Citing Sources
•
Direct quotes: When you draw text word-for-word from a source (including the
course text and materials), put the quoted text in quotation marks (“ ”). This shows
that it is not your own words. Also include an in-text citation in parentheses
immediately after each quote using APA style.
For example: The ethical theory of utilitarianism “holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness” (Mill, 1863/2010, p. 229).
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Paraphrases: Paraphrasing is putting ideas from a source in your own words.
When you paraphrase, nearly every word should be your own and you should
completely change the sentence structure. Do not just change words here and
there by switching in synonyms. Do not use quotation marks when you
paraphrase. However, you do need an in-text citation in parentheses for the
paraphrase using APA style.
For example: Mill’s utilitarian theory focuses on maximizing happiness and
minimizing unhappiness (Mill, 1863/2010, p. 229).
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References page: Include a References page at the end of an assignment. This will
have one entry in alphabetical order for each source quoted or paraphrased. Be
sure to use APA style for these entries.
APA Style
•
In-text citations: APA style has rules for in-text citations. These usually include
author’s last name, year of publication, and (for direct quotes) page number or
paragraph number. If the date is not listed for a website, put “n.d.” instead of a
year. If a work was originally published in an earlier year and then republished in
the work you are citing, there will be two dates. This is the case with the
selections in our course text.
For example: The ethical theory of utilitarianism “holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness” (Mill, 1863/2010, p. 229).
•
If you state an author’s last name in the text of a sentence, then you put the date
just after this and only need the page or paragraph number in parentheses.
For example: For example: As Mill (1863/2010) explains, utilitarianism “holds that
actions
are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness” (p. 229).
•
References page: APA style also has rules about References page entries. These
usually start with the author’s last name and have several types of information.
For example:
Mill, J. S. (2010). Utilitarianism. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential writings
(pp. 228-255). New York: Modern Library. (Original work published 1863)
Presentation
•
•
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For the research presentation, use quotation marks any time you quote from a
source and APA in-text citations in parentheses any time you quote or paraphrase
from a source. Quotation marks and in-text citations are required on the formal
outline, speaking outline, and slideshow.
Give an APA References page listing all sources at the end of each outline and on
the last slide of the slideshow.
Lastly, acknowledge your sources orally as you record your videos. Verbally
indicate quotes as you speak by saying “quote” and “end quote” and giving the
author’s name and the source date. For example, “as Jessica Rodriguez stated in her
2017 article in Newsweek–quote–Pollution increased each year since 2010–end
quote.” Verbally indicate paraphrases by saying the author’s name and source date
without saying “quote” and “end quote.”
Types of Sources
•
•
Example in-text citations and References page entries for the course readings are
provided at the end of this document. For sources beyond the textbook, follow the
guidelines in the tabs on the library APA page (Links to an external site.).
You will not generally cite my course videos and notes since most assignments tell
you to engage directly with the readings. If you do need to quote or paraphrase
from my materials, cite them in-text by explaining in the text of the assignment
“As Dr. Rice says in his lecture video...” and then using quotation marks for a
quote or putting things in your own words. For these kinds of materials, there is
nothing that goes in parentheses or on the References page.
Other Plagiarism Issues
•
•
•
•
•
•
All course assignments (quizzes, paper, summary questions, etc.) are open-book
and open notes, so you are encouraged to use the readings, videos, notes, and
other course materials for help. For assignments, put things entirely in your own
words unless the instructions ask for a direct quote.
You are welcome to discuss and review course concepts with other students, but
make sure any work you submit is your own. For example, do not collaborate
with other students on summary questions or research work, submit the same
answers as another student, or take another student’s answers and just change
some of their words.
Also, do not submit work from a student who took the course in the past. Even if
you change several aspects of their work, this is still plagiarism and can often be
detected by TurnItIn or the professor reading the assignment.
Similarly, do not reuse your own work from the past as part of a new assignment.
This is self-plagiarism. For example, do not take a paragraph from a paper you
wrote for a previous course and paste it into a new paper for this course.
Never ask or pay someone to do an assignment for you. This is plagiarism and is
often easy to detect. Since these outside parties are not in the class, they tend to
use information or writing patterns very different from what we are learning
which can indicate plagiarism to a professor even if your TurnItIn report is clear.
There are also other forms of academic dishonesty not discussed on this handout.
For a full explanation of Lynn’s academic honesty policy and the possible
penalties for violations, see the statement of this policy in the current Academic
Catalog on MyLynn.
Sample Citations for the Course Readings
Here are example in-text citations and Reference page listings for the course readings:
•
Introductions in the course text before each reading
This is for the short editor’s introductions that appear before each course reading. For
example, in Chapter 13, the page starting “The renowned anthropologist” is the introduction,
while the later page starting “Modern social anthropology” begins the original reading. Do
not cite the introductions in place of required quotes from the readings in assignments. If
you also need to bring in quotes or details from the introductions, this is how to cite them.
(Marino, 2010, p. __)
Marino, G. (Ed.). (2010). Ethics: The essential writings. Modern Library.
•
Ruth Benedict
(Benedict, 1934/2010, p. __)
Benedict, R. (2010). Anthropology and the abnormal. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The
essential writings (pp. 310-320). Modern Library. (Original work published 1934)
•
Martin Luther King, Jr.
(King, 1963/2010, p. __)
King, M. L. (2010). Letter from a Birmingham jail. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential
writings (pp. 358-377). Modern Library. (Original work published 1963)
•
Immanuel Kant
(Kant, 1785/2010, p. __)
Kant, I. (2010). Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals. In G. Marino
(Ed.), Ethics: The essential writings (pp. 191-224). Modern Library. (Original work published
1785)
•
Tom Regan
(Regan, 2006/2010, p. __)
Regan, T. (2010). The case for animal rights. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential
writings (pp. 531-544). Modern Library. (Original work published 2006)
•
John Stuart Mill
(Mill, 1863/2010, p. __)
Mill, J. S. (2010). Utilitarianism. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential writings (pp. 228255). Modern Library. (Original work published 1863)
•
Peter Singer
(Singer, 1979/2010, p. __)
Singer, P. (2010). Rich and poor. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential writings (pp. 507529). Modern Library. (Original work published 1979)
•
Nel Noddings
(Noddings, 1984/2010, p. __)
Noddings, N. (2010). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. In G.
Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential writings (pp. 425-444). Modern Library. (Original work
published 1984)
•
Aristotle
(Aristotle, ca. 350 B.C.E./2010, p. __)
Aristotle. (2010). Nicomachean ethics (C. Rowe, trans.). In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The
essential writings (pp. 46-84). Modern Library. (Original work published ca. 350 B.C.E.)
•
Confucius
(Confucius, ca. 500 B.C.E./n.d., p. __)
Confucius. (n.d.). The analects (J. Legge, trans.). Course handout. (Original work published
ca. 500 B.C.E.)
•
David Hume
(Hume, 1751/2010, p. __)
Hume, D. (2010). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics:
The essential writings (pp. 152-187). Modern Library. (Original work published 1751)
•
Friedrich Nietzsche
(Nietzsche, 1887/2010, p. __)
Nietzsche, F. (2010). On the genealogy of morality. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The essential
writings (pp. 277-300). Modern Library. (Original work published 1887)
•
Jean-Paul Sartre
(Sartre, 1957/2010, p. __)
Sartre, J. P. (2010). Existentialism and human emotions. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The
essential writings (pp. 329-333). Modern Library. (Original work published 1957)
•
Aldo Leopold
(Leopold, 1949/2010, p. __)
Leopold, A. (2010). A sand county almanac: The land ethic. In G. Marino (Ed.), Ethics: The
essential writings (pp. 487-505). Modern Library. (Original work published 1949)
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
by Gordon Marino
PART
I:
FROM
ix
PLATO
TO
KIERKEGAARD
1. PLATO Euihyphro, Crito, and The Republic: Book II
Nicomachean Ethics
3. EPICTETUS
The Enchiridion
4. ST. AUGUSTINK City of God; Book XIX
5. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS Summa Theologica: Question XCIV
6. THOMAS HOBBES Leviathan: Part I. Of Man,
Part II. Of Commonwealth
7. DAVID HUME An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
8. IMMANUEL KANT Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysics of Morals
9. JOHN STUART MILL Utilitarianism
10. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER Parerga and Paralipomena
11. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE On the Genealogy of Morality
12. SOREN KIERKEGAARD The Sickness Unto Death: Part II
2. ARISTOTLE
PART
II:
THE
85
107
119
I 34
149
188
225
2 56
274
299
MODERNS
Anthropology and the Abnormal
14. MARY MIDGLEY Trying Out One's New Sword
15. JKAN-PAUL SARTRE Existentialism and Human Emotion
16. PHILIP HALLIE From Cruelty to Goodness
1 3. RUTH BENEDICT
3
43
309
321
328
333
viii • Contents
The Disparity Between Intellect and Character
17. ROBERT COLES
18.
Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. Letter from a Birmingham Jail
19. J OHN RAWLS A Theory of Justice
20. ALASDAIB MACINTYRE
After Virtue
and Moral Education
23. SUSAN WOLF
Moral Saints
25. PETER SINGER
26. TOM REGAN
Rich and Poor
The Case for Animal Rights
DON MARQUIS
Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands
THOMSON
445
462
A Sand County Almanac: The Land Ethic
27. MICHAEL WALZER
28. JUDITII JARVIS
396
424
Mortal Questions
24. ALDO LEOPOLD
356
378
Caring A Feminine Approach to Ethics
21. NEL NODDINGS
2 2. THOMAS NAGEL
3 50
486
506
530
545
A Defense of Abortion
Why Abortion Is Immoral
567
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
607
PERMISSION CREDITS
609
INTRODUCTION
Gordon Marino
T h e existentialists had one thing right. To live is to abide within the
chilly coordinates of constant choice, choices about what to value,
about how to live our lives, about ethics.
A few years back, I was at the bedside of a friend dying a slow,
painful death. T h e r e was no hope of a recovery and she was haunted
by the concern that she would be gobbling up all of her children's
resources by continuing in her agonizing half-life. Worse yet, she
feared that by the time the flames of pain had finished with her, all of
her good memories and her repository of loving feelings would be
cinder. "What," she once said with a sigh, "could be more humiliating, what could be worse than not caring anymore about anything
except being free of pain?" One night, she calmly asked me to hand
her a bottle of sleeping pills. I thought for a long moment: If her end
was going to be as bad as she imagined it, why not? But it felt too
much like playing God, and I demurred.
On my way to a party, I am accosted by an unkempt man who insists
that he needs taxi fare to take his feverish baby to the emergency
room. Maybe 1 should trust him and help him out, but then again,
would I only be lending a hand to make myself feel better? But
wait—what am I? Some kind of narcissist? What difference do my
motives make to a potentially desperate individual?
x • Introduction
My mother passed away a few years ago. She had a dear aid friend whom
I started visiting. A bright, interesting, and kind nonagenarian, she very
much looks forward to o u r chats. However, every time I go to see her,
I have to pass through a long ward of Alzheimer's patients and, much as I
am ashamed to admit it, the sight unnerves me. Between the grief triggered about my mother and my two-way passage through the unit of
people who are here and yet not here, I invariably leave the nursing
home so depressed that I am not much good to anyone else for about
twenty-four hours. Should 1 continue to visit my mother's friend?
Your friend has applied for a job and you are on the hiring c o m m i t tee. Objectively speaking, he is qualified but his application does not
exactly jump to the top of the pile. Years ago, he helped you find a
position. You know f r o m experience the glass-in-your-gut feeling of
u n e m p l o y m e n t . Should you try to give his application a boost?
Would that be fair? T h e r e is an ancient and much prized virtue
called loyalty. How should we balance fairness and loyalty when they
come into conflict?—and they willcome into conflict.
Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, the killing fields of Rwanda, the American harrowing machine of slavery, and the genocide of Native A m e r i c a n s are h u m a n beings beasts? H o w can the h o r d e of us be so easily
c o r r u p t e d and transformed into murderers? Or take it one or two
notches up from the moral abyss to the recent scandals on Wall
Street and in the banking industry: H o w could all of these Ivy
L e a g u e - e d u c a t e d businessmen and -women, stalwarts of their c o m munities, defraud people out of their life savings while sipping martinis in the Hamptons?
Abstract, concrete, and in between, the questions about ethics
abound. W h a t constitutes moral progress? W h a t criteria should we
use to evaluate conduct? C a n I morally justify my actions? Should I
do the so-called right thing if it is against my self-interest? W h a t is
the right thing anyhow? Do good and evil exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y of
humans? Is ethics a body of knowledge? If so, how do we acquire this
knowledge? From books? Experience? Both? T h e s e are some of the
p r o b l e m s that fall within the purview of ethics and this collection.
But what unites this family of concerns? W h a t is ethics?
Introduction • xi
Some say that what we call ethics is nothing more nor less than
custom. Listen to Herodotus. In Book T h r e e of his Histories, he
writes:
. . . I have no doubt that Cambyses was completely out of
his mind; it is the only possible explanation of his assault
upon, and mockery of, everything which ancient law and
custom have m a d e sacred in Egypt. If anyone, no matter
who, were given the opportunity of choosing from
amongst all the nations in the world the set of beliefs
which he thought best, he would inevitably—after careful
considerations of their relative merits—choose that of his
own country. Everyone without exception believes his
own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in,
to be the best; and that being so, it is unlikely that anyone
but a madman would mock at such things. T h e r e is abundant evidence that this is the universal feeling about the
ancient customs of one's country.
O n e might recall, for example, an anecdote of Darius. W h e n he was
king of Persia, he s u m m o n e d the G r e e k s who h a p p e n e d to be present at his court, and asked t h e m what they would take to eat the dead
bodies of their fathers. T h e y replied that they would not do it for any
m o n e y in the world. Later, in the presence of the Greeks, and
through an interpreter, so that they could understand what was said,
he asked some Indians of the tribe called Callatiae, who do in fact eat
their parents' dead bodies, what they would take to burn them. T h e y
uttered a cry of h o r r o r and forbade him to mention such a dreadful
thing. O n e can see by this what custom can do.
In other words custom is king.
Scholars have noted that both the word "ethics" and the term
"morals," which are often used interchangeably, derive respectively
f r o m the Greek and Latin words for "customs." O n e of Socrates's
interlocutors in Plato's Republic holds that ethics is nothing more than
m a n n e r s or conventions and as such it has no basis in nature. On this
account, there is n o t h i n g sacred about the injunction not to lie, n o t h ing from on High d e m a n d i n g that we refrain from cruelty. For
Socrates's antagonist and the throng who think like him, the only
xii • Introduction
law with objective force is written into our pulse and instincts in the
f o r m of an innate desire to p u r s u e our self-interests and to take care
of those close to us. It is the idea of "family values" writ large. From
this skeptical point of view, norms are socially constructed rules that
t h e strong individual has to learn how to feign following so that he or
she can at least appear to be just; but, a la Machiavelli, the appearance is all that matters, and only so that the strong person can get
what he or she wants.
T h a t ethics has no objective reality, no basis in nature, is half of
the gist of the immortal Ring of Gyges myth (see page 40), again
f r o m Plato's Republic. According to the story with which G l a u c o n
regales Socrates, a shepherd happens upon a ring that renders him
invisible when he rotates the facet inward. T h e shepherd m u r d e r s
the king and marries his wife. Glaucon insists that any intelligent
man who could slip such a ring u p o n his finger would and should do
the same. And if ethics is in fact just custom, a matter of putting the
fork on the left side, then maybe Glaucon is correct and there is no
reason to refrain from cheating on our taxes and spouses.
In what the philosopher Friedrich N i e t z s c h e would come to see as
a sin against h u m a n nature, Plato's Socrates reasons that not only
should we act justly with or w i t h o u t the magical ring, but that the
righteous individual w h o is wrongly declared unjust and severely
punished is happier than the scoundrel who bamboozles people and
receives honors from the local chamber of commerce. H e r e the connection between good living (ethics) and the good life (eudaimonia.
happiness) looms up and begins its long march through the history of
reflections on ethics in the west.
In philosophical parlance, Plato and Socrates were both objectivists and cognitivists. T h e y believed that G o o d n e s s exists i n d e p e n dently of the mores of a particular society and that we can c o m e to
know it. Indeed, it was with this transcendent standard of the G o o d
in mind that Socrates, the war hero and devoted citizen of his
beloved Athens, twice risked his life in acts of civil disobedience.
T h e r e are glaring problems with the ethics-equals-customs equation. It does not seem right to say that when we c o n d e m n slavery or
torture we mean only that these practices are simply conventions
that h ave gone out of favor. Moreover, customs and manners are by
definition a matter of taste akin to "You like bread p u d d i n g and I
Introduction • xiii
don't." C o m m o n wisdom has it that t h e r e is something m o r e p r o found at stake with matters moral. W h e n we complain that the greed
of the champions of finance has w r o u g h t havoc on the American
economy and working people, we mean something more potent than
the actions of these m o n e y - m o n g e r s is not to our taste. W h a t e v e r
ethics may be, it cannot be strictly identified with customs. N e v e r theless, moral and social life are inextricably bound together. As
Alasdair M a c l n t y r e puts it:
Moral concepts change as social life changes. I deliberately do not write "because social life changes," for this
might suggest that social life is one thing, morality
another, and that there is merely an external contingent
causal relationship between them. Moral concepts are
embodied in and are partially constitutive forms of social
life. {After Virtue)
But moral concepts are more than social mores; they also differ f r o m
legal strictures. For the most part, except in the cases of certain types
of crimes, the law is not concerned with intentions. T h e law does not
care w h e t h e r or not you paid your taxes with bitterness or alacrity; it
merely demands that you carry out or abstain from certain types of
conduct. On most accounts of morals, the springs of your actions
speak to the issue of the moral worth of your actions.
T h e r e are, moreover, m a n y acts that would raise the brows of conscience but to which laws are indifferent, actions such as malicious
gossip and failing to help the poor. Finally, the halls of history are
h u n g with statutes that could only have been written by the devil.
