8.1 OVERVIEW: JUSTICE AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY Political philosophy is the study of political
societies using the methods of
philosophy-namely, critical reasoning and careful analysis. It is
essentially moral philosophy applied to government and political
life. Like moral philosophy, it is a normative endeavor, concerned
with standards or principles for determining how politicalsystems
oughtto bestructured. To do irs work properly, political philosophy
must also take into account ho\v political systems are infact
structured, but this is a descriptive task that is secondary to the
normative one. Politicalscience, on the other hand, is mostly a
descriptive enterprise dedicated to uncovering the empirical facrs of
political systems past or present.
The issues of political philosophy are large, important, and personal.
They raise questions about the moral and nonmoral goodness
ofwhole societies, which largely determine the moral and nonmoral
goodness ofour lives. We can, ofcourse, try to ignore these issues,
but that is like a fish trying to ignore the water. The questions press
us from all sides. What is justice, and \vhat constitutes just and
unjust treatment of the members of society? How should the political and
material goods of society (\vealth, property, liberties, righrs) be
distributed among its citizens? Should these goods be allotted
according to need, utility, merit, desert, equality, or some other
principle? What theory of political society should rule the
distribution? Is de- mocracy really the best form of governmen t? Is
socialism? Libertarianism? Do \vell- off citizens have a duty to
provide goods to the less well-off? What is the morally right (just)
balance between the state's control of its people and the people's
liberty and rights? What is the moral justification for the state's
exercise of po\ver and au- thority over individuals? Is the state
necessary at all-or is it better to live in small
communities without state authority?
Suppose someone fails to see the need to study political philosophy
or even to
think much about the government under which she lives. Political
philosophers can make several replies to this attitude, but let us
focus on just two. First, whether you are just beginning to form your
ideas about politics and government or you are al- ready a veteran
of many political discussions (and proudly call yourselfa Democrat,
Republican, socialist, libertarian, or something else), political
philosophy can help you more than you may realize. A good dose of
political philosophy can clarify your thinking, introduce you to ne\v
perspectives, acquaint you \vith arguments for and against political
theories (including your O\vn), and help you arrive at informed
opinions. The result is greater understanding acquired through
critical thinking and reflection-not through prejudice or
unsupported presumption.
Consider, for example, this issue: the pervasiveness of government.
The state's fingers are every\vhere, revealed through levie.d taxes, a
welfare system, the con- struction of roads and dams, the treatment
of prisoners and patients, vast armies of government employees,
declarations of peace and war, subsidies for homeo\vners and
corporations, and the regulation of everything from hamburger to
baby cribs. How do you feel about such omnipresent governance?
Would you like to see more of the same, much less, or some other
political system altogether? Such questions are flashpoints in
contemporary debates about the proper role ofgovernment in our
Political philosophy is the study ofpolitical soci- eties using che mechods of
philosophy.
Overview: Justice and Political Philosophy 355
lnjustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.
-Martin Luther Klng.Jr.
356 Chapter 8
The Just Society
In the absence ofjustice, what is sovereignty but organiu:d robbery? -Saint Augustine
Figure 8.1 Signing of the Declaration of Independence: ·we hold these truths
to be self- evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.• What philosopher inspired these words?
lives. How would you go about getting some answers? An offhand,
party-line reac- tion to these questions may provide some temporary
satisfaction or assurance. But ifyou ,vant better understanding and
well-supported vie,vs, your best bet is to take the philosophical
approach.
Second, political philosophy may not bake bread or sell widgets, but
it does sometimes change the world. You ,viii see several examples
in this chapter of po- litical theories that affected history, but for
no,v let's ponder this one. John Locke (1632-1704) argued that
through a social contract between government and the governed, the
authority ofthe state could be justifie.d. The state exisrs by the
consent ofthe governed and is the guarantor of the people's
inalienable rights of"life, liberty,
and estate." The state serves the people, and the people have the
right to challenge it through revolution if it violates the terms of the
contract. Locke's ideas (shockingly radical when first introduced)
,vere familiar to American colonisrs, and they heavily influenced
the framers of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution,
and the Bill of Rights. (Other nations took notice of Locke's
thinking as ,veil.) Even the language in these documenrs reflects
Locke's thinking. This famous sentence in the Declaration, for
example, is almost pure Locke: "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator ,vith certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." Political theory in the
seventeenth century thus affects twenty-first- century Americans
(and the rest of the ,vorld).
The topic that gets most attention in political philosophy is justice.
In its broad- est sense,justice refers to people getting what is fair or
\vhat is their due, and the core principle that defines a person's due
is equals should be treated equally. The idea is that people should
be treated the same unless there is a morally relevant reason for
treating them differently. Justice by this definition comes in two
forms, and each is profoundly important in a society.
Retributivejustice has to do with the fair meting out ofpunishment to
citizens for wrongdoing. Distributive justice, or social jus- tice, is
about the fair distribution ofsociety's benefits and burdens (its
material and
nonmaterial goods)-such things as jobs, income, property, liberties,
rights, welfare aid, taxes, and public service. Ho\v these goods are
distributed among the citizens of a s t a t e i s a f u n c t io n o f h o \
vthestateisstructured,howitssocialandpolit
i c a l i n s t i t u - tions are arranged. It's this kind ofjustice that is
the focus ofpolitical philosophers and their theories ofjustice.
Theories ofjustice embody principles that define fair distributions,
that explain what people are due and why. A utilitarian theory
ofjustice, for example, says that the distribution ofgoods should be
base.cl on the principle of utility. Society's insti- tutions must be
arranged so that its benefits and burdens are allocated to maximize
some measure ofsociety's welfare (total happiness, for example).
This is a popular scheme of distribution, although some think it is
inconsistent with our common- sense notions ofjustice and equality.
As you might guess, the utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill
favors the vie\v.
S o m e t h e o r i e s o f j u s t i c e i n s i s t o n d i s t r i b u t io n s
a c c o r d i n g t o m e r i t , o r d e s e r t ( w h a t people deserve).
Plato (c. 427-347 BCE) took this tack, arguing that because people
differ in their talencs and achievements, they should be given a
station in life that reflects this difference. Some people have superior
capacities and therefore should receive a superior share ofsociety's
goods; some possess few capacit ies and should get a smaller share.
As you can see, Plato's vie\v is strongly antidemocratic.
In other theories, merit and utility mean little, while equality means
(almost) everything. The thoroughgoing egalitarian maintains that,
contrary to Plato, there are no morally relevant differences among
persons, so everyone should be appor- tioned an equal share
ofsociety's benefits. After all, don't we believe that all persons are
created equal? John Rawls (1921-2002) argues for this kind of
rigorous equality
in his theory of justice. He contends that since people's character
and behavior are accidents of nature, no one really deserves any
particular allotment of benefics or burdens-and so equality is the
most reasonable basis for distribution ofgoods. A
staunch egalitarianism demands that the supposedly deserving,
undeserving, needy, and self-sufficient receive the same size slice
ofsociety's pie and the portions cannot be adjusted on grounds
ofutility.
