Political Parties Worksheet eCore 2021_Revised 02/12/2021 Instructions: Use this worksheet to prepare for your weekly discussion posting and quiz. Use the chart below to compare and contrast how the two major political parties present their stance on major issues. In addition, you should locate and compare a thirdparty website as well (your choice!). Note: You will see a variety of issues presented on the websites. It is up to you which issues you choose to explore. You are encouraged to learn more about major policy issues including: the economy, immigration, health care, taxes, and civil rights/liberties. As you are completing the worksheet, consider: • How are the Democratic and Republican parties using the Web? Evaluate each party’s use of Internet technology. • How sophisticated is each site? Who are they trying to reach? To whom do you think their Web site will most likely appeal, and why? What image are they trying to project for the party (or candidate)? How successful are they in their efforts? • What improvements might they make to appeal to certain demographics? After completing the worksheet on the next page, proceed to the lesson discussion. Note: If you need to add another row in the document, right-click (for Windows computers), or two-finger click (for Mac) one of the three boxes in the last row and select “Insert”, then select “Rows Below”. Political Parties Worksheet Issue eCore 2021_Revised 02/12/2021 Republican Party Democratic Party Independent Party http://www.gop.com/ http://www.democrats.org/ (Your Choice) Insert website used here Chapter Five Interest Groups Carl D. Cavalli and Barry D. Friedman Learning Objectives After covering the topic of interest groups, students should understand: 1. The history of and reasons why interest groups exist. 2. Why we join interest groups, and their structure, their organization, and the µµfreerider¶¶ proElem. 3. The mythology and reality of interest groups. 4. The inÀuence of interest groups on puElic policymaNing, including the various methods of inÀuence. Abstract The framers’ hostility to ‘‘factions’’ was addressed not by restrictions, but by encouraging proliferation, creating what today is referred to as a pluralist system. While groups offer potential members many social and economic reasons for Moining, obtaining actiYe support is often dif¿cult because of the ‘‘free-rider’’ problem. Modern literature challenges the popular myth of benevolent groups alleviating inequities in society. Instead, Roberto Michels speaks of an ‘‘iron law of oligarchy’’ and E.E. Schattschneider warns of a strong upper-class bias. Data on federal spending by lobbyists support this theory about bias. Groups use many methods to inÀuence public policy. These methods include lobbying, direct access through ‘‘iron triangles,’’ litigation, direct grants of power from governments, ‘‘going public,’’ and electoral activity. Government regulation of groups’ electoral activity has resulted in the formation of many types of organizations, including political action committees, ‘‘527’’ and ‘‘501(c)’’ organizations, and, most recently, ‘‘SuperPACs.’’ Introduction Watching each others’ backs In the feudal systems that once dominated European countries, lords, as the saying goes, µµwatched each others¶ EacNs.¶¶ For that matter, so did the serfs. The feudal system placed all individuals into automatic, life-long af¿liations with their peers. In case of trouEle, help was on the way. The European immigrants who came to North America to populate the colonies had a common, middle-class background. Besides, while the shortage of land in Europe was part of the rationale for feudalism, once they 80 The Basics of American Government arrived here, the immigrants discovered an abundance of land. Imitating feudalism in North America was, quite simply, out of the question. But the choice of individualism came with a new challenge: Each individual, faced with some sort of problem, could not automatically rely on any association for assistance. For example, if someone’s barn was burning down, it would be problematic to endeavor to put out the ¿re alone. Therefore, the colonists learned to create associations for collective bene¿t²associations like volunteer ¿re departments. As a matter of fact, it was Benjamin Franklin who founded the ¿rst such association, known as the Union Fire Company, in 1736 in Philadelphia. The stage was set for the creation of innumerable interest groups in the United States. In Federalist 1, -ames 0adison reÀects the distaste of the framers toward what he called µµfactions’’ see Chapter 2 : µµThe friend of popular governments never ¿nds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice [i.e., factions]’’ (Madison, 2001, p. 92). We generally understand his term µµfactions’’ to encompass political interest groups, political parties, and other instruments whose purpose is to cultivate political inÀuence. Conventional wisdom states that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention were still in some kind of shock over 6Ka\s¶ 5ebeOOion, the recent incident in Massachusetts during which debt-ridden farmers set out to topple the state government in Boston so that there would be no instrument to enforce their debts. Although the rebellion failed, the afÀuent delegates to the convention must have feared imitators and, thus, the possibility that private property would not be secure. In so far as the Federalist papers were intended to advocate the rati¿cation of the proposed Constitution, Madison took on the challenge of showing that the document would manage the threat posed by factions. Did the delegates to the Constitution Convention decide to outlaw factions? No, says Madison; they did not outlaw them by µµdestroying the liberty which is essential to [their] existence.’’ That, he acknowledges, would be µµworse than the disease’’ itself. Instead, he explains, the framers did something much cleverer: They decided to µµextend the sphere’’²i.e., they transformed the system of 13 separate political systems into one large, national system. And then they set the stage for factions to proliferate. Then, he boasted, there would be so many factions in this one national system that they would cancel each other out, rather than creating the conditions under which one faction would eventually prevail. Chapter Five: Interest Groups 81 By the time that the French observer Alexis de Tocqueville toured the United States in the early 1830s, the creation of clubs and associations had clearly become second nature to Americans. His observation was that Americans form associations at the drop of a hat. Subsequently, scholars in the ¿eld of American government found many reasons to celebrate the proliferation of interest groups. Tocqueville himself referred to the spectrum of clubs and associations as µµgreat schools, free of charge, where all citizens come to be taught the general theory of associations,’’ in which Americans learn to make proposals, debate them, vote on them, and accept the majority decision (Tocqueville, 1835/2000, p. 497). In 1951, David B. Truman referred to interest groups as the µµbalance wheel in a going democratic system’’ (p. 514). The existence of innumerable interest groups, and each American’s af¿liation with a variable number of such groups, amounted to a system of pluralism, whose net effect is considered to be the moderation of individual Americans and, as a result, of the entire political system. 7Ke %asics What are they and why do they exist? 4uite simply, interest groups organize to inÀuence government. This makes them purely political entities, as they seek to affect public policy. However, these groups generally are not interested in all policies. Typically they focus on a single area, remaining uninterested in others (except to the extent those others may affect their interest). This focus leads many to refer to them as special- or single-interest groups. While the framers’ distaste for µµfactions’’ included interest groups as well as political parties, this single focus distinguishes them from political parties, which generally seek to mold policy in all areas. Another distinction is that, in general, while interest groups are focused on inÀuencing government—largely from the outside—parties want to get their members elected to government in order to run it (see Chapter 6). Democracy, Diversity, and Division While not an absolute requirement, democracy helps explain the existence of interest groups. Democratic governments are set up to listen to public input, and an organized group is more easily heard than a scattered collection of individuals (Think of a chorus versus a crowd). 82 The Basics of American Government Another explanation is found in diversity. There would be little reason for groups to form if the entire population possessed the same beliefs, desires, and needs. Indeed, in Federalist #10, Madison notes that one way of µµremoving the causes of faction’’ is to give everyone µµthe same opinions, … passions, and … interests’’ (Madison 2001, p. 92). He quickly dismisses this as impossible. So—factions happen! One other less appreciated but equally important explanation for the existence of interest groups is division. More precisely, our government is fragmented—divided in many ways. Implementing the constitutional principle of separation of powers leads to a divided government—three branches (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) in each of three levels (national, state, and local). In addition, each branch at each level usually has multiple agencies with many individuals within it. This diversity creates numerous access points for interest groups to contact. In addition to lobbying Congress for favorable legislation, they may also lobby executive agencies for favorable regulations as well as accessing the legal system to affect laws, regulations, and their implementation. All of these may be pursued at the state (governor, state legislature, state courts) and local (mayor, city council, municipal courts) levels as well. The Rationale for Forming or Joining Groups Clubs and associations originate because of their founders’ perception of self-interest. Others join these organizations to advance their selfinterests, too. While one cannot rule out the possibility that those who establish an association are doing so for purely altruistic reasons, systematic observation suggests that such an event is a rarity. People join groups for some of these reasons: t
