Educational Policy http://epx.sagepub.com/ Introduction: The Politics of Higher Education Michael K. McLendon and James C. Hearn Educational Policy 2003 17: 3 DOI: 10.1177/0895904802239283 The online version of this article can be found at: http://epx.sagepub.com/content/17/1/3 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Politics of Education Association Additional services and information for Educational Policy can be found at: Email Alerts: http://epx.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://epx.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://epx.sagepub.com/content/17/1/3.refs.html Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 10.1177/0895904802239283 Introduction: The Politics of Higher Education MICHAEL K. MCLENDON and JAMES C. HEARN WRITING IN 1968, Samuel Gove and Barbara Solomon concluded their comprehensive bibliographic essay on the politics of higher education by observing that, although public elementary and secondary education is seen historically as “inseparable” from local and state politics, The same cannot be said for the relationship of higher education and . . . politics. The existing literature presents a fragmentary picture of the political involvements of public higher education, and the attitude of many writers is that of keeping colleges and universities out of politics. (pp. 181-182) Now, 30 years later, the same assessment can still be made: As a subject of social scientific inquiry, politics of higher education research remains in a state of perpetual infancy, prone to periodic lurches but lacking in sustained and systematic conceptualization and analysis. That politics of higher education scholarship should remain so scattered and irregular is somewhat curious given the richness of the parent political science discipline and the rather steady advances of K-12 specialists in developing a politics of education literature in their own field. This 2003 edition of the Politics of Education Association Yearbook and special issue of Educational Policy represent an effort to invigorate politics of higher education scholarship, an important but longneglected area of inquiry likely to be of interest to many social scientists, particularly higher education researchers. EDUCATIONAL POLICY, Vol. 17 No. 1, January and March 2003 3-11 DOI: 10.1177/0895904802239283 © 2003 Corwin Press 3 Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 4 EDUCATIONAL POLICY / January and March 2003 HIGHER EDUCATION’S POLITICAL INVOLVEMENTS: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES The question of higher education’s relationship to external political forces and processes in the United States is by no means a uniquely contemporary one. Indeed, debate about the extent to which American colleges and universities should be insulated from external political influences, especially partisan influences, has persisted throughout the history of U.S. higher education. For example, delegates to Michigan’s second constitutional convention of 1850 took the historic step of codifying the self-governing authority of that state’s flagship public university, the University of Michigan, in the new constitution to remove direct control of the university from “meddlesome politicians” (Cudlip, 1969) in the legislative and executive branches whose interferences, delegates believed, had stunted the university’s early development. California would follow Michigan’s lead in 1879 by granting the University of California constitutional protections in an effort to render the university “entirely independent of all political or sectarian influences” (Stadtman, 1970). The University of Minnesota, its powers defined by the territorial government’s provisional constitution, predated the establishment of the state of Minnesota and retained its autonomous status upon the state’s entry into the Union. Through this early practice of “constitutional autonomy,” voters in Michigan, California, Minnesota, and elsewhere sought to elevate public universities to that of a “fourth branch of government” with authority coordinate to the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Although the 20th century would find constitutional autonomy in retreat in virtually every state where it once flourished, the episode underscores the historical struggle of American governments to strike a balance between, on one hand, the demand for public accountability of higher education in a democratic society and, on the other hand, the necessity for some measure of political insulation from majoritarian excesses. Deepening governmental involvement in American higher education during the post–World War II era brought colleges and universities more directly under the influence of political institutions and processes at both the national and state levels. The expansion of the federal government’s involvement in higher education came primarily in the form of congressional passage of landmark student financial aid legislation (i.e., The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act or “GI Bill,” 1944; Higher Education Act, 1965; Higher Education Reauthorization Act, 1972) and programs designed to bolster the research capacity of college campuses (i.e., National Defense Education Act of 1958; National Institutes of Health, 1949; National Science Foundation, 1950). The new legislation and programs signaled a significant relational change Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 MICHAEL K. MCLENDON and JAMES C. HEARN 5 between the higher education community and the U.S. government, regularizing patterns of interaction between colleges and universities and the Congress and numerous executive branch agencies. These interactions, in turn, presented new opportunities for higher education to become enmeshed in larger institutional struggles and, occasionally, in partisan politics. For example, congressional debate surrounding the 1972 Higher Education Amendments saw the Washington higher education associations throw their support behind an ill-fated college finance proposal, one that would have expanded direct aid to institutions rather than provide portable aid to students as many in Congress preferred. The associations’ decision to stake their entire legislative agenda on the doomed proposal badly undermined the credibility of the national higher education lobby for the next two decades (Parsons, 1997). More recently, the Gingrich-led Republican sweep of the U.S. Congress in 1994 pitted the Washington associations, which were unprepared for a shift in congressional party control, against the new Republican majority over the continued existence of the National Endowment for the Humanities and National Endowment for the Arts and the funding levels of certain student aid programs. Significantly, this episode of the 104th Congress led to the development of a new lobbying paradigm by the national higher education community (Cook, 1998). Of course, higher education interacts with the American national political landscape in ways that are more routine and subtle than what is sometimes witnessed during high-stakes, higher education reauthorization episodes or in times of changing congressional party control. The annual appropriation of federal funds for academic science and for student financial aid, the practice of academic earmarking, and rule-making procedures of the U.S. Department of Education all present avenues by which higher education exerts influence over and is in turn shaped by political forces at the national level of government. One implication of American federalism is the assigning of primary responsibility for higher education, through the reserved powers clause of the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to the several state governments. Hence, it is in the states where the full scope and variety of higher education’s interactions with external political forces are so clearly evident. In the 1960s and 1970s, higher