姝 Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2006, Vol. 5, No. 3, 324 –332.
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Business Ethics: A Way Out of
the Morass
EDWIN A. LOCKE
University of Maryland
In view of recent scandals (e.g., Enron, Health South, MCI, Tenet), there is no doubt that
ethics is something that people in business desperately need (and not only to keep out of
jail). But where should people going into business get the needed ethical guidance?
Many may hope to get it in business school. Thus, in preparation for this essay, I read a
number of current books on business ethics (listed after the references), including
textbooks. Here I report the dismaying results of my search and suggest an antidote.
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The texts presented (or claimed to present) a variety of ethical theories, including (depending on the
book) utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, rights theory
(e.g., from John Locke), Rawls’ theory of justice,
libertarianism, and Marxism. However, there was
never any serious attempt to integrate any of the
theories into a coherent whole—and for good reason. The theories are not only flawed, either partially or totally, they are also contradictory (e.g.,
utilitarianism vs. rights theory; libertarianism vs.
Marxism).
A surprising omission from the list of theories
presented in the texts I read is pragmatism—surprising because this is probably the most prevalent theory “in use” (consciously or subconsciously)
by most people in business—not to mention by
Americans in general (excepting those who are
religious). Pragmatism, originated by William
James and John Dewey near the turn of the 20th
century, is an early version of postmodern skepticism (Locke, 2003). Pragmatism asserts that there
are no absolute principles or standards, no objective truth and no objective reality. “Truth” is simply
that which “works” (“works” means attaining any
goals you want) or makes one feel better (Rand,
1961). The connection between pragmatism and
business executives who try to “get away with
something” is obvious. It is also ironic that a theory
designed to be “practical” is not practical at
all—as many disgraced business executives have
found out— because it is, on its own terms, detached from reality.
A surprising omission from the list of
theories presented in the texts I read is
pragmatism—surprising because this is
probably the most prevalent theory “in
use” (consciously or subconsciously) by
most people in business—not to mention
by Americans in general (excepting those
who are religious).
The problem for the business students who read
business ethics books and who will presumably
someday go into business, is this: “How do they get
firm ethical guidance from such a contradictory
mish-mash?” Of course, they cannot. Worse yet,
they might get the idea that since there is no objectively correct theory, they can switch theories at
their convenience or simply become cynical and
dispense with ethics in business as a hopeless
cause. In such a case, pragmatism (“let’s see what
seems to work for me today”), almost of necessity,
becomes the default option.
I am going to single out four additional aspects
of the business ethics texts for discussion here.
First, the descriptions of some theories are not accurate or sufficiently complete. Second, the criticisms are often not sufficiently fundamental. Third,
most of the theories are based on the assumption,
without proof, that acting in one’s own interest is
immoral but that working for the collective is
moral. Fourth, the arguments offered in favor of
morality, including collectivism, are predominantly subjective. I end by offering an antidote to
the ethical theory morass.
The most glaring problems arise in discussions
The author is indebted to Dr. Onkar Ghate for his helpful comments on parts of this manuscript.
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of Kant. Typically texts will say that the categorical imperative simply refers to the universality
principle (viz., that a moral principle had to apply
equally to everyone). Second, they claim that Kant
champions respect for the individual. And third,
they claim that Kant is an advocate of reason. All
these claims about Kant may seem superficially
true, but, if you look deeper, they are the exact
opposite of the truth.
Text writers seem to grasp that Kant stood for a
duty ethics, but none goes into the ghastly details.
Kant is profoundly opposed to the idea of people
seeking happiness and caring about their own
lives. He views self-love, or more precisely, loving
self-love as “the very source of evil.” Love of self is
“a radical, innate evil in human nature” (quoted in
Peikoff, 1982: 78, 79). Acting out of duty—the only
kind of truly moral action for Kant—must be totally
divorced from concern for any interest or desire
one might hold (including the desire to be moral).
But how can you tell whether a man is acting from
duty? Kant gives a clear answer. The ideal (moral)
man, he says, is “a person who would be willing
not merely to discharge all human duties himself . . . but even though tempted by the greatest
allurements to take upon himself every affliction,
up to the most ignominious death . . .” (quoted in
Peikoff, 1982: 80). The truly moral man must suffer,
“suffering which the new [moral] man, in becoming
dead to the old, must accept throughout life . . .”
(quoted in Peikoff, 1982: 80 – 81). Man, because he is
never free from guilt “can regard as truly merited
the sufferings that may overtake him, by whatever
road they come . . . ” (quoted in Peikoff, 1982: 81).
Peikoff (1982: 82) summarizes Kant’s ethics as
follows:
Your desires, regardless of their content, deserve no respect because they are desires. Do
your duty, which is yours because you have
desires, and which is sublime because, unadulterated by the stigma of any gain, it
shines forth unsullied, in loss, pain, conflict,
torture. Sacrifice the thing you want, without
beneficiaries. . . . sacrifice your values, your
self-interest, your happiness, your self, because they are your values, your self-interest,
your happiness, your self; sacrifice them to
morality. . . . The moral commandment is:
thou shalt sacrifice, sacrifice everything, sacrifice for the sake of sacrifice, as an end in
itself.
This is the full meaning of the categorical imperative. One might ask, given the above, why would
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anyone want to be moral, especially considering
that morality belongs to the noumenal world which
is unknowable to man? This says Kant, “is precisely the problem we cannot solve. . . .” it is “a
reproach which we must make to human reason
generally. . . .” (quoted in Peikoff, 1982: 76). In other
words, Kant’s moral system is totally arbitrary.
One cannot read this and defend the idea that
Kant respected man as an end in himself. In reality, a more profound hatred of man cannot be found
in the entire history of philosophy. One more quote
should suffice to demonstrate this:
It is a duty to preserve one’s life, and moreover everyone has a direct inclination to do
so. But for that reason the often anxious care
which most men take of it has no intrinsic
worth, and the maxim of doing so has no
moral import. They preserve their lives according to duty, but not from duty. But if adversities and hopeless sorrow completely
take away the relish for life, if an unfortunate
man, strong in soul, is indignant rather than
despondent or dejected over his fate and
wishes for death, and yet preserves his life
without loving it and from neither inclination
nor fear but from duty—then his maxim has a
moral import (quoted in Rand, 1970: 866).
