Running head: GLOBAL SOCIETAL ISSUES DISCUSSION
1
Many societal issues within the global context are of great significance. In this case, I
will focus on two topics, which include the refugee crises and the airport security. In deciding to
develop these two topics as part of my research, I decided to focus on current issues, which is of
great concern globally. Thus, currently, the issue of refugees has been making headlines across
the world with different factors influencing the type of refugees ranging from political to
economically oriented factors. Major airports across the world have come under constant
scrutiny with different attacks and assassinations taking center stage. However, when evaluating
the two topics, I decided to choose the topic that has significant weight to the society and has
been in place for a long time, and that is refugee crises.
In evaluating a scholarly article, there is some consideration that needs to be considered.
The author of the article must be an expert in a given field. The audience for the article is mainly
scholars such as researchers and students. The beginning of a scholarly usually has an abstract
which is a summary of the whole article.
According to Fargues (2014), he asserts that the Syrian refugee burden has been troubling
the Europe and the world at large regarding how well to ensure better consideration of the
refugees from the war-torn country. The article highlights the need for Europe to shoulder the
burden since they also played a huge role in the current condition of the country. However, the
modality on how it should be undertaken remains a huge challenge.
Another article developed by Carrera et.al, (2015), it focuses on the European Union’s
response to the refugee crisis putting in place various policies and strategies that have been put in
place. The European Union has been questioned regarding how it is dealing with the refugee
crisis about its underlying principles.
GLOBAL SOCIETAL ISSUES DISCUSSION
2
Scholarly articles are vital in serving as source of information since they contain
information, which is reviewed and is quite developed on the past similar studies, which were
done by other scholars and thus are better placed to offer quality information.
References
Carrera, S., Blockmans, S., Gros, D., & Guild, E. (2015). The EU's Response to the Refugee
Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities.
Fargues, P. (2014). Europe must take on its share of the Syrian refugee burden, but how?.
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)
The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities
Carrera, S.; Blockmans, S.F.; Gros, D.; Guild, E.
Link to publication
Citation for published version (APA):
Carrera, S., Blockmans, S., Gros, D., & Guild, E. (2015). The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: Taking
Stock and Setting Policy Priorities. (CEPS essay; No. 20). Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
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Download date: 29 Mar 2017
The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities
Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans,
Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild
No. 20 / 16 December 2015
Abstract
What have been the most important EU policy and legal responses to the
2015 refugee crisis? Is Europe acting in compliance with its founding
principles? This Essay takes stock of the main results and policy outputs
from the EU’s interventions to the refugee crisis. It critically highlights the
outstanding policy dilemmas confronting the adopted instruments and
puts forwards a set of policy priorities to guide the next phases of the
European Agenda on Migration.
Sergio Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs section
at CEPS and Associate Professor at the University of Maastricht. Steven Blockmans is
Senior Research Fellow and Head of EU Foreign Policy at CEPS. Daniel Gros is Director of
CEPS. Elspeth Guild is Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Jean Monnet
Professor ad personam at Queen Mary, University of London as well as at Radboud
University Nijmegen.
CEPS Essays offer scholarly observations and personal insights into topics of critical
importance in European affairs. The views expressed are attributable only to the authors in
a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated.
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)
© Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild, 2015
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
2. Overview of EU institutional, policy and legal responses ......................................... 2
2.1
Institutional renewal and migration ..................................................................... 2
2.2
The European migration agenda ........................................................................... 3
2.3
Adopted legal and policy instruments (May-December 2015): State of play..... 5
2.3.1
The temporary relocation system .................................................................. 5
2.3.2
The hotspots approach ................................................................................... 7
2.3.3
Safe third countries ......................................................................................... 7
2.3.4
Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling ........................................... 9
2.3.5
Funding.......................................................................................................... 10
2.3.6
The Commission proposal for a European border and coastal guard ...... 10
3. Assessing the EU responses: What are the challenges?............................................ 12
3.1
A fairer sharing of responsibilities in the European asylum system ................ 12
3.2
Enforcing member states’ implementation of EU standards............................. 14
3.3
Guaranteeing rule of law and human rights when the EU goes abroad? ........ 17
3.4
A multi-policy angle for the EU agenda on migration ...................................... 18
4. What policy priorities for the next phase of the European agenda on migration? 20
References .......................................................................................................................... 22
The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis:
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities
Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans,
Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild
No. 20 / 16 December 2015
1.
Introduction
The year 2015 has sorely tested the added value and legitimacy of the European Union in
responding to the refugee crisis. The public outcry and unprecedented levels of political and
media attention to the dramatic experiences and images of asylum-seekers arriving in the EU
have put huge pressures on the European institutions and member state governments to show
that they can meet the challenge.
Migration policies are now at the top of the EU policy agenda. It is difficult to envisage that
this will change anytime in the near future. Each of the relevant European institutions has
positioned this issue at the heart of its respective agenda. During this same period a whole
series of initiatives have been put on the table and heatedly discussed between the relevant
institutional actors and EU member states, and indeed with third countries – as the recent
Valetta Summit on migration of 11-12 November 2015 has shown. 1 These have been
accompanied by a succession of inconclusive extraordinary summits and conferences
reporting mixed and obscure results about the kind of concrete steps the EU might take. The
resulting picture is difficult for the general public to fully grasp, which has proved to be
profoundly concerned about the impasse reached on migration and the lack of commitment
by European authorities. Is Europe effectively assuming responsibility in compliance with its
founding principles? It is roughly one year since the new European Commission, the High
Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European
Council took office.
It is therefore a proper moment to take stock of the results and policy outputs from the EU’s
interventions in the refugee crisis. This Essay examines the most salient policy and legislative
initiatives taken by the EU in this area and identifies the main challenges associated with them
from a variety of policy perspectives. Section 2 provides a synthesis of the most far-reaching
policy, legislative, institutional and financial responses agreed at EU level to respond to the
refugee crisis. Section 3 critically highlights the outstanding policy dilemmas confronting the
next phases of the European Agenda on Migration.
The Essay illustrates that while a number of the recently adopted EU initiatives constitute a
step forward in the building of a common European policy on migration, asylum and borders,
a number of far-reaching challenges remain in need of attention. This is particularly true with
regard to:
i)
ii)
1
ensuring a fairer sharing of legal responsibilities and institutional solidarity between
the EU and the member states, as well as among the member states themselves;
guaranteeing a proper implementation and enforcement of existing EU laws and
standards by member states on the ground and of rule of law principles in external
See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs/
|1
2 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
border controls and defence/military-oriented responses; and
iii)
implementing a common EU policy agenda that gives priority to – also in the shortterm – all policy sectors with relevance to migration and not only those related to EU
and member states’ security. The latter point implies giving proper consideration to
the repercussions of home affairs responses over wider economic, trade, development
cooperation, human rights and foreign affairs policies.
Until the present time, most of these measures did not go deep enough to treat the actual
dilemma behind this refugee crisis. This mainly concerns a lack of effective action on
remodelling the sharing of protection and human rights responsibilities between all EU
member state governments in a way that takes us beyond the current unworkable EU Dublin
system. Still, events such as the terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris should not be
taken as an opportunity to shy away EU member states’ commitments towards the legislative
and policy measures already adopted in the scope of the European Agenda on Migration. The
EU policy responses, both internally and in cooperation with third countries, have by and large
lacked a multi-policy sector approach. Instead, they have given priority to security-driven
(home affairs) and military concerns and interests of the EU and its member states, where the
focus on border controls, return and readmission and fighting against smuggling have by and
large prevailed, instead of first ensuring full compliance with fundamental human rights
standards and principles. This constitutes one of the Achilles heels of the current European
Agenda on Migration.
2.
Overview of EU institutional, policy and legal responses
2.1 Institutional renewal and migration
Since the inauguration of the new European Commission, led by President Jean-Claude
Juncker, one of whose Vice-Presidents, Federica Mogherini, is also the new High
Representative leading the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the start of activities
by Donald Tusk as President of the European Council, migration policies have been at the top
of their political agendas. President Juncker’s Political Guidelines ‘A New Start for Europe’
included migration as one of the key action areas.2 The new intra-institutional configurations
of the current Commission included for the first time a First Vice-President in charge of
coordinating both Commissioners responsible for ‘Justice’ (DG JUST) and ‘Home Affairs’ (DG
HOME), and therefore politically steering the Commission’s work emanating from these two
DGs, including on migration policy (Guild & Carrera, 2014). For the first time also, the
Commissioner for Home Affairs was additionally nominated as Commissioner for ‘Migration’,
yet without any significant reallocation of responsibilities in comparison to his predecessor.