education’s involvements with state political institutions and processes grew increasingly visible as a result of the general expansion of state governmental activity and the tumultuous social climate of that era. The centralization of state budget authority in executive budget offices brought higher education systems under direct control of governors and their staffs (Glenny, 1976). The “professionalization” movement among state legislatures greatly enhanced the capacity of legislative bodies to intervene more Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 6 EDUCATIONAL POLICY / January and March 2003 directly in the affairs of campuses (Sabloff, 1997). The growing complexity and size of higher education, whose enrollments ballooned from 3.7 million in 1960 to 8.5 million in 1970 to 12 million in 1980, suggested to many state officials the need for greater regulatory oversight of higher education. At the same time, political and public scrutiny of higher education everywhere increased as a result of the student protest movement of the 1960s. Governor Ronald Reagan’s controversial dismissal in 1967 of University of California president Clark Kerr as a reaction against the protracted unrest on the University of California, Berkeley, campus symbolized the extent to which the affairs of higher education institutions had grown inextricably linked with those of the larger state political landscape. To be sure, efforts also were made during this era to distance higher education from the vicissitudes of state political pressures. The emergence of the coordinating board as a popular form of statewide organization of higher education was an effort to inject greater rationality in state planning for higher education, thereby lessening the influence of idiosyncratic political factors in the development of higher education systems (Hearn & Griswold, 1994). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the American states remained hotbeds of political activity in the higher education arena. For example, in a development closely mirroring events in K-12 education, legislatures enacted various “accountability” regimes that focused public attention on the “performance” (deficit) of higher education systems and institutions (Zumeta, 1998). Higher education themes received increased prominence in statewide elections, especially gubernatorial races, where issues such as merit scholarships, race-based university admissions policies, and state lotteries placed higher education at the center of contentious campaign debates. During this era, some legislatures and governors began using single-issue litmus tests to “politicize” the appointment process of university governing boards, resulting, according to at least one national study, in the diminished quality of public university trusteeship (Association of Governing Boards, 1998). Moreover, in those states where voters directly elect trustees of public universities, campaigns for office are said to have become increasingly partisan and ideological, with the candidates’ stances on such seemingly sideline issues as abortion occupying a central role in board elections (Healy, 1996). Colleges and universities showed greater sophistication in their efforts to influence political processes and election outcomes—no fewer than 24 political action committees in six states now make contributions to political candidates on behalf of campuses (Lederman, 1997). Finally, the past two decades witnessed growth in the number of higher education–related measures that now appear before voters in statewide ballot elections (initiatives and referenda); Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 MICHAEL K. MCLENDON and JAMES C. HEARN 7 with greater frequency than at any time in the past, voters are being asked to decide directly at the ballot box complex governance and finance questions and broader social morality issues that intersect the interests of campuses (McLendon & Eddings, 2002). QUESTIONS FRAMING THIS VOLUME This special issue of Educational Policy has as its central purpose the stimulating of scholarly interest in the politics of higher education. By the term politics, we mean the institutional arrangements in which government decisions are made, the processes by which such decisions are made, and the causes and consequences of the public policies that represent the sum of governmental activity (Dye, 2002). Accordingly, our orientation to the study of higher education politics emphasizes topical, theoretical, and methodological breadth. Specifically, this volume broadly addresses questions such as the following ones: • How do the comparative political features of the American states influence • • • • • • • • patterns of higher education policy adoption, and how do higher education system characteristics mitigate these influences? What are the political antecedents and consequences of recent higher education accountability and governance reform initiatives in the states? To what extent does the structure of state higher education systems influence patterns of higher education policy development across the states? What are the implications of American federalism for the political involvements of higher education? To what extent does the design of federal or state higher education policies influence the sustainability or effectiveness of those policies? How do governmental decisions about the allocation of federal research and student financial aid funding affect core higher education constituencies and the functioning of American college campuses? To what extent do theories of public policy making in the political science literature provide useful lenses for understanding and explaining higher education policy phenomena at the national or state level? What are some of the likely causes and consequences of new supranational governmental bodies on higher education organization and policy patterns? What are some of the relevant substantive, theoretical, and methodological issues that scholars should consider in developing an agenda for future research on the politics of higher education? Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 8 EDUCATIONAL POLICY / January and March 2003 Obviously, no single volume is capable of definitively addressing these questions. Nonetheless, our expectation is that the articles contained in this special issue, one of the few major collections of articles on the politics of higher education in the past three decades, will lend greater coherence, clarity, and systematization to future research efforts in these several areas. The eight articles of this volume are grouped according to the level of government examined, beginning with the U.S. national level, then moving to the level of the American states. A subsequent article places many of the themes found in this volume in cross-national perspective. The concluding article in this compilation sketches the outlines of a research agenda on the politics of U.S. higher education. The opening article by A. Abigail Payne examines two politically motivated approaches employed since the early 1980s to influence the distribution of federal research funding across research and doctoral universities: congressional earmarks and set-aside programs. Using data that span almost two decades, Payne presents an econometric analysis of the effect of changes in earmarked funding and research set-aside programs on academic research activities at American universities. Her analysis provides a set of divergent findings. Funding from congressional earmarks increased the quantity of academic publications but decreased the quality of those publications, whereas research funding from set-aside programs had just the opposite effect. Michael Mumper examines an overlooked aspect of federal and state programs created to encourage participation in higher education, namely, whether the design of a program affects its long-term sustainability. Drawing