An important theme ofsome theories is that society's wealth should
be allocated according to need. Allotmencs ofgoods based on
people's hardship or indigence are common elements in ma ny societ
ies, often combined with other d istribution prin- ciples. Welfare
programs, lo\ver tax rates for people with low incomes, disaster relief, low-interest loans to the disadvantaged-such programs are
strictly need-base.cl. Some thinkers hold that meeting the needs
ofsociety's worst offshould be a major concern of the state. But
others argue that assisting the needy is not a requirement of
Justice is the idea that people should get what is lair or whar is their due.
Distributivejustice (or social justice) is the lair distribution ofsociety's
benefirs and burdens- such chings as jobs,
income, property, libcrrics, rights, welfare aid, taxc.'i,
and public service.
Overview: Justice and Political Philosophy 357
1Would a society structured entirely on the principle of utility
be just?
The vinuc ofjustice consists in moderatio n, as
rcgulaccd by wisdom. - A r istotle
2 Are the principles of desert and equality in conflict? That is,
is it possible to have
a society that treats everyone with strict equa lity while ensuring that everyone gets what they deserve?
358 Chapter 8
The Just Society
Figure 8.2 More Americans are shunning political parties and migrating to the
polit- ical center.
MostlyRep11bUcan Staunch Conservatives
(Highly engaged Tea Party supporters} Main Strecr Republicans
(Con1ervative 011 most issues) Mostly Independent
Libertarian s
(Free market, smallgovernmentseculars)
Disaffccreds
(Downscale and cynical}
Post-Moderns
(Moderates but liberal 011 social issues) Mostly Democratic
New Coalition Dcmocrars (Upbeat, 111ajority-mi11oriry)
Hard-Pressed Democrats (Religious, fi11a11cially struggling)
Solid Liberals
(Across-rJ1e-board liberalpositions)
Bystanders
Young, politically disengaged
Total
General PtlbUc
9
II
9
II
13
JO
13
14
JO
JOO
Registered V oters
II
14
JO II 14
9
15 16
0 JOO
WHAT DO YOU BELi EVE?
Political Views in Flux
The Pe,v Research Center, which conduces opinion surveys co gauge political
attitudes, reports chat, "With the economy still struggling and the nation
involved in multiple 1nilicary operations overseas, che public's political
1nood is fractious. In chis environ,nent, many political attitudes have beco,ne
,nore doctrinaire at both ends of che ideological spectrum, a polarization chat
reAecrs the current atmosphere in Washing- ton. Yee ac the sa,ne time, a
gro,ving number of Americans
are choosing not co identify with either political party, and the center of the
political spectrum is increasingly diverse." H ere are che results fro,n a recent
Pew survey o f Americans.
P e r c e n t a g e o f.
..
·BeyondRedvs.Blue:71,ePoliticalTypology'"PewResearchCenter,
Washington,DC(May,2011)http:!/ www.people-press.org/20J J/05!04/beyo11dred-vs-blue-rhe-polirical-typologyl.
Do you see yourself in these numbers? If not, how would you
characterize your political views?
justice; helping unfortunates is a job best left to voluntary charity,
not government.
Many who resist the idea of distributions based on equality or desert
do so by appealing to a principle of entitlement. They argue that
even if people don't deserve the goods they have, they nevertheless
may be entitled to them. We are entitled, for example, to selfownership of our O\vn bodies even though \Ve have done nothing to
deserve having them. Perhaps the most famous entitlement theory of
justice is that of Robert Nozick (1938-2002). He argues that if \Ve
rightfully possess any goods, they are ours only because we are
entitled to them-entitled because we acquired them legitimately, not
because we got them through appeals to equality or desert.
The most influential theories of justice have incorpo- rated some or
all of these principles, emphasizing some of them, downplaying
others, and arriving at distinc- tive sociopolitical models that we can
use to judge the worthiness of real-\vorld systems. It is difficultperhaps impossible-to fully fathom our own political system
without knowing something about the theories ofjustice that
preceded it. The following sections should help you
understand what those predecessors are like.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS
Figure 8.3 Is the state obligated to help the poor? Is it morally permissible for
the government to tax the rich to guarantee the poor a basic minimum of w
elfare assistance?
1. Imagine you are convinced that the way your own society is
structured is better than that ofother societies. Ho\v could you argue
for such a position?
2. Suppose you think your country's form of distributive justice is
ser- iously Aa\ved. Ho\v could you argue for your view? What
principle of justice is at fault?
3. Do you think a society based entirely on equality would be
just? Why or why not?
4. Do you think, as Ra\vls does, that no one really deserves any
particu- lar distribution of benefits or burdens? Explain.
5. In your view, \vhat would be some of the beneficial or harmful
effects ofa society based solely on merit, as Plato proposed?
Overview: Justice and Political Philosophy 359
SECTION 8.1
Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where
any one class is made to fed that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and
degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe.
-Frederick Douglass
360 Chapter 8 The Just Society
Meritocracy is a system ofrule by rhosc mosr qualified to govern.
Democracy is rule by the people as a whole.
3How wouldyou defend democ- racy against Plato's criticisms?
\Vhat do I care about Jupiter>Justice is a human
issue, and I do not need a god to teach it to me. -Jean-Paul Sartre
8.2 PLATO'S THEORY: JUSTICE AS MERIT
About nventy-five centuries ago, Plato proposed in his masterwork
The Republic a theory of justice that has challenged thinkers and
stimulated debate ever since. He argues that the only kind ofsociety
that can ensure people get their due is a meritocracy, a system of
rule by those most qualified to govern. He contrascs meri- tocracy
with a form of government he strongly opposes: democracy, rule by
the people as a whole. In his view, democratic rule is mob rule, the
reign of a rabble too easily swayed by emotional appeals and bad
arguments. Plato had plenty of experience with democratic rule, for
in his day Athens was a democracy in which governmental
decisions were made by direct vote of adult male Athenians. (Greek
democracy was far from rule by all the people, for only free men
\vere full citizens, and \vomen and slaves were excluded.) He never
forgot that it \vas a democratic vote of his fello\v citizens that
committed the ultimate injustice by condemning to death his teacher
and role model, the venerable Socrates.
Plato's theory ofjustice dovetails with his theory of mind, as \vell as
with his epis- t e m o l o g y a n d e t h ic s . H e a r g u e s t h a t t h
e m a k e u p a n d f u n c t i o n i n g o f s o c ie t y i s d i r e c t l y
analogous to the makeup and functioning ofthe person (or soul). In
his philosophy ofmind, every person is composed ofthree
fundamental componencs: (1) appetite, or desires; (2) spirit, or drives
(including motivations and emotions); and (3) reason (the intellect).
The just, or virtuous, person will be a \vell-balance.d composite
ofthese, each
Figure 8.4 Plato's Academy at Athens. In Plato's republic, all people are not
created equal. Does this f act invalidate his t heory of justice?
•
.
