Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General FEMA's Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters OIG-10-101 July 2010 Office of Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 July 7, 2010 Preface The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Logistics Management Directorate’s process for responding to catastrophic disasters. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. Richard L. Skinner Inspector General Inspector General Table of Contents/Abbreviations Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1 Background ..........................................................................................................................2 Results of Review ...............................................................................................................4 LMD Initiatives..............................................................................................................5 Conclusion .........................................................................................................................13 Recommendations..............................................................................................................14 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ......................................................................14 Appendixes Appendix A: Appendix B: Appendix C: Appendix D: Appendix E: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................15 Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................16 FEMA Logistics Organizational Components.....................................19 Major Contributors to this Report........................................................20 Report Distribution ..............................................................................21 Abbreviations CORE DHS FEMA FY GSA LMD OIG Cadre of On-call Response Employees Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency Fiscal Year General Services Administration Logistics Management Directorate Office of Inspector General OIG Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General Executive Summary The Federal Emergency Management Agency has made significant progress in enhancing its logistics capability and, based on recent initiatives, is better prepared now than at any previous time for dealing with a catastrophic disaster. Notwithstanding dramatic changes following a congressionally mandated reorganization in 2007, which resulted in the creation of the Logistics Management Directorate, a number of persistent issues inhibit further improvement. The agency has made great strides to improve its logistics capability by: (1) increasing staff levels; (2) training and developing personnel; (3) enhancing coordination among federal, state, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector; (4) developing plans and exercises to improve readiness; (5) utilizing interagency agreements and contracts for needed commodities; (6) conducting meetings and teleconferences with logistics partners; and (7) reviewing and evaluating performance. The logistics transformation that began in 2007 is expected to be completed by 2014. Despite progress at the federal level, corresponding improvements in many of the state and local governments have lagged behind due to staffing and budget restrictions. Another difficulty is the inability of the agency’s information systems to communicate directly with the systems of their federal partners. We are making two recommendations to assist FEMA in its management and oversight function. We will follow up on progress made in this area during our scheduled Federal Emergency Management Agency Disaster Preparedness Inspection. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 1 Background In 2007, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform requested that the Office of Inspector General assess the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency’s preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster. In March 2008, we issued the report FEMA’s Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster (OIG-08-34) in response to that request. This follow-up report focuses on FEMA’s initiatives to increase its logistics preparedness for catastrophic incidents. Logistics deals with the procurement, supply, and maintenance of equipment and the provision of facilities; with the movement, evacuation, and supply/support of personnel and services; and with related matters. As defined by legislation, 1 a catastrophic incident is “any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other manmade disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an area.” By these criteria, Hurricane Katrina qualified as a catastrophic incident. The hurricane’s devastation overwhelmed the capacity of federal, state, and local governments to respond and recover. FEMA experienced significant challenges, some of which garnered media attention and invoked public criticism. Logistical shortcomings involved misplaced shipments, spoiled food that had to be discarded, and wasted truckloads of ice left to melt. The difficulty of responding to such a catastrophic event was a catalyst for changes in federal policy and reorganization within FEMA. A major change was the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (see note 1), which required FEMA to lead and support the Nation in a comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. The act further required FEMA to develop an efficient, transparent, and flexible logistics system for procurement and delivery of goods and services necessary to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, other manmade disasters, and for real-time visibility of items throughout the logistics system. 1 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295), Title VI – National Emergency Management, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 2 In April 2007, as part of FEMA’s reorganization, the logistics function, which had been a small branch within the former Response Division, was elevated to a directorate. The Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) is FEMA’s major program office responsible for all aspects of logistics policy, guidance, standards, execution, and governance of logistics activities. Originally tasked with providing recovery assistance following major disasters, LMD’s new mission is to plan, manage, and sustain the national logistics response and recovery operations response to domestic emergencies and special events. In carrying out that mission, LMD serves as the National Logistics Coordinator and is responsible for coordinating with partners in the public and private sectors in order to strategically position initial and follow-on response resources based on anticipated need, and to distribute the assets to the states in a timely manner. The concept recognizes that LMD must collaborate with its national partners to promote a truly integrated disaster logistics approach. Figure 1 shows an organization chart of the new LMD. Figure 1: Logistics Management Directorate Organization Chart Source: OIG, prepared using FEMA data. A description of LMD’s major component units is contained in Appendix C. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 3 Results of Review FEMA has made great strides to improve its logistics capability by: (1) increasing staff levels; (2) training and developing personnel; (3) enhancing coordination among federal, state, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector; (4) developing plans and exercises to improve readiness; (5) utilizing interagency agreements and contracts for needed commodities; (6) conducting meetings and teleconferences with logistics partners; and (7) reviewing and evaluating performance. Given the recent initiatives, FEMA is better prepared now than at any previous time for dealing with a catastrophic disaster. The logistics transformation that began in 2007 is expected to be completed by 2014. In keeping with the National Response Framework, which provides guidance for managing incidents, FEMA’s LMD is the National Logistics Coordinator, as co-lead of Emergency Support Function #7 with the General Services Administration (GSA). FEMA provides initial response resources and integrates the activities of the logistics emergency management community, which includes federal, state, nongovernmental, and private sector logistics partners. FEMA is also involved with increasing the states’ planning and execution capabilities. Despite FEMA’s recent initiatives, which are described below, a number of factors inhibit continued enhancement of the logistics community’s capabilities. Although FEMA and its federal partners have made progress, corresponding logistics improvements at the state and local levels have lagged behind. Some states do not have adequate logistics functions, and the situation is unlikely to change in the current fiscal environment. Another difficulty is the inability of FEMA’s information systems to communicate directly with the systems of federal partners, including GSA, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. To address this issue, a 4-year development plan was recently assigned new contracts to reconfigure the software in a way that would allow FEMA to communicate with its partners’ systems. FEMA’s logistics system is not expected to be fully functional for several years. FEMA also faces internal logistics challenges. As part of the LMD transformation, FEMA identified the need for permanent full-time FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 4 regional logisticians to plan, lead, and coordinate activities during disasters and to assist state and local governments. LMD Initiatives To assess LMD’s progress, we reviewed the following key functional areas: � � � � � � � Staffing, Training, and Credentialing Planning Coordinating Sourcing Tracking and Timing Deliveries Communications Evaluating Performance Staffing, Training, and Credentialing FEMA relies on a staffing combination of permanent full-time employees, temporary employees, and contractors to respond to incidents. Since FEMA reorganized in 2007, it has almost tripled the number of permanent full-time logistics staff from 54 to 150, and reprogrammed 15 headquarters positions to the field, where there was a greater need. In addition, FEMA has increased its experienced disaster temporary workforce, including hundreds of Cadre of On-call Response Employees (CORE). Table 1. LMD Staffing Totals LMD Staffing Totals Type of Appointment Full-time Positions CORE Positions Totals Allocated Positions FY07 FY 09 67 163 184 321 251 484 Source: Prepared by OIG, from FEMA data. FEMA has also partly addressed staffing shortfalls through its training strategy. Staff rotations were arranged in order to train employees in multiple areas, and additional systems training was implemented. In 2009, FEMA hosted a National Training Symposium called “Boot Camp 09.” This event involved internal FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 5 and external partners, including more than 150 logistics reservists and staff from all 10 regions for predisaster synchronization and training. Topics of discussion included the latest logistics concepts, policy changes, new processes, and lessons learned. FEMA launched the Credentialing