Miami Dade College Locke and Hobbes View of Human Nature Discussion

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What is Martin Gardner's argument for the objectivist view of art? Do you agree? Why or why not?

Use Vaughn’s textbook to help you explain Gardner’s theory and its strengths and weaknesses. Choose an object, performance, or piece of writing as an example, and explain whether Gardner’s theory would classify the object as Art. Do you agree with objectivism about Art or do you find another theory more convincing? Defend your point of view.

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Explain Locke’s view of human nature. Use details from the textbook to support your description. Explain Hobbes’s view of human nature, again using details from the textbook to support your description. How do Locke's view of human nature and Hobbes' view differ? Which do you think is more accurate? Explain, and defend your answer.

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8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY Political philosophy is the study of political societies using the methods of philosophy-namely, critical reasoning and careful analysis. It is essentially moral philosophy applied to government and political life. Like moral philosophy, it is a normative endeavor, concerned with standards or principles for determining how politicalsystems oughtto bestructured. To do irs work properly, political philosophy must also take into account ho\v political systems are infact structured, but this is a descriptive task that is secondary to the normative one. Politicalscience, on the other hand, is mostly a descriptive enterprise dedicated to uncovering the empirical facrs of political systems past or present. The issues of political philosophy are large, important, and personal. They raise questions about the moral and nonmoral goodness ofwhole societies, which largely determine the moral and nonmoral goodness ofour lives. We can, ofcourse, try to ignore these issues, but that is like a fish trying to ignore the water. The questions press us from all sides. What is justice, and \vhat constitutes just and unjust treatment of the members of society? How should the political and material goods of society (\vealth, property, liberties, righrs) be distributed among its citizens? Should these goods be allotted according to need, utility, merit, desert, equality, or some other principle? What theory of political society should rule the distribution? Is de- mocracy really the best form of governmen t? Is socialism? Libertarianism? Do \vell- off citizens have a duty to provide goods to the less well-off? What is the morally right (just) balance between the state's control of its people and the people's liberty and rights? What is the moral justification for the state's exercise of po\ver and au- thority over individuals? Is the state necessary at all-or is it better to live in small communities without state authority? Suppose someone fails to see the need to study political philosophy or even to think much about the government under which she lives. Political philosophers can make several replies to this attitude, but let us focus on just two. First, whether you are just beginning to form your ideas about politics and government or you are al- ready a veteran of many political discussions (and proudly call yourselfa Democrat, Republican, socialist, libertarian, or something else), political philosophy can help you more than you may realize. A good dose of political philosophy can clarify your thinking, introduce you to ne\v perspectives, acquaint you \vith arguments for and against political theories (including your O\vn), and help you arrive at informed opinions. The result is greater understanding acquired through critical thinking and reflection-not through prejudice or unsupported presumption. Consider, for example, this issue: the pervasiveness of government. The state's fingers are every\vhere, revealed through levie.d taxes, a welfare system, the con- struction of roads and dams, the treatment of prisoners and patients, vast armies of government employees, declarations of peace and war, subsidies for homeo\vners and corporations, and the regulation of everything from hamburger to baby cribs. How do you feel about such omnipresent governance? Would you like to see more of the same, much less, or some other political system altogether? Such questions are flashpoints in contemporary debates about the proper role ofgovernment in our Political philosophy is the study ofpolitical soci- eties using che mechods of philosophy. Overview: Justice and Political Philosophy 355 lnjustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. -Martin Luther Klng.Jr. 356 Chapter 8 The Just Society In the absence ofjustice, what is sovereignty but organiu:d robbery? -Saint Augustine Figure 8.1 Signing of the Declaration of Independence: ·we hold these truths to be self- evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.• What philosopher inspired these words? lives. How would you go about getting some answers? An offhand, party-line reac- tion to these questions may provide some temporary satisfaction or assurance. But ifyou ,vant better understanding and well-supported vie,vs, your best bet is to take the philosophical approach. Second, political philosophy may not bake bread or sell widgets, but it does sometimes change the world. You ,viii see several examples in this chapter of po- litical theories that affected history, but for no,v let's ponder this one. John Locke (1632-1704) argued that through a social contract between government and the governed, the authority ofthe state could be justifie.d. The state exisrs by the consent ofthe governed and is the guarantor of the people's inalienable rights of"life, liberty, and estate." The state serves the people, and the people have the right to challenge it through revolution if it violates the terms of the contract. Locke's ideas (shockingly radical when first introduced) ,vere familiar to American colonisrs, and they heavily influenced the framers of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. (Other nations took notice of Locke's thinking as ,veil.) Even the language in these documenrs reflects Locke's thinking. This famous sentence in the Declaration, for example, is almost pure Locke: "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator ,vith certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Political theory in the seventeenth century thus affects twenty-first- century Americans (and the rest of the ,vorld). The topic that gets most attention in political philosophy is justice. In its broad- est sense,justice refers to people getting what is fair or \vhat is their due, and the core principle that defines a person's due is equals should be treated equally. The idea is that people should be treated the same unless there is a morally relevant reason for treating them differently. Justice by this definition comes in two forms, and each is profoundly important in a society. Retributivejustice has to do with the fair meting out ofpunishment to citizens for wrongdoing. Distributive justice, or social jus- tice, is about the fair distribution ofsociety's benefits and burdens (its material and nonmaterial goods)-such things as jobs, income, property, liberties, rights, welfare aid, taxes, and public service. Ho\v these goods are distributed among the citizens of a s t a t e i s a f u n c t io n o f h o \ vthestateisstructured,howitssocialandpolit i c a l i n s t i t u - tions are arranged. It's this kind ofjustice that is the focus ofpolitical philosophers and their theories ofjustice. Theories ofjustice embody principles that define fair distributions, that explain what people are due and why. A utilitarian theory ofjustice, for example, says that the distribution ofgoods should be base.cl on the principle of utility. Society's insti- tutions must be arranged so that its benefits and burdens are allocated to maximize some measure ofsociety's welfare (total happiness, for example). This is a popular scheme of distribution, although some think it is inconsistent with our common- sense notions ofjustice and equality. As you might guess, the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill