movement for Black Lives, making Black lives matter
requires more than just an end to white vigilantism; it demands that we
reject all forms of state-sponsored violence against Black communities,
whether that violence manifests itself in police misconduct, housing and
education disparities, or in the ever-worsening wealth gap between white
and Black Americans.
Standing’s theory of precarity offers one explanation for the abysmal
conditions of Black and other members of the precarious class, seeing in
neoliberalism an explanation for low-wage, short-term work without the
promise of advancement or basic job security. While his assessment is
accurate, it is lacking in its failure to account for the long-standing status
of Black Americans as a precarious class. The result: the perpetuation
and fortification of precarity in Black communities, the normalization of
white precariat class members selecting far-right, fascist leaders, and the
undermining of progressive coalitions to combat neoliberalism.
M4BL, with its foundation in intersectionality, can guide us forward in
solving precarity. Such an approach has allowed the movement to center
the voices of those most marginalized within the Black community, as well
as generate new methods of leadership. Moreover, it has transformed how
attorneys practice the law, thus laying the foundation for building entirely
new institutions and systems. Were Standing’s theory of precarity to adopt
similar approaches, this would not only resolve his erasure of people of
African descent, it would also allow for comprehensive solutions that actually address and eliminate precarity on the global stage.
Sean Hill II, Esq., is the cochair of the New York Chapter of the National Conference
of Black Lawyers and on the Steering Committee of Law4BlackLives. He works on bail
and speedy trial reform throughout New York in an effort to end mass criminalization.
He can be reached at seanhill.ii@gmail.com.
104 Sean Hill II
Notes
1. Stacey Patton noted this particular phenomenon in a recent article for Dame
magazine, in which she criticizes right-wing media for casting white men as
the exclusive victims in America and as the only demographic denied the
American Dream. This narrative not only “privileges White male experiences of hardship,” but it also “takes attention away from [the] system and the
elites controlling it.” She adds, “It says that the media and politicians need to
understand the White male voter in Ohio or Pennsylvania but not the black
voter in Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, or New Orleans that [Trump] wants to
be watched closely at the polls on Election Day” (Patton 2016).
2. Michelle Alexander’s concept of the “racial bribe” can be used to partly
explain this phenomenon. Specifically, she contends that white elites, as a
means of maintaining their dominance over both poorer whites and people
of African descent, have always extended special privileges to poor whites
so as to keep them divided from their Black counterparts. This strategy has
been employed since chattel slavery and resulted in an entrenched racial
caste system, which poor whites have a vested interest in maintaining (Alexander 2010, 25–57).
3. One explanation for whites’ susceptibility may be that the white members
of the precariat classes have no choice but to rally around their (fictional)
identities as white people as a means of filling the identity void that’s left
whenever they are denied labor-related identities as a result of neoliberalism.
It follows that they then select fascist political parties and candidates because
these entities make specific appeals on the basis of a shared national (often
exclusively white) identity. In fact, Blacks could be said to use their shared
identity in similar fashion: to assuage the trauma and concomitant challenges of perpetually being denied labor-related securities and the full range of
rights accorded to citizens. However, Black Americans’ reliance on shared
identity does not result in the selection of far-right candidates and parties,
despite such conduct being a logical outgrowth according to Standing’s conception of precarity (2011b).
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University Press.
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
Sean Hill II
Abstract: Guy Standing’s theory of precarity fails to account for the myriad ways in which people of African descent, specifically Black Americans,
experienced precarity prior to the rise of neoliberalism. This facilitates
Black Americans remaining an eternal precariat class and also undermines
the multiracial, progressive coalitions that could assist in solving precarity.
Were Standing’s theory to center those who, both historically and contemporaneously, have been most marginalized, his theory and recommended
solutions would be more comprehensive. The intersectional approach of
the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), and the transformative effect it
is having upon law practice, can guide us in the development of a more
robust theory of precarity that produces sustainable solutions and change.