In response to a spike in deadly tragedies at sea since February 2015, ‘migration’ has also been
a key domain of intervention by Federica Mogherini, in her dual capacity as High
Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) responsible for the
Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA), which includes Commissioner
Avramopoulos (DG HOME) in the broader cluster (Blockmans & Russack, 2015):3
We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming weeks and months; we need to be
2
Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf
3
Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/about/structure/index_en.htm#ta
THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 3
able to give a strong political and operational response. As I have announced today during
the College in Strasbourg, I will convene an extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners'
Group on External Action in the coming days in order to discuss with the Commissioner
for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our
policies. I've also decided to put a discussion on migration on the agenda of the Foreign
Affairs Council soon. The fight against smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants
at sea, the protection of asylum-seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger
exercise of shared responsibility.4
On the occasion of the Foreign Affairs Council in March (the first in 10 years to discuss
‘migration’), it was decided to organise an extraordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers and
Interior Ministers on 20th April. This first-ever joint ministerial prepared the first ‘special’
European Council meeting on the refugee crisis on 23rd April, after the single-most deadly
shipwreck on the Mediterranean claimed more than 800 lives. Mogherini has played an
instrumental role in keeping the external dimension of the refugee crisis on the agenda since.
Whereas “the need to manage migration properly” (and strengthen Triton, the Frontex
Operation in the central Mediterranean and the EU’s support to the countries of origin and
transit) had already been recognised by EU Heads of State or Government in 2014, President
Tusk tried to respond to the concerns expressed by an ever-louder chorus of EU leaders by
coordinating a more concerted effort at the highest political level. He appointed former EEAS
Secretary General Pierre Vimont as his point man for the Valetta Summit process and has kept
refugee and migration issues on the agenda of every regular European Council summit since,
including the upcoming European Council meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015.5
2.2 The European migration agenda
In May 2015, the Commission adopted the so-called European Migration Agenda. 6 The
Agenda is a political document outlining priorities in migration, asylum and borders policies
for the years to come. The relevance of the above-mentioned new inter- and intra-institutional
configurations became evident during the press conference presenting the Agenda to the
public, which started with First Vice-President Timmermans, followed by HR/VP Mogherini
and only then Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Avramopoulos.7
In contrast to the previous institutional arrangements, for the first time a common policy
agenda was adopted between the two institutions, aimed at being ‘comprehensive’ 8 and
4
See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm
See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/12/17-18/ See also an
interesting timeline of key developments in the work of the Council and the European Council on
migration
here:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/historymigratory-pressures/
5
See
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
6
7
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm
During the Press Conference presenting the Agenda Mogherini stated: “The response is finally European. And it is also as we say in European terminology, I don’t necessarily like it very much, but you
know what I refer to, is a comprehensive response, means that it tackles all different aspects of a problem
that is complex, is not going to be solved from today to tomorrow but we have a set of European policies
that can be put together, and we are doing that in an integrated and coordinated way…finally we don’t
8
4 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
joining up (or ensuring consistency between) the various internal and external policy strands
and instruments at the Union’s disposal. Yet, has this really been the result so far?
In light of the increasingly pressing political context surrounding the arrival of asylum-seekers
through the south-eastern land borders and the Mediterranean, the Agenda identified six
‘immediate (short-term) EU policy actions’ or proposals:
1)
A temporary and emergency-driven relocation mechanism for asylum-seekers within
the EU for those member states confronting higher influx, based on a new
redistribution key criteria for determining responsibility for assessing asylum
applications; and the presentation of a legislative initiative for a permanent system
before the end of 2015
2)
A relocation mechanism for 20,000 refugees from outside the EU, and an extra €50
million budget 2015-16 to support this scheme
3)
Tripling the capacities and budget of the EU External Border Agency (Frontex) joint
border control and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean (called ‘Triton’ and
‘Poseidon’)
4)
Increasing emergency funding to frontline EU member states by €60 million, and
setting up a new ‘hotspot approach’ in which EU home affairs agencies like Frontex,
Europol and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) would work on the ground
to support ‘frontline’ member states in identifying, registering and fingerprinting
migrants
5)
Strengthening Europol’s joint maritime information operation in the Mediterranean to
deal with migrants’ smuggling via CEPOL (European Policy College)
6)
Establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Operation in the
Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers’ networks and the ‘business model’ of
smugglers, so as to identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers
In addition to these ‘immediate’ actions, understood as more ‘medium-term’ in nature, the
European Agenda on Migration outlined the following four key ‘pillars’ or ‘levels of action’
for an EU migration policy: 1) reducing the incentives for irregular migration; 2) border
management – saving lives and securing external borders; 3) Europe’s duty to protect – a
strong common asylum policy; and 4) a new policy on legal migration. Each pillar advanced
a set of specific policy actions.
A majority of MEPs supported the European Commission’s proposals to address the crisis,
while criticising EU member states for their failure to make tough decisions and provide a
compassionate response to the refugee crisis. For its part, the June European Council embraced
the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration and stressed the need to make progress on
all dimensions of a “comprehensive and systemic approach”.
This approach includes the diplomatic work by High Representative Mogherini, supported by
her staff at the EEAS, for instance in supporting the UN-brokered peace deal to form a
have
a
European
response
but we
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=KKxWBvW7llE).
have
an
integrated
European
response”
THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 5
government in Libya,9 and by widening the ‘E3+3’ format with Iran in an effort to reboot
discussions on how to bring about an end to the violence in Syria.10 Mogherini, in her hybrid
capacity as HR/VP, and fellow Commissioners (in particular Timmermans, Hahn,
Avramopoulos, Stylianides and Mimica) have also tried to move Turkey (See Section 2.3.3
below), Western Balkan countries, African countries and organisations, 11 toward closer
cooperation to manage refugee flows and address the so-called ‘root causes of irregular
migration’.12
2.3
Adopted legal and policy instruments (May-December 2015): State of
play
EU policy proposals have been the subject of intense policy debates over the past six months.
This Section explores in more detail the main legal and policy instruments adopted.13
2.3.1 The temporary relocation system
One of the most controversial ideas has been the establishment of a Temporary EU Relocation
System for the redistribution of asylum-seekers between EU member states (Carrera & Guild,
2015). The main contribution of the initiative has been to derogate temporarily the guiding
rule under the so-called ‘EU Dublin system’ according to which the EU member state of first
entry is responsible for examining an asylum application.
The temporary system introduces a new ‘distribution key’ model of allocating responsibility
between member states on the basis of new criteria, which include GDP, population,
unemployment, etc. On the basis of the Commission’s initiative, the member states adopted a
Resolution on relocating from Greece and Italy 40,000 persons in clear need of international
protection of 22 July 2015,14 which was complemented on September 3rd by an additional
Council Decision on the temporary relocation of 120,000 asylum-seekers from Greece and
Italy.15 EU Member States had also committed themselves in July 2015 to resettling over 22,000
See M. Toaldo, “Libya's migrant smuggling highway: Lessons for Europe, ECFR Policy Memo, 10 November 2015.
9
Joint Statement by China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations,
and the United States, Final declaration on the results of the Syria Talks in Vienna as agreed by participants, EEAS Press Release 151030_06, 30 October 2015.
10
Speech of Mogherini at the opening ceremony of the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso,
Tchad, Mali, Mauritanie et Niger), N’djamena, 20 November 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151120_fr_02.htm; and Speech of Mogherini to the African Union, 20 October 2015,
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151020_01_en.htm.
11
For an analysis on the ‘root causes approach’ refer to http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mpp_issue_22.pdf
12
For summaries, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm and more recently European Commission, “State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis”, 4 November 2015
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5958_en.htm). See also European Commission, Communication, Managing the refugee crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions under
the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 510 final, 14.10.2015.
13
14
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11131-2015-INIT/en/pdf
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11132-2015-INIT/en/pdf http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11161-2015-INIT/en/pdf
15
6 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
people from outside Europe.16
The first relocation flight took place from Italy on October 9th, transporting 19 Eritrean asylumseekers to Sweden. 17 Twelve days later, on October 21st, another 19 Eritrean and Syrian
asylum-seekers were relocated to Sweden and 48 to Finland. In what concerns Greece, the
European Commission announced on the 4th November that the first relocations flights of 30
asylum-seekers will take place to Luxembourg.18 As of December 11th, the resulting picture is
as follows: 54 asylum-seekers have been relocated from Greece and 130 from Italy (see Table
1 below).19 The EU member states that have participated most actively so far are Finland,
Sweden and Luxembourg; followed by France, Spain and Germany. It is not surprising that
the member states’ resolve has become the object of criticism: “At the current pace, it would
take more than 750 years to relocate the 160,000 asylum-seekers covered by a now-expanded
resettlement plan.”20
Table 1. State of play of relocation of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy
I
T
A
L
Y
G
R
E
E
C
E
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
F
r
a
n
c
e
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
4
9
1
9
1
1
2
4
L
u
x
e
m
S
p
a
i
n
S
w
e
d
e
n
1
2
3
9
3
0
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
According to the Commission Communication COM(2015) 510, Managing the Refugee Crisis, the first
resettlements have already taken place and “132 Syrians staying in neighbouring countries have already
been resettled under the scheme agreed on 20 July 2015 to the Czech Republic (16), Italy (96), and Liechtenstein (20)”(p. 6).
