Attached.

UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)

The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities
Carrera, S.; Blockmans, S.F.; Gros, D.; Guild, E.

Link to publication

Citation for published version (APA):
Carrera, S., Blockmans, S., Gros, D., & Guild, E. (2015). The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking
Stock and Setting Policy Priorities. (CEPS essay; No. 20). Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

General rights
It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s),
other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).

Disclaimer/Complaints regulations
If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating
your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask
the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam,
The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.

UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl)
Download date: 29 Mar 2017

The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities
Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans,
Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild
No. 20 / 16 December 2015
Abstract
What have been the most important EU policy and legal responses to the
2015 refugee crisis? Is Europe acting in compliance with its founding
principles? This Essay takes stock of the main results and policy outputs
from the EU’s interventions to the refugee crisis. It critically highlights the
outstanding policy dilemmas confronting the adopted instruments and
puts forwards a set of policy priorities to guide the next phases of the
European Agenda on Migration.

Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs section
at CEPS and Associate Professor at the University of Maastricht. Steven Blockmans is
Senior Research Fellow and Head of EU Foreign Policy at CEPS. Daniel Gros is Director of
CEPS. Elspeth Guild is Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Jean Monnet
Professor ad personam at Queen Mary, University of London as well as at Radboud
University Nijmegen.
CEPS Essays offer scholarly observations and personal insights into topics of critical
importance in European affairs. The views expressed are attributable only to the authors in
a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated.
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)
© Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild, 2015
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu

Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
2. Overview of EU institutional, policy and legal responses ......................................... 2
2.1

Institutional renewal and migration ..................................................................... 2

2.2

The European migration agenda ........................................................................... 3

2.3

Adopted legal and policy instruments (May-December 2015): State of play..... 5

2.3.1

The temporary relocation system .................................................................. 5

2.3.2

The hotspots approach ................................................................................... 7

2.3.3

Safe third countries ......................................................................................... 7

2.3.4

Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling ........................................... 9

2.3.5

Funding.......................................................................................................... 10

2.3.6

The Commission proposal for a European border and coastal guard ...... 10

3. Assessing the EU responses: What are the challenges?............................................ 12
3.1

A fairer sharing of responsibilities in the European asylum system ................ 12

3.2

Enforcing member states’ implementation of EU standards............................. 14

3.3

Guaranteeing rule of law and human rights when the EU goes abroad? ........ 17

3.4

A multi-policy angle for the EU agenda on migration ...................................... 18

4. What policy priorities for the next phase of the European agenda on migration? 20
References .......................................................................................................................... 22

The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis:
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities
Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans,
Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild
No. 20 / 16 December 2015
1.

Introduction

The year 2015 has sorely tested the added value and legitimacy of the European Union in
responding to the refugee crisis. The public outcry and unprecedented levels of political and
media attention to the dramatic experiences and images of asylum-seekers arriving in the EU
have put huge pressures on the European institutions and member state governments to show
that they can meet the challenge.
Migration policies are now at the top of the EU policy agenda. It is difficult to envisage that
this will change anytime in the near future. Each of the relevant European institutions has
positioned this issue at the heart of its respective agenda. During this same period a whole
series of initiatives have been put on the table and heatedly discussed between the relevant
institutional actors and EU member states, and indeed with third countries – as the recent
Valetta Summit on migration of 11-12 November 2015 has shown. 1 These have been
accompanied by a succession of inconclusive extraordinary summits and conferences
reporting mixed and obscure results about the kind of concrete steps the EU might take. The
resulting picture is difficult for the general public to fully grasp, which has proved to be
profoundly concerned about the impasse reached on migration and the lack of commitment
by European authorities. Is Europe effectively assuming responsibility in compliance with its
founding principles? It is roughly one year since the new European Commission, the High
Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European
Council took office.
It is therefore a proper moment to take stock of the results and policy outputs from the EU’s
interventions in the refugee crisis. This Essay examines the most salient policy and legislative
initiatives taken by the EU in this area and identifies the main challenges associated with them
from a variety of policy perspectives. Section 2 provides a synthesis of the most far-reaching
policy, legislative, institutional and financial responses agreed at EU level to respond to the
refugee crisis. Section 3 critically highlights the outstanding policy dilemmas confronting the
next phases of the European Agenda on Migration.
The Essay illustrates that while a number of the recently adopted EU initiatives constitute a
step forward in the building of a common European policy on migration, asylum and borders,
a number of far-reaching challenges remain in need of attention. This is particularly true with
regard to:
i)
ii)