t
People may join an organization in order to obtain a material bene¿t. For example, one may join AARP—the organization for people 50 years of age and older—to obtain health insurance at a discounted group rate or to obtain discounts when checking into a hotel. People may join an organization in order to feel good about themselves. They may volunteer their unpaid labor to helping a free-soup kitchen so that they can get some personal satisfaction out of feeding hungry people. They may join a museum Chapter Five: Interest Groups t
t
t
83 organization to feel as though they are doing something worthy by being a patron of the arts. People may establish or af¿liate with an organization in order to obtain employment. Clubs and associations employ millions of Americans. The most successful organization executives even in the nonpro¿t charitable sector command generous salaries, sometimes exceeding $1 million. People or business enterprises may af¿liate with an organization in the hope that the organization will attempt to persuade legislators and others who possess government authority to make decisions that will promote the well-being of the members’ industry or other common interest. People may af¿liate with an organization because of their intention that the organization’s ideological program or policy preferences would, if transformed into public policy, bene¿t the individual or, at least, create the kind of society that they prefer. Organization There are more potential interests than most of us may comprehend. Your interests may stem from any number of factors related to you or your surroundings, including sociological factors (race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, sexual orientation), political factors (partisanship, ideology), behavioral factors (activities, personal and consumer habits), demographic factors (gender, age, location, income, occupation, education), and even physical characteristics (height, weight, health issues). However, not all interests gain the attention of government. The key to gaining this attention is organization. Organization is what separates interests from interest groups (recall the earlier analogy: a chorus versus a crowd). Any interest wishing to inÀuence government must have some sort of structure, consisting most basically of leadership and membership. The leadership provides direction and (along with the staff) usually accounts for much of the group’s activities. The membership may account for some activity (e.g., picketing, protesting, writing to or calling government of¿cials), but in many instances provides mainly ¿nancing and popular support. In general, organized groups cannot achieve signi¿cant success without a sound ¿nancial structure. Most organizations rely on membership dues 84 The Basics of American Government along with additional contributions from supporters (including charitable foundations and think tanks—i.e., other groups). Many groups also bene¿t from federal and state funding. This funding is not supposed to be used to support their attempts to inÀuence government. However, funding in the form of research or project grants—often providing data in support of a group’s aims—may help them succeed nonetheless. The ‘‘Free-Rider’’ Problem As noted above, people join groups for many reasons. In general, it makes sense to say that we look to obtain some sort of bene¿t from our memberships. In turn, groups need our support in order to function effectively. Yet many groups ¿nd it dif¿cult to obtain that support. Interestingly, this dif¿culty generally increases with the size of a (potential) group. You might think that the broader the interest, the easier it is to organize, collect resources, and take action. You would be wrong! Broad interests face a Ireerider problem. Mancur Olson (1982) describes the logic: The successful boycott or strike or lobbying action will bring the better price or wage for everyone in the relevant category, so the individual in any large group with a common interest will reap only a minute share of the gains from whatever sacri¿ces the individual makes to achieve this common interest. Since any gain goes to everyone in the group, those who contribute nothing to the effort will get Must as much as those who made a contribution. It pays to ‘‘let George do it,’’ but George has little or no incentive to do anything in the group interest either, so … there will be little, if any, group action. The paradox, then, is that (in the absence of special arrangements or circumstances ...) large groups, at least if they are composed of rational individuals, will not act in their group interest. (p. 18) In other words, groups that pursue collective or public goods, cannot limit them only to those who contribute time and resources to the cause (see Samuelson 1954). National defense is one of the purest examples of a collective good. It is impossible to divide: If it is provided at all, it is provided for everyone. Contrast this with largely private goods—like typical consumer goods—that are bought and sold through individual Chapter Five: Interest Groups 85 transactions. You must pay for that iPod you want! On the other hand, much of the regulations regarding the manufacture and sale of iPods (material and manufacturing quality, limitations on the use of hazardous materials, required disclosure of radiation levels) are closer to public goods that exist (or not) regardless of your individual actions. If you bene¿t from these goods whether you contribute or not, it is not rational for you to contribute to any groups seeking these bene¿ts. *roups seeking these regulations often will struggle to build support. You will just µµlet *eorge do it’’ (which, of course, he will not because he has no more incentive than you!). In small groups (such as a local union seeking a pay raise for a company’s workers), you may quickly realize that if you and George do not act, you may not receive any bene¿t. This realization may spur you to action. However, in large groups (such as consumer, environmental, social, and issue groups), there are lots of other Georges, at least some of whom (you are likely to assume) will act. Yet again, they have no more incentive than do you. This lack of action is the problem. Governments may address this problem through compulsory action. National defense is funded through tax revenues. You pay taxes or you go to prison (assuming you are caught). Interest groups, however, do not have that compulsory power. So how do groups overcome this problem? Two words: selective incentives (or selective bene¿ts). These are bene¿ts that can be limited in their distribution. As Olson (1971) says, ... group action can be obtained only through an incentive that operates ... selectively toward the individuals in the group. The incentive must be ‘‘selective’’ so that those who do not Moin the organization ... can be treated differently from those who do. (p. 51) These are the kind of bene¿ts mentioned earlier, including material bene¿ts like access to or discounts on consumer goods or other resources or information, and social bene¿ts like entertainment, travel, and other group activities. Regardless of what George does, you are more likely to contribute your time and money to the group if it means that you can get a t-shirt with the group’s logo on it, or a magazine with information on the group’s accomplishments and activities, or a discount on tickets to a Yankees game or on an insurance policy, or if you can attend a group party or lecture, or go on a Caribbean cruise with group members. 86 The Basics of American Government 7Ke 0\tKolog\ and tKe 5ealit\ The Myth: Inequities Are Alleviated The spectrum of communications-media sources that discuss American life in general contains a signi¿cant amount of mythology about groups, organizations, associations, and so forth. The traditional mythology describes these collectivities in mostly Àattering terms. They are said to contribute to the spirit of American democracy. They are described as effective instruments of political participation. Charitable organizations are rhapsodized as instruments by which socioeconomic inequities are alleviated because the charities redistribute wealth from generous haves to appreciative have-nots. That there is such a mythology is somewhat ironic, given the clear skepticism among the framers of the U. S. Constitution about such collectivities. To Tocqueville, the participation of Americans who, he said, organized clubs and associations at the drop of a hat, in such groups gave the public experience with the idea of democracy: The members would learn to make a proposal, debate it, vote on it, and abide by the results of the majority vote. Thus, he said, these groups served as training grounds for democracy. While Madison considered µµfactions’’ a threat to the republic, Tocqueville considered associations to be its very mainstay. The Reality: Oligarchy, the Upper Class, and Corporations As the twentieth century proceeded, the literature of political science, following the direction of the literature of sociology, gradually departed from the mythology of popular publications about the value of interest groups, but for reasons that were different from Madison’s rationale. In 1915, French sociologist Roberto Michels made this chilling observation: µµWho says organization, says oligarchy’’ (1915/1958, p. 418). His µµiron law of oligarchy’’ suggests that, in any organization, a clique of some sort will inevitably rise to the top and assume control. The automatic process that determines who will become the leaders recognizes charisma, strength, leadership ability, intelligence, wealth, access to inÀuential individuals, and so on. When, in 1966, Grant McConnell studied special-interest groups in the United States and their inÀuence on public policy, he rediscovered Michels’ µµiron law,’’ and complained: µµIf private associations themselves should be undemocratic [because of the iron law of oligarchy], … how can they be essential to democracy?’’ (pp. 122-123). Chapter Five: Interest Groups 87 The further development of the literature of political science explores with increasingly greater sophistication and alarm the actual effect of groups. The effect is not, as Tocqueville surmised, the empowerment of the common man as his participation in groups makes him an effective participant of the political system, but, rather, to solidify the dominant position of those who are already afÀuent and inÀuential. Evaluating the celebrated idea of American µµpluralism,’’ which heralds the role of groups as, in the words of David Truman, the µµbalance wheel in a going political system like that of the United States,’’ (1951, pp. 514), and E. E. Schattschneider lamented, µµThe Àaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent’’ (1960/1975, p. 34-35). Theodore J. Lowi decried the inÀuence of special-interest groups in American policy-making as a distortion of democratic decision-making that he called µµinterest-group liberalism’’ (1979, p. 50). Even though groups of various kinds tend to promote the interests of the wealthy, their insatiable appetite for funds causes them to solicit dues and donations from people of modest means. These groups certainly include political parties, ideological groups, and election candidates’ campaign committees. While, to be sure, political leaders tend to be wealthier than the average American, they send desperate solicitations to the masses to send money lest their political opponents inÀict irreversible damage on the United States. The solicitations, written by shrewd fund-raisers, contain shrill, disingenuous messages to alarm and inÀame the recipients, who proceed to write checks as donations to the organizations. Undoubtedly, an immediate effect of these transactions is to transfer wealth from lowermiddle and middle-class Americans to wealthier political operatives and fund-raising professionals. Most vulnerable to these appeals are elderly citizens, who, confronted by the question, µµWhat kind of country are we going to leave for our children and grandchildren?’’ write generous checks that they can often ill afford. Even the most casual observer can see that this economic activity has done little to create a better country, but it certainly has depleted the resources of working-class and retired Americans somewhat while it has allowed the organizations’ managers to prosper. In addition, this upper-class µµaccent’’ leans in a clearly corporate direction. This leaning can be demonstrated by examining the spending done by lobbyists at the federal level. Compiling data from the U.S. Senate Of¿ce of Public Records, OpenSecrets.org ranked various 88 The Basics of American Government sectors of society by how much they spent on lobbying (see http://www. opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear 2012 indexType c). In 2012, de¿nably corporate sectors—agribusiness, communications/electronics, construction, defense contractors, energy, ¿nance/insurance/real estate, health (dominated by pharmaceutical companies), lawyers/lobbyists, transportation, and other business interests—spent approximately $3 billion on lobbying while non-corporate interests—ideological, singleissue (e.g., environmental, human rights, social issues), labor, education, public sector, and religious interests—spent less than $500 million. In other words, corporate interests spent about six times as much as did noncorporate interests. &ase 6tud\ 7Ke 1onpro¿t 6ector Where the divergence between the mythology and the reality is widest probably involves the nonpro¿t sector, which encompasses educational, cultural, and religious organizations and a countless array of charities. The national, state, and local governments generously subsidize the activities of these organizations by exempting them from the payment of income, property, and sales taxes. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code even permits donors to most of these organizations to deduct their donations when they calculate the amount of income on which they must pay taxes. Americans are then inundated with appeals to give, give, give. These appeals come in the mail, they are delivered by e-mail, and they are communicated incessantly by television and radio stations and newspapers. Much less frequently, the news media get around to reporting about the unattractive activities and behaviors that are common in the nonpro¿t sector, such as the generous salaries that many nonpro¿t executives draw. In 1992, William Aramony, president of the United Way of America, resigned under pressure when the news media ¿nally revealed that he µµwas earning $463,000 a year in salary and other bene¿ts, was Àying ¿rst class on commercial airlines, had occasionally booked Àights on the supersonic Concorde and avoided cabs in favor of limousines.’’ As Aramony arranged, the United Way µµcreated and helped ¿nance several taxable spin-off organizations that provided travel, bulk purchasing and other services to local chapters. One of these companies acquired a $430,000 condominium in Manhattan and a $125,000 apartment in Coral Gables, Fla., for business use by Aramony and his associates’’ (Duffy, 2001). But these revelations Chapter Five: Interest Groups 89 usually reach the public only when the greedy conduct has become grotesque, as it did in Aramony’s case supposedly because, according to his lawyer, his cancer and brain atrophy impaired his judgment. After the journalists do their civic duty of reporting these scandals on rare occasions, their television and radio stations and newspapers go back to their routine of promoting the charities and imploring viewers, listeners, and readers to give away as much of their money as they can be persuaded to donate. This occurs even though the journalists, their editors, and the corporate owners who employ them know very well that the charities they are promoting are run by executives who are living very comfortably on the salaries that the donations are ¿nancing. Consider the case of the annual µµtelethons’’ that supported the Muscular Dystrophy Association from the 1950s through 2010. In each television µµmarket,’’ one television station agreed to donate about 21 hours of its air time beginning on the evening before Labor Day for the speci¿c purpose of continuously soliciting the public for donations. Repeatedly, during the national broadcast hosted by MDA national chair Jerry Lewis and during the occasional presentations from the studio of the local television station featuring the station’s news anchors and weather and sports reporters, the viewers’ attention was drawn to a scoreboard that appeared to tally the viewers’ pledges. At the end of the telethon, the scoreboard displayed a total amount in excess of $60 million. The perception the pledge total grew gradually over the 21-hour broadcast undoubtedly incited many viewers to call in a pledge. 1one of the Mournalists involved in this spectacle thought it was newsworthy to report that, in fact, most of the $60 million had already been raised before the telethon went on the air, despite the fact that the µµtote board’’ falsely showed a beginning amount that was negligible or even zero when the broadcast began. MDA executives fed the pre-telethon donations into the µµtote board’’ gradually over the course of the 21-hour begging marathon to create the illusion that the viewers’ interaction with the telethon activity was causing the donation total to build along with the nail-biting excitement (Bakal, 1979, pp. 354-360). MDA’s president claimed $402,000 of the organization’s 2008 revenue for his salary. Put another way, the $25 donations of 16,080 donors to the MDA that year were needed to pay for the president’s salary. The question must arise: What possible motivation does a wage-earner who earns $50,000 per year have to donate $25 to the MDA in order to pay 1/16,080th of the president’s 90 The Basics of American Government generous salary? But such individuals do make these donations, making one suspect that the donors do not have enough information to make an informed, rational decision. While television, radio, and newspaper personalities like Atlanta’s Clark Howard explain to viewers, listeners, and readers how to practice the vigilance of caveat emptor (µµlet the buyer beware’’) in their purchasing transactions, these communication outlets contrarily plead with the public to give their money away spontaneously and injudiciously to charities. The result of this relentless manipulation is that Americans, chronically, are too gullible to make intelligent decisions concerning charity. Charities and religious organizations (such as those that sponsor television broadcasts hosted by such televangelists as the Rev. Pat Robertson) have manipulated countless elderly people to provide their bank-account numbers so that the organizations can debit their accounts monthly (an exploitation that their adult children often discover only when the elderly parents become enfeebled or die). A group of journalists and academic researchers conducted a study to determine just how gullible Americans might be when they are solicited for charitable donations (Bakal, 1979, pp. 289290). The group set up fund-raising tables in front of stores, with jugs for the collection of money and signs identifying charities (however, the charities were the results of the researchers’ fertile imaginations and sense of humor). Shoppers stopped at the tables and deposited money into the jugs to help these nonexistent charities: µµHeroin Fund for Addicts.’’ µµAmerican Communist Refugee Fund’’ µµNational Society for Twinkletoed Children.’’ A fund to µµHelp Buy Rustproof Switchblades for Juvenile Delinquents.’’ t
µµNational Growth Foundation for African Pygmies.’’ t
µµThe Fund for the Widow of the Unknown Soldier’’ (Bakal, 1979, pp. 289-290) t
t