Consider some of the Nazi legislation or our own miscegenation
laws of a mere sixty years ago. As T h o m a s Aquinas and his longdistance learning student, Dr. Martin L u t h e r King, Jr., taught, ethics
provides a standard for the law. Legal strictures that do not measure
up to that standard, and so poison rather than n u r t u r e life, are only
simulacra of a law and as such call for acts of civil disobedience.
Although there may be considerable overlap, ethics is neither law
nor custom. W h a t e v e r else it may be, ethics is the study of oughts and
of relationships; that is, of how we aught to relate to ourselves, ought to
relate to others, and as of late, of how we ought to relate to the earth.
xiv • Introduction
If t h e r e is a factual or descriptive side to this discipline, it inheres in
trying to c o m p r e h e n d h u m a n nature so as to g u i d e it.
T h e anthology before you is an assemblage of classical texts on
the science of oughts. But before squeaking open the door to this collection, we might press: W h a t is the use of studying these relationships? Of becoming a student of the literature on ethics?
In the first m o v e m e n t of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle responds
to this very question:
As then our present study, unlike the other branches of
philosophy, has a practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the sake of knowing what is,
but in order that we may become good without which
result our investigation would be of no use) . . .
Notice, Aristotle does not offer a preface of this ilk in any of his h u n dreds of other tracts. T h e end of the study of ethics should not be the
mere acquisition of knowledge or an increased ability to debate
about right and wrong. Instead, the study of ethics ought to transform us in some way. H o w so? W h a t kind of transformation am I
alluding to?
In his philosophical m a g n u m opus, The Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Soren Kierkegaard observed that he wrote to make life m o r e
difficult for his readers. Almost the same could be said for a w o r t h while collection on ethics. My hope is that spending time in these
pages will make our lives m o r e difficult by illuminating problems
that used to fly u n d e r the radar of conscience. And while these r e a d ings should sharpen our moral insight, they should also enhance our
lives. For as the great Stoic Seneca puts it, " H e who studies with a
philosopher"—or, I think, with a book of philosophy—"should take
h o m e with him some good thing every day; he should daily return
h o m e a s o u n d e r man, or on the way to become sounder."
PART I
F R O M PLATO TO K I E R K E G A A R D
CHAPTER 1
PLATO
In a sense there are two authors responsible for these three texts:
Euthyphro, Crito, and the Republic. Plato composed the dialogues Euthyphro and Crito, but it is widely believed that the conversations that
comprise these magisterial works of literature and philosophy were
based on discussions that his teacher Socrates engaged in at the time
of his trial and death. T h e Republic is a later production and though
Socrates is the central character in this work, the views and arguments expressed therein are widely held to be those of Plato himself.
Born in Athens in 469 B.C., Socrates revolutionized thinking to
such a degree that most scholars regard him and the dialectical
method he developed as the starting point of Western philosophy.
Today the philosophers who preceded Socrates, such as Anaximander, Xenophanes, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, are routinely grouped together u n d e r the heading "the Pre-Socratics."*
Socrates never wrote a word, perhaps because he heHeved that
one needed to appropriate one's thoughts on philosophical matters
and that writing was merely an aid to rote memorization. 1
In the Golden Age of Athens, in which Socrates matured and
' F o r die most part, the reflections of these early sages were a combination of myth and
natural science.
'See Plato's seventh letter on this issue.
4 • Plato
flourished, the ability to persuade assumed n e w importance. T h e
great city state was a d e m o c r a c y and in order to accrue power in this
type of government you had to learn how to convince others of your
opinion. Philosophical sparring was c o m m o n over questions such as:
Are morals based in n a t u r e or in custom? Can v i r t u e be taught?
T h o u g h a stonemason by trade, Socrates was an intellectual m a r tial artist by calling. He became both famous and infamous for p u b licly dissecting the reasoning of the powerful and elite, often making
t h e m seem foolish in the eyes of the crowd gathered at these examinations. A cadre of admirers swirled around him and listened intently
as he debated sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras.
Socrates did not regard his skills of analysis as a tool for amassing
power in the worldly sense, but rather as a means of ferreting out the
truth. His thinking may have been that both the internal and external
worlds are always shifting. In order to achieve some degree of stability, h u m a n s need to have a compass. T h e only reliable compass in the
face of flux is reason and argument. Socrates is not alone a m o n g our
moral philosophers in seeking this ballast within the self.
In a way, Socrates had nothing to teach but a method. After all, he
claimed only one piece of knowledge, namely, that he knew that he
did not know anything. Paradoxically enough, it was on the basis of
this self-awareness that the oracle at Delphi judged him to be the
wisest person in the world. Plato, who was born in 4 2 8 / 4 2 7 B.C. and
died in 347 B.C., was one of Socrates's informal students: informal
because unlike the Sophists, Socrates accepted no fees and did not
profess anything.
As Aristophanes's brilliant play The Clouds reveals, there were citizens who believed that Socrates's style of questioning u n d e r m i n e d
faith in the gods of the city, and it was for this lack of faith that
Athens was being punished. Socrates was b r o u g h t up on charges of
sowing doubts about the gods and of corrupting the youth. He was
unsuccessful in his ironic self-defense and was executed by being
forced to drink hemlock. O n e of the selections, Crito, is set in
Socrates's prison cell as he awaits execution.
Plato was surely p r e s e n t at his mentor's trial. A stern critic of
democracy, Plato recognized the intimate bond between the health
of the individual and that of t h e state. On his account, one needed to
know the Good in order to steer the state in a good direction. T r y i n g
Ethics: The Essential Writing.r • 5
to put theory into practice, Plato, on more than one occasion, undertook the task of trying to transform upstart kings into philosophers.
These adventures ended in disaster, making for a certain hidebound
quality to Plato's late works.
It is difficult to parse out the ethical positions of Socrates from
those of his genial student, Both placed enormous emphasis on the
relation between knowledge and moral goodness; so much so that it
seems that Socrates, at least, held the extreme view that moral virtue
is essentially knowledge. If you truly know the Good, you will do it.
For him there is no weakness of the will. Also, as the renowned classicist Terence Irwin notes, Socrates seems to have held that we ought
to lead a moral life whether or not such a life leads to happiness.
Plato, in contrast, argues that the righteous life is not only good in
itself but also a necessary condition of a eudaimonia or a happy life.
These issues as well as the question of whether or not moral laws are
customs or objective realities are taken up in the Ring of Gyges
excerpt from Book II of the Republic.
EUTHYPHRO
PERSONS OV THE DIALOGUE
Socrates
Euthyphro
SCENE:—The Porch of the KingArchon
EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are
you doing in the porch of the King Archon? Surely you can not be
engaged in an action before the king, as 1 am.
SOCRATES: Not in an action, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word
which the Athenians use.
EUTH: What! 1 suppose that some one has been prosecuting you, for I
can not believe that you are the prosecutor of another.
soc: Certainly not.
EUTH: T h e n some one else has been prosecuting you?
soc: Yes.
EUTH: A n d w h o i s h e ?
soc: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know
him: his name is Meletus, and'he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps
you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long
straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown.
EUTH: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. And what is the charge
which he brings against you?
Euthyphro • 7
soc: W h a t is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a
good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is
certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are
corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a
wise man, and seeing that 1 am anything but a wise man, he has
found me out, and is going to accuse me of c o r r u p t i n g his young
friends. And of this our m o t h e r the state is to be the judge. Of all
o u r political men he is the only one w h o seems to me to begin in
the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; he is a good
husbandman, and takes care of the shoots first, and clears away us
who are the destroyers of them. T h a t is the first step; he will
afterward attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has
begun, he will be a very great public benefactor.
EUTH: T hope that he may; hut I rather fear, Socrates, that the reverse
will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you
he is simply aiming a blow at the state in a sacred place. But in
what way does he say that you c o r r u p t the young?
soc: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first
hearing excites surprise: he says that T am a poet or maker of gods,
and that I make new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this
is the ground of his indictment.
EUTH: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the
familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He
thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up
before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is
readily received, for the world is always jealous of novelties in
religion. And I know that when I myself speak in the assembly
about divine things, and foretell the f u t u r e to them, they laugh at
me as a madman; and yet every word that 1 say is true. But they are
jealous of all of us. I suppose that we must be brave and not mind
them.
s o c : T h e i r laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a m a t t e r of m u c h
consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians,
I suspect, do not care m u c h about this, until he begins to make
other men wise; and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you
say, from jealousy, they are angry.
EUTH: I have no desire to try conclusions with them about this,
s o c : 1 dare say that you don't make yourself c o m m o n , and are not apt
8 • Plato
to i m p a r t your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring
out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I
am afraid that the Athenians know this; and therefore, as I was
saying, if the Athenians would only laugh at me as you say that
they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court;
but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be
you soothsayers only can predict.
EUTH: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that
you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win mine,
s o c : And what is your suit? and are you the p u r s u e r or defendant,
Euthyphro?
EUTH: I am p u r s u e r ,
s o c : Of whom?
EUTH: You will think me mad when I tell you w h o m I am pursuing.
soc: Why, has the fugitive wings?
EUTII: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.
s o c : W h o is he?
EUTH: M y f a t h e r .
SOC: Your father! good heavens, you don't m e a n that?