on contemporary debate in political science about the merits of universal versus targeted program designs for social policy, Mumper compares the experiences of differentially designed state tuition and aid programs and federal student financial aid programs. He concludes that although design elements appear to have made a difference in program sustainability at the federal level, design has had only a modest effect at the state level. Mumper concludes his discussion by noting the emergence of a new design strategy, which, he suggests, may prove more politically popular than either of the conventional designs. Higher education accountability and governance issues have in recent years occupied a prominent position on the policy agendas of state governments, and three articles in the volume examine various political dimensions of these issues. The article by Delmer D. Dunn notes that most discussions of “accountability” in higher education do not consider its underlying concept or the role of accountability mechanisms in democratic governance. Dunn draws on an important mid-20th-century debate between two theorists of Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 MICHAEL K. MCLENDON and JAMES C. HEARN 9 democratic governance, as well as the larger public administration and democratic theory literature, to explore several recent episodes of accountability legislation in higher education and to frame lessons for contemporary higher education policy making. The article by Jill Nicholson-Crotty and Kenneth J. Meier examines the relationship between governance structure, state political characteristics, and higher education policy outcomes, a topic about which little empirical evidence exists. Framing their analysis with theoretical insights from the literature on bureaucratic politics, Nicholson-Crotty and Meier test two competing hypotheses concerning the ability of bureaucratic structure to insulate higher education policies from state political influences, such as partisanship, political ideology, and legislative characteristics. Their analysis, which relies on observations drawn from 47 states over a 7-year period, reveals that higher education governance structures do significantly affect how political forces influence higher education policy outcomes, although the direction and strength of these relationships appear mixed. The third governance-related article contained in this volume is one by David W. Leslie and Richard J. Novak, in which the authors present comparative case studies of higher education governance reform in five states. Using a “qualitative heuristic” approach, Leslie and Novak assess first whether “instrumental” or “political” factors constituted the explanatory effects in each case and, second, the extent to which patterns in governance reform are found across states. The authors report that political factors were usually central to the story of reform, whereas instrumental goals of the higher education community typically were of secondary importance. Brian Pusser presents a case study of the recent contest over affirmative action at the University of California in an effort to revise the prevailing interest-articulation model of higher education governance. Building on recent work in the area of positive theories of institutions, Pusser argues for a reconceptualization of public colleges and universities as exogenous political institutions that function as sites of broader political and economic conflict within American society. In the one article of this volume that focuses on the politics of higher education outside of the United States, Guy Neave explores the historical antecedents and the social, organizational, and political implications of the Bologna Process for higher education in Western Europe. In particular, Neave focuses on the evolution of differing conceptions of community in European higher education, and he argues that higher education’s “referential community”—that is, the community to which higher education is answerable—has shifted rather radically away from that of the nation state and toward both that Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 10 EDUCATIONAL POLICY / January and March 2003 of the superordinate community (European Union influences) and subnational units (regional influences). Finally, the volume concludes with an article by Michael K. McLendon that outlines an agenda for future research on the politics of U.S. higher education. McLendon focuses on three primary sets of recommendations for invigorating research in this area: the need for a wider range of issue coverage, the need for a broadened and enriched theoretical perspective, and the need for improved analytic sophistication and rigor. McLendon’s focus is on research approaches that are expressly comparative in nature so as to take maximal advantage of the political and policy experiments that American federalism affords. Together, these articles serve as an initial effort to assemble a broad-based scholarship on the politics of higher education. It is our hope that this special issue of Educational Policy will provide those interested in politics of higher education research with new ideas, fresh frames of reference, and an initial research base with which to build an accumulative literature on this important but historically neglected topic. REFERENCES Association of Governing Boards. (1998). Bridging the gap between state government and higher education. Washington, DC: Author. Cook, C. E. (1998). Lobbying for higher education: How colleges and universities influence federal policy. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press. Cudlip, W. B. (1969). The University of Michigan: Its legal profile. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Dye, T. R. (2002). Understanding public policy (10th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Glenny, L. A. (1976). State budgeting for higher education. Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education. Gove, S., & Solomon, B. (1968). The politics of higher education: A bibliographic essay. Journal of Higher Education, 39(4), 181-195. Healy, P. (1996, October 11). The making of a Michigan regent. Chronicle of Higher Education, 42(16), A16-A17. Hearn, J. C., & Griswold, C. (1994). State-level centralization and policy innovation in U.S. postsecondary education. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 16(2), 161-190. Lederman, D. (1997, April 18). Political action committees help lawmakers who help colleges. Chronicle of Higher Education, 42(32), A29-A30. McLendon, M. K., & Eddings, S. (2002). Direct democracy and higher education: The state ballot as an instrument of higher education policymaking. In D. Opfer & K. Wong (Guest Eds.), Educational Policy, 16, 193-218. Parsons, M. (1997). Power and politics: Federal higher education policymaking in the 1990s. Albany: State University of New York Press. Sabloff, P. (1997). Another reason why state legislatures will continue to restrict public university autonomy. Review of Higher Education, 20(2), 141-162. Stadtman, V. A. (1970). The University of California 1868-1968. New York: McGraw-Hill. Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 MICHAEL K. MCLENDON and JAMES C. HEARN 11 Zumeta, W. (1998). Public university accountability to the state in the late twentieth century: Time for a rethinking? Policy Studies Review, 15(4), 5-22. Michael K. McLendon is an assistant professor of public policy and higher education at Peabody College of Vanderbilt University. His research focuses on state governance of higher education, comparative state politics and policy making for higher education, and legislative involvement in the higher education arena. His work has appeared in the Journal of Higher Education, the Review of Higher Education, Research in Higher Education, Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research, and Educational Policy. James C. Hearn is a professor of public policy and higher education in the Department of Leadership, Policy, and Organization at Vanderbilt University. His research and teaching focus on policy and organizational issues in higher education, with particular attention to student financial aid and state-level governance of postsecondary education. Downloaded from epx.sagepub.com at UNIV OF GEORGIA LIBRARIES on March 17, 2011 TheFormsof Capital lIIaximize monetary profit cannot be defined 2 The Forms of Capital Pierre Bourdieu ,.. The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its 'incorporated,' embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor.1t is avis insita, a force inscribed in objective or subjective structures, but it is also a lex insita, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world. It is what makes the games of society-not least, the economic game-something other than simple games of chance offering at every moment the possibility of a miracle. ~oulette, which holds out the opportunity of winning a lot of money in a short space of time, and therefore of changing one's social status quasi-instantaneously, and in which the winning of the previous spin of the wheel can be staked and lost at every new spin, gives a fairly accurate image of this imaginary universe of perfect competition or perfect equality of opportunity, a world without inertia, without accumulation, without heredity or acquired properties, in which every moment is perfectly independent of the previous one, every soldier has a marshal's baton in his knapsack, and every prize can be attained, instantaneously, by everyone, so that at each moment anyone can become anything. Capital, which, in its objectified or embodied forms, takes time to accumulate and which, as a potential capacity to produce profits and to reproduce itselqn identical or expanded form, contains a tendency to persist in its being, is a force inscribed in the objectivity of things so that everything is not equally'possible or impossible.1 And the structure of the distribution of the different types and subtypes of capital at a given moment in time represents the immanent structure of the social world, i.e., the set of constraints, inscribed in the very reality of that world, which govern its functioning in a durable way, determining the chances of success for practices. It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory. Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism; and by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as noneconomic, and therefore disinterested. In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the transubstantiation whereby the most material types of capital-those which are economic in the restricted sense-can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa. Interest, in the restricted sense it is given in economic theory, cannot be produced without producing its negative counterpart, disinterestedness. The class of practices whose explicit purpose is to '\\II! From J. E. Richardsun (cd.), /!tmt//lllol: of Theory of Researchfor Ihe Sociolol{VofF-tlt/t'IIl;O/l "','('nwunll'rcsN, IIJKh);2415K. Translnlcd hy Richard Nicc. Rcprintl.d hy 1"""IIiMMinll. « (Ill Rueh without producing the purposeless I'nality of cultural or artistic practices and Iheir products; the world of bourgeois man, with his double-entry accounting, cannot be Invented without producing the pure, perfect universe of the artist and the intellectual and Ihc gratuitous activities of art-for-art's sake ftndpure theory. In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relationships which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to anaIyzt..'-private property, profit, wage labor, rlc.-is not even a science of the field of economic production, has prevented the constilution of a general science ofthe economy of practices, which would treat mercantile "~change as a particular case of exchange in all hHforms. It is remarkable that the practices and assets Ihus salvaged from the 'icy water of egotistical nlleulation' (and from science) are the virtual monopoly of the dominant class-as if l'l'Onomism had been able to reduce every'hing to economics only because the reduction IInwhich that discipline is based protects from .~crilegious reduction everything which nrcds to be protected. If economics deals only with practices that have narrowly economic Intcrest as their principle and only with goods Ihat are directly and immediately convertible IlItomoney (which makes them quantifiable), Ihcn the universe of bourgeois production and "~change becomes an exception and can see IIHclf and present itself as a realm of disinter- 1'8tedness.As everyone knows, priceless ,hings have their price, and the extreme diffi- I'ulty of converting certain practices and cerIIllnobjects into money is only due to the fact Ihat this conversion is refused in the very IlIIention that produces them, which is nothIlIgother than the denial (Verneinung) of the peonomy. A general science of the economy of IlrRctices, capable of reappropriating the totality of the practices which, although ubjectively economic, are not and cannot be Nodally recognized as economic, and which ran be performed only at the cost of a whole Inbor of dissimulation 'or, more precisely, fllphemization, must endeavor to grasp capital IlI1dprofit in all their forms and to establish the Inwswhereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing) change into one another.l " I)epcnding on thc field in whieh it rune. 47 tions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility.3 Cultural Capital Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodiedstate, i.e., in the form oflong-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee. The reader should not be misled by the somewhat peremptory air which the effort att axiomization may give to my argument.4 The notion of cultural capital initially presented itself to me, in the course of research, as a theoretical hypothesis which made it possible to explain the unequal scholastic achievement of children originating from the different social classes by relating academic success, Le., the specific profits which children from the different classes and class fractions can obtain in the academic market, to the distribution of cultural capital between the classes and class fractions. This starting point implies a break with the presuppositions inherent both in the commonsense view, which sees academic success or failure as an effect of natural aptitudes, and in human capital theories. Economists might seem to deserve credit for explicitly raising the question of the relationship hl:twcl:n the rates of profit on educational 8 The Forms of Capital The Fonns of Capital investment and on economic investment (and its evolution). But their measurement of the yield from scholastic investment takes account only of monetary investments and profits, or those directly convertible into money, such as the costs of schooling and the cash equivalent of time devoted to study; they are unable to explain the different proportions of their resources which different agents or different social classes allocate to economic investment and cultural investment because they fail to take systematic account of the structure of the differential chances of profit which the various markets offer these agents or classes as a function of the volume and the composition of their assets (see esp. Becker 19Mb). Furthermore, because they neglect to relate scholastic investment strategies to the whole set of educational strategies and to the system of reproduction strategies, they inevitably, by a necessary paradox, let slip the best hidden and socially most determinant educational investment, namely, the domestic transmission of cultural capital. Their studies of the relationship between academic ability and academic investment show that they are unaware that ability or talent is itself the product of an investment