1

ensuring a fairer sharing of legal responsibilities and institutional solidarity between
the EU and the member states, as well as among the member states themselves;
guaranteeing a proper implementation and enforcement of existing EU laws and
standards by member states on the ground and of rule of law principles in external

See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs/
|1

2 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD

border controls and defence/military-oriented responses; and
iii)

implementing a common EU policy agenda that gives priority to – also in the shortterm – all policy sectors with relevance to migration and not only those related to EU
and member states’ security. The latter point implies giving proper consideration to
the repercussions of home affairs responses over wider economic, trade, development
cooperation, human rights and foreign affairs policies.

Until the present time, most of these measures did not go deep enough to treat the actual
dilemma behind this refugee crisis. This mainly concerns a lack of effective action on
remodelling the sharing of protection and human rights responsibilities between all EU
member state governments in a way that takes us beyond the current unworkable EU Dublin
system. Still, events such as the terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris should not be
taken as an opportunity to shy away EU member states’ commitments towards the legislative
and policy measures already adopted in the scope of the European Agenda on Migration. The
EU policy responses, both internally and in cooperation with third countries, have by and large
lacked a multi-policy sector approach. Instead, they have given priority to security-driven
(home affairs) and military concerns and interests of the EU and its member states, where the
focus on border controls, return and readmission and fighting against smuggling have by and
large prevailed, instead of first ensuring full compliance with fundamental human rights
standards and principles. This constitutes one of the Achilles heels of the current European
Agenda on Migration.

2.

Overview of EU institutional, policy and legal responses

2.1 Institutional renewal and migration
Since the inauguration of the new European Commission, led by President Jean-Claude
Juncker, one of whose Vice-Presidents, Federica Mogherini, is also the new High
Representative leading the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the start of activities
by Donald Tusk as President of the European Council, migration policies have been at the top
of their political agendas. President Juncker’s Political Guidelines ‘A New Start for Europe’
included migration as one of the key action areas.2 The new intra-institutional configurations
of the current Commission included for the first time a First Vice-President in charge of
coordinating both Commissioners responsible for ‘Justice’ (DG JUST) and ‘Home Affairs’ (DG
HOME), and therefore politically steering the Commission’s work emanating from these two
DGs, including on migration policy (Guild & Carrera, 2014). For the first time also, the
Commissioner for Home Affairs was additionally nominated as Commissioner for ‘Migration’,
yet without any significant reallocation of responsibilities in comparison to his predecessor.
In response to a spike in deadly tragedies at sea since February 2015, ‘migration’ has also been
a key domain of intervention by Federica Mogherini, in her dual capacity as High
Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) responsible for the
Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA), which includes Commissioner
Avramopoulos (DG HOME) in the broader cluster (Blockmans & Russack, 2015):3
We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming weeks and months; we need to be
2

Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf

3

Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/about/structure/index_en.htm#ta

THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 3

able to give a strong political and operational response. As I have announced today during
the College in Strasbourg, I will convene an extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners'
Group on External Action in the coming days in order to discuss with the Commissioner
for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our
policies. I've also decided to put a discussion on migration on the agenda of the Foreign
Affairs Council soon. The fight against smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants
at sea, the protection of asylum-seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger
exercise of shared responsibility.4