EUTH: Yes.
s o c : And of what is he accused?
EUTH: M u r d e r , Socrates.
s o c : By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the c o m m o n herd
know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an
extraordinary man and have m a d e great strides in wisdom, before
he could have seen his way to this.
EUTH: Indeed, Socrates, he must have m a d e great strides,
soc: I suppose that the man whom your father m u r d e r e d was one of
your relatives; if he had been a stranger you would never have
t h o u g h t of prosecuting him.
EUTH: I am amused, Socrates, ac your making a distinction between
one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the
pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate
with the murderer when you ought to clear yourself by proceeding
against him. T h e real question is whether the murdered man
has been justly slain. If justly, then your duty is to let the matter
alone; but if unjustly, t h e n even if the m u r d e r e r is u n d e r the same
roof with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him.
Euthyphro • 9
N o w the man who is dead was a poor d e p e n d a n t of m i n e
who worked for us as a field laborer at Naxos, and one day in a
fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with one of our
domestic servants and slew him. My father bound him hand and
foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent to Athens to ask of
a diviner what he should do with him. M e a n t i m e he had no care
or t h o u g h t of him, being u n d e r the impression that he was a
murderer; and that even if he did die there would be no great
harm. And this was just what happened. For such was the effect of
cold and h u n g e r and chains u p o n him, that before the messenger
returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and family
are angry with me for taking the part of the m u r d e r e r and
prosecuting my father. T h e y say that he did not kill him, and if he
did, the dead man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any
notice, for that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. T h a t
shows, Socrates, how little they know of the opinions of the gods
about piety and impiety,
soc: G o o d heavens, Euthyphro! and have you such a precise
knowledge of piety and impiety, and of divine things in general,
that, supposing the circumstances to be as you state, you are not
afraid that you too may be doing an impious thing in bringing an
action against your father?
EUTH: T h e best of E u t h y p h r o , and that which distinguishes him,
Socrates, from o t h e r men, is his exact knowledge of all these
matters. W h a t should 1 be good for without that?
soc: Rare friend! I think that T can not do better than be your disciple,
before the trial with Meletus comes on. T h e n I shall challenge
him, and say that 1 have always had a great interest in religious
questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and
innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. N o w you,
Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge E u t h y p h r o to be a
great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you think that
of him you o u g h t to think the same of me, and not have me into
court; you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and
who is the real corruptor, not of the young, but of the old; that is
to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he
admonishes and chastises. And if M e l e t u s refuses to listen to me,
but will go on, and will not shift the i n d i c t m e n t from me to you, I
10 • Plato
can not do better than say in the court that T challenged him in this
way.
EUTH: Yes, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if
I don't find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to
say to him than to me.
s o c : I know that, dear friend; and that is the reason why T desire to be
your disciple. For 1 observe that no one, not even Meletus, appears
to notice you; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and
he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell
me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you k n e w
so well, and of murder, and the rest of them. What are they? Is not
piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again, is not
that always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself,
having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?
EUTH: T O be sure, Socrates,
soc: And what is piety, and what is impiety?
EUTH: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one
who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any other similar c r i m e —
w h e t h e r he be your father or mother, or some other person, that
makes no d i f f e r e n c e — a n d not prosecuting t h e m is impiety. And
please to consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of
t h e t r u t h of what 1 am saying, which 1 have already given to
others:—of the truth, I mean, of the principle that the impious,
whoever he may be, o u g h t not to go u n p u n i s h e d . For do not m e n
regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and even
they admit that he b o u n d his father (Cronos) because he wickedly
devoured his sons, and that he too had punished his own father
(Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when
I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. T h i s is their
inconsistent way of talking when the gods are concerned, and
when I am concerned,
soc: M a y not this be the reason, E u t h y p h r o , why I am charged with
i m p i e t y — t h a t I can not away with these stories about the gods?
and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you
who are well informed about t h e m approve of them, I can not do
better than assent to your superior wisdom. For what else can I say,
confessing as 1 do, that I know nothing of them. I wish you would
tell me whether you really believe that they are true?
Euthyphro • 11
EUTH: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the
world is in ignorance,
soc: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another,
and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as
you may see represented in the works of great artists? T h e
temples are full of them; and notably t h e robe of Athene, which is
carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is
embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true,
Euthyphro?
EUTH: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would
like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would
quite amaze you.
soc: T dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when I
have leisure. But just at present I would rather hear from you a
m o r e precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend,
to the question, W h a t is "piety"? In reply, you only say that piety
is, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder?
EUTH: And that is true, Socrates.
s o c : I dare say, Euthyphro, but there are m a n y other pious acts.
EUTH: T h e r e a r e .
soc: R e m e m b e r that I did not ask you to give me two or three
examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all
pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one
idea which m a d e the impious impious, and the pious pious?
EUTH: I r e m e m b e r .
s o c : Tell me what this is, and then T shall have a standard to which I
may look, and by which I may m e a s u r e the nature of actions,
w h e t h e r yours or any one else's, and say that this action is pious,
and that impious?
EUTH: 1 will tell you, if you like,
soc: I should very m u c h like.
EUTH: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that
which is not dear to them,
soc: Very good, E u t h y p h r o ; you have now given me just the sort of
answer which I wanted. But w h e t h e r it is true or not I can not as
yet tell, although I make no douht that you will prove the t r u t h of
your words.
EUTH: O f c o u r s e .
12 • Plato
soc: C o m e , then, and let us examine what we are saying. T h a t thing
or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or
person which is hateful to the gods is impious. Was not that said?
EUTH: Yes, that was said.
s o c : And that seems to have been very well said too?
EUTH: Yes, Socrates, I think that; it was certainly said,
soc: And further, E u t h y p h r o , the gods were admitted to have
enmities and hatreds and differences—that was also said?
EUTH: Yes, that was said.
SOC: And what sort of difference creates e n m i t y and anger? Suppose
for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a n u m b e r ;
do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance
with one another? Do we not go at once to calculation, and end
t h e m by a sum?
EUTH: T r u e .
soc: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly
put an end to that difference by measuring?
EUTH: T h a t is true.
soc: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to
a weighing-machine?
EUTH: T O be sure.
soc: But what differences are those which, because they can not be
thus decided, make us angry and set us at enmity with one another?
I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and
therefore I will suggest that this happens when the matters of
difference are the just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and
dishonorable. Are not these the points about which, when differing,
and unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, we quarrel,
when we do quarrel, as you and I and all men experience?
EUTH: Yes, Socrates, that is the nature of the differences about which
we quarrel.
soc: And the quarrels of the gods, noble E u t h y p h r o , when they occur,
are of a like nature?
EUTH: T h e y are.
s o c : T h e y have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and
evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable: there would
have been no quarrels among them, if t h e r e had been no such
differences—would t h e r e now?
Euthyphro • 13
EUTH: You are quite right.
soc: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and
good, and hate the opposite of them?
EUTH: Very true.
soc: But then, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just
and others as unjust; and they dispute about this, and there arise
wars and fightings a m o n g them.
EUTH: Yes, that is true.
soc: T h e n the same things, as appears, are hated by the gods and
loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?
EUTH: T r u e .
soc: T h e n upon this view the same things, E u t h y p h r o , will be pious
and also impious?
EUTH: T h a t , 1 suppose, is true.
soc: T h e n , my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered what I asked. For I certainly did not ask what was that
which is at once pious and impious: and that which is loved by the
gods appears also to be hated by them. And therefore, E u t h y p h r o ,
in thus chastising y o u r father you may very likely be doing what is
agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to C r o n o s or Uranus, and what
is acceptable to H e p h a e s t u s but unacceptable to Hera, and t h e r e
may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.
EUTH: But 1 believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to
the propriety of punishing a m u r d e r e r : there would be no
difference of opinion about that,
soc: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any
one arguing that a m u r d e r e r or any sort of evil-doer o u g h t to be
let off?
EUTH: I should rather say that they are always arguing this, especially
in courts of law: they c o m m i t all sorts of crimes, and t h e r e is
n o t h i n g that they will not do or say in order to escape punishment,
soc: But do they admit their guilt, E u t h y p h r o , and yet say that they
o u g h t not to be punished?
EUTH: N o ; t h e y do not.
s o c : T h e n there are some things which they do not venture to say
and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?
EUTH: Yes.
14 • Plato
s o c : T h e n they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be
punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is,
and what he did and when?
EUTH: T r u e .
s o c : And the gods are in the same case, if as you imply they quarrel
about just and unjust, and some of them say that they w r o n g one
another, and others of t h e m deny this. For surely neither G o d nor
man will ever venture to say that the doer of evil is not to be
punished:—you don't mean to tell me that?
EUTH: T h a t is true, Socrates, in the main.
soc: But they join issue about particulars; and this applies not only to
men but to the gods; if they dispute at all they dispute about some
act which is called in question, and which some affirm to be just,
others to be unjust. Is not that true?
EUTH: Q u i t e true.
s o c : Well then, my dear friend E u t h y p h r o , do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the
Opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is p u t
in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is p u t
in chains before his corrector can learn from the interpreters what
he o u g h t to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such
an one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of
murder. H o w would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in
approving of his act? Prove to me that, and I will applaud your
wisdom as long as you live.