favors the vie\v. S o m e t h e o r i e s o f j u s t i c e i n s i s t o n d i s t r i b u t io n s a c c o r d i n g t o m e r i t , o r d e s e r t ( w h a t people deserve). Plato (c. 427-347 BCE) took this tack, arguing that because people differ in their talencs and achievements, they should be given a station in life that reflects this difference. Some people have superior capacities and therefore should receive a superior share ofsociety's goods; some possess few capacit ies and should get a smaller share. As you can see, Plato's vie\v is strongly antidemocratic. In other theories, merit and utility mean little, while equality means (almost) everything. The thoroughgoing egalitarian maintains that, contrary to Plato, there are no morally relevant differences among persons, so everyone should be appor- tioned an equal share ofsociety's benefits. After all, don't we believe that all persons are created equal? John Rawls (1921-2002) argues for this kind of rigorous equality in his theory of justice. He contends that since people's character and behavior are accidents of nature, no one really deserves any particular allotment of benefics or burdens-and so equality is the most reasonable basis for distribution ofgoods. A staunch egalitarianism demands that the supposedly deserving, undeserving, needy, and self-sufficient receive the same size slice ofsociety's pie and the portions cannot be adjusted on grounds ofutility. An important theme ofsome theories is that society's wealth should be allocated according to need. Allotmencs ofgoods based on people's hardship or indigence are common elements in ma ny societ ies, often combined with other d istribution prin- ciples. Welfare programs, lo\ver tax rates for people with low incomes, disaster relief, low-interest loans to the disadvantaged-such programs are strictly need-base.cl. Some thinkers hold that meeting the needs ofsociety's worst offshould be a major concern of the state. But others argue that assisting the needy is not a requirement of Justice is the idea that people should get what is lair or whar is their due. Distributivejustice (or social justice) is the lair distribution ofsociety's benefirs and burdens- such chings as jobs, income, property, libcrrics, rights, welfare aid, taxc.'i, and public service. Overview: Justice and Political Philosophy 357 1Would a society structured entirely on the principle of utility be just? The vinuc ofjustice consists in moderatio n, as rcgulaccd by wisdom. - A r istotle 2 Are the principles of desert and equality in conflict? That is, is it possible to have a society that treats everyone with strict equa lity while ensuring that everyone gets what they deserve? 358 Chapter 8 The Just Society Figure 8.2 More Americans are shunning political parties and migrating to the polit- ical center. MostlyRep11bUcan Staunch Conservatives (Highly engaged Tea Party supporters} Main Strecr Republicans (Con1ervative 011 most issues) Mostly Independent Libertarian s (Free market, smallgovernmentseculars) Disaffccreds (Downscale and cynical} Post-Moderns (Moderates but liberal 011 social issues) Mostly Democratic New Coalition Dcmocrars (Upbeat, 111ajority-mi11oriry) Hard-Pressed Democrats (Religious, fi11a11cially struggling) Solid Liberals (Across-rJ1e-board liberalpositions) Bystanders Young, politically disengaged Total General PtlbUc 9 II 9 II 13 JO 13 14 JO JOO Registered V oters II 14 JO II 14 9 15 16 0 JOO WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE? Political Views in Flux The Pe,v Research Center, which conduces opinion surveys co gauge political attitudes, reports chat, "With the economy still struggling and the nation involved in multiple 1nilicary operations overseas, che public's political 1nood is fractious. In chis environ,nent, many political attitudes have beco,ne ,nore doctrinaire at both ends of che ideological spectrum, a polarization chat reAecrs the current atmosphere in Washing- ton. Yee ac the sa,ne time, a gro,ving number of Americans are choosing not co identify with either political party, and the center of the political spectrum is increasingly diverse." H ere are che results fro,n a recent Pew survey o f Americans. P e r c e n t a g e o f. .. ·BeyondRedvs.Blue:71,ePoliticalTypology'"PewResearchCenter, Washington,DC(May,2011)http:!/ www.people-press.org/20J J/05!04/beyo11dred-vs-blue-rhe-polirical-typologyl. Do you see yourself in these numbers? If not, how would you characterize your political views? justice; helping unfortunates is a job best left to voluntary charity, not government. Many who resist the idea of distributions based on equality or desert do so by appealing to a principle of entitlement. They argue that even if people don't deserve the goods they have, they nevertheless may be entitled to them. We are entitled, for example, to selfownership of our O\vn bodies even though \Ve have done nothing to deserve having them. Perhaps the most famous entitlement theory of justice is that of Robert Nozick (1938-2002). He argues that if \Ve rightfully possess any goods, they are ours only because we are entitled to them-entitled because we acquired them legitimately, not because we got them through appeals to equality or desert. The most influential theories of justice have incorpo- rated some or all of these principles, emphasizing some of them, downplaying others, and arriving at distinc- tive sociopolitical models that we can use to judge the worthiness of real-\vorld systems. It is difficultperhaps impossible-to fully fathom our own political system without knowing something about the theories ofjustice that preceded it. The following sections should help you understand what those predecessors are like. WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS Figure 8.3 Is the state obligated to help the poor? Is it morally permissible for the government to tax the rich to guarantee the poor a basic minimum of w elfare assistance? 1. Imagine you are convinced that the way your own society is structured is better than that ofother societies. Ho\v could you argue for such a position? 2. Suppose you think your country's form of distributive justice is ser- iously Aa\ved. Ho\v could you argue for your view? What principle of justice is at fault? 3. Do you think a society based entirely on equality would be just? Why or why not? 4. Do you think, as Ra\vls does, that no one really deserves any particu- lar distribution of benefits or burdens? Explain. 5. In your view, \vhat would be some of the beneficial or harmful effects ofa society based solely on merit, as Plato proposed? Overview: Justice and Political Philosophy 359 SECTION 8.1 Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any one class is made to fed that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe. -Frederick Douglass 360 Chapter 8 The Just Society Meritocracy is a system ofrule by rhosc mosr qualified to govern. Democracy is rule by the people as a whole. 3How wouldyou defend democ- racy against Plato's criticisms? \Vhat do I care about Jupiter>Justice is a human issue, and I do not need a god to teach it to me. -Jean-Paul Sartre 8.2 PLATO'S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT About nventy-five centuries ago, Plato proposed in his masterwork The Republic a theory of justice that has challenged thinkers and stimulated debate ever since. He argues that the only kind ofsociety that can ensure people get their due is a meritocracy, a system of rule by those most qualified to govern. He contrascs meri- tocracy with a form of government he strongly opposes: democracy, rule by the people as a whole. In his view, democratic rule is mob rule, the reign of a rabble too easily swayed by emotional appeals and bad arguments. Plato had plenty of experience with democratic rule, for in his day Athens was a democracy in which governmental decisions were made by direct vote of adult male Athenians. (Greek democracy was far from rule by all the people, for only free men \vere full citizens, and \vomen and slaves were excluded.) He never forgot that it \vas a democratic vote of his fello\v citizens that committed the ultimate injustice by condemning to death his teacher and role model, the venerable Socrates. Plato's theory ofjustice dovetails