EDD 611 TUI Alternative Funding Models & Strategic Planning Essay

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K–12 Leadership Students
Epple, D., Romano, R. E., & Urquiola, M. (2017). School vouchers: A survey of the economics literature. Journal of Economic Literature, 55(2), 441–492.

Wolf, P. J., Kisida, B., Gutmann, B., Puma, M., Eissa, N., & Rizzo, L. (2013). School vouchers and student outcomes: Experimental evidence from Washington, D.C. Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 32(2), 246–270.

Compose a 3- to 5-page paper with the following components:

  1. Introduction
  2. Describe the intention of school vouchers.
    1. What did this policy intend to solve?
  3. Discuss the impact of school vouchers on education.
    1. Was this policy effective? Why or why not?
  4. What is your position on the use of school voucher?
    1. What would you do differently as an educational leader to address the issue that lead to the implementation of school vouchers?

Higher Education Leadership Students
Chapter 1: The Case for Fundraising (p. 9–18):
Klingaman, S. (2012). Fundraising strategies for community colleges: The definitive guide for advancement (Vol. 1st ed). Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing.

Gearhart, G. D., Mamiseishvili, K., & Murry, J. W. (2018). Involvement of academic department heads and chairs in fundraising at U.S. public research universities. Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice, 18(5), 34-40.

  1. Introduction
  2. Describe the role of fundraising in higher education.
    1. Why has fundraising become necessary?
  3. Discuss the impact of fundraising on educational outcomes or student experiences.
    1. Is fundraising effective? Why or why not?
  4. What is your position on the increased reliance on fundraising in higher education?
    1. How does fundraising impact educational leadership positions in higher education?

Required Reading

Epple, D., Romano, R. E., & Urquiola, M. (2017). School vouchers: A survey of the economics literature. Journal of Economic Literature, 55(2), 441–492.

Gearhart, G. D., Mamiseishvili, K., & Murry, J. W. (2018). Involvement of academic department heads and chairs in fundraising at U.S. public research universities. Journal of Higher Education Theory and Practice, 18(5), 34-40.

Chapter 1: The Case for Fundraising (p. 9–18):
Klingaman, S. (2012). Fundraising strategies for community colleges: The definitive guide for advancement (Vol. 1st ed). Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing.

McKinney, L., Mukherjee, M., Wade, J., Shefman, P., & Breed, R. (2015). Community college students' assessments of the costs and benefits of borrowing to finance higher education. Community College Review, 43(4), 329–354.

Chapter 14: Should School Districts Charge Additional Fees for Academic Programs Such as Advanced Placement Classes?
Thro, W. E. (2012). School finance. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Wolf, P. J., Kisida, B., Gutmann, B., Puma, M., Eissa, N., & Rizzo, L. (2013). School vouchers and student outcomes: Experimental evidence from Washington, D.C. Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 32(2), 246–270.

