POLS 631 MNSU Gun Control Debate Political Science Research Paper

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Student Name 1 Student Name Dr. Lori Weber POLS 631 Research Methods 18 May 2018 Bowling Outside: A Closer Look At Day Camps, Parks And Recreation, And Social Capital Introduction Putnam (2000) argues that Americans’ social capital has declined over the past quarter of a century. Putnam (2000) utilizes the image of “bowling alone” to describe this decline in social capital, stating that instead of bowling in teams and leagues, Americans now bowl alone. This paper applies Putnam’s image of “bowling alone” and social capital to an additional field of study: parks and recreation. For example, Putnam (2000) analyzes data regarding civic clubs, organizations, and volunteering. This research applies Putnam’s concepts of organized civic engagement to recreation. The specific question this paper explores is: What is the relationship between valuing organized recreation and valuing parks and recreation as a mechanism to assist in creating social capital (i.e. bowling outside)? Scope of Research This research question is timely and relevant to multiple fields of study. Scholars in leisure studies -- the social science study of leisure activities including parks and recreation -- have identified a lack of in-depth research centered on connections between leisure and social capital (Hemingway 1999). Thus, this research exploring connections between parks and recreation and social capital adds to the literature and fills the aforementioned gap in leisure research. This research also adds to public administration and public policy literature, as described below. Research on parks and recreation and social capital is important to public administration. John Gaus (1936), considered a founding member of the field of public administration, states that the ecology of society -- the soils, climate, location, and people -- is intertwined with public administration and the functioning of government. Thus, studying how the ecological environment -- such as parks and Student Name 2 recreation -- affects social capital is important for proper governance. Gaus (1936) notes that is it vital for public administrators and scholars to study the people, their civic attitudes, and the roots of government from the ground up in order to properly govern. Identifying how people perceive the development of social capital regarding parks and recreation is important data for creating public policy at the local, state, and national level on several fronts including environmental policy, planning policy, recreation policy, and social policy. Thus, the research question regarding parks and recreation and social capital is timely and relevant to leisure studies as well as public administration and policy studies. The specific hypothesis explored in this paper is that people who value parks and recreation day camps in their local community are also more likely to identify that parks and recreation increases social capital. The reasoning for this hypothesis is that organized recreation such as day camps may assist in creating social capital (Devine and Parr 2008), thus respondents would identify that parks and recreation increases social capital. The next section reviews a broad scope of literature on this research topic. Literature Review This review of the literature brings together two areas of research -- parks and recreation from leisure studies, and social capital from political science. This piece centers on a relationship between organized recreation and social capital, and identifies what research has found thus far as well as suggestions for future studies. Social Capital Putnam (2000) establishes that social capital is an important indicator of the “health” of a society -- from its democracy to murder rate to physical well-being. Further, social capital is primarily developed at the community or “neighborhood” level -- at town hall meetings, committees, and block parties, for example. Putnam’s 2000 research mentions leisure activities broadly as indicators of social capital (e.g. having friends over for dinner, playing cards, etc.), but does not specifically explore a relationship between parks and recreation and social capital. Contemporary scholars and practitioners have started to Student Name 3 fill this gap in literature that spans two fields -- leisure studies and political science -- but there is more work to be done. This review of the literature discusses past research on social capital and parks and recreation in order to identify the next steps to study this unique area. Parks and Recreation There is research that supports a hypothesis of organized parks and recreation influencing social capital. For historical context, the first “national park” was designated Yellowstone National Park in 1872, growing from economic, intellectual, and social changes in America that encouraged conservation, and appreciation of green spaces that starkly contrasted new industrialization (“Brief History of the National Park,” n.d.). Thus, parks were founded within a social capital framework -- through collaboration and community centered on a common goal of conservation. Previous research illustrates that parks and recreation may have a reciprocal relationship with social capital. First, social capital may encourage use of parks and recreation. Broyles, Mowen, Theall, Gustat, and Rung (2011) designed a quantitative study and found that parks with higher levels of social capital are frequented by more people and produce more physical activity at the aggregate level. Thus, this research also supports Putnam’s (2000) hypothesis that social capital encourages higher levels of health and well-being. The second portion of the aforementioned reciprocal relationship is that parks and recreation and leisure activities help to build social capital (Hemingway 1999). Access to nature aids in community cohesion and identity (Lewis 1990). Kuo (2001) asserts that nature reduces crime, which Putnam (2000) finds is also a byproduct of social capital. Moreover, Mann and Leahy (2010) frame their research in social capital theory and argue that organized recreation in the form of all-terrain vehicles (ATV) clubs possess a definable social value. An example of this value is strong social networks and social sports recreation -- as respondents identified enjoying meeting other club members and organizing rides (Mann and Leahy 2010). Finally, there is research that links specific organized recreation such as youth day camps with cultivating social capital. Researchers have identified that organized recreation in the form of inclusive Student Name 4 youth camps for campers with and without disabilities provide settings to build what Putnam (2000) calls inclusive, or “bridging,” social capital (Devine and Parr 2008). Thus, there is scholarly context in support of day youth camps increasing social capital or “belonging” in diverse communities (Devine and Parr 2008). This review of the literature finds that parks and recreation may assist in the creation of social capital and its byproducts (Devine and Parr 2008; Kuo 2001; Lewis 1990; Mann and Leahy 2010). Researchers have identified gaps in knowledge such as: 1. Connections between social capital and “nature capital” (Senior and Townsend 2005), 2. Understanding health promotion through the formation of social capital in parks (Broyles et al. 2011), and 3. Further examination of social capital in recreation-based organizations (Mann and Leahy 2010). Thus, this research explores the value of organized recreation regarding youth day camps and perceptions of social capital, in order to examine a portion of these gaps in literature. Data and Methods The dataset this research uses to explore perceptions of organized recreation and social capital is the mail/online portion of the 2012 Survey on Public Opinions and Attitudes on Outdoor Recreation (SPOA) produced by the California Department of Parks and Recreation (CDPR). SPOA is part of the 2015 Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan (SCORP), which is a five-year planning document required for eligibility for the National Park Service’s Land and Water Conservation Fund assistance program (LWCF). Similar surveys have been administered every five years since 1987 (“About SPOA” 2018). Specifically, scholars from several institutions’ departments of parks, recreation, and tourism at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, and the University of Utah, developed the 2012 survey, analyzed the data, wrote the report, and presented the findings, working with the CDPR. A marketing research firm -- IntelliQ -- administered the survey, and a non-profit organization -- GreenInfo Network -- built the online data analysis tool, working with the CDPR. Lastly, the CDPR, LWCF, and Student Name 5 California State University Agricultural Research Initiative provided funding for the study (“About SPOA” 2018). The 4,400 respondents were drawn from a random landline telephone survey during April-July 2012. After completing the telephone survey, individual respondents were asked to complete a mail/online survey which is utilized for this research study. A total of 1,021 respondents completed the mail/online survey. This sample is representative for the broader California population within a 95% confidence level (“Survey Methods” 2018). The variables utilized in this research study have 926 respondents, with 95 missing cases. This paper explores the data through frequencies and cross tabulations as well as statistics such as chi-square and statistical significance. The hypothesis this paper explores is: respondents who identify that it is important to provide “facilities in the local community that can be used for day youth camps” through California parks and recreation services are also more likely to think that “parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging in my community.” Thus, the independent variable is: “importance of providing facilities in the local community that can be used for day youth camps” (i.e. importance of youth day camps) and the dependent variable is “parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging in my community” (i.e. perception of social capital). Other possible variables that may influence the dependent variable are: 1. Age, 2. Economic development and socioeconomic status (DeFilippis 2001), 3. Race and ethnicity (Hero 2003), and 4. Region (Currie 2017). Region may affect the dependent variable as rural and urban dwellers tend to have different interactions and experiences with parks and recreation, with urban dwellers – especially lowincome urban dwellers -- likely having less exposure to parks and recreation (Currie 2017). Thus, the regions of the respondents may affect their responses to the dependent variable more so than the proposed independent variable. California region is both controlled for, and discussed, in the results section. One limitation of this data is that it considers the hypothesis in terms of respondents’ perceptions. In other words, this research does not test if day camps increase social capital. Instead, it tests if people Student Name 6 who value day camps also perceive parks and recreations as increasing social capital. Future research may want to concretely consider the ways in which youth camps increase or decrease social capital. Results and Discussion This section details frequencies and cross tabulations of the hypothesized relationship between the independent variable (i.e. importance of youth day camps), dependent variable (perception of social capital), and control variable (region). Frequencies First, this research explores frequencies of each variable. The independent variable is: “How important is it to have facilities in the local community that can be used for day camps?” (i.e. importance of youth day camps) This variable was re-coded into a nominal level of measure with two choices. Choice #1 is: “it is not important” and Choice #2 is “it is important.” The majority of respondents (63.1%) identify that is important to have facilities in the local community that can be used for day camps (i.e. the mode), whereas 36.9% of respondents identify that is it not important. See Figure 1 for this data. This finding reflects Mann and Leahy’s (2010) argument that organized recreation has a definable social value. A majority of respondents in this survey also agree that organized recreation is important for the community. Figure 1. Student Name 7 Next, this research explores the dependent variable: “How much does parks and recreation influence a sense of belonging in your community?” (i.e. perception