Plan, which aims to standardize the training, experience, and skill requirements for logistics personnel serving in disaster-related positions. The plan provides current and prospective workforce members with a clear understanding of the specific skill sets and experiences required and concise guidelines for each position. Training began at the end of 2009, with a goal of having 85% of all disaster assistance employees fully certified by the end of 2010. Planning In conjunction with FEMA headquarters and regions, LMD develops plans and coordinates exercises aimed at identifying limitations and enhancing readiness. Using lessons learned during exercises, LMD works with FEMA regional offices and state responders to conduct after-action reviews and implement corrective measures. The regional offices also determine likely disaster scenarios within their respective regions, taking into account the infrastructure, resources, and preparedness of the state, local, and tribal governments to respond to incidents. The regional offices are the primary conduit through which information flows between FEMA and emergency responders at the state and local levels. In 2008, FEMA established Regional Planning Teams to assist its regional offices in supporting their state, local, and tribal partners. Despite recent progress, FEMA is concerned that budget constraints in the current economic condition will hinder the ability of state and local governments to participate in future planning and exercises. Planning activities are closely coordinated with other FEMA directorates that set planning milestones, establish working groups, and conduct training exercises. FEMA also coordinates plans with its federal logistics partners: GSA, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Coordinating As the National Logistics Coordinator, co-lead of Emergency Support Function #7, FEMA relies on strong collaboration with FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 6 other federal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, state and local governments, and the private sector to establish integrated disaster support supply chains. To improve coordination throughout the logistics process, FEMA conducted the first National Logistics Coordination Forum in March 2008, consisting of representatives from all supply chain partners. A subset of this forum, the Distribution Management Strategy Working Group, was established to analyze and develop a comprehensive distribution and supply chain management strategy. In April 2009, FEMA issued guidance for integrating the operations and logistics functions at the incident, regional, and headquarters levels. FEMA regional offices are responsible for coordinating with state, local, and tribal governments as well as channeling information between state and local responders and FEMA headquarters. The regional offices are also responsible for determining likely disaster scenarios in their geographic areas and assessing their state and local counterparts’ preparedness. FEMA works with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and with trade associations to build awareness of logistics processes and procedures. Biweekly “Vendor Day” meetings are held to invite private sector companies to share information on their products and services. FEMA also works closely with nongovernmental disaster relief organizations providing coordination and support. In 2009, a consortium of voluntary organizations active in disasters presented FEMA with its annual “Partner of the Year” Award for the agency’s assistance to the nongovernmental disaster relief community. Sourcing FEMA relies on four different sourcing methods to acquire commodities needed to respond to a disaster: (1) warehoused goods; (2) interagency agreements; (3) mission assignments; and (4) contracts. Warehoused goods are controlled by FEMA and are immediately available when incidents occur. However, most warehoused goods have a limited shelf life, and may have to be discarded if not used within that shelf life. Warehoused goods include Initial Response Resources, which are intended to sustain life and prevent further property damage. Table 2 shows a partial list of these items. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 7 Table 2. Initial Response Resources to Sustain Life and Protect Property Water Tarps Meals Resources Cots Blue roof sheeting Blankets Source: Prepared by OIG, from FEMA data. To ensure that Initial Response Resources are available where needed, they are strategically stored through FEMA’s Pre-positioned Disaster Supplies Program. Initial Response Resources are prepositioned at areas with high hurricane and earthquake risk, as well as at various locations ready for transport. Pre-positioned Initial Response Resources were delivered to Guam in preparation for a typhoon threatening the Northern Mariana Islands. FEMA uses interagency agreements to access contracts held by other federal agencies. For example (as shown in table 3), FEMA has interagency agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency and GSA for a number of items, including water and emergency meals. Table 3. Examples of Interagency Agreements, 2008 Agency Federal Protective Service General Services Administration Defense Logistics Agency Immigration and Customs Enforcement General Services Administration U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Federal Bureau of Investigation Good/Service Guard services Water Emergency meals Fuel Transportation of the FEMA Administrator Contract support for operations Disaster Housing Assistance Program Processing of fingerprints Oversight of debris removal from navigable waterways U.S. Coast Guard Source: Prepared by OIG, from FEMA data. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 8 Mission assignments are work orders issued by FEMA to other federal agencies that direct the completion of a specific task and are intended to meet urgent, immediate, and short-term needs. They allow FEMA to quickly task federal partners to provide critical resources, services, or expertise. To expedite the delivery of federal assistance, FEMA has developed hundreds of prescripted mission assignments with 30 federal agencies (see table 4). Table 4. Examples of Mission Assignments, 2008 Agency U.S. Army Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Corps of Engineers U.S. Coast Guard Federal Protective Service U.S. Department of Agriculture U.S. Forest Service National Geospatial Intelligence Agency U.S. Department of Defense U.S. Department of Health and Human Services National Park Service Environmental Protection Agency Description of Work Oversight of state and/or local entities’ debris operations; water Planning and preparation for temporary roofing Mobile communication teams Contract security officers Personnel to control the spread of animal disease agents Emergency road clearing Support for the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue operations Aircraft and personnel to support medical patient evacuation Medical evacuation of patients Support of FEMA search and rescue disaster operations Conduct oil and hazardous materials field operations Source: Prepared by OIG, from FEMA data. As table 5 shows, FEMA also uses contracts, which can be activated following an incident to provide services such as ambulance and bus evacuation, facilities support, electrical generator maintenance, and temporary housing support. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 9 Table 5. Examples of Advance Contracts in Place, 2008 Type of Service Disaster Legal Services Hotel Authorization (Intake Management) for Disaster Victims Housing Inspection Services Temporary Housing Support Maintenance of Disaster Housing Generator Maintenance Evacuation Planning and Operational Support Base Camp Support Ambulance Services Source: Prepared by OIG, from FEMA data. In August 2009, we issued a report 2 that examined FEMA’s sourcing and concluded that the existing decentralized process suffered from inefficiencies, including poorly integrated information systems, and was susceptible to duplication and waste. FEMA agreed with our findings and is working with its partners to develop processes to make the planned Single-Point Ordering system a reality. Like some of the other initiatives, this system is not expected to be fully implemented for several years. Tracking and Timing Deliveries As part of the agency’s restructuring, FEMA set out to transition to a “21st century” logistics system that would incorporate modern efficiencies, allowing FEMA to store and ship fewer supplies, yet have greater assurance that they will arrive when and where needed. As a first step, in 2005, FEMA began implementing the Total Asset Visibility program, which is designed to provide asset and in-transit visibility as well as electronic order management for all primary commodities. Costs of FEMA’s Total Asset Visibility Program The initial attempt to implement this program cost FEMA $117.3 million over 4 years. FEMA transitioned the program into the Logistics Supply Chain Management System, or Phase II, which is designed to address earlier shortcomings such as 2 FEMA’s Sourcing for Disaster Response Goods and Services, OIG-09-96, August 2009. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 10 information transfer, systems interaction, data entry, and data accuracy issues while providing data access to federal, state, tribal, and local logistics partners. Phase II is expected to cost $93.8 million and be operational by 2012. As shown in table 6, FEMA estimates that the continued operation and maintenance will cost $109.9 million. Table 6. Costs for Total Asset Visibility/ Logistics Supply Chain Management System Period 2005–2009 2009–2012 2012–2017 Phase Actual/Projected Cost Phase I $ 117,311,000 Phase II 93,832,000 Operations, Maintenance, and Management 109,938,000 Total Costs $ 321,081,000 Source: Prepared by Logistics Management Directorate. Phase II is not yet fully functional, which hinders FEMA’s ability to accurately report and facilitate decisions. FEMA has partnered with GSA and the Defense Logistics Agency as customers, and both agencies have responded positively to the system’s projected features. FEMA’s ability to respond to catastrophic disasters will be limited until the system is fully implemented. Given that the initial Total Asset Visibility project had to be directed into a second phase, it is unclear whether sufficient quality controls and assurances are in place to evaluate whether the system is being developed according to specifications, and whether it will deliver what the agency needs. We raised similar concerns about other information technology systems in 2006 and 2008 3 . It is important that LMD consult with FEMA’s Chief Information Officer to determine whether Phase II is progressing on schedule and whether an independent evaluation of the system is warranted. 3 FEMA’s Progress in Addressing Information Technology Management Weaknesses, OIG-07-017, December 2006; and Logistics Information Systems Need To Be Strengthened at the Federal Emergency Management Agency, OIG-08-60, May 2008. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 11 Communications Recognizing that communication was the single largest failure during the 2005 hurricane season, the LMD has taken a number of positive steps. To facilitate communication, it holds weekly teleconferences between headquarters and regional staff, as well as other federal agencies involved in logistics. Several regional managers we spoke with expressed satisfaction with recent communications initiatives, reporting good interactions between headquarters and the field, improved communications, active regional involvement, and finally having “a voice at the headquarters level.” LMD also hosts periodic “summit” meetings featuring presentations by FEMA and other federal partners, including GSA, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These meetings are a platform to discuss ongoing initiatives, solicit ideas, and discuss lessons learned. Recent discussions have included: (1) other federal agencies’ roles to leverage buying power for improved response and lower costs; (2) providing emergency resources; and (3) deploying facilities for storing and distributing emergency commodities. In an effort to standardize and disseminate best practices, LMD has issued a number of guidance documents. In FY 2009, it issued several guidance documents, including the Temporary Housing Unit Concept of Operations, the Logistics Operations Manual, and the Logistics Management Center Standard Operating Procedures. Evaluating Performance Following each exercise or actual incident, LMD conducts afteraction reviews to discuss with supply chain partners any challenges encountered, where corrective actions are needed, and what best practices should be applied moving forward. Corrective actions are monitored, and when successful, incorporated into procedures, policies, and training. Through face-to-face meetings, FEMA works with regional logistics staff to identify areas needing attention, including the states’ capabilities. Plans are then designed and implemented to address areas of need. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 12 FEMA generators are unloaded from a C-17 military cargo plane in American Samoa to help provide electric power to disaster survivors following the September 2009 tsunami. Photo by Casey Deshong/FEMA Conclusion FEMA has made substantial progress in the logistics area, but continues to face challenges as it enhances preparedness. In carrying out its role as the National Logistics Coordinator, LMD is responsible for coordinating with public and private sector partners to provide a truly integrated approach to disaster logistics. FEMA faces challenges regarding its inability to communicate directly with the information systems of its federal partners. Because of the importance placed on the yet-to-be completed Total Asset Visibility program and because it is expected to cost more than a quarter billion dollars over the 7-year development stage, it is important that LMD consult with the FEMA Chief Information Officer to determine whether the proposed Phase II has the ability to support logistics operations, whether it is progressing on schedule and whether an independent evaluation of the system should be conducted. Some state and local jurisdictions’ logistics capabilities are deficient because of staffing and budget shortfalls. FEMA is aware that those deficiencies detract from the concept of community integration. FEMA needs to explore alternative ways to identify state and local shortcomings and to help those jurisdictions to enhance their capabilities. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 13 Recommendations We recommend that the Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Recommendation #1: Evaluate whether the Total Asset Visibility system being developed is on track to support logistics operations. The evaluation should include such functions as � information technology systems’ requirements, � staffing needs, and � coordination with emergency management partners. Recommendation #2: Work with state partners to identify and overcome state and local logistical deficiencies. Management Comments and OIG Analysis FEMA concurs with our recommendations and will provide us with a detailed corrective action plan, with timeframes, in 90 days. We consider the two recommendations resolved but open, pending receipt and review of FEMA’s corrective action plan. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 14 Appendix A Purpose, Scope, and Methodology The objectives of our audit were to determine (1) the status of LMD’s strategic plans, accomplishments, partnerships, performance, and existing challenges, and, (2) determine LMD’s progress in preparing for the next catastrophic disaster. This is the first comprehensive review of FEMA’s LMD since it was elevated from a branch within the former Response Division to the directorate level. We reviewed the following key functional areas: � � � � � � � Staffing, Training, and Credentialing Planning Coordinating Sourcing Tracking and Timing Deliveries Communications Evaluating Performance Audit fieldwork was conducted in the Washington, DC, area, where we interviewed FEMA officials from LMD as well as other agency components. We also interviewed regional FEMA officials and representatives from federal partner agencies and nongovernmental organizations. We conducted our audit between January and September 2009 under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to Government Auditing Standards issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 15 Appendix B Management Comments to the Draft Report ll,S. IJ.p.... m.n' orUom.I,"d SooU"') ~ (. 5'''''olicy and Program Analysis SUBJECT: Comments on DIG Draft Report, FEMA 's Logislics MmwgcmCIII Process for NcspoJldiJlg /0 Cfl/os/rQphic DisaSlers tUrc;:~ &- Thank you for the opportunity to review and eommelll on the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) subject draft audit report, As the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) works toward refining its programs, the DIG's independent analysis of program perfonnanee greatly benefits our ability to continuously improve our activities. Technical comments have been provided under separate cover. FEMA concurs with the draft report's two recommt."11dations and has taken actions to implement them. While we will be providing corrective aetioll plilt1s in our 90-day response, we provide the following infomlation rclalive 10 the lWO recommendations: Recommendation I; Evaluate whether the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) system that is undt.'T development is on track to support logistics operations. Thc evaluation could include such functions as: lnfonmuion technology systems' requirements, Staffing needs. and Coordination willt cmergeney management partners. Response: Actions arc ongoing to implement recommendation onc. TAV (renamed Logistics Supply Chain Management System/LSCMS) has undergone extensive reviews by FEMA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) executivc Icvels to include the Acquisition Review Boards, Enterprise Arehiteelurc Boards. and Office of Chief Infonnation Officcr (OCIO) program rcviews. We have also been ineludt.'(\ in the FEMA FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 16 Appendix B Management Comments to the Draft Report Page 2 acquisition portfolio review process. During these reviews, information technology systems' requirements, staffing needs, and coordination with emergency management partners have been, and continue to be, carefully and closely scrutinized. Our next DHS portfolio review is scheduled for May 27, 2010. In addition, during the course of this audit, we provided the orG team access to our SharePoint and all ofOUT signed approved documents and processes. The following documents contain the current performance metrics and can be found on the LCSMS SharePoint sile: • Operational Requirements Document • Exhibit 300 • Acquisition Program Baseline • Performance Management Plan outlines our metrics strategy and is very detailed. This document is neither required by DHS nor FEMA. However, the Logistics Systems Program Office recognized the need for a definitive plan to accomplish measurement tracking. This document is currently in draft and scheduled for a preliminary review during 3rd quarter FYI O. • Master Schedule - monitored weekly by the Property Management Officer and bi-weekly by OCIO. The FEMA OCIO has appointed a dedicated Delivery Manager to the LSCMSrrAV Program. Additionally, we conduct weekly Eltccutive Reviews at which the Chief Information Officer (CIa) personally participates. We also conduct bi-weekly meetings at which the project managers, along with OCIO key players, participate. The FEMA CIa attends and Co-Chairs these meeting. Recommendation 2: Work with state partners to identify and overcome state and local logistical deficiencies. Response: With a long-term goal of creating a logistics technical assistance program, we have been working with the states to develop and implement the Logistics Capability Assessment Tool (LCAn. The LCAT provides states an automated capability to selfassess their logistics maturity in five key areas: logistics planning, operations, organization, property management, and distribution management. We have also created a Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) that assists the states with the emergency supplies grant approval process as they determine their needs through the selfassessment. This is the second year of the Demonstration Program/LCA T. This initiative is a result of the Congressional Conference Report 109-699, pg 162, directing FEMA to develop and conduct a Demonstration Program with regional and local govenunents ''to improve readiness, increase response capacity, and maximize the management and impact of homeland security resources." Drawing upon input from select FEMA regions and states, FEMA developed a collaborative tool for use by states to help evaluate their current disaster logistics readiness, identify areas for targeted improvement, and develop a roadmap to mitigate weaknesses and enhance strengths. As of February 2010, FEMA FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 17 Appendix B Management Comments to the Draft Report Page 3 has trained all 10 of its regions, conducted briefings for 35 states and territories. and has facilitated 12 two-day LCAT focus sessions with states and territories. See attached Fact Sheet. To further help improve state and local readiness, beginning in FY2009, critical emergency supplies, such as shelf stable food products, water, and basic medical supplies are an allowable expense under the State Homeland Security Program. Prior to Grant Programs approving grant funding, FEMA Logistics conducts a technical review to ensure the state has offcred a viable inventory management plan, an effective distribution strategy, considered sustainment costs, and has logistics expertise. FEMA Logistics continues to assist Grant Programs in monitoring and reviewing progress of the program. FEMA Logistics is also working with National Preparedness to publish a Logistics Comprehensive Planning Guide (CPG 201) to funher suppon state logistics planning and preparedness. This guide includes a standard logistics plan template, with instructional information on staging areas, points of distribution (PODS), LeAT, Critical Emergency Supplies (CES), United States Army Core of Engineers predictive modeling, and more. Thank you again