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The nonpro¿t sector, sometimes referred to by economists as the µµThird Sector’’ of the economy, appears to be a collection of needy little organizations struggling to help poor and sick people. Actually, the U.S. nonpro¿t sector is a formidable economic engine, accounting in 2006 µµfor 5 percent of GDP, 8 percent of the economy’s wages, and nearly 10 Chapter Five: Interest Groups 91 percent of jobs’’ (Urban Institute, n.d.). The term µµnonpro¿t’’ suggests that the organizations are living hand to mouth and giving away their revenues as quickly as they receive them, but nothing could be further from the truth. The term µµnonpro¿t’’ merely means that the organizations have no owners (such as proprietors or stockholders) who anticipate pro¿t. Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code or other statutes prohibits a µµnonpro¿t’’ organizations from collecting more revenue than it expends for programs. It just calls the difference a µµsurplus.’’ As Bennett and DiLorenzo (1994) report, organizations like the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association, which plead for donations in solicitations that claim the urgent need to help patients and fund vital research, have on hand in their investment accounts at any given time an amount of money equivalent to an entire year’s revenue. This they can use later on to build more impressive of¿ce buildings containing of¿ce suites suitable for their executives. If all of these charitable organizations are combined with other nonpro¿t (although not tax-exempt) organizations, such as business and political interest groups, we are examining a mammoth economic complex that collects much of the nation’s wealth, provides generous salaries and bene¿ts to its leadership and management, and redistributes wealth in various directions. Far from being a mechanism that takes from the haves and gives to the have-nots, the nonpro¿t sector inconspicuously redistributes wealth from the working class to the wealthy with surprising frequency, as it does when it collects a donation from a working-class individual and uses it to pay a salary of hundreds of thousands of dollars to a charity executive. The tax-deductibility provision of Section 501(c)(3) often has this effect as well. When afÀuent individuals make $10,000 donations to art museums, they deduct the $10,000 from their taxable income when they ¿le their income-tax returns. The effect of the deduction is that wealthy taxpayers may reduce their tax payment by, say, $4000. This is $4000 that would otherwise go into the public treasury to fund such programs as children and family services. The government has given them the $4000 bene¿t, even though their donations went to a museum whose visitors are almost all similarly wealthy people. How many working-class people go to a museum? Likewise, consider a $10,000 donation from an afÀuent alumnus of Harvard University to the university’s endowment. Harvard University’s endowment stands at $25 billion. Now, after the donation is made, Harvard 92 The Basics of American Government University has an endowment of $25,000,010,000 to support the education of upper-class children, and the government sacri¿ces $4000 of revenue to fund such programs as children and family services. The rich-get-richer phenomenon is clearly alive and well. Many of these organizations invite ordinary people to enroll as members, which involves a payment of membership dues. The member may receive a membership card as an acknowledgment of the payment. In most organizations, the award of µµmembership’’ is a meaningless gesture. The governing documents of most national organizations restrict actual voting and decision-making to a small group, such as a board of directors. Some organizations have as few as three members of the decision-making board. The members of the board of a charity do not receive any pay. They will, however, usually ratify the recommendations of the paid executive, a person with a title such as president, executive vice president, or executive director. The ordinary donors who possess membership cards tend to get no vote at all. This is the clear pattern of national organizations: The organizations appeal to the masses of supporters to give and give and give, but have no particular interest in the supporters’ opinions about how the organization ought to be run. It is not unusual that the founder of such an organization will develop the organization’s governing documents to disenfranchise the supporting masses from the outset. However, if the founder happens to have a democratic orientation, her successors will inevitably conform to Michels’ µµiron law of oligarchy’’ by adjusting the governing documents to con¿ne decision-making to a select few. A charity’s ¿eld volunteers (as distinguished from the volunteer board members)—i.e., those individuals who have been attracted to the charity to provide labor without pay—will usually discover in a short period of time that their opinions about how the organization should operate are unwanted. Attempts by such individuals to affect policy-making will often be met with a ¿rm rebuke and, at the extreme, excommunication, as this chapter’s co-author, Barry D. Friedman, experienced and reported in his 1997 exposp entitled, µµCracking Down on Red Cross 9olunteers: How American Red Cross Of¿cials Crushed an Insurrection by Agitated, Mistreated 9olunteers in Northeast Georgia.’’ In trying to address mistreatment of Red Cross volunteers in White County, Ga., Friedman sought information about the organization’s governing bodies, which Red Cross managers refused to divulge. Instead, they terminated his 9½-year- Chapter Five: Interest Groups 93 long volunteer af¿liation. Friedman concluded: µµ. . . [T]he Red Cross wants your money, unpaid labor, blood, and bone marrow but for its part it prefers to operate in secrecy and to be governed by committees shrouded in anonymity’’ (See http://faculty.northgeorgia.edu/bfriedman/studies/ REDXcd.htm, or log in to the textbook website at http://www.upng.org/ amergovt/ and go to the Chapter 5 Documents section.) Objections to the activities of the nonpro¿t sector are also expressed by business people in the pro¿t-making sector when they ¿nd themselves in competition with nonpro¿t organizations that are invading their markets. One of the most visible examples of a nonpro¿t organization competing with the pro¿t-making sector is the sale of Girl Scout cookies. The Girl Scouts sell cookies with a total annual sale of $700 million. This amount is about 9 percent of the total American market for cookies, estimated at $6 billion per year. Competing companies such as Keebler (now a subsidiary of the Kellogg Company) have to compete head-on with the scouts, but the scouts have two impressive advantages: (a) the fact that the Girl Scouts do not have to pay taxes and (b) the fact that the Girl Scouts do not have to pay the sales force! This competition is most de¿nitely not on a level playing ¿eld. Testing laboratories for electrical devices complain about the tax-exempt status of their nonpro¿t competitor, Underwriters Laboratories, asking how they are supposed to compete fairly (in terms of pricing) with an enterprise for which taxes are not a cost of doing business. In conclusion, far from being a humble segment of American society and the indefatigable source of relief for the poor, the massive assortment of interest groups, charities, and other associations has proved to be most effective in promoting the interests of the inÀuential, mostly well-to-do people who control and manage them. 7Ke InÀuence oI *roups in 3ublic 3olic\maNing Lobbying Countless interest groups have been established to inÀuence public policymaking in the national government. If you plan to visit Washington, D.C., consider taking a walk along K Street. Enter the buildings, and look at the list of groups that appear on each building’s directory. You will notice that a lot of the groups that occupy space in the buildings are called µµAmerican BBBBBB Association’’ and µµCenter for BBBBBBB.’’ These groups have set up shop in the nation’s capital to lobby Congress and 94 The Basics of American Government other government of¿cials and to obtain public policies that will bene¿t or satisfy them. Of course, maintaining an of¿ce in Washington and staf¿ng it are costly matters, so that the upper class is disproportionately represented in this competition to inÀuence policymaking. The business community is amply engaged at numerous points of contact in this frenzy of lobbying activity. One of the challenges facing these groups is knowing how to play the game. All the money, expertise, and effort a group has may go to waste if they do not know the whos, hows, and whens of lobbying. To assist them, an entire community of professional lobbying ¿rms also line K Street. These ¿rms are not dedicated to any causes—their value lies in both their knowledge of the policy process and (more importantly) their connections to it. They are populated with highly paid former members of Congress and ex-congressional and Executive Branch staffers. What makes these people so valuable is their knowledge of the process and especially their connections to current members of the Legislative and Executive Branches. A former member of Congress has access to many places in the Capitol to which others do not. This advantage gives them a chance to buttonhole current members that ordinary interest-group members do not have. The µµrevolving door’’ of legislators and staffers going from government to lobbying ¿rms (and back again) has become a regular feature in Washington, D. C. The high price of these professional lobbyists also limits their availability to upper-class and corporate clients. LOBBYISTS HELPING LOBBYISTS: Sometimes, interests and their lobbies form unlikely allies. T.R. Reid (1980) describes a situation in the late 1970s in which railroad lines and environmentalists both favored a waterway user charge for barge lines and opposed funding to rebuild a major Mississippi River Lock and Dam in Alton, Ill. The environmentalists were concerned about the ecological impact while the railroads were battling a competitor in the transportation business. The railroad companies were Àush with lobbying cash while the environmentalists were not (see the earlier discussion of the free-rider problem). Yet railroads were