Keywords: intersectionality, Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), critical
race theory, Black Lives Matter, movement lawyering, National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL)
Two hundred and twenty-eight years. It’s just shy of the 240 years that
America has celebrated as an independent nation. It also happens to be
the number of years it would take the average Black American family to
build the same wealth as their white counterparts (Asante-Muhammed et
al. 2016). This is the financial state of the Black community as it bids farewell to the first Black president and steels itself for the promised dangers
of the Trump administration.
The Movement for Black Lives (M4BL), launched with the 2013 tweet
#BlackLivesMatter, has become a channel for many Black Americans to
voice their dissatisfaction with a country that, for all of its rhetoric of “freedom” and “equality,” cannot solve long-standing disparities between its
white and Black citizens.
WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 45: 3 & 4 (Fall/Winter 2017) © 2017 by Sean Hill II. All rights reserved.
94
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
95
Yet a few years before the inception of M4BL, Guy Standing (2011a)
proposed an explanation for the ever-increasing wealth disparities seen
not just in the United States but around the globe. It is a concept that he
calls “precarity.” The “precariat,” Standing (2011a) claims, is an emerging
class of people denied the security and protections associated with the
postwar Keynesian era—a livable wage, unionization, opportunities for
training and advancement, etc.—as a result of neoliberal policies that encourage the privatization of social services and reliance on a transnational,
unskilled labor force. “Precarity,” according to Standing (2011a), is a relatively new phenomenon, the result of countries rejecting the policies of
the Keynesian welfare state in favor of neoliberalism’s calls for fewer government interventions on behalf of the proletariat. In Standing’s (2014,
2011b) opinion, if we are to solve the issue of precarity, then political leaders must embrace policies that are sensitive to the plight of the precarious
class, like the provision of a basic income and other progressive measures.
Yet when we examine the United States through the lens of precarity, we encounter a glaring contradiction—namely, that Black Americans
have had the markers of precarity since the country’s inception through
to the present day. Their existence as a precarious class in fact preceded
neoliberalism. The last several decades are only unique in that the pool
of precarious persons has now expanded to include white Americans and
others of European descent, the lives that have “mattered” both historically
and contemporaneously. It is this small subset of the precarious class that
Standing is seemingly describing in his scholarship: newly exposed to the
job insecurities of capitalism and especially susceptible to the appeals of
fascist leaders.
I will spend the first part of this article briefly exploring the ways in
which people of African descent have been a perpetual precarious class in
America. I will then proceed to identify the inherent dangers of failing to
account for their precarious status. And in the final section, I will examine
how M4BL can guide us toward eliminating precarity both in America and
on the global stage.
Mapping Precarity in the Black American Community
Precarity, in Standing’s estimation, is a contemporary phenomenon, the
product of industrial nations adopting, exporting, and imposing neoliberal policies on a global scale. Whereas the proletariat, which preceded
96 Sean Hill II
the precariat, was able to secure the seven forms of labor-related security—adequate income-earning opportunities, protection against arbitrary dismissal, the opportunity to gain skills through apprenticeships
or employment, etc.—the precariat is said to lack all of these securities
(Standing 2011a, 10–13). In a world that prioritizes the use of a transnational, cheap labor force, they cycle in and out of short-term, low-wage
jobs that have little to no opportunity for advancement. According to
Standing, they lack a work-based identity and do not feel part of a “solidaristic labour community,” which only serves to intensify “a sense of
alienation and instrumentality in what they have to do” (2011a, 12).
They are “denizens” in that they are denied at least one of the rights afforded true citizens, e.g., civil, cultural, social, economic, and political
rights (14, 87–88, 93–96).