'
performing its own distinctive function in harmony \Vith the others,
\vith the appetites and spirit ruled and coordinated by reason. In
similar fashion, Plato says, a society consiscs of three types
ofpeople, each one identified according to \vhich
ofthesoul'scomponencs predominates:
1. Those who are moved by their appetites (producers- laborers,
carpenters, artisans, farmers)
2. Those who are moved by spirit (auxiliaries-soldiers,
\varriors, police)
3. Those who are moved by reason (guardians-leaders, rul- ers,
philosopher-kings)
In a just society, these three perform their proper functions \vhile the producers and aux iliaries are led and controlled by
the guardians. The just state is a harmonious community governed
by reason, just as a virtuous person is a tripartite be- ing presided
over by the rational faculty ofthe soul.
Plato says citizens are assigned to one of the three func- tions base.cl
on their aptitude and performance, and once ap- pointed, they are
expected to remain in that class and not try to cross over to another.
This scheme reflects his theory of ethics. To be virtuous and happy,
he says, we must act ac- cording to our talencs and aptitude, striving
for excellence in the endeavors nature has chosen for us.
Plato, then, envisions an aristocracy (a society ruled by the best
citizens)- not an aristocracy of the rich, landed, or well-born, but of
the intellectual. The guardians are true philosopher-kings. They
wield all the political power by virtue
of their greater talents and intelligence. In the ideal republic, the
guardians- contrary to the usual custom-cannot own property, for
O\vning property might tempt them to govern for personal gain
rather than for the good ofsociety. This po\verful elite can include
women and anyone from the lower classes, because the only
qualification for becoming a ruler is simply to be ofsuperior
intelligence and character.
To modern minds, some ofthe elements ofPlato's society may sound
both wrong and alien. H is ideal state rests on massive inequality
among citizens who are sorted into three classes marked by unequal
shares ofpower and privilege. Granted, people
are assigned to different classes according to merit, but inequality is
still the rule. Plato maintains that equals should be treated equally,
but to him the classes deserve different treatment because they are
different. All men are not created equal. Then there is the
authoritarianism ofPlato's republic, in which no one gets to choose
his or her own role in life. In general, once assigned to a social role,
citizens cannot jump to another. There is no social mobility, except
within a class and in the case ofguardians
being chosen from lower classes.
In the follo\ving selection from The Republic, Plato (through the
character of
Socrates) is explaining his concept ofjustice to companions. The
discussion is nar- rated by Socrates.
Plato, The
Republic
Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You rem ember the
original prin- ciple which we were always laying down at the
foundation of the State, that one man should practise one thing only,
the thing to which his nature was best adapted;- now justice is this
principle or a part of it.
Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.
Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and
not being a
busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the
same to us. Yes, we said so.
Then to do one's own business in a certain way may be assumed to
be justice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?
I can not, but I should like to be told.
Because I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State
when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are
abstracted; and, that this is the ultimatecause and condition
oftheexistence ofall ofthem, and whileremaining in them is also their
preservative; and we were saying that if the three were discovered by
us, justice would be the fourth or remaining one.
Aristocracy is a socicry ruled by the best citizens.
4 To determine cit- izens' aptitudes and talents (and thustheir place in
society), Plato favored testing them while they are young. Is it possible
to discover the bestcareer for someone thisway? What about people
who discover or de- velop their true talents lateinlife-those, for
example, who are poor studentsbut turn out to be geniuses in adulthood like Einstein? Is Plato too optimistic about the ease of
discovering a person's true calling?
Thatfollows ofnecessity.
Justice in the life and con- duct ofthe State is pos.sible only as first it resides in
the hearts and soulsofrhe citizens.
- P la,o
5 Don't we reward ath- letes, doctors, lawyers,
and business executives according to their merit
and not by democratic
vote? Should our leaders be chosen the same way, as Plato suggests?
Why or why not?
Plato's Theory: Justice as Merit 361
362 Chapter 8
The Just Society
6 Do you think Plato exaggerates the consequences of allowing a person to abandon his own career path and do
another person's job? Explain.
If we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its
presence contrib- utes most to the excellence of the State, whether
the agreement of rulers and subjects
or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which the law ordains
about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in the
rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is
found in children and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler,
subject,- the quality, I mean, ofevery one doing his own work and not
being a busybody, would claim the palm- the question is not so easily
answered.
Certainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.
Then the power ofeach individual in the State to do his own work
appears to compete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.
Yes, he said.
And the virtue which enters into this competition is justice? Ex a c t l y
.
Let us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the
rulers in a State those to whom you would entrust the office
ofdetermining suits at law?
Certa inly.
And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither
take what is another's, nor be deprived of what is his own?
Yes; that is their principle.
Which is a just principle?
Yes.
Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and
doing what is
a man's own, and belongs to him? Very true.
Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a
cobbler to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a
carpenter; and suppose them to ex- change their implements or their
duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever
be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the
State?
Not much.
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a
trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his
followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the
class ofwarriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for
which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of
the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one,
then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and
this meddling of one with another is the ruin ofthe State.
Most true.
Seeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling
ofone with
another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the
State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?
Precisely.
And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be
termed by you
injustice ? Certainly.
This then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the
auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice,
and will make the city just.
I agree with you.•
PHILOSOPHY NOW
Merit or Equality: Who Gets to Live?
Organ transplant operations are incredibly expensive, organs are in very
short supply, and transplants are desperately needed by far ,nore people
than can be acco1n1nodared. The ,vaicing list for transplants is long, and thousands die every year for their
lack. Screening commit- tees at transplant centers decide whether
someone should be placed on the ,vairing list and
,vhac ranking he or she should receive. They use various criteria to make
these decisions, some explicit, so,ne inforrnal or unspoken, some
plausible (such as che patient's need and likeli- hood of benefit), and
so,ne controversial (such as ability co pay, social ,vorthiness, and health
habits).
A,nong these, social or ,noral ,vorthiness-,nerit-is probably rhe ,nose
contentious. Here the questions are: Which
potential recipients-if given che chance co live-are expected co
contribute most co the good of society? Or ,vhich possible recipients do
nor deserve transplants, because they have indulged in habits (like
excessive alcohol use or dangerous activities) char contributed to their
irnpend ing organ fai lure? To scare che is- sue concretely: All things
being equal, should rhe medical student or priest gee che transpla nt
instead of che prostitute or alcoholic?
Figure 8.5 Who should get the only available liver or heart- the person
chosen by lottery, the upright citizen, the man who donates thousands of
dollars to the hospital, the priest, or the homeless child?
Many reject such appeals co merit and insist char the proper criteria are
egalitarian- a matter of justice and che moral equality of persons. They
argue char all persons have equal ,vorth. Morally, che medicalstudent is
nor worth ,nore than the prostitute or alcoholic, and
vice versa. Education, achievement, occupation, and the like are nor
,norally relevant. Nevertheless, ,vh ile generally taking the egalitarian
approach, son1e ph ilosophers ,nain- rain char in very rare cases, social
worth can outweigh egalitarian concerns. It seems reason- able that in a
natural d isaster involving ,nass casualties, injured physicians or nurses
should
be created first if they can aid the ocher survivors.
Should social or moral worth ever be taken into account in
deciding who should get a transplant? Suppose the question
is whether to give a transplant to a Nobel laureate or to a
hard-working, honest truck driver. Assuming that all other
factors are equal, which one should get the transplant? Why?