for the opponunity to comment on this draft report and we look forward to working with you on other issues as we both strive to improve FEMA. Attachment FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 18 Appendix C FEMA Logistics Organizational Components Below are descriptions of LMD’s major organizational components. Office of Logistics Transformation and Initiatives – Acts as the primary LMD transformation agent by researching, recommending, and integrating emerging concepts and initiatives to enhance the directorate’s mission. Distribution Management Division – Manages the FEMA warehousing and transportation systems used to receive, store, maintain, issue, distribute, and track supplies, as well as servicing material and equipment. The division is comprised of the following branches: Transportation Management, Supply Chain Integration, Regional Distributions Centers, and Maintenance. Business Management Division – Provides comprehensive administrative support for LMD’s fiscal, human capital, professional development, and training functions. It manages and integrates human resource objectives and formulates and oversees the budget. The division is comprised of the Human Capital and Training Branch and the Budget, Programs & Analysis Branch. Logistics Plans & Exercises Division – Develops and provides plans and exercises to the field aimed at identifying limitations and enhancing partners’ readiness. From lessons learned during the exercises, the division implements corrective actions and conducts post-action reviews. The division is comprised of the following branches: Plans & Exercises and Assessment & Analysis. Logistics Operations Division – Manages and executes the command, coordination, tracking, and reporting for all-hazards operations. It serves as the central reporting element for the National Response Coordination Center on all logistics actions and operational activities and manages FEMA’s temporary housing unit program, maintaining custody of manufactured housing. The division is comprised of the Current Operations and the Logistics Support branches. Property Management Division – Provides oversight, internal control, and technical services to manage personal property assets and enhance its accountability, reutilization, and disposal. The division is comprised of the Logistics Systems Branch and the Inventory Management Branch. FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 19 Appendix D Major Contributors to this Report Donald Bumgardner, Director Eric Young, Supervisory Auditor John Meenan, Senior Program Analyst Alexandra Vega, Program Analyst Kimberly Gilliland, Program Analyst Nathaniel Nicholson, Auditor FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 20 Appendix E Report Distribution Department of Homeland Security Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff Deputy Chiefs of Staff General Counsel Executive Secretariat Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs FEMA Administrator FEMA Audit Liaison (08-142-EMO) Office of Management and Budget Chief, Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner Congress Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate FEMA’s Logistics Management Process for Responding to Catastrophic Disasters Page 21 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. OIG HOTLINE To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations: • Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; • Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; • Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or • Write to us at: DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, Washington, DC 20528. The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller. IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual February 2009 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Course Overview Display Visual 1 Key Points Purpose: The purpose of this course is to familiarize you with the function and composition of ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support. Approximate Time: 1 hour Content Outline: This module includes the following major topics: • ESF Overview • ESF #7 Purpose and Scope • Logistics Management • Logistics Management Primary and Support Agencies • Logistics Management Activities • National Logistics Staging Areas • Resource Support • Resource Support Primary and Support Agencies • Resource Support Activities • GSA Resources (Office of Emergency Response and Recovery, Public Building Service, and Federal Acquisition Service) • Summary Materials: • Instructor Guide • Student Manual (including the ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Annex) February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 1 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Course Overview Display Visual 2 Key Points At the end of this course, you will be able to: • • • • Describe the overall purpose and scope of ESF #7. Identify the supplemental assistance ESF #7 provides to State, tribal, and local governments. Identify typical activities accomplished by ESF #7 resources. Describe the types of partnerships formed between ESF #7 and other response agencies and organizations. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 2 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Course Overview Display Visual 3 Key Points Introduce yourself to the members of your table groups, providing: • • • Your name. Your role in emergency management. What you hope to gain from this course. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 3 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 4 Key Points The National Response Framework (NRF): • • Is a guide to how the Nation conducts all-hazards response. Builds upon the National Incident Management System (NIMS) coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities across the Nation, linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. The NRF is comprised of: • • • • • The Core Document, which describes the doctrine that guides our national response, roles and responsibilities, response actions, response organizations, and planning requirements to achieve an effective national response to any incident that occurs. Emergency Support Function Annexes, which identify Federal resources and capabilities that are most frequently needed in a national response (e.g., transportation, firefighting, mass care). Support Annexes, which describe essential supporting aspects that are common to all incidents (e.g., financial management, volunteer and donations management, privatesector coordination). Incident Annexes, which address the unique aspects of how we respond to seven broad categories or types of incidents (e.g., biological, nuclear/radiological, cyber, mass evacuation). Partner Guides, which provide ready references describing key roles and actions for local, tribal, State, Federal, and private-sector response partners. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 4 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 5 Key Points The Federal Government and many State governments organize many of their resources and capabilities—as well as those of certain private-sector and nongovernmental organizations— under Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The ESFs: • • Are coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs), and Joint Field Offices (JFOs). Are a critical mechanism to coordinate functional capabilities and resources provided by Federal departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. Note that some States also have organized an ESF structure along this approach. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 5 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 6 Key Points Review the general ESF duties listed on the visual. Why is it important that ESFs have the authority to commit agency assets? February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 6 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 7 Key Points The ESF structure includes: • • • ESF Coordinator. The entity assigned to manage oversight for a particular ESF. Primary Agencies. ESF primary agencies are Federal agencies with significant authorities, resources, or capabilities for a particular function within an ESF. A Federal agency designated as an ESF primary agency serves as a Federal executive agent under the Federal Coordinating Officer (or Federal Resource Coordinator for nonStafford Act incidents) to accomplish the ESF mission. Support Agencies. Support agencies are those entities with specific capabilities or resources that support the primary agencies in executing the mission of the ESF. ESFs provide support to other ESFs. For example: ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering may support rural ESF #5 – Emergency Management forces to obtain heavy equipment and/or demolition services as needed to suppress incident-related fires. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 7 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 8 Key Points The ESF coordinator has management oversight for that particular ESF. Note that, as described on the visual, the ESF coordinator has a role throughout the incident management cycle. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 8 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 9 Key Points When an ESF is activated in response to an incident: • The primary agency is responsible for: • Serving as a Federal executive agent under the Federal Coordinating Officer (or Federal Resource Coordinator for non-Stafford Act incidents) to accomplish the ESF mission. • Orchestrating Federal support within its functional area for an affected State. • Providing staff for the operations functions at fixed and field facilities. • Notifying and requesting assistance from support agencies. • Managing mission assignments and coordinating with support agencies and appropriate State agencies. • Working with appropriate private-sector organizations to maximize use of all available resources. • Supporting and keeping other ESFs and organizational elements informed of ESF operational priorities and activities. • Maintaining trained personnel to support interagency emergency response and support teams. • Support agencies are responsible for: • Conducting operations, when requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the designated ESF primary agency, using their own authorities, subject-matter experts, capabilities, or resources. • Participating in planning for short- and long-term incident management and recovery operations and the development of supporting operational plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs), checklists, or other job aids, in concert with existing first-responder standards. • Assisting in the conduct of situational assessments. • Furnishing available personnel or other resource support as requested by DHS or the ESF primary agency. • Providing input to periodic readiness assessments. • Participating in training and exercises aimed at continuous improvement of response and recovery capabilities. • Identifying new equipment or capabilities required to prevent or respond to new or emerging threats and hazards, or to improve the ability to address existing threats. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 9 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 10 Key Points ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act incidents under circumstances as defined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5). Not all incidents requiring Federal support result in the activation of ESFs. FEMA can deploy assets and capabilities through ESFs into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is expected to cause a significant impact and result. This coordination through ESFs allows FEMA to position Federal support for a quick response, though actual assistance cannot normally be provided until the Governor requests and receives a Presidential major disaster or emergency declaration. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 10 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF Overview Display Visual 11 Key Points The 15 ESFs are listed on the visual. The complete ESF Annexes are available at the NRF Resource Center at www.fema.gov/nrf. This course focuses on ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support. Describe your roles or associations with ESF #7. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 11 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF #7 Purpose and Scope Display Visual 12 Key Points On the Federal level, ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support assists the DHS with: • • DHS/FEMA Logistics providing a comprehensive, national disaster logistics planning, management, and sustainment capability that harnesses the resources of Federal logistics partners, key public and private stakeholders, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to meet the needs of disaster victims and responders; and The General Services Administration (GSA) supporting Federal agencies and State, tribal, and local governments that need resource support prior to, during, and/or after incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 12 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic ESF #7 Purpose and Scope Display Visual 13 Key Points The mission of ESF #7 is twofold, encompassing both the logistics management and resource support functions of emergency response. ESF #7 scope includes: • • DHS/FEMA Logistics providing a nationally integrated process for the collaborative implementation of the logistics capability of Federal agencies, public- and private-sector partners, and NGOs. GSA providing: • Emergency relief supplies. • Facility space. • Office equipment. • Office supplies. • Telecommunications (in accordance with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies). • Contracting services. • Transportation services. • Personnel required to support immediate response activities. • Support for requirements not specifically identified in other ESFs, including excess and surplus property. The scope information can be found on pages 1-3 of the ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Annex. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 13 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Logistics Management Display Visual 14 Key Points Why is logistics management important? The first part of this course explains the logistics management function of ESF #7, including which departments/agencies are involved, what services they provide, and how they achieve their mission. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 14 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Logistics Management Primary and Support Agencies Display Visual 15 Key Points As the primary agency for Logistics Management, DHS/FEMA Logistics divides its responsibilities along functional lines, as described in the following examples: • • • • • Material management includes determining requirements, sourcing, ordering and replenishment, storage, and issuing of supplies and equipment. This includes network, computer, and communications equipment required to support Joint Field Office (JFO) and other field operations. Transportation management is part of distribution management and includes equipment and procedures for moving material from storage facilities and vendors to incident victims, particularly with emphasis on the surge and sustainment portions of response. Transportation management also includes providing services in response to requests from other Federal entities. Facilities management includes the location, selection, and acquisition of storage and distribution facilities. These facilities include Distribution Centers (DCs) and National Logistics Staging Areas (NLSAs). Logistics is responsible for establishing and operating facilities as well as managing related services to shelter and support incident responders in JFOs and other field-related operations, including Base Camps. Personal property management and policy and procedures guidance maintain accountability of material and identification and reutilization of property acquired to support a Federal response operation. Total Asset Visibility (TAV) programs are included in property management providing end-to-end visibility of response resources. Planning and coordination with internal and external customers and other supply chain partners in the Federal and private sectors provide for the comprehensive review of best practices and available solutions for improving the delivery of goods and services to the customer. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 15 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Logistics Management Primary and Support Agencies Display Visual 16 Key Points The following partners assist with ESF #7 logistics management activities: • • • • • Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce Department of Defense Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Department of Energy Turn to the chart on pages 8-10 of the ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Annex for more information about the role of each support agency. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 16 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Logistics Management Primary and Support Agencies Display Visual 17 Key Points Other ESF #7 partners in providing logistics management services include: • • • • • • Department of Health and Human Services Department of the Interior Department of Transportation Department of Veterans Affairs General Services Administration National Aeronautic and Space Administration February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 17 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Logistics Management Activities Display Visual 18 Key Points Under the supply chain management process adopted by DHS/FEMA Logistics, response actions are divided into three phases: • • • Preparedness Response Recovery During the preparedness phase, ESF #7 helps to: • • • • Identify logistics requirements. Identify logistics resources. Balance logistics resources with logistics requirements. Establish and communicate logistics policies, procedures, and plans. The next slide presents information on the response and recovery phases. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 18 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Logistics Management Activities Display Visual 19 Key Points In the response phase, ESF #7 provides logistics response to the incident with: • • Initial surge (push) Ongoing sustainment (pull) After an incident, ESF #7 provides for logistics recovery. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 19 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic National Logistics Staging Areas Display Visual 20 Key Points DHS/FEMA’s National Logistics Staging Areas (NLSAs) are temporary facilities at the site of an incident, where commodities, equipment, and personnel can be received and pre-positioned for deployment as required. Generally NLSAs hold approximately 3 days’ worth of supplies, which can be distributed to multiple States. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 20 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Resource Support Display Visual 21 Key Points While responders address the priorities of protecting life and property, what support do they need? The next part of this course explains the resource support function of ESF #7, including which departments/agencies are involved, what services they provide, and how they accomplish their mission. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 21 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Resource Support Primary and Support Agencies Display Visual 22 Key Points The General Services Administration (GSA) is the primary agency for Resource Support. As such, GSA is responsible for providing, directing, and coordinating ESF #7 operations, including: • • • • • Locating, procuring, and issuing resources to other Federal agencies. Coordinating the transfer and disposal of excess Federal personal property. Locating and coordinating the use of available space for incident management activities. Coordinating and determining the availability and provision of consumable nonedible supplies. Coordinating the procurement of communications equipment and services. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 22 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Resource Support Primary and Support Agencies Display Visual 23 Key Points The following partners assist with ESF #7 resource support services: • • • • • • • • • Department of Commerce Department of Energy Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division/National Communications System Department of Labor Department of Transportation Department of Veterans Affairs National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Personnel Management Refer to the chart on page 11 of the ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Annex for information on the role of each support agency. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 23 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Resource Support Activities Display Visual 24 Key Points In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, GSA Headquarters initiates ESF #7 Resource Support operations as follows: • • • The GSA Emergency Coordinator (EC) or an authorized representative alerts the Headquarters and regional ESF points of contact as required. The GSA EC alerts supporting agencies as required. The GSA EC provides support to Federal agencies engaged in the response as requirements are identified. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 24 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Resource Support Activities Display Visual 25 Key Points The Regional Emergency Coordinator (REC) or Deputy REC (DREC) assumes control of ESF #7 operations in the affected regions, and provides the following support as necessary: • • • Deploys representatives to the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) and the State emergency operations center. Ensures that a suitable JFO facility is acquired and ready to occupy within 72 hours of receiving DHS requirements. Provides support in acquiring communications, office furniture, equipment, and supplies to equip the JFO. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 25 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Resource Support Activities Display Visual 26 Key Points • • • • • ESF #7 provides goods and services during incident response. Upon notification of space requirements, ESF #7 determines, through the regional GSA Public Building Service (PBS), the availability of suitable space in federally owned or leased buildings. ESF #7 provides communications support; and office furniture, equipment, and supplies. ESF #7 provides motor equipment from Federal agencies, Federal supply schedule contractors, and other commercial sources. ESF #7 also makes available technical advisors in connection with damage surveys, appraisals, and building demolitions or repairs. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 26 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic GSA Resources Display Visual 27 Key Points To effectively meet the resource support needs at each stage of a response, GSA uses several services, including the Disaster Support Division of the Office of Emergency Response and Recovery, the Public Building Service, and the Federal Acquisition Service. GSA’s Office of Emergency Response and Recovery promotes planning and coordination of disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. During an incident, the Office’s Disaster Support Division provides: • • • Emergency acquisition support. Emergency real property management. On-the-ground liaison between GSA field organizations and Headquarters. More information about the Public Building Service and the Federal Acquisition Service is on the next slides. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 27 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic GSA Resources Display Visual 28 Key Points GSA’s Public Building Service (PBS) is the largest public real estate organization in the country, managing more than 342 million square feet of workspace in 2,100 U.S. communities. PBS provides: • • • • • Realty specialist services. Space leasing. Construction services. Building maintenance services. Excess and real property services. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 28 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic GSA Resources Display Visual 29 Key Points GSA’s Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) is a consolidation of the Federal Technology Service and the Federal Supply Service, which helps provide: • • • • • • Contracting officers services. Travel and transportation services. Property management disposition of excess and surplus personal property. Fleet management. Logistics. Telecommunications. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 29 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Summary Display Visual 30 Key Points Instructions: • • • Answer the review questions on pages 33 and 34 of your Student Manual. Be prepared to share your answers with the class in 5 minutes. If you need clarification on any of the material presented in this course, be sure to ask your instructors. Additional information about the National Response Framework and Emergency Support Functions can be obtained at the NRF Resource Center at www.fema.gov/nrf. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 30 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Summary Display Visual 31 Key Points Instructions: 1. Take a few moments to review your Student Manuals and identify any questions. 2. Make sure that you get all of your questions answered prior to beginning the final test. 3. When taking the test . . . • Read each item carefully. • Circle your answer on the test. • Check your work and transfer your answers to the computer-scan (bubble) answer sheet or enter the answers online. You may refer to your Student Manuals and the annex when completing this test. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 31 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support Topic Summary Display Visual 32 Key Points Please complete the course evaluation/feedback form. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 32 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support ESF #7 – Knowledge Review 1. What are some examples of activities that are included in the scope of ESF #7’s Logistics Management Function? 2. What are some examples of activities that are not included in the scope of ESF #7’s Logistics Management Function? 3. Match the Logistics Management activities with the ESF #7 support agencies that perform them. Activities Support Agencies Provides water, ice, construction materials, and engineering services. A. Department of Transportation (DOT) Provides medical response teams and supplies. B. Department of Agriculture (USDA)/ Food and Nutrition Service (USDA/FNS) Coordinates the restoration and recovery of transportation systems and infrastructure. C. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Arranges for delivery of food supplies. D. Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 4. What are some examples of activities that are included in the scope of ESF #7’s Resource Support Function? 5. What are some examples of activities that are not included in the scope of ESF #7’s Resource Support Function? February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 33 IS-807: ESF #7 – Logistics Management and Resource Support 6. Match the Resource Support activities with the ESF #7 support agencies that perform them. Activities Support Agencies Provides technical expertise on structural surveys. A. Department of Labor (DOL) Helps identify and procure medical supplies and other medical services. B. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assists in the identification and recruitment of individuals with specialized occupations. C. Department of Commerce (DOC) Assists in coordinating the provision of commercial telecommunications assets. D. Department of Energy (DOE) Assists in satisfying critical fuel, lubricant, and electrical power needs. E. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) 7. Use the space below to make note of any questions you have about the material covered in this course. February 2009 IS-807 ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support Student Manual Page 34 NPS-LM-11-188 ^`nrfpfqflk=obpb^o`e= pmlkploba=obmloq=pbofbp= = Strategies for Logistics in Case of a Natural Disaster 28 September 2011 by Dr. Aruna Apte, Assistant Professor, and Dr. Keenan D. Yoho, Assistant Professor Graduate School of Business & Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California 93943 = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Report Documentation Page Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2. REPORT TYPE 28 SEP 2011 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Strategies for Logistics in Case of a Natural Disaster 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School,Graduate School of Business & Public Policy,Monterey,CA,93943 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT The need to effectively and efficiently provide emergency supplies and services is increasing all over the world. We investigate four policy options? prepositioning supplemental resources, preemptive as well as phased deployment of assets, and a surge of supplies and services?as potential strategies for responding to a disaster. We illustrate the linkage between our four policy options and a disaster classification based upon disaster localization (dispersed or local) and speed of disaster onset (slow or sudden). We summarize our work by introducing a matrix that aligns logistics strategies with disaster types in order to assist policymakers in their resource management decisions. 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE unclassified unclassified unclassified 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 18. NUMBER OF PAGES Same as Report (SAR) 43 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 The research presented in this report was supported by the Acquisition Chair of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School. To request Defense Acquisition Research or to become a research sponsor, please contact: NPS Acquisition Research Program Attn: James B. Greene, RADM, USN, (Ret.) Acquisition Chair Graduate School of Business and Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School 555 Dyer Road, Room 332 Monterey, CA 93943-5103 Tel: (831) 656-2092 Fax: (831) 656-2253 E-mail: jbgreene@nps.edu Copies of the Acquisition Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our website www.acquisitionresearch.net = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= Abstract The need to effectively and efficiently provide emergency supplies and services is increasing all over the world. We investigate four policy options— prepositioning supplemental resources, preemptive as well as phased deployment of assets, and a surge of supplies and services—as potential strategies for responding to a disaster. We illustrate the linkage between our four policy options and a disaster classification based upon disaster localization (dispersed or local) and speed of disaster onset (slow or sudden). We summarize our work by introducing a matrix that aligns logistics strategies with disaster types in order to assist policymakers in their resource management decisions. Keywords: logistics, natural disaster, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian aid, disaster response = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= -i- THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= - ii - About the Authors Dr. Aruna Apte has successfully completed various research projects, involving application of mathematical models and optimization techniques that have led to over 20 research articles and one patent. Her research interests are in developing mathematical models for complex, real-world operational problems using optimization tools. She values that her research be applicable. Currently her research is focused in humanitarian and military logistics. She has several publications in journals, such as Interfaces, Naval Research Logistics, Production and Operations Management. She has recently published a monograph on Humanitarian Logistics. Aruna has over twenty years of experience teaching operations management, operations research, and mathematics courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. She has advised emergency planners in preparing for disaster response. She is the founding and current president for a new college (focus group) in Humanitarian Operations and Crisis Management under the flagship academic professional society in her intellectual area of study, Production and Operations Management Society. Dr. Keenan Yoho’s primary research activities are in the area of analyzing alternatives under conditions of uncertainty and resource scarcity. Keenan’s primary research activities lie in the analysis of alternatives for capital purchases under conditions of resource scarcity, supply chain management, risk analysis, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and resource management in environments that exhibit high degrees of uncertainty. Dr. Aruna Apte Graduate School of Business and Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Tel: 831-656-7583 Fax: (831) 656-3407 E-mail:auapte@nps.edu Dr. Keenan D. Yoho Graduate School of Business and Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Tel: 831-656-2029 Fax: (831) 656-3407 E-mail: kdyoho@nps.edu = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= - iii - THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK = = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = - iv - NPS-LM-11-188 ^`nrfpfqflk=obpb^o`e= pmlkploba=obmloq=pbofbp= = Strategies for Logistics in Case of a Natural Disaster 28 September 2011 by Dr. Aruna Apte, Assistant Professor, and Dr. Keenan D. Yoho, Assistant Professor Graduate School of Business & Public Policy Naval Postgraduate School Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the Federal Government. = = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -v- THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK = = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = - vi - Table of Contents I. Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 II. Literature Review ..................................................................................... 5 III. Disaster Life Cycles ................................................................................. 7 IV. Disaster Classification ............................................................................. 9 V. VI. A. Indian Ocean “Boxing Day” Tsunami of 2004 ................................ 10 B. Haiti 2010 Earthquake ................................................................... 11 C. Hurricane Katrina .......................................................................... 12 D. Influenza “Swine Flu” Epidemic of 2009 ........................................ 12 Discussion .............................................................................................. 15 A. Prepositioning ................................................................................ 15 B. Proactive Deployment ................................................................... 17 C. Phased Deployment ...................................................................... 18 D. Surge Capacity .............................................................................. 20 Conclusion.............................................................................................. 21 List of References ............................................................................................. 25 = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= - vii - THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= - viii - I. Introduction In 2009 there were 335 natural disasters reported worldwide that killed 10,655 persons, affected more than 119 million others, and caused over $41.3 billion in economic damages (Vos, Rodriguez, Below, & Guha-Sapir. 2009). The number of natural disasters reported between 1900 and 2010 has increased significantly and, with it, the number of requests for aid and humanitarian assistance (see Figure 1). While the trend in the number of disasters reported shows an increase, it is not clear that there has been a commensurate response in terms of preparedness. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reports that of all funds used to support disaster operations, 90% are spent for response, whereas 10% are spent on preparedness activities and investments and risk reduction (A. Giegerich, personal communication, September 21, 2010). The United Nations estimates that every dollar spent to prepare for a disaster saves seven dollars in disaster response (United Nations Human Development Program, 2007). 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Figure 1. Number of Disasters Reported from 1900–2010 (EM–DAT, 2011) = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -1- Although the objective of all the organizations and agencies involved in humanitarian assistance is to reduce human suffering and casualties, the duration and severity of the human toll during a natural disaster is largely dependent upon the speed and scope of the response, which is often a function of the level of preparedness that has been established prior to the disaster event. While there are no internationally agreed upon metrics by which to judge or measure the effectiveness of a response to a disaster, scholars working in the humanitarian and disaster response research area have found that improvement is desirable (Apte, 2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006). An effective and efficient humanitarian response depends “on the ability of logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at the site of a humanitarian relief effort” (Thomas, 2003). In this research we focus on the response to a disaster area in the form of distributing supplies, and strategies that will enhance the effectiveness of such a response. For the purpose of this research, we accept the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ (CRED) definition of disaster, which is “a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external assistance.” The unpredictability of the timing of a disaster, as well as the scope of its human and material destruction, raises several serious questions for emergency planners and first responders. For example, how can a state of supply preparedness be established and maintained? How should adequate prepositioned disaster relief inventory be established and sustained over time, to include the rotation of perishable stocks? How can information regarding the location, quantity, and condition of prepositioned inventory be shared, and what effect would this information sharing have on the total investment of prepositioned stocks? Is prepositioning the best strategy for all types of disasters? How reliable are the potential supply lines if it is determined that supplies should be virtually stockpiled (that is, a detailed list or database of supplies by type and quantity is created and maintained, as well as reliable sources that can provide the supplies quickly)? = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -2- Should the supplies be sourced locally or from outside the disaster zone? Answers to these questions depend on the expected onset speed of the disaster, the volume and weight of supplies to be moved, the expected magnitude of humanitarian relief required, and the expected likelihood of a disaster in the area. As part of our investigation we explore four policy options: (1) prepositioning supplemental resources in or near the incident location; (2) proactive deployment of assets in advance of a request; (3) phased deployment of assets and supplies, analogous to the “just in time” inventory control philosophy practiced by many commercial manufacturers; and (4) “surge” transportation of manpower and equipment from locations outside the disaster area. = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -3- THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -4- II. Literature Review One of the major issues in a response supply chain in case of a natural disaster is to coordinate the operations and relief inventories over a large number of stages, locations, and organizations. This has to be done while providing the emergency supplies and services to the affected population under extreme conditions. Decisions regarding the types of provisions that should be prepositioned, as well as their location, should be made well before a disaster strikes in order to provide quick response. To some extent, without such a high level of uncertainty and an adverse environment, it is similar to the core question in supply chain management of coordinating activities and inventories over a spectrum of stages of the supply chain and facility locations of the inventory (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009). In the private sector, it has been found that if each individual stage in a serialsystem of the supply chain operates with a designated base stock policy with service guarantees, then the optimal safety stock strategy is to maintain inventory at certain key locations, which results in separating the stages of the supply chain; this type of policy allows each stage to operate independently by minimizing the need for communication and coordination amongst players (Simpson, 1958; Graves & Willems, 2002). Models available in supply chain management literature are predominantly with unlimited capacity for storage. In cases where there is unlimited capacity, the amount of safety stock needed is less than the level needed with capacity constraint (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009). The determination of the optimal placement of safety stock in a supply chain has been addressed by Simpson (1958) and Schoenmeyr and Graves (2008), where there are evolving or predetermined forecasts, and by Graves and Willems (2002), where there is uncertain, as well as non-stationary, demand. This concept can explain the response supply chain where there exists uncertainty for the quantity required, as well as what is required (Apte, 2009; Ergun, Karakus, Keskinocak, = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -5- Swann, & Villareal, 2009). Rawls and Turnquist (2010) developed a model for determining the location and quantity of supplies that should be prepositioned when there is uncertainty with respect to whether a disaster will occur and where it will occur, and built upon this work by adding service quality constraints (Rawls & Turnquist, 2011) to ensure the probability of meeting demand and the average shipment distance is within a specified parameter. In addition to the prepositioning of relief inventories, a disaster response may require the formulation of policies that require the expansion of warehouses, medical facilities, and temporary shelters, while infrastructure preparation may include the provision of airstrips and ramp space at existing airfields (Salmeron & Apte, 2010). Koavacs and Spens (2009) weighed the difference between traditional commercial logistics and humanitarian logistics. With humanitarian logistics, it is imperative to go beyond the profitability of commercial logistics. Within the domain of humanitarian logistics, suppliers have different motivations for participating, and customers do not generate voluntary demand. It is clear that in most cases a “repeat purchase” is not a possibility. Thus, supply networks must take into account the lack of true demand. Demand is dictated by the relief agencies that are the primary actors within this framework. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the agency to “push” the supplies to the disaster location in the immediate response phase, which is different from the commercial philosophy of pull-based demand. Humanitarian logistics focuses on getting the greatest volume of supplies to the points where they are needed, and there may be lessons learned in the commercial sector that could be used to improve the planning and execution of strategies that could be implemented during a disaster response. = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -6- III. Disaster Life Cycles The life cycle of a disaster from the perspective of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is divided into three stages (as illustrated in Figure 2): being prepared in the pre-disaster stage, response as the disaster strikes, and recovery in post-disaster (Apte 2009; Van Wassenhove, 2006). RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS RECOVERY Asset Prepositioning Infrastructure Preparation Pre-Disaster Ramp Up Ramp Down Sustainment Disaster Event Post-Disaster Figure 2. Life Cycle of Disasters (Apte, 2009) Disaster preparedness is the first step in mitigating the adverse impacts of any unforeseen catastrophic event. Preparedness on an individual level is defined by the creation of an escape and survival plan, as well as the procurement and storage of supplies that will enable an individual to act on the plan. Preparedness at an organizational or institutional level translates to the planning and preestablishment of adequate capacity and resources that will enable efficient relief operations. Prepositioning of war reserve and contingency stocks, such as that practiced by each of the U.S. Armed Services, has proven an effective means of increasing the speed of response to a conflict (Abell et al., 2000; Button, Gordon, Hoffmann, Riposo, & Wilson, 2010; Hura & Robinson, 1991). The private commercial sector, too, has been involved in prepositioning strategic safety stocks in supply chains with evolving forecasts (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2008), capacity = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -7- constraints (Schoenmeyr & Graves, 2009), and non-stationary demands (Graves & Willems, 2002, 2008). Disaster response is a function of the preparation that took place prior to the disaster event, as well as the coordination of available supplies and distribution capacity. The first part of the response consists of gaining situational awareness of events and conditions on the ground in the disaster area through the collection of available information, and then using this information and awareness to generate an operational picture that will inform the nature, scale, and timing of the response. The result of this collection of information and establishment of situational awareness is a needs assessment or requirement for assistance. The response itself is largely comprised of the tactical activities that must take place to move needed supplies to those parts of the disaster area that have the most critical demand, given the available resources at hand. Disaster recovery consists of stabilizing the disaster area and improving the living and economic conditions of those affected by the catastrophic event. The recovery phase means different things to different organizations. For the military, the recovery phase likely signals the beginning of drawn-down or redeployment operations, whereby military personnel and equipment are withdrawn and responsibility turned over to civil authorities. For non-governmental and non-military aid organizations, the recovery phase may consist of establishing semi-permanent camps, aid stations, or warehouses to shelter displaced persons; delivering critical services that cannot be provided by other civil authorities; and coordinating the storage and distribution of supplies that are otherwise unavailable or in short supply to the local population. Studying the life cycle of recent disasters offers insight into both short-term and long-term consequences. It also provides us with numerous lessons to form effective strategies for mitigating future disasters. However, in order to formulate such strategies, we need to understand disasters in terms of their speed and scope. = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -8- IV. Disaster Classification Disasters are often classified based on the speed of onset and the source or cause of the disaster (Ergun, Heier, & Swann, 2008; Van Wassenhove, 2006). However, in our research we focus on four disaster scenarios that are combinations of the geographic dispersion of the disaster (dispersed or localized) and its speed of onset (slow or sudden), as discussed by Apte (2009) and described in Figure 3. We differentiate local from dispersed disasters in terms of the number of civil administrative districts impacted, such as cities, counties, townships, parishes, prefectures, provinces, or states. As the number of civil administrative districts increases, so does the geographic area impacted, resulting in an increase in the complexity associated with responding to the disaster. It is the coordination of effort across multiple districts, coupled with the size of the relief requirement, which frustrates the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations. Slow-onset disasters are defined as those that allow potentially affected populations time to react in order to mitigate the impact of the disaster, whereas sudden-onset disasters allow little to no time to react to the disaster event. The disaster classification suggests that the level of difficulty in the logistics execution is less onerous in the case of localized, slow-onset disasters (depicted in quadrant III of Figure 3) because there may be adequate lead-time and local resources to prepare for the response. We next discuss four specific disaster cases that exhibit different onset and localization characteristics, as illustrated in Figure 3, and serve as exemplars of strategies that are appropriate to specific disaster types, as described in the discussion section. = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = -9- Dispersed Localized IV 2009 H1N1 Flu Pandemic I 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami III 2005 Hurricane Katrina II 2010 Haiti Earthquake Slow Onset Time Sudden Onset Figure 3. Classification of Disasters (Apte, 2009) A. Indian Ocean “Boxing Day” Tsunami of 2004 Dispersed and sudden-onset disasters (depicted in quadrant I of Figure 3) tend to be the most catastrophic in humanitarian terms because they lack warning in advance of their onset, and they impact large geographic areas that often cross multiple civil administrative areas, making coordination critical and difficult. The Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 was the result of a 9.1 magnitude earthquake and was responsible for more than 227,000 deaths, more than 500,000 injured, over 2 million missing, and more than 1.5 million displaced persons across more than 12 countries (Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). The destruction was primarily limited to the coastal regions (Samek, Skole, & Chomentowski, 2004), but was dispersed across so many countries that relief efforts were frustrated by the lack of complete reports of the damage to those countries affected and of the specific types of aid and assistance needed most. = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = - 10 - Most of the people affected by the tsunami did not actually know it was coming. Because the earthquake occurred far offshore, those affected on land were not aware of it and had no way of knowing the tsunami was coming. The earthquake occurred so far away that it was not felt. The key problem was notification. Agencies that did sense the earthquake were not able to effectively notify those areas that might be potentially affected and even if they did the agencies did not have adequate means of disseminating the potential threat of a tsunami to all those that might be affected. It should be noted at this juncture that there was no tsunami warning system in the Indian Ocean. Some areas, particularly the Banda Aceh region of Sumatra in Indonesia, lacked a basic, functioning transportation infrastructure, which imposed severe capacity constraints on the flow of inbound supplies. B. Haiti 2010 Earthquake A sudden-onset disaster, even if localized (depicted in quadrant II of Figure 3), creates operational difficulties that are greater than circumstances where the onset is slow, but less than if the catastrophe were both rapid in its onset and geographically dispersed. Sudden-onset disasters deny authorities and the public time to prepare for the consequences of the disaster event and, therefore, tend to exact a much higher human cost. The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, measured 7.0 in magnitude on the Richter scale, resulting in more than 200,000 dead (United Nations, 2010). Poorly designed and constructed buildings, bridges, and other infrastructure resulted in significant losses, the creation of large debris fields and obstructions to transportation, and a need for large-scale rescue efforts of those trapped alive underneath concrete and steel wreckage. The government of Haiti was immobilized with a significant percentage of the national leadership dead or missing as a result of the earthquake. With little ability to assess damage or mobilize and manage the few resources that were not destroyed in the quake, the surviving population were left to rely on the response of other nations to help rescue those trapped in collapsed buildings and to provide = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = - 11 - food, water, medicine, and shelter. Lack of physical infrastructure, especially in underdeveloped and poor countries, causes long lead-times in transportation, which was evident in Haiti. The consequences of poor governance and weak institutions were evident in the Haiti disaster, and so, in spite of the proactive deployment from the rest of the world, suffering persists. C. Hurricane Katrina On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the city of New Orleans. It was known days in advance that the hurricane might make landfall in New Orleans, and although the city had warned residents, there were many who remained and were killed, stranded, or left homeless as a direct result of the storm’s violence or the failure of the levee system that otherwise protected the city from flooding. Hurricane Katrina was a slow-onset, localized disaster (see quadrant III of Figure 3) and one of the most devastating and costly hurricanes to strike the United States. Once the storm had passed, more than 80% of the city of New Orleans was under water, approximately 1,700 people were dead, 1 million persons were displaced, and an estimated $135 billion in damage along the Gulf coast was incurred (Plyer, 2010). The official plan for the city was for displaced residents to gather in the New Orleans Superdome football arena in the downtown center as a refuge of last resort. However, due to failed infrastructure and lack of planning for needed supplies to be delivered to the affected area, those who sought refuge during the critical first week following the landfall of the storm found thousands of people confined in a large open building whose roof was torn open and which had no functioning utilities, such as electricity or water. The state of Louisiana activated the National Guard and after several days, buses were organized to begin evacuating those still in the city to outlying areas. D. Influenza “Swine Flu” Epidemic of 2009 Quadrant IV describes a context where the onset is slow but the affected area is geographically dispersed. When the disaster area consists of a large or scattered = = ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã= do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli= = - 12 - geographical area, it may take substantial planning, resource allocation, and coordination among the military, humanitarian organizations, and local, federal, and perhaps even foreign, government representatives. The 2009 influenza epidemic is an example of a slow-onset, geographically dispersed disaster event affecting multiple countries (see Figure 4). The epidemic was responsible for more than 14,000 known deaths (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control [ECDC], 2010), which occurred throughout the world. Subsequent resea...
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