of social capital). This variable was re-coded into a nominal level of measure with two choices. Choice #1 is: “parks and recreation has no effect or decreases a sense of belonging in my community” and Choice #2 is “parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging in my community.” A slight majority of respondents (54.4%) identify parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging in their community (i.e. the mode), whereas 45.6% of respondents identify that parks and recreations has no effect or decreases a sense of belonging. See Figure 2 for this data. This data reflects a slight tweak on previous literature, which finds that leisure, parks, and recreation increases social capital (Devine and Parr 2008; Hemingway 1999; Lewis 1990; Putnam 2000). This data provides support that a slight majority of people perceive that parks and recreation increases social capital. Figure 2. Finally, this research explores the control variable: region of respondent. Region of California was controlled due to previous literature that finds that rural and urban dwellers have differing exposure Student Name 8 to, and experience with, parks and recreation (Currie 2017). This variable was re-coded into a nominal level of measure with two choices. Choice #1 is: “rural” and Choice #2 is “urban.” A majority (68.4%) of respondents are from urban areas, whereas a minority (31.6%) of respondents are from rural areas. See Figure 3 for this data. Figure 3. Cross Tabulations Next, this research explores cross tabulations with the hypothesized relationship between the independent and dependent variables, and the control variable. The first cross tabulation (see Figure 4) utilizes one answer choice from the dependent variable, “parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging my community” and the independent variable, importance of youth day camps, to explore the hypothesized relationship. The results support the hypothesized relationship. Sixty-one percent (61.0%) of respondents (i.e. the mode) who identify that youth day camps are important also identify that parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging in their community (i.e. perception of social capital), compared to just 43.6% of respondents who identify that youth day camps are not important. Thus, those who value youth day camps are more likely to Student Name 9 perceive parks and recreation as building social capital. Moreover, these results are statistically significant at p=0.000 and chi-square of 25.977 (see Figure 4 and Table 1). These results reflect previous research which finds that respondents identify organized recreation as a way to build social networks (Devine and Parr 2008; Mann and Leahy 2010). Figure 4. Figure 4. Cross tabulation of the importance of youth day camps and the perception of social capital. Data source: 2012 Survey on Public Opinions and Attitudes on Outdoor Recreation (SPOA), California Department of Parks and Recreation, http://www.parks.ca.gov/SPOA/Download Table 1. Chi-square and significance level for cross tabulation of youth day camps and social capital. Chi-square 25.977 Significance level p=0.000 Student Name 10 Finally, this research adds the control variable of California region to the previous cross tabulation. Region (rural versus urban) may influence respondents’ perception of and experience with parks and recreation (Currie 2017). However, the controlled variable of region does not appear to influence the relationship between importance of youth day camps and perception of social capital. For respondents who identified that parks and recreation increases a sense of belonging in their community, 61.8% of urban dwellers identified that day camps are important compared to 59.2% of rural dwellers. The percent difference between urban and rural dwellers is just 2.6%, which is not large. The results are statistically significant at p=0.000 (chi-square is 18.371) for urban dwellers and p=0.005 (chi-square is 7.857) for rural dwellers (see Figure 5 and Table 2). Due to the small percent change, this finding is not theoretically significant, and does not support Currie’s (2017) conclusion that rural and urban dwellers have different experiences with parks and recreation. However, more research should be conducted to solidify these findings. Figure 5. Student Name 11 Table 2. Chi-square and significance level for cross tabulation of the importance of youth day camps and the perception of social capital with California region controlled. Region (control) Chi-square Significance level Rural 7.857 p=0.005 Urban 18.371 p=0.000 Conclusion In sum, this research on youth day camps and social capital is important to both leisure studies and political science as well as the broader community at-large. This research is essential because it focuses on youth-centered social capital building, which Putnam (2000) identifies as paramount for the continuation of American democracy. Findings illustrate a strong relationship between identifying that youth day camps are important, and perceiving parks and recreation as increasing a sense of belonging -or social capital -- in the community. This research centers on abstract concepts -- the importance of youth day camps and perceptions of social capital. This knowledge is theoretically significant for creating parks and recreation public policy, as it is critical to know the public’s perception of proposed programming and policies. From this data, researchers may assert that the public perceives organized parks and recreation as important to cultivating social capital. Thus, policy makers may want to consider this data and its implications for the community when creating or discontinuing organized recreation programs such as youth day camps. Future Research Future research may want to move from the theoretical to the concrete and explore how participating in youth day camps affects social capital in communities through both qualitative (e.g. interviews) and quantitative data (e.g. indexes -- see Putnam 2000 for examples). Variations on previous research may want to explore if different types of camps (e.g. art, co-ed, theatre, sports) and varying facilities (e.g. overnight and far away from home, or indoor versus outdoor versus park-based) help or Student Name 12 hinder social capital uniquely from one another. Moreover, it is crucial to continue exploring how to cultivate social capital (Putnam 2000), through parks and recreation and other leisure activities (Hemingway 1999). Researchers may also want to explore other social capital-building activities in leisure studies apart from youth day camps. For example, the author of this paper intends to continue studying parks and recreation and social capital with a follow-up feasibility report of the international “Healthy Parks, Healthy People” (HPHP) program. This program seeks to build community health and social capital through active parks programming (“The Healthy Parks, Healthy People: Bay Area Story”). The researcher will conduct a feasibility study of HPHP to evaluate how it may be implemented in Northern California, thus filling a gap in literature on health promotion, parks and recreation and social capital identified by Broyles et al. 2011. This research will add to academic- and community-based knowledge regarding the development of social capital through health programs in parks and recreation. Student Name 13 References “About SPOA.” 2018. California Department of Parks and Recreation. http://www.parks.ca.gov/SPOA/About (Accessed April 27, 2018). “Brief History of the National Park,” (n.d.). Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/collections/national-parks-maps/articles-and-essays/brief-history-of-thenational-parks/ (Accessed May 3, 2018). Broyles, S.T., Mowen, A.J., Theall, K.P., Gustat, J., and Rung A.L. 2011. “Integrating Social Capital Into a Park-Use and Active-Living Framework.” American Journal of Preventive Medicine 40 (5): 522-529. California Department of Parks and Recreation. 2012. Survey on Public Opinions and Attitudes on Outdoor Recreation (SPOA). http://www.parks.ca.gov/SPOA/Download. Currie, Melissa. 2017. “Public Spaces and Social Equity.” Parks and Recreation Magazine, National Parks and Recreation Association. March 2, 2017. https://www.nrpa.org/parks-recreationmagazine/2017/march/public-spaces-and-social-equity/. (Accessed April 18, 2018). DeFilippis, James. 2001. “The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development.” Housing Policy Debate 12 (4): 781-806. Devine, Mary Ann and Parr, Mary G. 2008. “Come on in, but not too Far:” Social Capital in an Inclusive Leisure Setting, Leisure Sciences 30 (5): 391-408. doi:10.1080/01490400802353083 Gaus, John. 1936. “The General Environment: The Concept of Ecology.” Public administration: Concepts and cases, Richard J. Stillman, ed.. Houghton Mifflin, 1976. “The Healthy Parks, Healthy People: Bay Area Story.” 2016. Healthy Parks, Healthy People: Bay Area, Golden Gate National Parks Conservatory and the National Park Service. http://www.hphpbayarea.org/about/hphp-bay-area-story (Accessed May 6, 2018). Hemingway, J. L. 1999. “Leisure, Social Capital, and Democratic Citizenship,” Journal of Leisure Research 31 (2): 150-165. Hero, Rodney. 2003. “Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America,” Perspectives on Politics 1 (1): 113-122. Kuo, F. E. 2001. “Coping with poverty: Impacts of environment and attention in the inner city.” Environment and Behavior 33: 5-34. Lewis, C. A. 1990. “Effects of plants and gardening in creating interpersonal and community well-being.” Role of Horticulture in Human Well-being and Social Development: A National Symposium, D. Reif, ed. Timber Press, Arlington, Virginia. Putnam, Robert. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Touchstone Books by Simon & Schuster: New York. Student Name 14 Senior, John, and Townsend, Mardie. 2005. “‘Healthy Parks, Healthy People’ and other social capital initiatives of Parks Victoria, Australia.” in Ted Trzyana, ed., The Urban Imperative. California Institute of Public Affairs, Sacramento, California. “Survey Methods.” (2018). California Department of Parks and Recreation. http://www.parks.ca.gov/SPOA/Methods (Accessed April 27, 2018). POLITICAL SCIENCE 631: SEMINAR ON RESEARCH METHODS HYPOTHESIS NOTE PAPER GUIDE This paper should be approximately 10-12 pages in length, typed in 11-12 point, double-spaced font—including tables/graphs. It is worth 65 points and is to be submitted electronically on Blackboard Learn by the posted due date. Your paper should be divided into the following major sections: Introduction, Literature Review, Data and Methods, Results and Discussion, Conclusion, and References. Some authors choose to divide the literature review into conceptually/thematically related subsections. Also, it is standard for authors to introduce their argument either through a broad statement or a research question in the introduction and then address their very specific hypothesis in the data and methods sections, whereby they then introduce the precise variables that they will use to explore the hypothesis. This makes sense since the variables are then introduced/discussed AFTER the details of the dataset are discussed. Otherwise, discussing technical “variables” earlier in the paper prior to talking about the dataset can be confusing to the reader. Also keep in mind that you NEVER need to provide the reader with the technical details of the variable name (e.g., V1022) in the dataset—that is irrelevant technical detail. Overall, think of your paper like a funnel, introducing your reader first to something more general and then becoming very specific in your data and methods section. Here is a useful link to what to do when undertaking all those sections in your paper: http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/purpose. Overall, the hypothesis “note” is really a small paper to get you started on what could be a larger research project (e.g., POLS 680 paper for MPA students or thesis for MA students undertaking this option). The emphasis in terms of point totals below is placed on the data analysis section; however, the success of your paper is also highly dependent upon putting your research into context in your introduction, literature review, and conclusion. It is assumed that you already know how to produce the literature review portion of the paper. If you need extra assistance on that, see additional links provided on Blackboard. Specifically, your paper will be scored based upon the following with point totals in brackets on the far left: Introduction [7]______ Clearly state your research question/purpose. [7]______ It