On the occasion of the Foreign Affairs Council in March (the first in 10 years to discuss
‘migration’), it was decided to organise an extraordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers and
Interior Ministers on 20th April. This first-ever joint ministerial prepared the first ‘special’
European Council meeting on the refugee crisis on 23rd April, after the single-most deadly
shipwreck on the Mediterranean claimed more than 800 lives. Mogherini has played an
instrumental role in keeping the external dimension of the refugee crisis on the agenda since.
Whereas “the need to manage migration properly” (and strengthen Triton, the Frontex
Operation in the central Mediterranean and the EU’s support to the countries of origin and
transit) had already been recognised by EU Heads of State or Government in 2014, President
Tusk tried to respond to the concerns expressed by an ever-louder chorus of EU leaders by
coordinating a more concerted effort at the highest political level. He appointed former EEAS
Secretary General Pierre Vimont as his point man for the Valetta Summit process and has kept
refugee and migration issues on the agenda of every regular European Council summit since,
including the upcoming European Council meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015.5

2.2 The European migration agenda
In May 2015, the Commission adopted the so-called European Migration Agenda. 6 The
Agenda is a political document outlining priorities in migration, asylum and borders policies
for the years to come. The relevance of the above-mentioned new inter- and intra-institutional
configurations became evident during the press conference presenting the Agenda to the
public, which started with First Vice-President Timmermans, followed by HR/VP Mogherini
and only then Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Avramopoulos.7
In contrast to the previous institutional arrangements, for the first time a common policy
agenda was adopted between the two institutions, aimed at being ‘comprehensive’ 8 and
4

See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm

See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/12/17-18/ See also an
interesting timeline of key developments in the work of the Council and the European Council on
migration
here:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/historymigratory-pressures/
5

See
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
6

7

See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm

During the Press Conference presenting the Agenda Mogherini stated: “The response is finally European. And it is also as we say in European terminology, I don’t necessarily like it very much, but you
know what I refer to, is a comprehensive response, means that it tackles all different aspects of a problem
that is complex, is not going to be solved from today to tomorrow but we have a set of European policies
that can be put together, and we are doing that in an integrated and coordinated way…finally we don’t
8

4 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD

joining up (or ensuring consistency between) the various internal and external policy strands
and instruments at the Union’s disposal. Yet, has this really been the result so far?
In light of the increasingly pressing political context surrounding the arrival of asylum-seekers
through the south-eastern land borders and the Mediterranean, the Agenda identified six
‘immediate (short-term) EU policy actions’ or proposals:
1)

A temporary and emergency-driven relocation mechanism for asylum-seekers within
the EU for those member states confronting higher influx, based on a new
redistribution key criteria for determining responsibility for assessing asylum
applications; and the presentation of a legislative initiative for a permanent system
before the end of 2015

2)

A relocation mechanism for 20,000 refugees from outside the EU, and an extra €50
million budget 2015-16 to support this scheme

3)

Tripling the capacities and budget of the EU External Border Agency (Frontex) joint
border control and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean (called ‘Triton’ and
‘Poseidon’)

4)

Increasing emergency funding to frontline EU member states by €60 million, and
setting up a new ‘hotspot approach’ in which EU home affairs agencies like Frontex,
Europol and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) would work on the ground
to support ‘frontline’ member states in identifying, registering and fingerprinting
migrants

5)

Strengthening Europol’s joint maritime information operation in the Mediterranean to
deal with migrants’ smuggling via CEPOL (European Policy College)

6)

Establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Operation in the
Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers’ networks and the ‘business model’ of
smugglers, so as to identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers

In addition to these ‘immediate’ actions, understood as more ‘medium-term’ in nature, the
European Agenda on Migration outlined the following four key ‘pillars’ or ‘levels of action’
for an EU migration policy: 1) reducing the incentives for irregular migration; 2) border
management – saving lives and securing external borders; 3) Europe’s duty to protect – a
strong common asylum policy; and 4) a new policy on legal migration. Each pillar advanced
a set of specific policy actions.
A majority of MEPs supported the European Commission’s proposals to address the crisis,
while criticising EU member states for their failure to make tough decisions and provide a
compassionate response to the refugee crisis. For its part, the June European Council embraced
the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration and stressed the need to make progress on
all dimensions of a “comprehensive and systemic approach”.
This approach includes the diplomatic work by High Representative Mogherini, supported by
her staff at the EEAS, for instance in supporting the UN-brokered peace deal to form a

have
a
European
response
but we
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=KKxWBvW7llE).

have

an

integrated

European

response”

THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 5

government in Libya,9 and by widening the ‘E3+3’ format with Iran in an effort to reboot
discussions on how to bring about an end to the violence in Syria.10 Mogherini, in her hybrid
capacity as HR/VP, and fellow Commissioners (in particular Timmermans, Hahn,
Avramopoulos, Stylianides and Mimica) have also tried to move Turkey (See Section 2.3.3
below), Western Balkan countries, African countries and organisations, 11 toward closer
cooperation to manage refugee flows and address the so-called ‘root causes of irregular
migration’.12

2.3
Adopted legal and policy instruments (May-December 2015): State of
play
EU policy proposals have been the subject of intense policy debates over the past six months.
This Section explores in more detail the main legal and policy instruments adopted.13

2.3.1 The temporary relocation system
One of the most controversial ideas has been the establishment of a Temporary EU Relocation
System for the redistribution of asylum-seekers between EU member states (Carrera & Guild,
2015). The main contribution of the initiative has been to derogate temporarily the guiding
rule under the so-called ‘EU Dublin system’ according to which the EU member state of first
entry is responsible for examining an asylum application.
The temporary system introduces a new ‘distribution key’ model of allocating responsibility
between member states on the basis of new criteria, which include GDP, population,
unemployment, etc. On the basis of the Commission’s initiative, the member states adopted a
Resolution on relocating from Greece and Italy 40,000 persons in clear need of international
protection of 22 July 2015,14 which was complemented on September 3rd by an additional
Council Decision on the temporary relocation of 120,000 asylum-seekers from Greece and
Italy.15 EU Member States had also committed themselves in July 2015 to resettling over 22,000
See M. Toaldo, “Libya's migrant smuggling highway: Lessons for Europe, ECFR Policy Memo, 10 November 2015.
9

Joint Statement by China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations,
and the United States, Final declaration on the results of the Syria Talks in Vienna as agreed by participants, EEAS Press Release 151030_06, 30 October 2015.
10

Speech of Mogherini at the opening ceremony of the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso,
Tchad, Mali, Mauritanie et Niger), N’djamena, 20 November 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151120_fr_02.htm; and Speech of Mogherini to the African Union, 20 October 2015,
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151020_01_en.htm.
11

For an analysis on the ‘root causes approach’ refer to http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mpp_issue_22.pdf
12

For summaries, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm and more recently European Commission, “State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis”, 4 November 2015
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5958_en.htm). See also European Commission, Communication, Managing the refugee crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions under
the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 510 final, 14.10.2015.
13

14

http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11131-2015-INIT/en/pdf

http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11132-2015-INIT/en/pdf http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11161-2015-INIT/en/pdf
15

6 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD

people from outside Europe.16
The first relocation flight took place from Italy on October 9th, transporting 19 Eritrean asylumseekers to Sweden. 17 Twelve days later, on October 21st, another 19 Eritrean and Syrian
asylum-seekers were relocated to Sweden and 48 to Finland. In what concerns Greece, the
European Commission announced on the 4th November that the first relocations flights of 30
asylum-seekers will take place to Luxembourg.18 As of December 11th, the resulting picture is
as follows: 54 asylum-seekers have been relocated from Greece and 130 from Italy (see Table
1 below).19 The EU member states that have participated most actively so far are Finland,
Sweden and Luxembourg; followed by France, Spain and Germany. It is not surprising that
the member states’ resolve has become the object of criticism: “At the current pace, it would
take more than 750 years to relocate the 160,000 asylum-seekers covered by a now-expanded
resettlement plan.”20
Table 1. State of play of relocation of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy

I
T
A
L
Y
G
R
E
E
C
E

F
i
n
l
a
n
d

F
r
a
n
c
e

G
e
r
m
a
n
y

4
9

1
9

1
1

2
4

L
u
x
e
m

S
p
a
i
n

S
w
e
d
e
n

1
2

3
9

3
0

Source: Authors’ elaboration.

According to the Commission Communication COM(2015) 510, Managing the Refugee Crisis, the first
resettlements have already taken place and “132 Syrians staying in neighbouring countries have already
been resettled under the scheme agreed on 20 July 2015 to the Czech Republic (16), Italy (96), and Liechtenstein (20)”(p. 6).
16

For the current state of affairs of member states’ support to emergency relocation mechanism (December 2015), see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf
17

See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5971_en.htm and information provided at
http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/11/04-asselborn-athenes/index.html
See also http://www.unhcr.org/566eac399.html
18

19

See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6134_en.htm

See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/merkel-and-east-european-leaders-discuss-migrant-crisis-in-brussels.html?_r=0
20

THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 7

2.3.2

The hotspots approach

A second accompanying measure to the relocation system has been the so-called hotspot
approach in specific (more problematic) venues in Italy and Greece and the strengthening of
EU Home Affairs agencies.21 As briefly mentioned above, this model entails the deployment
of operational support by Frontex, Europol and EASO experts involved in the ‘screening’ of
third country nationals (identification, fingerprinting and registration), provision of
information and assistance to applicants of international protection and the preparation and
removal of irregular immigrants.
The hotspots involve setting up a joint operational headquarters called the European Union
Regional Task Force (EURTF), composed by representatives from the three EU agencies who
coordinate the work on the ground collaborate with national authorities. In Italy, hotspot areas
include Augusta, Lampedusa, Porte Empedocle, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani. A first
Migration Management Support Team is up and running in Lampedusa, which builds upon
the EURTF in Catania, Sicily. In Greece the following areas have been identified: Lesvos, Chios,
Leros, Samos and Kos. The EURTF is based in Piraeus and the first Migration Management
Support Team has been based in Lesvos.22
Frontex has also seen its capacities ‘tripled’ when it comes to Joint Operations in the
Mediterranean (Triton and Poseidon), including financial allocations, an increase in staff by 60
new members (corresponding to €1.3 million) and an additional pool of EU member state
officials (291) to be deployed in the hotspots,23 which compares to the higher original demand
by Frontex of 775 border guard officials. Frontex is also expected to become more involved in
‘joint return operations’ and to create a dedicated returns office to organise return operations.
EASO has also increased its staff (by 30 additional members) and called for 370 national
experts to support asylum management authorities in Italy and Greece.

2.3.3

Safe third countries

A third important development has been the adoption of a Regulation establishing a common
list of safe third countries24 and the adoption of Council conclusions on the same subject.25 The
main idea behind the Regulation is the designation of countries, in particular the (potential)
EU candidates along the Western Balkan route (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey), as ‘safe countries’, which entails that nationals from those
countries are not a priori deemed as ‘refugees’ and an expedited procedure can be applied by
Annex 2 to the Commission Communication, Managing the refugees crisis: Immediate operational,
budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 490 final,
23.9.2015.
21

For an overview of the current state of play (December 2015) of the Hotspots see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf
22

Frontex News http://frontex.europa.eu/news/member-states-provide-291-border-guards-to-frontex-to-be-deployed-in-greece-italy-2tVnYY
23

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/proposal_for_regulation_of_the_ep_and_council_establishing_an_eu_common_list_of_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf
24