16
For the current state of affairs of member states’ support to emergency relocation mechanism (December 2015), see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf
17
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5971_en.htm and information provided at
http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/11/04-asselborn-athenes/index.html
See also http://www.unhcr.org/566eac399.html
18
19
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6134_en.htm
See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/merkel-and-east-european-leaders-discuss-migrant-crisis-in-brussels.html?_r=0
20
THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 7
2.3.2
The hotspots approach
A second accompanying measure to the relocation system has been the so-called hotspot
approach in specific (more problematic) venues in Italy and Greece and the strengthening of
EU Home Affairs agencies.21 As briefly mentioned above, this model entails the deployment
of operational support by Frontex, Europol and EASO experts involved in the ‘screening’ of
third country nationals (identification, fingerprinting and registration), provision of
information and assistance to applicants of international protection and the preparation and
removal of irregular immigrants.
The hotspots involve setting up a joint operational headquarters called the European Union
Regional Task Force (EURTF), composed by representatives from the three EU agencies who
coordinate the work on the ground collaborate with national authorities. In Italy, hotspot areas
include Augusta, Lampedusa, Porte Empedocle, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani. A first
Migration Management Support Team is up and running in Lampedusa, which builds upon
the EURTF in Catania, Sicily. In Greece the following areas have been identified: Lesvos, Chios,
Leros, Samos and Kos. The EURTF is based in Piraeus and the first Migration Management
Support Team has been based in Lesvos.22
Frontex has also seen its capacities ‘tripled’ when it comes to Joint Operations in the
Mediterranean (Triton and Poseidon), including financial allocations, an increase in staff by 60
new members (corresponding to €1.3 million) and an additional pool of EU member state
officials (291) to be deployed in the hotspots,23 which compares to the higher original demand
by Frontex of 775 border guard officials. Frontex is also expected to become more involved in
‘joint return operations’ and to create a dedicated returns office to organise return operations.
EASO has also increased its staff (by 30 additional members) and called for 370 national
experts to support asylum management authorities in Italy and Greece.
2.3.3
Safe third countries
A third important development has been the adoption of a Regulation establishing a common
list of safe third countries24 and the adoption of Council conclusions on the same subject.25 The
main idea behind the Regulation is the designation of countries, in particular the (potential)
EU candidates along the Western Balkan route (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey), as ‘safe countries’, which entails that nationals from those
countries are not a priori deemed as ‘refugees’ and an expedited procedure can be applied by
Annex 2 to the Commission Communication, Managing the refugees crisis: Immediate operational,
budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 490 final,
23.9.2015.
21
For an overview of the current state of play (December 2015) of the Hotspots see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf
22
Frontex News http://frontex.europa.eu/news/member-states-provide-291-border-guards-to-frontex-to-be-deployed-in-greece-italy-2tVnYY
23
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/proposal_for_regulation_of_the_ep_and_council_establishing_an_eu_common_list_of_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf
24
25
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11133-2015-INIT/en/pdf
8 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & G UILD
national authorities. This does not mean that all applicants of international protection from
these countries can be automatically refused or directly treated as unfounded.
To this end, the EU first hosted a High-Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean
/Western Balkan Route on October 8th and adopted a plan of collective action. A second, more
restricted, high-level meeting was convened on October 25th, with leaders from Austria,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia as well as Albania, Serbia
and Macedonia invited to attend. The Presidents of the European Commission and the
European Council, the current and future rotating presidencies of the Council (Luxembourg
and the Netherlands), as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were also in
attendance. The meeting agreed on a “17-point plan of pragmatic and operational measures”,
where increased border management and implementation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan
(agreed on October 15th) feature prominently.26
More recently, a contact points group composed of senior member state officials, EU agencies
and the Commission, followed up with, inter alia, an additional 50,000 reception places along
the Western Balkans Route before the end of the year, of which 12,000 have been already
committed by Austria, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. 27 It also called for launching the civil
protection mechanism for the benefit of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia.28
Meanwhile, the EU has been bending over backwards to engage with Turkey, in the hope that
the country will cooperate in stemming the flow of refugees. Two extraordinary EU-Turkey
summits were held in Brussels, one with President Erdogan (5October 5th) and the other with
Prime Minister Davutoglu (29th November), both on the request of the Union.29
The EU and Turkey agreed to activate the Joint Action Plan to step up cooperation for support
of Syrians under temporary protection and migration management for the purposes,
according to the statement, to address the crisis created by the situation in Syria. According to
both parties: “results must be achieved in particular in stemming the influx of irregular
migrants.” It is not entirely clear whether the parties were referring to Syrians as irregular
migrants or others, one can only hope that they meant the latter. The parties sought to bring
order into migration flows and help stem irregular migration. This will include active
cooperation on migrants not in need of international protection to prevent them from
travelling to Turkey and the EU.
The parties agreed to activate the EU Turkey Readmission Agreement from June 2016 and
ensure that it is used to swiftly return migrants who do not need international protection to
their countries of origin. Turkey agreed to adopt immediate measures to improve the socioeconomic situation of Syrians resident in that country under temporary protection. In a similar
vein the parties agreed to take decisive action to enhance the fight against ‘criminal smuggling
networks.’
This cooperation comes with a price tag: an initial €3 billion of additional resources to help
Turkey cope with the high numbers of Syrian refugees currently in the country; the
See http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/10/20151025_en.htm and the final statement available at
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/leader_statement_final.pdf
26
27
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5952_en.htm
28
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/factsheet_the_eu_civil_protection_mechanism.pdf
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/29/ The German
Chancellor has followed a parallel track, entering into direct bilateral negotiations with Erdogan.
29
THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING P OLICY PRIORITIES | 9
acceleration of the visa liberalisation process; the opening of a new chapter to re-energise
Turkey’s accession process. One of the positive outcomes of visa liberalisation would of course
be a stronger border control of its coastal waters, as indeed a change in Turkey’s visa policy,
provided that Ankara does not abuse its newly found power position in exploiting
vulnerabilities of the EU to new spikes in the flow of refugees towards Europe.
2.3.4 Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling
Among the most visible responses by the European Commission have been the adoption of an
EU Action Plan against Migrants’ Smuggling COM(2015) 285,30 EU Action Plan on Return
COM(2015) 453 of 9 September 2015, 31 and a Recommendation on Common Return
Handbook.32 These measures have been by and large welcomed by all EU Member States, a
clear example being the Council Conclusions on the future of the return policy of 8 October
2015.33 The focus of these measures is on the return of irregular entering and staying third
country nationals, and cooperation with third countries on readmission.34
The EU policy in fighting traffickers has also involved the launch of a CSDP operation called
EUNAVFOR MED - recently re-baptised ‘Operation Sophia’ – on the high seas of the southern
Mediterranean.35 From its invitation to the High Representative to start preparations until
today, the European Council has insisted that the CSDP operation be conducted in accordance
with international law. To strengthen the EU’s presence at sea, the European Council also
agreed to triple the resources available to Triton, the EU border mission in the Central
Mediterranean, and to enhance its operational capability with the supply of additional vessels,
https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_action_plan_against_migrant_smuggling_en.pdf
30
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/communication_from_the_ec_to_ep_and_council_-_eu_action_plan_on_return_en.pdf
31
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/return_handbook_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/commission_recommendation_establishing_a_return_handbook_for_member_states_competent_authorities_to_deal_with_return_related_tasks_en.pdf As part of a broader package of proposals, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a joint communication
JOIN(2015) 40 of 9 September 2015, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External
Action”, in which they describe how the Union’s international engagement has built upon the 2011
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility COM(2011) 743.
32
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/10/40802203341_en_635799226800000
000.pdf
33
As part of a broader package of proposals, the Commission and the High Representative adopted a
joint communication JOIN(2015) 40 of 9 September 2015, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The
Role of EU External Action”, in which they describe how the Union’s international engagement has built
upon the 2011 so-called ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM). The EU and Turkey
have agreed to apply from June 2016 the readmission agreement. They are aiming to complete the visa
liberalization process, and the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone, by
October 2016.
34
See Council Conclusions on Migration, 12 October 2015 (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures) and section 3.3 below.
35
10 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
aircraft and experts by member states. Other agreed measures include increased cooperation
against smuggling networks with the help of Europol and the deployment of immigration
officers to third countries.
2.3.5
Funding
Another rather visible output, this time of a predominantly financial nature, has been the socalled Trust Funds for the Syrian crisis (with an additional €500 million) and Africa.36 An
Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration in Africa
(Trust Fund for Africa) of €1.8 billion. 37 Financial solidarity has also taken the form of
additional emergency assistance in 2015 under the Asylum, Migration and Immigration Fund
and the Internal Security Fund-Borders, totalling €100 million. 38 This has come along with
additional funding reallocated from the European Neighbourhood Instrument of about €300
million. For the year 2015, Greece has received +/- €41.8 million (including €8.7 million in
emergency funding), and Italy +/- €58.3 million (including €19 million in emergency funding).