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Community College Students' Assessments of the Costs and Benefits of ... McKinney, Lyle;Mukherjee, Moumita;Wade, Jerrel;Shefman, Pamelyn;Breed, Rachel Community College Review; Oct 2015; 43, 4; ProQuest One Academic pg. 329 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. 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Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Journal of Economic Literature 2017, 55(2), 441–492 https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20150679 School Vouchers: A Survey of the Economics Literature† Dennis Epple, Richard E. Romano, and Miguel Urquiola* We review the theoretical, computational, and empirical research on school vouchers, with a focus on the latter. Our assessment is that the evidence to date is not sufficient to warrant recommending that vouchers be adopted on a widespread basis; however, multiple positive findings support continued exploration. Specifically, the empirical research on small-scale programs does not suggest that awarding students a voucher is a systematically reliable way to improve educational outcomes, and some detrimental effects have been found. Nevertheless, in some settings, or for some subgroups or outcomes, vouchers can have a substantial positive effect on those who use them. Studies of large-scale voucher programs find student sorting as a result of their implementation, although of varying magnitude. Evidence on both small-scale and largescale programs suggests that competition induced by vouchers leads public schools to improve. Moreover, research is making progress on understanding how vouchers may be designed to limit adverse effects from sorting, while preserving positive effects related to competition. Finally, our sense is that work originating in a single case (e.g., a given country) or in a single research approach (e.g., experimental designs) will not provide a full understanding of voucher effects; fairly wide-ranging empirical and theoretical work will be necessary to make progress. ( JEL H52, H75, I21, I22, I28, O15) 1. purposes of this review, we define a voucher to be a ­government-supplied coupon that is used to offset tuition at an eligible private school.1 Programs that distribute such vouchers exhibit variation in dimensions including Introduction I n the past two decades, both research and experience have contributed to significant progress in the understanding of educational vouchers. We review both. For the course, these individuals bear no responsibility for errors or opinions herein. We thank Abby Linn for excellent research assistance. Epple and Romano thank the National Science Foundation and Romano thanks the Institute for Education Sciences for support. † Go to https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20150679 to visit the article page and view author disclosure statement(s). 1 For other reviews and discussions see Ladd (2002), Neal (2002), McEwan (2004), Gill et al. (2007), Levin (2008), and Rouse and Barrow (2009). * Epple: Carnegie Mellon University and NBER. Romano: University of Florida. Urquiola: Columbia University and NBER. We thank Roger Gordon for his encouragement to undertake this paper, and Janet Currie and Steven Durlauf for their invaluable support. We are indebted to Thomas Nechyba and four anonymous referees for their numerous comments. In addition, we received useful comments from Chelsea Coffin and Jesse Levin. Of 441 442 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) who is eligible to receive them, their source of funding, and the criteria for private-school participation. For example, vouchers are frequently “targeted” to ­low-income students, are sometimes funded privately rather than through tax proceeds, and religious schools may or may not be eligible to participate.2 The research that has analyzed these programs seeks to answer five fundamental questions: 1. What effects do vouchers have on the students who use them? 2. Do vouchers induce ­nonrandom migration of students from public to private schools, possibly lowering the achievement of students that remain in the public sector via peer effects or other channels? 3.  Do voucher programs pressure public schools to become more efficient, increasing the achievement of students that remain in the public sector? 4. What is the net effect of vouchers on aggregate educational performance? 2 This program heterogeneity poses a challenge in determining which programs to classify as voucher programs. From the perspective of this review, the most difficult decision regards whether to include charter schools under the voucher umbrella. Most charter-school advocates would strenuously resist classifying charter schools as voucher schools, pointing to ­state requirements that the former be chartered as public schools, subjected to the oversight of the ­state-designated charter authorizer, and bound by constraints on admissions and funding. The c­ ounterargument is that, in some states, charter schools can be privately owned and operate under constraints on admission and financing not markedly different from those imposed by some of the more restrictive voucher programs. While there is merit to both perspectives, we view the distinction between charters and vouchers to be meaningful despite the fuzzy boundary between the two, in part because all of the voucher programs we review permit use of the voucher in private schools. Moreover, there is tremendous heterogeneity in charter school characteristics, both across and within states, making inclusion of charters in this review unwieldy if not unmanageable. Hence, we have chosen not to include research on charter schools in this review. See Epple, Romano, and Zimmer (2017) for a review of research on charter schools. 5. What political-economy factors determine the existence and design of voucher programs? Research frequently focuses on more specific questions that help to get at these fundamentals. Our review begins by describing the issues and controversies that frame the research on these questions (section 2). We set out the “for” and “against” positions typically (and at times informally) cited on vouchers. The brief discussion is sufficient to show that the answers to questions ­1–5 can depend on both the characteristics of the program analyzed and the context into which it is introduced. We then summarize the features of voucher programs that have been implemented throughout the world (section 3). We make a distinction between two program types. First, by small-scale programs, we mean those that place significant restrictions on who can receive vouchers. The most common restrictions involve income or geography; for instance, vouchers may be made available only to low-income children in a given municipality within a country. Second, by large-scale programs we mean those in which vouchers are distributed countrywide with minimal restrictions on the type of children who can use them. We then present a brief synopsis of the theoretical literature (section 4). It reveals that even in a qualitative sense, the answers to questions 1­ –5 depend on voucher design. The main exception surrounds question 2, where most models suggest that voucher systems will display a tendency towards stratification by ability and/or income—although this too can be mitigated by design and depends on context. Finally, we turn to reviewing the empirical work—the focus of this survey (section 5). In terms of question 1, the empirical research does not suggest that awarding students a voucher is a systematically reliable way to Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers improve their educational outcomes. A perhaps surprisingly large proportion of the most rigorous studies suggest that being awarded a voucher has an effect that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. At the same time, there is also evidence that in some settings, or for some subgroups or specific outcomes, vouchers can have a substantial positive effect on those who use them. In addition, however, some recent evidence points to some discouragingly large negative test score effects. In terms of question 3, the literature generally suggests that competition from vouchers leads public schools to improve. That said, it also makes clear that it is very difficult to isolate the effect of competition on public-sector value added (the object of interest); this reflects that as implied by the answer to question 2, vouchers typically lead to sorting and can thus affect public schools through channels other than productivity enhancements. Taken together, these findings point to an ambiguous answer to question 4 regarding the net effect of vouchers. Finally, empirical work finds support for theoretical predictions regarding the political economy of voucher adoption. Our “bottom line” assessment is that those hoping for definitive answers to questions ­1–5 will not find them in the research to date. In our view, the available answers to these questions are insufficient to warrant recommending that vouchers be adopted on a widespread basis. In that respect, the effects of vouchers have been disappointing, relative to early views on their promise. That said, our view is also that the record definitely warrants continued exploration. This assessment reflects three factors. First and as stated, there is evidence that in some cases vouchers can have significant positive effects on educational performance, or at least produce substantial cost savings. Second, there is some indication that the prevalence of such results might be increased with improved voucher design. 443 For instance, the accumulated research has begun to provide guidance regarding how voucher programs may be formulated to limit adverse effects related to sorting while preserving a­chievement-enhancing effects related to competition. Third, there is evidence that the returns to a ­well-functioning education system can be large, with the associated implication that a good understanding of voucher design could be very useful. A final note is that given the evidence we have reviewed, our sense is that work originating in a single case (e.g., a given country) or in a single research approach (e.g., ­randomized-control trials) is unlikely to fully answer questions ­1–5. The work on vouchers suggests that educational markets are complex, and that therefore fairly wide ranging empirical and theoretical work will be necessary to make progress. 2. The Issues To provide perspective for our review, we begin with an overview of the types of issues theoretical and empirical research on vouchers must address. These issues are complex, in part because the effect of a voucher program depends on both its design and the institutional and economic setting in which it is introduced. For instance, the effects may depend on the size of the program and also on the alternative: What educationalprovision regime would prevail without the voucher program? The “effects” that are of interest are themselves a fundamental issue. What is the social objective? To introduce these issues, we list some classic claims that frame the voucher controversy—and virtually everything about vouchers remains controversial—without discussing any literature. This listing will begin to illustrate the challenges that research on vouchers faces, and our hope is that the subsequent review will help to c­ larify what issues remain the most unsettled. We 444 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) begin simply by stating some arguments for and against vouchers, essentially as they are commonly expressed. The arguments in favor of vouchers include: • V  ouchers would lead to market or quasi-market provision of education, ­ with competition among providers and choice by students inducing efficient provision.3 The alternative of public provision is characterized by weak incentives, both because public providers are politically managed and monopolized, and because the exercise of student choice is limited. Thus, both static and dynamic efficiency would be promoted by vouchers, with gains coming both from private-school advantages and a public-school response. • Market provision would lead to educational variety, better matching preferences to supply. Diversity would increase with respect to aspects like curricula and teaching methodology, an improvement over the excessive homogeneity associated with monopolized public provision. • While there might be concerns regarding externalities from educational attainment (for example, a modern democratic society requires citizens to be literate in a common language), restrictions on private providers could address these. Similarly, the level of the voucher would address capital market failures affecting educational investment.4 • By decoupling residence and school choice, vouchers would increase access to quality education, especially for students at the low end of the s­ ocioeconomic ladder. Stratified educational provision 3 In our discussion, we will refer to the student and the student’s household as just the “student.” 