Managerial Economics
Applications, Strategies and Tactics, 14e
James R. McGuigan
R. Charles Moyer
Frederick H. deB. Harris
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1
PART III – PRODUCTION AND COST
Chapter 8 –
Cost Analysis
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Chapter 8 – Cost Analysis
Overview
• THE MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF COST
• SHORT-RUN COST AND PRODUCT FUNCTIONS
• LONG-RUN COST FUNCTIONS
• ECONOMIES AND DISECONOMIES OF SCALE
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Ch 8 – The Meaning and Measurement of Cost
Accounting versus Economic Costs (1 of 2)
• Accountants have been primarily concerned with identifying
highly stable and predictable costs for financial reporting
purposes
• As a result, they define and measure cost by the known certain
historical outlay of funds
• The price paid for commodity or service inputs, in USD, is one measure
of the accounting cost
• Interest paid to bondholders or lending institutions is used to measure
the accounting cost of funds to the borrower
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Ch 8 – The Meaning and Measurement of Cost
Accounting versus Economic Costs (2 of 2)
• Economists, on the other hand, have been mainly concerned
with measuring costs for decision-making purposes
• That objective is different
• Opportunity costs: The value of a resource in its next-bet alternative use
• Opportunity cost represents the return or compensation that must be
foregone as the result of the decision to employ the resource in a given
economic activity
• Economic profit is defined:
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Ch 8 – The Meaning and Measurement of Cost
Three Contrasts between Accounting & Economic Costs (1 of 3)
• Depreciation Cost Measurement – The production of a good of
service typically requires the use of plant and equipment
• Capital assets: A durable input that depreciates with use, time and
obsolescence
• Depreciation is a loss of asset value, but it is difficult or impossible to
determine the exact service life of a capital asset and future changes in its
market value
• As a result, accountants have adopted standard allocation procedures for
assigning a portion of the acquisition cost of an asset to each accounting
time period, and to each unit of output produced within that time period
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Table 8.1 – Profitability of Bentley Clothing Store
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Ch 8 – The Meaning and Measurement of Cost
Three Contrasts between Accounting & Economic Costs (2 of 3)
• Inventory Valuation– When materials are stored in inventory before
being used, the accounting and economic costs may differ if the
market price of the materials has changed
• The accounting cost is equal to the actual acquisition cost
• The economic cost is equal to the current replacement cost
• Sunk cost – A cost incurred regardless of the alternative action
chosen in a decision-making problem
• Sunk Cost of Underutilized Facilities – As shown in Table 8.3, a
savings results from accepting an offer for less than the firm’s cost
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Table 8.2 – Effect of Inventory Valuation Methods on
Measured Profit – Westside Plumbing & Heating Co.
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Table 8.3 – Warehouse Rental Decision –
Dunbar Manufacturing Company
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Ch 8 – The Meaning and Measurement of Cost
Three Contrasts between Accounting & Economic Costs (3 of 3)
• Conclusions–
• 1. Costs can be measured indifferent ways, depending on the purpose
for which the cost figures are to be used
• 2. The costs appropriate for financial reporting purposes are not
always appropriate for decision-making purposes. The relevant cost
in economic decision making is the opportunity cost of the resources
rather than the historical outlay of funds required to obtain the
resources
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Ch 8 – Short-Run Cost and Product Functions
(1 of 3)
• Fixed costs – The costs of inputs to the production process that are
constant over the short run
• Variable input costs – The costs of the variable inputs to the
production process
• Average and Marginal Cost Functions
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Ch 8 – Short-Run Cost and Product Functions
(2 of 3)
• Marginal cost – The incremental increase in total variable cot that
results from a one-unit increase in output
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13
Table 8.4 – Production Function –
Deep Creek Mining Company
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Figure 8.1 – Foreign Exchange (FX) Rates: The Value of the
U.S. Dollar against Several Major Currencies
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Table 8.5 – Short-run Cost Functions –
Deep Creek Mining Company
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16
Ch 8 – Short-Run Cost and Product Functions
(3 of 3)
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Figure 8.2 – Short-Run Average & Marginal Cost Functions
– Deep Creek Mining Company
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18
Figure 8.3 – Long-Run & Short-Run Average Cost Functions
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19
Ch 8 – Long-Run Cost Functions
(1 of 1)
• In long-run planning, the firm chooses the optimum combination of
inputs to produce the desired level of output at least cost, and some
of these inputs become fixed
• In the short run, if demand increases unexpectedly, the firm may
have little choice but to add additional variable inputs
• Should this demand persist, a larger fixed input investment in plant