hesitant to spend a lot for fear of being dismissed as a self-interested competitor with a ¿nancial stake. They thought that environmental lobbying could have a greater impact because these groups had no direct ¿nancial or business interest in the policies. However, the railroads could not contribute funds Chapter Five: Interest Groups 95 directly to the environmentalists because they were as big (if not bigger) polluters as were the barge lines. Environmental groups would not take their money. The railroads’ chief lobbyist got an idea. +e conMured, out of thin air, a new organization, for which he created a name (The Council for a Sound Waterways Policy), an address (a vacant of¿ce down the hall in the Western Railroads Building), and a bank account. Each month he transferred some money from the railroads’ lobbying fund to the Council, and the Council, in turn, transferred a monthly grant to environmental groups lobbying for waterway charges and against the Alton proMect... For the environmental groups, this arrangement was Must right. They could continue their work without ever acknowledging that they were accepting money from a maMor polluter. (Reid, 1980, pp. 50-1) The funding for the non-corporate environmentalists was now coming in large part from a major corporate interest. So, the corporate bias discussed earlier is likely even greater than the data may indicate. Interest Groups in the Iron Triangle Truman (1951) maintained that interest groups have an extensive inÀuence in public policymaking in the United States (see a detailed description of his analysis in Chapter 12). Another analysis is widely known among scholars and students in the ¿eld of political science. This analysis features the µµsubgovernment model of public policy.’’ Cater and Freeman discussed this theory in their 1964 and 1965 works, respectively. This subgovernment model states that, in each area of public policy, there is a subgovernment that dominates policymaking in that policy area. The famous illustration of subgovernment is the iron triangle (see Figure 5.1). For example, in the policy area of agriculture, the partners in the iron triangle are as follows: congressional committees, the standing Agriculture Committees; executive agency, the Department of Agriculture; and interest groups, the American Farm Bureau Federation, among others. The theory is that these partners take control of policymaking in the policy area of agriculture, while other of¿cials and citizens pay little attention to the making of agricultural policy. 96 The Basics of American Government Meanwhile, other iron triangles dominate policymaking in other areas. In the policy area of veterans’ bene¿ts, the partners are as follows: congressional committees, the standing 9eterans’ Affairs Committees; executive agency, the Department of 9eterans Affairs; and interest groups, the American Legion, the 9eterans of Foreign Wars, and others. Again, these partners take control of policymaking in the policy area of veterans’ bene¿ts, while the partners in the agriculture iron triangle pay little attention to the making of veterans’-bene¿ts policy. If this model is accurate—and many political scientists have found it to be very persuasive over the years—the motivation of people to establish and operate interest groups becomes perfectly clear. Participating in an irontriangle partnership can be extraordinarily bene¿cial for the partners, while those who are not involved in these mutually bene¿cial arrangements are condemned to pay the taxes that ¿nance the bene¿ts that the iron-triangle partners are enjoying. No enterprising individual or group will be content for very long to be left out of the process by which the pie is divided and the pieces are distributed to those who are actively playing the game. Chapter Five: Interest Groups 97 Interest Groups and Litigation Many groups—notably publicinterest groups—set out to inÀuence policy by going µµover the heads’’ of the president and Congress, and ¿ling lawsuits in the judiciary. This tactic accounts for much of the inÀuence that public-interest lawyer Ralph Nader and his µµPublic Citizen’’ publicinterest law ¿rms have been able to exert. While Nader’s interests have been far-reaching, he is best known as an activist for consumer protection. For example, when in 1972 Nader was µµbumped’’ from a Àight that Allegheny Airlines (the forerunner of U. S. Air) had deliberately overbooked, Nader retaliated against the airline by ¿ling a lawsuit in the case of Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976), accusing the airline of concealing its policy of overbooking. Nader collected $25,000 in punitive damages, as did an organization of his creation—the Connecticut Citizens’ Action Group—whose meeting Nader, the would-be guest speaker, was unable to address when Allegheny refused to board him. Today, of course, an airline will do anything within its power to ¿nd µµvolunteers’’ who are willing to give up their seats to ticket-holders whose travel plans are inÀexible. Many policies in the areas of consumer protection, worker protection, environmental protection, and so forth have come about through litigation ¿led by interest groups. Delegations of Raw Government Power Congress and the state legislatures sometimes delegate raw government power to certain kinds of interest groups. This occurrence happens most commonly when one of these legislatures empowers a professional association of some kind to determine who will be licensed to practice the profession. Often . . . the exercise of licensing powers is delegated to ‘‘private’’ associations, even though the coercive power involved is that of a state. In the clearest case of this sort an association receives direct delegation; in other cases professional or trade associations are given the power to nominate personnel, virtually as a form of representation, to of¿cial licensing boards (bar associations, for example) and, on occasion, to policy-making boards. (McConnell, 1967, p. 147) 98 The Basics of American Government The licensing power is an extremely signi¿cant form of inÀuence over economic activity. For example, the American Bar Association has a keen interest in the licensing of lawyers and the accreditation of law schools, for such reasons as erecting barriers to entry into the profession in order to limit competition and sustain the levels of their fees. McConnell writes: The practice of giving public authority—sometimes formally but often in practice—to private associations of professionals is quite old. As early as 1859 the North Carolina legislature enacted that ‘‘the association of regularly graduated physicians . . . is hereby declared to be a body politic and corporate,’’ with ‘‘power to appoint the body of medical examiners.’’ (1967, p. 188) While one might ¿nd the licensing of physicians and dentists to have some justi¿cation as a method of protecting the public from incompetent practitioners, the practice of licensing, often controlled by the members of the profession and trade, extends into a variety of ¿elds for questionable reasons. . . . [T]he list of activities frequently given state authority to regulate the quali¿cations of their members also includes barbers, hairdressers (‘‘cosmetologists’’), dry cleaners, funeral directors, cemetery salesmen, and many others. Even garage mechanics have attempted to gain such standing. Clearly, protection of the Mob market, which has been behind much trade unionism, forms a large part of the motivation to establish under state authority licensing systems effectively controlled by members of a given vocation. (McConnell, 1967, p. 189) Going Public, Grassroots, and ‘‘Astroturf’’ Legislators may or may not listen directly to interest groups (who may sometimes be discounted or dismissed as unrepresentative of the general population), but they will frequently listen to public opinion. The quest for reelection means constantly pleasing the voters. Recognizing this idea, many groups attempt to inÀuence public opinion in addition to trying to directly inÀuence government. In the age of modern media, µµgoing public’’—as it is often called—is an increasingly popular strategy that may take several forms: Chapter Five: Interest Groups t
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99 Advertising: Trade and issue groups will try to build a favorable public image through advertising. One of the more successful ad campaigns is the dairy industry’s µµGot Milk?’’ ads (e.g., see http://www.gotmilk.com/). Look carefully at the ads. They are not designed to sell one company’s brand of milk. They are designed to build support for the overall dairy industry. Their hope is that these ads will pressure governments to support policies favorable to a µµpopular’’ industry. Other ad campaigns may involve more naked attempts to pressure governments for favorable action. In 2010, the National Association of Manufacturers (http://www. nam.org) ran a series of ads to pressure the federal government into enacting tax policies favorable to their industry. Their ads raised the specter of job losses and other calamities if Congress did not do what they wanted (see: http://www.nam.org/Special/ Energy-Tax-Ads/Landing.aspx).In addition to broad advertising, groups may try to build support with narrower direct mail or E-mail campaigns in which they obtain lists of customer addresses from companies that they believe their potential supporters will patronize (e.g., if you subscribe to the Wall Street Journal, you are a good target for business, Republican-leaning, and conservative groups), and send out information to those customers. Letters, phone calls, and E-mails: As they build favorable public opinion, groups will also encourage supporters to take action. One of the simplest forms of action is to have supporters contact government of¿cials by mail, phone, or E-mail. The New York branch of the AIDS policy organization ACT-UP explains the value of letter-writing campaigns: Letter-writing and post card campaigns, like phone and fax zaps, are a direct means of letting public of¿cials and others know how you feel about a particular issue and what you want them to do. Like phone calls, they are counted and often used by politicians or agency heads to Mustify their actions. Without taking personal responsibility, they can then claim they were ‘‘responding to their constituencies.’’ (ACT-UP New York, 2000) 100 The Basics of American Government t