4 If necessary, this could be supplemented with policies supporting educational loans. wherein quality rises with socioeconomic status would be reduced. In short, vouchers would provide both efficiency and equity gains.5 The arguments against vouchers include: • V  ouchers would lead to the sorting of students across schools along characteristics like income and ability (such sorting is often referred to as stratification). For example, the private sector might “cream skim” the highest income or most motivated children away from public schools. Teachers would sort as well—the most advantaged students would be taught by the best teachers and the least advantaged by the worst. • Such sorting would have negative consequences due to peer effects. These would arise directly, for example, if the ability to interact with higher-achieving peers helps students to learn or to acquire useful networks. Peer effects could also reflect indirect mechanisms, e.g., if school oversight of wealthier parents disciplines school administrators and teachers. • Even if peer effects do not exist, sorting would adversely affect less-advantaged students through informational channels. For example, being at a “bad” school could stigmatize students in the labor market, affecting their incentives to study. Further, sorting might be detrimental if the mixing of students along categories such as race and religion 5 Additionally, a more philosophical argument for vouchers rests on the substitution of student choice for public choice. As noted, the traditional economic version of this argument emphasizes better matching of preferences to educational supply. The ­noneconomic version of the argument places value on freedom of choice per se, while rejecting the paternalistic alternative. Since the literature we review considers mainly economic outcomes and considerations, we abstract from such issues. Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers ­romotes mutual understanding valup able in a diverse society. • If it is more expensive to educate disadvantaged students, then stratification would impose costs on the public sector. In as much as the public sector continues to serve a segment of students, political support for funding of public schools would be reduced by vouchers, compounding the problem. • Choice by students who are not wellinformed about educational quality could lead to poorer choices than decisions by policy makers. Poor choice could regard the focus of education, as well as the quality. These “for” and “against” positions make clear that research faces a tall order in understanding the impact of vouchers. For example, a small-scale voucher system might produce no sorting response, and its evaluation will therefore not address concerns related to stratification. Similarly, a scheme that does not generate large-scale entry of new schools may not reveal gains from curricular variety. The usual arguments also implicitly assume “universal vouchers,” which are available to all students. In many cases, including programs in the United States, vouchers are “targeted” to poorer households, meaning available only to students whose household income falls below a threshold. Income targeting of vouchers is intended to provide access to better educational alternatives to students who cannot afford to buy expensive housing in neighborhoods with good public schools or pay tuition to attend a private school. Such targeting would seem to weaken both the “for” and “against” arguments about vouchers, presenting another challenge to research on vouchers. For example, the net aggregate effect of a targeted voucher program could be very different from that of a universal voucher program. 445 Another crucial design feature of voucher programs regards the extent and character of regulations imposed on schools that accept vouchers. For example, a school that accepts ­voucher-supported students might or might not be required to accept all applicants, or use an ­equal-probability lottery when applications exceed slots. Participating schools may or may not be allowed to charge additional tuition and, if allowed, might be regulated with respect to whether they can price discriminate.6 Any of these traits will influence the type of sorting that vouchers can generate.7 Other issues concern not the design of the voucher program but the environment into which it is introduced. For instance, the extent of “take-up” of vouchers and the ease of entry of v­ oucher-supported schools will vary with the population’s density and preferences. In addition, the initial public provision regime may or may not already provide a degree of choice and sorting. For example, magnet public schools might exist or ability tracking might be practiced in the public sector. The baseline equilibrium may or may not have substantial Tiebout (1956) sorting by income and preference for education. Private schools might already attract a substantial number of students. The thematic message is that it is an oversimplification to view research on vouchers as a simple test of market versus nonmarket provision of education. Nonmarket provision of education is anything but uniform, and a voucher program need not correspond to a pure market substitute. 6 Of course, admission and tuition restrictions are closely intertwined: requiring a school to admit all voucher applicants but letting it discriminate in tuition can render the former restriction moot. 7 Sufficient regulation on ­voucher-supported providers, such that providers are essentially public, would violate our definition of a voucher program, though the threshold of regulations is blurry. 446 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) 3. Voucher Programs This section describes the characteristics of existing voucher programs in a total of eight countries. Given space constraints, our aim is not to do full justice to the details of these complex programs, but rather to provide the reader with useful background and references that will be relevant in our review of the empirical literature. As stated, we make a distinction between small-scale and large-scale voucher programs. This will be relevant in our review of the empirical literature, since each type of program has analytic advantages and disadvantages for conducting research. We classify voucher programs as small scale when voucher eligibility is restricted geographically to only part of an education market (e.g., only the c­ entral-city school district in a metropolitan area) or vouchers are targeted based on individual characteristics (e.g., only low-income children are eligible) or based on school performance (e.g., only students in underperforming schools are eligible). Conversely, large-scale programs are those in which the distribution of vouchers is largely unrestricted within the education market—all children in a country are eligible. A large-scale program need not, in principle, be a nationwide program (e.g., a voucher available to all students in the New York metropolitan area would be a large program). In practice, however, all large-scale programs are nationwide. districts have significant control over local schools. This has produced a large number of small-scale voucher programs—about ­sixty-five, by an admittedly rough count. We do not discuss each in detail; rather we summarize the characteristics of three types of programs that vary according to how vouchers are funded: • P  rograms funded by tax revenues. We summarize the characteristics of nine in this category, providing additional detail on the largest and oldest, which operate in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. • Programs funded via tax credits. We summarize the traits of seven in this group, elaborating briefly on the largest, operating in Florida. • Programs funded by private foundations. We summarize the typical characteristics of about fifty in this class, highlighting those operated by the Children’s Scholarship Fund (CSF). Distinguishing US programs by their source of funding is for convenience. Nothing suggests that the source of funding per se will influence program effects, though some program characteristics tend to vary by funding source, as we discuss. We also provide further detail on some programs in our discussion of the empirical research in section 5.8 Tax-­Revenue-Funded Programs.—Table 1 provides a summary of the main ­tax-funded 3.1 Small-Scale Programs We begin by describing the small-scale programs in the United States, the country that has produced the greatest number. This section also describes small-scale programs in Colombia and India. 3.1.1 United States The United States has a highly decentralized education system in which states and 8 These three categories do not include all ­small-scale v­oucher-type public programs. Specifically, since the 1800s, Maine and Vermont have had programs that give students in sparsely populated areas an alternative to public provision. Students can use vouchers to attend a ­nonreligious private school. In Vermont, for example, the voucher is for the lesser of average public schooling costs or tuition. In ­2001–02 there were 90 “tuitioning towns” as they are called, with 7,147 students participating. There are also programs that target special-needs students that, in the interest of space, we do not discuss here. 24,027 in 2012 $6,442 in 2012/13 Some, not routinely 112 in 2012 ­K–8: No. HS: Yes above 220% poverty Yes since 1998 Yes beginning 2006 Funding per student Transportation provided Number of participating private schools Can tuition supplement be required? Can vouchers be used at religious schools? Same achievement exams as in public schools? 1990– Years of program Enrollment Lottery Below 300% poverty Admission to oversubscribed pvt schools Targeting Milwaukee Yes Yes ­K–8: No. HS: Yes above 220% poverty 13 in 2013 Some, not routinely $6,442 in 2013/14 520 in 2012 2011– Lottery Below 300% poverty 2013– Racine Table 1 Yes Yes ­K–8: No. HS: Yes above 200% poverty 32 in 2012 Yes if voucher school in student’s district ­K–8: $4,250; HS: $5,000 3,649 in 2012 ­1999–2006 Lottery Failing school Florida Yes Yes ­K–8: No. HS: Yes above 200% poverty 35 in 2012 Yes ­K–8: $4,250; HS: $5,000 6,300 in 2009 1995– Lottery Open to all, priority to low income Cleveland Yes Yes Yes 23 in 2013 $4,600 in 2011/12 494 in 2011 (cap 500) 2013– Lottery All students Douglas, CO Yes Yes Yes, above 200% poverty 305 in 2009 Yes ­K–8: $4,250; HS: $5,000 12,685 in 2009 2005– Pvt school admission criteria Underperforming public Ohio Publicly Funded US Voucher Programs Yes Yes Yes 280 in 2013 Up to school $4,700 for ­K–8, HS slightly higher 3,919 in 2011 2011– Pvt school admission criteria Below 150% poverty or failing school Indiana Yes Yes No about 130 No $7,617 maximum in 2011/12 8,000 2013 2008– Pvt school admission criteria Below 250% of poverty New Orleans Yes Yes Yes 52 in 2012 Voucher can be used to pay for metro/bus K–8: $8,256; HS: $12,385 in 2013 3,105 in 2012 2004– Pvt school admission criteria Below 300% poverty or on food stamps Washington, DC Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers 447 448 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) voucher programs in the United States.9 All of these programs apply for grades ­K–12, and almost all are targeted to students in low-income households or schools desig­ nated as underperforming. Programs vary in age, ranging from Milwaukee, which started in 1990, to New Orleans, which started in 2008. Programs also vary substantially in the number of students receiving vouchers. Several programs require that oversubscribed voucher schools choose students by lottery. Others permit private schools to apply the same admission criteria for voucher as for ­non-voucher students. Funding per student varies across programs, but most provide sufficient resources to attract participation of a substantial number of private schools. Vouchers may be used in religious schools in all of these programs. All now require that voucher recipients take the same standardized examinations as public school students. While not detailed in the table, all programs require participating schools to meet curricular and other criteria. Some programs (e.g., Milwaukee) require schools to be ­pre-accredited by an approved national agency; some (e.g., Ohio) require that schools obtain a state charter, and others require annual reporting to an oversight body. Milwaukee is in many respects the most important voucher program in the United States and has served as a model for others; it therefore merits additional discussion. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program was introduced in 1990 in the Milwaukee school district, targeting K ­ –12 students with household income not exceeding 175 percent of the federal poverty level. At its inception, the program was not available to students attending religious schools. That changed 9 Though we discuss programs in the present tense, the Florida program described in table 1, known as the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program (FOSP), was declared unconstitutional and suspended in 2006. in 1998, with students enrolled in religious schools retaining the right to opt out of religious instruction. The voucher pays the lesser of tuition at a private school and the standard district allocation, $6,442 in 2010. Initially, schools could not charge additional tuition. Beginning in 2011, high schools were permitted to charge additional tuition to eligible students above 220 percent of the poverty line. Transportation is provided by the district if the student is within a set attendance area. Participating private schools set the number of available slots for voucher students, and must accept all students, conducting a lottery if ­oversubscribed. They must also be accredited by one of several agencies. Private schools must also meet at least one of the following four performance standards:10 (1) at least 70 percent of ­voucher-supported students must advance a grade level, (2) frequency of attendance by voucher students must be at least 90 percent, (3) at least 80 percent of program students must demonstrate significant academic progress, or (4) at least 70 percent of v­ oucher-student families must meet parental involvement criteria set by the school. The income threshold for eligibility has been on an upward trend. It was raised from the initial 175 percent of the federal poverty level to 220 percent in 2005, and 300 percent more recently. This allowed the program’s coverage to grow. In 2004 it distributed about 24,000 vouchers, accounting for about 23 percent of total district enrollments. By 2002, 102 private schools were participating, including 26 schools reported as entering as a result of the voucher program (Chudgar, Adamson, and Carnoy 2007). Tax-Credit-Funded Programs.