and equipment is warranted, and then unit cost can be reduced
• See Figure 8.3
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20
Ch 8 – Long-Run Cost Functions
Optimal Capacity Utilization: Three Concepts
(1 of 1)
• Optimal output for a given plant size – Output rate that results in
lowest average total cost for a given plant size
• Optimal plant size for a given output rate – Plant size that results in
lowest average total cost for a given output
• Optimal plant size – Plant size that achieves minimum long-run
average total cost
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21
Ch 8 – Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
(1 of 1)
• Product Level Internal Economies of Scale
• Internal economies of scale - Declining long-run average costs as the
rate of output for a product, plant, or firm is increased
• Learning curve effect – Declining unit cost attributable to greater
cumulative from longer production runs
• Volume discount – Reduced variable cost attributable to larger
purchase orders
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22
Figure 8.4 – Learning Curve: Arithmetic Scale
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23
Ch 8 – Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
The Percentage of Learning
(1 of 1)
• Plant-Level Internal Economies of Scale
• Sources of scale economies at the plant level include capital investment,
overhead, and required reserves of maintenance parts and personnel
• Firm-Level Internal Economies of Scale
• One possible source is in distribution; multi-plant operations may permit
a larger firm to maintain geographically dispersed plants, lowering
delivery costs
• Diseconomies of Scale
• Diseconomies of scale - Rising long-run average total costs as the level of
output is increased
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24
Ch 8 – Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
The Overall Effects of Scale Economies and Diseconomies (1 of 2)
• For some industries, long-run average total costs for the firm
remain constant over a wide range of output once scale economies
are exhausted; For others, long-run average total costs rise at a
large scale
• The possible presence of both economies and diseconomies of
scale leas to the hypothesized long-run average cost function for a
typical manufacturing firm being U-shaped with a flat middle area
• See Figure 8.5
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25
Figure 8.5 – Long-Run average Cost Function and Scale
Economies
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26
Ch 8 – Economies and Diseconomies of Scale
The Overall Effects of Scale Economies and Diseconomies (2 of 2)
• Minimum efficient scale (MES) - The smallest scale at which
minimum costs per unit are attained
• Up to some MES, the smallest scale at which minimum long-run average
total cost are attained, economies of scale are present
• In most industries, it is possible to increase the size of the firm beyond
this MES without incurring diseconomies of scale
• But expansion beyond the maximum efficient scale eventually will result
in problems in inflexibility, lack of managerial coordination, and rising
long-run average total costs
•
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Figure 8.6 – Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) in Autos
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Business: A sadder, wiser union; Carmaking in
America
Anonymous . The Economist ; London Vol. 400, Iss. 8752, (Sep 24, 2011): 75-76.
ProQuest document link
ABSTRACT
On September 20th, as the United Auto Workers union (UAW) and General Motors (GM) unveiled a remarkably
modest four-year pay agreement, union bosses stressed their commitment to helping GM prosper. Some union
members will complain loudly about the new deal. But the UAW's leaders can boast of some achievements. After
what seemed like endless rounds of job cuts, GM is now hiring again. The road ahead for GM and the other
American carmakers is still potholed and slippery. If sales continue to recover, they can hire more workers and still
make profits. But if recession returns, forget it.
GM has plenty of cash to help it weather passing storms, and its repeated cost-cutting has made it lean enough to
make profits even if it produces fewer cars. But its fight for survival is far from over--and the same applies to the
union it has locked horns with for 75 years.
FULL TEXT
GM has reached a realistic deal with its blue-collar union. But bigger struggles lie ahead for both
TWO years ago General Motors (GM) went bankrupt. High labour costs, short-sighted management and global
economic turmoil forced what was once America's mightiest firm to seek refuge from its creditors. Only a federal
bail-out saved GM from the scrapheap. Now, after a dramatic restructuring, the company is in reasonable shape,
but another recession could sideswipe it.
Small wonder the United Auto Workers union (UAW) is less truculent than before. On September 20th, as the UAW
and GM unveiled a remarkably modest four-year pay agreement, union bosses stressed their commitment to
helping GM prosper.
The deal allows GM to hire thousands of new "tier two" employees, who will get about half the pay of longer-serving
blue-collar workers for the same work. It offers early-retirement buy-outs to thousands of costly tradesmen the
firm no longer needs. It gives each of GM's 48,500 production-line workers a $5,000 lump sum now and about
$4,000 more spread over four years, plus a slightly higher share of profits. But GM has not had to concede any
increase in basic pay (apart from a modest rise for the low-paid tier twos). The next contract talks, in 2015, will in
effect start with pay reset at the levels of the early 2000s.