EUTH: T h a t would not be an easy task, although I could make the
m a t t e r very clear indeed to you.
s o c : I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to t h e m you will be sure to prove
that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.
EUTH: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.
soc: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good
speaker. T h e r e was a notion that c a m e into my mind while you
were speaking; I said to myself "Well, and what if E u t h y p h r o does
prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as
unjust, how do I k n o w anything more of the n a t u r e of piety and
impiety? for granting that this action may be hateful to the gods,
still these distinctions have no bearing on the definition of piety
Euthyphro • 15
and impiety, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown
to be also pleasing and dear to them." And therefore, Euthyphro, I
don't ask you to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the
gods c o n d e m n and abominate such an action. But 1 will amend the
definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious,
and what they love pious or holy; and what some of t h e m love and
others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety
and impiety?
EUTH: W h y not, Socrates?
soc: W h y not! certainly, as far as 1 am concerned, E u t h y p h r o . But
whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of
instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.
EUTH: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy,
and the opposite which they all hate, impious,
soc: O u g h t we to inquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply
to accept the m e r e statement on our own authority and that of
others?
EUTH: We should inquire; and 1 believe that the statement will stand
the test of inquiry,
soc: T h a t , my good friend, we shall know better in a little while. T h e
point which I should first wish to u n d e r s t a n d is whether the pious
or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it
is beloved of the gods.
EUTH: I don't u n d e r s t a n d your meaning, Socrates,
soc: 1 will endeavor to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of
being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen.
And here is a difference, the nature of which you understand.
EUTH: I think that I understand.
s o c : And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state of
carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason?
EUTH: N O ; that is the reason.
s o c : And the same is true of that which is led and of that which is
seen?
EUTH: T r u e .
soc: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing in the state of being led
16 • Pla to
because it is led, or in the state of being carried because it is
carried, but the converse of this. And now I think, Euthyphro, that
my meaning will be intelligible; and my meaning is, that any state
of action or passion implies previous action or passion. It does not
become because it is becoming, but it is becoming because it
comes; neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but
it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you admit that?
EUTH: Y e s .
soc: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or
suffering?
EUTH: Y e s .
soc: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of
being loved Follows the act of being loved, and not the act the
state.
EUTH: T h a t is certain.
soc: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according
to your definition, loved by all the gods?
EUTH: Y e s .
soc: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
EUTH: No, that is the reason.
soc: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
EUTH: Y e s .
soc: And that which is in a state to be loved of the gods, and is dear
to them, is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of
them?
EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: Then that which is loved of God, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is
that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things.
EUTH: H O W do you mean, Socrates?
soc: 1 mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be
loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
EUTH: Y e s .
soc: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is
loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
EUTH: T r u e .
soc: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same as that
which is dear to God, and that which is holy is loved as being holy,
Euthyphro • 17
then that which is dear to G o d would have been loved as being
dear to God; but if that which is dear to G o d is dear to him
because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been
holy because loved by him. Rut now you see that the reverse is t h e
case, and that they are quite different f r o m one another. For one
(-deocpiXeQ is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the
other ( 8 o i o v ) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. T h u s you
appear to me, E u t h y p h r o , when T ask you what is the essence of
holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the e s s e n c e — t h e
attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to
explain to me the n a t u r e of piety. And therefore, if you please, 1
will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more
what piety or holiness really is, w h e t h e r dear to the gods or not
(for that is a m a t t e r about which we will not quarrel). And what is
impiety?
EUTH: I really do not know, Socrates, how to say what I mean. For
somehow or other o u r arguments, on whatever ground we rest
them, seem to t u r n round and walk away,
soc: Your words, E u t h y p h r o , are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or p r o p o u n d e r of them, you
might say that this comes of my being his relation; and that this is
the reason why my arguments walk away and won't remain fixed
where they are placed. But now, as the notions are your own, you
must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you yourself
allow, show an inclination to be on the move.
EUTH: Nay, Socrates, 1 shall still say that you are the Daedalus who
sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, make them move or go
round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am concerned,
soc: T h e n 1 must be a greater than Daedalus; for whereas he only
made his own inventions to move, 1 move those of other people as
well. And t h e beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would
give the wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus to be
able to detain t h e m and keep t h e m fixed. But enough of this. As I
perceive that you are indolent, I will myself endeavor to show you
how you might instruct me in the n a t u r e of piety; and I hope that
you will not grudge your labor. Tell me, then,—Is not that which
is pious necessarily just?
EUTH: Yes.
18 • Plato
s o c : And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all
just, but that which is just only in part and not all pious?
EUTH: 1 don't understand you, Socrates.
s o c : And yet 1 know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you are
younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of
y o u r wisdom makes you indolent. Please to exert yourself, for
there is no real difficulty in u n d e r s t a n d i n g me. W h a t I mean I may
explain by an illustration of what I do not mean. T h e p o e t
(Stasinus) sings—
Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also
reverence.
And T disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what 1 disagree?
EUTH: By all m e a n s .
soc: 1 should not say that where t h e r e is fear there is also reverence;
for I am sure that m a n y persons fear poverty and disease, and the
like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of
their fear.
EUTH: Very true.
s o c : But w h e r e reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a feeling of
reverence and s h a m e about the commission of any action, fears
and is afraid of an ill reputation.
EUTH: N o d o u b t .
s o c : T h e n are we wrong in saying that w h e r e there is fear t h e r e is
also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence t h e r e
is also fear. But t h e r e is not always reverence w h e r e t h e r e is fear;
for fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear,
just as the odd is a part of number, and n u m b e r is a more extended
notion than, the odd. 1 suppose that you follow me now?
EUTH: Q u i t e well.
s o c : T h a t was the sort of question which I m e a n t to raise when asking
w h e t h e r the just is the pious, or the pious t h e just; and w h e t h e r
t h e r e may not be justice where there is not always piety; for justice
is the m o r e extended notion of which piety is only a part, Do you
agree in that?
EUTH: Yes; that, 1 think, is correct-
Euthyphro • 19
soc: T h e n , now, if piety is a part of justice, T suppose that we inquire
what part? If you had pursued the injury in the previous cases; for
instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what
part of n u m b e r the even is, I should have had no difficulty in
replying, a n u m b e r which represents a figure having two equal
sides. Do you agree?
EUTH: Yes.
soc: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice is piety
or holiness; that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me
injustice, or indict me for impiety; as I am now adequately
instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their
opposites.
EUTH: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of
justice which attends to the gods, as t h e r e is the other part of
justice which attends to men.
soc: T h a t is good, E u t h y p h r o ; yet still there is a little point about
which I should like to have f u r t h e r information. W h a t is the
m e a n i n g of "attention"? For attention can hardly be used in the
same sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other
things. For instance, horses are said to require attention, and not
every person is able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in
horsemanship. Is not that true?
EUTH: Q u i t e true.
soc: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
attending to horses?
EUTH: Yes.
soc: N o r is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman.
EUTH: T r u e .
soc: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the an
of attending to dogs?
EUTH: Yes.
s o c : As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
EUTH: Very true.
soc: And as holiness or piety is the art of attending to the gods?—that
would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
EUTH: Yes.
soc: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit of
20 • Plato
that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses, you
may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are
benefited and improved, are they not?
EUTH: T r u e .
soc: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen by
the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended
for their good and not for their hurt?
EUTH: Certainly, not for their hurt,
soc: But for their good?
EUTH: Of c o u r s e .
soc: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined as the art of
attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say
that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
EUTH: No, no; that is certainly not my meaning,
soc: Indeed, E u t h y p h r o , I did not suppose that this was your
meaning; far otherwise. And that was the reason why I asked you
the nature of this attention, because I t h o u g h t that this was not
your meaning.
EUTH: You do me justice, Socrates; for that is not my meaning,
soc: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods which
is called piety?
EUTH: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters,
soc: 1 u n d e r s t a n d — a sort of ministration to the gods.
EUTH: Exactly.
soc: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, tending to the
attainment of some object—would you not say health?
EUTH: Yes.
soc: Again, there is an art which ministers to t h e ship-builder with a
view to the attainment of some result?
EUTH: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship,
soc: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a
view to the building of a house?
EUTH: Yes.
SOC: And now tell me, my good friend, about this art which ministers
to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must
surely know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is
best instructed in religion.
EUTH: And that is true, Socrates.
Euthyphro • 21
soc: Tell me then, oh tell m e — w h a t is that fair work which the gods
do by the help of us as their ministers?
EUTH:.Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
soc: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief of
them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the
chief of them?
EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I am not
mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the earth?
EUTH: Exactly.
soc: And of the many and fair things which the gods do, which is the
chief and principal one?
EUTH: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these things
accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety is
learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and
sacrifices. T h a t is piety, which is the salvation of families and
states, just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their
ruin and destruction,
soc: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the
chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But T
see plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me: else why,
when we had reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only
answered me T should have learned of you by this time the nature
of p i e t y Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily d e p e n d e n t
on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask
again, what is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they
are a sort of science of praying and sacrificing?
KUTH: Y e s , I d o .
soc: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of the
gods?