—We next turn to ­tax-credit-funded voucher programs, 10 Wisconsin Administrative Code, chapter PI 35, p. 117. Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers summarized in table 2.11 The operation and funding of one of the earliest, the Florida Corporate Income Tax Credit Scholarship Program (FTC), illustrates similarities and differences between these programs and the ­ tax-funded programs summarized in table 1. The FTC was established in 2001 and is financed by corporate contributions, for which donors get a 100 percent corporate income tax credit for contributions that do not exceed 75 percent of their tax liability. Total contributions are capped at 88 million dollars, currently. Vouchers are for free- or ­reduced-lunch students and the program is administered by approved ­nonprofit agencies. In 2012, the FTC awarded about 51,000 vouchers to students attending about 1,300 schools. This makes it the largest voucher program in the United States—roughly twice the size of Milwaukee, although relative to a much larger population. As shown in table 2, the average voucher per student among tax-credit-funded programs was $4,335 in the 2012 school year. Private schools may impose their own admission policies, restricted only by antidiscrimination statutes, and can charge tuition in addition to the voucher, so long as this is their normal policy. Privately Funded Programs.—Roughly fifty privately funded voucher programs also exist in the United States.12 The largest 11 The t­ax-credit-funded programs detailed in table 2 are to be distinguished from state income tax credit and deduction programs available to households for educational expenses that currently exist in Arizona, Minnesota, Illinois, and Louisiana. Given restrictions on amounts, eligibility, and state income taxation, these programs have limited effects. For example, the most recently passed program in Louisiana in 2008 allows taxpayers to deduct from the state income tax 50 percent of educational expenses, up to the minimum of $5,000 per child or the total taxable income of the individual. With the maximum marginal income tax of 6 percent in Louisiana, the maximum subsidy to educational expenditure is below $300. 12 This calculation counts separately programs in different municipalities that are administered by the same organization. 449 s­ponsoring organization is the CSF, and a brief description of its operation illustrates key characteristics of this type of program. The CSF received a founding contribution from the Walton Family Foundation and has provided vouchers to l­ow-income students in numerous municipalities including New York City, Charlotte, Dayton, Baltimore, and Washington, DC. In 1999, it received 1.25 million applicants for 40,000 vouchers. Its Baltimore program is typical. It targets ­low-income students in grades K ­ –8. In 2008, it distributed vouchers to 490 students attending 70 private schools, 64 of which were religious. The average voucher was $1,759 and the maximum was $2,000. Families are required to pay at least $500 themselves, and their average payment was $2,711. All privately funded programs of which we are aware are similarly targeted, typically by income, and some to racial/ethnic groups. Some also target students that are identified as having high academic potential but limited means. 3.1.2 Colombia13 Small-scale voucher programs are much less common outside the United States, but Colombia provided a salient, if ­short-lived, example. Specifically, in 1992 it began operating the PACES secondary-school voucher program.14 This initiative was launched to increase secondary-school enrollment—the intent was for private participation to help ease public-sector capacity constraints. The vouchers, which were renewable ­contingent on grade completion, were targeted at entering students who were: (1) residing in 13 For further reference see King et al. (1997), King et al. (1998), and Angrist et al. (2002), on which this discussion is based. 14 PACES stands for Programa de Ampliación de Cobertura de la Educación Secundaria—program for increasing secondary school enrollment. Yes Yes Yes Can tuition supplement be required? Can vouchers be used at religious private schools? Same achievement exams as in public schools? Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes Yes 154 in ­2011–12 Pennsylvania No Yes Yes N/A Up to $5,000 N/A 2013– No Yes Yes 400 in ­2012–13 $990 average in ­2011–12 45,100 in ­2011–12 2001– Below 300% of Below poverty level or in $75,000 and in ­underperforming u ­ nderperforming public school. public school. Oklahoma No Yes Yes 54 in ­2012–13 $2,690 average in ­2012–13 382 in ­2012–13 2006– Below 250% of poverty level. Rhode Island Notes: Tax credits to businesses are generally limited as is the statewide total credit and amount available to provide vouchers to eligible students. Lotteries are then generally used to provide vouchers to applicants. The poverty level for eligibility is generally measured by the federal poverty level. No Yes Yes N/A $1,031 in 2­ 011–12 1,330 in 2­ 012–13 $880 average in ­2012–13 Number of participating private schools 2006– $4,335 average in $3,388 average in ­2012–13 ­2011–12 2009– Below 300% of poverty Iowa Funding per student 2008– All public-school Below 200% of students poverty level or in ­underperforming public school. Indiana 51,023 in 2­ 012–13 13,285 in ­2011–12 2,890 in ­2012–13 10,600 in 2­ 011–12 2001– Below 230% of poverty level Georgia Enrollment Years of program Targeting Florida Table 2 ­Tax-Credit-Financed Voucher Programs 450 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers ­low-income neighborhoods,15 (2) attending public school, and (3) accepted at a participating private school. The initiative was implemented at the municipal level, with the national government covering about 80 percent of its cost and municipalities contributing the remainder. Resource constraints at both governmental levels resulted in excess demand in most jurisdictions. When this happened, the vouchers were generally allocated by lottery.16 The voucher covered registration and tuition payments up to a maximum. Specifically, its value increased with schools’ fees up to about $150 dollars per year. Angrist et al. (2002) note this was roughly equivalent to the cost of a ­low-to-mid priced private school, and that it was common for recipients to supplement this amount. At the program’s inception, any private school authorized to operate by the Ministry of Education could take vouchers, although more expensive schools generally did not. Starting in 1996, and following ­well-publicized reports of perceived low quality at specific private schools, participation was restricted to n ­ ot-for-profit institutions. By 1995, the year of peak activity, about 90,000 students were using vouchers to attend roughly 1,800 private voucher schools. These students accounted for about 1 percent of all ­secondary-level enrollments in Colombia (King et al. 1997). Subsequent declines reflected funding constraints that cut both the number of vouchers and their maximum value. The program was discontinued in 1997. 15 Colombia had a scheme by which neighborhoods were classified into six strata depending on income; only children in the two poorest strata were eligible for vouchers. 16 Angrist et al. (2002) present evidence consistent with these lotteries generating random allocation in the cities of Bogota and Cali, and use this to evaluate PACES, as discussed herein. 451 3.1.3 India17 India provides an interesting example of a small-scale voucher experiment that, like many in the United States, is privately funded. Specifically, in 2008 the Azim Premji Foundation began distributing vouchers in five districts of the state of Andhra Pradesh, focusing on 180 villages that each contained at least one legally operating private school. Baseline tests were conducted at all private and public schools in these villages. All the test takers in public schools were then invited to apply for vouchers, with the knowledge that these would be allocated randomly. Students and parents were informed that the vouchers would cover all school fees and materials (e.g., textbooks, uniforms, shoes), but not transportation costs. Students in public schools are typically of lower socioeconomic status, and many found this offer attractive. Private schools were given the option to join the program, with the understanding that the value of the voucher would be paid directly to them and was equivalent to about the 90th percentile of the distribution of all private-school fees in the 180 villages.18 In joining, private schools had to specify how many slots they would make available for voucher recipients. The main condition placed upon these schools related to ­ non-selection. If space permitted, they would have to admit all voucher winners; if they were oversubscribed, they had to enroll those selected via a lottery run by the funder. This program featured a unique randomization, which took place in two stages. First, ninety villages were randomly selected to 17 This discussion is based on Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015). 18 The full voucher amount is paid directly to the school, which is in charge of distributing uniforms, textbooks, and other materials. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015) state that this arrangement reflects common practice among private schools in India. 452 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) TABLE 3 International Voucher Programs Restrictions on private/independent schools Years in operation Enrollments in private or independent voucher-funded schools For-profit operation allowed Selective admissions allowed Religious affiliation allowed Significant tuition charges allowed Chile 1981– 47% Yes Yes Yes Yes Denmark 1855– 12% No Yes Yes Yes Holland 1917– 70% No Yes Yes No New Zealand 1989– 15% Yes Yes Yes No early 1990s– 10% Yes No Yes No Country Sweden receive vouchers, and ninety remained in a control group. Second, within the ninety treatment villages, about 3,000 households applied for vouchers. About 2,000 were randomly selected to receive them, and about 1,200 of these actually used them. As we will discuss below, this double randomization has analytic advantages. 3.2. Large-Scale Programs We now turn to describing large-scale programs. The fact that they distribute vouchers without targeting implies that these have the potential to have a greater effect on educational markets, although this impact ultimately depends on their design and the context into which they are introduced. Table 3 summarizes five cases we consider, highlighting variation in the percentage of enrollments at independent schools and whether these schools can operate f­ or profit, implement selective admissions policies, have a religious affiliation, and charge tuition above the voucher. The remainder of this section discusses these on a ­case-by-case basis. 3.2.1 Chile19 In 1981, Chile introduced a universal voucher scheme. Prior to this reform, three types of schools were in operation: (1) public schools were managed by the national Ministry of Education and accounted for about 80 percent of enrollments; (2) unsubsidized private schools catered to upper-income households, and accounted ­ for about 6 percent of enrollments; and (3) subsidized private schools did not charge tuition, received limited l­ump-sum subsidies, were often Catholic, and accounted for roughly 14 percent of enrollments. The 1981 reform had two main components. First, it transferred public-school management to municipalities, simultaneously awarding them a ­per-student subsidy sufficient to cover their costs. Second, subsidized (or “voucher”) private schools began to receive exactly the same ­per-student subsidy 19 For further background see Gauri (1998), McEwan and Carnoy (2000), Mizala and Romaguera (2000), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), and Mizala and Urquiola (2013). Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers as municipal schools. These changes resulted in substantial private-school entry. By 2009, about 57 percent of all students attended private schools, with voucher schools alone accounting for about 50 percent.20 Chile’s scheme imposes few restrictions on private schools. These can receive voucher subsidies regardless of their religious status and operate ­for profit. They are allowed to implement admissions policies subject to few restrictions and, as of 1994, can charge tuition ­add-ons.21 The latter are capped at about four times the voucher payment, but this constraint rarely binds.22 Public schools operate under more restrictions. They are not allowed to turn away students unless oversubscribed, and cannot charge tuition at the primary level. All schools must implement elements of a national curriculum and participate in annual standardized exams, the results of which have been public since the 1990s.23 Recent years have seen further reforms. Since 1997, schools charging tuition a­ dd-ons are required to provide exemptions on these for a percentage of low-income students. In 2008, the flat voucher became differentiated: it was increased for low-income students. However, not all schools receive these additional subsidies, as they have to comply with a number of conditions to receive them. Even further significant reforms to the voucher system are under active discussion, in part in reaction to persistent student 20 The “elite” unsubsidized private schools continued to account for about 6 percent of enrollments. 21 Over the years, e ­ducation-related legislation often mentions that private schools should not select students. The anecdotal evidence indicates that this rarely binds— for instance no admissions lotteries are required. We return to this issue below. 