with his theory of mind, as \vell as with his epis- t e m o l o g y a n d e t h ic s . H e a r g u e s t h a t t h e m a k e u p a n d f u n c t i o n i n g o f s o c ie t y i s d i r e c t l y analogous to the makeup and functioning ofthe person (or soul). In his philosophy ofmind, every person is composed ofthree fundamental componencs: (1) appetite, or desires; (2) spirit, or drives (including motivations and emotions); and (3) reason (the intellect). The just, or virtuous, person will be a \vell-balance.d composite ofthese, each Figure 8.4 Plato's Academy at Athens. In Plato's republic, all people are not created equal. Does this f act invalidate his t heory of justice? • . ' performing its own distinctive function in harmony \Vith the others, \vith the appetites and spirit ruled and coordinated by reason. In similar fashion, Plato says, a society consiscs of three types ofpeople, each one identified according to \vhich ofthesoul'scomponencs predominates: 1. Those who are moved by their appetites (producers- laborers, carpenters, artisans, farmers) 2. Those who are moved by spirit (auxiliaries-soldiers, \varriors, police) 3. Those who are moved by reason (guardians-leaders, rul- ers, philosopher-kings) In a just society, these three perform their proper functions \vhile the producers and aux iliaries are led and controlled by the guardians. The just state is a harmonious community governed by reason, just as a virtuous person is a tripartite be- ing presided over by the rational faculty ofthe soul. Plato says citizens are assigned to one of the three func- tions base.cl on their aptitude and performance, and once ap- pointed, they are expected to remain in that class and not try to cross over to another. This scheme reflects his theory of ethics. To be virtuous and happy, he says, we must act ac- cording to our talencs and aptitude, striving for excellence in the endeavors nature has chosen for us. Plato, then, envisions an aristocracy (a society ruled by the best citizens)- not an aristocracy of the rich, landed, or well-born, but of the intellectual. The guardians are true philosopher-kings. They wield all the political power by virtue of their greater talents and intelligence. In the ideal republic, the guardians- contrary to the usual custom-cannot own property, for O\vning property might tempt them to govern for personal gain rather than for the good ofsociety. This po\verful elite can include women and anyone from the lower classes, because the only qualification for becoming a ruler is simply to be ofsuperior intelligence and character. To modern minds, some ofthe elements ofPlato's society may sound both wrong and alien. H is ideal state rests on massive inequality among citizens who are sorted into three classes marked by unequal shares ofpower and privilege. Granted, people are assigned to different classes according to merit, but inequality is still the rule. Plato maintains that equals should be treated equally, but to him the classes deserve different treatment because they are different. All men are not created equal. Then there is the authoritarianism ofPlato's republic, in which no one gets to choose his or her own role in life. In general, once assigned to a social role, citizens cannot jump to another. There is no social mobility, except within a class and in the case ofguardians being chosen from lower classes. In the follo\ving selection from The Republic, Plato (through the character of Socrates) is explaining his concept ofjustice to companions. The discussion is nar- rated by Socrates. Plato, The Republic Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You rem ember the original prin- ciple which we were always laying down at the foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;- now justice is this principle or a part of it. Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only. Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us. Yes, we said so. Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference? I can not, but I should like to be told. Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and, that this is the ultimatecause and condition oftheexistence ofall ofthem, and whileremaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one. Aristocracy is a socicry ruled by the best citizens. 4 To determine cit- izens' aptitudes and talents (and thustheir place in society), Plato favored testing them while they are young. Is it possible to discover the bestcareer for someone thisway? What about people who discover or de- velop their true talents lateinlife-those, for example, who are poor studentsbut turn out to be geniuses in adulthood like Einstein? Is Plato too optimistic about the ease of discovering a person's true calling? Thatfollows ofnecessity. Justice in the life and con- duct ofthe State is pos.sible only as first it resides in the hearts and soulsofrhe citizens. - P la,o 5 Don't we reward ath- letes, doctors, lawyers, and business executives according to their merit and not by democratic vote? Should our leaders be chosen the same way, as Plato suggests? Why or why not? Plato's Theory: Justice as Merit 361 362 Chapter 8 The Just Society 6 Do you think Plato exaggerates the consequences of allowing a person to abandon his own career path and do another person's job? Explain. If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence contrib- utes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of rulers and subjects or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,- the quality, I mean, ofevery one doing his own work and not being a busybody, would claim the palm- the question is not so easily answered. Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which. Then the power ofeach individual in the State to do his own work appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage. Yes, he said. And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice? Ex a c t l y . Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office ofdetermining suits at law? Certa inly. And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own? Yes; that is their principle. Which is a just principle? Yes. Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him? Very true. Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a cobbler to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to ex- change their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State? Not much. But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class ofwarriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin ofthe State. Most true. Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling ofone with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing? Precisely. And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice ? Certainly. This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just. I agree with you.• PHILOSOPHY NOW Merit or Equality: Who Gets to Live? Organ transplant operations are incredibly expensive, organs are in very short supply, and transplants are desperately needed by far ,nore people than can be acco1n1nodared. The ,vaicing list for transplants is long, and thousands die every year for their lack. Screening commit- tees at transplant centers decide whether someone should be placed on the ,vairing list and ,vhac ranking he or she should receive. They use various criteria to make these decisions, some explicit, so,ne inforrnal or unspoken, some plausible (such as che patient's need and likeli- hood of benefit), and so,ne controversial (such as ability co pay, social ,vorthiness, and health habits). A,nong these, social or ,noral ,vorthiness-,nerit-is probably rhe ,nose contentious. Here the questions are: Which potential recipients-if given che chance co live-are expected co contribute most co the good of society? Or ,vhich possible recipients do nor deserve transplants, because they have indulged in habits (like excessive alcohol use or dangerous activities) char contributed to their irnpend ing organ fai lure? To scare che is- sue concretely: All things being equal, should rhe medical student or priest gee che transpla nt instead of che prostitute or alcoholic? Figure 8.5 Who should get the only available liver or heart- the person chosen by lottery, the upright citizen, the man