Even the early Christians, though advocating
self-sacrifice, permitted man to work toward an
ultimate reward: eternal life and happiness in
heaven. But this is not permitted as a moral motive
by Kant (even though he believed that good people
went to heaven).
Kant’s contempt for man was not revealed only
in his ethics. In epistemology he was the first philosopher in history to totally sever reason from
reality. He believed that the real or noumenal
world was completely unknowable to man. Man,
he argued, could only know the world of appearances, the phenomenal world (for Kant’s view and
its refutation, see Ghate, 2003). Kant, following
from Hume, started philosophy on its long downhill slide to total skepticism, ending in postmodernism (Locke, 2003). Kant was not an advocate of
reason, but its destroyer. He wrote, “I have . . .
found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to
make room for faith” (quoted in Peikoff, 1982: 25).
I will give one more example of inadequate
analysis. This concerns utilitarianism, originated
by Bentham and further developed by Mill. The
fundamental principle of utilitarian ethics is “the
greatest good (or happiness) for the greatest number.” While texts note that there are problems of
application (e.g., how do you compare the plea-
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sures of different people?), they don’t go deep
enough. What is utilitarianism fundamentally?
Peikoff (1982: 122) writes, “Utilitarianism is a union
of hedonism and Christianity. The first teaches
man to love pleasure; the second to love his neighbor. The union consists in teaching man to love his
neighbor’s pleasure.” Consistent with Kant, Mill
writes, “All honor to those who can abnegate for
themselves the personal enjoyment of life” Peikoff
(1982: 122). Utilitarianism can be justified, therefore, only if one can justify both hedonism and
Christianity’s divine command/divine duty theory
of morality. The textbooks attempt no such justification. Observe that utilitarianism could readily
justify cannibalism or mass enslavement so long
as the greatest number got pleasure from it. Only
individual rights can protect one from the tyranny
of the majority, but, if individuals possess rights,
then the entire utilitarian theory is invalidated.
This brings us to another feature of ethics texts.
Again, consistent with Kant, it is taken as a virtual
axiom that selfishness is immoral and that altruism (sacrifice for the sake of others) is moral. The
false dichotomy offered is this: the selfish business
leader as hedonistic, amoral marauder versus the
selfless business leader as steward of “society’s”
resources who sacrifices himself for the good of the
community. The concept of a rationally selfish,
moral business leader who makes an honest profit
is never considered. If a businessman makes a
good business decision out of self-interest, this
automatically takes the decision out of the realm of
morality. This brings up the following question,
which none of the texts address: “If seeking profits
is by definition nonmoral, amoral, or immoral,
whereas sacrifice to society is moral, yet incompatible, if practiced consistently, with business success (i.e., profits), then why would anyone want to
go into business?” And what would motivate a
business executive to want to be moral?
ing for the self is considered immoral. The default
option is collective subjectivism (an idea that originated with Kant in the realm of cognition). But how
do you defend a collectivistically subjective view
from the accusation that it is arbitrary? Group feelings are still feelings, not objective fact [s].
All these are problems that a kaleidoscope of
invalid and contradictory moral theories cannot
resolve. What is needed is a logically consistent,
valid ethical theory that is objective. In the remainder of this essay I will offer objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand, as the proper alternative to
conventional ethical theories.
Before turning to her theory, however, I must
point out that objectivism has virtually nothing in
common with libertarianism. Libertarians have
sometimes used some of Ayn Rand’s ideas (e.g.,
freedom from government coercion) but without
any of the philosophical context needed to validate
them (e.g., the nature and role of reason). They
claim simply to “want freedom.” Some advocate
anarchy; others, amazingly, even reject the concept
of individual rights. Libertarians are not advocates
of reason but of emotional whim. Ayn Rand called
libertarians “hippies of the right” (Binswanger,
1986: 253). Even Nozick, a nonhippie philosophy
professor, attempted to defend freedom and capitalism using some of Ayn Rand’s ideas but without
grasping her total philosophy—an error which
makes his work an easy target of attack.
Objectivism
For the most systematic presentation and proof of
the philosophy of objectivism, see Peikoff (1991; see
also Rand, 1992, 1964a, 1991). A valid theory of ethics cannot exist in limbo, apart from a valid foundation in metaphysics and epistemology.1 (And
politics, as we will see, depends upon all three.)
Ayn Rand wrote (1975:30):
The false dichotomy offered is this: the
selfish business leader as hedonistic,
amoral marauder versus the selfless
business leader as steward of “society’s”
resources who sacrifices himself for the
good of the community.
Finally, the texts writers, seeing the problems
with extant theories, typically end up viewing morality, in whatever form, as something which is
validated consensually, that is, by majority opinion. This implies that all morality is subjective.
Individual subjectivism is rejected because work-
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In order to live, man must act; in order to act,
he must make choices; in order to make choices; he must define a code of values; in order to
define a code of values, he must know what
he is and where he is—i.e., he must know his
own nature (including his means of knowledge) and the nature of the universe in which
he acts—i.e., he needs metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, which means: philosophy.
1
I use the male pronoun to refer to all human beings below,
following its use by Ayn Rand.
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Metaphysics
In metaphysics (the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of the universe as a whole,
including man’s nature), objectivism begins with
three primary axioms (axioms are truths that are
self-evident to direct perception, which form the
foundation of all knowledge, and which cannot be
contradicted without accepting them in the process). These are existence (reality), identity (everything has a specific nature), and consciousness
(consciousness is the faculty for perceiving reality). Contrary to Kant’s view, the possession of a
means of awareness, consciousness, does not disqualify us from knowing reality, but rather it is
precisely what makes it possible (see Ghate, 2003).
In objectivism reality comes first; thus, consciousness is not the creator of reality as the postmodernists claim (Locke, 2003). Manmade facts exist
(e.g., television), but to bring meaningful creations
into existence, one has to know the laws of reality.
A corollary of the axiom of identity is the law of
causality. If everything has a specific identity, then
it has a specific capacity for action. Thus every
entity obeys causal laws (including elementary
particles).
Epistemology
In epistemology (the branch of philosophy that
deals with the nature and means of knowledge),
objectivism holds that all knowledge comes from
the senses and reason which identifies and integrates sensory material. It rejects any form of mysticism or revelation as a source of knowledge; one
cannot validate one’s knowledge using nonrational methods. Man’s unique form of awareness is
conceptual. (For Ayn Rand’s original theory of objective concept formation, see Rand, 1991.)