of time and cultural capital (Becker 1964a: 63-6). Not surprisingly, when endeavoring to evaluate the profits of scholastic investment, they can only consider the profitabmty of educational expenditure for society as a whole, the 'social rate of return,' or the 'social gain of education as measured by its effects on national productivity' (Becker 19Mb: 121,155),This typicallyfunctionalist definition of the functions of education ignores the contribution which the educational system makes to the reproduction of the social structure by sanctioning the hereditary transmission of cultural capital. From the very beginning, a definition of human capital, despite its humanistic connotations, does not move beyond economism and ignores, inter alia, the fact that the mental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment. The accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of what is called culture, cultivation, Bi/dung, presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation, which, insofar as it implies a lab or of inculcation and assimilation, costs time, time which must be invested personally by the investor. Like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a suntan, it cannot be done at second hand (so that all effects of delegation are ruled out). The work of acquisition is work on oneself (self-improvement), an effort that presupposes a personal cost (on paie de sa personne, as we say in French), an investment, above all of time, but also of that socially constituted form of libido, libido sciendi, with all the privation, renunciation, and sacrifice that it may entail. It follows that the least inexact of all the measurements of cultural capital are those which take as their standard the length of acquisition-so long, of course, as this is not reduced to length of schooling and allowance is made for early domestic education by giving it a positive value (a gain in time, a head start) or a negative value (wasted time, and doubly so because more time must be spent correcting its effects), according to its distance from the demands of the scholastic marke,t.s This embodied capital, external wealth converted into an integral part of the person, into a habitus, cannot be transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility) by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange. It follows that the use or exploitation of cultural capital presents ,particular problems for the holders of economic or political capital, whether they be private patrons or, at the other extreme, entrepreneurs employing executives endowed with a specific cultural competence (not to mention the new state patrons). How can this capital, so closely linked to the person, be bought without buying the person and so losing the ~ from educational action very effect oflegitimation which presupposes the dissimulation of dependence? How can depends on the cultural capital previously this capital be concentrated-as some underinvested by the family. Moreover, the ecotakings demand-without concentrating the nomic and social yield of the educational qualpossessors of the capital, which can have all ification dep'ends on the social capital, again sorts of unwanted consequences? inherited, which can be used to back it up. Cultural capital can be acquired, to a varying extent, depending on the period, the sociTHE EMBODIED STATE Most of the properties of cultural capital can ety, and the social class, in the absence of any deliberate inculcation, and therefore quite be deduced from the fact that, in its funda- tlllI'OI1Ndously,It always remains marked by 11. 1'llI'liuslconditions of acquisition which, Ihl'Olll(h the more or less visible marks they 11'11 VI'(Muchas the pronunciations characterisIh 0111clnssor region), help to determine its .lllIrhwtive value, It cannot be accumulated IlI'yond the appropriating capacities of an IIlIlIvlllul1lagent; it declines and dies with its 111111'1'1' (with his biological capacity, his mem1111', l'I'C.).Because it is thus linked in numer'11I11wnys to the person in his biological "lIl(lIlnrity and is subject to a hereditary trans111INNlon which is always heavily disguised, or I'ITn Invisible, it defies the old, deep-rooted ,ltllll1wrion the Greek jurists made between IlIhlll'lIl;dproperties (ta patroa) and acquired 1"IIPI.rties(epikteta), i.e., those which an indiIhlllnlndds to his heritage. It thus manages to '1IlI1hil1ethe prestige of innate property with Ihl l1tul'itsof acquisition. Because the social I,ulllhions of its transmission and acquisition ., I I1wre disguised than those of economic 1111'hnl, it is predisposed to function as sym1IIIIh'cnpital, i.e., to be unrecognized as capital .lIlIt I'l'cognized as legitimate competence, as .11 tIhelI'ity exerting an effect of (mis )recogni111111, o.g" in the matrimonial market and in all ,I... II1lu'ketsin which economic capital is not IlIlIy I'eeognized,whether in matters of cul11111' with the great art collections or great culIIlI'n ifoundations, or in social welfare, with the It'lIlIomy of generosity and the gift. Further111111'11, the specifically symbolic logic of disIIII"llon additionally secures material and q\llIho!ic profits for the possessors of a large IlIhuntl capital: any given cultural compe11'IWl' (e.g" being able to read in a world ofillit- derives a scarcity value from its 1'1'1111111) I"IMIIion in the distribution of cultural capital Ill1dyidds profits of distinction for its owner. III 01her words, the share in profits which 1II'IIree cultural capital secures in class-divided lllU~lctiesis based, in the last analysis, on the (,wt Ihat all agents do not have the economic I1l1dcultural means for prolonging their chilIh'~I1's education beyond the minimum necesIIlIrytor the reproduction of the labor-power 1"1U1Ivalorized at a given moment.6 '(,hus the capital, in the sense of the means or nppropriating the product of accumulated IlIhlll'in the objectified state which is held by a ~lvel1agent, depends for its real efficacy on the rOI'l1! of the distribution of the means ofapproprinting the accumulated and ohjeclivdy IIvnilnhle I'CSCIII rees; and the rclal iCII,,;!!ip01 (~ appropriation between an agent and the resources objectively available, and hence the profits they produce, is mediated by the relationship of (objective and/ or subjective) competition between himself and the other possessors of capital competing for the same goods, in which scarcity-and through it social value-is generated. The structure of the field, i.e., the unequal distribution of capital, is the source of the specific effects of capital, i.e., the appropriation of profits and the power to impose the laws offunctioning ofthe field most favourable to capital and its reproduction. But the most powerful principle of the symbolic efficacy of cultural capital no doubt lies in the logic of its transmission. On the one hand, the process of appropriating objectified cultural capital and the time necessary for it to take place mainly depend on the cultural capital embodied in the whole family-through (among other things) the generalized Arrow effect and all forms of implicit transmission.' On the other hand, the initial accumulation of cultural capital, the precondition for the fast, easy accumulation of every kind of useful cultural capital, starts at the outset, without delay, without wasted time, only for the offspring of families endowed with strong cultural capital; in this case, the accumulation period covers the whole period of socialization. It follows that the transmission of cultural capital is no doubt the best hidden form of hereditary transmission of capital, and it therefore receives proportionately greate weight in the system of reproduction strate gies, as the direct, visible forms of transmission tend to be more strongly censored and controlled. It can immediately be seen that the link between economic and cultural capital is established through the mediation of the time needed for acquisition. Differences in the cultural capital possessed by the family imply differences first in the age at which the work of transmission and accumulation begins-the limiting case being full use of the time biologically available, with the maximum free time being harnessed to maximum cultural capital-and then in the capacity, thus defined, to satisfy the specifically cultural demands of a prolonged process of acquisition. Furthermore, and in correlation with this, the length of time for which a given individual can pro101110( his acquisition process depends on the ) ThoForm. of Capitol (50 : The FormsofCapital \.