who donates thousands of dollars to the hospital, the priest, or the homeless child? Many reject such appeals co merit and insist char the proper criteria are egalitarian- a matter of justice and che moral equality of persons. They argue char all persons have equal ,vorth. Morally, che medicalstudent is nor worth ,nore than the prostitute or alcoholic, and vice versa. Education, achievement, occupation, and the like are nor ,norally relevant. Nevertheless, ,vh ile generally taking the egalitarian approach, son1e ph ilosophers ,nain- rain char in very rare cases, social worth can outweigh egalitarian concerns. It seems reason- able that in a natural d isaster involving ,nass casualties, injured physicians or nurses should be created first if they can aid the ocher survivors. Should social or moral worth ever be taken into account in deciding who should get a transplant? Suppose the question is whether to give a transplant to a Nobel laureate or to a hard-working, honest truck driver. Assuming that all other factors are equal, which one should get the transplant? Why? Plato's Theory: Justice as Merit 363 364 Chapter 8 The Just Society Social contract theory is the view that justice is secured, and the stare is made legi,imate, through an agreement among citizens ofthe state or between rhc cirizcns and the rulers of ,he sratc. WRITING TO UNDERSTAND: CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.2 1. Plato thinks democracy is no better than mob rule. Do you agree? What are your reasons? 2. Plato believes that it's possible for a society to be just without equality among irs citizens. Do you agree? W hy or why not? 3. Plato believes his just society to be well ordered, rational, and harmo- nious. But are these trairs sufficient to ensure justice in a society? Can we plausibly call such a society just \vhen the state decides what kinds of lives its citizens must live? Give reasons for your view. 4. In Plato's republic, the guardians deserve to be rulers because they are the most intelligent and intellectually gifted. But do such attributes g uarantee \visdom? Are intellectually superior people a hvays good leaders? 5. Would you want to live in a state patterned after Plato's just society? Why or why not? 8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES In the seventeenth century, philosophers defied tradition by defending a new kind of theory of justice and a novel way of justifying the existence of the state: social contract theory. This vie\v says that justice is secured, and the state is made legiti- mate, through an agreement among citizens of the state or between the citizens and the rulers of the state. The people consent explicitly or implicitly to be governed-to be subject to the dictates and the power of the state -in exchange for the state's providingsecurity, righrs, and liberties. The state's exi.stence is justified by the binding contract that all parties accept. This understanding ofthe role and justification ofthe state was incorporated into the Constitution ofthe United States, and in the twenty-first century, this idea of a social contract is now taken for granted by much ofthe world. Nevertheless, when fully formed social contract theories were first introduced, they \Vere thought by many to be radical, scandalous, and wrong. In medieval Europe, the prevailing vie\v had been that states are supposed to be dominated by monarchs \vho rule by the"divine right ofkings." God sanctions the monarch's authority and ordains that society be ranked in a hierarchy of positions, from the king or queen do\vn to the poorest serfs, with each perform ing his or her preordained function. As in Plato's republic, people have their proper place in society, and no one is permitted or expected to deviate from it. The governed cannot consent to anything, and monarchs have absolute power over all their subjects. Among the most influentialsocial contract theorists are Thomas Hobbes (1588- 1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and John Rawls (19212002). We take up their views in the following pages. Hobbes Hobbes \vas the first philosopher in modern times to systematicallyarticulate asocial contract theory. It was a major departure from received vie\vS about society, and that fact alone \vas enough to infuriate many. It also contained a rejection of both the divine right ofkings and the notion ofa divinely established moral la\v-points that gave his critics even more reasons to attack him. In his famous Leviathan, Hobbes contends that a social contract is necessary in human affairs because living without one would be a horrific nightmare ofex- istence. He begins by assuming a pessimistic view of human beings: At their core, he says, they are selfish, treacherous, dishonest, and violent. He argues that when PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK Thomas Hobbes Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) ,vas more than an em- inent English philosopher whose cheories inAuenced future generations. He ,vas also a linguist, poet, classical scholar, cranslacor, logician, critic, and 1nache1nacical cucor Charity begins at home, and justice begins next door. - Charles Dickens 7 Hobbes is a pessimist about human nature; he thinks people are basically greedy and treacherous. Do you think he's right aboutthis?Orare people fundamentally sociable, cooperative, and benign? Explain your reasonrng. co Charles II. He ,vas born into a poor religious fa,nily and Figure 8.6 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), political theorist liked co say char when his ,nocher was pregnant ,vich hi,n, she went into labor on hearing char che Spanish Armada was chreacening England. He joked char "fear and I ,vere born nvins cogecher." He was educated at Oxford and spent most of his years as secretary and tutor co che family ofche chird earl of Devonshire. During chis employment, he mer che fore,nosc European thinkers (Galileo and Francis Bacon a,nong chem) and ,vroce on a wide range of issues, both scientific and philosophical. Many of these ,vorkswereextremelycontroversial. Hispoliticalphilosophy,vasoffensivecoboch sides in che English Civil War; che Ron1an Catholic Church and Oxford Univer- sity forbade che reading of his books; and he went against che grain of his era by advancing macerialis,n, egoism, and (\vhacsome considered) heresy. H is most fa,nous creation is leviathan (1651), ,vhich has had an enorn1ous in- Auence on English ,noral and political chinking. His ocher ,vricings include Philo- sophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (1651), On the Body (1655), and On Man (1658). and polymath. Social Contract Theories 365 366 Chapter 8 The Just Society 8 Do you think Hobbes is right about humans being roughly equal physicallyand men- tally? Why or why not? these tendencies are left unchecked by enforced laws or agreements, humans sink into a "state of nature"every man." In the state of a "war of every man against nature, there is no code, culture, or comfort. There is no justice. There is only "continual fear, and danger ofviolent death; and the life ofman [is) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."2 But, Hobbes says, humankind also has a strong instinct for selfinterest and self-preservation, and fortunately this impulse is coupled with the power of reason. Through reason, he says, people see that the only ,vay to escape this "war of all against all" is to enter into a social contract ,vith one another. In the name ofself- interest, they agree to turn over much of their autonomy, freedom, and power to an absolute sovereign that will forcibly keep the peace, restrain antisocial actions, and compel people to keep their agreements. Hobbes calls this sovereign the Leviathan (the name ofa sea monster mentioned in the Bible), which symbolizes great power and evil. Its authority over those bound by the social contract is absolute, its po,ver is fearsome (enough to deter any tendency to disorder), and irs contractual agreement ,vith irs subjects is irrevocable. Once po,ver is given up to this despot, there is no going back, and there is ahvays the chance that the sovereign will create an environ- ment worse than the state of nature. But that is the chance people must take. So the state's authority is