In light of the above, most of the ‘actions’ that the European Agenda on Migration framed or
identified as ‘immediate’ have been largely adopted during the last five months. It is too early
to project and examine the actual practical repercussions that these EU instruments are having
or will have on the ground. The framing of these actions as ‘short-term’ by the Agenda is
however misleading, as their actual impacts will be mainly noticed on the ground in the
medium and long terms.
2.3.6
The Commission’s proposal for a European border and coast guard
The European Agenda on Migration adopted in May 2015 anticipated that “within the scope
of the Treaties and its relevant Protocols”, the European Commission would launch a
reflection on how to foster “a shared management of the European border”. It stipulated:
a European System of Border Guards…would cover a new approach to coastguard
functions in the EU, looking at initiatives such as asset sharing, joint exercises and dual
use of resources as well as a the possibility of moving towards a European Coastguard.39
President of the Commission Juncker declared in his state of the union speech40 the need to
reinforce significantly Frontex’s competences and “develop it into a fully operational
European border and coast guard system.”41 This was reflected in the Commission’s Work
Programme for 2016 “No Time for Business as Usual”,42 which anticipated the presentation of
36
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/migration/docs/letter-tusk-bettel-juncker_en.pdf
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/emergency-trust-fund-stability-and-addressing-root-causes-irregular-migration-and-displaced-persons_en
37
38
Refer to Annex 8 of the Communication COM(2015) 510.
39
European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240, 13.5.2015, page 17.
40
See http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf
The Speech continued by saying that “It is certainly feasible. But it will cost money. The Commission
believes this is money well invested. This is why we will propose ambitious steps towards a European
Border and Coast Guard before the end of the year.”
41
European Commission, Communication ‘Commission Work Programme 2016: No Time for Business
as Usual’, COM(2015) 610, 27.10.2015.
42
THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 11
proposals before end of 2015 “for a European Border and Coast Guard, building on a
significant strengthening of Frontex”. In the European Council Conclusions of 15 October EU
Member States’ representatives called for the need to
in accordance with the distribution of competences under the Treaty, in full
respect of the national competence of the Member States, enhance the mandate of
Frontex in the context of discussions over the development of a European Border
and Coast Guard System, including as regards the deployment of Rapid Border
Intervention Teams in cases where Schengen evaluations or risk analysis
demonstrate the need for robust and prompt action, in cooperation with the
Member State concerned.43
The Commission has followed up these calls with the publication of a Communication and a
package of legislative measures.44 The Communication “A European Border and Coast Guard
and effective management of Europe's external borders” COM(2015) 673 lays down the main
featuring components of the new Commission initiatives and the newly envisaged European
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk & Carrera, 2015).
The European Border and Coast Guard has been developed in the shapes of a Regulation
under the ordinary legislative procedure. It would be based on a new European Border and
Coast Guard Agency of semi-military nature and have the legal status of ‘body of the Union’.45
The Agency would be built from Frontex, and the EU member states’ authorities responsible
for border control and national coastal guard authorities when they perform maritime border
surveillance. It would have two main competences: first, facilitating the development and
implementation of common EU border management standards; and second, operationally
support frontline EU Member States whose national border authorities are not effectively
copying with the challenges on the ground.
As regards the budgetary implications of the proposal, the Commission is envisaging an
amount of “at least” €31,5 million in 2017 to be added to the Agency’s Union budget and an
additional 602 posts until 2020 (in addition to the corresponding financial resources), which is
expected to include 329 establishment plan posts and 273 external staff.46
The model running the Agency would work on the basis of liaison officers who would be sent
or seconded by the Agency to the EU member states’ concerned. 47 They would be fully
43
See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/16-euco-conclusions/
Refer to http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6327_en.htm See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks
against relevant databases at external borders, COM(2015) 670 final, 15.12.2015; Commission Recommendation adopting the Practical handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR Handbook), C(2015) 9206 final, 15.12.2015. See also European Commission, Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 10 December 2015,
COM(2015) 675 final, 15.12.2015.
44
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard
COM(2015) 671 final, 15.12.2015.
45
46
Refer to page 8 of the proposal.
Article 11.3 of the proposal laids down the specific tasks of the officers, which include “(a) act as an
interface between the Agency and the national authorities responsible for border management, including coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks; (b) support the collection of information required by the Agency for carrying out the vulnerability assessment referred to in Article
47
12 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & G UILD
integrated into the national authorities’ work and information systems, so that the Agency
would be informed ‘in real time’. The EU border officers would identify weaknesses in the
system and propose recommendations to overcome them. The Agency would acquire
important evaluation powers over “the resources and equipment of the Member States as well
as their contingency planning”, and its decisions concerning corrective actions to address
deficits or gaps would be binding upon member states.
The new Agency would move beyond the current Frontex model by: First, creating a
mandatory rapid reserve pool and a technical equipment pool from EU member states;48 and
second, granting the Agency the power or right to intervene in urgent situations to a particular
fraction of the EU external border irrespective of an EU member state requesting it or not
(Article 18 of the Commission Proposal).49 The Agency would have three main additional
competences: i) developing the Hotspot approach; ii) coordination of operational cooperation
with third neighbouring countries; and iii) initiate return operations and support member
states’ in returns.
3.
Assessing the EU responses: What are the challenges?
3.1 A fairer sharing of responsibilities in the European asylum system
Some EU responses can be regarded as steps forward in exploring new ways of sharing
responsibilities both between EU member states, and between them and the EU. Various
measures have attempted to display institutional, legal and financial solidarity in the areas of
asylum and external borders policies. Examples include such instruments as the EU temporary
relocation system for the redistribution of responsibility for asylum-seekers or the operational
support by EU Home Affairs agencies to Greece and Italy, combined with an increase in the
12; (c) monitor the measures taken by the Member State at border sections to which a high impact level
has been attributed in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013; (d) assist the Member States in
preparing their contingency plans; (e) report regularly to the Executive Director on the situation at the
external border and the capacity of the Member State concerned to deal effectively with the situation at
the external borders; (f) monitor the measures taken by the Member State with regard to a situation
requiring urgent action at the external borders as referred to in Article 18”.
According to the Communication (pp 5-6): “a rapid reserve pool of experts [would be placed] as a
standing corps at the disposal of the Agency. … the Agency will be able to call on this pool within a
very limited timeframe in circumstances requiring immediate response. Member States will have to
make available at least 1500 border guards to be deployed by the Agency in rapid border interventions
within days. Similarly, the Agency will have at its disposal a technical equipment pool where Member
States will be required to make available at immediate notice operational equipment acquired at a 90%
co-financing rate under the additional allocations of specific actions8 of the Internal Security Fund.”
48
The Communication states that “such action could be necessary due to a disproportionate increase in
the pressure at that section of the external border where the national border guard authorities (and
coastguards to the extent that they have border control tasks) are not able to cope with the crisis which
has developed. On the other hand, the requirement of urgent action at a particular section of the external
border could be due to a deficiency in the border management system of a member state which the
Agency had identified as a result of a vulnerability assessment and had recommended corrective
measures which the member state concerned failed to implement within the set time limits.”, page 6.
See Articles 14 and 18 of the proposal.
49
THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING P OLICY PRIORITIES | 13
financial allocation of funds.
That notwithstanding, most of these measures do not go deep enough to treat the root causes
behind the refugee crisis (Carrera & Lannoo, 2015). True, the EU temporary relocation system
constitutes a welcomed move from the EU Dublin System rule.50 The new relocation system
has introduced a new set of criteria considering other numerical factors such as population
size, total GDP, average number of asylum applications per one million habitants over 201014 and unemployment rate.
Although many observers have voiced the view that the Dublin system is ‘dead’ and no longer
works in practice (Carrera, 2015), the EU temporary relocation system aims to retain the
system in abeyance by introducing an instrument that has been devised for exceptional and
emergency situations. The alternative distribution key criteria are only to be used “in times of
crisis”. The current situation, however, is not so exceptional or casuistic, showing as it does a
phenomenon that can be expected to continue and that has made revealed a deeper malady
affecting the common European asylum system (CEAS).
The logic of the Dublin system puts a disproportionate amount of pressure on frontline EU
member states holding the common EU external land and sea borders. Photographs and other
evidence provided by the UN, the Council of Europe and civil society organisations working
on the ground show that the reception and humanitarian conditions in many of these EU
member states are systematically deficient (Carrera & Guild, 2015). UNHCR has acquired
ample evidence showing that inadequate access to asylum procedures, a continued backlog in
assessing asylum applications and inhuman detention conditions in several EU member
states.51
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has stated that the Dublin system is
“dysfunctional and ineffective and should be urgently reformed to ensure ‘equitable burden
sharing’ among member States”. 52 A similar call has been given by the Human Rights
Commissioner of the Council of Europe, who has said that “the “Dublin system” leaves a few
frontline southern EU countries to bear a disproportionate responsibility for asylum-seekers,
and in any case it doesn’t conform with international human rights standards. EU countries
need to agree on a new system based on the principles of inter-state solidarity as well as on
effective human rights protection.”53
Hence, people often do not wish to stay and apply for asylum in these countries, but would
prefer to move elsewhere in the EU. The controversial assumption in the Dublin system that
people can be generally obliged to stay and apply for asylum in the country of first entry has
proved to be one the main obstacles hindering the effectiveness of EU asylum policy (Guild,
Costello, Garlick & Moreno-Lax, 2015a). The new EU relocation system is a significant
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national
or a stateless person, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 31–59.