This is not the first time the union has had to make concessions. In 2007 it accepted the long-taboo two-tier wage
structure. In 2009 it agreed to curbs on its ability to call strikes. Now that GM has lighter debts and a smaller,
cheaper workforce, the firm is back in profit. Better models have won car-buyers back: in August GM had a 20.4%
market share in America, up almost two percentage points in a year. But still, the union has to be realistic.
Two spectres make it shiver. One is the economy. The other is the continuing threat from the "transplants"--lowcost foreign-owned car factories in America, mostly in the union-unfriendly South. Until 2007, GM's labour costs
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were far higher than the transplants' (see chart). Now GM, like Ford and Chrysler, has slashed them so severely
that they are only slightly higher. Analysts at Deutsche Bank reckon that the labour deal could narrow the cost gap
by a few dollars more.
Some union members will complain loudly about the new deal. But the UAW's leaders can boast of some
achievements. After what seemed like endless rounds of job cuts, GM is now hiring again: of the 6,400 jobs it plans
to add or retain in American plants as a result of the deal, many will involve work that would otherwise have been
sent down Mexico way. Since all these jobs will be at unionised plants, the UAW will get some respite from the
relentless decline in its membership, which has slumped from 1.5m at its peak in 1979 to less than 400,000.
The UAW is being reasonable partly because it wants to keep GM competitive, but also because it dreams of
persuading workers at foreign transplants to unionise, says Harley Shaiken, a labour expert at the University of
California, Berkeley. Mr Shaiken thinks this is fairly likely, so long as Ford and Chrysler reach similarly amicable
deals with the UAW.
However, Kristin Dziczek of the Centre for Automotive Research in Michigan is sceptical: workers usually join
unions only when they feel mistreated, she says. Pay at the transplants may be lower than at the Big Three in
Detroit, but it is above-average for the states where the foreign-owned plants are located. And most of the
transplants are in "right-to-work" states, where closed-shop agreements, which force workers to join a union as a
condition of employment, are banned.
In any case, the UAW may have its reasonableness tested in the coming talks with Ford and, in particular, Chrysler.
Ford, which never declared bankruptcy, has the highest costs of the Big Three, and thus needs to drive a hard
bargain. Sergio Marchionne, the boss of Chrysler and of its main shareholder, Fiat, has shown himself to be tough
with the Italian and Canadian unions, says Ms Dziczek, and he is already in a bad mood with the UAW's leader, Bob
King, for failing (says Mr Marchionne) to turn up for a negotiating session.
Still, it may make sense for Mr King to grit his teeth and strike a deal with Mr Marchionne: Chrysler insiders say the
firm is contemplating bringing back in-house some work currently contracted out to non-union suppliers, so long
as the UAW agrees to keep labour costs down.
The road ahead for GM and the other American carmakers is still potholed and slippery. If sales continue to
recover, they can hire more workers and still make profits. But if recession returns, forget it. Analysts at Morgan
Stanley, a bank, expect Americans to buy 14m new cars next year. If the economy shrinks, however, they could buy
as few as 10m, and GM would again start to lose money.
Either way, the Big Three will face tougher competition, as foreign rivals such as Hyundai and Volkswagen
continue to expand their global capacity. GM has plenty of cash to help it weather passing storms, and its repeated
cost-cutting has made it lean enough to make profits even if it produces fewer cars. But its fight for survival is far
from over--and the same applies to the union it has locked horns with for 75 years.
DETAILS
Subject:
Automobile industry; Corporate profiles; Labor unions; Labor contracts; Statistical
data; Business conditions; Competition
Location:
United States--US
Company / organization:
Name: General Motors Corp; NAICS: 333415, 336111, 336399
Classification:
8680: Transportation equipment industry; 9110: Company specific; 6300: Labor
relations; 9140: Statistical data; 9190: United States
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Publication title:
The Economist; London
Volume:
400
Issue:
8752
Pages:
75-76
Publication year:
2011
Publication date:
Sep 24, 2011
Section:
Business
Publisher:
The Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., Incorporated
Place of publication:
London
Country of publication:
United States, London
Publication subject:
Business And Economics--Economic Systems And Theories, Economic History,
Business And Economics--Economic Situation And Conditions
ISSN:
00130613
CODEN:
ECSTA3
Source type:
Magazines
Language of publication:
English
Document type:
News
Document feature:
Photographs Graphs
ProQuest document ID:
893994147
Document URL:
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ccountid=42685
Copyright:
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Last updated:
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U.S. Car Business in Major Shift
Publication info: Wall Street Journal (Online) ; New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]04 Jan 2011: n/a.