Plato's Theory: Justice as Merit 363
364 Chapter 8
The Just Society
Social contract theory is the view that justice is
secured, and the stare is made legi,imate, through
an agreement among citizens ofthe state or between rhc cirizcns and
the rulers of ,he sratc.
WRITING TO UNDERSTAND:
CRITIQUING PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS SECTION 8.2
1. Plato thinks democracy is no better than mob rule. Do you
agree? What are your reasons?
2. Plato believes that it's possible for a society to be just without
equality among irs citizens. Do you agree? W hy or why not?
3. Plato believes his just society to be well ordered, rational, and
harmo- nious. But are these trairs sufficient to ensure justice in
a society? Can we plausibly call such a society just \vhen the
state decides what kinds
of lives its citizens must live? Give reasons for your view.
4. In Plato's republic, the guardians deserve to be rulers because
they are the most intelligent and intellectually gifted. But do
such attributes
g uarantee \visdom? Are intellectually superior people a hvays
good leaders?
5. Would you want to live in a state patterned after Plato's just
society? Why or why not?
8.3 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORIES
In the seventeenth century, philosophers defied tradition by
defending a new kind of theory of justice and a novel way of
justifying the existence of the state: social contract theory. This
vie\v says that justice is secured, and the state is made legiti- mate,
through an agreement among citizens of the state or between the
citizens and the rulers of the state. The people consent explicitly or
implicitly to be governed-to be subject to the dictates and the
power of the state -in exchange for the state's providingsecurity,
righrs, and liberties. The state's exi.stence is justified by the binding contract that all parties accept. This understanding ofthe role and
justification ofthe state was incorporated into the Constitution ofthe
United States, and in the twenty-first century, this idea of a social
contract is now taken for granted by much ofthe world.
Nevertheless, when fully formed social contract theories were first
introduced, they \Vere thought by many to be radical, scandalous,
and wrong. In medieval Europe, the prevailing vie\v had been that
states are supposed to be dominated by monarchs \vho rule by
the"divine right ofkings." God sanctions the monarch's authority
and ordains that society be ranked in a hierarchy of positions, from
the king or queen do\vn to the poorest serfs, with each perform ing
his or her preordained function. As in Plato's republic, people have
their proper place in society, and no one is permitted or expected to
deviate from it. The governed cannot consent to anything, and
monarchs have absolute power over all their subjects.
Among the most influentialsocial contract theorists are Thomas Hobbes
(1588- 1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and John Rawls (19212002). We take up their
views in the following pages.
Hobbes
Hobbes \vas the first philosopher in modern times to
systematicallyarticulate asocial contract theory. It was a major departure
from received vie\vS about society, and that fact alone \vas enough to
infuriate many. It also contained a rejection of both the divine right
ofkings and the notion ofa divinely established moral la\v-points that
gave his critics even more reasons to attack him.
In his famous Leviathan, Hobbes contends that a social contract is
necessary in human affairs because living without one would be a
horrific nightmare ofex- istence. He begins by assuming a pessimistic
view of human beings: At their core, he says, they are selfish,
treacherous, dishonest, and violent. He argues that when
PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK
Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) ,vas more than an em- inent English
philosopher whose cheories inAuenced
future generations. He ,vas also a linguist, poet, classical scholar,
cranslacor, logician, critic, and 1nache1nacical cucor
Charity begins at home, and justice begins next door.
- Charles Dickens
7 Hobbes is a pessimist about human nature; he thinks people
are basically greedy and treacherous. Do you think he's right
aboutthis?Orare people fundamentally sociable, cooperative, and benign?
Explain your reasonrng.
co Charles II.
He ,vas born into a poor religious fa,nily and
Figure 8.6 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), political theorist
liked co say char when his ,nocher was pregnant ,vich
hi,n, she went into labor on hearing char che Spanish Armada was chreacening England. He joked char "fear and I ,vere
born nvins cogecher." He was educated at Oxford and spent most of his
years as secretary and tutor co che family ofche chird earl of
Devonshire. During chis employment, he mer che fore,nosc European
thinkers (Galileo and Francis Bacon a,nong chem) and
,vroce on a wide range of issues, both scientific and philosophical. Many
of these ,vorkswereextremelycontroversial.
Hispoliticalphilosophy,vasoffensivecoboch
sides in che English Civil War; che Ron1an Catholic Church and Oxford
Univer- sity forbade che reading of his books; and he went against che
grain of his era by
advancing macerialis,n, egoism, and (\vhacsome considered) heresy.
H is most fa,nous creation is leviathan (1651), ,vhich has had an
enorn1ous in- Auence on English ,noral and political chinking. His ocher
,vricings include Philo- sophical Rudiments Concerning Government and
Society (1651), On the Body (1655),
and On Man (1658).
and polymath.
Social Contract Theories 365
366 Chapter 8 The Just Society
8 Do you think Hobbes is right about humans being roughly equal
physicallyand men- tally? Why or why not?
these tendencies are left unchecked by enforced laws or agreements,
humans sink into a "state of nature"every man." In the state of
a "war of every man against
nature, there is no code, culture, or comfort. There is no justice.
There is only "continual fear, and danger ofviolent death; and the
life ofman [is) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."2
But, Hobbes says, humankind also has a strong instinct for selfinterest and self-preservation, and fortunately this impulse is
coupled with the power of reason. Through reason, he says, people
see that the only ,vay to escape this "war of all
against all" is to enter into a social contract ,vith one another. In the
name ofself- interest, they agree to turn over much of their
autonomy, freedom, and power to an absolute sovereign that will
forcibly keep the peace, restrain antisocial actions, and compel
people to keep their agreements. Hobbes calls this sovereign the
Leviathan (the name ofa sea monster mentioned in the Bible), which
symbolizes great power and evil. Its authority over those bound by
the social contract is absolute, its po,ver is fearsome (enough to
deter any tendency to disorder), and irs contractual agreement ,vith
irs subjects is irrevocable. Once po,ver is given up to this despot,
there is no going back, and there is ahvays the chance that the
sovereign will create an environ- ment worse than the state of
nature. But that is the chance people must take.
So the state's authority is justified by a social contract, and justice
comes into be- ing as the Leviathan assumes power. For Hobbes,
justice is a matter of the keeping ofcovenanrs (contracrs), and the
only ,vay to ensure that covenants are kept is to let the Leviathan
reign. Without the Leviathan to enforce covenants, there is no
justice. As Hobbes says, "Where there is no common power, there is
no la,v; where no law no injustice."3
Here is Hobbes arguing for his theory in Leviathan:
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
CHAPTER 13. OF THE NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND AS
CONCERNING THEIR FELICITY, AND M ISERY
Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind;
as that though there be found one man sometimes
manifestlystronger in body, or ofquicker mind than another; yet
when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man,
is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to
himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he.
For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to
kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy
with others, that are in the same danger with himself.
And as to the faculties ofthe mind (setting aside the arts grounded
upon words, and especially that skill of proceeding upon general,
and infallible rules, called sci- ence; which very few have, and but in
few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained,
[as prudence], while we look after somewhat else), Ifind yet a
greater equality amongst men, than that of strength. For prudence, is
but experience;
Ir is better to lose every.. thing you have to keep the
balance ofjustice level, than to livea life ofpetty privilege devoid oftrue freedo m .