22 Most of the “elite” unsubsidized private schools could take vouchers but choose not to; see Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009). 23 These tests have been used for purposes of accountability and targeting. For instance, Chay, McEwan, and Urquiola (2005) consider a program that targeted the 900 worst-performing schools in the country. 453 ­ rotests. The current Bachelet administrap tion has submitted to congress a proposal with three main ingredients: (1) the elimination of tuition ­top-ups, (2) the end of the ability of private voucher schools to operate for profit, and (3) the introduction of a significant reduction of the ability of private schools to select students. The proposals are still under discussion, and the details of implementation remain to be seen. 3.2.2 Denmark24 Denmark has a long tradition of subsidizing independent schools. Since the Free School Act of 1855, it has allowed parents and organizations to set up independent schools to which any child can apply, and which are allowed to have religious affiliations. Historically, these schools were funded through a scheme by which the State reimbursed a large portion of their expenses. In 1992, this system was replaced with one that provides independent schools with a grant based on the number of pupils enrolled by a certain date. Public schools continue to be financed by a combination of national and local government allocations; they do not receive ­per-student payments. The v­oucher-type payment for independent schools is indexed to expenditures in public schools and varies with two factors: school size (with higher payments for smaller schools, to account for economies of scale) and the age distribution of students and teachers. These payments cover only about 80 percent of average educational costs, and independent schools are therefore allowed to charge tuition (low-income households can apply for waivers) or seek external grants to cover the remainder. Despite this, total ­per-pupil expenditures are slightly lower in 24 For further discussion see Justesen (2002), on which this discussion is based. 454 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) the independent-school sector.25 By 2005 independent schools accounted for about 12 percent of enrollments. They operate subject to nationwide collective agreements with teachers, and to basic curricular requirements that leave them relatively broad pedagogical autonomy. 3.2.3 Holland26 The Dutch 1848 constitution allows for churches, foundations, and parental associations to set up independent school boards that operate schools to which any child can apply. The 1917 constitution further includes commitments of equal financial support for public and independent schools. While both types of schools receive funds for infrastructure, a substantial part of schools’ support is in the form of a ­per-pupil grant, with greater payments when they enroll children of low socioeconomic status. While this system was initially set up to allow for transfers to Catholic and Protestant schools, at present it also covers schools with other religious affiliations. Nevertheless, a majority of independent schools still identify as Protestant or Catholic, with enrollment shares of 27 and 29 percent, respectively. The public sector’s share is 35 percent, with the remaining 9 percent of children in schools of other types. Independent schools must be run on a n ­ ot-for-profit basis and “top-up” tuition charges are not allowed. In addition, these schools must implement at least parts of a core national curriculum, participate in national standardized exams, and comply with regulations regarding aspects like class size, teacher qualifications, and minimum enrollments. Private schools implement selection policies and may deny 25 Justesen (2002) indicates that in the aggregate, 77 percent of independent schools’ resources come from ­voucher-type payments, 18 percent from user fees, and the remaining 5 percent from other external sources. 26 For further reference, see Justesen (2002), Patrinos (2002), and Levin (2004), on which this discussion is based. admission for various reasons, including religious affiliation. 3.2.4 New Zealand 27 In 1989, New Zealand implemented a decentralization initiative transferring control of each public school from a national department of education to a “Board of Trustees”—largely consisting of parents— elected locally. In 1991, this system was extended by granting ­per-pupil funding to all schools, including independent and “integrated” institutions. The latter are schools which, while being institutionally independent, had been affiliated with the public system since the 1970s; most, though not all, have a religious affiliation. At present, the enrollment shares of public, integrated, and independent schools are 85, 11, and 4 percent respectively. These arrangements put in place a key ingredient of a voucher system—schools that attract more students receive greater funding. That said, they depart from the textbook voucher in some ways. First, not all schools receive the same p ­ er-student funding. Public schools receive subsidies for teacher salaries, operational costs, and capital expenses; integrated schools are only compensated for teacher salaries and operational costs; and independent schools receive only a portion of the p ­er-student payments awarded to integrated schools (the percentage has fluctuated around 30 percent over the years). Second, public and integrated schools do not have control over teacher pay; pay scales are centrally determined for all but the independent schools. In addition, while public schools may supplement their central subsidies via fundraising activities and donations, they are not allowed to charge mandatory fees. Integrated schools are allowed to collect donations and 27 This description is based on Ladd and Fiske (2001); Adams (2009); and Lubienski, Lee, and Gordon (2013). Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers charge compulsory “attendance dues” to meet capital costs. Independent schools can charge fees. The 1991 legislation allowed all schools wide latitude in setting up admissions procedures. For example, admissions policies could specify a catchment area, sibling preferences, and the use of parental interviews. Lubienski, Lee, and Gordon (2013) point out that some restrictions on selection were implemented in the 1990s. These mainly related to transparency in stating the selection criteria and the specification of catchment areas (there had been objections around the fact that children living very close to a given school might not gain access to it). Nevertheless, schools retain wide latitude in selecting students. 3.2.5 Sweden28 Prior to the early 1990s, almost all Swedish children (about 99 percent) attended municipal schools. While controlled by local jurisdictions, municipal schools were funded by earmarked transfers originating in the national government, which also directly hired teachers. Beginning in 1991, these arrangements underwent reforms that had four main components. First, the government turned the earmarked funds into largely lump-sum subsidies, with municipalities gaining latitude in financial management. Second, municipalities became teachers’ official employers, obtaining the ability to negotiate pay and terminate employment. Through 1996, however, the national government largely fixed teacher pay as a function of credentials and experience (Hensvik 2012). Beginning in 1996, salaries were determined by negotiation at the local level. Although these negotiations allowed for greater pay differentials, their 28 For further reference see Sandstrom and Bergstrom (2005) and Bohlmark and Lindahl (2007), on which this discussion is based. 455 outcomes continued to be constrained by agreements at the national level.29 Third, “open enrollment” plans were instituted at the municipal level, such that, in principle, students could attend any school in their jurisdiction; in practice, distance to school continued to be a criterion for admission. Fourth, independent schools were given the right to receive municipal funding as well— the government mandated that municipalities fund them with a ­per-student payment equivalent to the resources they would have spent themselves. In practice, these payments equal about 80 percent of per-student costs at municipal schools.30 Independent schools must be approved by the National Agency for Education. While municipalities can raise objections regarding specific institutions that apply for approval, they do not have veto power. Independent schools may be operated on a f­or-profit or ­nonprofit basis, they can be religious or secular, and they can focus on specific ethnic groups or languages. In all cases, however, independent schools must be open to all students—regardless of their municipality of origin, ethnicity, or religion—and they cannot charge tuition beyond the voucher. Further, grades cannot be used as admissions criteria at the compulsory level. Instead, proximity to the school, wait list (­first-come, ­first-served), and sibling presence at a school determine priority. A ­ bility-based admissions are allowed at the secondary level. ­Top-up funding is not permitted. Ownership of a school is unrestricted, and hence can be religious, ­for-profit, or n ­ onprofit. 29 There were two ­ five-year agreements between the central government and the teachers’ union. The first raised teacher pay by 10 percent over five years and the second, beginning in 2000, by 20 percent. Hence, local negotiations were constrained by minimum-pay requirements set at the national level. 30 Further, if a student crosses municipal lines, the locality losing him has to make a similar transfer to the municipality that accommodates the student. 456 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) Bohlmark and Lindahl (2012) point out that there was relatively little voucher school entry through 1998; at that point, the ­independent-school share began to grow. By 2004, the independent-school enrollment rate reached 10 percent for high schools and 6 percent for primary and lower secondary. By 2009, independent schools accounted for roughly 10 percent of all students. The reasons for the relative lack of voucher school entry for the first several years are unclear. These could include anything from a lack of information or risk aversion on the part of parents, to the fact that the 1996 relaxation of centralized wage setting might have allowed independent schools to compete more effectively. 4. Theory In this review, our primary emphasis is on empirical research (a comprehensive review of theoretical and computational research is provided by Epple and Romano 2012). Nonetheless, this section provides a brief summary of the theoretical literature with an emphasis on empirical and policy implications. The case for a ­market-based educational voucher was laid out by Milton Friedman (1962), who provided a vision for voucher design and an enumeration of the benefits that he foresaw from voucher adoption. He supported public funding of education on the grounds that such funding was warranted by the social externalities flowing from an educated population and due to borrowing constraints, but argued that public funding need not imply public provision. He envisioned a system in which parents could choose a school for their child with public funding going to the chosen school. The role of government would be to provide funding while “… insuring that schools meet certain minimum standards, such as inclusion of minimum common content in programs…” (p. 89). Implicit in this government role would be assurance that voucher funds be spent on education. Friedman argued that competition for students would induce schools to operate efficiently and reward quality teaching, with effective schools establishing good reputations. The poor would have educational choices not bound by the residence restrictions embodied in neighborhood public school systems. In Friedman’s view, the education environment was not sufficiently different from other market settings to interfere significantly with effective functioning of such a marketplace for education. More recent research has modeled educational vouchers taking account of distinctive features of the education environment. Table 4 provides a summary of the characteristics of models that we discuss in this section. The delineation of model characteristics in table 4 is imperfect and does not, of course, fully describe differences across papers. For example, the table indicates whether the vouchers that are studied are targeted, but does not indicate the type of targeting, which varies in important ways across studies. Likewise, there are important differences in what makes public schools heterogeneous in the models that have such differentiation. In the discussion below, these modelling differences are highlighted. In reviewing this recent literature, we make reference to how it helps to address the five fundamental questions on vouchers that we set out in section 1. A central theme that emerges is that the answers to these questions depend on voucher design. Regarding question 2, virtually all theoretical analyses predict that a ­ laissez-faire design will induce “cream skimming,” with the associated implication for question 1 that some students will gain more than others; and some will be made worse off unless the effects on public-school performance (question 3) are ­ substantial. X indirectly X X Nechyba (2003) McMillan (2005) Ferrerya (2007) Epple and Romano (2008) X X X X X X X X X X Epple and Romano (1996) Hoyt and Lee (1998) Chen and West (2000) Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) Bearse et al. (2009) Epple and Romano (2014) Epple, Romano, and Sarpca (2014) X X Ireland (1990) Public-choice models Chakrabarti (2013d) Nielson (2013) Chakrabarti (2013c) X X X Nechyba (2000) Ferrerya and Liang (2012) X Nechyba (1999) X X X X Epple and Romano (1998) Macleod and Urquiola (2009) X Manski (1991) Voucher models Public schools X X X X X Peers affect Homoge- Heterogequality neous neous TABLE 4 X X X X X Rent seeking X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Imperfectly Income Aptitude observed Student differentiation X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Universal X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Public choice Private No topping Limit Public price Housing Targeted up admissions discriminate market expenditure Voucher Vouchers Characteristics of Theoretical Models of Vouchers Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers 457 458 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) Theoretical models are often paired with a computational counterpart to quantify magnitudes, distributional effects, and, with respect to question 4, net impacts. As problematic implications of the l­aissez-faire design have become better understood, research has increasingly emphasized ways in which benefits from v­oucher-induced competition can be obtained without adverse distributional effects. While the natural focus with regard to question 1 is on educational outcomes, theory has also developed interesting implications regarding impacts on residential choice and housing values, and the connection to voucher design. Regarding question 3, theoretical research has identified potential sources of efficiency gains from educational competition, as well as ways that public-school performance might be adversely affected. Failures of voucher proposals at the ballot box have motivated research addressing question 5. 