PPT about transportation strategies of logistics (disasters)

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Powerpoint about transportation strategies of logistics in disasters disasters.

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  • This is a 5-8 minute PPT presentation describing your approach to providing transportation resources to support disaster operations. You may focus on one method- air, sea, rail or road.
  • The key is to identify what resources you will need and how you intend to support/resource it. This does not need to be detailed; 8-10 slides max.

Important notes:

- Include comments in each slide because i will read these comments to record an audio in each slide.

- only focus on transportation strategies of logistics.

- The references must be official such as (org,edu)

- Use APA style in your citation and references in the last slide.

- please find a good article to talk about transportation strategies and answer the questions above. you may need the uploaded articles below.


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JULY–AUGUST 2013 NUMBER 287 TR NEWS Logistics of Disaster Response 䡲 Key Lessons for Postdisaster Humanitarian Logistics 䡲 Building Adaptive Supply Chains 䡲 Assembling a Model for Community Recovery 䡲 Planning for the Worst, Teaming with the Best 䡲 Securing the Fuel Supply 䡲 Timely Interventions: Social Media, Ferries 䡲 Commercial Aviation and Business Continuity Plus: Communicating the Urgency for Action on Climate Change TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD 2013 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE* National Academy of Sciences National Academy of Engineering Institute of Medicine National Research Council The Transportation Research Board is one of six major divisions of the National Research Council, which serves as an independent adviser to the federal government and others on scientific and technical questions of national importance, and which is jointly administered by the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The mission of the Transportation Research Board is to provide leadership in transportation innovation and progress through research and information exchange, conducted within a setting that is objective, interdisciplinary, and multimodal. The Board’s varied activities annually engage about 7,000 engineers, scientists, and other transportation researchers and practitioners from the public and private sectors and academia, all of whom contribute their expertise in the public interest. The program is supported by state transportation departments, federal agencies including the component administrations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and other organizations and individuals interested in the development of transportation. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. www.TRB.org Chair: Deborah H. Butler, Executive Vice President, Planning, and CIO, Norfolk Southern Corporation, Norfolk, Virginia Vice Chair: Kirk T. Steudle, Director, Michigan Department of Transportation, Lansing Executive Director: Robert E. Skinner, Jr., Transportation Research Board Victoria A. Arroyo, Executive Director, Georgetown Climate Center, and Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. Scott E. Bennett, Director, Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department, Little Rock William A. V. Clark, Professor of Geography (emeritus) and Professor of Statistics (emeritus), Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles James M. Crites, Executive Vice President of Operations, Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport, Texas Malcolm Dougherty, Director, California Department of Transportation, Sacramento John S. Halikowski, Director, Arizona Department of Transportation, Phoenix Michael W. Hancock, Secretary, Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, Frankfort Susan Hanson, Distinguished University Professor Emerita, School of Geography, Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts Steve Heminger, Executive Director, Metropolitan Transportation Commission, Oakland, California Chris T. Hendrickson, Duquesne Light Professor of Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Jeffrey D. Holt, Managing Director, Bank of Montreal Capital Markets, and Chairman, Utah Transportation Commission, Huntsville, Utah Gary P. LaGrange, President and CEO, Port of New Orleans, Louisiana Michael P. Lewis, Director, Rhode Island Department of Transportation, Providence Joan McDonald, Commissioner, New York State Department of Transportation, Albany Donald A. Osterberg, Senior Vice President, Safety and Security, Schneider National, Inc., Green Bay, Wisconsin Steve Palmer, Vice President of Transportation, Lowe’s Companies, Inc., Mooresville, North Carolina Sandra Rosenbloom, Director, Innovation in Infrastructure, The Urban Institute, Washington, D.C. (Past Chair, 2012) Henry G. (Gerry) Schwartz, Jr., Chairman (retired), Jacobs/Sverdrup Civil, Inc., St. Louis, Missouri Kumares C. Sinha, Olson Distinguished Professor of Civil Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana Daniel Sperling, Professor of Civil Engineering and Environmental Science and Policy; Director, Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis Gary C. Thomas, President and Executive Director, Dallas Area Rapid Transit, Dallas, Texas Phillip A. Washington, General Manager, Regional Transportation District, Denver, Colorado Rebecca M. Brewster, President and COO, American Transportation Research Institute, Marietta, Georgia (ex officio) Anne S. Ferro, Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) LeRoy Gishi, Chief, Division of Transportation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. (ex officio) John T. Gray II, Senior Vice President, Policy and Economics, Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C. (ex officio) Michael P. Huerta, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) David T. Matsuda, Administrator, Maritime Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Michael P. Melaniphy, President and CEO, American Public Transportation Association, Washington, D.C. (ex officio) Victor M. Mendez, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Robert J. Papp (Adm., U.S. Coast Guard), Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (ex officio) Lucy Phillips Priddy, Research Civil Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Vicksburg, Mississippi, and Chair, TRB Young Members Council (ex officio) Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Peter M. Rogoff, Administrator, Federal Transit Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) David L. Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Joseph C. Szabo, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Polly Trottenberg, Under Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Robert L. Van Antwerp (Lt. General, U.S. Army), Chief of Engineers and Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C. (ex officio) Barry R. Wallerstein, Executive Officer, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Diamond Bar, California (ex officio) Gregory D. Winfree, Acting Administrator, Research and Innovative Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation (ex officio) Frederick G. (Bud) Wright, Executive Director, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, D.C. (ex officio) * Membership as of August 2013. TR NEWS NUMBER 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 LOGISTICS OF DISASTER RESPONSE AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY 3 INTRODUCTION Transportation’s Roles in Disaster Response Jon S. Meyer Many parties are involved in transportation’s role in disaster relief and business continuity; the articles assembled here offer snapshots of well-researched initiatives, improvements, collaborations, insights, and the steps ahead. 4 4 Improving Postdisaster Humanitarian Logistics: Three Key Lessons from Catastrophic Events José Holguín-Veras, Miguel Jaller, and Tricia Wachtendorf The authors present three practical lessons gleaned from fieldwork after the Port-auPrince, Haiti, earthquake and the Tohoku, Japan, tsunami: the strategic differences between disasters and catastrophes, the need to control the spontaneous flow of supplies, and the benefits of integrating the civic society into the response and recovery. 11 Humanitarian Relief and Broken Supply Chains: Advancing Logistics Performance John T. (Jock) Menzies III and Omar (Keith) Helferich All of the stakeholders in a relief operation—donors, humanitarian groups, governments, local nongovernment organizations, the military, and the private sector—are connected by a fragile supply chain. The challenge is to create a flexible and adaptive supply chain for humanitarian relief, capable of launching a variety of services appropriate to the incident, with a wide scope, in a short time. The authors identify practical approaches. 18 17 Humanitarian Clean Water Initiative in the Dominican Republic: Summary of a Sustainability Pilot John T. (Jock) Menzies III and Omar (Keith) Helferich 18 Building Resilience in Community Recovery: Overcoming Supply Chain Performance Challenges in a Crisis Charlotte Franklin The Arlington County Office of Emergency Management is implementing a supply chain–focused partnership between local government and private businesses. The goal is to enable a fast, smooth transition from the supply chain’s normal, cost-efficient function to the life-saving focus needed in a crisis. 32 20 Summit Explores Lessons from Supply Chains 23 Disaster Resilience in America: Steps Forward Elizabeth A. Eide and Lauren Alexander Augustine 24 Fuel Supply in an Emergency: Securing the Weakest Link Herby Lissade 26 Social Media in Disaster Preparation, Response, and Recovery Sarah M. Kaufman 28 Ferries to the Rescue: Lessons for Resilience on Waterways Roberta E. Weisbrod and Adam Zaranko 30 Emergency Management and Business Continuity Within Commercial Aviation Richard Bloom, Joyce Kirk-Moyer, and Norm Wrona 32 Planning for the Worst, Teaming with the Best: Instituting an Emergency Management Program in Idaho to Maximize Performance Bryan D. Smith Instead of building a conventional emergency management office, the Idaho Transportation Department has established a broad, team-focused system and program that can tap into all the expertise, staff, and resources of the department and the state. The best cross-functional team can be ready for deployment anywhere in the state at any time, and can grow as fast as necessary, as big as necessary, for as long as necessary. 38 Transportation Hazards and Security Summit and Peer Exchange: Advancing Research and Applications for Agencies Stephan A. Parker COVER: A U.S. Coast Guard crew loads medical supplies for first responders in Portau-Prince, Haiti, after the 2010 earthquake. Recent natural and human-caused disasters have highlighted gaps in international aid and disaster relief logistics. (Photo: Stephen Lehmann, U.S. Coast Guard) TR NEWS 40 features articles on innovative and timely research and development activities in all modes of transportation. Brief news items of interest to the transportation community are also included, along with profiles of transportation professionals, meeting announcements, summaries of new publications, and news of Transportation Research Board activities. POINT OF VIEW Communicating the Urgency for Action on Climate Change: Challenges and Approaches Robert B. Noland The science of climate change suggests that ambitious initiatives are needed in planning for adaptation and in implementing policies to mitigate potentially severe impacts in the next 50 years. How can transportation professionals play a role in advocating and implementing the most effective policy options? The author reviews research that offers guidelines for overcoming the barriers to communication about climate change. TR News is produced by the Transportation Research Board Publications Office Javy Awan, Editor and Publications Director Lea Camarda, Associate Editor Jennifer J. Weeks, Photo Researcher Juanita Green, Production Manager Michelle Wandres, Graphic Designer A L S O 44 I N I S S U E : Profiles C. Randall (Randy) Mullett, public policy, corporate security, and communications executive at Con-way Inc.; and Eric C. Shen, Director of Transportation Planning for the Port of Long Beach, California TR News Editorial Board Frederick D. Hejl, Chairman Jerry A. DiMaggio Charles Fay Christine L. Gerencher Edward T. Harrigan Christopher J. Hedges Russell W. Houston Katherine Kortum Thomas R. Menzies, Jr. G.P. Jayaprakash, Research Pays Off Liaison 46 Research Pays Off Extending the Service Life of Pavement Markings: Iowa Applies Innovation and Technology to Reduce Costs, Increase Safety Omar Smadi, Neal Hawkins, and Robert Younie 49 Calendar Transportation Research Board Robert E. Skinner, Jr., Executive Director Suzanne B. Schneider, Associate Executive Director Mark R. Norman, Director, Technical Activities Stephen R. Godwin, Director, Studies and Special Programs Gary J. Walker, Director, Administration and Finance Christopher W. Jenks, Director, Cooperative Research Programs Ann M. Brach, Director, SHRP 2 50 TR News (ISSN 0738-6826) is issued bimonthly by the Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001. Internet address: www.TRB.org. 54 News Briefs 56 Bookshelf TRB Highlights Webinars Save State Agencies Money, 50 Lisa Berardi Marflak Cooperative Research Programs News, 50 Second Strategic Highway Research Program News, 51 On-Time Arrival App Wins Six-Minute Pitch: Young Members Council Sponsors Annual Meeting Challenge, 52 Shana R. Johnson Editorial Correspondence: By mail to the Publications Office, Transportation Research Board, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001, by telephone 202-334-2972, by fax 202-334-3495, or by e-mail jawan@nas.edu. N E X T I S S U E COURTESY OF KEN POLCAK C O M I N G PHOTO Subscriptions: North America: 1 year $55; single issue $12. Overseas: 1 year $80; single issue $14. Inquiries or communications concerning new subscriptions, subscription problems, or single-copy sales should be addressed to the Business Office at the address below, or telephone 202-334-3216, fax 202-334-2519. Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C. T H I S Postmaster: Send changes of address to TR News, Transportation Research Board, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Washington, DC 20001. Notice: The opinions expressed in articles appearing in TR News are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Transportation Research Board. The Transportation Research Board and TR News do not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade and manufacturers’ names appear in an article only because they are considered essential. Printed in the United States of America. Copyright © 2013 National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. For permissions, contact TRB. Noise barriers—the traditional approach to traffic noise abatement in the suburban setting—target the primary noise source and provide a means of restoring or improving the soundscape. The September–October issue of TR News focuses on environmental sustainability in transportation and how it can improve the quality of life for individuals and communities. Articles highlight practice-ready research and cover such topics as integrating vegetation and green infrastructure into sustainable transportation planning; implementing the Eco-Logical approach in Nevada, Colorado, Utah, Montana, Washington, and Oregon; Virginia’s improved construction specifications for stormwater pipe-lining materials; creating a multiagency sustainability framework in Colorado; effective noise barriers in North Carolina; Delaware’s use of recycling materials and techniques; sustainability in airspace system planning; and more. T he Transportation Research Board established the Task Force on Logistics of Disaster Response and Business Continuity in 2012. The mission of the task force is to provide a forum to initiate and facilitate discussion, feedback, and exchange between the different parties involved in the various aspects of disaster relief and humanitarian aid logistics—from academia, industry, all levels of government, the military, research, nongovernmental organizations, and U.S. and international relief agencies. The need for this dialogue is readily apparent in the response to the many natural disasters that have occurred in the past few years—for example, the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan and Superstorm Sandy, the deadliest and most destructive hurricane of the 2012 Atlantic season and the second-costliest in U.S. history. The feature articles, minifeatures, and sidebars in this issue of TR News provide snapshots of the many parties involved in transportation’s role in disaster relief and business continuity— their well-researched initiatives, improvements, collaborations, insights, and the steps ahead—to stimulate interest in this topic, as well as participation in the ongoing efforts of the task force. —Jon S. Meyer, Chair Task Force on Logistics of Disaster Relief and Business Continuity TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Appreciation is expressed to TRB Senior Program Officers Joedy W. Cambridge, who retired in May, and Scott Brotemarkle for their work in developing this issue of TR News. The magazine’s editorial board salutes Cambridge for her work in coordinating a variety of theme issues on marine, freight, and transportation security topics and in recruiting many additional feature articles during her TRB career. 3 Improving Postdisaster Humanitarian Logistics Three Key Lessons from Catastrophic Events JOSÉ HOLGUÍN-VERAS, MIGUEL JALLER, AND TRICIA WACHTENDORF 4 Publisher’s Note: Holguín-Veras is a 2013 recipient of a U.S. White House Champion of Change Award for “exemplary leadership in developing or implementing transportation technology solutions to enhance performance, reduce congestion, improve safety, and facilitate communication across the transportation industry….” Flooding at the Sendai Airport near the site of the March 2011 Tohoku tsunami. C atastrophic events such as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the 2010 Port-au-Prince earthquake, and the Tohoku tsunami in 2011 reinforce the critical importance of postdisaster humanitarian logistics (PD-HL), not only in transporting and distributing supplies to the affected populations but in the larger response effort. Conducting efficient and effective PD-HL operations in the aftermath of such events is a huge challenge. The world today is embedded in complex sociotechnical systems—networks of individuals conducting technical activities through a set of supporting systems, such as transportation, communications, and finance. The impacts of a catastrophe on these components and systems are severe, as individual members of the social networks may be killed, injured, or displaced; the equipment and materials needed to conduct the technical activities may be destroyed or may lack the necessary inputs to run; and all of the supporting systems are likely to be inoperable or to function at a fraction of their normal capacity. Catastrophic events present other unique and notable challenges. In the aftermath, large and dynamically changing volumes of critical supplies must be transported in a short time; great uncertainty prevails about the needs for critical supplies; the ability of the local civic society to organize a response is compromised; large portions of critical local assets are destroyed; and huge flows of nonpriority donations arrive at the site, distracting resources from more critical tasks (1–3). Moreover, a poor understanding of catastrophes affects the nature and efficiency of a response. Because catastrophic events are rare, only a minuscule percentage of responders have experience in postcatastrophe logistics and operations. In addition, the events are extremely dynamic and can quickly transition from stage to stage. Lastly, catastrophes are extremely difficult to study—travel to the area is required soon after to observe the unfolding response. Fieldwork that has spanned such catastrophic events as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Hurricane Katrina, the Portau-Prince earthquake, the Tohoku tsunami, the Joplin tornados, and Superstorm Sandy has yielded definite lessons. The focus here, however, is on the top three lessons learned from the Port-au-Prince PHOTO: SAMUEL MORSE, U.S. AIR FORCE TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Holguín-Veras is William H. Hart Professor and Director, and Jaller is Research Associate, Volvo Research and Educational Foundations’ Center of Excellence for Sustainable Urban Freight Systems and the Center for Infrastructure, Transportation, and the Environment, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York. Wachtendorf is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice and Associate Director, Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark. PHOTO: OXFAM and the Tohoku responses. These two events provide complementary lessons leading to a unified and comprehensive set of suggestions for improvement (4–6). Lesson 1. Disasters and catastrophes are not the same; be ready for both. Disasters of all sizes leave trails of destruction and human suffering that defy easy description or categorization. Individuals and families can experience impacts that are disastrous or catastrophic on a personal level; nevertheless, disasters are defined from a sociological and not from a personal perspective— the focus is on how communities and societies can best prepare for and respond to extreme events. Defining Terms Although the appropriate definition is a subject of debate (7), a disaster can be understood as “a nonroutine event that exceeds the capacity of the affected area to respond in a way that saves lives, preserves property, and maintains the social, ecological, economic, and political stability of the affected region” (8). In contrast, a catastrophe is “a high-consequence event that generates widespread and crippling impacts, [so that] the ability of the impacted society to respond is severely compromised” (2, 9). The typical impacts of disasters and catastrophes are summarized in Table 1 (below). In disasters, the local capacity to respond is viable and depends on the state of the civic leadership, the availability of critical supplies, and the capacity to mobilize and distribute critical supplies. The response effort has access to multiple entry points in the disaster area, and the local distribution effort is simpler than in a comparable catastrophe. In short, the local civic society is able to provide a meaningful first wave of resources in response to a disaster. Outside help complements the local effort beyond the initial 24 to 48 hours, as outlined in the National Response Framework (10). By contrast, a catastrophe is likely to have had an impact on the local leadership, which may be unable Pallets of water treatment gear are loaded onto an Oxfam aid flight to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince. TABLE 1 Comparison of Impacts: Disasters Versus Catastrophes Disaster Catastrophe Leadership of civic society Typically survives the disaster and is able to lead the response In most cases, severely affected and unable to lead an effective response Local stocks of supplies in businesses and households Only partly destroyed; the surviving supplies may become part of the response Mostly destroyed; the role of local supplies in the response is minimal Demand for supplies Increases with the needs of businesses, people, and the response; precautionary or opportunistic buying could be a problem Huge increases because of the magnitude of the impacts; precautionary or opportunistic buying could be a problem in nearby areas Private-sector supply chains Partly impacted but functional, could Severed, destroyed, cannot help in help in response response Number of points of entry to the disaster area Multiple points of entry provide Only a few points of entry, compliresponders with alternatives to enter cating distribution efforts the area Complexity of the local distribution effort Challenging but manageable Exceedingly complex, because of the size of the impacted area and the personnel required Material convergence of nonpriority supplies A nuisance that can be controlled A major problem that distracts significant amounts of resources from critical tasks Net result Local help is key in initial days; outside help brings additional supplies Outside help is the primary source of supplies TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Characteristic 5 PHOTO: TAYLOR TOEKA/CARITAS GOMA Collaborative aid networks such as Caritas—here providing assistance to Congolese residents displaced by war—are well-suited to respond to emergency events. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 to lead the civic society and to organize aid efforts. The material capacity to respond is likely to be severely compromised—local inventories of critical supplies are usually destroyed or out of reach, and the companies that manage local supply chains for critical supplies are unable to function. Moreover, the demands for the impacted population and for the response itself are much more intense than after a disaster; as a result, the local civic society cannot provide the first wave of resources. 