-Bryant H. McGill
which equaltime,equallybestowson all men, inthose things
theyequallyapplythem- selves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible, is but a vain con- ceit of one's own wisdom,
which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the
vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom
by fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is
the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge many
others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more learned; yet they
will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves: For they see
their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proves
rather that men are in that pointequal, than unequal. For there is not
ordinarilyagreater sign ofthe equal distribution ofany thing, than that
every man is contented with his share.
From this equality of ability, arises equality of hope in the attaining of
our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which
nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in
the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and
sometimes their delectation only), endeavor to destroy, or subdue one
another. And from hence it comes to pass, that where an invader hath
no
more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build,
or possess a convenient seat, others may probably be expected to
come prepared with forces united,
to dispossess, and deprive him, not only ofthe fruit ofhis labour, but
also ofhis life, or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger o f
another.
And from this diffidence ofone another, there is no way for any man to
secure himself, so reasonable, as anticipation; that is, by force, or
wiles, to master the persons ofall men he can, so Jong, till he see no
other power great enough to endanger him: and this is no more than
his own conservation requires, and is
generally allowed. Also because there be some, that taking plea- sure
in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they
pursue farther than their security requires; if others, that otherwise
would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by
invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by
standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such
augmentation ofdominion over men, be- ing necessary to a man's
conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again, men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal ofgrief)
in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them
all. For every man looks that his companion should value him, at the
same rate he sets upon himself: and upon all signs of contempt, or
undervaluing, naturally endeavors, as far as he dares (which amongst
them that have no common power to keep them in quiet, is far enough
to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his
condemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes ofquarrel.
First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the
third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make them- selves
masters ofother men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the
second to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a
different opinion, and any other sign o f undervalue, either direct in
their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their
nation, their profession, or their name.
9 Does the existence of stabledemocracies
in the twenty-first century showthat Hobbes iswrong about human
nature?
Social Contract Theories 367
Figure 8.7 Frontispiece to Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power o f a
Common Wealth Ecclesiastical/ and Civil, 1651, by Thomas Hobbes.
368 Chapter 8
The Just Society
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is
called war; and such a war, as is
ofevery man, against every man. For WAR, consists not in battle only,
or the act offight- ing; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend
by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion oftime, is to be
considered in the nature ofwar; as it is in the nature ofweather. For as
the nature offoul weather, lies not in a shower or two ofrain; but in an
inclination thereto of many days together: so the nature ofwar,
consists not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto,
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time
is PEACE.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time ofwar, where every
man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time;
wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength,
and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition,
there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain:
and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of
the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious
building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account
of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst ofall,
continual fear, and danger ofviolent death; and the life ofman, solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish, and short. .. .
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent;
that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and
injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there
is no law: where no law no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the
two cardinal virtues. Justice, and injustice are none of the fac- ulties
neither ofthe body, nor mind. Ifthey were, they might be in a man that
were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are
qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent
also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no
mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can
get; and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill cond
ition, which man by mere nature is actually placed in; though with a
possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the passions, partly in
his reason.
The passions that incline men to peace, are fear ofdeath; desire
ofsuch things as are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by
their industry to obtain them. And reason suggests convenient articles
of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These
articles, are they, which otherwise are called the Laws ofNature... .
CHAPTER 14. OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS,
AND OF CONTRACTS
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which writers commonly call jus natura/e, is
the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for
the preservation of his own
nature; that is to say, ofhis own life; and consequently, ofdoing any
thing, which in his own judgment, and reason, he shall conceive to be
the aptest means thereunto.
By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification ofthe
word, the absence of external impediments: which impediments, may
oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot
hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment,
and reason shall dictate to him.
A LAW OF NATURE (lex naturalis), is a precept, or general rule,
found out by rea- son, by which a man is forbidden to do that, which is
destructive ofhis life, or taketh
10 Suppose the world issuddenly left with
no governmental au- thority anywhere; no formal restraints on human
behavior exist. Speculate on how you think people would act. Would
chaos and sav- agery ensue, or would people more or less live in
peace and harmony?
away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that, by which
he thinks it may be best preserved. For though they that speak ofthis
subject, use to confound jus, and lex, right and law; yet they ought to
be distinguished; because RIGHT, consists in liberty to do, or to
forbear; whereas LAW, determines, and binds to one of them: so that
law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty; which in one
and the same matter
are inconsistent.
And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the
precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one; in which
case every one is governed by his own reason; and there is nothing
he can make use of that may not be
a help unto him, in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth,
that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing; even to
one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right ofevery man to every thing endures,
there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he
be) of living out the time, which natureordinarilyallows men to live.
And consequentlyit isaprecept,orgeneral ruleof reason, that every
man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope ofobtaining it;
and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps,
and advantages of war. The first branch ofwhich rule, containeth the
first, and fundamental law of nature; which is, to seek peace, and
follow it. The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is, by all
means we can, to defend ourselves.
From this fundamental law ofnature, by which men are commanded to
endeavor peace, is derived this second law; that a man be willing,
when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defence
ofhimself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things;
and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would
allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holds this
right, of doing any thing he likes; so long are all men in the condition
ofwar. But ifother men will not lay down their right, as well as he; then
there is no reason for any one, to divest
himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey (which no man
is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of
the Gospel; whatsoever you
require that others should do to you, that do ye to them. And that law
ofall men, [what you would not have done to you, do not do to others).
. ..
CHAPTER 15. OFOTHER LAWS OF NATURE
From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to
another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind,
there followeth a third; which is this, that men perform their covenants
made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and
the right ofall men to all things remaining, we are still in the condi- tion
ofwar.
And in this law ofnature, consists the fountain and original of
JUSTICE. For where no covenant hath proceeded, there hath no right
been transferred, and every man has
right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But
when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition
of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance ofcovenant. And
whatsoever is not unjust, is just.
But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not
performance on either part (as hath been said in the former chapter),
are invalid; though the ori- ginal ofjustice be the making ofcovenants;
yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause ofsuch fear be
taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war,
cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can
have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men
equally to the performance oftheir
11 Is ceding all power to a leviathan the only way for people to achieve
peace, security, and cooperation in a society? Expla in.
Social Contract Theories 369
370 Chapter 8
The Just Society
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
covenants, by the terror ofsome punishment, greater than the benefit
they expect by the breach oftheir covenant; and to make good that
propriety, which by mutual con- tract men acquire, in recompense of
the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before
the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of
the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for they say, that
justice is the constant will ofgiving to every man his own. And
therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no
injustice; and where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where
there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety; all men having right
to all things: therefore where there is no commonwealth, there nothing
is unjust. So that the nature ofjustice, consists in keeping ofvalid
covenants: but the validity ofcovenants begins not but with the
constitution ofa civil power, sufficient to compel men to keep them:
and then it is also that propriety begins.•
Locke
Locke's social contract theory has some points in common \Vith
Hobbes's-but also much that Hobbes would have rejected outright.