Two key aspects of reason are that it is fallible
and volitional. It is fallible because man’s conceptual reasoning is not automatically correct. That is
why a science of epistemology is needed. The key
method of reason is logic. For objectivists, logic
does not simply mean deduction. It means that all
concepts must be formed inductively, based on
observation of reality by the senses and then integrated conceptually, and that these concepts be
ultimately reducible to the perceptual level. Logic
also means that all elements of knowledge must
be integrated with all other elements, and there
must be no contradictions.
Volition (free will) is a corollary of the axiom of
consciousness. It means that one can make choices
that are not necessitated by prior conditions. One’s
most fundamental choice, according to objectiv-
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327
ism, is the choice to think or not to think. (Other
choices, such as the choice to act, are derivative). It
is the rational faculty that is activated and sustained by choice. This can be validated by introspection, by direct observation of one’s consciousness. The antithesis of volition, psychological
determinism, leads to self-contradiction, because
it would consist of a claim of knowledge from an
entity that can only say what it was programmed
to say. Such an entity would have no means of
validating its knowledge. Volition is not a contradiction of the law of causality but a particular form
of it, a form unique to man. Volitional action (thinking) is not uncaused but self-caused.
Ethics
Objectivist ethics rests on the fact that reality exists, that man gains knowledge of it through reason, and that he possesses volition. If there is no
reality, ethics must be a matter of subjective whim.
The same holds if reason is invalid. And if man has
no choice about how to act, then a science of ethics
is useless. Given the foundation, here are four issues that need to be addressed in establishing a
code of ethics:
1. Why does one need a code of ethics?
2. What is the ultimate standard in ethics?
3. Who should be the beneficiary of one’s ethical
code?
4. What virtues should one practice?
Why Does One Need a Code of Ethics? Ayn Rand
(1964a) explained that since there is no inborn conceptual knowledge, one has no inborn guidance on
how to act. (Physical sensations like pleasure and
pain are inborn but are not sufficient to guide one’s
long-range choices.) As a volitional being with no
inborn knowledge, man needs to acquire a code of
values and has the power to choose such a code.
(Of course, many people do not choose to think
much about ethics, in which case they absorb,
more or less at random, some unintegrated conglomeration of parental teachings, peer models
and pressures, cultural influences, and subjective
feelings.)
What Is the Ultimate Standard in Ethics? This is
the fundamental question that has stumped moral
philosophers throughout the centuries. The standard answer (outside of religion) has been subjective feelings. Ayn Rand was the first to identify an
objective standard. She discovered this standard
by asking: “What is the root of the concept of
value?” She saw that the concept of value presupposed the existence of entities whose life was conditional, that is, living entities. She wrote, “It is
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only the concept of ‘Life’ that makes the concept of
‘Value’ possible. It is only to a living entity that
things can be good or evil” (Rand, 1964a: 15–16).
This means that even the lower animals can have
values, even though they do not have the capacity
to formulate or act on the basis of a moral code
(which requires conceptual knowledge). Living organisms continually face the alternative of life or
death and must engage in appropriate goal(value) directed action in order to survive. Life (the
life of each individual), therefore, is the standard of
the good. Thus, that which is pro-life is the good
and that which is anti-life is the evil.
It is critical to note here that only individuals
exist; a group or society is not an entity but a
collection of individuals. Thus only individuals are
units of moral value. The group as such is not a
super entity and has no special or superior moral
status.
Survival is not a matter of acting on the range of
the moment (like animals and pragmatists). One
must think in terms of the range of a lifetime. Nor is
the good determined by feelings. Feelings (emotions) are important for motivation but are not tools
of knowledge. To know what is in one’s interest
one must know one’s own nature (e.g., needs) and
must engage in rational thinking to decide what
action to take. Finally, as a conceptual being, one
needs to think and act in terms of principles (Locke,
2002). One cannot act coherently on the basis of an
endless series of disconnected facts.
Superficially, one might regard Kant’s demand
for “universalizability” as advocacy of a principled
approach to morality; but for Kant, the “principles”
of morality are nonempirical—i.e., divorced from
reason and experience—and serve not as an aid
but most fundamentally as a hindrance to life.
Kant was right, though he did not offer any proof,
about the need for principles in morality; his error
was to conclude that only a duty ethics would
allow for the formulation of such principles.
Who Should Be the Beneficiary of One’s Moral
Code? As noted earlier, most people take as an
axiom of morality (especially since Christianity)
that self-sacrifice is the highest virtue. It was August Comte who coined the term altruism, meaning
other-ism. According to altruism the good means
sacrificing oneself to others. (Altruism does not
mean generosity, benevolence, or good will.)
No one has ever offered a this-worldly, nonmystical argument for the claim that altruism is good,
and, if examined closely, it leads to bizarre contradictions. For example, if it is evil to act in one’s
own interests and moral to sacrifice for others,
then isn’t it selfish of others to accept the sacrifice?
Shouldn’t they in turn sacrifice to others and so on,
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so that in the end no one in the world has what he
or she wants? If so, why would anyone want to act
at all or seek to gain any values? The altruist
answer is that you should sacrifice to those “in
need,” which usually means those with less than
you. The question then arises: “Why do others peoples’ lack of values give them a claim on yours?”
Wouldn’t that make those who are able, hardworking, and productive the slaves of those who
are not? By what principle can a creator of nonvalue make a moral claim to values created by others? This would mean the more you produce, the
less you get, and the less you produce the more you
get—a system of justice in reverse—Karl Marx’s
communist ideal. We have seen the results of
Marx’s philosophy in action.
Acted on consistently, altruism is the morality of
death. Even taking a bite of food is a selfish act—
but what about the starving people in some far off
country who need that food? Wouldn’t it be more
moral to starve yourself and send your food to
others? Of course, if you did not earn money to buy
the food, then others would starve anyway. So to be
a good altruist you would have to keep producing
and then giving almost everything away to others— death by slow torture. Under Kant’s morality,
suffering unto death is what morality is all about.
