transfer of funds took place, and the fact that defendant may not have received any of the proceeds from the underlying scam neither negates her intent nor diminishes her role in defrauding the victim. ... "[t]here is [a] valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences [that] could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury"-namely, that defendant was guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree and fraudulent accosting. Holding he did not perform. More to the point, Gervasio acknowl- edged that he "scammed the [victim] out of money," that such was his intent when he spilled his coffee underneath her vehicle and that he had executed similar scams several times before. Additionally, although Gervasio attempted to downplay defendant's role in the charged crimes, he conceded on cross-examination that defendant "knew this was a fraudulent scheme." While it is true that Gervasio's testimony-standing alone-is insufficient to sustain defen- dant's conviction, defendant's written statement to the police, which was read into evidence at trial, makes clear that she was both well aware of and actively participated in the scam perpetrated upon the victim. Indeed, defendant admitted that she saw Gervasio "pour coffee under the lady's car," that they then “waited for the lady to come out" of the supermarket and that, upon the victim's return, she approached the victim and “told her that something was leaking under her car." Additionally, as again evidenced by defendant's state- ment and the trial testimony, there is no question that defendant accompanied Ger you to the victim's home and to the bank the following dayai which times the actual Accordingly, we are satisfied that the jury's verdict is sup- ported by legally sufficient evidence. Questions for Discussion 1. What facts in the case support the view that Gervasio committed grand larceny (false pretenses) and fraudulent accosting? 2. What facts support Abbott's conviction? 3. Do you agree with the length of Abbott's prison sentence? Cases and Comments Stolen Valor Act. In United States v. Alvarez, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of the federal Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. $ 704(b). The law provides: Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United States, any of the service medals or badges awarded to the members of such forces, the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such badge, decoration, or medal, or any colorable imitation of such item shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both. The prescribed prison term is enhanced to one year if the decoration involved is the Congressional Medal of Honor, a Distinguished Service Cross, a Navy cross, an Air Force cross, a silver star, or a Purple Heart. Id. $ 704(c), (d). District Board of Directors in 2007. At a joint meeting with a Xavier Alvarez won a seat on the Three Valley Water neighboring water district board, Alvarez introduced himself and noted that "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in The year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy. I'm still around." Alvarez had neither served in the military nor been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. In the past, Alvarez had falsely claimed to have rescued the U.S. ambassa- dor during the Iranian hostage crisis and had claimed to have been a helicopter pilot during the Vietnam War. Other mis- representations included playing hockey for the Detroit Red Wings, working as a police officer, and having been secretly married to a Mexican movie star. Alvarez pled guilty to one count of falsely claiming that he was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and was sentenced to pay a $100 special assessment and a $5,000 fine, to serve three years of probation, and to perform 416 hours of community service. The court of appeals held that the Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional, reasoning that "the right to speak and write whatever one chooses-including, to some degree, worth- less, offensive, and demonstrable untruths-without cow- ering in fear of a powerful government is, in our view, an essential component of the protection afforded by the First Amendment." The appellate court also observed that the Stolen Valor Act did not constitute a false pretenses fraud statute. The government was not required to establish that Alvarez's "statement was material, intended to mislead, or most (Continued) CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY CHAPTER 13 427
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