Both Hobbes and Locke assert that ( I ) r e a s o n e n a b l e s p e o p
l e t o s e e t h e w is d o m o f f o r m i n g a s t a t e t h r o u g h a s
o c i a l c o n - tract, (2) people must freely consent to be bound by
the contract (not be coerce.cl into accepting it), and (3) the state's
authority is justified by this consent ofthe governed. Beyond these
matters, Hobbes and Locke part company.
For one thing, they have very d ifferent ideas about the "state of
nature," the \vorld in \vhich no civil society exisrs. For Hobbes, to
be in the state of nature is to
be in a "war of all against all," where morality is nonexistent, and
the only la\vS are commonsense rules for survival and self-interest.
For Locke, on the other hand, the state of nature is considerably less
nasty and brutish, for even there, natural moral la\vS apply and help
to regulate people's behavior. Those living in the state of nature
are free, sociable, equal, and (mostly) at peace.
Hobbes contends that, generally, justice and rights do not come into
being until
the state is established. People surrender their lives and liberties to
the Leviathan in exchange for security and peace, and he can do
\vhat he wants \Vith his subjects. But Locke argues that humans
have inherent, God-given rights \vhether or not a govern- ment is
around to guarantee them. Chiefamong these is the right to
property-not just land but your own body and any object that you
change through work (\vith \vhich you "mix your labor"). These
rights are inalienable: They cannot be trans- ferred to the
government or any other entity. Humans create the government and
cede some power to it; in return it protects their righrs and liberties.
The state serves the people (not the other way round), directing all
its power "to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good
ofthe people."
But \vhat exactly does the state do to preserve liberties and promote
the com- mon good? Locke identifies three functions that people
need the state to perform. First, citizens need the natural moral la\v
to be set out in clearly expressed laws of the land. Un\vritten natural
laws are clear to humans, but people are apt to mis- construe them
in line with their biases. Second, there need to be impartial judges
\vho can settle disputes concerning the application of the laws.
Third, there nee.ds
\Vhy has government been instituted at all? Because the passions o f m an will not
conform to the die~ tares of reason and justice without constraint.
- A lexander Hamilton
to be po,ver in the state to enforce the laws. Otherwise, people will be
able to take justice into their o,vn hands.
Suppose, however, that the state abuses its power by repeat- edly and
arbitrarily trampling on the people's rights and liberties. Hobbes says
that once you cede po,ver to the Leviathan, he is free to treat you as he
will. But Locke says if the government violates
the righrs of citizens, it is no longer legitimate, obligations to it are
voided, and the people have a right to dissolve it-to initiate rebellion.
Locke's insistence on the right to rebel against a government that misuses its po,ver is echoed clearly in the Declaration of
Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre- ated equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with cer- tain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.- That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed,- That whenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right
of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new Government. ..
.s
The following passages are from Locke's landmark Second Trea- tise o
fGovernment:
TWO '
TREA TISES
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government
CHAPTER VIII
Ofthe BeginningofPoliticalSocieties
95. Men being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal, and
independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the
political power of another, without his own consent. The only way,
whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the
bonds ofcivil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite
into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one
amongst an- o t h e r , i n a s e c u r e e n j o y m e n t o f t h e i r p r o p e
r t ie s , a n d a g r e a t e r s e c u r i t y a g a i n s t a n y , t h a t are not
ofit. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom
ofthe
rest; theyare leftas theywere inthe libertyofthe stateofnature.When any
number of men have so consented to make one community or
government, they are thereby pres- ently incorporated, and make one
body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act
and conclude the rest.
96. For when any number of men have, by the consent of every
individual, made a
community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a
power to act as
'
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Social Contract Theories 371
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Figure 8.8 Title page of Two Treatises of Government by John Locke,
second edition,
1694.
372 Chapter 8
The Just Society
John Locke, Second Treatise of
Government
one body, which is only by the will and determination ofthe majority.
For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the
individuals of it, and it being neces- sary to that which greater force
carries it, which is the consent ofthe majority: or else it is impossible
it should act or continue one body, one community, which the consent
of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so
every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority.
And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by
positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which
impowers them, the act ofthe majority passes for the act of the
whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and
reason, the power of the whole.
97. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body
politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to
every one of that society, to sub- mit to the determination of the
majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact,
whereby he with others incorporate into one society, would signify
nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties
than he was in before in the state ofnature. For what appearance
would there be ofany compact?What new engagement if he were no
farther tied by any decrees of the society, than he himself thought fit,
and did actually consent to? This would be still as great a liberty, as
he himself had before his compact, or any one else in the state
ofnature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it if
he thinks fit.
98. For ifthe consent
ofthe majority shall not, in reason, be received
as the act ofthe whole, and conclude every individual; nothing but the
consent of every individual can
makeanythingtobetheactofthewhole: Butsuchaconsentisnext
toimpossibleever to be had, ifwe consider the infirmities of health, and
avocations ofbusiness, which in
a number, though much less than that of a commonwealth, will
necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we
add the variety ofopinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen in all collections ofmen,
the coming into so- ciety upon such terms would be only like Cato's
coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such aconstitution as
thiswould make the mighty leviathan ofashorter duration than the
feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was born in: which
cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should
desire and constitute so- cieties only to be dissolved. For where the
majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body,
and consequently will be immediately dissolved again.
99. Whosoever therefore out of a state of nature unite into a
community, must be understood to give up all the power, necessary to
the ends for which they unite into society, to the majority of the
community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater than
the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one
political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be,
between the individuals, that enter
into,ormakeupacommonwealth.Andthusthat,which
beginsandactuallyconstitutes any political society, is nothing, but the
consent o f any number o f freemen capab le o f a majority, to unite
and incorporate into such a society. And this is that, and that only,
which did, or could give beginning to any lawful government in the
world... .
CHAPTER IX
Of the Ends o f Polit ical Society and Government
123. If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be
absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the
greatest, and subject to no body, why will
he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject
himself to the
12 Locke believes in an objective morallaw.
Do you also believe in it? Do you believe that there are objective moral
principles that
are binding on every- one? Why or why not?
dominion and control ofany other power? To which it is obvious to
answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the
enjoyment ofit is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the
invasion of others. For all being kings as much as he, every man his
equal, and the greater part no strict observers ofequity and justice, the
enjoy- ment ofthe property he has in this state is very unsafe, very
unsecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition, which,
however free, is full offears and continual dangers: and it is not
without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with
others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual
preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the
general name, property.
great and chiefend, therefore, of men's uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the
preservation oftheir property. To which in the state of nature there
are many things wanting.
124 . The
First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong,
and the common measure
to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of
nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being
biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want ofstudying it, are
not apt to allow ofit as a law binding to them in the application of it to
their particular cases.
125.
Secondly,Inthestateofnaturetherewantsaknownandindifferentjudge,w
ith authority to determine all differences according to the established
law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of
the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and
revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in
their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to
make them too remiss in other men's.
126. Thirdly,
In the state ofnature, there often wants power to back
and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.