6 Manning the Distribution The most challenging component in the response to a catastrophic event is the local distribution of critical supplies at the points of distribution (PODs). This activity is relatively simple in disasters but in catastrophes is hugely complex, because of the large geographic areas to be served; the large number of PODs to be established, manned, and supplied; and the severe impacts on the transportation and distribution networks (11). In the immediate aftermath of the Port-au-Prince earthquake, for example, manning and supplying the 150 to 200 PODs required 20,000 to 25,000 volunteers—approximately the size of an average U.S. Army division, which needs three to four weeks to deploy. In catastrophes that have an impact on large urban areas, therefore, the resources to man and supply the PODs cannot be provided by outside sources; only the local social networks can address the monumental challenge. Lesson 2. Control material convergence and precautionary or opportunistic buying. Material convergence—the spontaneous flow of supplies, donations, and equipment to the disaster area— is a unique, overlooked, and poorly understood phenomenon (3, 11, 12). The convergence contributes much-needed supplies, along with an astronomical amount of useless and inappropriate items, such as wedding gowns, used clothing, expired medications, and a range of products that have failed in the marketplace. Material convergence comprises three groupings (2, 13): 1. High-priority supplies for immediate distribution and consumption, 2. Low-priority supplies that are not immediately needed but could be useful later, and 3. Nonpriority supplies that are not of any practical use. Nonpriority items often are termed “in kind” and “unsolicited” donations, but in-kind and unsolicited donations can be useful; a large portion of the international aid that arrived at Haiti was both in-kind and unsolicited, as international donors sent critical supplies without being asked by the Haitian government. The impacts and problems associated with material convergence were first identified almost a century ago (3, 11, 12). Recent rough estimates indicate that disaster, the private sector should be engaged to facilitate these procedures. about 5 to 15 percent of the cargo arriving at the site consists of high-priority supplies, about 25 to 35 percent are low-priority supplies, and nonpriority supplies make up a staggering 50 to 70 percent. Lesson 3. Integrate the civic society in disaster preparation and response efforts. Controlling Nonpriority Supplies The flow of nonpriority supplies is the most problematic component of material convergence. Nonpriority supplies consume resources that could be applied to more important tasks, create major complications to the response, and offer little to help the survivors or the response. Disaster responders refer to the flow of useless, nonpriority goods as “a secondtier disaster” (14). These supplies “often complicate unnecessarily the logistics of relief operations,” “frequently… have not been asked for,” “do not respond to the needs of the affected population,” “lead to a waste of time and resources,” “are useless or irrelevant,” and “should be discarded as soon as possible…to make room for useful supplies” (3, 11, 13). Research suggests that the media’s portrayal of needs—mostly subjective and based on what is considered newsworthy—can generate nonpriority supplies (3). Moreover, vehicles carrying nonpriority supplies can clog the entry points to the area and usually require longer inspection times because of poor documentation. These vehicles often do not have a consignee and circulate until locating someone willing to receive the cargo; failing that, some drivers may dump the loads, creating health hazards. Young residents of a temporary camp in Léogâne, Haiti, distribute water from a truck. The United Nations created a registry of local truckers in Haiti to implement the efficient flow of aid and supplies. UNITED NATIONS PHOTO BY SOPHIA PARIS Tapping into Networks After the Port-au-Prince earthquake, large and experienced international organizations had problems distributing critical supplies to survivors. The massive amount of aid that arrived in Haiti piled up at the port and airport and did not reach the population in need with the speediness required by the circumstances. Even the United Nations was unable to find trucks to transport supplies (4). This crisis of connectivity started when the earthquake effectively decapitated the local leadership. When the massive flow of aid arrived in Haiti, the international relief groups could not connect with local leaders. Without the leaders’ connections to local truckers and social networks, the relief groups attempted to distribute the supplies themselves, but because of personnel constraints, the agencies could open far fewer PODs than were needed to serve nearly TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Proactive Steps Proactive steps are needed to increase the net benefits from material convergence by maximizing highand low-priority flows and minimizing the negative impacts of nonpriority supplies. Disaster plans should explicitly consider material convergence—this is a critical first step. Second, strategies must be developed to reduce nonpriority flows. This may require education efforts aimed at potential donors, the media, and local leaders (15). Access controls should expedite the traffic of high-priority supplies, reroute low-priority supplies to storage locations, and prevent nonpriority supplies from reaching the affected area (2, 3, 11). Precautionary or opportunistic buying is another behavior that affects disaster response, particularly in surrounding areas. Anticipating shortages, individuals and businesses rush to purchase critical supplies of food, water, fuel, and electricity generators. This removes from the market critical supplies that are best positioned—in terms of proximity—to help the survivors and the response itself. Rationing of critical supplies or other forms of demand management would be beneficial to the response. Before a Effectively integrating the civic society into all facets of the disaster cycle, particularly in the preparation and response, is probably the most important lesson. Examples from Haiti and Japan illustrate this critical point (4–6). 7 2 million beneficiaries. The crisis subsided two weeks later, when the United Nations created a registry of local truckers, opening access to local equipment, personnel, and know-how. Collaborative aid networks (CANs) were able to put in place efficient and effective PD-HL operations. CANs are large social networks established for other purposes; two notable CANs in the Haiti relief efforts were the Servicio Social de Iglesias and CARE– Caritas RD, the social arms of the evangelical and the Catholic churches, respectively. The CANs were able to undertake PD-HL with efficiency and ease, through large networks of committed volunteers already on the ground. Haiti and the Dominican Republic have an estimated 30,000 Catholic and evangelical churches; each church, a node in the larger network, has a leader and followers with strong connections to the rest of the CAN, increasing resiliency. Moreover, because the CANs are spread out in the disaster area, they are ideally positioned to become the backbone of the local distribution effort. Intuitively, the leaders understood this, mobilized their networks, and used many of the churches as PODs, organizing the local population and the PD-HL effort effectively. Private-Sector Resources The response to the Tohoku tsunami provides important lessons in integration with the private sector. The PD-HL operations after the tsunami did not go well. The nuclear crisis consumed almost all of the government’s attention while the humanitarian crisis gathered momentum. The PD-HL operation started almost a week late, after members of parliament angrily complained; the government asked the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to distribute critical supplies to survivors. The government refused offers of assistance from several privatesector companies, however, citing a lack of fuel for the return trips—although the SDF could have brought in fuel for this purpose. Meanwhile, the commercial supply chains that routinely transported supplies to the impacted and surrounding areas followed usual procedures after a disaster and stopped deliveries until conditions could be assessed; this deprived both areas of much-needed supplies and aggravated the humanitarian crisis. At this critical juncture, a few food and retail companies ignored the warnings and took the initiative to deploy hundreds of trucks loaded with food, water, and other supplies to avert the humanitarian crisis. This example provides a potent argument for effectively integrating private-sector input and resources in PD-HL preparations and response procedures. Private-sector companies produce and transport supplies, own transportation assets, and have the local knowhow that can make a difference in the aftermath of a large disaster or catastrophe. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 PHOTO: MATTHEW BRADLEY, U.S. NAVY 8 A Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (SDF) sailor participates in cleanup efforts after the Tohoku tsunami. Exclusive SDF efforts faltered until supplemented by privatesector initiatives. TABLE 2 Key Findings and Policy Implications (17) Goal Findings Policy Implications Integration with civic society • Lack of pre-established links prevents the advantageous involvement of private sector, CANs, and the rest of civic society • Lack of designated leaders of PD-HL produces confusion and inefficiencies • Difficulties integrating outside help lead to major coordination problems, duplicated efforts, and unmet needs • Lack of training and of realistic exercises fails to involve the civic society • Integrate private-sector groups, reputable CANs, and other key groups that could contribute to a logistics committee • Designate a point of contact for PD-HL with good relations within the civic society • Facilitate the integration of outside help—for example, divide the area into small districts to be assigned to outside groups • Develop exercises to train potential participants in PD-HL Response plans • Usually not suitable for large disasters • Do not consider catastrophes • Operations listed in plans are not scalable • Do not explicitly consider PD-HL • Consider multiple scenarios for catastrophic events covering multiple jurisdictions • Design scalable response functions • Plan PD-HL operations in detail Relief distribution and donations management • In catastrophes, the bulk of supplies must be brought from outside the disaster area • Local distribution is a major challenge • Critical resources, such as fuel, are lacking • Excessive donations of low- and nonpriority supplies create problems • Precautionary or opportunistic buying is a major challenge • Preposition supplies in lower-risk but nearby areas • Plan for local distribution • Ensure resources are available • Proactively engage the media to advise the public on how to help; make plans to control access to the disaster area • Proactively manage donations • Control precautionary or opportunistic buying via rationing or educational campaigns and agreements with private sector Assessment and communication • Lack of technologies to assess damage to infrastructure and impacts on population • Lack of communication and other supporting systems that operate in disaster environments • Use satellite imagery, remote sensing, and geographic information systems for infrastructure assessment • Preposition communication equipment, such as satellite phones and generators PODs, training local leaders and members in first aid and disaster response procedures, and the like, could lead to a better prepared citizenry, enhanced community resiliency, and a more efficient PD-HL process. Similarly, private-sector representatives could be engaged as part of a PD-HL committee, which would be activated as needed. Their know-how, contacts, and resources could make a critical difference to the populations affected by a large disaster. Companies involved in the trade of critical supplies with both a regional and a local presence are best positioned to help, as they have access to regional resources and know local conditions. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Integrating Key Segments The experiences of Haiti and Japan underscore the benefits of integrating key segments of the civic society into disaster preparations and response procedures. In both cases, elements of the civic society stepped up to fulfill a need without any instructions or clear idea about how to proceed, without coordination with the public sector, and without practice or training. The efficiency of PD-HL operations after catastrophic events could increase greatly with a structure that incorporates participation by various components of the civic society. Such simple steps as designating local nodes from the CANs to serve as 9 PHOTO: LIZ ROLL, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy, the New York–New Jersey region received far more donated clothing than was needed; many months after the storm, piles of clothes still waited to be sorted. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Enhancing Readiness Jurisdictions at risk of catastrophic events must take appropriate actions to implement the guidelines in the National Response Framework and to enhance readiness. FEMA’s grants to foster planning for catastrophic events are a worthy first step (16). Table 2 (page 9) summarizes the chief findings of the authors’ research encompassing several disasters, along with the key policy implications. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Acknowledgments 10 The research was funded through several National Science Foundation projects: Contending with Materiel Convergence (NSF-HSD/DRU 0624083); Field Investigation on the Comparative Performance of Alternative Humanitarian Logistic Structures (NSF-RAPID 1034365); Field Investigation on Postdisaster Humanitarian Logistic Practices Under Cascading Disasters and a Persistent Threat: The Tohoku Earthquake Disasters (NSF-RAPID); and CyberEnabled Discovery System for Advanced Multidisciplinary Study of Humanitarian Logistics for Disaster Response (NSF-IIS 1124827). The authors acknowledge and appreciate this support. References 1. Holguín-Veras, J., N. Pérez, S. Ukkusuri, T. Wachtendorf, and B. Brown. Emergency Logistics Issues Affecting the 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Response to Katrina: A Synthesis and Preliminary Suggestions for Improvement. In Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportration Research Board, No. 2022, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., 2007, pp. 76–82. Holguín-Veras, J., M. Jaller, L. N. V. Wassenhove, N. Pérez, and T. Wachtendorf. On the Unique Features of Post-Disaster Humanitarian Logistics. Journal of Management, Vol. 30, No. 2012, pp. 494–506. Holguín-Veras, J., M. Jaller, L. Van Wassenhove, N. Pérez, and T. Wachtendorf. Material Convergence: An Important and Understudied Disaster Phenomenon. Natural Hazards Review, 2013. Holguín-Veras, J., M. Jaller, and T. Wachtendorf. Comparative Performance of Alternative Humanitarian Logistic Structures After the Port-au-Prince Earthquake: ACEs, PIEs, and CANs. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Vol. 46, No. 10, 2012, pp. 1623–1640. Holguín-Veras, J., E. Taniguchi, F. Ferreira, M. Jaller, and R. Thompson. The Tohoku Disasters: Preliminary Findings Concerning the Post-Disaster Humanitarian Logistics Response. Presented at 91st Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington, D.C. January 2012. Holguín-Veras, J., E. Taniguchi, F. Ferreira, M. Jaller, F. Aros-Vera, and R. Thompson. The Tohoku Disasters: Chief Findings Concerning the Post Disaster Humanitarian Logistic Response. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review (in preparation), 2013. Hazards, Disasters, and the U.S. Emergency Management System: An Introduction. Federal Emergency Management Agency. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/hazdisuse ms.asp. Pearce, L. D. R. An Integrated Approach for Community Hazard, Impact, Risk and Vulnerability Analysis: HIRV. School of Community and Regional Planning, University of British Columbia, Canada, 2000. Wachtendorf, T., B. Brown, and J. Holguin-Veras. Catastrophe Characteristics and Their Impact on Critical Supply Chains: Problematizing Material Convergence and Management Following Hurricane Katrina. 2010. National Response Framework. Federal Emergency Management Agency. www.fema.gov/national-response-frame work. Jaller, M. Resource Allocation Problems During Disasters: The Cases of Points of Distribution Planning and Material Convergence Handling. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, 2011. Fritz, C. E., and J. H. Mathewson. Convergent Behavior: A Disaster Control Problem. Special Report for the Committee on Disaster Studies, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1957. Humanitarian Supply Management and Logistics in the Health Sector. Pan American Health Organization, 2001. $75 Million of Stuff. Newsweek, February 18, 2002. Guidelines for Effective International Disaster Donations. Center for International Disaster Information. www.cidi. org/guidelines. National Preparedness Grant Program. Federal Emergency Management Agency. www.fema.gov/pdf/government/ grant/fy2013_npgp_grant_program_overview.pdf. Holguín-Veras, J., E. Taniguchi, F. Ferreira, M. Jaller, and R. Thompson. The Tohoku Disasters: Chief Findings Concerning the Post-Disaster Humanitarian Logistic Response, 2011. Humanitarian Relief and Broken Supply Chains Advancing Logistics Performance J O H N T. ( J O C K ) M E N Z I E S I I I * A N D O M A R ( K E I T H ) H E L F E R I C H Menzies is President, American Logistics Aid Network, Annapolis, Maryland, and Chairman, Terminal Corporation, Baltimore, Maryland. Helferich is Professor, Supply Chain Management, Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant. demand for humanitarian assistance will continue to rise because of conflicts and a dramatic increase in vulnerabilities caused by financial crises, food scarcity and pricing, insufficient energy and water, and the increased severity of disasters—in part the result of population growth and urbanization. Emergency relief comprises a spectrum of interventions. The services provided during relief operations recognize the basic hierarchy of needs for survival, including medicines, food, water, shelter, clothing, and—in many situations—mental health assistance. Emergency relief practices also can be examined from the viewpoint of continuity management. Table 1 (next page) reviews the process for continuity management, described in a white paper produced for the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals after the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks. Critical Challenges The timely delivery of goods and services is crucial to effective disaster response. In addition to Hurricane Katrina and Superstorm Sandy, recent examples include the 2004 Asian tsunami; the 2009 earthUN PHOTO BY *Publisher’s Note: John (Jock) Menzies III died August 17, 2013, after sustaining critical injuries in a cable car accident near Arnold, Maryland. An article in the online DC Velocity noted that Menzies had “transformed the way the logistics community, relief organizations, and individuals respond to natural disasters around the world.” N atural and human-made disasters inflict terrible casualties, destroy property, and disrupt the normal flow of life and commerce. The Haiti earthquake of 2010, for example, took the lives of an estimated 220,000 people. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina resulted in 1,836 deaths and damage in excess of $100 billion in the United States. Superstorm Sandy this past October again made clear that extreme events are likely to cause supply chain failures such as shortages of transport, facilities, and supplies. On December 14, 2012, the Supply Chain Resilience Project of the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program conducted a strategic capacity exercise in Washington D.C. The tabletop evaluation confirmed the potential for supply chain failures as a result of a major disaster event and highlighted the probable failure of the water and wastewater network; noted that the damage to transport capability, coupled with hoarding, would suppress food resupply; and indicated that hoarding and unanticipated demand would severely affect the supply of pharmaceuticals. According to the United Nations, the global TIM MCKULKA TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Sudanese war refugees receive emergency food aid distributed by the World Food Programme. According to the United Nations, the global need for humanitarian assistance will continue to rise. 11 TABLE 1 First Four Steps in Each Phase of Humanitarian Logistics Relief Planning Mitigation Detection Response Recovery 1. Establish planning team. 1. Define mitigation opportunities. 1. Develop a detection plan. 1. Review and implement a response plan. 2. Analyze capabilities and risks. 2. Develop mitigation plans. 1. Review and implement recovery plans and controls. 3. Develop charter and relief plan. 4. Implement relief plan. Members of the U.S. Air Force 353rd Special Operations Group and of the Indonesian Air Force unload relief supplies after a 7.6 magnitude earthquake in Padang, Indonesia, in 2009. 3. Initiate development of mitigation programs. 4. Establish a continuous improvement process. 2. Acknowledge major risks and warnings. 3. Evaluate and act on information and observations. 4. Determine corrective actions and improvements. 2. Evaluate direction and control. 3. Evaluate communications. 3. Maintain worker and 4. Evaluate safety, security community support. and function of processes, property, and people. 4. Resume sustainable operations. These trends intensify distinctive weaknesses in the humanitarian supply chain, such as decoupled finances, ambiguous objectives, limited resources, high uncertainty, extreme urgency, and political boundaries. Commercial supply chains are also becoming more vulnerable through changes in business best practices, such as lean initiatives to support just-intime deliveries, as well as through increased complexity and globalization. Most private-sector companies develop plans to protect against lowimpact, recurrent risks but ignore high-impact, lowlikelihood risks. Humanitarian organizations, in contrast, must face high-impact, low-likelihood risks somewhere every day; nevertheless, they rely on commercial supply chains to provide much of their support. quakes in Padang, Indonesia; the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant event in Japan; and the 2011 flooding in Thailand. Field research has estimated that logistics account for 60 percent to 80 percent of expenditures by aid agencies. All of the stakeholders in a relief operation—donors, humanitarian relief organizations, governments, local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the military, and the private sector—are connected by a relatively fragile supply chain. The challenge is to create a flexible and adaptive supply chain for humanitarian relief in an increasingly uncertain world. More complex disasters will require significantly enhanced responses. First, as societies become more interdependent, the supply networks become more complex and vulnerable. Second, the accelerating rate of advances in technology introduces unprecedented and unanticipated opportunities to interfere with human life, as through terrorist acts. Third, global power shifts and conflicts generate new threats. Exploring the Vulnerabilities TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 PHOTO: AARON CRAM, U.S. AIR FORCE 12 2. Ensure continuity of management. In the United States, relief agencies have been redesigning their processes continuously to improve performance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Red Cross (ARC) study and strive to implement appropriate supply network models and system solutions. The complexity and uncertainty of the events, however, challenge these preparations, as do the lack of human and financial resources for the supply chains. Funding is usually decoupled from the response to an event; this can curtail swift humanitarian response. Funding systems and financial flows play an important role in humanitarian operations and affect the scope, speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of disaster response. Models of humanitarian supply chains often do not consider the constraints imposed by funding systems; when time is of the essence, a relief agency does not expect to be asked, “Who is paying for this?” or to be told, “First