Observe that altruism contradicts the very purpose of morality—to guide your choices and actions so that you may live happily and successfully
on earth. Altruism, in effect, says you need a moral
code to live; therefore, act in such a way that will
make you suffer and die. Observe also that, as long
as you live, altruism cannot be practiced consistently. If you smuggle even a little self-interest into
your life in order to get some minimal pleasure,
you are morally guilty—and death is your only
permanent escape from the contradiction.
Objectivism totally rejects altruism as a moral
code; it is anti-life and therefore not just mistaken
but evil. Given that life is the standard, objectivism
holds that each individual should be the beneficiary of his moral code, and therefore, it advocates
rational self-interest (i.e., rational egoism) as
moral. (As we will see, self-interest does not necessarily preclude helping others.) People who rationally pursue and achieve their own goals and
values through honest means are not evil, or at
best morally neutral, but positively good. They are
living by a pro-life morality. For objectivists,
achieving one’s own happiness in life (which requires thinking) is one’s highest moral purpose.
What Virtues Should One Practice? It is not enough
for a moral theory to argue that one must pursue
one’s rational self-interest. It also has to indicate
how one does it; it has to identify how to act. This
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requires the identification of pro-life virtues.
Rationality is the core virtue in objectivism. If
one gains knowledge by means of reason (applied
to sensory data) and if knowledge is needed in
order to live, then rationality is primary. Being
rational includes taking reality (facts) seriously,
exerting mental effort, integrating one’s knowledge, not allowing contradictions, thinking long
range, and projecting the consequences of one’s
actions. Being irrational (e.g., evading facts)
means being anti-reality, which means acting
against your life. I personally believe that the refusal to take facts seriously is the single-most frequent cause of poor managerial decision making.
Most typically in such cases, facts are replaced by
wishes.
All the other virtues are aspects of rationality
and, like rationality, all pertain to the relationship
between consciousness and existence.
Honesty means the refusal to fake reality. Deceiving others or oneself means trying to make
reality unreal. Dishonesty sabotages one’s rational
faculty and makes it a faculty for not perceiving
what is but for perceiving what isn’t. It turns your
consciousness into your enemy. In a business context, the present author believes that dishonesty in
an organization should virtually always lead to
termination. Dishonesty is such a basic breach of
morality that it could take years before one could
be certain that a person has reformed. Furthermore, allowing dishonest people to remain in a
company risks (if not guarantees) that the whole
culture will eventually become dishonest—leading eventually to disaster. (It is not that dishonesty
needs to be singled out, since all the virtues are
interconnected, Peikoff, 1982, but this vice is the
one most frequently publicized in the business
world and is most directly connected with business
fraud.)
Integrity means loyalty to one’s rational convictions in action. Rational convictions are not the
same as feelings. Acting simply on feelings is
amoral hedonism. Integrity requires action. Claiming “X is true” and then not acting on that conviction when action is called for is, again, to sabotage
your mind. Moral compromise is one example of a
breach of integrity (supporting or sanctioning what
you know to be immoral). Refusing such compromises, for example, courage in the face of threat,
upholds integrity.
Independence refers to the responsibility of using your own rational judgment in every issue of
your life. Its antithesis is dependence, which
means blindly following the dictates of others. (Nor
does independence refer to blindly acting on emotions.) Only individuals have minds, so there is no
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way that other people can do your thinking for you.
Even if they provide you with ideas, you have to
understand them and judge their validity for yourself. Defaulting on the responsibility of thinking for
yourself means relinquishing your rational faculty,
and therefore, losing control of your own life. Independence in action includes taking responsibility
for supporting your own life, for example, earning
a living. A person who advocates egoism cannot,
in principle, ask others to sacrifice their earnings
for his sake. (In business this means not asking for
government favors, e.g., subsidies, legal protection, such as tariffs, against honest competitors.)
Productivity means creating (directly or obtaining through trade) the material values your life
requires. Man is not a ghost but a unity of mind
and body. He needs material values not only to
survive, but also to help him enjoy life (e.g., nice
clothes, TVs, automobiles). Productive work, such
as that accomplished by people in business, is not
the product of some lower and corrupt (e.g., “materialistic”) part of the self. Creating (as contrasted to
looting) wealth requires rational thinking, including creativity, planning, coordinating the efforts of
others, studying markets, cost control, financing,
making contracts, looking at the environment, buying or renting property, promoting sales, and hundreds of other activities. If one’s consciousness is
one’s spirit, then successful production, including
honest profit making, is a profound spiritual
achievement.
Justice. Justice is rationality applied to the evaluation of and actions toward other people. It
means looking at the facts of others’ character and
achievements and judging them objectively. It
means integrating all the relevant facts and holding the full context of your knowledge about others. It means acting toward people in accordance
with your honest judgment. In business this means
rewarding those who deserve it and not those who
do not. Since only individuals exist, it means evaluating people only as individuals and according to
their character and actions and never according to
what ethnic or gender group they belong to.
Forgiveness as such in objectivism is not a virtue
as in religion. Forgiveness may be just, but only
under certain circumstances (e.g., the breach of
morality was not too severe, the perpetrator has
sincerely apologized and made amends, there is
clear evidence that the individual has reformed,
not just in word but in deed).
It should be noted that John Rawls’ theory of
justice, also frequently presented in ethics texts, is
the complete antithesis of the objectivist view.
Rawls’ thesis (insofar as his theory can even be
understood) seems to be that some men are “un-
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fairly” advantaged at birth with talent or good
families (evading the fact that the concept of justice does not apply to attributes or conditions over
which you have no choice). Therefore such people
can only be allowed to function if it results in the
benefit of the least advantaged. In other words, the
competent are to be punished for their competence
by being made, at least in part, servants of the
incompetent so that everyone will share each other’s fate. A more grotesque example of injustice,
obviously motivated by altruism, can hardly be
imagined (Rand, 1973.)
Pride. In objectivism, earned pride (which does
not refer to boasting or fake self-esteem) is a virtue
not a vice. Pride is earned by what Ayn Rand
called moral ambitiousness— by working to perfect one’s moral character. Unlike in the case of
altruism, it is possible to practice the objectivist
virtues consistently (i.e., to be morally perfect), because the virtues are pro-life and consistent with
reason and man’s nature.
