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Question Description

answer Questions 3,4,5,

Use this book: DeRouen, Karl. 2015. An Introduction to Civil Wars. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press. And the uploded papers.

Each asnwer has to be in 1 full single spaced page

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Beyond Greed and Grievance: And Not Too Soon . . . A Review Essay Author(s): Mats Berdal Source: Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 687-698 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40072114 Accessed: 08-02-2017 14:54 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Review of International Studies This content downloaded from on Wed, 08 Feb 2017 14:54:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 687-698 Copyright © British International Studies Association doi:10. 101 7/ S02602 10505006698 Beyond greed and grievance and not too soon . . . A review essay MATS BERDAL* • Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, Report (Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 20 • Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), The Political Econo Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienne • Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with Jonathan Goodhand, War Ec Regional Context (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). • Ken Menkhaus, Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terror Paper 364 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). The 'Greed Paradigm' and the study of civil war 'A useful conceptual distinction in understanding the motivation for ci between greed and grievance'.1 Thus wrote Paul Collier in 1999 statistical data of civil wars since the mid-sixties, his conclusion at the and unequivocal: 'grievance-based explanations of civil war' were 'ser In seemingly uncompromising terms, he argued instead that the key to why such wars erupt lay in greed and the quest for loot by rebel a certainly was not to be found in self-serving 'narratives of grievance' o on the part of insurgents to be fighting for justice.3 The likelihood of wars breaking out was particularly high, Collier suggested further, in relied heavily on primary commodity exports, had a surfeit of young, and poorly educated men, and were experiencing a period of rapid econ This, in short, was the 'greed thesis' of contemporary civil wars. As Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman's unusually rich and inte nourishing collection of case studies on the political economy of ar makes clear, the explanatory power initially given by Collier and exploitation of natural resources by rebel groups for purposes of self-e * I am most grateful to David Keen and David Ucko for their comments on an earlier article. 1 Paul Collier, 'Doing Well out of War', in Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds.), G Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p 2 Ibid., p. 96. 3 Ibid., p. 92. See also Paul Collier, 'The Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Thei for Policy', in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict ( USIP, 2001), in which he argued that 'grievance is to a rebel organisation what imag business', pp. 145-7. 4 Collier, 'Doing Well out of War', p. 110. 687 This content downloaded from on Wed, 08 Feb 2017 14:54:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 688 Mats Berdal the principal cause and driver of civil wars, has had a marked i policymaking towards civil wars, especially within the Un UN-sponsored efforts to reduce trade in 'conflict goods' a undermine the capacity for income generation by rebel mo back, at least in part, to the widespread acceptance of gre explanations for civil wars. More specifically, since the lat Security Council relating to Angola, Sierra Leone and the D Congo (DRC) have all been shaped by the assumptions gover In Sierra Leone, an embargo was placed by the Council on th from the country in July 2000 and this was later extended to (the first instance of UN-imposed 'secondary sanctions'). In An was made by the Council in June 1998 to curtail the expo rebel-controlled parts of the country.7 In both cases, the C means of targeted commodity sanctions, to weaken the fin main insurgent groups, the Revolutionary United Front (RU the Unido Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UN It would be wrong, of course, to attribute the widespread acc thesis in policy circles to academic papers and World Bank r the focus on economic motivations - however problematic the form is now acknowledged to be -offered a valuable corre sought to explain civil wars solely 'by reference to its irra inexplicably primordial qualities'.8 These were prominent, discourse on civil wars in the first half of 1990s. On closer ins frequently turned out to be empirically unsustainable, highly some cases, downright suspect.9 Aspects of Western media conflicts - especially the popular fascination with the opul rapacity of colourful and unsavoury 'warlords' -no doubt drawing attention to the predatory behaviour of insurgent gro and effective advocacy work of single-issue NGOs concern extraction of natural resources. But perhaps the most impor initial attraction of the greed thesis, as Ballentine and Sherman the statistical analysis and social-science methodology in which had the effect of simplifying the complexity of conflicts conf This was, of course, also part of its attraction to social sc 5 Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Arme and Grievance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003). The book (henceforth Grievance) is the concluding volume in a three-year research programme Civil Wars organised by the International Peace Academy and directed by details of the programme and associated research reports see (www.ipacad Karen Ballentine and Heiko Nitzschke, 'Policy Lessons from Studies in t Armed Conflict', IP A Policy Report (October 2003), p. 4. 7 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1173 (Angola), 1306 (Sierra Leone an excellent assessment of the impact of commodity sanctions see Charlie Critical Cases of Africa', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), Bevond Greed a 8 Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with Jonathan Goodhand, War Economi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 97. 