JIUTH: Yes, Socrates.
soc: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
EUTH: You understand me capitally, Socrates.
soc: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your science,
and give my mind to it, and therefore n o t h i n g which you say will
be thrown away u p o n me. Please then to tell me, what is the n a t u r e
of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests
and give gifts to them?
22 • Plato
EUTH: Y e s , I d o .
SOC: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want?
EUTH: C e r t a i n l y .
soc: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what they
want of us. There would be no meaning, in an art which gives to
any one that which he does not want.
EUTH: Very true, Socrates.
soc: T h e n piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of
doing business with one another?
EUTH: T h a t is an expression which you may use, if you like,
soc: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. I wish,
however, that you would tell me what benefit accrues to the gods
from our gifts. T h a t they are the givers of every good to us is clear;
but how we can give any good thing to them in return is far from
being equally clear. If they give everything and we give nothing,
that must be an affair of business in which we have very greatly
the advantage of them.
EUTI-I: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the
gods from what they receive of us?
soc: But if not, Euthyphro, what sort of gifts do we confer upon the
gods?
EUTH: What should we confer upon them, but tributes of honor; and,
as I was just now saying, what is pleasing to them?
soc: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or dear to
them?
EUTH: 1 should say that nothing could be dearer.
soc: T h e n once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to
the gods?
EUTH: N O doubt.
soc: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not
standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse me of being the
Daedalus who makes them walk away, not perceiving that there is
another and far greater artist than Daedalus who makes them go
round in a circle; and that is yourself: for the argument, as you will
perceive, comes round to the same point. I think that you must
remember our saying that the holy or pious was not the same as
that which is loved of the gods. Do you remember that?
EUTH: I d o .
Euthyphro • 23
soc: And do you not see that what is loved of the gods is holy, and
that this is the same as what is dear to them?
ICUTH: T r u e .
soc: T h e n either we were wrong in that admission; or, if we were
right then, we are w r o n g now.
KUTH: I suppose that is the case.
soc: T h e n we must begin again and ask, W h a t is piety? T h a t is an
inquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me
lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to
the utmost, and tell me the truth. For, if any man knows, you are
he; and therefore I shall detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. For
if you had not certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I
am confident that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have
charged your aged father with murder. You would not have r u n
such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you would
have had too m u c h respect for the opinions of men. I am sure,
therefore, that you know the nature of piety and impiety. Speak
out then, my dear E u t h y p h r o , and do not hide your knowledge.
LCUTH: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now.
soc: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? I was
hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and
impiety, so that I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his
indictment. T h e n I might have proved to him that I had been
converted by E u t h y p h r o , and had done with rash innovations and
speculations, in which I had indulged through ignorance, and was
about to lead a better life.
CRITO
PERSONS OF T H E DIALOGUE
Socrates
Crito
SCENE:—The Prison of Socrates
SOCRATES: W h y have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be quite
early?
CRITO: Y e s , c e r t a i n l y ,
soc: What is the exact time?
CR: T h e dawn is breaking.
SOC: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.
CR: He knows me, because I often come, Socrates; moreover, 1 have
done him a kindness,
soc: And are you only just come?
CR: No, I came some time ago.
soc: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of awakening me
at once?
CR: Why, indeed, Socrates, T myself would rather not have all this
sleeplessness and sorrow. But I have been wondering at your
peaceful slumbers, and that was the reason why I did not awaken
you, because I wanted you to be out of pain. I have always thought
you happy in the calmness of your temperament; but never did 1
Crito • -?7
see t h e like of the easy, cheerful way in which you bear this
calamity.
soc: Why, Crito, w h e n a man has reached my age he ought not to be
repining at the prospect of death.
CR: And yet other old men find themselves in similar misfortunes,
and age does not prevent them f r o m repining,
soc: T h a t may be. But you have not told me why you come at this
early hour.
CR: I c o m e to bring you a message which is sad and pain; not, as I
believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and
saddest of all to me.
soc: What! I suppose that the ship has c o m e from Delos, on the
arrival of which 1 am to die?
CR: N o , the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably be
h e r e to-day, as persons who have c o m e from Sunium tell me that
they left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the
last day of your life,
soc: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am willing; but my
belief is that there will be a delay of a day.
CR: W h y do you say this?
soc: I will tell you. 1 am to die on the day after the arrival of the ship?
CR: Yes; that is what the authorities say.
soc: But 1 do not think that the ship will be here until to-morrow;
this I gather from a vision which I had last night, or rather only
just now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.
CR: And what was the n a t u r e of the vision?
soc: T h e r e came to me the likeness of a woman, fair and comely,
clothed in white raiment, who called to me and said: O Socrates,
The third day hence to Phthia shalt thou go.
CR: W h a t a singular dream, Socrates!
soc: T h e r e can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I think.
CR: Yes; t h e m e a n i n g is only too clear. But, Oh! my beloved Socrates,
let me entreat you once m o r e to take my advice and escape. For if
you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced,
but there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will
believe that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give
26 • Plato
money, but that T did not care. Now, can t h e r e be a worse disgrace
than this—that T should be t h o u g h t to value m o n e y more than the
life of a friend? For the m a n y will not be persuaded that I wanted
you to escape, and that you refused.
SOC: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the
many? G o o d men, and they are the only persons who are worth
considering, will think of these things truly as they happened.
CR: But do you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the m a n y must
be regarded, as is evident in your own case, because they can
do the very greatest evil to any one who has lost their good
opinion.
s o c : T only wish, Crito, that they could; for then they could also do
the greatest good, and that would be well. But the truth is, that
they can do neither good nor evil: they can not make a man wise
or make him foolish; and whatever they do is the result of chance.
CR: Well, T will not dispute about that; but please to tell me, Socrates,
w h e t h e r you are not acting out of regard to me and your other
friends: are you not afraid that if you escape hence we may get
into trouble with t h e informers for having stolen you away, and
lose either the whole or a great part of our property; or that even
a worse evil may h a p p e n to us? Now, if this is your fear, be at ease;
for in order to save you, we ought surely to r u n this, or even a
greater risk; be persuaded, then, and do as I say.
s o c : Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by no means
the only one.
CR: Fear not. T h e r e are persons who at no great cost are willing to
save you and bring you out of prison; and as for the informers, you
may observe that they are far from being exorbitant in their
demands; a little m o n e y will satisfy them. My means, which, as 1
am sure, are ample, are at y o u r service, and if you have a scruple
about spending all mine, h e r e are strangers who will give you the
use of theirs; and one of them, Simmias the T h e b a n , has b r o u g h t
a sum of money for this very purpose; and C e b e s and m a n y others
are willing to spend their money too. I say therefore, do n o t on
that account hesitate about making your escape, and do not say, as
you did in the court, that you will have a difficulty in knowing
what to do with yourself if you escape. For men will love you in
other places to which you may go, and not in Athens only; t h e r e
Onto
>7
are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you like to go to them, who will
value and protect you, and no Thessalian will give you any
trouble. N o r can I think that you are justified, Socrates, in
betraying your own life when you might be saved; this is playing
into the hands of your enemies and destroyers; and moreover I
should say that you were betraying your children; for you might
bring them up and e d u c a t e them; instead of which you go away
and leave them, and they will have to take their chance; and if they
do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will he small
thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world who
is unwilling to persevere to the end in their n u r t u r e and
education. But you are choosing the easier part, as I think, not the
better and manlier, which would rather have become one who
professes virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am
ashamed not only of you, but of us who are your friends, when T
reflect that this entire business of yours will be attributed to our
want of courage. T h e trial need never have come on, or might
have been brought to another issue; and the end of all, which is the
crowning absurdity, will seem to have been permitted by us,
through cowardice and baseness, who might have saved you, as
you might have saved yourself if we had been good for anything
(for t h e r e was no difficulty in escaping); and we did not see how
disgraceful, Socrates, and also miserable all this will be to us as
well as to you. Make your mind up then, or rather have your mind
already m a d e up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is
only one thing to he done, which must be done, if at all, this very
night, and which any delay will render all but impossible; T
beseech you therefore, Socrates, to be persuaded by me, and to do
as I say.
soc: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if wrong,
the greater the zeal the greater the evil; and therefore we o u g h t to
consider w h e t h e r these things shall be done or not. For I am and
always have been one of those natures who must be guided by
reason, whatever the reason may be which u p o n reflection
appears to me to be the best; and now that this f o r t u n e has come
u p o n me, I can not put away the reasons which I have before given:
the principles which I have hitherto honored and revered I still
honor, and unless we can find other and better principles on the
28 • Plato
instant, I am certain not to agree with yon; no, not even if the
power of the m u l t i t u d e could inflict many more imprisonments,
confiscations, deaths, frightening us like children with hobgoblin
terrors. But what will be the fairest way of considering the
question? Shall 1 r e t u r n to your old a r g u m e n t about the opinions
of men? some of which are to be regarded, and others, as we were
saying, are not to be regarded. N o w were we right in maintaining
this before 1 was c o n d e m n e d ? And has the a r g u m e n t which was
once good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking;—in fact
an a m u s e m e n t only, and altogether vanity? T h a t is what 1 want to
consider with your help, Crito:—whether, u n d e r my present
circumstances, the a r g u m e n t appears to be in any way different
or not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. T h a t argument,
which, as 1 believe, is maintained by m a n y who assume to be
authorities, was to the effect, as 1 was saying, that the opinions
of some men are to be regarded, and of other men not to be
regarded. N o w you, Crito, are a disinterested person who are n o t
going to die t o - m o r r o w — a t least, there is no h u m a n probability
of this, and you are therefore not liable to be deceived by the
circumstances in which you are placed. Tell me then, w h e t h e r I
am right in saying that some opinions, and the opinions of some
m e n only, are to be valued, and other opinions, and the opinions
of o t h e r men, are not to be valued. I ask you w h e t h e r I was right in
maintaining this?