-/' length of time for which his family can provide him with the free time, i.e., time free from economic necessity; which is the precondition for the initial accumulation (time which can be evaluated as a handicap to be made up). THE OBJECTIFIED STATE Cultural capital, in the objectified state, has a number of properties which are defined only in the relationship with cultural capital in its embodied form, The cultural capital objectified in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc., is transmissible in its materiality. A collection of paintings, for example, can be transmitted as well as economic capital (if not better, because the capital transfer is more disguised). But what is transmissible is legal ownership and not (or not necessarily) what constitutes the precondition for specific appropriation, namely, the possession of the means of 'consuming' a painting or using a machine, which, being nothing other than embodied capital, are subject to the same laws of transmission. 8 period of embodiment needed to acquire the means of appropriating it), so the collective strength of the holders of cultural capital would tend to increase-if the holders of the dominant type of capital (economic capital) were not able to set the holders of cultural capital in competition with one another. (They are, moreover, inclined to competition by the very conditions in which they are selected and trained, in particular by the logic of scholastic and recruitment competitions.) Cultural capital in its objectified state presents itself with all the appearances of an autonomous, coherent universe which, although the product of historical action, has its own laws, transcending individual wills, and which, as the example of language well illustrates, therefore remains irreducible to that which each agent, or even the aggregate of the agents, can appropriate (i.e., to the cultural capital embodied in each agent or even in the aggregate of the agents). However, it should not be forgotten that it exists as symbolically and materially active, effective capital only insofar as it is appropriated by agents and implemented and invested as a weapon and a stake in the struggles which go on in the fields of cultural production (the artistic field, the scientific field, etc.) and, beyond them, in the field of the social classes-struggles in which the agents wield strengths and obtain 'profits proportionate to their mastery of this objectified capital, and therefore to the extent of their embodied capital.' Thus cultural goods can be appropriated both materially-which presupposes economic capital-and symbolically-which presupposes cultural capital. It follows that the owner of the means of production must find a way of appropriating either the embodied capital which is the precondition of specific appropriation or the services of the holders of this capital. To possess the machines, he only needs economic capital; to appropriate them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose (defined by the cultural capital, of scientific or technical type, incorporated in them), he must have access to embodied cultural capital, either in person or by proxy. This is no doubt the basis of the ambiguous status of cadres (executives and engineers). Ifit is emphasized that they are not the possessors (in the strictly economic sense) of the means of production which they use, and that they derive profit from their own cultural capital only by selling the services and products which it makes possible, then they will be classified among the dominated groups; ifit is emphasized that they draw their profits from the use of a particular form of cap- THE INSTITUTIONAUZED STATE The objectification of cultural capital in the form of academic qualifications is one way of neutralizing some of the properties it derives from the fact that, being embodied, it has the same biological limits as its bearer. This objectification is what makes the difference between the capital of the autodidact, which may be called into question at any time, or even the cultural capital of the courtier, which can yield only ill-defined profits, of fluctuating value, in the market of high-society exchanges, and the cultural capital academically sanctioned by legally guaranteed qualifications, formally independent of the person of their bearer. With the academic qualification, a certificate of cultural competence which ital, then they will be classified among the confers on its holder a conventional, constant, dominant groups. Everything suggests that legally guaranteed value with respect to as the cultural capital incorporated in the culture, social alchemy produces a form of meansof production increases(and withit the 1'lIhlll"IIcapitlll which has a rclntivl: nulol1omy vllI'l\ viIIits hl:arl:r and even vis-a-vis the cul111I'111 cnpitnl he effectively possesses at a given IIHllncnt in time, It institutes cultural capital hV l'OlIective magic, just as, according to "".rll:nu-Ponty, the living institute their dead Ih!'llugh the ritual of mourning. One has only tllthink of the concours(competitiverecruit1l1l'l1ll:xamination) which, out ofthe contin1111111 of infinitesimal differences between "II'filrmances, produces sharp, absolute, lastI "11differences, such as that which separates Iht, Inst successful candidate from the first 1I1\/llIccessfulone, and institutes an essential .11t1('rence between the officially recognized, 1IIIIII'IInteedcompetence and simple cultural 1111'11111, which is constantly required to prove 11_.11I', In this case, one sees clearly the perforIIhlllvl:magic of the power of instituting, the I",wl:r to show forth and secure belief or, in a WIU'd,to impose recognition. lIy conferring institutional recognition on lilt' cultural capital possessed by any given 1\1('~nt, the academic qualification also makes it I'IIMflible to compare qualification holders and "Ven to exchange them (by substituting one 101'another in succession). Furthermore, it IIInkesit possible to establish conversion rates IIlHween cultural capital and economic capital hy guaranteeing the monetary value of a given IlI'ademic capital.lO This product of the convcrsion of economic capital into cultural capi1nlestablishes the value, in terms of cultural !III)ital, of the holder of a given qualification I'Cative to other qualification holders and, by Ihe same token, the monetary value for which It cnn be exchanged on the labor market (academic investment has no meaning unless a minimum degree of reversibility of the convc:rsionit implies is objectively guaranteed). lIr.:causethe material and symbolic profits which the academic qualification guarantees .IKOdepend on its scarcity, the investments Itlllde(in time and effort) may turn out to be Irssprofitable than was anticipated when they were made (there having been a de ]acto liIlangein the conversion rate between academic capital and economic capital), The strateIties for converting economic capital into cultural capital, which are among the shortIeI'm factors of the schooling explosion nnd the inflation of qualifications, are governed hy changes in the structure of the chances of profit offered hy the different types (}fcapital. / 51 Social Capital Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition--or in other words, to membership in