9 An oft-cited example of this kind of writing is Robert Kaplan's article for February 1994, evocatively entitled 'The Coming Anarchy'. Another varian 'new barbarism' at work in many of today's war-zones. For a discussion of Cooper, War Economies in a Regional Context, pp. 18-19 and pp. 96-7. This content downloaded from on Wed, 08 Feb 2017 14:54:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Conflict and develovment 689 rational-choice theory and wedded to the belief that only 'scientific' methods us unravel the mysteries of the social world. To the policy community, the re of a conflict to a struggle over economic resources also reduced, at least in theo policy challenge. Identity-driven conflicts, involving subjective and elusive cat such as ethnicity, religion, ideas and history, are by definition hard to resolv not provide obvious entry points for policy intervention. By contrast, e resources and assets appear, in principle at any rate, to be 'divisible', thus ope possibility for achieving peace 'through technical measures that in the sh medium-term will reduce both the accessibility and profitability of lucrative ec resources to combatant groups'.10 Not surprisingly, Collier's original thesis powerfully stimulated academi about the troubling persistence and, in several instances, the violent intensifi of civil wars after the Cold War.11 Indeed, the books under review suggest th initially crude and simplistic polarisation of 'greed' versus 'grievance' has useful heuristic purpose in sharpening debate and, above all, in enco qualitative and more historically informed research into ongoing civil w results of this research are now beginning to emerge, and if there is one them unites all four books under review - including Breaking the Conflict Trap publicised World Bank Policy Research Report authored by Paul Collier an of associates - it is that the conceptual distinction between greed and grievanc in fact terribly useful, either in explaining the motivation or persistence of civ As with other more recent works by Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap definite shift away from the earlier emphasis on the 'motives of rebel actors 'opportunity for organised violence' and the 'feasibility of rebellion . . . regar motivation'.12 The World Bank report still emphasises how the 'lethal co economic decline, dependency on primary commodities and low per capita places countries at 'high risk of civil war'.13 But on the question o connections, the tone is notably different from the greed thesis of the la 'While the prevalence of natural resource secessions suggest that greed c entirely discounted', the report notes, 'it does not appear to be the power behind rebellion that economic theorists have assumed'.14 Leaving behind the crude and unhelpful juxtaposition of greed versus grievance, and putting to rest the deeply flawed notion that civil wars are caused by rebel greed alone, is certainly to be welcomed.15 Beyond Greed and Grievance is properly 10 Ballentine and Nitzschke, 'Policy Lessons', p. 14. 11 For an excellent overview of that debate, see David M. Malone and Heiko Nitzschke, Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know', Discussion Paper no. 2005/07 (WIDER: United Nations University. April 2005). 12 Ballentine and Nitzschke, 'Policy Lessons', p. 4. Pugh and Cooper also draw attention to the shift in Collier's work towards an emphasis on the increased scope for violent conflict in the contemporary era. See Pueh and Cooper, War Economies in a Regional Context, p. 22. 13 Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, A World Bank Report (Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 4. 14 Ibid., p. 64. 15 In truth, greed-based explanations were recognised at the outset as being deeply problematic and several of the articles that appeared alongside Collier's aforementioned piece (fn. 1 above) in Greed and Grievance stressed the interaction of political and economic agendas in armed conflict. See, in particular, David Keen, 'Incentives and Disincentives for Violence', in Berdal and Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance, pp. 31-5. This content downloaded from on Wed, 08 Feb 2017 14:54:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 690 Mats Berdal concerned with the 'relative weight of economic factors vis-aother political, cultural, and strategic factors in shaping the i character of intrastate wars'.16 It is a perspective which fl book's chosen approach: a series of detailed, historically in researched case studies that go beyond the better-known Leone and the DRC to include armed conflicts in Colomb Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Burma. Each of these case studies of counter-intuitive, insights into the economic dimensions o conflict. Taken together, they all point to a fundamental limi literature that relies primarily on rational-choice theory and capture the dynamics of violent conflict. Though usually pres to greater precision and 'objectivity' in the analysis of conflic in revealing general trends, such methods inevitably end culturally blind and profoundly ahistorical picture of civil wa contributions of Beyond Greed and Grievance to remind us equally important, to stress that it remains a limitation even 'greed' has now been downplayed in favour of an emp 'opportunity' for rebellion. 'Whether cast in terms of m inferences drawn from statistical analysis remain 'probabil rather than factual descriptions of actual conflict dynamics'.1 the Conflict Trap is rich in statistical analysis and much of it documents the social, economic and 'legacy' costs of civil w worth assembling in one volume. Clearly, documenting these c Bank is there to do. It is difficult to escape the conclusion, how to the truly interesting questions - the interaction of gre triggers and sustains civil wars, how and why they mutate ov analysis is of distinctly limited utility.18 This is of course hard analysis, though often deceptively precise and impressive (for country reaching the end of a civil war faces around a 44 per to conflict within five years'.19), tells us very little about ind conflict dynamics. Without denying its potential value, B seem to get the balance just about right: 'while statistical met 16 Ballentine and Sherman, 'Introduction', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.) Grievance, p. 5. 17 Ibid. For a more detailed critique of rational-choice theories of conflict 'violate the complexity of individual motivation, razing the individual (an monolithic maximising agents', see Chris Cramer, "Homo Economicus G Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War', Wor d. 1846. 