justified by a social contract, and justice comes into be- ing as the Leviathan assumes power. For Hobbes, justice is a matter of the keeping ofcovenanrs (contracrs), and the only ,vay to ensure that covenants are kept is to let the Leviathan reign. Without the Leviathan to enforce covenants, there is no justice. As Hobbes says, "Where there is no common power, there is no la,v; where no law no injustice."3 Here is Hobbes arguing for his theory in Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan CHAPTER 13. OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND M ISERY Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestlystronger in body, or ofquicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself. And as to the faculties ofthe mind (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general, and infallible rules, called sci- ence; which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, [as prudence], while we look after somewhat else), Ifind yet a greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is but experience; Ir is better to lose every.. thing you have to keep the balance ofjustice level, than to livea life ofpetty privilege devoid oftrue freedo m . -Bryant H. McGill which equaltime,equallybestowson all men, inthose things theyequallyapplythem- selves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain con- ceit of one's own wisdom, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proves rather that men are in that pointequal, than unequal. For there is not ordinarilyagreater sign ofthe equal distribution ofany thing, than that every man is contented with his share. From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only), endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only ofthe fruit ofhis labour, but also ofhis life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger o f another. And from this diffidence ofone another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons ofall men he can, so Jong, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requires, and is generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking plea- sure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such augmentation ofdominion over men, be- ing necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him. Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal ofgrief) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looks that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his condemners, by damage; and from others, by the example. So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes ofquarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make them- selves masters ofother men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign o f undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name. 9 Does the existence of stabledemocracies in the twenty-first century showthat Hobbes iswrong about human nature? Social Contract Theories 367 Figure 8.7 Frontispiece to Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power o f a Common Wealth Ecclesiastical/ and Civil, 1651, by Thomas Hobbes. 368 Chapter 8 The Just Society Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is ofevery man, against every man. For WAR, consists not in battle only, or the act offight- ing; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion oftime, is to be considered in the nature ofwar; as it is in the nature ofweather. For as the nature offoul weather, lies not in a shower or two ofrain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature ofwar, consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE. Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time ofwar, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time; wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst ofall, continual fear, and danger ofviolent death; and the life ofman, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. .. . To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the fac- ulties neither ofthe body, nor mind. Ifthey were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill cond ition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in his reason. The passions that incline men to peace, are fear ofdeath; desire ofsuch things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws ofNature... . CHAPTER 14. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS, AND OF CONTRACTS The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus natura/e, is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, ofhis own life; and consequently, ofdoing any thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification ofthe word, the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment, and reason shall dictate to him. A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis), is a precept, or general rule, found out by rea- son, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is destructive ofhis life, or taketh 10 Suppose the world issuddenly left with no governmental au- thority anywhere; no formal restraints on human behavior exist. Speculate on how you think people would act. Would chaos and sav- agery ensue, or would people more or less live in peace and harmony? away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which he thinks it may be best preserved. For though they that speak ofthis subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consists in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas LAW, determines, and binds to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right ofevery man to every thing endures, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time, which natureordinarilyallows men to live. And consequentlyit isaprecept,orgeneral ruleof reason, that every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope ofobtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war. The first branch ofwhich rule, containeth the first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all means we can, to defend ourselves. From this fundamental law ofnature, by which men are commanded to endeavor peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence ofhimself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holds this right, of doing any thing he likes; so long are all men in the condition ofwar. But ifother men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then there is no reason for any one, to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey (which no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law ofall men, [what you would not have done to you, do not do to others). . .. CHAPTER 15. OFOTHER LAWS OF NATURE From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men perform their covenants made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right ofall men to all things remaining, we are still in the condi- tion ofwar. And in this law ofnature, consists the fountain and original of JUSTICE. For where no covenant hath proceeded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance ofcovenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just. But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part (as hath been said in the former chapter), are invalid; though the ori- ginal ofjustice be the making ofcovenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause ofsuch fear be taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance oftheir 11 Is ceding all power to a leviathan the only way for people to achieve peace, security, and cooperation in a society? Expla in. Social Contract Theories 369 370 Chapter 8 The Just Society Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan covenants, by the terror ofsome punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach oftheir covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual con- tract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for they say, that justice is the constant will ofgiving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature ofjustice, consists in keeping ofvalid covenants: but the validity ofcovenants begins not but with the constitution ofa civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins.• Locke Locke's social contract theory has some points in common \Vith Hobbes's-but also much that Hobbes would have rejected outright. Both Hobbes and Locke assert that ( I ) r e a s o n e n a b l e s p e o p l e t o s e e t h e w is d o m o f f o r m i n g a s t a t e t h r o u g h a s o c i a l c o n - tract, (2) people must freely consent to be bound by the contract (not be coerce.cl into accepting it), and (3) the state's authority is justified by this consent ofthe governed. Beyond these matters, Hobbes and Locke part company. For one thing, they have very d ifferent ideas about the "state of nature," the \vorld in \vhich no civil society exisrs. For Hobbes, to be in the state of nature is to be in a "war of all against all," where morality is nonexistent, and the only la\vS are commonsense rules for survival and self-interest. For Locke, on the other hand, the state of nature is considerably less nasty and brutish, for even there, natural moral la\vS apply and help to regulate people's behavior. Those living in the state of nature are free, sociable, equal, and (mostly) at peace. Hobbes contends that, generally, justice and rights do not come into being until the state is established. People surrender their lives and liberties to the Leviathan in exchange for security and peace, and he can do \vhat he wants \Vith his subjects. But Locke argues that humans have inherent, God-given rights \vhether or not a govern- ment is around to guarantee them. Chiefamong these is the right to property-not just land but your own body and any object that you change through work (\vith \vhich you "mix your labor"). These rights are inalienable: They cannot be trans- ferred to the government or any other entity. Humans create the government and cede some power to it; in return it protects their righrs and liberties. The state serves the people (not the other way round), directing all its power "to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good ofthe people." But \vhat exactly does the state do to preserve liberties and promote the com- mon good? Locke identifies three functions that people need the state to perform. First, citizens need the natural moral la\v to be set out in clearly expressed laws of the land. Un\vritten natural laws are clear to humans, but people are apt to mis- construe them in line with their biases. Second, there need to be impartial judges \vho can settle disputes concerning the application of the laws. Third, there nee.ds \Vhy has government been instituted at all? Because the passions o f m an will not conform to the die~ tares of reason and justice without constraint. - A lexander Hamilton to be po,ver in the state to enforce the laws. Otherwise, people will be able to take justice into their o,vn hands. Suppose, however, that the state abuses its power by repeat- edly and arbitrarily trampling on the people's rights and liberties. Hobbes says that once you cede po,ver to the Leviathan, he is free to treat you as he will. But Locke says if the government violates the righrs of citizens, it is no longer legitimate, obligations to it are voided, and the people have a right to dissolve it-to initiate rebellion. Locke's insistence on the right to rebel against a government that misuses its po,ver is echoed clearly in the Declaration of Independence: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre- ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer- tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,- That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government. .. .s The following passages are from Locke's landmark Second Trea- tise o fGovernment: TWO ' TREA TISES John Locke, Second Treatise of Government CHAPTER VIII Ofthe BeginningofPoliticalSocieties 95. Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds ofcivil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst an- o t h e r , i n a s e c u r e e n j o y m e n t o f t h e i r p r o p e r t ie s , a n d a g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t a n y , t h a t are not ofit. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom ofthe rest; theyare leftas theywere inthe libertyofthe stateofnature.When any number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby pres- ently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest. 96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as ' OF Social Contract Theories 371 Government: In,heformer, 17,efalfePrinciples a11d Foundation OF, SirROBERT FILMER, And hisFoLLOW £ R s , . ARE l!Dcttctrb y . and ©bcrtb:orun. CONCERNING T h e latter is :m EssA The True Original, Extent, a.nd End OF Civil- Government. ---- 11!.:bt ~,,unb e ,'l,io:~ ;;crctri:J. WND0,'1,Printedto)A11'11;'li••an4'1,t..Chnr#18 ~ 1bc a/,.,P $>P,,,., i.n Ptf•tr~~r,,,..11..,.,, 1&94, Figure 8.8 Title page of Two Treatises of Government by John Locke, second edition, 1694. 372 Chapter 8 The Just Society John Locke, Second Treatise of Government one body, which is only by the will and determination ofthe majority. For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being neces- sary to that which greater force carries it, which is the consent ofthe majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them, the act ofthe majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole. 97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to sub- mit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporate into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state ofnature. For what appearance would there be ofany compact?What new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state ofnature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit. 98. For ifthe consent ofthe majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act ofthe whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can makeanythingtobetheactofthewhole: Butsuchaconsentisnext toimpossibleever to be had, ifwe consider the infirmities of health, and avocations ofbusiness, which in a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add the variety ofopinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections ofmen, the coming into so- ciety upon such terms would be only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such aconstitution as thiswould make the mighty leviathan ofashorter duration than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should desire and constitute so- cieties only to be dissolved. For where the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently will be immediately dissolved again. 99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the individuals, that enter into,ormakeupacommonwealth.Andthusthat,which beginsandactuallyconstitutes any political society, is nothing, but the consent o f any number o f freemen capab le o f a majority, to unite and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world... . CHAPTER IX Of the Ends o f Polit ical Society and Government 123. If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the 12 Locke believes in an objective morallaw. Do you also believe in it? Do you believe that there are objective moral principles that are binding on every- one? Why or why not? dominion and control ofany other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment ofit is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers ofequity and justice, the enjoy- ment ofthe property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full offears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, property. great and chiefend, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation oftheir property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting. 124 . The First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want ofstudying it, are not apt to allow ofit as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases. 125. Secondly,Inthestateofnaturetherewantsaknownandindifferentjudge,w ith authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's. 126. Thirdly, In the state ofnature, there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it. mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and un- certain exercise ofthe power every man has ofpunishing the transgressions ofothers, make them take sanctuary under the established laws ofgovernment, and therein seek 127. Thus the preservation oftheir property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to t hat