ProQuest document link
ABSTRACT
If the Korean auto maker crosses that threshold as expected this year, the U.S. market will have seven
manufacturers--GM, Ford, Toyota Motor Corp., Honda Motor Co., Chrysler, Nissan Motor Co. and Hyundai--with
market share of 5% or more.
FULL TEXT
Author: Sharon Terlep; John Kell
U.S. auto sales rose 11% in December, capping a year that suggests the industry is on the verge of one of the most
dramatic shifts in its history.
For most of the past century, the U.S. car industry was dominated by General Motors Co., Ford Motor Co. and
Chrysler Group LLC. Now, as a result of both long-term trends and the upheaval of the last two years, the Big Three
are about to be replaced by a Gang of Seven as the industry's driving force.
In 2010, Hyundai Motor Co. saw its U.S. market share climb to just short of 5%. If the Korean auto maker crosses
that threshold as expected this year, the U.S. market will have seven manufacturers--GM, Ford, Toyota Motor Corp.,
Honda Motor Co., Chrysler, Nissan Motor Co. and Hyundai--with market share of 5% or more. That's a dramatic
shift from the days when the three Detroit companies dominated the market and dictated the industry's direction.
"I think it's fair to say we are entering a new era," said Jim Press, a former Toyota and Chrysler executive now
working as a consultant to several vehicle makers. "You have a completely different situation when you have six or
seven companies that are all established, with a significant customer base. It's not like the old days when it was
the Big Three and then all these little guys."
The emergence of seven major car makers means companies can no longer focus on besting a single rival, as they
did years ago when GM was on top, or in recent years when Toyota set the bar for quality and reputation.
"There's much less margin for error now," said Michael J. Jackson, chief executive of AutoNation Inc., a large chain
of auto dealerships based in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. "If you don't give the customer exactly what he wants, he's got a
wide range of other places to go."
Underpinning the change in the competitive landscape are two extraordinary shifts in 2010: a stronger-thanexpected resurgence by the three Detroit makers, and a reversal of fortune for Toyota, which just a year ago
appeared ready to pass GM as the country's top-selling car maker.
In 2008 and 2009, the Detroit Three were beaten down by massive losses and, later, bankruptcy. But in 2010, Ford
and Chrysler both gained market share. GM, while its share slipped less than a percentage point, is on its way to
reporting billions of dollars in profit for 2010 as its sales rise.
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At the same time, Toyota, which for nearly 30 years reported an almost unbroken string of U.S. market-share gains,
suffered a significant setback, losing 1.8 points of share in 2010, to 15.2% from 17%, according to Autodata Corp.
As a result, Toyota fell behind Ford in share for the first time since 2006.
Toyota has struggled to keep its sales rising since a recall and sudden-acceleration crisis engulfed the company a
year ago. Toyota's sales fell 5.5% in December and were flat for the year, while almost every other major maker
reported increases.
GM's sales rose 8.5% in December and 7.2% for the full year. Ford's increased 6.8% in December and almost 20%
for the full year. Chrysler saw increases of 16.4% last month and 16.5 for 2010. Chrylser sold 1.1 million vehicles
last year, hitting the target set a year ago by Chief Executive Sergio Marchionne.
Meanwhile, Hyundai, which a decade ago was laughed off as a maker of cheap, small cars, said its December sales
climbed 33% to 44,802. For the full year, its sales totaled 538,228, up 24%. It was the first year Hyundai's U.S. sales
exceeded 500,000 vehicles.
Write to John Kell at john.kell@dowjones.com
Credit: By Sharon Terlep And John Kell
DETAILS
Subject:
Automobile industry; Automobile sales; Market shares
Location:
United States--US
Company / organization:
Name: General Motors Corp; NAICS: 333415, 336111, 336399
Product name:
Chevrolet Equinox
Publication title:
Wall Street Journal (Online); New York, N.Y.
Pages:
n/a
Publication year:
2011
Publication date:
Jan 4, 2011
Section:
Business
Publisher:
Dow Jones &Company Inc
Place of publication:
New York, N.Y.
Country of publication:
United States, New York, N.Y.
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Publication subject:
Business And Economics
Source type:
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Language of publication:
English
Document type:
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