should put your research problem/purpose into a larger context. Another way to put this is ask yourself “So What?” Why is you research question important? For example, it can be important for social science, public policy, democracy in general, and so forth. Be specific about this context. Also, be creative. Don’t just say, for example, that it is “important for democracy” and leave it at that vague statement. Explain why it’s important for democracy. This is putting the “spice” to your research question. You should also broadly introduce your research question, objective, or hypothesis (if you hypothesize here, keep it broad for now and get more specific about your variables in the “data and methods” section). Literature Review (may use subsections, especially if you’re utilizing more than the minimum 5 sources) [10]______ You should include relevant information from a minimum of 5 scholarly sources. This means peer reviewed journal articles or books put out by academic presses, government, research institutes or government publications. If you wonder about your sources, ask me or e-mail me about it with the full citation. These sources should also help you with putting your research into a theoretical context. Include your references (at the end of your paper) with any sources that you cite in the text of your paper. Most important, when you use the ideas from these sources, whether your quote directly, rephrase or refer to them, you should cite these sources within the text of your paper. Use Chicago Author-Date. See the following helpful links from the Meriam library and Williams College: http://libguides.csuchico.edu/citingsources-chicago-author-date-style and another link at http://libguides.williams.edu/citing/chicago-author-date. Be sure to select the “parenthetical author-date references” for examples of how to cite references within the text of your paper. Also, do not forget to cite your data in your “References” section at the end of your paper. See a discussion on this at ICPSR’s web site: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/curation/citations.jsp. For a Chicago citation style for your dataset, see the “bibliographic” example on the following web site: http://libguides.webster.edu/data/chicago. Data and Methods [10]______ Describe your dataset. Be specific. Describe the details of the sample. You do not need to reinvent the wheel here, see how studies are described in empirical research articles and see the example papers posted on Blackboard. If you wonder about some of this information for your dataset, let me know and I can help point you toward the information needed. Who funded the study? If there were specific people who did the study, who were they and what is their institutional affiliation (what university or research institute or government office, and so forth)? When was the study conducted? How many cases/observations are there in the study (e.g., if individuals were the sampling unit/unit of analysis, how many were surveyed, how many are in the dataset? What year(s) is your data from (be careful since some variables might be from different years than others). What are your methods that you use to explore the data (e.g., frequencies, cross tabulations, correlations, regression)? [12]______ Discuss how the hypothesis can be tested using the dataset you have chosen. In other words, what variables in the dataset will you begin to use to address your research hypothesis? What variables have you chosen to “operationalize” your research hypothesis? Results and Discussion [12]______ This is where you present your preliminary data analysis. Run frequencies on your dependent and independent variables and control variable(s). Report these frequencies in STYLIZED tables in your paper (see example tables of frequency results in Essentials, Ch. 2); also see journal articles for examples or paper examples on Blackboard Learn. Do NOT just paste in your output tables; they need to be cleaned up. This is unacceptable and incomplete and, most important, NOT the practice for presenting analysis results EVER. The practice everywhere, from public policy reports to scholarly work is to present stylized results for a general audience. Be sure to include your number of cases and the valid percents in your stylized frequency tables (Hint: you do not need to include the word ‘valid’ since that is too technical for a general audience, but the percents in your table need to come from the valid percent column from your output. Typically just a frequency table(s) for your independent, dependent and control variables will suffice. If you have interval level variables that you recoded into ordinal—you may report means, medians and modes only if you think it is relevant and helpful in providing an overview of the variables prior to when they were recoded (e.g., if you recoded income, it is often helpful to report mean and median income prior to the recode). Then, begin to examine a relationship by performing cross tabulations (or correlations or a bivariate regression). You must examine at least one relationship. Report your crosstabulation results in a stylized bar graphs (see “how to” video in Applied Research Project area on Blackboard). Do NOT just paste in your output. You should also control for an additional independent variable and put the results in a stylized bar chart in your paper. Again, see the “how to” video on Blackboard. Do not forget to highlight and discuss the important results from your tables in the text of your paper (including discussing the relevant percent differences—see Handout 1 on Blackboard, located in Week 6 in the “Additional Items for the Class Period”). See example papers of how this is done as well; the best discussions often briefly refer back to literature/ideas/concepts introduced in the literature review. Tables should be placed as soon as they can after the first mention of them in the text of the paper. Do not forget to report your chi-square results (both the chi-square value and the probability/significance level or the statistical significance of the regression coefficients or the correlation if you are choosing these alternate types of analyses). Again, see example papers. Conclusion [7]______ Your conclusion is your opportunity to synthesize your main points and provide a justification for why the research is important (even if you do not have statistically significant findings). Include a discussion of possibilities for future research. Do not just mention or “list” future research, but your discussion should provide a context/justification for what you suggest that is related to what you’ve already discussed in your paper (it is best if your conclusion ties back in with your literature review). [65 total] _________ There’s a Pill for That! How direct-to-consumer advertising has perpetuated a culture of overmedicated Americans through fear mongering and loopholes in poorly regulated public policy Kristonda Pryor POLS 631: Methods of Political Inquiry November 9, 2019 1 Introduction: Tune your TV to nearly any station at any time on nearly any given day and you will likely come across advertisements for prescription medications of various sorts and sizes aimed directly at you; the consumer. Recent years have seen a steady increase in the number of pharmaceutical ads featured on television with $6.46 billion advertising dollars spent in 2018 alone. (Bell, J. 2018). Prior to 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) mandated all pharmaceutical companies list every risk associated with a drug in their advertisements. The strict regulations made it nearly impossible for drug manufacturers to produce commercials that would fall within normal time constraints of television advertising, thusly relegating the vast majority of direct-toconsumer advertising (DTCA) to print ads in magazines. A softening in policy regulations in 1997 by the FDA, however, stated that a company need only list those side effects which would be deemed most significant and encourage consumers to seek further information through their healthcare provider, the manufacturers website, or customer support lines. (Reichel, C. 2018). This shift in requirements allowed for the floodgates of DTCA to be opened, resulting in a tidal wave of television, internet, radio, and social media advertising. Americans have become inundated with prescription drug advertisements that claim to relieve symptoms associated with everything from allergies and dry eyes to migraines and high cholesterol. A shifting focus on more severe conditions, such as atrial fibrillation (heart failure/heart attack) and breast cancer, and rarer disorders such as multiple sclerosis and hepatitis, has been observed most recently, as manufacturers net an increased profit for specialty drugs over more generalizable prescriptions. Often depicting bright images of smiling and exuberant people, seemingly unconstrained by the realities of time or circumstance, swept away by the newfound joy in their lives brought about by prescription medication and unencumbered by the symptoms of an ailment which previously plagued them, DTCA falls nothing short of an adult child’s unrelenting desire to be free and virile, but at what cost? Are pharmaceutical companies 2 disillusioning an entire population with unrealistic expectations brought about by fanciful imagery and exaggerated claims? The goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of DTCA on consumers and physicians separately and also any impacts on the patient-physician interaction. Secondarily, the ethical obligations and considerations of the pharmaceutical companies will be addressed with specific emphasis on corporate accountability. Specifically, the following data should provide insight into whether any correlation can be drawn between DTCA and increased rates of medication prescribing. *Note: Direct-to-Consumer Advertisement(s)/advertising will be referred to as DTCA for the remainder of this paper. It should also be noted that the phrase “alternative treatment” refers to any alternate course of treatment suggested by a physician, outside of prescription medication and is not in reference to the practice of alternative medicine.  Key Research Questions: 1. Do DTCA motivate more consumers to seek prescriptions from their doctors? 2. Has DTCA affected the prescribing habits of physicians? 3. What are the pros and cons of DTCA? 4. What strategies are drug manufacturers utilizing to sell their products? 5. How has policy on DTCA evolved? 6. What is the significance for health administration?  Hypothesis: Patients who see DTCA are more likely to request prescription medications from their physicians. 3 Literature Review: The effects and full scale of DTCA have not been studied in great quantity, perhaps because the ability to advertise directly to consumers has only been permitted a short time (fewer than 25 years) or because the implications of DTCA are not easily measured. However, of the studies that have been conducted there have been several interesting findings which indicate DTCA does have an effect on the patient-physician interaction, among a myriad of other indications. Key Research Question 1: Do DTCA motivate more consumers to seek prescriptions from their doctors? Each year succeeding the loosening of policy restraints has seen an astronomical increase in the amount of money spent on pharmaceutical advertising. In just seven years, from 1991 to 1998, DTCA expenditures increased from $55 million to $1.3 billion. (NIHCM, 2000). By 2016 that number had swelled to $6.46 billion. (USA TODAY, 2017). During this same time, as reported by the National Institute for Health Care Management, doctors had prescribed over 34% more prescriptions for the top selling 25 drugs in 1999 than they had in in the previous year. (NIHCM, 2000). The significant increases in spending and prescribing do seem to be a direct response to the increase in consumer demand. The driving motivations behind increased consumer demand may be vast and heavily reliant on a multitude of individual factors. The role of DTCA in driving consumerism however, is without doubt a key contributor to this increase and can be thought of in terms of a cycle: DTCA prompt consumers to seek prescriptions from their physicians  consumers seek out 4 prescriptions as advertised  sales of prescribed medications increase  net profits by manufacturers elicit the production of more DTCA  and the cycle repeats. A 2002 study conducted by the Consumer asks physician to prescribe medication in DTCA DTCA prompts consumer to consult physician Centre for Health Services and Policy Research at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver in collaboration Production of more DTCA is initiated with the University of California, Davis Cycle of Consumerism for DTCA Prescription for advertised drug is given found that among survey respondents, Overall sales of advertised drug increase 42% of patients who had requested prescriptions during a physician visit had requested medications advertised directly Figure 1 DTCA Cycle of Consumerism: As more consumers observe ads in popular media the number of prescriptions increases and, in turn, more dollars are spent on generating new ads. to consumers. (Mintzes, B. et al. 2002). A 2014 article published by the National Institutes of Health explained that while FDA surveys have found evidence that DTCA have aided consumers in engaging in more thoughtful conversations with their physicians there have been mixed results when determining whether advertising has improved the patient/physician interaction. By contrast, there have been various surveys which conclude DTCA leads to many patients requesting specific medications that may not be appropriate for their needs. (Fain, K.M. & Alexander, G.C., 2014). These results support the argument that DTCA creates a domino effect on consumer behavior, wherein further information is sought through visitation with a physician regarding the advertised medication and the consumer ultimately requests a prescription for that medication. Interestingly, consumers who view DTCA in a favorable light are more often those patients who have received prescriptions for the advertised drug by their physician. (Ceccoli, S.J. & Klotz, R.J., 2013; Herzenstein, M. et al., 2004). 