purpose, shall agree on. And i n this we have the original right and rise o fboth the leg- islative and executive power, as well as o f the governments and societies themselves. . . . CHAPTER XIX Ofthe Dissolution ofGovernment 222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation oftheir property, and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is, that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties ofall the members ofthe society: to limit the power, and moderate the dominion, ofevery part and member ofthe soci- ety. For since it can never be supposed to be the will ofthe society, that the legislative 13 Do you agree with Locke that the main reason for people to establish a government is to protect property? Explain. Social Contract Theories 373 374 Chapter 8 The Just Society John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 14 Do citizens of a state ever have the right to overthrow their government? How would a utilitarian answer this question? How does Locke answe r it ? Wh ich view is closer to your beliefs? Why? should have a power to destroy that, which every one designs to secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators oftheirown making, whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property ofthe people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state ofwarwith the people, who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force and violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands ofany otheran absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates ofthe people; by this breach oftrust theyforfeit the power, the people had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both, when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will, as the law of the society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs the force, treasure, and offices ofthe society to corrupt the representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he has by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his designs: and employs them to bring in such, who have promised before-hand, what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon examination and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To p r e p a r e s u c h a n a s s e m b ly a s t h i s , a n d e n d e a v o u r t o s e t u p t h e d e c l a r e d a b e t t o r s o f h i s own will, for the true representatives of the people, and the law-makers ofthe society, is certainlyas great a breach oftrust, and as perfect a declaration ofa design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. To which ifone shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end, and all the arts ofperverted Jaw made use of, to take offand destroy all that stand in the way ofsuch a design, and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust that went along with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot any longer be trusted.6 Liberalism is the political doctrine chat purs primary emphasis on the liberty and rights of individuals against encroachments by che scace. le is at the heart ofpo- litical outlooks chat today are given the vague labels of liberalism and conservatism, for both ideologies cake for granted chat basic individual liberties and rights should be protected against unacceptable government intrusion. They d iffer in ho,v they de- fine unacceptable involvement ofthe government. Locke's theory ofjustice is a form Government docs not solve problems; itsubsi.. dizcs them. -Ronald Reagan L iberalism is the political doctrine thar puts primary emphasis on ,he libcny and rights ofindividuals against encroachment.~ by the state. of liberalis m -classical liberalism, che view chat che scace should protect personal freedoms as well as che right co pursue one's O\vn social and economic \veil-being in a free market \vichouc interference from ochers. In contemporary politics, classical liberalism most resembles what is known as (political) libertarianism. Libertarians insist chat government should be small and limited co night-watchman funccions- the protection ofsociety and free economic systems from coercion and fraud. All ochersocial oreconomic benefits are che responsibility ofindividuals. Rawls David Hume, \vhom \Ve met in earlier chapters, \vas a severe critic ofsocial con- tract theory as offered up by Hobbes and Locke. He declared chat social contracts are historical fictions-no such concraccs have existed in reality. Governments have been established by conquest and force, not by agreements among equals in a state of nature. This criticism did not matter much to many lacer theorises because they viewed che theories of Locke, Hobbes, and ochers not as historical faces, but moscly PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK John Locke The philosopher John Locke (1632- 1704) is the senior theorise among the British empiricists and perhaps, as so,ne say, the grearesr English philosopher in rhe early modern period (rhe first decades after Descartes). Classical liberalism is , he view thar ,hesrareshould pm,ec, personal freedoms as wdl as the right m pursue one's own social and economic wdJ.bcing in a free market without interference from others. Libertarianism (political) is the view that govern· men, should be small and limited to night-watchman functions. 8.9 John 1704), empiricist philosopher and politicaltheorist. moral philosophy and logic ar Oxford, and rhen sec his sighrs on a career in medicine. Like his fellow empiricist Thomas Hobbes, he rubbed elbo,vs with many of rhe great chinkers ofrhe day. He knew rhe famous chemise Robert Boyle as well as rhe physicist Isaac Newton and encountered ocher notables ar rhe Royal Society. For a ,vhile he was secretary ro rhe earl ofShaftesbury, ,vho beca,ne his patron. This relationship involved hi,n in Protesranr policies and in talk of resistance ro Charles II, rhe Catholic king. Consequenrly, Shaftesbury had ro Aee ro Holland, and Locke followed him in 1683, returning ro England in 1689. Locke ,vas nor an academic who directed his ,vrirings ar ocher philosophers. He preferred instead ro address imporcanr issues in conre,nporaty society, aiming his ,vriring ar an educated public. His besr-kno,vn works include the Essay Concerning Hu.man Understanding, Second Treatise o f Government, and Leuer on Toleration, all published in t 689. Eventually he became the ,nose renowned inrellecrual in England and possibly throughout the Conrinenr. Figure Locke (i 632- He ,vas born into a Puritan family, studied Social Contract Theories 375 376 Chapter 8 The Just Society John Rawls, A Theo,y ofJustice as explanations of how states could be formed and justified. Nevertheless, Hume's attack dampened interest in social contract theories ofjustice for two centuries- until the \vork ofJohn Ra\vls (1921-2002). Ra\vls also thinks of social contracrs as fictions-but very useful fictions. He believes they give us a way to explore the requirements ofdistributive justice. He asks, in effect, What kind ofsocial contract would best ensure a fair distribution ofrights, duties, and the advantages ofsocial cooperation? To ans\ver this question, he proposes an ingenious thought experiment. Imagine we are living in a state of nature and want to devise a social contract that ensures that everyone is treated fairly. What kind of state \vould we all agree to? Specifically, by what principles should our just society structure itself? His response is that the required principles are those that people \vould agree to under hypothetical conditions that ensure fair and unbiased choices. He holds that if the starting point for the social contract is fair - i f the initial conditions and bargain- ing process for producing the principles are fair-then the principles themselves will be just and will define the essential makeup of a just society. As Rawls says, John Rawls, A Theory ofjustice [The] guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms oftheir association. These principles are to regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds ofsocial cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established.7 At the hypothetical starting point-what Rawls calls the "original position"-a group of normal, self-interested, rational individuals come