CR: Certainly.
SOC: T h e good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
CR: Yes.
soc: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the opinions of the
unwise are evil?
CR: Certainly.
soc: And what was said about another matter? Was the disciple in
gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and
opinion of every man, or of one man only—-his physician or
trainer, whoever that was?
CR: Of one man only.
soc: And he ought to fear the censure and w e l c o m e the praise of that
o n e only, and not of the many?
CR: T h a t is clear.
Crito • -?7
soc: And he ought to live and train, and eat and drink in the way
which seems good to his single master who has understanding,
rather than according to the opinion of all other m e n p u t
together?
CR: T r u e .
soc: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and approval of
the one, and regards the opinion of the m a n y who have no
understanding, will he not suffer evil?
CR: Certainly he will.
soc: And what will the evil be, whither t e n d i n g and what affecting, in
the disobedient person?
CR: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the evil,
soc: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things which we
need not separately enumerate? In the matter of just and unjust,
fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present
consultation, o u g h t we to follow the opinion of the many and to
fear them; or the opinion of the one man who has understanding,
and whom we ought to fear and reverence m o r e than all the rest
of the world: and whom deserting we shall destroy and injure that
principle in us which may be assumed to be improved by justice
and deteriorated by injustice;—is t h e r e not such a principle?
CR: Certainly there is, Socrates.
s o c : T a k e a parallel instance:—if, acting u n d e r the advice of m e n
who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improvable
by health and deteriorated by disease—when that has been
destroyed, 1 say, would life be worth having? And that i s — t h e
body?
CR: Yes.
soc: C o u l d we live, having an evil and c o r r u p t e d body?
CR: Certainly not.
soc: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be
depraved, which is improved by justice and deteriorated by
injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in
man, which has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to
the body?
CR: Certainly not.
soc: M o r e honored, then?
CR: Far more honored.
30 • Plato
s o c : T h e n , my friend, we must not regard what the many say of us:
but what he, the one man who has u n d e r s t a n d i n g of just and
unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you
begin in error when you suggest that we should regard the opinion
of the many about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and
dishonorable.—Well, s o m e one will say, "but the many can kill
us."
CR: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
SOC: T h a t is true: but still I find with surprise that the old a r g u m e n t
is, as I conceive, unshaken as ever. .And I should like to know
w h e t h e r 1 may say the same of another p r o p o s i t i o n — t h a t not life,
but a good life, is to be chiefly valued?
CR: Yes, that also remains.
soc: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable o n e — t h a t
holds also?
CR: Yes, that holds.
SOC: From these premisses I proceed to argue the question whether I
o u g h t or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the
Athenians: and if 1 am clearly right in escaping, then 1 will make
the attempt; but if not, I will abstain. T h e other considerations
which you mention, of money and loss of character and the duty
of educating children, are, as I fear, only the doctrines of the
multitude, who would be as ready to call people to life, if they
were able, as they are to p u t t h e m to d e a t h — a n d with as little
reason. But now, since the a r g u m e n t has thus far prevailed, the
only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall
do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our
escape and paying t h e m in money and thanks, or w h e t h e r we shall
not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity
which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to
enter into the calculation.
CR: I think that you are right, Socrates; how then shall we proceed?
soc: Let us consider the matter together, and do you either r e f u t e me
if you can, and I will be convinced; or else cease, my dear friend,
from repeating to me that I o u g h t to escape against the wishes of
the Athenians: for I am extremely desirous to be persuaded by
you, but not against my own better judgment. And now please to
consider my first position, and do your best to answer me.
Crito • -?7
cu: I will do my best.
soc: Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or
that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do
wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was
just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us?
Are all our former admissions which were made within a few
days to be thrown away? And have we, at our age, been earnestly
discoursing with one another all our life long only to discover
that we are no better than children? Or are we to rest assured, in
spite of the opinion of the many, and in spite of consequences
whether better or worse, of the t r u t h of what was then said, that
injustice is always an evil and dishonor to him who acts unjustly?
Shall we affirm that?
CR: Yes.
soc: T h e n we must do no wrong?
CR: Certainly not.
soc: N o r when injured injure in return, as the m a n y imagine; for we
must injure no one at all?
CR: Clearly not.
soc: Again, Crito, may we do evil?
CR: Surely not, Socrates.
soc: And what of doing evil in return for evil, which is the morality
of the many—is that just or not?
CR: N o t just.
soc: For doing evil to another is the same as injuring him?
CR: Very true.
s o c : T h e n we ought not to retaliate or r e n d e r evil for evil to any one,
whatever evil we may have suffered from him. But I would have
you consider, Crito, whether you really mean what you are saying.
For this opinion has never been held, and never will be held, by
any considerable n u m b e r of persons; and those who are agreed
and those who are not agreed u p o n this point have no c o m m o n
ground, and can only despise one another when they see how
widely they differ. Tell me, then, w h e t h e r you agree with and
assent to my first principle, that neither injury nor retaliation n o r
warding off evil by evil is ever right. And shall that be the premiss
of our argument? Or do you decline and dissent from this? For this
has been of old and is still my opinion; but, if you are of another
32 • Plato
opinion, let me hear what you have to say. If, however, you remain
of the same mind as f o r m e r l y I will proceed to the next step.
CR: You may proceed, for I have not changed my mind,
s o c : T h e n I will proceed to the next step, which may be put in the
form of a q u e s t i o n : — O u g h t a man to do what he admits to be
right, or o u g h t he to betray the right?
CR: He ought to do what he thinks right.
Soc: Rut if this is true, what is the application? In leaving the prison
against the will of the Athenians, do I w r o n g any? or rather do I
not w r o n g those whom I o u g h t least to wrong? Do I not desert t h e
principles which were acknowledged by us to be just? W h a t do
you say?
CR: I can not tell, Socrates; for I do not know.
s o c : T h e n consider the matter in this way:—Imagine that I am about
to play t r u a n t (you may call the p r o c e e d i n g by any n a m e which
you like), and the laws and the government come and interrogate
me: "Tell us, Socrates," they say; "what are you about? are vou
going by an act of yours to overturn u s — t h e laws and the whole
state, as far as in you lies? Do you imagine that a state can subsist
and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no
power, but are set aside and overthrown by individuals?" W h a t
will be our answer, Crito, to these and the like words? A n y one,
and especially a clever rhetorician, will have a good deal to urge
about the evil of setting aside the law which requires a sentence to
be carried out; and we might reply, "Yes; but the state has injured
us and given an unjust sentence." Suppose I say that?
CR: Very good, Socrates.
s o c : "And was that our a g r e e m e n t with you?" the law would say; "or
were you to abide by the sentence of the state?" And if I were to
express astonishment at their saying this, the law would probably
add: "Answer, Socrates, instead of opening your eyes: you are in
the habit of asking and answering questions. Tell us what
complaint you have to make against us which justifies you in
attempting to destroy us and the state? In the first place did we not
bring you into existence? Your father married your mother by our
aid and begat you. Say whether you have any objection to u r g e
against those of us who regulate marriage?" N o n e , I should reply.
"Or against those of us who regulate the system of n u r t u r e and
Crito • -?7
education of children in which you were trained? Were not the
laws, who have the charge of this, right in c o m m a n d i n g your
father to train you in music and gymnastic?" Right, I should reply.
"Well then, since you were brought into the world and n u r t u r e d
and educated by us, can you d e n y in the first place that you are
our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? And if this is
t r u e you are not on equal terms with us; nor can you think that
you have a right to do to us what we are doing to you. Would you
have any right to strike or revile or do any other evil to a father or
to your master, if you had one, when you have been struck or
reviled by him, or received some other evil at his hands?—you
would not say this? And because we think right to destroy you, do
you think that you have any right to destroy us in return, and your
country as far as in you lies? And will you, 0 professor of t r u e
virtue, say that you are justified in this? H a s a philosopher like you
failed to discover that our country is more to be valued and higher
and holier far than m o t h e r or father or any ancestor, and more to
be regarded in the eyes of the gods and of men of understanding?
also to be soothed, and gently and reverently entreated when
angry, even m o r e than a father, and if not persuaded, obeyed? And
when we are punished by her, whether with i m p r i s o n m e n t or
stripes, t h e p u n i s h m e n t is to be e n d u r e d in silence; and if she lead
us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right;
neither may any one yield or retreat or leave his rank, b u t w h e t h e r
in battle or in a c o u r t of law, or in any other place, he must do
what his city and his country order him; or he must change their
view of what is just: and if he may do no violence to his father or
mother, m u c h less may he do violence to his country." W h a t
answer shall we make to this, Crito? Do the laws speak truly, or do
they not?