5 Key Research Question 2: Has DTCA affected physician prescribing habits? DTCA has clearly had a significant impact on the behaviors of consumers and, to some notable extent, on their interactions with their physicians. Research examining implications for prescribers has also suggested a correlation between DTCA and increased pressure on doctors to prescribe advertised medications. (van de Pol, P., and de Bakker, F., 2009; Fain, K., and Alexander, G., 2015). In about 40% of doctor visits examined by one study, requests were made for advertised drugs and prescriptions for those requests were granted more than half the time. The same study reported that over half the physicians participating had stated they had prescribed the advertised drug to appease the patient. (Ventola, C. 2011). A primary concern among opponents of DTCA is that advertisements may not only increase pressure on physicians to prescribe medications, but that such prescriptions may not always be the most effective or appropriate treatment for the patient. (Wilkes, M., Bell, R. and Kravitz, R., 2000). 74% of Oncology Nurse Practitioners participating in one study reported having a patient request an inappropriate drug; 43% of the participating respondents reported a pressure to prescribe the advertised medication. (Ventola, C., 2011). Several arguments have been made which point to a lacking on the part of manufacturers to include the importance of exercise and proper nutrition in their advertisements and having a discussion about alternative means of treatment with a physician to maintain proper and balanced health. (Frosch, D. et al., 2007; Rosenberg, M. 2015). A common theme among opponents of DTCA is the potential impacts such advertising may have on consumer beliefs and public health. DTCA has been partially blamed for medicalizing conditions that are naturally occurring, trivial, or even cosmetic in nature. Such medicalization is feared to perpetuate an overmedicated nation. (Ventola, C., 2011). 6 Key Research Question 3: What are the pros and cons of DTCA? A frequent phrase used in DTCA is “talk to your doctor to see if [drug name] is right for you.” Just as frequently, however, physicians seeing a patient will deny prescribing a drug seen in DTCA either due to the drugs inappropriateness for the condition or for an alternative treatment. This denial of prescribing a requested DTCA drug has been linked to negative impacts on the patient/physician relationship and causes a high potentiality for physician switching among dissatisfied consumers. One study found that 15% of patients who had reported being dissatisfied with their physicians for denying a prescription were considering switching their medical providers. (Ventola, C. 2011). Other arguments against DTCA include false or misleading claims, drug overutilization, wasted appointment time due to lengthy explanations of why a requested drug may be inappropriate for use, promotes drugs before full safety profiles are understood, increases drug costs, and unreliable enforcement of FDA regulations. (Ventola, C., 2011; Wilkes, M., Bell, R. and Kravitz, R., 2000; Bell, R., Kravitz, R., and Wilkes, M., 1999). In contrast, proponents of DTCA argue the importance such advertising has in educating the public to various health conditions and de-stigmatizing or normalizing previously misunderstood conditions, such as mental illness and depression. Encouraging consumers to seek the advice of a medical professional, advocating for consumer participation in treatment, and generating more thoughtful discussions between patients and physicians. Proponents also argue that DTCA reduces under-diagnosis and encourages patient medication compliance. A mixed and much disputed argument of proponents is that DTCA stimulate product competition due to high consumer demand and, in effect, drive the cost of prescription pharmaceuticals down. (Ventola, C., 2011; Wilkes, M., Bell, R. and Kravitz, R., 2000; Ceccoli, S.J. & Klotz, R.J., 2013). Perhaps the most interesting argument for DTCA is the sense of control and empowerment it may give to consumers who are generally regarded as having less power in the health system (i.e. those with 7 less access to resources, minorities, and lower education levels) by providing information directly to the individual and not through a system which the individual may feel segregated from. (Ceccoli, S.J. & Klotz, R.J., 2013). Key Research Question 4: What strategies are drug manufacturers utilizing to sell their products? There is no shortage of DTCA that depict formally sad and isolated individuals who are now experiencing the time of their lives since contacting their doctors about a drug for their condition. Many have argued, however, that such claims and imagery may be misleading. To this same point, arguments have been established that DTCA overemphasize the benefits of medications and may lead to overprescribing conditions that do not typically require pharmaceutical intervention. These points have previously been explored in this review (see Key Research Question 3, above). DTCA have also been studied for their potential to utilize fear mongering to elicit consumer response to action. By medicalizing naturally occurring conditions and generalizing vague symptoms for more serious or rare conditions, DTCA create a sense of anxiety or concern in consumers, thereby prompting them to seek medical attention and acquire prescriptions for the advertised medication. (Ventola, C., 2011; Rosenberg, M., 2015; Frosch, D. et al., 2007). Key Research Question 5: How has policy on DTCA evolved? Opponents of DTCA have argued for a call to action by the FDA to better enforce regulations. As of 2008, American TV viewers watched an average of 9 DTCA per day, with only about 35% of all DTCA being reviewed before airing. (Ventola, C., 2011). This discrepancy in the number of advertisements that air and the number that are reviewed by FDA staff members to ensure regulation compliance and safety is largely blamed on shortages in FDA staffing and disproportionate funding with DTCA expenditures nearly doubling that of the entire budget of the FDA in 2010. (Ventola, C., 2011). 8 In 2002, and again in 2011, New York Representative Jerrold Nadler proposed the “Say No to Drugs Ads Act”, which would prevent pharmaceutical manufacturers from claiming DTCA expenses as tax deductions. In 2013 the bill was introduced to congress but was not enacted. (H.R. 923 – 113TH Congress, 2013). Under current law, advertisers are permitted to make such deductions. That may be changing however, as in 2019 Senator Jeanne Shaheen of New Hampshire introduced the “End Tax Payer Subsidies for Drug Ads Act”. The act currently has 22 supporters and has been referred to the Committee on Finance. (S. 73 – 116th Congress, 2019). This past year has seen renewed interest in DTCA regulations. In May of 2019 the Trump administration, in an effort to “drive down prices and create transparency,” officially announced their intent on passing a rule which would require manufacturers to include list prices in their advertisements for drugs whose costs exceed $35/month and are covered by Medicare and Medicaid. If enacted, this action could have, potentially, increased consumer awareness regarding drug prices and encouraged the use of less expensive non-brand name (generic) medications or other less costly physician prescribed treatments, thereby “leveling the playing field” for consumer demand while still increasing the quality of care provided to patients. However, in July the US district Court blocked the new rule, stating “the Department of Health and Human Services does not have the authority to force drug companies to disclose prices.” The litigation concerning in-ad prices is ongoing, as the Trump administration attempts to take the issue up through congress. (Thomas, K., & Rogers, K., 2019). Key Research Question 6: What is the significance for health administration? The healthcare industry has seen a shift toward more inclusive care that is both high quality and lower cost. Many of the arguments put forth by proponents and opponents alike center around the “economic/cost-effectiveness or consumer empowerment and safety issues” of DTCA. (van de Pol, P., and de Bakker, F., 2009). There has also been much contention over the idea that 9 DTCA may lead consumers to pressure physicians for brand-name prescriptions over generic forms. The astronomical funds budgeted for advertisements has also lead many to question the implications DTCA content may have on patients’ own understanding of health and their prescription requesting habits. (Young, M. and Eckrich, D., 2013). Overprescribing of medications by physicians falls under the broad umbrella of “lowvalue care”. In recent years, low-value care and the practice of overprescribing have come to the spotlight with the rise of the American opioid epidemic. In an effort to combat such negative health implications, health policymakers are focusing on initiatives which explore new ways of improving the Triple Aim: better population health, lower costs, and better quality of care. Improvements in these areas may, arguably, be difficult to achieve simultaneously however, as progression in one area may come at the expense of such progression in another area. With regard to overprescribing, and in particular overprescribing of DTCA drugs, simultaneous improvements in all areas of the Triple Aim may be achievable. The key to combating this issue is creating awareness around the market exclusivity of brand name prescriptions and educating consumers on their ability to “negotiate the power of the payor.” (Kesselheim, A., Avorn, J., & Sarpatwari, A., 2016). Data and Methods: In order to test the hypothesis of this research project, the Public Health Impact of Directto-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs July 2001 – January 2002 (ICPSR 3687) dataset was utilized. The archival data was retrieved through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and was originally conducted by Dr. Joel Weissman of Harvard Medical School (Weissman, Blumenthal, Silk, Zapert, Newman, Leitman, 2003). 10 Funding information for the dataset is not provided, however the survey was conducted through Harris Interactive and took place between July 9th, 2001 and January 16th, 2002. The dataset consisted of a 20-minute phone interview surveying 3,000 American adults ages 18 and older. The dataset population was deemed nationally representative and had been collected through a process of random digit dialing across the continental US. The survey included information relating to exposure to DTCA, whether an ad had prompted a physician visit, and whether medications of alternative treatment had been prescribed. A crosstabulation was calculated in SPSS using the variable Q448 “Has an advertisement for a prescription drug ever prompted you to talk to a doctor about a prescription drug for yourself?” as the independent variable, and Q664 “Was the drug that your doctor prescribed as a result of the visits the same or different from the drug that you saw or heard advertised?” as the dependent variable. To account for patients actually receiving a prescription for medication, the control variable Q641a1 “As a result of the visit, did your doctor prescribe a drug for you?” was utilized. Results and Discussion: Prescription Type by DTCA Influence on Visit, Accounting for Receipt of Physician Prescription 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 63.2% 57.8% 42.2% 30.0% 59.0% 36.8% 41.