together to choose the principles that will determine their basic rights and duties and their share of society's benefits and burdens. But to ensure that their decisions are as fair and impartial as possible, they must meet behind a metaphorical "veil of ignorance." Behind the veil, no one knows his or her own social or economic status, class, race, sex, abilities, talents, level of intelligence, or psychological makeup. Rawls thinks that since the participanrs are rational and self-interested but ignorant oftheir situation in society, they \vill not agree to principles that will put any particular group at a disadvantage, because they might very \veil be members ofthat group. They will choose principles that are unbiased and nondiscriminatory. The assumption is that since the negotiating conditions in the original position are fair, the agreements reached will also be fair-the principles will bejust. Rawls contends that given the original position, the participants would agree to arrange their social relationships according to these fundamental principles: FIRST PRINCIPLE Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system ofequal basic liberties compatible with a similar system o f liberty for all. SECOND PRINCIPLE Socialand economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, ... and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality ofopportunity.a The first principle -the equal liberty principle-says that everyone is entitle.cl to the most political freedom possible in exercising basic rights and duties (for example, the right to vote and hold office and freedom ofspeech, assembly, and thought). Each person should get a maximum degree of basic liberties, but no more than anyone else. This principle takes precedence over all other considerations (including the second principle), so that basic political liberties cannot be reduced or cancelled just to improve economic wellbeing. This stipulation, ofcourse, directly contradicts utilitarian views of the matter. The second principle concerns social and economic goods such as income, wealth, opportunities, and positions of authority. Ra,vls recognizes that some social and economic inequalities in society are unavoidable as well as beneficial. Those who ,vork harder or devise a better mousetrap deserve to reap greater benefirs for their efforts. Such inequality provides incentives Giving moneyand power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys t o tee nage boys. -P . J.0 . Rourke 15Are you more sympathetic to liber- tarianism or welfare liberalism? Why? for extraordinary productivity, ,vhich in turn will be to the good ofsociety as a whole. (This kind of unequal social arrangement contrasrs ,vith systems that aim at a much greater degree ofequality, as in socialist societies.) So Rawls asserrs in part (a) that social and economic inequalities are not unjust if they work to everyone's benefit, especially to the benefit ofthe least well-offinsociety. "[There) is no injustice," he says, "in the greater benefirs earne.d by a few provided that the situation ofpersons not so fortunate is thereby improved." 9 For Rawls, such a policy is far more just than one in which some people are made to suffer for the greater good of others: "It is not just that some should have less in order that others may prosper." But Ra,vls also maintains that although economic inequalities are allowed, and not everyone will obtain the greater rewards, everyone should at least have an equal opportunity to acquire them. This is the message of part (b). Every person is entitled to an equal chance to try to acquire basic goods. No one is guaranteed an equal share of them, but opportunities to obtain these benefits must be open to all, regardless ofsocial standing. In Rawls's program, the demands of the first principle must be satisfied before satisfying the Figure 8.10 John Raw ls (1921-2002). Social Contract Theories 377 8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES The prevailing theories of justice throughout the ,vorld are liberalism and social- ism. Socialism is the political and economic doctrine that the means ofproduction (property, factories, businesses) should be owned or controlled by the people, either communally or through the state. Socialism can accommodate liberal democratic forms of government and can even retain some elements of market capitalism. Communism usually implies socialism within a totalitarian system. T h e g u id i n g p r i n c i p l e o f t h e s o c i a l i s t v ie , v i s e q u a l i t y : T h e , v e a l t h o f s o c ie t y s h o u l d be shared by all. The ideal distribution of goods usually follows the classic formula laid do,vn by Karl Marx (1818-1883), the father of modern socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." People should do work that fits their abilities, and they should reap rewards that match their nee.ds. Generally, liberal societies let the means ofproduction accrue to fewer people through the ,vorkings of a free market-that is, through capitalism. In such a system, wealth goes to anyone who can acqui re it in the marketplace, but in a socialist system, ,vealth is controlled by the state, ,vhich allocates it for the good ofthe people generally. Few philosophers have had as much influence on the world as Marx has-,vho, ironically, did not consider himself a philosopher and did not believe that ideas alone could have much of an impact on history. He thinks that ,vhat d rives philosophy, history, society, law, government, and morality is economics. It is the dominant system of economics in every age, he says, that determines how society is structured and ho,v history will go. A society's system ofeconomics is defined by its means of production-by irs economic and technological ways of meeting people's physical and social needs. The means of production, Marx says, shape social relationships, class structure, technological tools, and political and philosophical ideas. Those ,vho o,vn and control the means ofproduction make up the dominant class, possess most of t he ,vealth, wield most of the political power, and exploit the lower class. Their ideas-political, philosophical, or social-are the ruling ideas. The rest of the people own no property and occupy the lowest rungs ofsociety, selling their labor to the ruling class, the property o,vners. The nvo camps, then, are forever at odds. Marx maintains that this pattern of opposition-this class struggle-repeats irselfthroughout history. It is inevitable and unalter- able. In it he sees a dialectic process unfold again and again in society: First there is a historical starting point (the thesis), ,vhich eventually p r o d u c e s a s t a t e o f a f f a i rs d i r e c t l y o p p o s e d t o i t ( t h e a n t i t h e s i s ) , t h e c o n - flict being resolved by a ne,v situation (the synthesis). Marx thinks the dialectic struggle in modern times is between those who o,vn the means ofproduction (the bourgeoisie, or capitalists) and those who do not (the proletariat). The bourgeoisie are few but own all the factories and other means of production (thesis); the proletariat are many but o,vn nothing, serving only as workers in the capitalist system (antithesis). To in- crease thei r profits, the bourgeoisie hire more and more workers but pay them less and less, replacing workers ,vith machines ,vhenever possible. I am convinced that the path to a new, better and pos.
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Locke and Hobbes’s View of Human Nature

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Locke and Hobbes’s View of Human Nature
John Locke was a great European philosopher, born in the year 1632 and died in 1704.
He grew up among the most unique centuries of English intellectual and political history.
Similarly, Thomas Hobbes, an English theorist, was born in the year 1588 and died in 1679. He
is known for his Leviathan book, which explained an influential establishment of the theory of
social contract. Generally, both Locke and Hobbes played a significant role in philosophical
discussions (Parvini, 2020). Therefore, this paper will discuss Locke and Hobbes’s view of
human nature.
It is worth noting that the importa...


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