50
See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45116# and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (2015), “UNHCR welcomes more EU support to refugees, urges fast implementation”, 24 September (http://www.unhcr.org/5603d2a66.html).
51
52
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=5798&lang=2&cat=8
53
http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/a-to-do-list-for-the-refugee-crisis
14 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & G UILD
improvement in that it takes due account of the private, family and personal circumstances of
asylum-seekers in making relocation decisions. Contrary to claims by certain actors such as
the European Parliament, however, the new system still does not take into account the
personal preferences of the persons involved.54
When it comes to the ‘hotspots approach’, one can indeed welcome the priority given to
making EU home affairs agencies, such as EASO and Frontex, more effectively operationalised
in supporting most affected EU member states in confronting domestic challenges in migration
and asylum systems. The fact that this approach, however, is still anchored in the Dublin
system and that the reception conditions in many countries are profoundly deficient
undermine this model. Moreover, the agencies’ responsibilities are, at least formally, limited
to supporting Greek and Italian authorities in specific areas considered to be particularly
problematic or “hot”. These EU agencies do not directly intervene or take part in national
decisions concerning border controls (entry/refusal) in the common Schengen area or in
assessing asylum applications, which in turn also limits the extent to which they can actually
fill the gaps in current national systems.
3.2
Enforcing member states’ implementation of EU standards
The last months have also made clear that the extremely poor state of domestic transposition
and practical implementation of EU-level asylum standards by some EU member states. When
it comes to asylum policy, a particularly problematic aspect is the low record of
implementation by member states of the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33 (Guild &
Carrera, 2015).55 This not only relates to an ‘easy check’ of specific legislative reforms following
EU legal acts. It also demonstrates a more profound deficit concerning the judicial and
administrative capacities of some EU member states, particularly when it comes to domestic
asylum systems (Gros, 2015).
The Commission’s announcement that it will more effectively ensure the enforcement of EU
legislation and standards is a welcome development. A total of 40 infringement decisions
against several EU member states were launched in mid-September 2015 for failing to
implement EU asylum legislation.56 The Commission adopted on the 10 December 2015 a total
of 8 infringement decisions for failing to fully transpose and implement the Common
European Asylum System against Greece, Croatia, Italy, Malta and Hungary.57 Conversely,
Slovakia has asked the Court of Justice of the European Union to rule on the legality of the
above-mentioned EU temporary relocation scheme on largely dubious grounds of lack of legal
competence and interference of national sovereignty.58
Guaranteeing a proper and timely implementation and enforcement of existing EU laws and
See
guage=EN
54
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-0306&lan-
Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96–116
55
For a detailed picture of these infringement procedures, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5699_en.htm
56
57
See www.statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-com-infringements-10-12-15.pdf
See EUobserver, “Slovakia filing case against EU migrant relocation”, 30 September (https://euobserver.com/justice/130499).
58
THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING P OLICY PRIORITIES | 15
standards by member states on the ground is critical for the legitimacy of the entire CEAS and
the effectiveness of any of the EU measures adopted during the last five months of 2015. Civil
society organisations like ECRE (European Council of Refugee and Exiles) have recalled
European countries duty to ensure adequate reception conditions and treat of people in need
of international protection with dignity and respect, particularly in prospect of the winter
season approaching.59 In the same vein, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights has recently stated:
Over the last two months, several European countries of transit have been
employing restrictive policies against migrants and refugees who are trying to reach
European countries further north. However, the Czech Republic is unique in
routinely subjecting these migrants and refugees to detention for 40 days, and
reportedly sometimes even longer -- up to 90 days -- in conditions which have been
described as degrading.60
When it comes to Schengen, some voices have alluded to the existence of a link between the
refugee crisis and the Schengen system. As it has been argued elsewhere, there is no evidence
showing that the Schengen system has been under threat during these last months or that there
is a need for legislative reform (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk & Carrera, 2015). The few EU
member states which have reintroduced temporary internal border checks for over a period of
two to three months have done so in accordance to the rules envisaged in Article 25 the
Schengen Borders Code and the rules on temporary reintroduction of border checks. They
have been properly notified to the member states, the General Secretariat of the Council and
the European Commission.61 The necessity and proportionality of any further expansion of
these controls has been also subject to EU rule of law scrutiny.
Moreover, the dramatic events in Paris on the 13 November 2015 have shed some shadows as
regards the acquired obligations by EU Member States under the EU temporary relocation
system. That notwithstanding, President of the European Commission Juncker speech at the
G20 Meeting on the 15 November importantly underlined the need to delink terrorism and
refugee’s debates in Europe, 62 and that people seeking international protection are not
criminals or potential terrorists.63 He argued:
See http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1223-eu-preoccupiedwith-border-protection-instead-of-the-protection-of-refugees-rights.html and http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1222-with-winter-approaching-ecre-urgently-callson-europe-to-act.html
59
60
See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16632&LangID=E
According to the information provided by these three countries to the General Secretariat of the Council, in the case of Austria, for instance, the main purposes of these measures has been to allow registration of persons entering and ensuring proper reception, medical care and initial food provision. Refer
to Council of the EU, Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at Austrian internal borders in accordance to Article 25 of Regulation No. 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, 12435/15, 28 September 2015. See also
Council of the EU, Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at Slovenian internal
borders in accordance to Article 25 of Regulation No. 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the
rules governing the movement of persons across borders, 12418/15, 25 September 2015.
61
62
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6091_en.htm
63
See D. Bigo et al. (2015), “The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks”, CEPS
16 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & G UILD
I try to make it crystal clear that we should not mix the different categories of people
coming to Europe. The one who is responsible for the attacks in Paris cannot be put on
an equal footing with real refugees, with asylum-seekers and with displaced people.
These are criminals and not refugees or asylum-seekers. I would like to invite those in
Europe who are trying to change the migration agenda we have adopted –I would like
to invite them to be serious about this and not to give in to these basic reactions. I don't
like it.
Moreover, he stated: “The cynics who exploit the suffering of Paris have not understood that
those who perpetrated the attacks are precisely those whom the refugees are trying to flee.”64
The situation in Hungary is rather specific one, but certainly not an exception in the EU. There
have been observed distinct shortcomings in the country’s respect for democratic rule of law
and fundamental rights, which have repercussions in many areas including those related to
asylum and border controls. The building of walls in the border zones between Hungary and
Croatia and Slovenia have drawn wide criticism and concerns. In his State of Union speech
before the European Parliament, Commission President Juncker stated that “walls and fences
have no place in EU Member States”.65
A key challenge in current border policies and criminalisation practices in Hungary is that
Schengen rules accept no walls stopping asylum-seekers from having access to international
protection in the EU. This principle is not only a key foundational component of EU borders
and asylum law. It is one of the key values outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union as a condition for EU membership. In early October of this year, the Commission sent
a letter to the Hungarian Government asking for information concerning the latest legislative
reforms in the laws on asylum, borders, police and national defence adopted in July and
September 2015, in order to examine their compatibility with EU law. The letter expresses deep
concern about the quasi-systematic dismissal of applications for international protection in the
border with Serbia, the lack of guarantees in asylum procedures and effective remedies,
criminal sanctions imposed on immigrants crossing the borders and the lack of adequate
safeguards in the rights of the defence, the closing of border crossing points and powers
granted to the military in the area of border management. On 10 December 2015, the
Commission officially opened infringement procedures against Hungary concerning its new
asylum law.66
With respect to the latter concern, the Commission’s letter states that military authorities must
be bound by the same guarantees and legal obligations, including the provisions regarding
the rights of refugees and persons seeking international protection. Furthermore, the
Commission added that measures taken at the common EU external borders must be
proportionate and necessary, subject to effective control and compliant with fundamental
rights. These issues remain unresolved in the case of Hungary and will require further EU rule
of law intervention in the near future.
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels.
Refer to http://independent.com.mt/articles/2015-11-22/blogs-opinions/A-European-approach-tomigration-learning-the-lessons-of-Malta-6736145635
64
65
Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf
66
See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-com-infringement-hungary-10-12-15.pdf
THE EU’S R ESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING POLICY PRIORITIES | 17
3.3 Guaranteeing rule of law and human rights when the EU goes
abroad?
Questions of compliance with EU standards and principles, as indeed international law, not
only relate to member states’ actions inside the EU, but they also concern measures abroad or
in cooperation with third countries. A first case in point is the CSDP Operation Sophia. This
operation has been qualified as particularly tricky and sensitive in nature, given its ambitions
and its potentially damaging effects and risks due to its legal uncertainty and blurred strategy,
as well as the potentially damaging repercussions in Libya (Faleg & Blockmans, 2015).