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Rx and DTCA drug same Rx and DTCA drug All Respondents different DTCA prompted Dr. visit DTCA did not prompt Dr. visit Figure 2 Crosstabulation: DTCA influence on patient/physician habits. 11 The crosstabulation (Figure 2 above) revealed 63.2% of patients who had been prompted by a DTCA received a prescription from their physician for the advertised drug. Less than 39%, however, had received a prescription for a different drug, a difference of more than 26%. These results were calculated to be statistically significant (ꭓ2 = 18.682a, p = .000) and seem to support the hypothesis of this paper. These results also have theoretical significance as they support the argument that DTCA may have an impact on the patient/physician relationship and on the behaviors of individuals in the real world. This is an important consideration for future research, as understanding these patterns in behavior is imperative to directing policy change and regulation. An equally important consideration for future research should be evaluating mechanisms for decreasing costs of brand-name drugs and improving quality of care. Conclusion: The arguments for and against DTCA vary, but with some consideration for key points on both sides, there may be realistic space for improvement. As interest in the regulations and requirements of ads increases, it will be important to address issues of low value care that come as a result of misleading claims by monopolistic corporations loosely governed and overseen by regulatory bodies. (Kesselheim, A., Avorn, J., & Sarpatwari, A., 2016). Greater advocation for societal considerations, including transparency, affordability, and accountability by providers, manufacturers, and law makers is paramount in mitigating the issue of overprescribing and the hustling of brand-name medications over equally effective generic medications. 12 References Bell, Jacob. 2018. “Pharma Advertising in 2018: Midterms and Specialty Drugs.” Biopharma Dive. September 26, 2018. https://biopharmadive,com/news/pharma-ad-dtc-marketing-2018-spendTV-congress/533319/. Bell, Robert A., Kravitz, Richard L., and Wilkes, Michael S. 1999. “Directo-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising and the Public.” J Gen Intern Med. 1999 (14): 651-657. Ceccoli, Steven J. and Klotz, Robert J. 2013. “Taking your medicine? Attitudes toward Direct-toConsumer Advertising (DTCA).” The Social Science Journal. 50 (2013): 501-509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2013.02.002 Fain, Kevin M. and Alexander, G. Caleb. 2014. “Mind the Gap: Understanding the Effects of Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising.” Med Care. 52 (4): 291-293. http:// doi:10.1097/MLR.0000000000000126. Frosh, Dominick L., Krueger, Patrick M., Hornick, Robert C., Cronholm, Peter F., and Barg, Frances, K. “Creating Demand for Prescription Drugs: A Content Analysis of Television Direct-toConsumer Advertising.” Annals of Family Medicine. 5 (1): 6-13. http://doi.org/10.1370/afm.611. Herzenstein, Michal, Misra, Sanjog, and Posavac, Steven S. 2004. “How Consumers’ Attitudes Toward Direct-to-Consumer Asvertising of Prescription Drugs Influence Ad Effectiveness, and Consumer and Physician Behavior.” Marketing Letters. 15 (4): 201-212. Horovitz, Bruce and Appleby, Julie. 2017. “Prescription Drug Costs Are Up; So Are TV Ads Promoting Them.” USA TODAY, March 16, 2017. Kesselheim, Aaron S., Avorn, Jerry, & Sarpatwari, Ameet. 2016. “The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United StatesOrigins and Prospects for Reform.” JAMA. 2016;316(8):858-871. doi:10.1001/jama.2016.11237. Mintzes, Barbara, Morris L. Barer, Richard L. Kravitz, Arminée Kazanjian, Ken Bassett, Joel Lexchin, Robert G Evans, Richard Pan, Stephen A Marion. 2002. “Influence of direct to consumer pharmaceutical advertising and patients' requests on prescribing decisions: two site cross sectional survey.” BMJ Journal 324 (2002): 278-279. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.324.7332.278. Reichel, Chloe. 2018. “Consumer Drug Advertising Spikes Demand.” Business Ethics, May 8, 2018. https://www.business-ethics.com/2018/05/08/direct-to-consumer-drug-advertising-spikesdemand/. Rosenberg, Martha. 2015. “Direct-to-consumer advertising – selling drugs or disease?” Center for Health Journalism Member Posts, October 7, 2015. Thomas, Katie, Rogers, Katie. 2019 “Judge Blocks Trump Rule Requiring Drug Companies to List Prices in TV Ads.” The New York Times, July 8, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/08/health/drug-prices-tv-ads-trump.html. van de Pol, Pepijn K.C. and de Bakker, Frank G.A. 2009. “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceuticals as a Matter of Corporate Social Responsibility?” Journal of Business Ethics. 94 (2010): 211-224. http://doi.org/ 10.1007/s10551-009-0257-z Ventola, C. Lee. 2011. “Direct-to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Advertising: Therapeutic or Toxic?” P&T. 36 (10): 669-684. Weissman, Joel. Public Health Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, July 2001-January 2002: [United States]. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2003-04-25. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03687.v1 Wilkes, Micheal S., Bell, Robert A., Kravitz, Richard L. 2000. “Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Trends, Impact, and Implications.” Health Affairs. 19 (2): 110-128. Young, Mallory A., Eckrich, Donald. 2013. “Direct-to-Consumer Advertising in the Pharmaceutical Industry: An analysis of information disparities.” Preceedings of ASBBS. 20 (1): 213-218. ICPSR UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH PAPER COMPETITION, 2007 » Third Prize « Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation in an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe Kristian Voss Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe Kristian Voss State University of New York at New Paltz Bachelors of Arts in International Relations and History / Spring 2007 voss63@newpaltz.edu Abstract: In this study I set out to explain support for far right parties in countries of Western Europe that have been democratic since the end of World War II. Using individual level analysis of survey data from the European Social Survey 2004/2005 and country level analysis of aggregate and survey data from the Eurobarometer 59.2, I am able to offer an explanation of support for the far right. The results show that cross-national differences in support for far right parties are particularly the result of public opinion on cultural preservation as a reaction against increased immigration of foreign peoples. Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 1 Table of Contents: Introduction………………………………………………………………………………page 3 Recent Success of the Far Right in Western Europe……………………………………..page 4 Support for the Far Right – Previous Literature………………………………………….page 6 Political Economy Research on Support for the Far Right……………………………….page 7 Political Institution Research on Support for the Far Right………………………………page 9 Cultural Values Research on Support for the Far Right…………………………………..page 11 Data and Methodology…………………………………………………………………….page 13 Data and Methodology: The European Social Survey…………………………………….page 14 Results: Far Right Support Using the European Social Survey 2004/2005……………….page 16 Data and Methodology: The Eurobarometer 59.2…………………………………………page 18 Results: Far Right Support Using the Eurobarometer 59.2………………………………..page 21 Conclusion and Discussion………………………………………………………………...page 26 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….page 28 Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 2 Introduction: In an age that has seen European states become increasingly multicultural or diverse due to integration and increased migration from Africa and South East Asia, far right political parties throughout Western Europe have emerged, gotten stronger, and consolidated enough electoral successes to become viable political alternatives to mainstream parties of the center left and center right. Far right parties are no longer considered ‘flash’ political parties, but part of a durable movement that will continue to be competitive in national elections, with the potential to shape government policies and legislation. To gain a fuller understanding of politics in Western Europe, it is essential to study this important phenomenon. If support for the far right continues to grow, it will become increasingly more important, serving as a serious challenge to the continued integration of Europe. Political scientists need to examine, empirically, the sources and origins of the appeal of the far right as well as likely consequences of their success. With every new election in Western Europe, at the national or European level, the influence of the far right is evident. During the late 1990s and continuing to this day, the far right has successfully campaigned in many countries on a cultural preservation platform that includes support for legislation restricting immigration, tougher penalties for crime, and encouragement of traditional moral values. The political status of the far right before this period is substantially different from the current time. Important, but early studies by Herbert Kitschelt (1997), and Hans-Georg Betz (1994) among others were instrumental in explaining the emergence of the far right in the past, but their works need to be reexamined in light of more recent experience. It is important therefore to extend and continue their work to avoid overly simplistic assessments of these parties and their durability, and to analyze them within the current political environment, which saw the European Union enlarge to ten new members in 2004. It is my goal to review the past literature on far right political parties in Europe to understand the dynamics of the movement and the extent to which perceptions of cultural threat, stemming from recent immigration waves, explains the success of far right parties in some Western European states and not in others. To review past theories on the far right, and to possibly formulate my own new or modified conclusions, empirical evidence will be required. Empirical evidence that can be utilized for such an endeavor includes electoral results, public opinion surveys, and party affiliation analyses. By comparing those Western European states with successful far right parties, and those without, as well as individuals who claim to support far right parties from those who have yet to, one can test, refine, and refute existing explanations for far right popular support and the public’s evaluations of the anti-immigration and cultural preservation movements most of these parties claim to represent. The far right is an interesting political ideology to research because of its relatively recent emergence. For decades after World War II, Western European governments have been controlled by either the moderate left or right in what historians often refer to as the ‘post-war settlement’. This left a portion of the population underrepresented. Many stood by and voted for other parties or did not vote at all, while others became so critical of the state of politics in their respective countries that they organized together to offer a semi-reactionary alternative. As many in this world embrace globalization and multiculturalism, there is a sizable portion of Western European society that is strongly opposed to the trend. Healthy democratic competition has emerged to address the problems and possible solutions to the changing world, and it is important to understand the fears and hopes of those supporting the far right and what they ideologically offer to direct their societies into this unknown future. Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 3 Recent Success of the Far Right in Western Europe The far right has emerged as a regular force in many of the states in Western Europe. These parties represent a strong electoral force, and some have participated as official or unofficial members of coalition governments, vocal opposition parties, and in some countries, the plurality party in national legislatures. Far right parities have become substantial political forces in not just one geographical region of Western Europe, but in the Alpine, Scandinavian, Mediterranean, and Low Land states. The enormity of their success and influence has been observed by the mass media throughout the world. Hours of coverage have been dedicated to characterizing them and explaining their success in translating a portion of the population that may be economically unstable, politically dissatisfied, or xenophobic into a viable political class. The Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP or Swiss People’s Party) has been the most popular party in Switzerland for the last six years, and in 2005 earned a second seat in the seven member executive Swiss federal Council for their charismatic leader Christoph Blocher (“Right Wing Leader,” 2005). Using their power, the SVP has successfully campaigned to pass referendums, particularly in September of 2006, to limit immigration for citizens from outside of the European Union and make it difficult to qualify for asylum status; both referendums have made Switzerland the most restrictive state in Europe with regard to immigration and asylum policies (Waddington 2006). Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, in 2000 the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ or the Austrian Freedom Party) of Austria garnered more votes than the conservative Österreichlische Volkspartei (ÖVP or Austrian People’s Party) and participated in a coalition government (“Austrian Far Right,” 2000). Despite electoral defeats as a result of toppling the Austrian government in 2002 (“Far right Row,” 2002) and Haider’s formation of the breakaway Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ or Alliance for Austria’s Future) in 2005 (“Haider Party,” 2005), the FPÖ remains a strong force in Austria. Despite diminished support for the FPÖ a year earlier, new leader Hans-Christian Strache successfully increased his party’s support in the 2006 national elections on the basis of “a virulent anti-foreigner platform” (Landler 2006). In Germany, no far right party has been nationally successful, but the Republikaner (REP or Republicans) were successful in a few southern German Länder and European elections throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. More recently, the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deustschlands (NPD or National Democratic Party) gained solid representation in the state parliaments of Sacshen in 2004 (“German Far Right,” 2004) and Mecklenberg-Vorpommen in September of 2006 (Ferreira 2006). The Deutsche Volks Union (DVU or German People’s Union) has also recently been successful in gaining representation in the state parliament of Brandenburg in 2004 (“German Far Right,” 2004). With their National Socialist past, any success for the far right that may appear marginal is greeted with great dismay by the media and mainstream political parties, and increasing racist violence has further contributed toward a wary view of the future. . Like the SVP, the Fremskrittspartiet (FrP or Progress Party) of Norway has become the most popular party (Berglund 2006) and has slowly been losing their ungovernable stigma. Høyre (H or Conservative Party) has recently considered the FrP a future coalition partner in a government following the next national elections (Magnus and Tisdall 2006). Even though there has not been a substantially successful far right party nationally in Sweden, the far right Sveirgedemokraterna (SD or Swedish Democrats) is represented throughout many municipal councils, and is predicted to gain nationally in the near future (Ekman 2006). In Denmark, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF or Danish People’s Party), headed by Pia Kjaersgaard, has been a very important political party since its formation in 1996. Even though it has not been included in any coalition governments, the DF has become a significant partner for Det Konservative Folkeparti Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 4 (KF or Conservative People’s Party) and Venstre (V or Liberal Party) government. The coalition government relies on the support of the DF for a parliamentary majority (“Denmark’s Immigration,” 2005). This has allowed the DF to exert significant influence in Danish politics, particularly on its biggest issue of immigration and asylum. The DF influenced the Danish government in 2002 to enact legislation that, before Switzerland in 2006, made it one of Europe's strictest (“Denmark’s Immigration,” 2005). The far right in Finland has remained on the fringe of politics, though the Suomen Kansan Sinivalkoiset (SKS or the Finnish People’s Blue-Whites) is a far right nationalist party that has struggled to gain electoral success in tolerant Finland. The Allenaza Nazionale (AN) and the Lega Norda (LN) have long been apart of Italian politics, and were members of coalition governments under Silvio Berlusconi in 1994 and 2001 (“Berlusconi Takes,” 2001). For most of its political existence, the AN has made no qualms of its succession of Mussolini and fascism. When Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the AN and deputy Prime Minister under Berlusconi, repudiated fascism on a trip to Israel in 2003 (Holmes 2006), Alessandra Mussolini, granddaughter of Benito Mussolini, formed her own party in protest. Mussolini formed the Alternativa Sociale (AS or Social Alternative), and with another neofascist party the Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore (FT or Tricolor Flame), joined the Berlusconi coalition for the elections in April of 2006 (“Berlusconi Courts,” 2006). In France, success for the far right Front National (FN or National Front) has remained strong since its initial break through in the European Elections of 1984 (Mayer and Perrineau 1992). Headed by Jean Marie Le Pen, the FN has maintained electoral success despite French majoritarian electoral rules that tend to limit parliamentary seats that they win. Le Pen even stunned the world and French politics with his surprise success in the 2002 presidential election. Le Pen beat out Lionel Jospin of the Parti Socialiste (PS or Socialist Party) and finished second to Jacques Chirac by only three percentage points in the first round to make it to a second round run-off that he ultimately lost, but not before adding to his vote from the first round (“Chirac Wins,” 2002). In contrast, with the legacy of their right wing dictatorships, far right parties in Spain and Portugal have yet to free themselves from the popular stigmas of Francisco Franco and António de Oliveira Salazar, and thus have not gained representation nationally. The far right party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF or Pim Fortuyn List) had stunning success in the Dutch parliamentary elections of 2002, registering the second most votes among numerous parties. Campaigning on an anti-immigrant platform, the LPF tapped into an important political belief system and discontent among the people (“Fortuyn Party,” 2002). Even though the LPF has subsequently drifted into political oblivion as a result of the assassination of their founder and leader Fortuyn, and infighting among his would-be successors, their anti-immigrant and other far right positions have remained a feature of Dutch politics (“Dutch Government,” 2002). With the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh, and a popular realization of the failure of immigrant integration by the Dutch public, Rita Verdonk of the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD or Party for Freedom and Democracy) has continued the anti-immigrant movement (“Anger Over,” 2005; Coughlan 2003; Quartly 2004). New parties, like the Partij voor de Vriheid (PVV or Party for Freedom) headed by Geert Wilders, and Eén Nederland (EN or One Netherlands) headed by Marco Pastors, sought to fill the void left by LPF in November elections of 2006 (Zoonevylle 2006). The surprise success of PVV this November illustrates that support for the far right remains strong among the Dutch electorate (Clark 2006). The Vlaams Belang (VB or Flemish Interest), formally Vlaams Blok (VB or Flemish Block), remains one of the most extreme and successful of the far right parties in Western Europe. After seizing control over of the Antwerp city council in 2000, the VB lost its status as Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 5 the top seat holder, but slightly added to its percentage of the vote in the latest election in October of 2006 (“Poll Gain,” 2006). Running on an anti-immigrant party platform, the VB extended its support into smaller cities and rural areas (Siubersk 2006). The far right in Britain has been and remains fringe. The British National Party (BNP) has yet to emerge successfully on the national political scene. The BNP has though, like the Swedish Democrats, increased their representation in local councils, most recently doubling its number of seats (Wheeler 2006). Less extreme than the BNP, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has been very successful in European elections, surpassing the votes for the traditional third party, the Liberal Party, for about sixteen percent of the vote (“UKIP Takes,” 2004). Support for the Far Right - Previous Research Given these electoral successes across the continent, scholars have developed a substantial body of empirical and theoretical work on the rise of far right parties. According to Ignazi (1992: 6), the far right is the reactionary “silent counter-revolution” to the far left Green parties. Kitschelt (1995) identifies the far right as the ‘New Radical Right’, or a political movement that combines free-market capitalism and political authoritarianism. Betz (1991: 113) also identifies the far right in terms of economics, or “very much like the authoritarian materialist counterpart to left-libertarian post-materialism on the new politics axis defined by a new political conflict over the question which values will ultimately prevail in the postindustrial age.” Far right parties place an “increased emphasis on respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance for minorities, conformity to customs, and support for traditional and moral values” (Flanagan 1987: 1303). Far right parties commonly “favor law and order, tax cuts, and limits on immigration and oppose policies favored by parties on the left and far left of the political spectrum. They oppose the social equality and economic regulation of social democratic parties, and the multicultural society, women’s equality, and environmental protection of the left-libertarian and ecological parties” (Karapin 1998: 213). Despite some country level differences, however, what all of the far right parties have in common is their position on the restriction of immigration. Far right parties throughout Western Europe have framed immigrants as problems in four different ways: “as a threat to the ethno-national identity; as a reason for unemployment; as a major cause of crime and other kinds of social insecurity; and as abusers of the generosity of the welfare states” (Rydgren 2003: 57). The literature attempting to explain the emergence of far right parties in Western Europe substantially varies in emphasis. Scholars remain divided over the emergence of the far right since it became a political force in the 1970s. According to the literature, the emergence of the far right has been attributed to all of the following: “a post-industrial economy; dissolution of established identities, fragmentation of the culture, multiculturalism; the emergence of growing salience of the socio-cultural cleavage dimension; widespread political discontent and disenchantment; convergence between the established parties in political space; popular xenophobia and racism; economic crisis and unemployment; reaction against the emergence of the New Left and/or Green parties and movements; a proportional voting system; and experience of a referendum that cuts across the old party cleavages” (Rydgren 2002: 32) Pippa Norris (2005) provides an excellent overview of past theoretical conclusions of the emergence and continued support for the far right in her book Radical Right. Herbert Kitschelt's The Radical Right of Western Europe is considered by many to be the most ground breaking study on the emergence of the far right. It has however stimulated considerably more criticism than praise, and an extensive assortment of other theories have emerged within the field. Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 6 Political Economy Research on the Support for the Far Right Kitschelt and most early studies adopted a political economy approach to explain the rise of the far right as a result of their policies in favor of market allocation rather than social welfare redistribution (Kitschelt 1995: 1). The demands of the people differ in a post industrial society; as advocates of free-market economics, authoritarian policies, and cultural protections, far right parties have addressed the needs of the people who have ‘missed’ out in the changed society (Kitschelt 1995: 2). According to Kitschelt (1995), the mainstream parties of the left and the right failed to meet the changing demands of some of the people because they have each gravitated ideologically to the center. Thus alternative parties are classified by Kitschelt and subsequent scholars as members of the ‘new radical right’, or the NRR, because they are on the far right of the political spectrum, but not opposed to democracy and free-market capitalism (Kitschelt 1995: 47; Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2003: 8; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2004). This contrasts with the old radical right which advocated “a blend of authoritarianism with corporatist or anti-capitalist visions of economic organization” (Kitschelt 1995: 47). Those far right parties included in Kitschelt’s study were identified by two plausible indicators: “whether a party’s competitors perceive it to be located “on the right” and not a viable coalition partner, and when the party appeared on the political scene” at the same time their polar counterparts of the libertarian left did (Kitschelt 1995: 49). As parties hypothesized to be primarily motivated by economics, Kitschelt and others advocate the new social cleavage The transformation of Western European capitalism into service oriented post-industrial economies has led scholars to develop the new social cleavage thesis. The thesis assumes that in affluent societies, populist rhetoric is directed “among a low-skilled blue-collar underclass with minimal job security and among those populations most vulnerable to new social risks who have tumbled through the cracks” (Norris 2005: 129). It is therefore assumed that those with little job security and the unemployed are more likely to vote for the far right. This theory also complements the idea of partisan dealignment, or how far an erosion of social structure and partisan loyalties is related to voting behavior (Bjørklund and Andersen 2003: 119; Rydgren 2005: 420; Norris 2005: 130). It is believed that the far right recognizes the insecurities of the people and target those who “lost out to industrialization”; it is hypothesized that these people are predominately male, lower income, blue-collar, less religious and have an authoritarian personality (Kitschelt 1995:10; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002: 347; Lubbers and Scheepers 2000: 77; Norris 2005: 131; Dülmer and Klein 2005: 244; Scheepers, Schmeets, and Felling 1997: 145). Lubbers et al. (2002: 371) concluded that the individual-level effects of education varied between countries. Others have linked low levels of education with higher support for the far right (Norris 2005; Kitschelt 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). Rather than regarding voters of the far right as ‘losers of modernity’, van der Brug and Fennema (2003: 66) believe that “in terms of the way they attract their electoral support, parties of the radical right are more modern than various traditional parties.” Modern voters no longer vote based on social class, but on their own ideological and policy preferences; the far right is identified as garnering support across class, so they benefit from modern voting. The dealignment and realignment processes do not guarantee far right electoral success, but only provides them with favorable political opportunities (Rydgren 2005: 420). Despite criticism, the intensification of globalization has led some scholars to continue to support the new social cleavage thesis. In recent times as globalization has further affected Western European economies, the emergence and growth of the far right has been reassessed. Swank and Betz (2003: 215) hySupport for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 7 pothesized “that a comprehensive, generous and employment-oriented system of social protection lessens the economic insecurities attendant to internationalization and, in turn, weakens support for far right parties.” Using individual-level survey data, they coalesced the traditional middle class and semi- and unskilled workers who face the most risks from changes in the economic system, with voters of the far right (Swank and Betz 2003: 216). Swank and Betz (2003: 218) argue that far right “parties typically embrace neo-liberal economic programs, xenophobia and strident anti-establishment positions.” Since support for the far right increases as international economic integration broadens, policies to lessen the effects are believed to be a remedy to prevent their emergence and continued electoral growth (Swank and Betz 2003: 239). For Schain et al. (2003: 6), socioeconomic conditions are “more important in the earlier stages of party formation and electoral breakthrough, as these conditions provide an environment within which party organizations are able to define political issues around which militants, voters, and sympathizers may be mobilized.” The conditions are therefore necessary for the emergence of some far right parties, but not sufficient to explain the entire movement cross-nationally. Several studies utilizing individual level survey data suggest that voting support among the unemployed and among low-income households is not as strong as suggested by many aggregate level accounts in political economy (Norris 2005: 147; Lubbers et. al 2002: 364). For Lubbers et al. (2002: 364), Bjørklund and Andersen (2003: 118), Dülmer and Klein (2005: 252), Givens (2003: 144), and Swank and Betz (2003: 233), the relationship between levels of unemployment and support for the far right is actually negative. Therefore the emergence of the far right is not uniformly the result of the politics of resentment or the new social cleavage theory. The social profile of the far right “is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest” (Mudde 1999: 5; Norris 2005: 147; Schain et al. 2003: 10). Previous studies demonstrate that “the negative motivations of radial right voters remain scarce, and some research throws serious doubt on this thesis” (Norris 2005: 150). Bjørklund and Andersen (2003: 125) concluded that far right parties cannot “be explained as a reaction from any genuinely marginalized segments of the population”, but rather representative of “sentiments that are widespread in rather broad segments of the population.” Most scholars agree that, like the new social cleavage, the protest politics thesis cannot explain the support for the far right. The protest politics thesis assumes that those dissatisfied with current economic, social, and political policies, vote for the far right to protest polices of mainstream parties they believe are responsible. Using evidence from the ESS of 2002, Norris (2005: 158) concluded that contrary to general beliefs, “the measure of government satisfaction proved significant and positive, indicating that radical right voters had higher than average evaluations of government performance, not lower.” Many other scholars have argued against the protest voting theory because they believe voters are ideologically supportive of far right parties because of their defined party platforms (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000: 82; Mudde 1999; Rydgren 2005; Rydgren 2004). Kitschelt (1995: 78) recognizes that the perception of the far right as “an issueless protest vote of those who generally feel cynical about democratic systems in which all the parties appear to say the same thing is groundless in light of the preliminary data.” Van der Brug and Fennema (2003: 58) support claims made by Kitschelt (1995: 276) that “protest voting only occurs when political attitudes are of minor importance.” In contrast to idealistic voters, “since the prime motive of the a protest voter is to scare the elite, not to affect public policies, ideological proximity and issuestands will be poor predictors of votes” for far right parties (van der Brug 2003: 60). Since far right parties are considered by voters to be more attractive once they are larger and ideologically closer, survey data indicates “that votes for these parties are generally not protest votes” (van der Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 8 Brug and Fennema 2003: 65). In conclusion, “the motivations underlying a choice for a radical right-wing party is generally the same as the motivations for choosing other parties” (van der Brug 2003: 68). Related to the protest theory is also the single-issue party thesis. The single-issue party thesis for far right parties suggests that immigration is their single and only issue. Mudde (1999: 2) defines a single-issue party as “having an electorate with no particular social structure, being supported predominantly on the basis of one single issue, lacking an ideological programme, and addressing only one all encompassing issue.” Immigration is an extremely important issue, but support for the far right arises as a result of their platform and ideas on security and crime, social welfare, and anti-party and anti-politics sentiments (Bjørklund and Andersen 2003: 122; Mudde 1999: 5; Hossay 2003: 176; Rydgren 2002; Rydgren 2004). Each far right party has an ‘ideological core’ based on nationalism, or “the belief that the state (the political unit) and the nation (the cultural unit) should be congruent”; their ultimate goal is a return to a mono-cultural nation state (Mudde 1999: 6). Far right parties are not just fearful of foreigners, but “anything alien to their way of life and values” (Mudde 1999: 6). Far right parties, and in particular the FN, remain dedicated to their ideology. As opposed to a single-issue or protest party, in the process of integration of support for the far right, “new voters seem to incorporate the core-anti-immigrant, racist, and authoritarian values of the party rather than to dilute these values”, and “the party itself appears to be an effective mechanism not only for mobilizing a growing electorate, but also for encadrement” (Schain 2003: 234). Immigration is not their single issue, but one that “works as a catalyst for a more encompassing uneasiness about recent social and economic changes in Western Europe” (Mudde 1999: 8). Political Institution Research on Support for the Far Right Many scholars have assessed the role of political institutions in explaining the support for the far right. The supply-side claim that far right parties are not ideological parties is refuted by cross-national comparative studies of far right ideology. Norris (2005: 219) defined and analyzed the process of far right electoral consolidation through “maintaining alignments, secular dealignments, deviating dealignments, secular realignments, and critical realignments.” Critical elections are “abrupt, significant, and durable realignments in the electorate with major consequences for the long-term party order” (Norris 2005: 224). Critical elections are necessary for the consolidation of the far right electoral successes. According to Norris (2005: 230), electoral dealignments that led to critical elections can benefit any far right party. This dealignment is supported by “evidence of declining party membership, growing electoral volatility, the greater fragmentation of party systems, more split-ticket voting, the later timing of electoral decision, and increasingly leader-centered campaigns” (Norris 2005: 224). The most important factor contributing to the emergence of the far right is the extent of the “existence of widespread political disaffection, processes of partisan dealignment, which weaken the anchors of habitual voting choices, coupled with the rising salience of the values of cultural protectionism and antiglobalization” (Norris 2005: 271). The rise of the far right also “depends heavily upon how far their own strategic ideological appeals works within the constraints set by the electoral system and the distribution of public opinion” (Norris 2005: 271). The enduring success of the far right is dependent on “the process of building, institutionalizing, and consolidating party organizations” (Norris 2005: 271). Rydgren (2003: 51) acknowledges that the rise of the far right involves a number of circumstances that facilitate a successful mobilization, but he disagrees with the conclusion Norris provides. Rydgren (2003: 51) believes that the far right still requires