4.1 The Effects of Vouchers The theoretical and computational literature typically begins from a characterization of the educational environment, while taking the existence and characteristics of vouchers as exogenous. The question then is how the introduction of a given voucher program into a school “market” affects school effectiveness, the distribution of outcomes and welfare across students, the distribution of students across schools, tax revenues, publicschool expenditures, residences, and property values. In our discussion below, we draw out the predictions of theoretical models, while also noting those that have not yet received empirical testing. Manski (1992) pioneered this type of approach developing a theoretical and computational model that captures features of the educational environment including: public and private sectors between which students can choose; students differing by household income and motivation, with demand for educational quality rising with income and motivation; a positive peer externality from highly motivated students; educational quality determined by expenditure per student and peer quality; analysis of alternative ­public-sector objectives including rent seeking; and ­zero-profit private schools that set tuition to maximize enrollments with tuition and a voucher spent on educational inputs.31 Manski uses this setup to assess if vouchers would induce changes that equalized educational opportunity. The simulations and outcomes he considers are numerous, but overall the conclusion is that vouchers are not a “panacea.” A key prediction is that, as the voucher level rises, the fraction of highly motivated students in the public schools tends to fall, especially in poor communities. He states that “even in the most favorable case, a systemic choice system would not come close to equalizing educational opportunity across income groups.” Thus, Manski’s analysis predicts that cream skimming of the sort raised in question 2 will adversely affect less-motivated students. Epple and Romano (1998) study privateand public-school competition when students vary in ability and household income, and school quality increases with peer ability. Private schools maximize profits and can price discriminate, i.e., charge tuition that varies with student ability and income. Schools have fixed costs, as well as variable costs that are an increasing convex function of enrollment, i.e., cost per student is ­U-shaped in enrollment. The model gives rise to the following predictions. First, because school quality increases with peer ability, private schools charge lower tuitions (i.e., provide 31 While Manski describes students as varying in motivation, we label such variation as “aptitude” in table 4. Many authors describe students as varying in ability, and we have just chosen one term in the table to describe student variation along these lines. Note, too, that Manski considers ­rent-seeking public schools as we indicate in table 4, but also other objectives. Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers more financial aid) for high-ability students. Second, higher-income households with low-ability students pay a tuition premium to enable their children to attend high-quality schools. Thus, the school system will have a general tendency towards stratification in two respects. There will be stratification across schools within the private-school sector and there will be stratification between the public and private sectors. Moreover, private schools will be differentiated in quality and will exhibit “diagonal stratification,” with each private school having a student body that is a “diagonal slice” in the income–ability plane. The ­ ­ lowest-income and ­lowest-ability students will attend public schools. Thus, the model predicts that there will be a higher correlation between income and ability in public than in private schools.32 The model predicts that introduction of a universal (­ flat-rate) voucher will induce additional private schools to enter, with each entering school being of lower quality than the preceding entrant, and each exhibiting the ­ diagonal-stratification pattern. As the amount of the voucher increases, average peer quality in the public schools is predicted to decline as private entrants “cream skim” higher-income and ­ higher-ability students from the public schools. If a comparatively low voucher is introduced, those switching to private schools will attend a school with higher peer quality than the public-sector school they depart. As the ­ voucher level is increased, however, students who are induced to switch to private school exit a ­ public-school sector whose peer quality has been diminished by cream skimming to a private school with comparatively low peer quality. Thus, regarding questions 1 and 3, the model predicts that there will be high-achieving voucher schools 32 These and other predictions of the model are tested in Epple, Figlio, and Romano (2004) and are found to be supported by the data. 459 serving the relatively more able and affluent, lower-achieving voucher schools serving the relatively less able and affluent, and a ­public-school sector with lower achievement still. Epple and Romano (2008) extend this setup to show that these properties persist when school quality depends on expenditure per student in addition to peer quality.33 Could all students nonetheless have improved educational outcomes with the voucher? If private schools have an educational approach that is sufficiently superior to that of the public schools they supplant, and if the remaining public schools are induced by competition to adopt a superior delivery approach, all students might have higher achievement than in the ­no-voucher equilibrium. Computational analysis calibrated to the US context suggests, however, that some students will benefit from the voucher—the comparatively more able and affluent—while others—the comparatively less able and affluent—will be hurt. Regarding question 4, the effect on normed aggregate achievement (equal to future earnings) may be positive or negative depending on the extent to which private-school education delivery is more effective than ­preexisting public schools, and the extent to which public schools upgrade delivery in response to ­ competition. In ­summary, the model yields unambiguous predictions about stratification, p ­rivate-school pricing, and relative achievement across the predicted school hierarchy, while predicted aggregate effects depend on the impact of vouchers on educational effectiveness. It 33 One additional finding is that ­ low-quality “bottom feeder” schools may enter when vouchers are available, providing financial aid “kickbacks” to induce ­low-income households to choose l­ow-quality schools. It is shown that this can be prevented by a mandate that the voucher be spent on education. Theoretical models have generally assumed that kickbacks are not allowed. The incentive to kickback monies to poor students raises the related question as to whether vouchers would lead schools to provide ­noneducational goods to students as a way around a requirement to spend all of a voucher on education. 460 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) bears emphasis that these ­ predictions are for a universal (­flat-rate) voucher design, the Chilean voucher (at least in roughly its first two and a half decades) being perhaps the closest observed counterpart. Epple and Romano (2008) also investigate the implications of voucher design for cream skimming, showing that an ­ability-targeted and ­tuition-constrained voucher can preserve efficiency benefits from competition while eliminating cream skimming and providing relatively uniform benefits across the distribution of student income and ability types. The tuition constraint disallows “top-ups” and “kickbacks.” Such an a­bility-targeted design has not been implemented in practice.34 Voucher designs requiring that oversubscribed schools select by lottery ­ and that all school funds be spent on education, coupled with a prohibition against topping up, may be the nearest operational counterpart. Chakrabarti (2013b) provides a model of such a voucher and tests the sorting predictions, as discussed in section 5.3.35 34 In related work, Eden (1994) examines efficient voucher policy in a model with peer effects within schools and an achievement externality to society. Education is a pure investment good and capital markets are (implicitly) perfect. He shows that an achievement subsidy aligns school and social incentives, and combined with a ­type-dependent voucher equal to the efficient expenditure plus the student’s peer externality cost induces an efficient (­zero-profit) equilibrium in which students pay nothing out of pocket. 35 Chakrabarti (2013b) assumes students differ continuously in income and ability, with demand for school quality increasing in both. School quality is equated to expenditure per student, with a maximum quality. She considers a voucher that, for simplicity, covers the highest-quality cost of education, effectively implying no topping up. Neither can private schools kick back any of the voucher. Private schools have no incentive to base admissions on ability due to an absence of peer effects, as with a voucher that requires equal probability of admission. Private-school slots are, however, limited. While the voucher covers all tuition costs, students face utility costs of applying for a voucher that they may not get, and may face a monetary cost of attendance if, for example, transportation costs are not covered. Chakrabarti shows that there is sorting by ability at the application stage, but there may not be sorting by income. The former is because higher-ability Relative to the design of Epple and Romano (2008), the absence of enhanced voucher funding for low-ability students reduces incentives for schools to seek out and retain less able students. Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2003) analyzes the effects of voucher programs in ­multi-district local economies. He develops a rich theoretical and computational model to investigate the effect of several voucher programs under alternative public-school financing schemes. He demonstrates the importance of household mobility and general equilibrium effects in predicting outcomes from l­arge-scale voucher programs. In his 1999 framework, there are multiple local school districts, a fixed stock of heterogeneous housing units, neighborhoods within districts differentiated by housing quality, ­ district-wide homogeneous public schools, perceived education quality that varies with expenditure per student and average peer quality, and peer quality that is correlated with household income. Tuition varies across private schools, but, in contrast to Epple and Romano (1998, 2008), price discrimination is not permitted, implying each private school is specialized to serve one student type. This and the willingness of higher-income households to pay a premium for quality results in stratification by peer ability and income in the private sector. Households simultaneously choose where to live (district and neighborhood), whether to send their child to public or private school, and vote for a d ­istrict-wide property tax used to finance public schools. Nechyba conducts policy analysis in a ­computational types value quality by more and there are utility costs of applying. The latter is because tuition is fully covered, utility costs of applying are independent of income, and the potential monetary cost may not be enough to deter application. In contrast, in the enrollment stage, there will likely not be ability sorting but there will be sorting by income. The former is because ability sorting has already occurred, and the latter is because monetary-attendance costs that arise for some will deter take up by some lower-income students. Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers c­ ounterpart calibrated to data for New Jersey. His model predicts that private schools will emerge in poor communities as high-income households take vouchers and relocate to occupy higher-quality housing in such communities. Hence, stratification of income and property values across communities is reduced. Poorer households do not experience improved peer quality in their (public) schools, however, because incumbent somewhat higher-income households opt for private schools or relocate to communities with better public schools. Expenditure per student rises in public schools as long as the voucher is not high enough to induce more than half the population to attend private schools. Hence, public-school quality could increase if this increased spending offsets the decline in public-school peer quality. By allowing mobility and expenditure effects in public schools, Nechyba’s analysis predicts more favorable effects of universal vouchers on poor students, relative to Epple and Romano (1998, 2008). On the other hand, by not allowing price discrimination, benefits from vouchers to high-ability students, whether rich or poor, are curtailed. Nechyba (2000, 2003) extends this framework by studying vouchers targeted to poor individuals and poor districts, as compared to universal vouchers. This is of particular relevance for the US context.36 He concludes that a small n ­ on-means-tested voucher targeted to residents of l­ow-income districts is largely equivalent to a universal voucher that is not targeted, due to ­household mobility. 36 As reported in tables 1 and 2, targeting vouchers to the poor usually characterizes US voucher programs. Targeting to poor districts would be similar to the practice of targeting to poorly performing schools if households need only reside where their designated public school is so labeled to get a voucher, though prior attendance requirements limit this. In addition to differences in the underlying models, the ability targeting analyzed in Epple and Romano (2008) has a normative focus, while targeting forms studied in Nechyba (2000, 2003) are better motivated empirically. 461 Most households taking such vouchers would reside in or move to low-income districts, whether or not targeted to these districts. More generally, for realistic values, vouchers targeted to the poor district will have small effects. Similarly, income-targeted vouchers will have modest effects unless school quality depends largely on child ability. In that case, ­low-income parents of h ­ igh-ability children will choose private schools in districts with poor-quality public schools. Milwaukee would appear to be fertile ground for empirical investigation of Nechyba’s predictions of the effects of vouchers on household location, but such testing has not been undertaken. Ferreyra (2007) builds on Nechyba’s model introducing both preferences for religious schools and idiosyncratic (randomly drawn) preferences for school types (public, private, secular, religious) and location. She estimates the parameters of the model using data from seven metropolitan areas. She then uses these estimates to simulate the effect of several voucher programs. In particular, Ferreyra examines the differential effects of vouchers depending on whether these can be used at religious schools.37 She finds that both types of voucher programs increase private-school enrollment and give rise to mobility effects of the type identified by Nechyba. She also finds that a prohibition on the use of vouchers at religious schools results in less private-school enrollment and can shrink religious enrollments as some students take a voucher and switch from religious to secular private schools. Milwaukee’s 1998 shift to allowing the use of vouchers at religious schools provides a potentially promising environment for testing these predictions, although, to date such testing has not been undertaken. 37 We describe the vouchers in Ferreyra (2007) as universal and n ­ ontargeted in table 4, but the variation in whether vouchers can be used at religious schools or not is central to her paper. 462 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) Neilson (2013) develops and tests a model with geographically differentiated schools that compete for vouchers that are higher for poorer households. The empirical application is to Chile, as we discuss in section 5.3. Private schools are differentiated by their endogenously chosen quality, as well as by their location. There are no peer effects. Households differ demographically (e.g., in income) and in residence, with idiosyncratic preferences over schools, as well as (estimated) systematic differences in preferences. Locational differences among private schools and idiosyncratic preferences imply Profit-maximizing private market power.38 ­ schools choose quality below the competitive (­zero-profit) level, with the quality reduction increasing in their market power. The quality markdown is greater in poorer areas, where households are estimated to be more p ­ rice sensitive. As such, vouchers that are higher for poorer households have a greater positive effect on quality. This paper speaks to question 1, with gains to voucher students coming largely from reduction in market power among private providers; but it is also relevant to question 3 on public-sector responses. In contrast to the research discussed so far, McMillan (2004) is squarely focused on question 3. This paper endogenizes how public schools adjust their effectiveness in response to competition from more effective private schools. In McMillan’s framework, households are of two income types, with high-income households willing to pay more than low-income households for school quality. Schools exert effort, which raises their effectiveness but comes at a cost to them. Competition constrains private schools to provide efficient effort. Private 38 Nielson’s schools are then differentiated “vertically” by quality and “horizontally” by location and idiosyncratic appeal. Epple et al. (2013) also provide a model of vertical and horizontal school differentiation, applied to colleges. schools ­serving low-income students charge lower tuition and provide lower effort than private schools serving high-income students. The ­rent-seeking public-school sector will provide one of two quality levels, a high level sufficient to attract both highand ­ low-income students, or a low level that attracts only low-income students. If the former, high-income students prefer public schools over paying tuition to attend private school; hence the public sector attracts all students. McMillan considers the effect of a universal voucher in the high p ­ ublic-school effort case. The voucher lowers the cost of ­private-school education, and may induce high-income households to switch to private schools. If this happens, public schools choose to lower effort to the level required to retain only low income students. A voucher could, alternatively, induce public schools to increase effort to retain high-income students. Hence, McMillan provides a mechanism such that, instead of improving public-school effectiveness, voucher-induced private-school competi­ tion, and associated income stratification, may have an adverse effect on public-school effectiveness. McMillan’s framework thus captures an endogenous peer effect associated with variation in how parents of different income levels are able to induce school effectiveness. Building on McMillan (2005), Ferreyra and Liang (2012) model imperfect parental and ­policy maker monitoring of schools’ effort choices. Households vary in ability and income, and higher-ability households are more efficient at monitoring their children’s learning. Competitive private schools are sufficiently small that no free-rider problem arises in parental monitoring, while free riding prevails in the public sector. They demonstrate that combining vouchers with increased public monitoring of the public sector has the potential to increase everyone’s achievement and aggregate welfare. Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers Chakrabarti (2013c) also develops a model where vouchers could increase or decrease effort of rent-seeking public schools. In her model, students differ continuously in income and ability, with demand for quality increasing in both and school quality depending on school effort and mean ability. Private schools cannot price discriminate as in Nechyba’s (1999) model. Universal vouchers induce higher-ability students to exit the public sector, implying students at the margin of attending public school are of lower ability in the voucher regime. Increasing effort and public-school quality has a smaller marginal effect on increasing their attendance. If this is the dominant effect, then public schools worsen as in McMillan (2004). Motivated by voucher programs like the former Florida program (FOSP), targeted to failing schools, Chakrabarti then contrasts such a voucher with a policy that awards vouchers only if the public school fails to meet a quality standard. She shows that with appropriate setting of the quality standard, such a program will induce increased public-school effort and quality improvement. This is because public schools have a stronger incentive to improve to meet the standard and avert the voucher and loss of students, while students at the margin of attending private schools would always exit with a universal voucher. She goes on to test the model as discussed in section 5.3. In exploring why sorting might adversely affect students left in the public sector, the above models focus on peer effects.39 MacLeod and Urquiola (2009, 2012) depart from this by studying informational mechanisms instead. Specifically, they model the combination of educational and labor markets. In a first period, each individual attends school and accumulates skill as a function of 39 See Sacerdote (2011) and Epple and Romano (2011) for recent surveys of the literature on educational peer effects. 463 her innate ability, her effort, and her school’s value added. In the second period, the individual is employed in a competitive labor market. MacLeod and Urquiola assume that innate ability and effort are not directly observed; employers infer ability from all the available information. A key assumption is that individual innate ability is more accurately assessed by schools than by employers. For example, schools might be better able to administer admissions exams or conduct parental interviews. As a result, employers rationally use an individual’s school of origin as a signal of her skill. In turn, students seek to attend schools with good reputations, where a school’s reputation is the expected skill of its graduates. Two key sets of empirical implications emerge. First, “laissez-faire” school systems have a tendency towards stratification by ability. Students in n ­ onselective schools (e.g., the public sector) will be hurt by this stratification; their low ability is revealed to employers by their failure to gain admission to a selective school. Second, the effects of school competition induced by vouchers will depend on design. For example, schemes that restrict schools’ ability to select students will maximize effort on the part of students and their willingness to choose schools with the highest value added. Schools, in turn, will be forced to build their reputations on their advantage in value added, as opposed to just their ability to select high-ability students. In contrast, systems that facilitate selection will tend to lower students’ study effort and raise the probability that they choose schools based on peer quality rather than value added. To summarize, MacLeod and Urquiola (2009) show that even in the absence of peer effects, the reputational mechanisms emphasized by Friedman (1962) do not ensure that vouchers will increase the production of skill. The intuition behind this result is twofold. First, the fact that school membership 464 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) allows students to convey their innate ability reduces the incentive they face to work hard and do well in school. Second, under some conditions, rational parents will not always prefer the highest value-added schools, and rational schools will not always choose to compete on value added. These implications are consistent, for example, with the well-identified empirical evidence that selective schools only sometimes produce higher learning (e.g., Clark 2010; Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, and Pathak 2014; ­Pop-Eleches and Urquiola 2013). 4.2 Vouchers and Political Economy The research reviewed thus far studies implications of vouchers but does not analyze the endogenous public choice of voucher policy, a subject of obvious importance given the poor performance of voucher proposals in referenda in California and Michigan. Ireland (1990) provided the foundation for research on this issue. In his framework, households obtain utility from the education of their children and from the consumption of other goods. Households’ demand for educational expenditure is increasing in income. Expenditures on public schools and on a voucher, if any, are funded by a proportional income tax. Ireland investigates how public-school spending is impacted by the introduction of a universal voucher smaller than ­ per-student public-school expenditure. The effect may be either an increase or decrease, depending on whether the reduction in outlay for students who switch from public to private school in response to the voucher is sufficient to offset the cost of providing a voucher to students who would attend private school anyway. Ireland treats the voucher and tax rate as exogenous; subsequent work has sought to model these as chosen by majority rule. This effort encounters two challenges. First, the policy vector has three variables (tax rate, public-school expenditure per pupil, voucher). Invoking the public-sector budget constraint eliminates one of these variables, leaving a ­ two-dimensional choice set and the accompanying challenges for analyzing majority rule set forth by Plott (1967). Second, even if one variable, say the voucher, is exogenous, preferences over the tax rate are not ­single peaked. Epple and Romano (1996) investigate the second of these issues, considering voting over the tax rate that funds public educational expenditure and the voucher, taking the voucher amount as given.40 They show that, despite the ­non-single-peaked preferences, equilibrium under majority rule is likely to exist for realistic parameter values. The equilibrium is of an ­ends-against-the-middle form, with a coalition of poor and wealthy households, comprising half the population, favoring a reduction in the tax rate and m ­ iddle-income households, comprising the other half, preferring an increase.41 Work to endogenize voucher choice has followed two avenues. One is to consider voting one issue at a time. The other is to limit the choice set in other ways, such as requiring that the voucher equal public expenditure or by considering v­oucher-only economies. Hoyt and Lee (1998) endogenize both the voucher and tax rate by considering sequential voting with the voucher determined first and then the tax rate second. Employing information on the income distribution in each state, they find that there are some states in which introduction of a $1,000 voucher would permit lowering the tax rate without lowering public expenditure per student. 