25

http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11133-2015-INIT/en/pdf

8 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & G UILD

national authorities. This does not mean that all applicants of international protection from
these countries can be automatically refused or directly treated as unfounded.
To this end, the EU first hosted a High-Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean
/Western Balkan Route on October 8th and adopted a plan of collective action. A second, more
restricted, high-level meeting was convened on October 25th, with leaders from Austria,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia as well as Albania, Serbia
and Macedonia invited to attend. The Presidents of the European Commission and the
European Council, the current and future rotating presidencies of the Council (Luxembourg
and the Netherlands), as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were also in
attendance. The meeting agreed on a “17-point plan of pragmatic and operational measures”,
where increased border management and implementation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan
(agreed on October 15th) feature prominently.26
More recently, a contact points group composed of senior member state officials, EU agencies
and the Commission, followed up with, inter alia, an additional 50,000 reception places along
the Western Balkans Route before the end of the year, of which 12,000 have been already
committed by Austria, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. 27 It also called for launching the civil
protection mechanism for the benefit of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia.28
Meanwhile, the EU has been bending over backwards to engage with Turkey, in the hope that
the country will cooperate in stemming the flow of refugees. Two extraordinary EU-Turkey
summits were held in Brussels, one with President Erdogan (5October 5th) and the other with
Prime Minister Davutoglu (29th November), both on the request of the Union.29
The EU and Turkey agreed to activate the Joint Action Plan to step up cooperation for support
of Syrians under temporary protection and migration management for the purposes,
according to the statement, to address the crisis created by the situation in Syria. According to
both parties: “results must be achieved in particular in stemming the influx of irregular
migrants.” It is not entirely clear whether the parties were referring to Syrians as irregular
migrants or others, one can only hope that they meant the latter. The parties sought to bring
order into migration flows and help stem irregular migration. This will include active
cooperation on migrants not in need of international protection to prevent them from
travelling to Turkey and the EU.
The parties agreed to activate the EU Turkey Readmission Agreement from June 2016 and
ensure that it is used to swiftly return migrants who do not need international protection to
their countries of origin. Turkey agreed to adopt immediate measures to improve the socioeconomic situation of Syrians resident in that country under temporary protection. In a similar
vein the parties agreed to take decisive action to enhance the fight against ‘criminal smuggling
networks.’
This cooperation comes with a price tag: an initial €3 billion of additional resources to help
Turkey cope with the high numbers of Syrian refugees currently in the country; the
See http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/10/20151025_en.htm and the final statement available at
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/leader_statement_final.pdf
26

27

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5952_en.htm

28

http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/factsheet_the_eu_civil_protection_mechanism.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/29/ The German
Chancellor has followed a parallel track, entering into direct bilateral negotiations with Erdogan.
29

THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING P OLICY PRIORITIES | 9

acceleration of the visa liberalisation process; the opening of a new chapter to re-energise
Turkey’s accession process. One of the positive outcomes of visa liberalisation would of course
be a stronger border control of its coastal waters, as indeed a change in Turkey’s visa policy,
provided that Ankara does not abuse its newly found power position in exploiting
vulnerabilities of the EU to new spikes in the flow of refugees towards Europe.

2.3.4 Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling
Among the most visible responses by the European Commission have been the adoption of an
EU Action Plan against Migrants’ Smuggling COM(2015) 285,30 EU Action Plan on Return
COM(2015) 453 of 9 September 2015, 31 and a Recommendation on Common Return
Handbook.32 These measures have been by and large welcomed by all EU Member States, a
clear example being the Council Conclusions on the future of the return policy of 8 October
2015.33 The focus of these measures is on the return of irregular entering and staying third
country nationals, and cooperation with third countries on readmission.34
The EU policy in fighting traffickers has also involved the launch of a CSDP operation called
EUNAVFOR MED - recently re-baptised ‘Operation Sophia’ – on the high seas of the southern
Mediterranean.35 From its invitation to the High Representative to start preparations until
today, the European Council has insisted that the CSDP operation be conducted in accordance
with international law. To strengthen the EU’s presence at sea, the European Council also
agreed to triple the resources available to Triton, the EU border mission in the Central
Mediterranean, and to enhance its operational capability with the supply of additional vessels,

https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_action_plan_against_migrant_smuggling_en.pdf
30