send a check.” The complexity of the situation—such as the magnitude of the event, the level of the threat to life, the impact on the infrastructure, the difficulty of Comparing Networks The humanitarian community generally agrees that its logistics lag behind those of the commercial sector. Commercial and humanitarian logistics networks have many similarities; both do the following: u Operate within complex networks and require risk assessments, u Manage rapid-response and demand-driven systems, u Rely on collaboration and information-sharing to enhance agile response, u Follow established processes for effective solutions, u Address risk with a redundancy of resources, and u Improve flexibility through the principle of postponement—meeting needs with a minimum amount of inventory—and through the deployment of multiple skills. Communications between first responders can aid coordination between the many groups on the scene of a disaster. City Island in the Bronx, New York, was placed under a mandatory evacuation order during Superstorm Sandy. Agencies must be able to deploy large-scale operations, such as mass evacuations, on short notice. PHOTO: MTA NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT Improving Responsiveness TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 After the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks, many thought that an industry team could apply best practices and provide more effective and efficient preparation and response to major disasters. A team of representatives from several major corporations held discussions with NGOs and reviewed the challenges after a major disaster; the team concluded that industry alone could not supply the solution for disaster logistics response practices—a collaborative effort was necessary. Humanitarian supply chains must be capable of launching a variety of services appropriate to the type of incident, with a potentially wide scope. NGOs and federal agencies prepare for disaster response during the year, but when a disaster occurs, the response must be immediate and must allow for large-scale operations in a relatively short time. Maximum responsiveness—flexibility and agility—includes a capability to respond quickly to a range of needs for human resources, as well as for supplies and equipment. In all major disasters, the quick establishment of communications systems is PHOTO: NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION critical. The responding organizations must maintain internal communications and must link to the incident command center, as well as to all major responding organizations. For example, ARC’s Disaster System for Human Resources can contact thousands of volunteers trained in various skills at differing levels at any time. During hurricane and high-alert periods, ARC’s Advanced Logistics Emergency Response Teams or ALERTs are on call and ready to respond to the ARC national center within a few hours. communications, or the stage of the event—may yield ambiguous objectives. Limited resources hamper assessments of the needs, as well as the ability to obtain the appropriate types and amounts of equipment and materials for search and rescue and for survival and recovery. Communications between the first responders are not always effective; this delays coordination among the many organizations on the scene that are ready to provide assistance. The environment after a major disaster is usually rife with uncertainty about the status of the damage, even after the initial damage assessment. The urgency is acute for major events that require immediate search and rescue, encompassing basic survival needs such as triage and medical treatment, movement out of harm’s way, and supply of water and food. Addressing these needs takes priority, with considerations of cost and resource efficiency secondary until the next stage of the relief effort. Reviewing awareness of the situation is critical at each phase of relief, because the priorities shift with the transitions from initial response to recovery. A major event, by definition, involves multiple political boundaries. The challenges are obvious when a response effort spans countries, but can be complex even across county and parish boundaries—as was the case in the United States following Hurricane Katrina. The response to recent disasters continues to raise questions about the appropriate roles of business, government, and NGOs in supplying resources. 13 PHOTO: JASON COLSTON, AMERICAN RED CROSS Red Cross volunteers coordinate logistics of relief efforts in Queens, New York, immediately following Superstorm Sandy. Research and experience, however, point to critical differences in the two types of networks, as presented in Table 2 (below). The complexity of humanitarian disaster planning and response inevitably results in inefficient logistics and supply chain management. Nearly 30 percent of delivered materials are reported as wasted during a response to a disaster. Damaged infrastructure and the intermittent availability of electricity complicate local planning and the coordination of aid. As a result, relief efforts predicated on advanced methods and high-tech approaches may be ineffective during the initial hours after a disaster. Advancing Humanitarian Logistics Experience and findings from the literature and research indicate several areas of opportunities for the continuous improvement of humanitarian logistics. The similarities between commercial and humanitarian logistics suggest the value of increased collaborative efforts; the differences suggest that advances in humanitarian logistics cannot be achieved by adopting best commercial practices. Moreover, disaster relief and development require greater coordination with supply chain risk management and risk reduction planning and prepared- TABLE 2 Commercial and Humanitarian Logistics: A Comparison Attribute Commercial Networks Humanitarian Networks Business motive Profit for stakeholders Provide essential services to affected recipients Operating mode Uninterrupted Interrupted Metrics Economic value added and balanced scorecard: cost, speed, quality, customer service, flexibility, sustainability • Not well recognized; focus mostly on outputs instead of on outcomes from recipients’ perspective • Generally defined processes to achieve efficiency and effectiveness • Less certainty and less definition of processes Operating environment TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 • Operate on continuum from initial decision, development, implementation, and operation of network; lean practices 14 • Shift with phases of event: during initial response, life-saving and support services are key, cost is secondary; during recovery operations, costefficiency gains importance • Focus on humanitarian aid recipients—life saving and life support are initial priorities; costs become more of a concern in recovery phase • Space for humanitarian efforts is often less available, because of the number of areas of need Supply chain segments Direct link between financial and material flows Financial and material flows are decoupled; identity of true customers is ambiguous Risk Assess risk through continuity planning; highest risk usually is the disruption of the global supply chain Frequently the greatest risk is the “last mile,” serving the recipient most affected by the disruption; failure can result in loss of life and prolonged human suffering Uncertainty Decisions under risk are likely, but usually with range of estimated certainty • All segments of supply chain operate under uncertainty in disaster situations, demand frequently exceeds supply and capability—for example for food, water, transport, warehouse space, and communications • Demand and supply can change quickly—as with Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, and Japan tsunami Asset availability Initiatives include planning for logistics assets Finding assets in and near the impact area is frequently difficult; nonprofit American Logistics Aid Network (ALAN) assists nongovernmental organizations to locate assets Alert for logistics services Initiatives base need on an approved plan • Some disaster events such as hurricanes allow a few days for planning, but sometimes only hours or, in the case of tornadoes, a few minutes; often no alerts for intentional acts of destruction • Disaster logistics must be able to respond in “organized chaos” with little or no advance warning ness during nondisaster periods. Table 3 (below) summarizes areas for research and initiatives to advance the state of humanitarian logistics. Continuous Improvement Research is needed for the distribution planning and the control of humanitarian logistics processes. In particular, accessible planning techniques are needed for relief workers confronting a disaster. Disaster planning and response take place in a limited environment. An initial response may demand a basic, low-tech approach with planning techniques that complement other high- and lowtech tactics and that are relatively easy for inexperienced individuals to employ until additional resources become available. Research suggests that tools that are less resource-dependent are available to facilitate on-site planning and response. For example, a managerial approach known as Lean Six Sigma (LSS), developed in 2002, includes planning and response tools that could be applied to disaster relief. LSS tools can assist organizations in becoming effective and resilient in supply chain management and therefore could assist in resolving the challenges of humanitarian logistics. Applying LSS system tools appears to be practical and useful in disaster response, with proper planning and preparedness. LSS offers two major methodologies: 1. Define, measure, analyze, improve, and control (DMAIC), which parallels the Deming cycle of plan, do, check, and act and is used for improving processes already in place; and 2. Define, measure, analyze, design, and validate, a method for designing new processes. Interest in using these methods to design and plan critical services such as logistics is increasing. Few studies, however, have connected LSS methods with humanitarian logistics. The sidebar on page 17 provides the results of an application of LSS contin- TABLE 3 Potential Improvements to Disaster Logistics Management Potential Area Description of Improvement Disaster performance metrics • Develop metrics focused on outcomes; for example, percentage of items reaching beneficiaries, donation-todelivery cycle time, and financial efficiency and cost of providing goods to beneficiaries. • Develop longitudinal metrics for sustainable solutions; for example, metrics addressing quality of life, such as longitudinal profiles of family health; social and economic metrics from the medical and social sciences. • Apply balanced scorecard approach for outputs and outcomes. Disaster • Adopt end-to-end and real-time information management systems. information management and process standardization • Address the difficulty field workers have in gathering accurate information while working under time pressures and in extreme circumstances. • Implement process standardization and pipeline visibility; American Red Cross has a system for all human resources and a system for procurement. • Develop standard process mapping across the supply chain to eliminate delays and errors in the order cycle. • Establish corporate social responsibility programs to involve the private sector. • Explore crowd sourcing as an emerging opportunity. • Integrate geographic information systems tools with crowd sourcing to increase visibility and situational awareness. Disaster continuous process • Apply CPI to improve project efficiency and effectiveness; promising applications include chapter logistics planning, improvement (CPI) using collaboration among Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, and balanced scorecard metrics. Lean Six Sigma (LSS) • Use LSS tools in generating plans, implementing process improvements, setting priorities, and assessing risks. methods • Apply CPI to ensure the flow of funding and voluntary efforts to sustain humanitarian initiatives. • Develop information technology and systems for in-field transactions and tracking across a complex, humanitarian supply network; investigate use of a private-sector system, with costs shared by the response community. • Maintain a knowledge base for disaster response, to be shared among responding agencies and organizations. Disaster management resources • Address problem of limited resources—for transport, handling, and storage—by coordinating through organizations like ALAN, as appropriate. • Consider working with faith-based and other organizations that have facilities for feeding and sheltering, as well as trained staff and volunteers, and formal members of the primary disaster NGOs’ response and recovery team. • Collaborate with FEMA and commercial organizations such as logistics companies for special transport and handling equipment. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Disaster management systems 15 FIGURE 1 Humanitarian relief: example causeand-effect diagram. (SOPs = standard operating procedures.) Machine Equipment Usage did not follow SOPs flow rates quality Man Limited personnel maintenance parts Operations output used contaminated sources Inoperable vehicle Poor knowledge of locations, operations no fuel dead battery Damaged storage tank untrained worker Slow time in transit Maintenance No mode of transport Poor travel conditions Water not suitable contamination (chemical, metal) no purification Failure to Achieve Objectives (e.g., missed delivery, shortage of safe water, unsustainable operation) damaged infrastructure Remote delivery location No water arid region Effectiveness not evaluated other methods no sources restricted supply Improper water SOPs Materials uous improvement models to a humanitarian initiative providing clean water to poverty-level families in the Dominican Republic. The pilot used several LSS tools, including DMAIC, cause-and-effect diagrams, checklists, process flow charts, control plans, activity networks, and audit guides. Figure 1 (above) and Table 4 (below) present examples of Six Sigma methods applied to a humanitarian initiative. Achieving Best Practices As noted earlier, humanitarian supply chains lag behind the private sector in technology implementation, best practices, and operating efficiency. Inherent differences account for some of this lag, but Method humanitarian logistics decision makers either have not yet recognized the importance of newly introduced tools and approaches or—more likely—lack the staff and financial resources for implementation. The lack of standardized or universally accepted metrics also hurts humanitarian organizations, as they have difficulty knowing their finances to the degree of granularity that their commercial counterparts have achieved. This limitation affects the entire humanitarian supply chain—how the operations are managed, controlled, and continuously improved. Humanitarian logistics is a fertile area for process improvement with LSS and related tools. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 TABLE 4 Example Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for Humanitarian Relief 16 Process Function Potential Requirement Failure Mode Potential Effect of Failure Provide safe drinking water Smell, sickness, and Contamination; poor water None disease treatment Unsafe water Potential Causes and Mechanisms of Failure Process Control Recommended Action • Filter the water; improve quality control of water supply • Invest in treatment facility or filter devices Store water for safe drinking No storage or • Supply of water limited storage but no space • Scarcity, loss, or leakage • Contamination • Damaged or destroyed storage structures or containers • Leaks, theft • Use an open well and temporary storage • Guard or monitor the storage • Use inexpensive filter and storage device • No cover or protection • Sickness, disease Distribute safe drinking water on time Missed delivery Water shortage • Impassable routes • Transport unavailable • Build or acquire water storage tank for the community or for individuals Delivery by truck Change delivery mode (e.g., to cart and horse, pipeline, air drop) Humanitarian Clean Water Initiative in the Dominican Republic Summary of a Sustainability Pilot J O H N T. ( J O C K ) M E N Z I E S I I I A N D O M A R ( K E I T H ) H E L F E R I C H H through proper installation and maintenance training; u Measurable medical, educational, economic, and social improvements in recipient households; and u Stakeholder collaboration to improve products and services. The project provided a biosand filter for safe water to households in the region of La Romana in the Dominican Republic. The CPI method followed the typical Six Sigma or Deming cycle process. Define and plan. Deliverables at the first stage included the project charter, the project plan, a process chart for the initiatives, and a template for achieving continuous improvement for clean water initiatives. Measure and do. Deliverables included the following: u Write protocols for the clean water procedures. u Develop, test, redesign, and translate into Spanish the Analyze and check. The tools were used to guide activities and collect information about performance: u Evaluation of electronic versus paper surveys for primary data collection; Initiatives to provide safe water to developing countries can benefit from continuous process improvement. u Review of the filter performance after six months; u Review of the impact of clean water on family profiles: health, education, economics, and community; and u Identifying issues for further development, using a causeand-effect diagram. Results indicated that more than 90 percent of the filters maintained flow rates in the target range of 500 milliliters (ml) to 800 ml per minute. Medical incidents declined during the six months after the use of the clean water, and the number of school days missed also declined. Some discontinued the program because the water tasted salty, or they did not trust the technology, or they believed the water was not suitable for very young children. Improve, act, and control to achieve sustainable process improvement: u Guidelines for installation and performance audits need to be simplified further and completed in Spanish. u A checklist for the ongoing use of CPI methods for clean water iniatives will be provided to the primary stakeholders. The methods met the steps and objectives of the World Health Organization–UNICEF Report for Monitoring and Evaluating Household Water Treatment 2012. The most successful results were in areas with a resident paid to check on households, answer questions, resolve minor maintenance issues, and report to the primary stakeholder each month. Acknowledgment The authors thank key stakeholders for their support of the pilot sustainability initiative, including Good Samaritan Hospital, the Safe Water Team, Wolverine Worldwide, Cascade Engineering, Universidad Central del Este, and Supply Chain Sustainability. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 surveys and guidelines for installation, baseline household health, education, economic and community activity, and a sixmonth follow-up. u Collect and analyze data with Survey Monkey and Microsoft Excel to demonstrate sustainability. u Install filters in households, conduct surveys, and enter the data into Survey Monkey. u Conduct surveys of filter locations after six months of operation to determine the impact on family profiles—health, education, economics, and community activity. WWW.WATER.CC u Long-term, in-field availability of products and services PHOTO: LIVING WATER INTERNATIONAL, umanitarian relief has broadened its focus from particular response situations to the strategic—that is, how best to operate a sustainable network. Many corporations build a culture of sustainability by establishing standards of performance and implementing continuous process improvement (CPI). CPI was applied in the support of a humanitarian initiative to provide safe water in the bateys—the sugar mill company towns—of the Dominican Republic. The goals were to improve project efficiency and effectiveness, ensure funding flow, and stimulate voluntary efforts to sustain the project throughout its expected span. CPI provided the following benefits: 17 Building Resilience in Community Recovery Overcoming Supply Chain Performance Challenges in a Crisis CHARLOTTE FRANKLIN The author is Deputy Coordinator, Resiliency, Preparedness, Partnerships, Arlington Office of Emergency Management, Arlington, Virginia. A t the local level, the traditional approach to resource management for recovery from a disaster has addressed private businesses in a conversation that begins “Here’s what you can do for us.” But this government-centered approach to emergency planning has an inherent weakness—it focuses on resource management as an inventory issue. In contrast, approaching disaster recovery resource management as a supply chain issue focuses on the delivery of critical supplies to citizens more quickly and more efficiently. With this approach, local government initiates the conversation with private businesses by asking, “How can we clear the way for the delivery of emergency resources?” Businesses already have the expertise and processes in place to move supplies into the community; they are the experts in recovery and continuity. The types of supplies that are needed may change depending on the effects of the disaster, but the delivery and distribution challenges remain consistent. The goal is to enable a fast, smooth transition from the supply chain’s normal, cost-efficient function to the life-saving focus needed in a crisis. Timing is the most important component of any local government’s approach to disaster planning. Plans for supply chain involvement must be in place well before an emergency occurs. Government must stand ready to clear the way for private businesses to deliver disaster recovery resources quickly and efficiently, so that lives and businesses can return to normal. Resource Management Lessons The middle of an emergency is too late to start planning—the need is for doing. The current approach to recovery resource management therefore is not working. In this context, the following observations apply: u During the period when response is the priority, the delivery of short-term recovery resources into the community will experience delay at some point. If short-term recovery could start immediately, the right supplies could already be on the way during the response phase. u The private sector and the nonprofit sector are participants, whether invited or not. Local emer- TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 PHOTO: ANDREA BOOHER, FEMA 18 North Dakota residents prepare for flooding of the Souris River. A plan for implementing a supply chain approach is necessary before an emergency occurs— although businesses have experience and inventory, delivery and distribution are challenges. PHOTO: JOCELYN AUGUSTINO, FEMA Federal, state, local, and nongovernmental agencies at the City of San Antonio and Bexar County Emergency Operations Center in Texas coordinate activities in preparation for Hurricane Ike in 2008. housing. Shifting to a supply chain model introduces adaptability, which allows the delivery of recovery resources to be preplanned and managed, from point A to point B. u The for-profit supply delivery systems actively intersect with the nonprofit services at work in the community, daily delivering food, medical services and supplies, water, and shelter—for example, food chains donate nearly-out-of-date food to food pantries every day. The new approach to recovery resource management could leverage this point of intersection and avoid reinventing a process that already works. These observations are true wherever a disaster may occur. The concepts can be examined to determine what actions can be taken and what tools can be designed to address the dilemmas of recovery resource planning. Program Actions In Fiscal Year 2013, the Arlington County Office of Emergency Management, on behalf of the Northern Virginia Emergency Response System (NVERS), began implementing a supply chain–focused partnership between local government and private businesses: u Locations are being determined for the drop-off and distribution of disaster recovery resources. By TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 gency managers therefore could work with both sectors before an event to prepare for and address regulatory and policy obstacles that may impede full and successful participation. Emergency managers are less available during the chaotic phase immediately after a major event; therefore on-the-ground situational awareness could be established before an event to allow the private and nonprofit sectors to operate independently, efficiently, and effectively. u When an incident disrupts normal operations, the supply chain abruptly shifts into an emergency mode, in which everything changes, including objectives, commodity flow, the balance of demand, decision-making