They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good
their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment
dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.
mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of
nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly
driven into society. Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any
number of men live any time together in this state. The
inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and
un- certain exercise ofthe power every man has ofpunishing the
transgressions ofothers, make them take sanctuary under the
established laws ofgovernment, and therein seek
127. Thus
the preservation oftheir property. It is this makes them so willingly
give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by
such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such
rules as the community, or those authorized by them to t hat purpose,
shall agree on. And i n this we have the original right and rise o fboth
the leg- islative and executive power, as well as o f the governments
and societies themselves. . . .
CHAPTER XIX
Ofthe Dissolution ofGovernment
222. The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation
oftheir
property, and the end why they choose and authorize a legislative, is,
that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to
the properties ofall the members ofthe society: to limit the power, and
moderate the dominion, ofevery part and member ofthe soci-
ety. For since it can never be supposed to be the will ofthe society,
that the legislative
13 Do you agree with Locke that the main reason for people to establish a
government is to protect property?
Explain.
Social Contract Theories 373
374 Chapter 8
The Just Society
John Locke, Second Treatise of
Government
14 Do citizens of a state ever have the right to overthrow
their government? How would a utilitarian
answer this question? How does Locke answe r it ? Wh ich view is closer to your beliefs? Why?
should have a power to destroy that, which every one designs to
secure, by entering into society, and for which the people submitted
themselves to legislators oftheirown making, whenever the
legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property ofthe
people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put
themselves into a state ofwarwith the people, who are thereupon
absolved from any farther obedience, and are left to the common
refuge, which God hath provided for all men, against force and
violence. Whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society; and either by ambition, fear, folly or
corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands
ofany otheran absolute power over the lives, liberties, and estates
ofthe people; by this breach oftrust theyforfeit the power, the people
had put into their hands, for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to
the people, who have a right to resume their original liberty, and, by
the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit)
provide for their own safety and security, which is the end for which
they are in society. What I have said here, concerning the legislative
in general, holds true also concerning the supreme executor, who
having a double trust put in him, both to have a part in the
legislative, and the supreme execution of the law, acts against both,
when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will, as the law of the
society. He acts also contrary to his trust, when he either employs
the force, treasure, and offices ofthe society to corrupt the
representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly preengages the electors, and prescribes to their choice, such, whom he
has by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to his
designs: and employs them to bring in such, who have promised
before-hand, what to vote, and what to enact. Thus to regulate
candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is
it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very
fountain of public security? for the people having reserved to
themselves the choice of their representatives, as the fence to their
properties, could do it for no other end, but that they might always
be freely chosen, and so chosen, freely act, and advise, as the
necessity of the commonwealth, and the public good should, upon
examination and mature debate, be judged to require. This, those
who give their votes before they hear the debate, and have weighed
the reasons on all sides, are not capable of doing. To p r e p a r e s u
c h a n a s s e m b ly a s t h i s , a n d e n d e a v o u r t o s e t u p t h
e d e c l a r e d a b e t t o r s o f h i s own will, for the true
representatives of the people, and the law-makers ofthe society, is
certainlyas great a breach oftrust, and as perfect a declaration ofa
design to subvert the government, as is possible to be met with. To
which ifone shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to
the same end, and all the arts ofperverted Jaw made use of, to take
offand destroy all that stand in the way ofsuch a design, and will not
comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country, it will be
past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the
society, who thus employ it contrary to the trust that went along
with it in its first institution, is easy to determine; and one cannot but
see, that he, who has once attempted any such thing as this, cannot
any longer be trusted.6
Liberalism is the political doctrine chat purs primary emphasis on
the liberty and rights of individuals against encroachments by che
scace. le is at the heart ofpo- litical outlooks chat today are given the
vague labels of liberalism and conservatism, for both ideologies cake
for granted chat basic individual liberties and rights should be
protected against unacceptable government intrusion. They d iffer in
ho,v they de- fine unacceptable involvement ofthe government.
Locke's theory ofjustice is a form
Government docs not solve problems; itsubsi..
dizcs them. -Ronald Reagan
L iberalism is the political doctrine thar puts primary emphasis on ,he libcny and rights
ofindividuals against encroachment.~ by
the state.
of liberalis m -classical liberalism, che view chat che scace should
protect personal freedoms as well as che right co pursue one's O\vn
social and economic \veil-being in a free market \vichouc interference
from ochers. In contemporary politics, classical liberalism most
resembles what is known as (political) libertarianism. Libertarians insist
chat government should be small and limited co night-watchman
funccions- the protection ofsociety and free economic systems from
coercion and fraud. All ochersocial oreconomic benefits are che
responsibility ofindividuals.
Rawls
David Hume, \vhom \Ve met in earlier chapters, \vas a severe critic
ofsocial con- tract theory as offered up by Hobbes and Locke. He
declared chat social contracts are historical fictions-no such concraccs
have existed in reality. Governments have been established by conquest
and force, not by agreements among equals in a state of nature. This
criticism did not matter much to many lacer theorises because they
viewed che theories of Locke, Hobbes, and ochers not as historical
faces, but moscly
PHILOSOPHERS AT WORK
John Locke
The philosopher John Locke (1632- 1704) is the senior theorise among
the British empiricists and perhaps, as so,ne say, the grearesr English philosopher in rhe early modern
period (rhe first decades after Descartes).
Classical liberalism is , he view thar ,hesrareshould pm,ec, personal freedoms
as wdl as the right m pursue one's own social and economic wdJ.bcing in a free
market without interference from others.
Libertarianism (political) is the view that govern· men, should be small and
limited to night-watchman functions.
8.9 John
1704), empiricist philosopher and
politicaltheorist.
moral philosophy and logic ar Oxford, and rhen sec his sighrs on a career
in medicine. Like his fellow empiricist Thomas Hobbes, he rubbed elbo,vs with
many of rhe great chinkers ofrhe day. He knew rhe famous chemise
Robert Boyle as well as rhe physicist Isaac Newton and encountered
ocher notables ar rhe Royal Society.
For a ,vhile he was secretary ro rhe earl ofShaftesbury, ,vho beca,ne his
patron.
This relationship involved hi,n in Protesranr policies and in talk of
resistance ro
Charles II, rhe Catholic king. Consequenrly, Shaftesbury had ro Aee ro
Holland,
and Locke followed him in 1683, returning ro England in 1689.
Locke ,vas nor an academic who directed his ,vrirings ar ocher
philosophers. He
preferred instead ro address imporcanr issues in conre,nporaty society,
aiming his ,vriring ar an educated public. His besr-kno,vn works include
the Essay Concerning
Hu.man Understanding, Second Treatise o f Government, and Leuer on
Toleration, all published in t 689.
Eventually he became the ,nose renowned inrellecrual in England and
possibly throughout the Conrinenr.
Figure
Locke
(i 632-
He ,vas born into a Puritan family, studied
Social Contract Theories 375
376 Chapter 8
The Just Society
John Rawls,
A Theo,y ofJustice
as explanations of how states could be formed and justified.
Nevertheless, Hume's attack dampened interest in social contract
theories ofjustice for two centuries- until the \vork ofJohn Ra\vls
(1921-2002).