Yet Black Americans carried all of these markers of precarity before
neoliberalism assumed global proportions. Take, for example, Standing’s (2011a) position that today’s precarious classes are defined by an
inability to unionize, and the denial of basic employment and income
securities associated with the labor movement of the postwar era. This
stance presumes there was an era when all or a majority of the members of the proletariat had equal access to the protections and security
of union membership. An examination of America’s labor movement,
however, shows concerted, intentional, and altogether successful efforts
by white laborers to exclude their Black counterparts from unions and
their related rewards (Velez 2015; Honey 1999). As late as 1968, Black
Americans were forced to create alternative union collectives because
the AFL-CIO unions remained deeply discriminatory and persistently
denied admission of Blacks to the higher ranks of leadership (Georgakas and Surkin 1998). Across all seven forms of labor-related security
that Standing enumerates, history shows us that Black Americans have
not just fared far worse than white members of the working class, they
have also more often than not found themselves without any of the labor
protections that the precariat class is only now said to be lacking (Perea
2011; Moreno 2006; Kropp 2002).
Similarly, Black Americans have occupied the role of denizens since
first arriving on America’s shores as slaves, and even after their de jure release from bondage (Blackmon 2008). The era of Jim Crow, which followed on the heels of abolition, rested firmly on the denizen status of Black
Americans, who were not treated equally before the law, not protected
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
97
against crime and physical harm, not entitled to income-earning activity,
and not granted an equal right to vote (Woodward 1974), all of the rights
Standing claims are critical to a nonprecarious existence (2011a, 14). This
denizen status has only continued, unabated, in the age of neoliberalism,
with our ever-growing prison and policing systems acting as the primary
vehicles for the routine denial of basic rights to Black Americans (Hinton 2016; Alexander 2010). In the last several decades, we have seen voter
suppression transform into pervasive felony disenfranchisement (Davidson 2016), rampant discrimination in housing access (Coates 2014), and
severe employment disparities (Desilver 2013) that undercut any claims
of equal access to the various forms of state-sponsored social protection.
Capitalism, which finds its origins in the slave trade, demanded Black
Americans occupy the role of denizens (Quijano and Wallerstein 1992).
Given that Standing counts people of African descent amongst today’s
precariat (2011a, 86), it follows that their denizen status has continued
uninterrupted since chattel slavery into the present.
I am not the first to identify precarity and precarious classes as preceding neoliberalism. In Precarious Existence and Capitalism: A Permanent
State of Exception, Tayyab Mahmud makes the compelling argument that
precarity “is an unavoidable historical and structural feature of capitalism”
(2015, 701) and that neoliberalism has simply served the dual role of expanding and deepening precarity. This expansion has resulted in what he
calls the “hyper-precarious,” a labor pool of undocumented immigrants
that is “large, flexible, super-controlled and super-exploited” (722). He
explains that, “Dislocated from their spaces and communities of affiliation, these workers have to contend with low wages, low-status work, denial of labor rights, political disenfranchisement, state repression, racism
and xenophobic nativism” (723). The racist ideologies underlying their
oppression “help keep the attention of relatively privileged sections of the
working classes away from the crisis of global capitalism . . . undermin[ing]
unity and coalition building among the working classes” (724).
While Mahmud does the necessary and critical work of demonstrating capitalism’s longstanding reliance on precarity, like Standing, he does
not address the perpetual status of Black Americans as a precarious class.
He begins the work of defining a new, hyperprecarious class when Black
Americans have also been exhibiting the signs of hyperprecarity for centuries, including being relegated to low-wage work, and being subjected
to political disenfranchisement, state repression, and racism. And the rac-
98 Sean Hill II
ist ideologies he identifies as being responsible for division within today’s
working classes were used in nearly identical fashion to divide Black and
white workers in America before the rise of neoliberalism (Honey 1999).
In the next section, I will identify the inherent risks in failing to acknowledge people of African descent as the persistent precariat class. I will
then proceed to identify one way forward in efforts to eradicate precarity
for good: the platform and demands of those in M4BL.