Launched on June 22nd, Operation Sophia was only granted international legal mandate by
way of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2240 on October 9th. This
Resolution authorises states and regional organisations to intercept, inspect, seize and dispose
(i.e. destroy) vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya for a period of one year, but only
when they have “reasonable grounds to believe” that these vessels, inflatable boats, rafts and
dinghies are being used for smuggling and human trafficking from Libya.67 In fact, the UNSC
Resolution circumscribes the kind, level and reach of the intervention within strict rule of law
parameters.
For instance, the Resolution puts special emphasis on the need for states and regional
organisations to display “good faith efforts to obtain the consent of the flag state” before the
inspection of the vessels. Any subsequent seizure or disposal of such vessels must happen in
accordance with applicable international law “with due consideration of the interests of any
third parties who have acted in good faith”. The Resolution also stresses the obligation of states
and regional organisations carrying out such UNSC mandated activities “to provide safety for
the persons on board as an utmost priority and to avoid causing harm to the maritime
environment or to the safety of navigation”.68
Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution thus effectively details the
circumstances under which the use of force may be used, all in keeping with the protection of
migrants’ rights, international human rights obligations, international refugee law and the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In short, UNSC Resolution 2240 lays down a set of
standards which may well complicate the practical running of the operation, especially when
confronted on the high seas with smugglers who have proven to possess callous disregard for
the well-being of their ‘clients’. To be sure, UNSC Resolution 2240 does not authorize
EUNAVFOR MED to act within the territorial and internal waters of Libya, let alone on Libyan
territory, as projected by the Decision adopted by the Council of the EU.69
When it comes to cooperation with third countries, the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey
remains critical, as recent reports from NGOs and UNHCR evidence.70 The careful language
of the above-mentioned statement (Section 2.3.3 above) 71 regarding persons in need of
67
UNSC Resolution 2240 (2015), SC/12072, 9 October 2015.
68
Refer to paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of the Resolution.
See part (ii) of phase 2 as well as phase 3 of the Operation, in Article 2(2)(b) and (c) of Council Decision
(CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015, OJEU L 122/31.
69
See www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.htmlhttp://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-refugees-turkey-long-road-ahead;
and
www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-crisis/agenda-action
70
71
See Press 870/15, 29/11/2015.
18 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
international protection indicates that the EU leaders are well aware that the return of Syrian,
Iraqi or Afghan refugees to Turkey is likely to be impossible both in practice and in law. If the
reception conditions in Greece are inadequate for their return to that country, it is unlikely that
the European supranational courts will find that the ever more problematic reception
conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey will be acceptable and compliant with European
fundamental human rights law.
3.4 A multi-policy angle for the EU agenda on migration
The Migration Agenda put forward a set of ‘pillars’ or fields of action to guide the common
EU migration policy in the ‘medium term’, including questions related to working in parallel
on matters related to the management of border controls, asylum, irregular immigration and
legal immigration aspects. President Tusk has recently stated:
Europe is taking its responsibility - saving lives, welcoming refugees and those entitled
to international protection, offering more organised routes for legal migration, and
dismantling criminal organisations. If we are not able to find humanitarian and efficient
solutions, then others will find solutions which are inhumane, nationalistic and for sure
not European.72
The overview provided in the previous sections of this essay illustrates how so far the priority
has been given to policy responses driven by security (home affairs), diplomatic and military
concerns and interests of the EU and its member states. Examples include the predominance
given to measures covering the fight against smuggling, measures on removal and
readmission of irregular migrants or measures targeting the reinforcement of border controls.
This has been noted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which has stated
that EU countries should avoid “a narrow emphasis on border control and security” in dealing
with the migration crisis, and instead embrace a “holistic, rights-based and effective” approach
involving countries of transit and origin”, and expressed concerns about the priority so far
given by the EU to:
…keeping refugees out or at the periphery of the European Union. Beyond that,
however, it reveals a reluctance to accept protection responsibilities, with no mention of
resettlement, and a lack of solidarity in burden-sharing between States.73
The official justification given for these developments to take priority over others has been
their framing as “immediate actions” and urgent “short-term measures”. This has led to the
marginalisation of other non-security related policy sectors of especial relevance for migration
policies which frame human mobility not as a ‘security issue’ but rather one related mainly to
employment, economic and trade opportunities, fundamental rights and development
considerations. And while the Commission and High Representative are calling for more
‘coherence’ between different EU policy sectors, this should not lead to EU responses that give
priority to EU and member states’ security prerogatives over other policy approaches and
See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/10/15-16/ and Opening
Speech at Valetta Conference (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11-tuskopening-statement-valletta-summit/).
72
See http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=22058&lang=en and
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-en.asp?newsid=5799&lang=2
73
THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE R EFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING P OLICY PRIORITIES | 19
agendas.74
This single-minded focus of the EU measures and developments adopted during the last five
months has prevented proper consideration, priorities and concrete outputs related to crossborder human mobility and asylum. For instance, the economic and social dimensions of
asylum and immigration are of central importance but they have not been properly addressed
in the last few months. The Commission has stated that asylum-seekers should have access to
EU labour markets, but no concrete ideas or initiatives to this end have been presented so far.
A welcomed exception to this has been the European Economic Forecast published by the DG
for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission. The Forecast puts put
forward some positive economic effects and repercussions of the current refugee flows into
the EU and states:
It should be noted that an inflow of about one million persons into the EU in 2015 as a
whole would correspond to just 0.2% of the total population. This is markedly less than
e.g. the increase in the foreign-born population by more than 6 million persons (or 15%)
in Spain alone between 1995-2008. The number also pales when compared to Syria’s
neighbouring countries. Depending on how the situation in Syria and its neighbouring
countries develops (as well as other parts of MENA, South Asia and Africa), a sustained
further rise in the influx of migrants cannot be excluded.75
Moreover, when it comes to the impact of the larger-than-expected inflows of asylum-seekers
on the economies of the EU, the report concludes that “the economic impact is expected to be
relatively small in the medium term, raising the level of GDP by 0.2-0.3% above the baseline
by 2020”, and argues:
While unevenly distributed across countries, the estimated additional public
expenditure related to the arrival of asylum-seekers is limited for most EU Member
States. For the most affected transit countries, the currently-estimated effect on the
headline balance amounts to a maximum of 0.2% of GDP in 2015, broadly stabilising in
2016. For destination countries, the impact amounts to a maximum of 0.2% of GDP in
2015, with a small further increase in some countries in 2016. In Sweden, which has
among the highest share of refugees as a percentage of the population in the EU, the
impact on the headline balance is expected to be closer to 0.5% of GDP this year. The
corresponding positive effects on growth would be somewhat smaller….As a result,
this implies an increase in the EU labour force of about 0.1% by the end of 2015 and by
0.3% in both 2016 and 2017.76
Moreover, as DG Trade of the Commission has recently acknowledged in its strategy “Trade
for All”,77 the temporary movement of professionals constitutes an essential factor for all the
sectors to conduct business internationally, it provides exports and helps to close the skills gap
This was in fact identified as one of the key elements to guide the European Agenda. The Communication stated that “As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust fight against
irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe's external borders must be paired
with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. Clearly, this
requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such as development cooperation, trade,
employment, foreign and home affairs policies (page 6). (Emphasis added).”
74
75
See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip011_en.pdf
76
Pages 48-51 of the report.
77
See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf
20 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
in the EU. For the EU to fully benefit from the economic and social potential of migration, a
key priority area needs to be ensuring a more flexible and improved application of current EU
visa policy, which should include more flexible and harmonious use of humanitarian visas
(Jensen, 2014). This needs to be accompanied by the development of more legal channels for
economic immigration into the EU for employment-related purposes. The creation of legal
channels of immigration has been conspicuously absent across all the EU responses to the
crisis. A similar view has been expressed by the UN special representative international
migration, who has argued:
Perhaps the single most effective contribution would be to establish less cumbersome
means for asylum-seekers to reach safety. Providing humanitarian visas – which can be
issued with minimal delay – constitutes one clear commitment countries could make
immediately. Over time, countries could also establish procedures enabling asylumseekers to apply more easily for labor, student, or family reunification visas. 78
These sector-specific contributions, which move beyond a security-driven vision of crossborder human mobility, have not been properly acknowledged, communicated and followed
up by European authorities. The responses so far have not taken either into account the
relevance and effects of the adopted instruments from a foreign affairs and development
cooperation perspectives. In a previous Commission Communication on the work of Task
Force Mediterranean the Commission had stated:
Given the nature of migratory movements, transit countries along the Southern
Mediterranean coasts will need to be given incentives to engage in cooperation
concerning migrants who are not citizens of their countries. Therefore, a wider
perspective needs to be applied and positive messaging on migration by the EU put
forward. Relations with partner countries will also have to take into account the specific
sensitivities and expectations of partner countries on the migration dossier, and their
perception that the EU wishes to focus primarily on security-related aspects, readmission/return
and the fight against irregular migration (emphasis added).79
This still constitutes an Achilles heel of the European Agenda on Migration (Guild & Carrera,
2013; Carrera, 2011). The above-mentioned Council Conclusions on the future of the return
policy of 8 October 2015 may be seen a step backwards in EU policy by insisting on a purely
conditional and ‘more-for-more’ approach when it comes to EU cooperation with third
countries on migration. The idea to make development cooperation and humanitarian aid
conditional on cooperating with the EU on return and readmission sends a clear message in
the same direction. The compatibility of this ‘conditionality’ approach with the UN Sustainable
Development Goals is highly questionable.