a groupll-which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material andlor symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by a whole set of instituting acts designed simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them; in this case, they are more or less really enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges. Being based on indissolubly material and symbolic exchanges, the establishment and maintenance of which presuppose reacknowledgment of proximity, they are also partially irreducible to objective relations of proximity in physical (geographical) space or even in economic and social space.12 The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agentthus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each ofthose to whom he is connected.13 This means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, social capital is never completely independent of it because the exchanges instituting mutual acknowledgment presuppose the reacknowledgment of a minimum of objective homogeneity, and because it exerts a multiplier effect on the capital he possesses in his own right. The profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible.14 This does not mean that they are consciously pursued as such, even in the case of groups like select clubs, which are deliberately organized in order to concentrate social capital and so to derive full benefit from the multiplier effect ~ The Formaof Capital The Forms of Capital implied in concentration and to secure the profits of membership-material profits, such as all the types of services accruing from useful relationships, and symbolic profits, such as those derived from association with a rare, prestigious group. The existence of a network of connections is not a natural given, or even a social given, constituted once and for all by an initial act of institution, represented, in the case of the family group, by the genealogical definition of kinship relations, which is the characteristic of a social formation. It is the product of an endless effort at institution, of which institution rites-often wrongly described as rites of passage-mark the essential moments and which is necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits (see Bourdieu 1982). In other words, the network of relationships is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, i.e., at transforming contingent relations, such as those of neighborhood, the workplace, or even kinship, into relationships that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt (feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed (rights). This is done through the alchemy of consecration,the symbolic constitution produced by social institution (institution as a relative-brother, sister, cousin, etc.-or as a knight, an heir, an elder, etc.) and endlessly reproduced in and through the exchange (of gifts, words, women, etc.) which it encourages and which presupposes and produces mutual knowledge and recognition. Exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through the mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership which it implies, reproduces the group. By the same token, it reaffirms the limits of the group, i.e., the limits beyond which the constitutive exchangetrade, commensality, or marriage-cannot take place. Each member of the group is thus instituted as a custodian of the limits of the group: because the definition of the criteria of entry is at stake in each new entry, he can modify the group by modifying the limits oflegitimate exchange through some form of misalliance. It is quite logical that, in most 53 .~. societies, the preparation and conclusion of marriages should be the business of the whole group, and not of the agents directly concerned. Through the introduction of new members into a family, a clan, or a club, the whole definition of the group, i.e., its fines, its boundaries, and its identity, is put at stake, exposed to redefinition, alteration, adulteration. When, as in modern societies, families lose the monopoly of the establishment of exchanges which can lead to lasting relationships, whether socially sanctioned (like marriage) or not, they may continue to control these exchanges, while remaining within the logic of laissez-faire, through all the institutions which are designed to favor legitimate exchanges and exclude illegitimate ones by producing occasions (rallies, cruises, hunts, parties, receptions, etc.), -places (smart neighborhoods, select schools, clubs, etc.), or practices (smart sports, parlor games, cultural ceremonies, etc.) which bring together, in a seemingly fortuitous way, individuals as homogeneous as possible in all the pertinent respects in terms of the existence and persistence of the group. The reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed. This work, which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly or indirectly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even conceivable unless one invests in it a specific competence (knowledge' of genealogical relationships and of real connections and skill at using them, etc.) and. an acquired disposition to acquire and maintain this competence, which are themselves integral parts of this capital}S This is one of the factors which explain why the profitability of this labor of accumulating and maintaining social capital rises in proportion to the size of the capital. Because the social capital accruing from a relationship is that much greater to the extent that the person who is the object of it is richly endowed with capital (mainly social, but also cultural and even economic capital), the possessors of an inherited social capital, symbolized by a great name, are able to transform all circumstantial relationships into lasting connections. They are sought after for their social capital and, because they are well known, are worthy of being known ('I know him well'); they do not need 10 'mnke the '1I'lIlInllllnnce'of nil their 'acquaintances'; they 111'1' klIown to more people than they know, and 11\1'11' work of sociability, when it is exerted, is ht~hly J)I'oductive. l~vcl'Ygroup has its more or less institution111111.11 forms of delegation which enable it to 111I1I't'lIlratethe totality of the social capital, "hil'h is the basis of the existence of the group III IlIl\IiI~or a nation, of course, but also an ,1~_odRtlonor a party), in the hands of a single tI11"11I or a small group of agents and to man11.111 Ihis plenipotentiary, charged with plena ~"'''.''II.' agendi et loquendi,16to represent the 1410111', to speak and act in its name and so, with thi IIld of this collectively owned capital, to t -1'1'I'iHea power incommensurate with the '1141'111 'H personal contribution. Thus, at the 11111" elementary degree of institutionaliza- 111111, Ihe head of the family, the pater Jamilias, IIII ,'Idest, most senior member, is tacitly recasthe onlyperson entitled to speakon "1I1I1~ed III,hllll'of the family group in all official cir- , 1lIlIlIlnnces. But whereas in this case, diffuse 111\"',lItionrequires the great to step forward '"111defend the collective honor when the 11111111I'of the weakest members is threatened, till Institutionalized delegation, which I II_III'I~S the concentration of social capital, tll_11 hns the effect oflimiting the consequences III IlIdividuallapses by explicitly delimiting I"~ponsibilities and authorizing the recog1I11I,dspokesmen to shield the group as a ",hoh' from discredit by expelling or excom11llIl1kntingthe embarrassing individuals. III he internal competition for the monoplilt ol'legitimate representation of the group is 1111110 Ihreaten the conservation and accumu1111 Ion of the capital which is the basis of the IIIIIP,the members of the group must regur..111'Ihe conditions of access to the right to 11I'llnreoneself a member of the group and, ,.hoveItll, to set oneself up as a representative hllll,'g:tte, plenipotentiary, spokesman, etc.) III