The Dangers and Pitfalls of Failing to Acknowledge Black Americans as a
Perpetual Precarious Class
Failing to account for Black Americans’ perpetual state of precarity has
several consequences, some obvious and others discrete. Chief amongst
these consequences is that it facilitates Blacks remaining an eternal precariat class. Following Standing’s lead, American precarity, for example, is
being cast as an altogether new phenomenon whose effects are being felt
primarily (if not exclusively) by the white working class (Patton 2016).1
There is no shortage of pieces on what Hillary Clinton and the Democrats
did wrong in their appeals to the white working class, and what Donald
Trump got right (Leonard 2017; Kilibarda and Roithmayr 2016; Eisler
2016). This provokes a conversation that is exclusively about what needs
to be done to make the lives of white Americans better, rather than the lives
of Black people or the millions of hyperprecarious individuals residing
within America’s borders (Patton 2016). Policies are recommended and
applied on the basis of what a small subset of the precarious class—white
people—wants or needs, rather than on what would be best for the entire
precarious class (Stephanopoulos 2015; Hutchison 2010). This, in turn,
allows for the ever-greater concentration of wealth and resources in white
communities (precarious or otherwise), while capitalism and its brother, neoliberalism, continue uninterrupted and unabated, using Blacks and
undocumented persons as a perpetual pool of cheap labor. Believing precarity has been solved (at least for them), whites become susceptible to
messages from neoliberals and fascists alike, that Blacks and other hyperprecarious persons have an innate dysfunction that explains their lack of
basic labor-related securities, like steady employment and wages (Franke
2016). These inaccurate and racist tropes distract white members of the
precariat and ensure they do not interrogate the neoliberal systems that
are crushing their own communities (Mahmud 2015, 724). This, in turn,
Precarity in the Era of #BlackLivesMatter
99
allows Black Americans’ status as denizens to be further justified, exploited, and entrenched.
A failure to examine African-descended peoples as a precarious class
also normalizes whites’ routine selection of racist and xenophobic fascists
whenever the privileges temporarily afforded them as white members of
the precarious class (like unionization, a livable wage, social welfare programs, etc.) are at risk of being made available to other members of the
precarious class.2 Standing speaks of migrants, Black and otherwise, being
convenient scapegoats when neoliberal policies prove ineffective (2011a,
90–102), but there is no analysis of how such scapegoating also serves to
concretize what it means to be white. This phenomenon is worthy of its
own full analysis and explanation, given that the white precariat’s reliance
on a shared white identity produces not just fascist leadership but also
leadership that is deeply invested in the oppression of Blacks and other
ethnic minorities (Adichie 2016; Morrison 2016; Painter 2016). It is the
type of leadership that produced a system which routinely and disproportionately cages Black and brown bodies (Alexander 2010), and that routinely exports war and terror on a global scale (Selby 2016). Breaking this
cycle requires an analysis that accounts not just for the degree of precarity
class members experience based on race and ethnicity but also for how
each subset of the precarious class reacts to their precarity, particularly in
the context of political choices and decisions.3
Finally, failing to acknowledge and name Black people as a perpetual precarious class is undermining the ability of progressives to build
the broad, multiracial coalitions necessary to end neoliberalism (Glaude
2016; Laymon 2016). Because Standing’s (2014) and others’ sense of
precarity is divorced from race, it results in policy recommendations and
political platforms that are sensitive to class, exclusively, as opposed to
class and race. The Sanders campaign was routinely criticized for taking
an exclusively class-based approach (Thrasher 2016; Coates 2016), with
some commentators drawing connections between his primary loss and
a failure to make specific, race-based appeals to Black Americans (Starr
2016). An exclusively class-oriented approach will lose even greater traction in the wake of the Obama administration, which regularly claimed
that promulgating and implementing policies on the basis of class would
inevitably result in benefits to Blacks, who make up a disproportionate
number of the precariat (Darity Jr. 2016). But with recent studies showing that Black households would have to save 100 percent of their in-
100 Sean Hill II
come for three consecutive years just to close the Black-white wealth gap
(...
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