4.
What policy priorities for the next phase of the European agenda
on migration?
PRIORITY 1: EU policy responses need to move from a security-centric focus towards a
‘multi-sector policy approach guaranteeing a balanced setting of priorities across all relevant
policy sectors such as development cooperation, foreign affairs, trade, economic, as well as
ttps://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-refugee-crisis-by-peter-sutherland-201509#OqRZgfGrwAHRaj76.99
78
79
Commission Communication (2013), on the work of Task Force Mediterranean, COM(2013) 869.
THE EU’S RESPONSE TO THE R EFUGEE CRISIS - TAKING STOCK AND SETTING P OLICY PRIORITIES | 21
social and employment considerations. All these responses should fully guarantee a
fundamental human rights compliant focus, so that their effects over individuals’ well-being
and lives are properly and systematically prioritized over other sectoral policy considerations
and interests. This is a central condition for ensuring the legitimacy of the EU both inside its
borders as well as when engaging in effective cooperation and partnerships with third
countries. A policy mainly focused on security approach driven by EU and Member States’
interests will damage EU’s image abroad and will pose fundamental obstacles over foreign
affairs and wider international relations.
PRIORITY 2: The EU Dublin System needs to be fundamentally revisited and substituted by
a new regime of redistribution of responsibility on the basis of new ‘key criteria’. These criteria
should combine numerical factors, as well as the personal, family and personal circumstances
and preferences of asylum-seekers. The issue is not only about moving asylum-seekers around
but also about making sure that proper reception conditions are in place everywhere across
the Union. The upcoming evaluation by the European Commission of the Dublin system
constitutes a key opportunity for this process to be launched. A key for the success of the future
European asylum and borders systems will be boosting legal sharing of responsibility by
boosting institutional capacity. The EU should call for the setting up of a common European
Asylum service with the competence in assisting member states in the assessment of asylum
applications, building their domestic capacity on reception and deciding on the redistribution
of asylum applications on the basis of new criteria (Carrera, Gros and Guild, 2015).
PRIORITY 3: The Commission should, in close cooperation with the European Parliament,
more effectively (and independently) monitor and properly enforce existing EU law asylum
and borders standards by Member States, as well as their compliance with the principles laid
down in Article 2 TEU. Strict oversight should be exerted to the implementation of EU
measures that have the potential of violating international law. A case in point is CSDP
Operation Sophia, whose Operation Plan and Rules of Engagement should be scrupulously
subjected to the highest international (legal) standards and guarantees applicable to search
and rescue at sea, including human rights law.
PRIORITY 4: The future of the EU common external borders policy is also a central issue. If
the Schengen Area is to endure, it needs to establish a common institution responsible for
securing external borders (Gros, 2015). The Commission aims at opening a debate about the
setting up of a common European border service and coastal guard. Any future step towards
the setting up a common European border service should take the uniform and high standard
application/implementation of the Schengen Borders Code. Such as service should follow a
predominantly civilian (non-military) nature and should come along the establishment of a
‘border monitor’ to ensure administrative guarantees and fundamental rights (Carrera, 2010).
The mandate and competences of these European officials could be set up in a gradual or
phased-in fashion basis in selected external (air, land and sea) border crossing points, with the
ambition to expand to all the main external crossing points. A starting point should be a true
‘European coast guard’, with its own budget, ships, and personnel, as a flexible tool to a
flexible tool with which to allocate resources as effectively as possible at any given moment
(Gros, 2015).
22 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD
References
Bigo, D. et al. (2015), “The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks”,
CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels.
Blockmans, S. and S. Russack, “The Commissioners’ Group on External Action: Essential
political facilitator of inter-service cooperation”, CEPS Special Report No. 125,
CEPS, December.
Carrera, S. (2010), “Towards a Common European Border Service”, CEPS Working
Document, CEPS, Brussels.
Carrera, S. (2011), “The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the
Southern Mediterranean: Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach to Migration”,
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels.
Carrera, S. and K. Lannoo (2015), “Treat the Root Causes of the Asylum Crisis, not the
Symptoms”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels.
Carrera, S., E. Guild and D. Gros (2015), “What priorities for the new European agenda
on migration?”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels.
Faleg, G. and S. Blockmans (2015), “EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in
troubled waters”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels.
Gros, D. (2015), “Europe’s Double Refugee Crisis”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels.
Gros, D. (2015), “Schengen and European Security”, Project Syndicate, 10 December,
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/schengen-open-borders-helpsecurity-by-daniel-gros-2015-12
Guild, E. and S. Carrera (2013), “EU Borders and their Controls: Preventing unwanted
movement of people in the EU?”, CEPS Essay No. 6, CEPS, Brussels, 14 November.
Guild, E. and S. Carrera (2015), “Can the New EU Refugee Relocation System Work?
Perils in the Dublin Logic and Flawed Reception Conditions in the EU”, CEPS
Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels.
Guild, E., E. Brouwer, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (2015), “What is Happening to the
Schengen Borders”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels.
Guild, E., C. Costello, M. Garlick and V. Moreno-Lax (2015), “Enhancing the Common
European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and
Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels.
Guild, E., C. Costello, M. Garlick and V. Moreno-Lax (2015), “The 2015 Refugee Crisis in
the European Union”, CEPS Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels.
Jensen, U.I. (2014), “Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty
and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels.
February 2014
2014/01
Europe Must Take on its Share of
the Syrian Refugee Burden, but
How?
Philippe Fargues, Director of the Migration Policy Centre
This policy brief was originally published in the IAI-GMF Op-Med series.
POLICY
BRIEF
While peace talks between Syria’s government and opposition bump
along in Geneva, battles rage on the ground and the death toll and
the refugee wave rise. Europe wants its voice to be heard in the talks,
but can it keep its eyes — and borders — closed to the men, women
and children fleeing Syria? How can Europe better respond to the
human and political disaster looming on its external border?
The conflict began when, three years ago, a handful of children wrote
anti-regime slogans on the board of their classroom in the southern
town of Deraa. This event triggered an implacable spiral of repression and protest and the conflict in Syria has now forcibly moved 7
million people from their homes, including 4.5 million internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and 2.5 million refugees who have fled
abroad.1 As in all refugee crises, the vast majority of those who do
not get trapped inside the country find themselves stuck on just the
other side of the border. The bulk of Syrian refugees is sheltered
among four of Syria’s five neighbors: Lebanon, the main receiver
where more than 900,000 refugees are registered with UNHCR and
where many others have not been registered; Turkey and Jordan
each of them with close to 600,000 refugees; and Iraq with around
220,000 refugees. Israel, which is at war with Syria, has, to date, kept
its border closed.
1. Numbers are continuously increasing. Regular updates are provided: for IDPs
by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at http://
www.unocha.org/crisis/syria; for refugees in countries neighbouring on Syria
by the UN Refugee Agency at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.
php; and for refugees in the EU by Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database.
migrationpolicycentre.eu/
Table 1. Flows of Syrian refugees into Syria’s neighboring countries and Europe (2011-13)
Destination / year
2011
2012
2013
03.15.2011 - 12.31.2013
15,455
491,651
1,799,882
2,301,533
6,450
20,810
42,480
69,740
Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece and Italy (3)
947
8,509
18,972
28,428
EU 28 / Total %
29.4
4.1
2.3
2.9
Smuggled by sea / asylum claims %
14.7
40.9
44.7
40.8
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Egypt (1)
EU 28 Member States (2)
1) UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. At the time of writing (10 Feb
2014), the total number of registered Syrian refugees in the five countries was 2,430,100.
2) EUROSTAT, Asylum and new asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Monthly data, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/portal/population/data/database.
3) Italian Ministry of Interior and Greece Police records.
Other refugees have travelled further away and to
destinations where they have relatives or friends.
Thus some 135,000 Syrian refugees are currently
hosted by Egypt, and tens of thousands find themselves in the Maghreb countries. By contrast, Europe’s
response to the refugee crisis has been limited and
uneven. Moreover, it has been constantly outpaced
by events on the ground and riddled with obstacles,
as shown by Table 1.
First, Europe has only taken in a small part (2.9
percent) of the overall Syrian refugee population.