The above are the key objectivist virtues. It is
important to note that objectivism is not deontological. Virtue is not a duty, not an end in itself,
and not its own reward. The reward of virtue is to
place oneself on the path to live successfully on
earth and achieve one’s own long-range happiness. (Obviously, factors outside the realm of morality can affect one’s well-being, such as accidents, crime, illness, war, or dictatorship. For a
detailed discussion of Ayn Rand’s ethics, see
Smith, 2006.)
Nor does objectivism accept any dichotomy between the moral and the practical. Its code of morality is practical, because its virtues are pro-life.
Honesty, for example, is in one’s rational self-interest (Locke & Woiceshyn, 1995). It is true that
dishonesty (or the breach of any virtue) might give
you some type of short-term “gain” (e.g., cheating
your customers). If there were no such “gain,” people would not act immorally. But in the long term
and in the fundamental sense, immorality acts
against your self-interest. The “gain” is illusory,
because you have sabotaged your own consciousness, undermined your own pride, and opened
yourself up to the risk of harm (e.g., lawsuits, loss
of job, loss of reputation, jail).
Note that the above list of objectivist virtues does
not include traits that many people view as virtues. For example, since objectivism advocates
egoism, what is its view toward helping others?
Obviously helping others is not a duty. But it can
be a selfish value. Ayn Rand writes, “Love and
friendship are profoundly personal, selfish values . . . Concern for the welfare of those one loves is
a rational part of one’s selfish interests” (Rand,
September
1963: 5). An egoist would properly help a friend in
need or even risk his life for a loved one if life
would have no meaning without that person. Such
actions are expressions of integrity.
What of helping strangers? Ayn Rand’s view is
that it is proper to help strangers in an emergency— both out of good will and because one knows
the value of human life—as long as the risk to
one’s life is minimal and one can afford to help.
However, this does not give everyone in need a
claim upon one’s life. That would be altruism. (For
a discussion of generosity, charity and kindness,
see Smith, 2006.)
The Vice of Initiating Physical Force. If man lives
by reason, it means he needs to be able to be free
to think and to act on the basis of his rational
judgment. Physical force and reason are opposites.
Faced with a gun, your only choice is to obey or
die. Thus force negates your means of survival;
thus the initiation of physical force is anti-life, and
therefore evil. (The use of force in retaliation
against those who start it will be discussed below.)
Politics
Objectivist politics rests on the foundation provided by metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. If
the world is real and obeys causal laws, if man’s
means of knowledge and thus of survival is reason, and if egoism (and its associated virtues) is
morally good, then what are the proper terms under which men should form a society?
The proper role of government is to protect men
from the initiation of physical force by others (including by the government) and thereby leave
them free to pursue their own interests. The concept that does this is that of individual rights. To
quote Ayn Rand (1964a: 92):
“Rights” are a moral concept—the concept
that provides a logical transition from the
principles guiding an individual’s actions to
the principles guiding his relationship with
others—the concept that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context—
the link between the moral code of a man and
the legal code of a society, between ethics
and politics. Individual rights are the means
of subordinating society to moral law.
Given that rights are based on egoism, any attempt by Kant to advocate rights at the political
level is a contradiction. Rights are moral principles that protect the individual’s ability to pursue
his own life and happiness. They have no meaning
in a duty or altruist ethics, which banishes concern
2006
for one’s own life and happiness from morality.
Men whose moral code demands sacrifice do not
need rights and could not benefit from them. Why
would you need to be protected by the right to
immolate yourself? John Locke’s concept of rights
was basically correct, but certain flaws made his
theory vulnerable to attack. Among these flaws
were mixing rational arguments with religious arguments, not having a valid epistemology (e.g., a
valid theory of concepts), and not having an objective theory of ethics.
One consequence of not having an airtight case
was that eventually the concept of “rights” itself
became perverted. The objective concept of rights
is entirely negative: It prohibits certain actions
(initiating force) to members of society and its institutions, so that men are left free to act in their
self-interest. Negative rights allow freedom of action, but they do not guarantee that you will succeed in getting what you want (e.g., wealth, property, happiness). But eventually intellectuals
began to posit “positive rights,” the rights to certain objects such as food, housing, clothing, medical care, and a minimum wage. Observe that the
concept of “positive rights” totally negates negative rights. If men have a right to housing, medical
care, and the like, then certain people must be
forced to provide them, which means they lose
their rights to freedom of action and to the fruits of
their efforts (e.g., property).
“Positive rights,” of course, are based on altruism. In politics this means collectivism, the theory
that men are not sovereign entities but exist to
serve the group (e.g., the party, the state). In effect,
rights, in this view, belong to society. In contrast,
objectivism upholds individualism in every branch
of philosophy. Why? Because only individual human beings exist; only individual minds exist; and
thus only the individual is the unit of moral value.
Only individuals possess rights. Groups are not an
entity but an abstraction referring to a collection of
individuals.
It is important to note that in objectivism the
term coercion refers only to physical force. Being
threatened with loss of a job for not doing what the
boss wants is not, therefore, actual coercion. Economic power, the power of trade, is not the same as
political power (Binswanger, 1983). A dollar is not a
gun.
The application of individual rights to economics leads to laissez faire capitalism. This means
that the only role of government in the economy
and society at large would be to prevent the initiation of force, including fraud. The government
would consist of the police, the armed forces, the
courts and elected officials (e.g., Congress). The
Locke
331
use of physical force, consistent with objective law,
in retaliation against criminals is morally justified
because it protects rights and is therefore pro-life.
Fraud is a form of force in that it means you are
making a trade without your consent because of
being given false information. Under objectivism
all the company executives recently convicted of or
prosecuted for fraud would still be convicted or
prosecuted. Similarly, factories would not be allowed to release poisonous gasses or chemicals
into the air, ground, or water that could be objectively proven to harm others, because that would
involve initiating force. (The standards here have
to be rational; to close all factories and return
society to the middle ages because closing factories that released small amounts of particulate
matter would violate everyone’s right to life.)
Fraud is a form of force in that it means
you are making a trade without your
consent because of being given false
information. Under objectivism all the
company executives recently convicted of
or prosecuted for fraud would still be
convicted or prosecuted.
Under objectivism there would be no central
bank (and all banks would most likely be on the
gold standard), no anti-trust laws, no minimum
wage laws, no protection of endangered species
(except by your choice on your own property) and,
in general, no business regulation that did not
involve preventing force or fraud. (For how a truly
free country would raise money to support the government, see Rand, 1964b.) There would be no
mixed economy, and the result would be less inflation, less unemployment, and far greater economic prosperity.