procedures, the repetition of established cycles, and the choices of supporting infrastructure. The mechanics of these shifts can be examined in developing new approaches (1). u Community resiliency can be measured only after an incident by the length and efficiency of the recovery time. A resilient community will recover faster and will return to the new normal more effectively than one that is not. Local emergency management therefore needs to make supply chain resiliency a priority, not an after-the-fact solution. u Recovery resource conversations have focused on inventory and warehousing. Yet emergencies are unpredictable; the needs, quantities, and affected populations and locations vary; and the destruction may affect the safe storage of resources, complicating the preplanned deployment of inventory and ware- 19 Summit Explores Lessons from Supply Chains TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 O 20 n January 30–31, 2013, the Arlington County Office of Emergency Management successfully completed a two-day Local Supply Chain Capacity in a Crisis Summit Exercise. The summit addressed a new approach to improve disaster planning by working through the supply chain. With speakers and panelists from the public and private sectors, as well as from nonprofits, program discussions centered on the challenges and solutions related to the development of a local supply chain approach to disaster resource planning. U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen (retired) keynoted the first day’s program. Panelists examined issues that confront the transportation, communications, and power infrastrucThad Allen tures in the delivery of resources for community recovery. Presentations focused on real-world experiences and defined the critical components for solutions addressing recovery challenges. The keynote speaker on the second day was Charley Shimanski, Senior Vice Charley President of Disaster Services for the Shimanski American Red Cross. Panelists examined supply chain issues in the delivery of financial services, medical supplies, and other vital resources. The presentations explored how to create a successful supply chain solution that expedites the delivery and distribution of resources. Charlotte Franklin, Deputy Coordinator of Arlington County’s Office of Emergency Management, noted the importance of understanding what happens in the supply chain when “normal” abruptly shifts to “emergency.” “Supply chain modeling is more flexible and can adapt more readily to supply-and-demand shifts that occur when a disaster strikes,” Franklin observed. “The goal is to develop salient, supply chain–focused recommendations and remedies for disaster resource planning.” A report with recommendations for local supply chain capacity has been published,a drawing on discussions from the summit, which was funded through the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. ahttp://recoverydiva.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/arlingtonsummit report_finalrev.pdf. using the distribution paths already in place in every community, resource providers and local governments can rely on food pantries, medical dispensing sites, temporary shelters, and organizations such as Goodwill and the Salvation Army to help receive and distribute critical supplies and to help manage donations. u A Public Recovery Resource Access Portal is in development on the web, and a major project will add map layers and expand usability across jurisdictions. The online resource provides real-time updates to help businesses and the general public know where to donate and receive supplies during a disaster. The portal design is easily adaptable to any jurisdiction. Funding is through an Urban Areas Security Initiative grant from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Documentation to assist jurisdictions in developing their own public access portals is in process through a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities Centennial Challenge. u A Regional Catastrophic Resource Planning Summit Exercise convened January 30–31, 2013, in Arlington, Virginia (see sidebar at left). Participants included grocers, retailers, supply chain experts, representatives from financial institutions and medical suppliers, and stewards of the critical infrastructure that supports their activities. Private-sector representatives, staff from Information Sharing and Analysis Centers1 (ISACs), and local emergency managers worked together to develop tangible, before-theevent remedies that every community can apply to mitigate the impact of a disaster on the distribution and delivery of goods and services. Recommendations from the summit, which was funded by FEMA’s Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program, are available to all communities as a guide for a supply chain–focused approach to emergency preparedness.2 Risk and Flexibility Almost all decisions incorporate uncertainty about the future. The assessment of uncertainty and the risk inherent in these decisions can be critical, especially in a disaster (2). Providing the real-time, granular information required for sense-and-respond situational readiness can help assess risks when information about future events or the effects of events is incomplete and imprecise. Risk analysis is the main tool for dealing with uncertainties. Without proper information or the www.isaccouncil.org. http://recoverydiva.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/arlington summitreport_finalrev.pdf. 1 2 Intelligent Tools able real-time information is provided in a trustworthy and useable format. Survey Insights To determine the information that would be most valuable to recovery resource providers immediately following an emergency, a survey was sent to 30 professionals who deal with supply chain matters in either normal or emergency operations. Recipients were asked to identify from a list the real-time information items that would be most valuable for supply chain continuity during a crisis. The survey results showed that 93 percent to 100 percent of the respondents agreed about the value of the following realtime information: u Transportation—specifically, detours, traffic conditions, and bridge and road closures and access; u Energy—specifically, power and electrical outages and mobile fuel supplies; u Telecommunications—specifically, service disruptions and Internet access; u Resource management—specifically, identification of resource needs, locations for drop-offs and deliveries, and coordination with other providers; u Infrastructure status, especially water conditions; u Weather conditions; and u Real-time situational awareness through the local emergency operations center (EOC) and a mode of interfacing with EOCs via real-time, electronic alert systems. Of the respondents, 80 percent thought that changes in regulations or policy would be useful. Respondents also indicated that the following addi- The Salvation Army and other voluntary agencies provide critical services in emergency situations and have already established networks within the community. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Also important are intelligent and responsive tools to anticipate and react quickly to changing demand. Retailers and shippers need to sense and respond to immediate increases in demand. With intelligent tools that track product movement, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), retailers can redirect and reallocate products out of harm’s way and maintain profits even during an emergency. These tools also provide visibility into product shipments and cost structures. The visibility of the exact location of products on individual trucks is vital. A rerouted truck will need to arrive at multiple destinations in the right order to facilitate efficient unloading. Responsiveness tools help companies anticipate demand changes and react intelligently in emergencies (3). Responsiveness entails the accurate anticipation of changes in demand. In a natural disaster, demand can spike and shift unpredictably—the time for reaction is razor-thin. Instead of forecasting from several sources, a single point of demand can be established to increase visibility and avoid wasting time in reconciling information from different divisions. Companies do this to respond quickly, scheduling the necessary labor resources for the expected volume increases and planning for the replenishment of assets back through the supply chain. This is how a supply chain responds to sudden disruptions. But immediately after a disaster strikes, what local information can be made available so that inbound recovery resource providers are part of the communication loop and do not make independent decisions or search on their own for information about what is happening? Adept use of sophisticated information tools can help, but only if the most valu- PHOTO: GEORGE ARMSTRONG, FEMA ability to perform real-time monitoring, strategy and risk analysis cannot be fine-tuned and complete for making predictions. Risk is related to a lack of knowledge about the future; the more information available, the more is known and the less the risk. Businesses achieve the flexibility needed during a crisis by sharing key supply chain data with business partners. Information transparency is critical in providing visibility for product movement and in understanding the impacts on operations. In a weather-related emergency, a retailer is likely to face disruptions in receiving products allocated to, from, or through affected areas. Accurate product tracking and visibility enhances the ability to locate products in the supply chain at any time. The ability of retailers, carriers, and suppliers to access the same real-time tracking information can ensure that a product is rerouted to a nearby facility or a forwarding location. 21 IMAGE: A District of Columbia online planning tool shows alternative evacuation routes in a city emergency. Intelligent tools can anticipate changes in demand and make adjustments. HTTP://72HOURS.DC.GOV tional real-time information was important for continuity during a crisis: u Current threat status, criminal activities, and responses; u Central information and availability of data for real-time mapping and information sharing; and u Key points of contact at government agencies. Addressing Challenges Probably the most valuable information captured through the survey was the identification of challenges that confront private-sector supply chain managers during a disruption that could be addressed by emergency managers before an event, facilitating the delivery of goods. The most effective way emergency managers can partner with privatesector providers during an emergency is to share information to develop mitigations and remedies to the unique challenges in transitioning supply chains: 22 PHOTO: DHOMONIQUE RICKS, KOMU NEWS TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Boone Electric Company repairs power lines after a storm in Columbia, Missouri. Recovery depends on close cooperation with service providers. u The uncertain condition of the transportation infrastructure compounds the challenges of meeting the needs of disaster victims. u With markets evolving toward flexible, lean inventories, capacity is diminished, hampering the market’s ability to deliver supplies to victims in a disaster. u Stakeholders have a gap in knowledge and skills; management tools and decision support systems need to be expanded, along with leadership capabilities and situational awareness. u Storage and warehousing dynamics are changing in normal operations, affecting the response to needs that arise in an emergency. u Communications capabilities continue to be strained, but social media and portable communication devices are making significant progress in improving what are termed common operating pictures—a single display of shared information. u Legal and regulatory issues are changing in the new environment of homeland security. Requirements for cross-sector and cross-jurisdiction interfaces are challenging regulatory environments built over decades. Information Platform Arlington County has been investigating the requirements for developing the first phase of a comprehensive private-sector resource information platform to make the kinds of data described in this article available for any U.S. zip code. Many organizations have been collecting these data, and much is already available to the public, although often not in open format. Arlington County’s Public Recovery Resource Access Portal is a beginning and will provide the public with such vital information as which pharmacy is open and eventually which ATMs are in service. References 1. Holguín-Veras, J., N. Perez, M. Jaller, L. Destro, and T. Wachtendorf. On the Need to Reformulate Humanitarian Logistics Modeling: Deprivation Costs and Material Convergence. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, 2011. 2. Valishevsky, A. Granular Information-Based Risk Analysis in Uncertain Situations. University of Latvia, 2003. 3. Cashman, J. Bouncing Back When Disaster Strikes. Inbound Logistics, August 2007. www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/ article/bouncing-back-when-disaster-strikes/. Disaster Resilience in America Steps Forward ELIZABETH A. EIDE AND LAUREN ALEXANDER AUGUSTINE AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 For more information about Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative, published by National Academies Press, go to www.nap.edu/catalog.php? record_id=13457. N atural disasters pose a mounting threat to the economic and social well-being of the United States. The frequency and cost of disasters triggered by natural hazards have been rising over the past several decades. In the 1980s, the United States experienced approximately 50 natural disasters per year, but in the past decade, the number has tripled to approximately 170 per year. Costs have risen, too, with disasters in 2011 causing more than $55 billion in damage and the loss of nearly 600 lives. That year, the unusual combination of a rare East Coast earthquake, Hurricane The Bonnet Carré Spillway in New Orleans is a structural flood Irene hitting the Mid-Atlantic, deadly tor- mitigation measure managed by a partnership between local, nadoes in Massachusetts, and more than state, federal, and other organizations. $8 billion in flooding damage brought into sharp focus the need for increased resilience to haz1. Develop access to better and more complete data ards and disasters. and information about hazards and disasters—this can improve the prediction of events and the understanding of risk and can provide the means to docuDefining Resilience ment injuries, loss of life and property, and impacts on A 2012 National Research Council (NRC) report, Diseconomic activity. aster Resilience: A National Imperative (2012), defines 2. Improve ways to understand, communicate, and resilience as the ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, manage risk—this is critical to building a wellrecover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse informed citizenry. events. The report outlines ways in which increased 3. Identify measures of a community’s resilience— resilience can help to reduce the risks of—and vulthis provides a foundation for determining progress nerability to—disasters before they occur, to decrease toward resilience, documenting returns on investdisaster costs, and to mitigate the consequences. ment, and setting priorities for building resilient comWhat does resilience look like? The report munities. describes a future, disaster-resilient America in 2030 4. Support and maintain coalitions and partnerin which the citizenry is well-informed about levels ships within and across communities, because comof risk, communities have established plans for dismunity resilience is a shared responsibility—this can asters, community networks provide support when facilitate exchanges of information, best practices, and normal services are interrupted, and the need for ways to leverage resources. postdisaster aid and resources has decreased. A disaster-resilient America also would have an upgraded To advance these four actions, policies can be infrastructure designed and built for 21st century developed that mitigate risk—for example, through disasters and extreme events. building codes and zoning; that invest in critical infrastructure for energy, public health, and other Key Actions fundamental capabilities; and that secure arrangeThe challenge for communities and experts is how to ments for international cooperation in emergencies. move from the recovery-focused, disaster-manageThe many units across NRC will be taking on work ment mindset of today to a culture of resilience for the that advances these four actions to increase disaster future. Four key actions can help the United States to resilience in the United States and abroad. increase resilience to hazards and disasters: PHOTO: NATIONAL AERONAUTICS The authors are with the Division on Earth and Life Studies, National Research Council of the National Academies, Washington, D.C. Eide is Director of the Board on Earth Sciences and Resources and served as Study Director for the Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters. Augustine is the Associate Executive Director of the Division and oversees the National Academies’ Special Projects on Risk and Resilience of Extreme Events. 23 Fuel Supply in an Emergency Securing the Weakest Link HERBY LISSADE The author is Chief, Office of Emergency Management, California Department of Transportation, Sacramento, and Chair of two National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project Panels: on the Catastrophic Transportation Emergency Management Guidebook and on Preplanned Recovery and Accepted Practices for Replacement of Transportation Infrastructure. A t 3 a.m., a large magnitude earthquake hits Southern California. Responders rush to their vehicles to start the complex and arduous job of assessing the impact on people and on the surrounding infrastructure. The responders have done everything right in preparing for this event, including topping off the fuel tanks of their vehicles every night. The responders enter an environment that has no lights—the electrical grid is off line, water lines are broken, and gas lines and standard communications are not operable. As hours pass, it becomes evident that a critical resource is not available to the responders or to the public at large—fuel. Many commercial fuel sites are available, but the fuel cannot be accessed for the responders or the public until the electrical grid is back on line. At best, restoration may take several days This scenario identifies issues that are not unique to California but are global in scale: u How can commercial fuel sites be staffed and on line during emergencies, especially along routes designated for evacuation? u Although some states extend grants to assist commercial fuel sites in purchasing emergency generators, the grants often fall short of the amounts needed for purchase and installation. Protecting an Asset The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) has learned by experience that access to fuel at all times is essential to emergency response. During emergencies and catastrophic events, Caltrans has had to compete with the public for fuel at commercial sites. On many occasions, the commercial sites would be off line with the loss of electrical power. In some instances, fuel was not available for first responders or for the traveling public, let alone for Caltrans. Caltrans has 403 maintenance stations throughout the state; of these, 220 have on-site bulk fuel storage tanks for diesel, biodiesel, or unleaded gasoline. In addition, Caltrans owns many sources of E85 fuel—that is, 85 percent ethanol blend. Other state agencies, including the California Highway Patrol and the California Department of Forestry and Fire, rely on Caltrans’ bulk fuel in areas that have a limited TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 PHOTO: BRIAN KINGSLEY 24 After Superstorm Sandy, fuel was difficult to come by; several states imposed gasoline rationing. PHOTO: JONATHAN HENDERSON, GULF RESTORATION NETWORK availability of commercial fuel. Many bulk fuel sites can generate their own power; a major power outage would not affect the refueling of vital emergencyservice vehicles. Moreover, Caltrans has bulk fuel sites in strategic and densely populated areas such as the San Francisco Bay Area and Southern California. These resources represent an immediate and deployable resource for emergency responders. Fuel has a direct bearing on the means and resources to respond to emergencies and to maintain California’s infrastructure. Protecting and carefully managing this asset ensures that fuel is available whenever it is needed. Exposed by Sandy Applying the Lessons Several lessons for the fuel supply chain have emerged from recent disasters at home and abroad: u Readily available fuel, even in abundant supply, is useless unless it can be pumped from the storage tanks during a power outage. u Emergency responders should not be compet- ing with each other and with the traveling public for fuel. u Although many states have enacted legislation and awarded grants to assist fuel distribution sites to acquire emergency generators, the grants often are insufficient to offset the capital investment of buying and installing the generators. u Legislation should be enacted to identify critical fuel sites—for example, those that support lifeline routes and disaster supply chains—and to support those sites in dispensing fuel. u First and second responders should evaluate their access to fuel supplies. Funding may be needed to create bulk fuel sites that do not depend on the electrical grid, to support responders. Emergency managers are keenly aware of the interdependencies between transportation modes and utilities. A wind storm knocking down power lines or a cyberattack on the power grid can make this interdependence evident. Otherwise robust state emergency plans, county evacuation plans, continuity of operations plans, or emergency operations plans at any level of government need to incorporate well-thought-out courses of action to close the gap in what may be the weakest link—access to fuel. Flooding at the Phillips 66 Alliance Refinery near Belle Chasse, Louisiana. Storms can disrupt every part of the fuel supply chain. TR NEWS 287 JULY–AUGUST 2013 Superstorm Sandy hit the Eastern Seaboard with a vengeance in late October 2012, driving a record storm surge that killed more than 100 people. The Category 3 hurricane also exposed the fragility of the fuel supply chain in the United States. The storm affected every link of the fuel supply chain, from tankers halted by debris in the water, to flooded refineries, to refineries and commercial fuel depots shut down by power failures, to tanker trucks redirected by emergency agencies, to service stations—more than half of the region’s service stations were not able to operate because of the loss of electrical power. Residents struggled to acquire fuel; some states imposed gasoline rationing. Emergency and continuity of operations plans must be improved nationwide to address these kinds of situations, but new legislation also is needed. The legislation at the least should address facilities that support critical transportation routes, particularly evacuation or lifeline routes. New York State has made positive improvements since Superstorm Sandy—for example, requiring certain gas stations to install quick-c...
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 When it comes to disasters, there ought to be well

thought out planning and preparedness to counter the
disaster at hand
 A disaster happens when it I least expected, for most of
them at least
 This then requires there to be an emergency plan for
any scenario, very well calculated
 Efficiency in transportation helps facilitate quick
movement to the disaster-stricken area

 The government ought to have done its best to ensure

those infrastructures are in good shape
 This it to ensure that accessibility is at its best and there
will not be an obstacle at any one time as a result of
roads not being in tip-top shape
 This helps in improving efficiency, timely arrival and
delivery of medical supplies

 Emergency response planning helps with the

minimization of adverse effects on people, animals or
even property in the vicinity and care giving can be left
in the hands of able emergency response care givers
 The emergency ought to be timely too for the sake of
efficiency
 Communication is also enabled so that all casualties are
dealt with and information can reach the emergency
care givers in good time

 For the resources to be provided in case of a disaster

there should be a contact list with details of contacts of
individuals or companies that respond to disaster
emergency cases to carrying out disaster management
 This includes health personnel, those who deal with the
environment, the technical and the cleanup equipment
personnel, to name but a...


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