Between March 2011 and December 2013, the 28
Member States (MS) of the European Union (EU)
received 69,740 asylum claims from Syrian citizens
and made 41,695 positive decisions. These numbers
are not small in absolute terms, but they represent
just a fraction of the 2,301,533 Syrian refugees that
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt sheltered
over the same period.
third state, Bulgaria, deserves a mention as it has
received 4,545 claims since the beginning of the
crisis, 70 percent of them arrived in the four months
between August and November 2013 (at the time
of writing data for December 2013 are not available
for Bulgaria). Another nine states received between
1,000 and 3,500 claims each and the remaining 16
states fewer than 1,000, including Lithuania and
Austria which did not receive a single asylum seeker
from Syria.
Third, while asylum opportunities offered to Syrians
in Europe have grown, these opportunities have not
kept up with the war. Before the uprisings, there
had always been a regular flow of Syrians seeking
asylum in Europe. When the refugee crisis gained
momentum in the second half of 2011, pre-existing
flows simply amplified so that the EU28 received
almost one third of the Syrian refugees in the first
year of the crisis. But Europe did not open the door
Second, European nations have responded to the to refugees in proportion to their flight from Syria
refugee crisis in an uneven fashion. Only two states and its share of the overall refugee flows fell from
took two thirds of all asylum seekers accepted by 29.4 percent in 2011 to 4.1 percent in 2012, to a
the 28 Member States: Sweden and Germany with measly 2.3 percent in 2013.
respectively 23,110 and 20,700 claims received Fourth, obstacles that Syrian asylum seekers meet
and with 11,495 and 16,610 positive decisions. A on their way to the EU have increased. Indeed, there
2 ■ Migration Policy Centre ■ 14 February 2014
is a striking discrepancy between two facts. On the
one hand, the vast majority of Syrian asylum seekers
who are able to lodge a claim in the EU are granted
refugee status or temporary protection (86.7 percent
of positive decisions in 2011-13), which is a sign of
openness. On the other hand, the number of Syrian
refugees who turn to smugglers to reach Europe has
soared since the beginning of the crisis, something
which is, of course, a sign of closure. The ratio of
Syrians smuggled by sea to Greece or Italy, compared
to those regularly seeking asylum in the EU28, has
jumped from 14.7 percent in 2011 to 40.9 percent in
2012 and 44.7 percent in 2013.
Countries of first asylum in the Eastern Mediterranean are under extreme strain due to the massive
influx of refugees and the pressure they exert on
housing, food, water, schools, hospitals, etc. not to
mention security and the social order. It has to be
remembered that the Syrian refugee crisis comes just
after the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2006-2009, which had
displaced around two million Iraqi citizens towards
the very same countries: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon,
Turkey and Egypt. In addition, the two crises come
in countries where the vast majority of the world
largest and longest-standing refugee population,
namely the Palestinians, still live.
Put in other terms, 44.7 percent of those who sought
asylum in Europe last year were only able to reach
the territory of a Member State—a legal obligation
for claiming asylum—by putting their lives at risk
at sea with smugglers. That their number jumped
from 947 in 2011 to 8,509 in 2012 and 18,972 in
2013 must be interpreted as a response to obstacles
set up by Greece and Bulgaria at their land-border
with Turkey, be those obstacles police patrols or wire
fences. Greece is a case in point. In the three years
since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Greek
police and port authorities have arrested 16,211
Syrian refugees smuggled by sea, almost all of them
trying to reach another European destination, as
Greece has a reputation for not granting asylum
to Syrians (25 cases of positive decisions for 1,015
claims received).
None of these countries, and not even Turkey,
regards itself as country of durable settlement for
new refugees. Three of them – Lebanon, Jordan and
Iraq – are not party to the Geneva Refugee Convention. They do not grant proper refugee status to
those fleeing violence in neighboring countries, but
instead give refugees an ill-defined denomination
as “guests”. These “guests” are sometimes generously
hosted and protected, but most of the time they are
denied all the basic rights that would make settlement an option (work, access to services, etc.), even
though history shows that guests may wait a lifetime
and never return home. And, indeed, there is a widespread sentiment that many Syrian refugees will not
easily return to Syria once security is restored.
Europe is currently discussing burden-sharing, or
‘responsibility-sharing’ between those Member
States that are exposed by geography to irregular
entries, and those that are not. While this discussion
will be crucial to improve the Common European
Asylum System, its results will come too late to
address a refugee crisis that risks undermining or
even overturning fragile states in the Middle East.
The current situation is grim and the near future
promises to see the conflict get, if anything, worse.
Beyond economics, the social equilibrium and the
political stability of the countries of first asylum are
put at risk by the massive influx of Syrian refugees. It
has to be borne in mind that nations are not the only
lines structuring this part of the world. Religious
and ethnic communities which span nations are
also of paramount importance. Those fleeing Syria,
be they Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Christian Arabs,
Muslim Kurds or Syrian Palestinians, naturally find
shelter within their community on the other side of
the border. With numbers growing their mere presence can become a trigger fanning dormant tensions
3 ■ Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, But How?
alight. Moreover, camps and informal settlements nation to jointly bear the costs of the refugee crisis.
sheltering the refugees might easily become hotbeds Through which actors should humanitarian aid be
for terrorist organizations.
channeled in order to best serve the refugees themUnless the Geneva peace talks bring a miracle, the selves and at the same time prevent their presence
situation in Syria will continue to deteriorate. In the generating social and political tensions? In addition
coming months, new refugees will cross the border to the usual recipients —international organizaand those who have left Syria will stay where they tions, NGOs and governments— municipalities and
have found shelter. It is very likely that tensions will local administrations should be targeted, for they
keep growing in the countries of first asylum. Can the are tasked with helping the daily lives of people and
world, and in particular Europe, afford any further are ideally placed to bridge the gap between refugees
political deterioration in the Middle East? It is high and their hosts.
time for Europe to find a proper response to the
current refugee crisis and consider sharing the burden
of the crisis more effectively with the countries of first
asylum. What burden should be shared —the refugees or their cost— remains to be seen.
Burden-sharing could consist of taking more refugees currently hosted in the Arab countries and
Turkey into the EU. Various tools already exist for
this, such as: resettling more of the refugees currently
hosted in countries neighboring on Syria; delivering
asylum or humanitarian visas in European embassies in the Middle East to avoid obstacles set up at
the EU’s external border; exempting Syrian citizens
from visa requirements while the conflict is active;
or using the existing channels of family reunification
for legal entry into the EU.
While all these solutions must be seriously explored
and, as far as possible, implemented, it is important to remember that: not all Syrian refugees can
be admitted to the EU (they are too numerous); not
all of them would want to go to Europe were they
offered a place (e.g. families with children who are to
be taught in Arabic); and what is good for individuals
may do harm to the society of origin (for example, if
those admitted to Europe happen to be those most
needed to rebuild Syria once the war there ends).
Burden-sharing must also mean solidarity with
countries of first asylum so that there is the determi4 ■ Migration Policy Centre ■ 14 February 2014
Just as the Syrian peace talks in Geneva take place
against the backdrop of Switzerland voting for immigration quotas, the Syrian refugee crisis reaches
Europe during the deepest economic crisis since
World War II, with citizens’ income plummeting,
unemployment soaring and public opinion lumping
asylum seekers and irregular migrants together.
However, Europe must open the door wider to
Syrian refugees for the sake of its defining values.
For the sake of regional security in the Eastern
Mediterranean, it must open its cash till wider, too,
so as to be able to give humanitarian aid. In both
instances there is the duty to inform EU citizens
about the need for asylum and international solidarity, but no politician seems ready to take on that
particular task.
Migration Policy Centre
The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced research
on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy
and society. The Migration Policy Centre is co-financed by the European Union.
Migration Policy Centre Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies - European University Institute
Via delle Fontanelle 19I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy
Tel: (+39) 055 4685 817
Fax: (+39) 055 4685 770
mpc@eui.eu
Complete information on our activities can be found online at: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
© European University Institute, 2014
Content © Authors, 2014
5 ■ Migration Policy Centre ■ 14 February 2014
Week 5 Assignment-1
Global Societal Problem, Argument and Solution
Prepare: The topic of your essay needs to be a global societal problem from the following list: adult
illiteracy, funding for General Education vs STEM in primary and secondary schools, minimum wage,
oceans desertification, overcoming the digital divide, refugee (escaping persecution, war, or death)
crises, species extinctions (modern), tax havens, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), universal statement of human rights (pick one), airport security, or wealth disparity. Review
this GEN499 Sample Final Paper Guide for additional guidance on the expectations of this
assignment.
Reflect: Based on the topic that you have chosen, you will need to use critical thinking skills to
thoroughly understand how this topic can be a global societal problem and determine some logical
solution(s) to the problem.
Write: This Final Argumentative Essay will present research relating the critical thinker to the
modern, globalized world. In this assignment, you need to address the following items in separate
sections with new headings for each:
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Identify the global societal problem within the introductory paragraph and conclude with a
thesis statement that states your proposed solution(s) to the problem. For guidance on how
to cons...
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