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/communication_from_the_ec_to_ep_and_council_-_eu_action_plan_on_return_en.pdf
31

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/return_handbook_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/commission_recommendation_establishing_a_return_handbook_for_member_states_competent_authorities_to_deal_with_return_related_tasks_en.pdf As part of a broader package of proposals, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a joint communication
JOIN(2015) 40 of 9 September 2015, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External
Action”, in which they describe how the Union’s international engagement has built upon the 2011
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility COM(2011) 743.
32

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/10/40802203341_en_635799226800000
000.pdf
33

As part of a broader package of proposals, the Commission and the High Representative adopted a
joint communication JOIN(2015) 40 of 9 September 2015, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The
Role of EU External Action”, in which they describe how the Union’s international engagement has built
upon the 2011 so-called ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM). The EU and Turkey
have agreed to apply from June 2016 the readmission agreement. They are aiming to complete the visa
liberalization process, and the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone, by
October 2016.
34

See Council Conclusions on Migration, 12 October 2015 (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures) and section 3.3 below.
35

10 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD

aircraft and experts by member states. Other agreed measures include increased cooperation
against smuggling networks with the help of Europol and the deployment of immigration
officers to third countries.

2.3.5

Funding

Another rather visible output, this time of a predominantly financial nature, has been the socalled Trust Funds for the Syrian crisis (with an additional €500 million) and Africa.36 An
Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration in Africa
(Trust Fund for Africa) of €1.8 billion. 37 Financial solidarity has also taken the form of
additional emergency assistance in 2015 under the Asylum, Migration and Immigration Fund
and the Internal Security Fund-Borders, totalling €100 million. 38 This has come along with
additional funding reallocated from the European Neighbourhood Instrument of about €300
million. For the year 2015, Greece has received +/- €41.8 million (including €8.7 million in
emergency funding), and Italy +/- €58.3 million (including €19 million in emergency funding).
In light of the above, most of the ‘actions’ that the European Agenda on Migration framed or
identified as ‘immediate’ have been largely adopted during the last five months. It is too early
to project and examine the actual practical repercussions that these EU instruments are having
or will have on the ground. The framing of these actions as ‘short-term’ by the Agenda is
however misleading, as their actual impacts will be mainly noticed on the ground in the
medium and long terms.

2.3.6

The Commission’s proposal for a European border and coast guard

The European Agenda on Migration adopted in May 2015 anticipated that “within the scope
of the Treaties and its relevant Protocols”, the European Commission would launch a
reflection on how to foster “a shared management of the European border”. It stipulated:
a European System of Border Guards…would cover a new approach to coastguard
functions in the EU, looking at initiatives such as asset sharing, joint exercises and dual
use of resources as well as a the possibility of moving towards a European Coastguard.39

President of the Commission Juncker declared in his state of the union speech40 the need to
reinforce significantly Frontex’s competences and “develop it into a fully operational
European border and coast guard system.”41 This was reflected in the Commission’s Work
Programme for 2016 “No Time for Business as Usual”,42 which anticipated the presentation of
36

http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/migration/docs/letter-tusk-bettel-juncker_en.pdf

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/emergency-trust-fund-stability-and-addressing-root-causes-irregular-migration-and-displaced-persons_en
37

38

Refer to Annex 8 of the Communication COM(2015) 510.

39

European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240, 13.5.2015, page 17.

40

See http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf

The Speech continued by saying that “It is certainly feasible. But it will cost money. The Commission
believes this is money well invested. This is why we will propose ambitious steps towards a European
Border and Coast Guard before the end of the year.”
41

European Commis...