40 See also Glomm and Ravikumar (1998). 41 In a very similar model, assuming existence of majority- choice equilibrium, Rangazas (1995) identified the tradeoffs in the public choice of expenditure in the public school for a given voucher. His computational analysis predicts that a voucher equal to 1.25 percent of a teacher’s annual salary would cause per-student public expenditure to increase. Investigation of “­ends-against” voting is undertaken by Brunner and Ross (2010). Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers Chen and West (2000) take the voucher as equal to public-school expenditure per student in their examination of the political economy of income targeting. If vouchers produce some efficiency gains, they find that the targeted regime is likely to be majority preferred both to the ­no-voucher status quo and to a n ­ ontargeted voucher regime. Another approach, ­ voucher-only economies, is employed by Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) to study vouchers in a dynamic setting in which education spending impacts adult earnings. They consider three alternative voucher programs: a universal fl ­at-rate voucher, a means-tested voucher, and a “­means-equalizing” voucher that depends on household income and the amount of income devoted to education. They find that all three alternatives increase utilitarian welfare substantially, relative to the purely private system, and all tend to correct the inefficiency from low investment on the part of poor households.42 Bearse et al. (2013) continue the study of income-targeted programs by considering a voucher that is positive for the lowestincome household and declines linearly with income to zero. A sequential voting equilibrium, with the tax rate chosen first, followed by the parameters of the voucher program, is shown to exist. Their computational model shows that, compared to the n ­ o-voucher public equilibrium, the means-tested voucher chosen by majority rule benefits the poor via higher education spending and a lower tax rate, while also benefitting wealthy households who prefer private schooling coupled with a low tax rate. An alternative approach to overcome the Plott existence issue is adopted by Epple and 42 Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) note that their three voucher systems can be viewed as analogous to three different systems of state grants to local districts (foundation, means tested, and power equalizing). Hence, their analysis can alternatively be viewed as informing the political economy of public-school finance. 465 Romano (2014). They analyze simultaneous voting over the tax rate, public-school expenditure per student, and the voucher, exploiting the ­ citizen-candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997). They provide necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium, and show computationally that equilibrium exists for realistic parameter values. They also show that a voucher is likely to garner greater political support when income inequality is low. Intuitively, when inequality is low, a relatively small number of households choose private school. A marginal increase in the voucher induces a relatively large exodus from the public schools, permitting an increase in public-school expenditure per student with a lower tax rate, a change that garners unanimous support. Epple, Romano, and Sarpca (2014) extend this model to include income targeting via simultaneous voting over the tax rate, expenditure per student in public schools, the voucher amount, and the maximum income of households eligible for vouchers. They find that income targeting increases political support for vouchers by limiting their use by h ­ igh-income households that would use private school even in absence of vouchers, and that a targeted voucher always garners political support. The preference for targeted vouchers conforms to observation, but the finding that a targeted voucher would always garner political support does not. This latter finding brings to the fore limitations of the workhorse Ireland (1990) framework, particularly the assumptions that all households have the same preference function and differ only in income. Evidence on voting by legislators for voucher proposals discussed in section 5, along with differences in opinions evoked by vouchers, point to consideration of ideological differences in preferences as an avenue for extending the Ireland framework. This is being pursued in ongoing research of Epple, Romano, and Sarpca. 466 Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LV (June 2017) To summarize the research on the political economy of vouchers, two prominent themes emerge. One is that the majority of voters, those who do not choose private school in the absence of vouchers, will benefit by targeting vouchers so as to prevent ­take-up by those who would attend private school anyway. The other is that a voucher offering less than p ­ er-student expenditure in public school will generally be preferred by those who would continue to attend public school. Such a partial voucher induces some households to switch to private school, and this yields a net tax savings to those attending public school equal to the differential between ­ per-student public spending and the voucher. 5. The Empirical Evidence This section reviews the empirical evidence on each of the five questions raised above. For each, we highlight the methodological challenges that arise and we focus the review on the papers that have most successfully dealt with these challenges. This implies that we discuss some voucher programs more than others, depending on the question at hand. 5.1 Question 1: What effects do vouchers have on the students who use them?—The key challenge in answering this question is establishing credible counterfactuals; e.g., what would the outcomes of voucher winners have been had they not received a voucher? While different types of research attempt to do this, the papers on small-scale voucher programs are the most focused on it and have tackled it with the highest degree of credibility. This reflects that, in many cases, their setup at least emulates a randomized controlled trial in which subjects are randomly assigned to treatment (voucher) or control (­ no-voucher) groups. Specifically, some ­ ublicly and ­privately funded voucher prop grams have been explicitly designed as experiments. In other instances, nonexperimental programs are oversubscribed, and random assignment arises from the use of lotteries to allocate scarce slots. These cases, at least in principle, establish a clear counterfactual— on average the observed and unobserved characteristics of treated and untreated groups should be identical, and therefore simple comparisons of their achievement can reveal the causal effect of vouchers. One aspect to bear in mind is that in all the programs we discuss, those who are offered a voucher are not required to use it. Hence, a distinction arises between the effects calculated by focusing the comparison on those who have been offered the voucher and those who actually take it up. A comparison of the average outcomes of those offered and not offered the voucher yields an “Intent to Treat” (ITT) estimate. A “Treatment on the Treated” (TOT) estimate adjusts for the proportion of students who take up the voucher—thus providing an approximation to the effect of the treatment on those who received it. Both types of estimates have analytical advantages. For instance, the ITT estimate might provide a reasonable approximation to the effect of implementing a ­small-scale voucher scheme, since it is always the case that the proportion of students who take up the voucher is less than one. Finally, in some cases we also review the results of papers that, facing a lack of a (quasi-) experimental counterfactual, seek to establish one by using matching techniques or otherwise attempting to control for observable characteristics. In such cases, one must bear in mind that estimates can still be biased if unobserved student or parental characteristics are correlated with treatment. To preview the bottom line on question 1, the evidence does not suggest that awarding students a voucher is a systematically reliable Epple, Romano, and Urquiola: School Vouchers way to improve their educational outcomes. A perhaps surprisingly large proportion of the ­best-identified studies suggest that winning a voucher has an effect on achievement that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, three recent studies find large negative effects on test scores of voucher recipients. This is contrary to what one would expect, for example, if private or independent schools had systematically higher value added. There is, however, recent evidence from two ­randomized-control studies that point to more favorable effects on attainment. There is also evidence that in some settings, or for some subgroups or specific outcomes, vouchers can have substantial positive effects on those who use them. A question is, therefore, what accounts for the variation in estimated impacts? The literature offers some tentative and useful clues, but no definitive guidance. This reflects two aspects we will be explicit about. First, the best evidence on question 1 comes from very different settings—in this section we review studies on the United States, Colombia, and India—and while all these provide useful evidence, extrapolating is difficult, as these settings vary along multiple dimensions. Second, the experimental studies can provide clear counterfactuals and credibly answer question 1, but they deliver a “reducedform” answer that does not fully reveal what mechanisms account for the effects—a further reason for why extrapolation is difficult. 5.1.1 The United States Wolf et al. (2010a, 2010b) report on the Washington DC Opportunity Scholarship Program, which used an experimental design. Their sample consists of roughly 2,300 students, of whom about 60 percent were offered a voucher, with the rest serving as a control group. Of those offered a voucher, 77 percent made use of it. The authors find no significant impact on test scores after one, two, or four years (a s­ignificant effect 467 emerges for reading after three years, but none for math). Overall, there is little evidence that the Washington DC Opportunity Scholarship Program resulted in a sustained improvement on test scores. In contrast, Wolf et al. (2010a) report that the program had a large and statistically significant impact on graduation rates. After four years, students who were offered a voucher (ITT) were 12 percentage points more likely to graduate than those who were not, with a corresponding TOT effect of 21 percentage points. Exploring heterogeneity in impacts, Wolf et al. find similar effects among students originally in schools designated as “in need of improvement.” The School Choice Scholarship Foundation created three voucher programs—New York City, Dayton, and Washington, DC— that also conform to experimental design. The most intensively studied of these is the one in New York, where in 1997 a lottery was conducted among approximately 11,000 applicants (Peterson et al. 2003). None of these experiments yield significant test score effects for ­non–African American students. Nonetheless, Ma...
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EDD611 CA4

Alternative Funding Models

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EDD611 CA4
Alternative Funding Models
Introduction
Higher education currently operates in an environment filled with uncertainties as it has
to deal with the dramatic rise in the cost of education as sizable cuts have been made by states in
their spending and education appropriations. With traditional funding avenues dwindling
gradually, these institutions have now been forced to rely on alternative funding models to help
in the facilitation of their operations and expenses. It is for this reason that colleges and
universities now increasingly rely on fundraising strategies to support their operations. This
paper seeks to discuss the role fundraising currently plays in higher education, as well as its
impact on education as well as student experiences. Similarly, the paper will also share my
position on the increased reliance on fundraising in higher education.
The role of fundraising in higher education
As mentioned earlier, higher education continues to operate in an environment filled with
uncertainties as colleges and universities are forced to deal with the dramatic rise in the cost of
education. This is considering sizable cuts have been made by states in their spending and
education appropriations (Gearhart et al, 2018). For instance, some high...


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