IIll' whole group, thereby committing the .'"'1111 capital of the whole group. The title of IIlIhllityis the form par excellence of the instiIlIl'Ionalizedsocial capital which guarantees a 1'"1'llcularform of social relationship in a lastIIIK through him.) The mechanisms of delegation and representation (in both the theatrical and the legal senses) which fall into place-that much more strongly, no doubt, when the group is large and its members weak-as one of the conditions for the concentration of social capital (among other reasons, because it enables numerous, varied, scattered agents to act as one man and to overcome the limitations of space and time) also contain the seeds of an embezzlement or misappropriation of the capital which they assemble. This embezzlement is latent in the fact that a group as a whole can be represented, in the various meanings of the word, by a subgroup, clearly delimited and perfectly visible to all, known to all, and recognized by all, that of the nobiles, the 'people who are known', the paradigm of whom is the nobility, and who may speak on behalf of the whole group, represent the whole group, and exercise authority in the name of the whole group. The noble is the group personified. He bears the name of the group to which he gives his name (the metonymy which links the noble to his group is clearly seen when Shakespeare calls Cleopatra 'Egypt' or the King of France 'France,' just as Racine calls Pyrrhus 'Epirus'). It is by him, his name, the difference it proclaims, that the members of his group, the liegemen, and also the land and castles, are known and recognized. Similarly, phenomena such as the 'personality cult' or the identification of parties, trade unions, or movements with their leader are latent in the very logic of representation. Everything combines to cause the signifier to take the place of the signified, the spokesmen that of the group he is supposed to express, not least because his distinction, his 'outstandingness,' his visibility constitute the essential part, if not the essence, of this power, which, being entirely set within the logic of knowledge and acknowledgment, is fundamentally a symbolic power; but also because the representative, the sign, the emblem, may be, and create, the whole reality of groups which receive effective social existence only in and through representation. 17 wny.One ofthe paradoxesof delegation is Ihlll the mandated agent can exert on (and, up Conversions 11111 point, against) the group the power which Ih(l"roup enahles him to concentrate. (This is 11I,,'hnpsespecially true in the limiting cases in The different types of capital can be derived which the mnndated agent creates the !(roup from economic capital, but only at the cost of a wlllch Cl'enteshil11hut whkh only l~xiNIN 11100'eor less great effort of transformation, --- --54 I I '11 11 11 The Forms of Capital which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in question. For example, there are some goods and services to which economic capital gives immediate access, without secondary costs; others can be obtained only by virtue of a social capital of relationships (or social obligations) which cannot act instantaneously, at the appropriate moment, unless they have been established and maintained for a long time, as if for their own sake, and therefore outside their period of use, i.e., at the cost of an investment in sociability which is necessarily long-term because the time lag is one of the factors of the transmutation of a pure and simple debt into that recognition of nonspecific indebtedness which is called gratitude. ISIn contrast to the cynical but also economical transparency of economic exchange, in which equivalents change hands in the same instant, the essential ambiguity of social exchange, which presupposes misrecognition, in other words, a form offaith and of bad faith (in the sense of selfdeception), presupposes a much more subtle economy of time. So it has to be posited simultaneously that economic capital is at the root of all the other types of capital and that these transformed, disguised forms of economic capital, never entirely reducible to that definition, produce their most specific effects only to the extent that they conceal (not least from their possessors) the fact that economic capital is at their root, in other words-but only in the last analysis-at the root of their effects. The real logic of the functioning of capital, the conversions from one type to another, and the law of conservation which governs them cannot be understood unless two opposing but equally partial views are superseded: on the one hand, economism, which, on the grounds that every type of capital is reducible in the last analysis to economic capital, ignores what makes the specific efficacy of the other types of capital, and on the other hand, semiologism (nowadays represented by structuralism, symbolic interactionism, or ethnomethodology), which reduces social exchanges to phenomena of communication and ignores the brutal fact of universal reducibility to economics. 19 In accordance with a principle which is the equivalent of the principle of the conservation of energy, profits in one area are necessarily p;lid for by costs in another (so that a concept 1;1".Wl1Shl1ote has no meaning in a general sci- ence of the economy of practices). The universal equivalent, the measure of all equivalences, is nothing other than labor-time (in the widest sense); and the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in each case, one takes into account both the labor-time accumulated in the form of capital and the labor-time needed to transform it from one type into another. It has been seen, for example, that the transformation of economic capital into social capital presupposes a specific labor, i.e., an apparently gratuitous expenditure of time, attention, care, concern, which, as is seen in the endeavor to personalize a gift, has the effect of transfiguring the purely monetary import of the exchange and, by the same token, the very meaning of the exchange. From a narrowly economic standpoint, this effort is bound to be seen as pure wastage, but in the terms of the logic of social exchanges, it is a solid investment, the profits of which will appear, in the long run, in monetary or other form. Similarly, if the best measure of cultural capital is undoubtedly the amount of time devoted to acquiring it, this is because the transformation of economic capital into cultural capital presupposes an expenditure of time that is made possible by possession of economic capital. More precisely, it is because the cultural capital that is effectively transmitted within the family itself depends not only on the quantity of cultural capital, itself accumulated by spending time, that the domestic group possess, but also on the usable time (particularly in the form of the mother's free time) available to it (by virtue ofits economic capital, which en~bles it to purchase the time of others) to ensure the transmission of this capital and to delay entry into the labor markcl through prolonged schooling, a credit which pays off, if at all, only in the very long term. 20 The convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed OIl ensuring the reproduction of capital (and thl' position occupied in social space) by means 01 the conversions least costly in terms of COli version work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself (in a given state of the soci.,1 power relations). The different types of capi, tal can be distinguished according to their reproducibility or, more precisely, accordil'Mi to how easily they are transmitted, i.e., wilh more or less loss and with more or less COli cealment; the rate of loss and the degree ''''''''',',,'''''' ""d In "'y I" /0"'" """, ' ""y'hl"g wh/oh hdp, ,,, dl'gul" 'h, oco- 55 1'""-",,,"f "'o'ml"loo-pw-a
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