suffi- Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 9 cient organizational order, party order, and strategic skill to maintain their electoral successes. The political dealignment and realignment is also hypothesized to lead to far right success. Norris (2005: 83) determined whether electoral laws and regulations provided “formidable constitutional, legal, and administrative barriers for smaller parties,” particularly the far right, that prevented them from emerging in one country and not in another. To determine whether formal rules affected the success of far right parties, Norris examined the nomination, campaign, and electoral stages of a political system and the national share of votes and seats attained by a far right party in legislative elections. She hypothesized that “minor parties seeking to break into office (and thus many radical right parties) are generally expected to perform well in political systems which facilitate more egalitarian conditions of party competition” (Norris 2005:83). Minor far right parties face an extremely competitive environment that is “biased toward established parties already in the legislature” (Norris 2005: 83). To determine the validity of political institutional arguments for explaining the success of the far right, Norris (2005) evaluated the role of electoral regulations. Norris (2005) determined that the type of electoral regulations had little effect on the emergence of the far right; a combination of egalitarian and cartel regulations defines Western Europe, as autocratic regulations do not. In countries defined by egalitarian regulations, there is equal access to public resources and minimal legal restrictions on parties and ballot access. Cartel regulations are defined by limited party competition through restrictive practices that benefit the established parties and set requirements for ballot access, public funding, and access to free campaign services. The regulations have both mechanical and psychological effects (Norris 2005: 86). There is no mention of public funding, but Rydgren (2005: 430) believes that the attention the mass media gives to emerging far right parties “play an important role not only by facilitating indirect cross-national diffusion, but also by turning electoral successes of foreign far right parties into expanding political opportunities for domestic far right parties.” Despite the difference between more favorable egalitarian and less favorable cartel regulations, far right “parties did better where there was less regulation of party funding and access to public resources, not more” (Norris 2005: 101). The far right has enjoyed the most electoral success in Austria and Switzerland despite having little access to public resources. Throughout Western Europe, the “share of the votes and seats for radical right parties was higher under cartel allocation criteria” (Norris 2005: 101). Many scholars have concluded in the past that the electoral laws of Western European states determine the success of the far right. It is hypothesized that proportional electoral systems with lower thresholds allow for more far right electoral success than majoritarian electoral systems with higher thresholds (Givens 2003: 145; Jackman and Volpert 1994: 508; Abedi 2002; Norris 2005: 106; Carter 2002: 125; Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2003: 6). Carter (2002: 125) determined that proportional representation systems make it easier for far right parties to gain representation, but “there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that they promote extremism” and that the share of the vote going to them is unrelated to the electoral system. Schain et al (2003: 6) believes that “variations in the dynamics of the party system, electoral systems, and institutional constraints appear to be more important in explaining breakthrough and subsequent electoral growth.” Kitschelt (1995: 60) concluded that the electoral support for far right parties did not significantly vary under majoritarian or proportional representation electoral systems. Norris (2005: 113) provided empirical evidence suggesting that in recent national legislative elections, the share of the vote won by the far right was similar under majoritarian systems (7.2%) and proportional electoral systems (7.1%). Far right parties achieve substantially larger quantities of legislative seats under PR systems, but this exclusion from national legislatures has done little to Support for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 10 weaken their electoral support (Norris 2005: 114). The level of threshold also did not have an affect on the share of the vote gained by far right parties at the national level (Norris 2005: 121). Cultural Values Research on Support of the Far Right Scholars, including Rydgren (2004: 475) have in several studies concluded that the emergence of the new far right party family can be explained by combining a model of “innovation and successful cross-national diffusion of a new, potent master frame, and a group of mechanisms falling within the composite notion of expanding and contracting political opportunities.” Rather than trying to find one universal cause for the emergence of the far right, Rydgren (2005: 415) believes that there may be varying causes among different countries. The new far right is successful only when it can distance itself from the old right (Rydgren 2003: 51). The new far right achieved success when it became “flexible enough to fit in different political and cultural contexts”, resonated “with the lived experiences, attitudes and preconceptions of many people, and being sufficiently freed from stigma (Rydgren 2004: 478). The far right that is successful has been able to free itself from the stigma of the old right. The old right master frame emphasized “biological racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-democratic critiques of the political system”, as the master frame of the new far right has combined “ethno-nationalist, cultural racism, and antipolitical establishment populism” (Rydgren 2004: 478; Rydgren 2005: 413). Rather than advocating the superiority or inferiority of races, the far right of today “stresses the insurmountable difference between culturally defined ethnies” (Rydgren 2003: 47). When distinguishing differences in their respective culture, far right parties, like the VB, use ‘devil terms’ to identify peoples or ideas that they view negatively (Breuning and Ishiyama 1998: 7). Such terms, like foreigner as opposed to immigrant, indicate that a “person is less apt to be perceived as someone who can be part of ‘us’” (Breuning and Ishiyama 1998: 20). In explaining the emergence of the far right, Rydgren concludes that since the FN had an electoral breakthrough in 1984, far right parties throughout Western Europe learned from the experience and replicated it to achieve their own success (Rydgren 2005: 413; Rydgren 2004: 480). The main goal of a far right “party is to maximize its influence on policy outcomes in accordance with the core ideas and values embedded in its party ideology, and the duty of its party leaders is to use strategies that are judged to arrive at that goal as effectively as possible” (Rydgren 2005: 416). No matter the conditions or a satisfaction of the master frame, a far right party cannot successfully sustain electoral gains unless there are sufficiently large niches (Rydgren 2005: 418). For the emergence of the DF, Rydgren (2004: 488) concludes that it filled a new niche that emphasized the socio-cultural cleavage dimension as opposed to the socio-economic cleavage dimension. Rydgren (2005: 420) believes “socio-cultural authoritarianism and, more specifically, ethnonationalism and xenophobia have been the most important niches presenting far right parties with expanding political opportunities.” As new niches are opened up in the electoral area, it has allowed far right parties to “take advantage of the opportunities for ethnic mobilization” (Rydgren 2003: 50). Scholars largely remain skeptical of explaining the emergence of the far right as a response to increased aggregate levels of immigration and exposure to multiculturalism. Norris (2005: 167) concluded “that the share of the vote won by the radical right at national level cannot be explained satisfactorily by a wide range of aggregate indicators of ethnic diversity, including both objective measures, exemplified by the official rate of immigration and asylum seeks entering each nation, and subjective measures, notably anti-immigrant attitudes found in public opinion within each country.” For Western Germany, Karapin (2003: 193) used data on the percentSupport for the Far Right: The Desire for Cultural Preservation In an Increasingly Globalized and Multicultural Europe 11 age of foreign population to conclude that there is “a weak relationship between immigrant shares and far right success” and for asylum seekers there is “even less of a relationship.” Despite the less than satisfactorily explained connection, “attitudes toward cultural protectionism prove far more significant predictors of radical right voting then economic attitudes” (Norris 2005: 167). Schain et al. (2003: 11) supports a similar claim that even though opposition to immigration is related to the support of the far right, ther...
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Gun Control Debate


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Gun Control Debate


In the recent past, there have been cases of mass shootings to random shootings here and
there, bringing to attention the issue of gun control. This issue of gun control has received massive
support from one side, while the other side has vehemently opposed it, citing infringement of their
constitutional rights in the 2nd amendment. Individuals on the supporting side of gun control feel
that without proper gun control, the lives of innocent people will be at risk, thus their concern for
public safety. The shootings that have left many families in sorrow and grieve have ignited the
country's fierce debates on firearms in the united states of America and the merits and demerits of
gun control. There have been stricter gun laws debates by both the media and politicians on the
motivation behind public opinions and whether the views are as polarized as politicians portray
(Pierre et al. 2020). The debate on gun control in the united states has been recognized as a standoff
between the immutable positions that lack enough latent to initiate significant legislative reform.
America has been subjected to the polarization of two sides by the hun control discussion. One
side believes that gun ownership is amenece to American society, while the other argues that guns
are essential for protection. The ongoing debates about gun control have led to differing gun
policies when it comes to political ideologies. (Reeping et al. 2019). Their study identified that
with strict gun restrictions, fewer shootings than fewer restriction policies on gun laws where mass
shootings are encountered. In this research paper, I address why democrats are likely to vote in
favor of the gun control laws compared to the republicans.
I argue that Democrats are more likely to vote in favor of the gun control proposals as there
have been reignited calls for stricter gun control policies- something that the democrats are keen
to fulfill. Supporting this are the calls by the House speaker Nancy Pelosi to do something about
the mass shooting that has been encountered. Echoing the same is President Joe Bidden, who has

Gun Control Debate


called for the immediate passing of the two house bills to close the loopholes in the background
system, which will give more room for background checks before licensing of gun purchase and
Literature Review
Although there has been research on the causes of mass public shootings in the recent past,
shockingly, previous scholarship has not investigated whether proximity to mass shootings affects
the citizens of the US gun control policy preferences. I believe this question states not only to the
broader literature on the part of the background in shaping public opinion but also to the more
common issue of 'policy response in mass politics. In other countries where mass shootings have
occurred, swift measures have been taken in legislation changes showing a prompt degree of policy
response. For example, the massacre of sixteen British children and one teacher in Dunblane in
1996 prompted the passing of two firearm acts and permanently banning private handgun
ownership. Similarly, the Authur massacre in Tasmania in 1996, which left twent...

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