CR: I think that they do.
s o c : T h e n the laws will say: "Consider, Socrates, if this is true, that in
your present attempt you are going to do us wrong. For, after
having brought you into the world, and n u r t u r e d and educated
you, and given you and every other citizen a share in every good
that we had to give, we f u r t h e r proclaim and give the right to
every Athenian, that if he does not like us when he has c o m e of
age and has seen the ways of the city, and made our acquaintance,
34 • Plato
he may go w h e r e he pleases and take his goods with him; and none
of us laws will forbid him or interfere with him. Any of you who
does not like us and the city, and who wants to go to a colony or to
any other city, may go where he likes, and take his goods with him.
But he who has experience of the m a n n e r in which we order
justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into
an implied contract that he will do as we c o m m a n d him. And he
w h o disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong; first, because in
disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we
are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an
a g r e e m e n t with us that he will duly obey o u r commands; and he
neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are
wrong; and we do not rudely impose them, but give them the
alternative of obeying or convincing us;—that is what we offer,
and he does neither. T h e s e are the sort of accusations to which, as
we were saying, you, Socrates, will be exposed if you accomplish
your intentions; you, above all other Athenians." Suppose I ask,
why is this? they will justly retort u p o n me that 1 above all other
men have acknowledged the agreement. " T h e r e is clear proof,"
they will say, "Socrates, that we and the city were not displeasing
to you. Of all Athenians you have been the most constant resident
in the city, which, as you never leave, you may be supposed to
love. For you never went out of the city either to see the games,
except once when you went to the Isthmus, or to any other place
unless you were on military service; nor did you travel as other
men do. N o r had you any curiosity to know o t h e r states or their
laws: your affections did not go beyond us and o u r state; we were
y o u r special favorites, and you acquiesced in our government of
you; and this is the state in which you begat your children, which
is a proof of your satisfaction. Moreover, you might, if you had
liked, have fixed the penalty at banishment in the course of the
t r i a l — t h e state which refuses to let you go now would have let
you go then. But you pretended that you p r e f e r r e d death to exile,
and that you were not grieved at death. And now you have
forgotten these fine sentiments, and pay no respect to us t h e laws,
of whom you are the destroyer; and are doing what only a
miserable slave would do, r u n n i n g away and t u r n i n g your back
u p o n the compacts and agreements which you made as a citizen.
Crito • -?7
And first of all answer this very question: Are we right in saying
that you agreed to be governed according to us in deed, and not in
word only? Is that t r u e or not?" How shall we answer that, Crito?
M u s t we not agree?
CR: T h e r e is no help, Socrates.
soc: T h e n will they not say: "You, Socrates, are breaking the
covenants and agreements which you m a d e with us at your
leisure, not in any haste or u n d e r any compulsion or deception,
but having had seventy years to think of them, during which time
you were at liberty to leave the city, if we were not to your mind,
or if our covenants appeared to .you to be unfair. You had your
choice, and might have gone either to Laccdaemon or Crete,
which you often praise for their good government, or to some
other Hellenic or foreign state. W h e r e a s you, above all other
Athenians, seemed to be so fond of the state, or, in other words, of
us her laws (for who would like a state that has no laws), that you
never stirred out of her; the halt, the blind, the maimed were not
m o r e stationary in her than you were. And now you run away and
forsake your agreements. N o t so, Socrates, if you will take our
advice; do not make yourself ridiculous by escaping out of the
city.
"For just consider, if you transgress and err in this sort of way,
what good will you do either to yourself or to your friends? T h a t
your friends will be driven into exile and deprived of citizenship,
or will lose their property, is tolerably certain; and you yourself, if
you flv to one of the neighboring cities, as, for example, T h e b e s or
Megara, both of which are well-governed cities, will come to them
as an enemy, Socrates, and their government will be against you,
and all patriotic citizens will cast an evil eye u p o n you as a
subverter of the laws, and you will confirm in the minds of the
judges the justice of their own condemnation of you. For he who
is a c o r r u p t o r of the laws is m o r e than likely to be c o r r u p t o r of the
y o u n g and foolish portion of mankind. Will you then flee from
well-ordered cities and virtuous men? and is existence worth
having on these terms? Or will you go to t h e m without shame, and
talk to them, Socrates? And what will you say to them? W h a t you
say here about virtue and justice and institutions and laws being
the best things a m o n g men. Would that be decent of you? Surely
36 • Plato
not. But if you go away from well-governed states to Crito's
friends in Thessaly, w h e r e t h e r e is a great disorder and license,
they will be charmed to have the tale of your escape from prison,
set off with ludicrous particulars of the m a n n e r in which vou were
wrapped in a goatskin or some other disguise, and metamorphosed
as the fashion of runaways is—that is very likely; but will there be
no one to remind you that in your old age you violated the most
sacred laws from a miserable desire of a little m o r e life. Perhaps
not, if you keep them in a good temper; but if they are out of
t e m p e r you will hear many degrading things; you will live, but
how?—as the flatterer of all men, and the servant of all men; and
doing what?—earing and drinking in Thessaly, having gone
abroad in order that you may get a dinner. And w h e r e will be your
fine sentiments about justice and virtue then? Say that you wish to
live for the sake of your children, that you may bring them up and
e d u c a t e them—will you take them into Thessaly and deprive
them of Athenian citizenship? Is that the benefit which you would
confer u p o n them? Or are you u n d e r the impression that they will
be better cared for and educated here if you are still alive,
although absent from them; for that your friends will take care of
them? Do you fancy that if you are an inhabitant of Thessaly they
will take care of them, and if you are an inhabitant of the o t h e r
world they will not take care of them? N a y ; but if they who call
themselves friends are truly friends, they surely will.
"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have b r o u g h t you up. T h i n k
not of life and children first, and of justice afterward, but of justice
first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world
below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier
or holier or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as
C r i t o bids. N o w you d e p a r t in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer
of evil; a victim, not of t h e laws, but of men. But if you go forth,
r e t u r n i n g evil for evil, and injury for injury, breaking the
covenants and agreements which you have m a d e with us, and
wronging those whom you ought least to wrong, thac is to say,
yourself, your friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with
you while you live, and o u r brethren, the laws in the world below,
will receive you as an enemy; for they will know that you have
done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us and not to Crito."
Crito • -?7
T h i s is the voice which I seem to hear m u r m u r i n g in my ears,
like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I
say, is h u m m i n g in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any
other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be
vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.
CR: 1 have nothing to say, Socrates.
soc: T h e n let me follow the intimations of the will of God.
T H E REPUBLIC: BOOK I I
With these words 1 was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning For Glaucon,
who is always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus' retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me:
Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have
persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust?
I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if 1 could.
T h e n you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:—
How would you arrange goods—are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes, and independently of their consequences,
as, for example, harmless pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us
at the time, although nothing follows from them?
1 agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.
Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight,
health, which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their
results?
Certainly, 1 said.
And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and
the care of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of
money-making—these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no one would choose them for their own sakes, but only for
the sake of some reward or result which flows from them?
The Republic: Book II • 39
T h e r e is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?
Because 1 want to know in which of the three classes you would
place justice?
In the highest class, I r e p l i e d , — a m o n g those goods which he who
would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of
iheir results.
T h e n the many are of another mind; they think that |ustice is to be
reckoned in the troublesome class, a m o n g goods which are to be p u r sued for the sake of reward and of reputation, but in themselves are
disagreeable and rather to be avoided.
1 know, I said, that this is their m a n n e r of thinking, and that this
was the thesis which T h r a s y m a c h u s was maintaining just now, when
lie censured justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be
convinced by him.
1 wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then 1
shall see whether you and I agree. For T h r a s y m a c h u s seems to me,
like a snake, to have been charmed by your voice sooner than he
ought to have been; but to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside their reward and
results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how they
inwardly work in the soul. If you please, then, I will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of justice according to the c o m m o n view of them. Secondly, I will
show that all m e n who practice justice do so against their will, of
necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue that there is
reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better far
than the life of the just—if what they say is true, Socrates, since I
myself am not of their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am p e r plexed when I hear the voices of T h r a s y m a c h u s and myriads of
others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet
heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in
a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself;
then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think
that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore 1 will praise the
unjust life to the u t m o s t of my power, and my m a n n e r of speaking
will indicate the m a n n e r in which I desire to hear you too praising
justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of
my proposal?
40 • Plato
Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any t h e m e a b o u t which a m a n of
sense would oftener wish to converse.
I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by
speaking, as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.
T h e y say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice,
evil; hut that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have
both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both,
not being able to avoid t h e one and obtain the other, they think that
they had better agree a m o n g themselves to have neither; h e n c e there
arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is
t e r m e d by t h e m lawful and just. T h i s they affirm to be the origin and
n a t u r e of justice;—it is a m e a n or compromise, between the best of
all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all,
which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle p o i n t between the two, is tolerated not as a
good, but as the lesser evil, and honored by reason of the inability of
men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to he called a man
would ever sub...
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