Observe, in contrast to conservatism (e.g., Adam
Smith, Herbert Spencer, and others), that objectivism does not defend capitalism because it leads to
the greater good for the greatest number or benefits society as a whole (although it does, in fact,
benefit society). It advocates capitalism, because it
is the only system consistent with man’s rational
faculty and because it is the only moral system—it
is based on man’s right to his own life.
Objectivism (though I have only given a brief
summary here) is a complete, totally integrated
philosophic system. (It includes esthetics which I
have not discussed, but see Rand, 1975.) Before Ayn
Rand, there had been only three major systems of
philosophy: Plato’s, Aristotle’s, and Kant’s. Ayn
Rand’s only intellectual debt was to Aristotle, but
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all three previous systems suffered from fatal
flaws, especially Plato and Kant (see Ghate, 2003;
Rand, 1961).
In closing, one might ask if such a philosophy can
be successfully applied by a business. The answer is
yes. One example is BB&T, an Atlantic coast, 100billion dollar banking company, which promotes objectivism’s virtues as the core of its value system. The
company has grown steadily for many years, has
given an outstanding return to stockholders, has
been consistently rated as one of the best banks in
the U.S. and also one of the best companies (see
Thomas, 2006); it has been totally scandal free. Virtue
pays—if you choose the right ones.
REFERENCES
Binswanger, H. 1983. The dollar and the gun. The Objectivist
Forum, June, New York: TOF Publications.
Binswanger, H. 1986. The Ayn Rand Lexicon. New York: New
American Library.
Ghate, O. 2003. Postmodernism’s Kantian roots. In. E. Locke (Ed.)
Postmodernism and management: Pros, cons and the alternative. New York: JAI (Elsevier).
September
(9 –11), reprinted in: New York: The Intellectual Activist:163–
176.
Rand, A. 1975. The romantic manifesto. New York: Signet.
Rand, A. 1991. Introduction to Objectivist epistemology. New
York: NAL Books.
Rand, A. 1992. Atlas shrugged. New York: Signet (Originally
published in 1957)
Smith, T. 2006. Ayn Rand’s normative ethics: The virtuous egoist.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Press.
Thomas, M. 2006. The complete CEO. Chichester, UK: Capstone.
Business Ethics Texts
Boatwright, J. R. 2003. Ethics and the conduct of
business. Upper Saddle River, NY: Prentice Hall.
Ciulla, J. B. 2004. Ethics, the heart of leadership.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
Harvard business review on corporate ethics.
2003. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School
Press.
Locke, E. 2002. The epistemological side of teaching management: Teaching through principles. Academy of Management Learning and Education, 1: 195–205.
Jennings, M. M. 2003. Business ethics. Mason, OH:
Thomson (West Legal Studies).
Locke, E. 2003. Postmodernism and management: Pros, cons and
the alternative. New York: JAI (Elsevier)
Richardson, J. E. 2004. Business ethics, 7th ed.
Dubuque, IA: McGraw Hill/Dushkin.
Locke, E., & Woiceshyn, J. 1995. Why businessmen should be
honest: The argument from rational egoism. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 16: 405– 414.
Peikoff, L. 1982. The ominous parallels: The end of freedom in
America. New York: Stein & Day.
Velasquez, M. G. 2002. Business ethics, 5th ed.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Peikoff, L. 1991. Objectivism: The philosophy of Ayn Rand. New
York: Dutton.
Rand, A. 1961. For the new intellectual. New York: Signet
Rand, A. 1963. The ethics of emergencies. The Objectivist Newsletter, February, 2: 5ff.
Rand, A. 1964a. The virtue of selfishness. New York: Signet.
Rand, A. 1964b. What would be the proper method of financing
the government in a fully free society? The Objectivist
Newsletter, February, 3: 7–9.
Rand, A. 1967. Capitalism: The unknown ideal. New York: Signet.
Rand, A. 1970. Causality vs. duty. The Objectivist, July 1970,
reprinted in New York: The Intellectual Activist: 865– 870.
Rand, A. 1973. An untitled letter (3 parts). The Ayn Rand letter, 2
Edwin A. Locke received his PhD
from Cornell University in 1964.
He is Dean’s Professor (emeritus)
of Leadership and Motivation at
the R.H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland. His
research interests include motivation, job satisfaction, goal setting and the philosophy of science. He has published widely in
his field.
姝 Academy of Management Learning & Education, 2009, Vol. 8, No. 2, 259 –262.
........................................................................................................................................................................
Dialogue on Locke’s
Business Ethics
DAVID C. JACOBS
Morgan State University
Edwin Locke’s essay, “Business Ethics: A Way Out of the Morass” is a brief for a business
ethics founded on objectivism and formulated for management education. While Locke’s
argument is provocative and impressive in scope, he misconceives and caricatures the
arguments of leading philosophers in order to elevate the work of Ayn Rand. His
approach disserves both management education and practice.
........................................................................................................................................................................
I read the September 2006 AMLE with interest. Edwin Locke’s essay, “Business Ethics: A Way Out of
the Morass” (Locke, 2006), is a provocative review
of business ethics texts and brief for an objectivist
alternative. However, it is deficient in its characterization of pragmatism, Kantian ethics, and utilitarianism, among other philosophies. Locke’s errors in interpretation stem from the objectivist lens
through which he views the history of ideas.
[S]tudents and practitioners benefit when
they understand the social and historic
context of ideas, whether ideas in theory
or ideas for practice.
Of course, one should not adopt uncritically the
theories of McGregor, the social criticism of
Thomas Paine, the ethics of Aristotle, or any other
historic perspective. Rather, I believe that a “decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” construed across the ages as well as across the globe,
widens the span of experience under consideration
and inspires a helpful humility. Similarly, an appreciation of context for contemporary thinkers
and practitioners helps us better assess their work.
I must admit that my embrace of a history of
ideas framework has a basis in philosophical
pragmatism. The pragmatists’ rejection of absolute
truth leads to enhanced respect for provisional
truths—whether historic or contemporary. However, this insight does not make William James or
John Dewey an indispensable thinker. They were
not alone in their contextual understanding of
truth. Martin Heidegger and Dewey are sometimes
compared with regard to their rejection of the notion of fixed foundations for knowledge (Abrams,
2002). Similar ideas emerge within different traditions and arguments, as the concept of “equifinality” would suggest. (See Katz & Kahn, 1978: 30, for
their discussion of equifinality.)