18 One difficulty, highlighted by the case studies, is that statistical analysis necessarily involves choices about empirical data that might leave out what, on the face of it, looks highly relevant. For example, as Alexandra Guaqueta notes, Collier and Hoeffler 'arrived at their conclusion on natural resources and conflict without ever incorporating illegal commodities into their statistics'. Such commodities, most obviously narcotics, have been central to the political economy of armed conflict in Afghanistan, Colombia, Lebanon, Burma and Peru. See Alexandra Guaqueta, 'The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic Dimensions', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), Beyond Greed and Grievance, d. 90. 19 Breaking the Conflict Trap, p. 83. This content downloaded from on Wed, 08 Feb 2017 14:54:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Conflict and development 691 of identifying key variables across a class of cases, at best they generate broad correlations that illuminate only part of the picture'.20 None of this is to suggest that the increased attention given to economic agendas in the study of civil wars over the past decade or so has been misplaced. Indeed, Beyond Greed and Grievance and War Economies in a Regional Context both show that the dynamics of many contemporary civil wars - especially their protracted nature and marked tendency to mutate over time - can only be fully understood by references to global and regional economic changes which, though they sometimes originate in the 1970s and 1980s, accelerated dramatically in the 1990s. What, then, are the principal findings to emerge from the case studies? The political economy of armed conflict On the central question of causes and triggers of conflict, the conclusion is unambiguous: contemporary civil wars simply cannot be reduced to 'resource wars' sparked by the predatory designs of governments and/or the actions of greedy, loot-seeking rebels. The evidence presented all indicates that: . . . economic incentives and opportunities have not been the only or even the primary cause of these armed conflicts; rather, to varying degrees, they interacted with socio-economic and political grievances, interethnic disputes, and security dilemmas in triggering the outbreak of warfare.21 The emphasis placed on the interaction of economic and political agendas, on the impossibility of neatly separating them as analytical categories, also applies to instances where a country's chief economic resource has been central to a violent conflict, as in Bougainville where the Panguna copper mine was at the heart of the separatist conflict between 1988 and 1997.22 It also applies to Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC; the three cases that have figured most prominently as examples of greed-driven conflict involving rebel exploitation of natural resources. In the case of Angola, as Charlie Cater notes, 'high levels of commodity dependence did not initially cause civil war; instead, increasing reliance upon natural resources by both the state and UNITA has been a consequence of protracted conflict as other sectors of the economy were progressively destroyed'.23 Likewise, nepotistic exploitation and endemic mismanagement of natural resources by the State contrib- uted to the build-up of grievances and resistance to central government in Sierra Leone and the DRC. It was only later, however, that 'the commonly asserted pattern 20 Ballentine and Sherman, 'Introduction', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), Beyond Greed and Grievance, p. 5. It should be added here that questions have also been raised about the data sets on which some of the conclusions in Breaking the Conflict Trap rest. See in particular Astri Suhrke, Espen Villanger and Susan Woodward, 'Economic Aid to Post-Conflict Countries: A Methodological Critique of Collier and Hoeffler', CMI Working Paper 4 (Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2005), also available at (www.cmi.no/publications). See also James Fearon, 'Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (August 2005), pp. 483-507. 21 Karen Ballentine, 'Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), Beyond Greed and Grievance, p. 260. 22 See Anthony J. Regan, 'The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas', in Ballentine and Sherman (eds.), Beyond Greed and Grievance, pp. 133-67. 23 Cater, 'Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa', p. 29. This content downloaded from on Wed, 08 Feb 2017 14:54:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 692 Mats Berdal of natural resource exports financing insurgency [became] these conflicts'.24 Yet, while it is true that economic factors alone cannot accou or explain why and when violence erupts, it is equally the case have broken out, their logic and trajectory cannot be und appreciation of the economics underpinning them. And h evidence provided by Beyond Greed and Grievance, reinforced presented by Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (Central A South-eastern Europe) as well as by Breaking the Conflict T longevity, internal logic and, indeed, the ferocity of civil wars by the greater ease of access to economic and financial resou whether governments or rebels, have enjoyed in the 1990s studies bring out the skill and ingenuity with which non-st rulers have been able to exploit opportunities presented by the globalisation. The latter include the deregulation of internation and key industries (such as the airline industry) and, more gen of new and the expansion of older markets of all kinds. E markets, as well as to illicit markets in drugs, human traffickin greatly facilitated by the increasingly close engagement of bel national criminal networks. A notable feature of this eng symbiotic relationship between political elites and crimin frequently crystallises in 'transition' countries, be it transition from authoritarian rule.25 The upshot has been, in many b examined, to make economic motives and incentives more salien has the resulting process of conflict transformation involved a political, ideological or other agendas in favour of purely ec A fascinating case in point, illustrating the effects of global armed conflict in the 1990s, is provided by Alexandra Guaqueta course taken by the forty-year old civil war in Colombia. U pitting Left-wing guerrillas - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionar and Ejercito de Liber acion Nacional (ELN) - against the contained'.26 Since then, however, the civil war has seen a dram resulting from the combined pressures of 'globalisation, ec expanded access to international flows of funds and weap Breaking the Conflict Trap, an estimated US$500 m per year fl ...

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