Ra\vls also thinks of social contracrs as fictions-but very useful
fictions. He believes they give us a way to explore the requirements
ofdistributive justice. He asks, in effect, What kind ofsocial contract
would best ensure a fair distribution ofrights, duties, and the
advantages ofsocial cooperation? To ans\ver this question, he
proposes an ingenious thought experiment. Imagine we are living in
a state of nature and want to devise a social contract that ensures
that everyone is treated fairly. What kind of state \vould we all agree
to? Specifically, by what principles should our just society structure
itself? His response is that the required principles are those that
people \vould agree to under hypothetical conditions that ensure fair
and unbiased choices. He holds that if the starting point for the
social contract is fair - i f the initial conditions and bargain- ing
process for producing the principles are fair-then the principles
themselves will be just and will define the essential makeup of a just
society. As Rawls says,
John Rawls, A Theory ofjustice
[The] guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are
the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining
the fundamental terms oftheir association. These principles are to
regulate all further agreements; they specify the kinds ofsocial
cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that
can be established.7
At the hypothetical starting point-what Rawls calls the "original
position"-a group of normal, self-interested, rational individuals
come together to choose the principles that will determine their
basic rights and duties and their share of society's benefits and
burdens. But to ensure that their decisions are as fair and impartial
as possible, they must meet behind a metaphorical "veil of
ignorance." Behind the veil, no one knows his or her own social or
economic status, class, race, sex, abilities, talents, level of
intelligence, or psychological makeup. Rawls thinks that since the
participanrs are rational and self-interested but ignorant oftheir
situation in society, they \vill not agree to principles that will put any
particular group at a disadvantage, because they might very \veil be
members ofthat group. They will choose principles that are unbiased
and nondiscriminatory. The assumption is that since the negotiating conditions in the original position are fair, the agreements
reached will also be fair-the principles will bejust.
Rawls contends that given the original position, the participants
would agree to arrange their social relationships according to these
fundamental principles:
FIRST PRINCIPLE
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total
system ofequal basic liberties compatible with a similar system o f
liberty for all.
SECOND PRINCIPLE
Socialand economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, ... and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
fair equality
ofopportunity.a
The first principle -the equal liberty principle-says that everyone is
entitle.cl to the most political freedom possible in exercising basic
rights and duties (for example, the right to vote and hold office and
freedom ofspeech, assembly, and thought). Each person should get a
maximum degree of basic liberties, but no more than anyone else.
This principle takes precedence over all other considerations
(including the second principle), so that basic political liberties
cannot be reduced or cancelled just to improve economic wellbeing. This stipulation, ofcourse, directly contradicts utilitarian
views of the matter.
The second principle concerns social and economic goods such as
income, wealth, opportunities, and positions of authority. Ra,vls
recognizes that some social and economic inequalities in society are
unavoidable as well as beneficial. Those who ,vork harder or devise
a better mousetrap deserve to reap greater benefirs for their efforts.
Such inequality provides incentives
Giving moneyand power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys t o tee
nage boys.
-P . J.0 . Rourke
15Are you more sympathetic to liber- tarianism or welfare liberalism?
Why?
for extraordinary productivity, ,vhich in turn will be to the good
ofsociety as a whole. (This kind of unequal social arrangement
contrasrs ,vith systems that aim at a much greater degree ofequality,
as in
socialist societies.) So Rawls asserrs in part (a) that social and
economic inequalities are not unjust if they work to everyone's
benefit, especially to the benefit ofthe least well-offinsociety.
"[There) is no injustice," he says, "in the greater benefirs earne.d by
a few provided that the situation ofpersons not so fortunate is
thereby improved." 9 For Rawls, such a policy is far more just than
one in which some people are made to suffer for the greater good of
others: "It is not just that some should have less in
order that others may prosper."
But Ra,vls also maintains that although economic inequalities are allowed, and not everyone will obtain the
greater rewards, everyone should at least have an equal opportunity
to acquire them. This is the message of part (b). Every person is entitled to an equal chance to try to acquire basic goods. No one is
guaranteed an equal share of them, but opportunities to obtain these
benefits
must be open to all, regardless ofsocial standing. In Rawls's
program, the demands of the first principle must be satisfied before
satisfying the
Figure 8.10 John Raw ls (1921-2002).
Social Contract Theories 377
8.4 SOCIALIST THEORIES
The prevailing theories of justice throughout the ,vorld are
liberalism and social- ism. Socialism is the political and economic
doctrine that the means ofproduction (property, factories,
businesses) should be owned or controlled by the people, either
communally or through the state. Socialism can accommodate
liberal democratic
forms of government and can even retain some elements of market
capitalism. Communism usually implies socialism within a
totalitarian system.
T h e g u id i n g p r i n c i p l e o f t h e s o c i a l i s t v ie , v i s e q u
a l i t y : T h e , v e a l t h o f s o c ie t y s h o u l d be shared by all.
The ideal distribution of goods usually follows the classic formula
laid do,vn by Karl Marx (1818-1883), the father of modern
socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." People should
do work that fits their abilities, and they should reap rewards that
match their nee.ds. Generally, liberal societies let the means
ofproduction accrue to fewer people through the ,vorkings of a free
market-that is, through capitalism. In such a system, wealth goes to
anyone who can acqui re it in the marketplace, but in a socialist
system, ,vealth is controlled by
the state, ,vhich allocates it for the good ofthe people generally.
Few philosophers have had as much influence on the world as Marx
has-,vho,
ironically, did not consider himself a philosopher and did not
believe that ideas alone could have much of an impact on history.
He thinks that ,vhat d rives philosophy, history, society, law,
government, and morality is economics. It is the dominant system of
economics in every age, he says, that determines how society is
structured and ho,v history will go. A society's system ofeconomics
is defined by its means of production-by irs economic and
technological ways of meeting people's physical and social needs.
The means of production, Marx says, shape social relationships,
class structure, technological tools, and political and philosophical
ideas. Those ,vho o,vn and control the means ofproduction make up
the dominant class, possess most of t he ,vealth, wield most of the
political power, and exploit the lower
class. Their ideas-political, philosophical, or social-are the ruling
ideas. The rest of the people own no property and occupy the lowest
rungs ofsociety, selling their labor to the ruling class, the property
o,vners. The nvo camps, then, are forever at odds.
Marx maintains that this pattern of opposition-this class
struggle-repeats irselfthroughout history. It is inevitable and
unalter- able. In it he sees a dialectic process unfold again and again
in society: First there is a historical starting point (the thesis), ,vhich
eventually p r o d u c e s a s t a t e o f a f f a i rs d i r e c t l y o p p o
s e d t o i t ( t h e a n t i t h e s i s ) , t h e c o n - flict being resolved
by a ne,v situation (the synthesis). Marx thinks the dialectic struggle
in modern times is between those who o,vn the means ofproduction
(the bourgeoisie, or capitalists) and those who do not (the
proletariat). The bourgeoisie are few but own all the factories and
other
means of production (thesis); the proletariat are many but o,vn nothing, serving only as workers in the capitalist system (antithesis). To
in- crease thei r profits, the bourgeoisie hire more and more workers
but pay them less and less, replacing workers ,vith machines
,vhenever possible.
I am convinced that the path to a new, better
and pos.
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