John Rawls proposed a respectful contextual review of historical works. He argued that philosophers’ arguments should be construed in the most
favorable light and understood in the context of
their times:
HISTORY OF IDEAS
My AMLE essay on “Critical Biography and Management Education” (Jacobs, 2007) introduces a
“history of ideas-based” approach to management
education. By this I mean a framework that situates both theory and practice in social and historical context. I believe that students and practitioners benefit when they understand the social and
historic context of ideas, whether ideas in theory or
ideas for practice. While contemporary debates
about theory and practice are obviously worthy of
students’ attention, even classic arguments are instructive once we take context into account. The
management theories of Frederick Taylor and
Douglas McGregor, for example, should be understood as interventions in the contested workplaces
of their respective eras. Despite vast differences in
technology, language, and culture, there are enduring issues of social relations: the relations of
subordinate and superior, men and women, young
and old, rich and poor, human and animal, and the
like, that are reflected in classic scholarship.
The author thanks Neal Ashkanasy for his kind stewardship of
this project.
259
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When lecturing, say, on Locke, Rousseau,
Kant, or J. S. Mill, I always tried to do two
things especially. One was to pose their problems as they themselves saw them, given
what their understanding of these problems
was in their own time. . . . The second thing I
tried to do was to present each writer’s
thoughts in what I took to be its strongest form
(Rawls, 2000: xvi).
This does not mean, of course, that Rawls was
necessarily right in his interpretations, as will be
evident below. Despite his errors, he embraced an
honest and transparent approach to the classics.
He clearly admitted his role as interpreter. While it
is difficult, the best stance for the contemporary
thinker is to seek to find value in historic works, to
treat them with respect, to excavate useful insights, and to adopt some ideas while rejecting
others, rather than to simplify or distort works as a
means to an end. Perhaps this is a Kantian lens for
scholarship: treating thinkers as ends in themselves, not exclusively as means for one’s own
arguments.
Unfortunately, in his 2006 AMLE business ethics
essay, Locke is cavalier with the history of ideas
and invokes caricatures of Kant, Dewey, and James
Mill based on the analysis of hostile interlocutors.
He fails to engage directly with these philosophers. Rather, he cites Leonard Peikoff’s and Onkar
Ghate’s summaries and interpretations. While
Peikoff is recognized as a leading objectivist, he is
not an authority on Kant or James Mill. The result of
this indirect assessment of classic works is an
account that treats centuries of argument as
merely a prelude to the arrival of Ayn Rand. In fact,
Locke insists that there were only three major systems of philosophy before Rand’s arrival, those
provided by Plato, Aristotle, and Kant.
The result of this indirect assessment of
classic works is an account that treats
centuries of argument as merely a
prelude to the arrival of Ayn Rand.
On the other hand, Locke is right in his charge that
ethics texts frequently present a truncated version
of Kantian, utilitarian, and other ethical models.
Textbook writers are perhaps more concerned with
deriving heuristics from classic philosophical arguments than with constructing nuanced analyses. These heuristics emerge from a process of
distillation and vast oversimplification to enhance
the practicality and managerial orientation of the
June
texts. For example, Hartman and Desjardins (2008:
67), like Locke and many others, explain utilitarianism in a way that blurs the distinct formulations
offered by Jeremy Bentham and the Mills. (John
Stuart Mill’s version stresses the quality, not just
the quantity, of happiness, and introduces conceptions of social welfare. See Kurer, 1999.) The sheer
volume of Kant’s and others’ works helps explain
but does not excuse the omissions and possible
distortions. The simplistic presentations of textbook authors surely are not undone by a hostile
reading of the classics. Students and scholars
alike benefit from honest engagement with the
important philosophical debates.
PRAGMATISM
Locke begins with a striking misrepresentation of
pragmatism. It is not a justification of “attaining
any goal that you want . . . or makes [you] feel
better” (Locke, 2006: 324). William James and John
Dewey agreed that truth is provisional but differed
in the interpretation of the decisive consequences.
James stressed consequences for the individual in
the quality of life led, not material gain or personal
expediency. His classic The Will to Believe (James,
1899) explored the personal impact of religious
faith. Dewey stressed social consequences. His
Liberalism and Social Action (Dewey, 1935) was a
powerful indictment of the coercive powers of the
corporation in Depression Era America. Neither
James nor Dewey had any interest in defending the
self-dealing that has corrupted many historic and
modern enterprises (Kuklick, 2001: 164, 196; Jacobs,
2004).
Pragmatists do not deny the existence of facts, of
empirical data. Rather, they argue that facts must
be interpreted (and reinterpreted) in order to provide models of reality. The practice of peer review
in academic journals has in common with pragmatism the assumption that knowledge is not inert
personal property but emerges from a social process of argument and validation.
KANT AND RAWLS
Locke’s critique of Kant relies upon a mixture of
Peikoff’s, Ghate’s, and Ayn Rand’s selective quotations and builds to an astonishing and misguided
declaration: that there is no greater hatred of man
in the entire history of philosophy (Locke, 2006: 325).
Locke argues that ethics texts provide a sketchy
summary of Kant, emphasizing the universality
principle and asserting that Kant respects the individual and embraces reason. Locke denies that
Kant values the individual or reason. In fact, he
2009
Jacobs
insists that Kant’s conception of duty negates any
personal interests or desires.
Certainly Kant’s formulation of duty places his
philosophy at odds with self-interest and liberty as
understood by Ayn Rand. However, it is quite a
stretch to construe universalistic formulations of
duty to others as a “hatred of humanity.” Those to
whom duties are owed may find their lives enriched. Reciprocity of duty provides personal benefit even as it exacts a cost.
In The Conflict of the Faculties (Kant, 1798/1992:
69 –70) Kant wrote:
Now the critique of reason has appeared and
determined the human being to a thoroughly
active place in the world. The human being
itself is the original creator of all its representations and concepts and ought to be the sole
author of all its actions.
Indeed, Kantian ethics bring human autonomy and
reason to the fore. These elements cannot be easily
squared with Locke’s interpretation. Although
Kant’s claim to build the categorical imperative
from pure synthetic a priori reason merits skepticism (I find Dewey more persuasive in his experience-derived ethics), and Kantian duty may appear to be a difficult standard, Kantian appeals
to autonomy and reason cannot summarily be
denied.
In fact, Kantian duty is rigorous and not easily
reconciled with modern capitalism. Bowie thinks
he can do so, partly by positing service to stockholders as a duty, coexisting with obligations to
employers and community (Bowie, 1999).
Rawls quite decisively severs the categorical imperative from Kant’s a priori logic and ultimately
substitutes his own “original position” argument
(incorporating an empirical component) in order to
rebuild a universalistic ethical model. Rawls
writes:
I conclude these remarks by saying that in
presenting Kant’s moral philosophy, I have
played down the role of the a priori and
the formal. . . . These things I have done because I believe that the downplayed elements
are not the heart of his doctrine. Emphasizing
them easily leads to empty and arid formalities . . . (Rawls, 2000: 275; see also Budde, 2007).
Although Rawls may go too far in this deemphasis
of Kantian metaphysics, he is not wrong to seek to
build on a portion and not the whole of the Kantian
edifice.
261
A BOUNDED ALTRUISM
Kant, Dewey, and many other philosophers have in
common a commitment to the importance of altruism, and this is entirely inconsistent with objectivist thinking. Locke singles out Kant, Dewey, and
Rawls because each makes reason and inquiry a
social process. Note that, contrary to Locke’s assertion that altruism is necessarily equivalent to selfsacrifice and self-destruction, Kant specifically
identifies limits to beneficence:
I ought to sacrifice a part of my welfare to
others without hope of return, because this is
a duty, and it is impossible to assign determinate limits to the extent of this sacrifice.
How far it should extend depends, in large
part, on what each person’s true needs are in
view of his sensibilities, and it must be left to
each to decide this for himself (Kant, 1996:
393).
Locke is not persuasive in his argument that altruism admits of no limits. Consider the famous saying of the Hebrew philosopher Hillel: “If I am not
for myself, who will be? If I am only for myself,
what am I? And if not now, when?” It would appear
that a bounded self-interest and a bounded altruism need not be contradictory. A contradiction
emerges only when altruism is defined so as to
require surrender and self-destruction. An altruist
who disregards self in service to others may not
live to serve again. Altruism appears to be an
enduring element in the life of families and communities (see Mauss, 2002).
Locke specifically criticizes Rawls, this time citing neither an objectivist interpreter nor Rawls
himself. He misconstrues the “difference principle,” which directs institutional design to the benefit of the least advantaged. Locke equates the
difference principle to the punishment of the competent, because he rejects any form of altruism and
questions the concept of disadvantage.
Locke notes a false dichotomy in ethics texts but
misses his own. He protests the false choices of the
hedonistic, amoral business leader versus the selfless business leader as a steward of society’s resources. He is right to note the omission of rational
self-interest from this framing, which is not attributed to any author in particular and represents his
own distinctive reading of ethics texts. There is
surely an important place for rational self-regard
in business, but there is probably also a place for
a balanced altruism.
There is another false dichotomy, between the
individual and social, which is fundamental to
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Locke’s thinking. Corporations are not the instruments of individuals; they are inherently social
bodies. Conceptions of individual self-interest are
not sufficient to explain the behavior of these complex social institutions. Management education
benefits from attention to the ideas of great philosophers like Kant, James, and Dewey in part because they address enduring problems of social
life and social justice. We owe them something
more than idiosyncratic and inappropriate representations of their ideas, and we certainly owe
them much more than the assignment of minor
status in the story of objectivism.
June
Kant, I. 1996. The doctrine of virtue. In M. Gregor, (Ed. and
Trans.), The metaphysics of morals. New York: Cambridge
University Press. (Original work published 1797)
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. 1978. The social psychology of organizations. NY: Wiley.
Kuklick, B. 2001. A history of philosophy in America, 1720 –2000.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.
Kurer, O. 1999. John Stuart Mill: Liberal or utilitarian? European
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 6: 200 –215.
Locke, E. 2006. Business ethics: A way out of the morass. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 5: 324 –332.
Mauss, M. 2002. The gift: The form and reason for exchange in
archaic societies. New York: Routledge.
Rawls. J. 2000. Lectures on the history of moral philosophy.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
REFERENCES
Abrams, J. 2002. Philosophy after the mirror of nature: Rorty,
Dewey, and Peirce on pragmatism and metaphor. Metaphor
and Symbol, 17: 227–242.
Bowie, N. 1999. Business ethics: A Kantian perspective. Malden,
MA, and Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Budde, K. 20007. Rawls on Kant: Is Rawls a Kantian or Kant a
Rawlsian? European Journal of Political Theory, 6: 339 –358.
Dewey, J. 1935. Liberalism and social action. New York: G. P.
Putnam.
Hartman, L., & Desjardins, J. 2008. Business ethics: Decisionmaking for personal integrity & social responsibility. New
York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Jacobs, D. 2004. A pragmatist approach to integrity in business
ethics. Journal of Management Inquiry, 13: 215–223.
Jacobs, D. 2007. Critical biography and management education.
Academy of Management Learning & Education, 6: 104 –110.
James, W. 1899. The will to believe and other essays in popular
philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company.
Kant, I. 1992. In M. Gregor, (Ed. and Trans.), The conflict of the
faculties. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Original
work published 1798)
David C. Jacobs (dc.david.
jacobs@gmail.com) is associate
professor of labor, business, and
society at the Earl Graves School
of Business and Management at
Morgan State University. Jacobs’
work focuses on the role of altruism and self-interest in decision
making by business, labor, and
other stakeholders. His most recent book, coauthored with Joel
Yudken, The Internet, Organizational Change, and Labor, explores promise and peril in the
effects of the Internet on organizations. Jacobs has also published books on social security and employee benefits, business
lobbies, and bargaining as an instrument of social change. His
articles appear in The Academy of Management Review, Journal of Management Inquiry, Negotiation Journal, Labor Studies
Journal, Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Labor Law
Journal, Academy of Management Learning & Education,
Ephemera, etc. He has contributed chapters to research volumes on labor history and has edited symposia for Perpectives
on Work.
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