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Notice ACT-UP’s suggestion that this kind of contact not only helps pressure government of¿cials into action, but also provides them with some cover as well. Phone calls and E-mails work much the same way. Rallies and protests: As with letters, phone calls, and E-mails, rallies and protests are a way of turning public support into action. They are often used by groups with fewer resources, as the main costs—time, transportation, bullhorns, and hand-signs—are much less expensive than media ads, billboards, and professional lobbyists. The purpose of most rallies and protests is to gain both the attention of government of¿cials and the news media in the hopes of building further support for a cause. It should also be noted that, in many instances, these gatherings provide as much of a cathartic experience for their participants as anything else. WISCONSIN UNION PROTESTS—AN EXAMPLE: In February 2011, the governor of Wisconsin and a supportive legislative majority were poised to quickly enact legislation curtailing the collective-bargaining rights of many state employees. Union members representing state teachers and other employees quickly Àocked to the state capitol to protest the proposal, and thousands of protesters (and counter-protesters supporting the governor) ¿lled the capital (Reiss, 2011). With lawmakers opposed to the legislation deliberately out of state to prevent formal action on the bill, the protests continued for weeks. Similar protests erupted in other states considering legislation curbing union rights (McPhee, 2011). ‘‘Grassroots’’ and its evil twin, ‘‘Astroturf’’: Sometimes the public seemingly will act on its own, with little or no aid from organizing groups. This type of spontaneity is known as grassroots activity (as in, from the bottom up). Grassroots activity generally consists of the letters, phone calls, E-mails, rallies, and protests described above. New laws or proposed legislation may energize people to contact their legislators in support or opposition. They may gather in public to protest, as did many of the public employees in Wisconsin. Interest groups may encourage these activities or use them as a springboard to their own activities. Chapter Five: Interest Groups 101 Grassroots activities may appear to be democracy at its purest— but sometimes appearances can be deceiving. Knowing the value of public opinion to lawmakers, interest groups may try to arti¿cially generate activity that appears to be grassroots. That is, what look like grassroots letter-writing campaigns or spontaneous protests may actually be carefully planned and orchestrated by interest groups. These activities have been derisively (but not inaccurately) referred to as µµAstroturf’’ (get it? fake grass!). In a 1996 PBS documentary, Hedrick Smith interviews the head of a professional public-relations ¿rm that generates these kinds of campaigns (Smith, 1996): HEDRICK SMITH [9OICE O9ER]: Usually, business is targeting congress. JACK BONNER/PRES., BONNER & ASSOCIATES: They want 100 phone calls, 20 calls into a senator, 25 letters, 200 letters to a particular member of the House. SMITH: So you have 300 phone lines, that means you can have 300 people out of here at one time? BONNER: The biggest thing we ever did we were doing six thousand patch through phone calls a day to the Hill. HEDRICK SMITH [9OICE O9ER]: Patch through phone calls are a hot item for Bonner and leading edge lobbyists. Bonner’s staff phones ordinary citizens, sells them on a client’s issue, and when successful, immediately patches the call through to their senator or house member, while the mood is hot. SMITH: If they’re on the side of the issue your client wants, they get patched through? BONNER: Right. SMITH: if they’re on the other side of the issue, what happens to them? BONNER: What’s your guess? SMITH: They get dropped. BONNER: That’s right. [Source: http://www.hedricksmith.com/site_powergame/ ¿les/uneltrans.html.] 102 The Basics of American Government So be wary. What appears to be grassroots activity may be democracy at its purest—or it may be Astroturf at its most arti¿cial! Groups and Election Campaigns One way in which groups may increase their chances of obtaining favorable policies is to help put the µµright’’ people in of¿ce in the ¿rst place by getting involved in election campaigns. The further bene¿t of this is that of¿cials who arguably owe their election to groups’ support may feel gratitude for that support. This gratitude, in turn, may inÀuence their policy positions in ways bene¿cial to the groups. The most common electoral strategy is campaign spending. This spending may take the forms of either contributions to parties and candidates or direct spending in support of candidates. To address the concern among many Progressives in the early 1900s that politicians were µµbought’’ by corporate money, the 1907 Tillman Act outlawed corporate campaign contributions. The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act also outlawed laborunion contributions. In addition to those laws, many others in the ¿rst half of the twentieth century established a patchwork of regulations on money in elections. Following the 1968 presidential election and in the midst of the 1972 election and the Watergate scandal, there was still public concern regarding the inÀuence of wealthy individuals and groups over elections. Congress enacted a set of laws known as the Federal Election Campaign Acts (FECA) in the early 1970s to t
t
t
t
t
t
Set strict limits on individual and group contributions to parties and candidates. Require the public reporting of contributions. Require groups to register with the federal government before they can contribute. Limit the spending of presidential and congressional candidates. Set up a system of public funding for presidential elections. Create an independent agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), to administer and enforce the regulations. See Chapter 6 for more details on the FECA. Political Action Committees While law forbids corporations and unions from contributing to candidates’ campaign committees, the FECA formalized their members’ Chapter Five: Interest Groups 103 ability to create political action committees (PACs) for the purpose of raising money to contribute to campaigns. These PACs (the legislation actually refers to them as µµmulti-candidate committees’’) must register with the FEC before they can raise and contribute money, and they are limited to contributing a maximum of $5,000 per candidate, per election. To qualify as a PAC, they must support at least ¿ve candidates. The number of PACs has grown dramatically, from fewer than 1,000 in the mid-1970s to over 4,000 today, with the bulk of that increase coming in trade association and non-connected (ideological and issue-oriented) PACs (Federal Election Commission, 2009a). Consistent with the upperclass and corporate biases discussed earlier, the greatest amount of spending on campaigns by far comes from corporate and trade-association PACs. FEC data from 2006 indicate that corporate and trade-association PACs spent more than twice as much as labor and non-connected PACs combined (Federal Election Commission, 2009b). FOLLOW THE MONEY: PACs differ in their goals and strategies. Paul Herrnson (2008) describes three different PAC strategies: access, ideological, and mixed. The bottom-line goal of access PACs is to inÀuence legislation. They like winners, so they contribute most often to incumbents and to sympathetic candidates in close elections (where the extra money may make the difference). They do not wish to waste resources on challengers with little chance of getting elected. Most corporations pursue an access-oriented strategy. Ideological PACs wish µµto increase the number of legislators who share their broad political perspective or position on speci¿c, often emotionally charged issues...’’ (Herrnson, 2008, p. 141). Most of their contributions go to sympathetic candidates in close elections, but they are far more likely than access PACs to contribute to sympathetic challengers as well. Most non-connected (issue or ideological) PACs pursue this strategy. PACs pursuing a mixed strategy will make some contributions to candidates sharing their views, and some contributions to incumbents µµto improve their access to legislators’’ (Herrnson, 2008, p. 143). Most unions pursue a mixed strategy. Beyond PACs: ‘‘Soft Money’’, 527 Groups, and ‘‘Super PACs’’ Restrictions placed on political-party spending by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 (see Chapter 6) opened the way for 104 The Basics of American Government vastly increased spending by groups in recent elections. The law restricted the ability of parties to raise and spend unregulated µµsoft money,’’ and restricted their ability to run µµissue ads.’’ However, no such restrictions were placed on interest groups. Party activists, now restricted by BCRA, simply shifted their activity to outside groups. Given the exponentially growing costs of campaigns, PACs were not an attractive alternative, given their $5000-per-candidate, per-election limitation. Activists found their answer in tax-exempt µµ527’’ groups (named for Section 527 of the Internal Revenue code). These groups are technically not allowed to engage in campaign activity. However, FEC and court decisions established that soft money and issue ads do not amount to campaign activity as long as they do not expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates. What seals the deal is that these decisions also said that candidate names and images could be used in soft-money-funded issue ads without violating the campaign restriction. In recent years, whole new classes of groups have formed to keep interests involved in the big-money world of modern campaigns. The latest creation is the µµSuper PAC.’’ These are of¿cially known as independent expenditure-only committees, and they may raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and individuals, then spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against political candidates. Super PACs must, however, report their donors to the Federal Election Commission on a monthly or quarterly basis—the Super PAC’s choice—as a traditional PAC would. Unlike traditional PACs, super PACs are prohibited from donating money directly to political candidates. (OpenSecrets.org, 2011) In addition, the restrictions placed on corporations (and presumably unions) have been upended by the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (130 S.Ct. 876). The Court said that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend money from their own treasuries to expressly support the election or defeat of candidates, which the BCRA had forbidden (though they are still forbidden from contributing to campaigns, and their members’ PACs still face contribution limits). Chapter Five: Interest Groups 105 Other Activities While spending dominates the election-related activity of interest groups, there are other ways in which members may get involved. Group members may volunteer their time and effort to candidates. Supportive candidates may recruit volunteers for groups to help with information and get-outthe-vote (GOT9) activities. This often involves staf¿ng phone banks, or operating computers, or stuf¿ng envelopes. Given their place among the workforce, union members are especially able to help candidates they support by going door-to-door throughout their communities, encouraging residents to vote for their candidates. Other Forms of Participation The participation of individuals and groups in public life extends well beyond the activities of interest groups. For a discussion of other forms of civic participation, see Chapter 15. Discussion Questions 1. Discuss the history of interest groups. Why do they exist at all? 2. Tocqueville said that America is a nation of joiners. What did he mean? Investigate other nations to see if they differ from the United States. 3. Contact a local interest group or the local chapter of a larger group. A number of groups may be found at this site: http://www. twyman-whitney.com/americancitizen/links/lobbies.htm. What are their goals? What are their strategies for achieving those goals? 4. Examine the data on the µµrevolving door’’ by going to the OpenSecrets.org Web site. Under the µµInÀuence & Lobbying’’ menu, click on µµRevolving Door.’’ On the left-hand menu, click on µµLobbying Firms,’’ and select one of the ¿rms. You will see a list of their lobbyists. Examine the lobbyists’ employment timeline and history. In addition, there are tabs for information on the industries they represent and their expertise. Examine several lobbyists’ pro¿les. What do you see? Did they spend time in government service before their current employment as a lobbyist? If so, explore their time in government. Does it appear related to their expertise and/or their clients? Can you make the case that their past government work constitutes a current asset to their lobbying work? 106 The Basics of American Government References ACT-UP New York. (2000). Letter Campaigns. Accessed February 22, 2011, at http://www.actupny.org/documents/LW.html. Bakal, C. (1979). Charity U.S.A. New York, NY: Times Books. Bennett, J. T. & DiLorenzo, T. J. (1994). Unhealthy charities: Hazardous to your health and wealth. New York, NY: Basic Books. Cater, D. (1964). Power in Washington. New York, NY: Random House. de Tocqueville, A. (1945). Democracy in America. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. Federal Election Commission. (2009a). Number of Federal PACs Increases [Press release]. Accessed February 23, 2011 from http://www.fec. gov/press/press2009/20090309PACcount.shtml. _____. (2009b). PACs Grouped by Total Contributions to Candidates —2005-2006 [Press release]. Accessed February 23, 2011 from http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090415PAC/documents/ 7groupbycontrib2006.pdf. Freeman, J. L. (1965). The political process. New York, NY: Random House. Herrnson, Paul. S. (2008). Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington. 5th ed. Washington, D. C.: CQ Press. Lowi, T. J. (1979). The end of liberalism: Ideology, policy, and the crisis of public authority. (2nd ed.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton. Madison, J. (1788/2001). The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection. The Federalist. G. W. Carey & J. McClellan (Eds.). Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. McConnell, G. (1966). Private power and American democracy. New York, NY: Albert A. Knopf. Chapter Five: Interest Groups 107 McPhee, E. (2011, February 22). Union Disputes Spread to Indiana, Ohio. RealClearPolitics. Accessed February 23, 2011, at http:// realclearpolitics.blogs.time.com/2011/02/22/union-disputes-spreadto-indiana-ohio/. Michels, R. (1911). Political parties: A sociological study on the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr. Olson, Mancur. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. _____. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. OpenSecrets.org. (2011). Super PACs. Accessed February 23, 2011, at http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php?cycle 2010. Reid, T.R. (1980). Congressional Odyssey: The Saga of a Senate Bill. New York: W.H. Freeman & Company. Reiss, D. (2011, February 21). With Wisconsin’s Protesters: A Cold Night in Madison. Time. Accessed February 22, 2011, at http://www.time. com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052884,00.html. Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics 36(November): 387-389. Schattschneider, E. E. (1960/1975). The semisovereign people: A realist’s view of democracy in America. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden Press. Smith, Hedrick (producer). (1996). The Unelected: The Media & The Lobbies. The People & The Power Game. PBS. Online transcript accessed February 22, 2011, at http://www.hedricksmith.com/ site_powergame/¿les/uneltrans.html. Truman, D. B. (1951). The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion. New York, NY: Albert A. Knopf. Urban Institute. (2010). Nonpro¿ts. Accessed February 18, 2011, at http:// www.urban.org/nonpro¿ts/index.cfm. Chapter Six Political Parties, Voting, and Elections Carl D. Cavalli Learning Objectives After covering the topic of political parties, voting, and elections, students should understand: 1. The evolution, organization, and functions of the two major political parties. 2. The role of µµthird¶¶ or µµminor¶¶ parties and the hurdles the\ face in our system. 3. The history of suffrage in America and the rules governing registration, voting, and elections. 4. The prominent role of money in contemporary elections. Abstract As noted in chapters 1 and 2, our government is a democratic republic, and the centerpiece of all such governments are elections in which eligible voters select candidates to represent them. The organizing of voter preferences through political parties is central to the electoral concept. Not only did the framers not foresee this, but they were actually hostile1 to the concept. This lack of foresight may have been their biggest failure. A strong case may be made that our two-party system traces its roots to the nation’s founding. This system is sustained by our most common electoral rules: single-member district, plurality (or ‘‘SMDP’’) rules. Not only do these rules affect our party system, but there is strong evidence that they can affect the outcome of individual elections. Other rules affecting elections include campaign ¿nance regulations. Introduction Political parties seek to control government through elections. As such, their existence is closely tied to the electoral process. Political Parties What is a political party? It is an organization that selects candidates for of¿ce to represent the party¶s ideals, conducts election campaigns to get their candidates into of¿ce, and organizes government to facilitate 1 See especially Federalist # 10 (http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_10.html) as well as George Washington¶s farewell address (http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc 1 page transcript). 110 The Basics of American Government achievement of its goals. Selection includes recruiting (searching for and encouraging) candidates to run, and then conducting a nominating process to formally select a nominee among all competing candidates. In election campaigns, parties provide services (e.g., advertising, polling) for their nominees, and will also encourage turnout to support them. Examples of organization include majority party leadership in Congress (see chapter 7) or state legislatures, and presidential or gubernatorial appointments to the executive and judicial branches (see chapter 8). All of this is toward the goal of implementing a broad policy agenda. In addition, political party labels serve as µµcues,¶¶ or shortcuts to help us as voters decide whom to support in elections. Unlike other multi-party democracies, we have sustained a system of two major parties for most of our history. This fact is interesting because the framers did not anticipate their formation. Indeed, they were actively hostile to the idea. James Madison devotes Federalist #10 to a discussion of controlling the effects of factions. +e de¿ned a faction as µµa number of citizens...united...by some common impulse of passion, or of interest...’’—a de¿nition in which all modern interpreters include political parties (Madison, 1787). Additionally, in his farewell address as president, George Washington warned us µµagainst the baneful effects of the spirit of party.’’ However, the formation of political parties was in the air, and that air portended two political parties from the start. Every major issue surrounding the formation of the government provoked two opposing sides: national versus state power, commerce versus agriculture, North versus South, and when it came down to it, pro-Constitution versus antiConstitution. Moreover, these were not random divisions. Those on one side of any issue tended to be consistently on the same side of each of the other issues. Two big factions. Elections Why conduct elections? With elections, we can reward elected of¿cials who appear to serve us well (by re-electing them to of¿ce), and punish elected of¿cials who fail to serve us well (by kicking them out). That is, we can hold them responsible for their actions. This ability also provides the public with a sense of inÀuence (as debated in chapter 1). One might actually make the case that voting replaces violence as the main Chapter Six: Political Parties, Voting, and Elections 111 means of political participation (consider: if you cannot vote politicians you dislike out of of¿ce, then how do you get them out?). From the viewpoint discussed above, elections represent a bargain, both in the sense that they are (at least in theory) a good deal for us and in the sense that they represent an exchange between us and the government. What is the bargain from the government’s standpoint? They concede our right to participate—to inÀuence their composition—in exchange for gaining stability and legitimacy2. What is the bargain from our standpoint? We concede other means of altering the government (for example, violence) in exchange for the sense of inÀuence discussed above. %asics 3arties Formation As noted in the introduction, political parties were neither anticipated nor welcomed by the framers. However, the stage was set from the founding for a two-party system. The two big factions mentioned earlier developed, at ¿rst, into the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. The Federalists The better organized faction at our founding was the Federalists. The framers were largely Federalists. They felt the Articles of Confederation was a failure (see chapter 2) and so wrote an entirely new constitution. They favored national power over local power—in large part because they felt co-ordination at the national level was required to promote and develop the nation’s commerce and industry (e.g. see Wood, 1998). Most were northerners, probably because most of the nation’s commerce and industry was located in the north. The Anti-Federalists At least as numerous, but less organized were the Anti-Federalists. With many located in the agricultural South, they feared a powerful national government and the industrialization it might bring. They wanted to maintain the nation’s agrarian roots. Throughout the states, opposition to centralized national power was found most often in areas µµin which small, self-suf¿cient, and often debtor farmers were most numerous’’ (Main, 2006, p.112). 2 That is, we will respect and obey the laws they create, even if we disagree with them. Disagreement becomes a catalyst for voting (and other forms of participation), and not for violence. 112 The Basics of American Government From the Anti-Federalists to the Democrats The Anti-Federalists formed the ¿rst true American political party. They recognized the value of coordinating their efforts to win elections throughout the nation and to help bridge our system of separation of powers. Under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, they called themselves Republicans3. By the election of 1800, their organizational efforts paid off and they began to win huge majorities in Congress (Senate Historical Of¿ce, 2010, Of¿ce of the Clerk, 2010) as well as an unparalleled seven consecutive presidential elections. Among intra-party divisions in the 1820s, Andrew Jackson came to lead the party and attempted to preserve its Jeffersonian roots. It was at this time they began to call themselves Democrats. Even though some left the party, perceiving Jackson’s leadership to be autocratic, they continued to win elections. Including their Jeffersonian Republican forebears, they won all but two presidential elections from 1800 through 1856, and maintained control of Congress for all but a few years during that time. After a period of dominance by the new Republican Party (see below) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Democratic Party regained its majority in the 1930s under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt. They maintained this majority largely intact into the 1970s. It was a changed party, however. From its Anti-Federalist forebears, it came to be the party of the µµcommon man.’’ While the party maintains a similar focus today as the party of workers, minorities, and women, its view of government has changed drastically. Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic Party was quite different from Jefferson’s and Jackson’s. Gone were the Anti-Federalist fears of national government. Roosevelt’s µµNew Dealers’’ believed in using the power of the national government to ¿ght economic distress and inequality (e.g., see: http://www.democrats.org/issues/civil_rights). From the Federalists to the Whigs to the Republicans Though our founding was dominated by Federalists, their dislike of political parties proved to be their downfall. The electoral system they created worked to the advantage of organized parties. By the time they realized this and organized into a Federalist Party, it was too late. In the 3 This is not the modern Republican Party (see next section). To distinguish this party from the modern one, the terms µµDemocratic-Republicans’’ or µµJefferson’s Republicans’’ are often used. Chapter Six: Political Parties, Voting, and Elections 113 elections of 1800, they lost out to their better-organized opponents (see above) virtually everywhere. By the early 1800s, they were ¿nished as an organized group. Their sympathizers did not disappear, however. A combination of former Federalists and Democrats (who feared what they saw as autocratic rule in the election of Democrat Andrew Jackson to the presidency) formed the Whig Party. They were quite successful in the 1830s and 1840s, electing several presidents and building congressional majorities (Senate Historical Of¿ce, 2010, Of¿ce of the Clerk, 2010). The thorny issue of slavery split and ultimately destroyed the party in the early 1850s. At that time, a new party arose from anti-slavery elements in both the Democratic and Whig parties. To emphasize their belief that they were truly ful¿lling the framers’ vision, they called themselves the Republican Party. Under the leadership of John C. Fremont and Abraham Lincoln, they quickly rose to major party status. From the mid-1850s through today, they have competed with the Democrats as one of the two major political parties in America. Consistent with their Federalist roots, the Republicans have historically been the party of business and commerce. However, unlike their forebears who saw a strong national government as the key to commercial development, modern Republicans often take a dim view of federal power. More like the Anti-Federalists, modern Republicans generally place more trust in local government. The modern Republican Party supports free-market commerce (i.e., it opposes much government regulation of businesses and industries), small and localized government, and a socially conservative ideology (e.g., see: http://www.gop.com/our-party/). Three-Part Structure As noted earlier, parties exist to select and elect candidates and to organize government. This idea suggests a three-part structure to parties as we know them. Not only is there the party organization itself, but there is also the party in government and the party in the electorate (voters) as well (e.g., see Key, 1964, Beck, 1997). It is the party organizations at all levels (national, state, and local) that help to select and elect candidates. They do this by ¿rst nominating candidates as their choices for the general election. The process of nominating usually consists of either a primary, where voters select a 114 The Basics of American Government nominee, a caucus, where party members gather to agree upon a nominee, a convention, where party members gather in one location to formally choose a nominee, or some combination of these methods. Presidential Nominations We can see all three of these methods in presidential party nominations. In the late summer of presidential election years, the national party organizations (the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee) each hold a national convention to formally select their presidential nominees. At the convention, delegates representing all 50 states and many territories vote to select the nominees. Most delegates are bound by state and/or party rules to vote for particular candidates, so the outcome is rarely in doubt (leading some to talk more of coronations than conventions). So, how are the delegates chosen, and why are they bound to one candidate? This is where the other methods come into play. All states and territories hold either a primary or caucus4 to choose their delegates to the national conventions. A primary can be either open to all voters or closed to all but registered party members (there are some other variations as well). 9oting takes place at polling places around the state, much like any election. A caucus involves only party members meeting around the state. They involve more effort as participants must gather in one spot (an auditorium or gymnasium) to openly debate the choices (e.g. see: http://www.c-span.org/Events/C-SPAN39s-Iowa-Presidential-CaucusPre-Show/9131/). Because of the effort involved, caucuses usually involve far less of the electorate than do primaries. The Democratic Party requires all of its primaries and caucuses to use proportional representation rules which allocate delegates favoring candidates in proportion to their support in the primary vote or the caucus. The Republican Party allows states to use ZinnertaNeall rules, where the top ¿nisher gets all the state’s delegates, if they so choose. To win elections, the party organizations help candidates appeal to the electorate. The focus of these µµget-out-the-vote’’ (GOT9) efforts is twofold. First, the organizations want to make sure their supporters—the party in the electorate (often called the µµbase’’) turn out to vote. Next, they want to reach out to independent and uncommitted voters to win their support. Particularly strong or popular candidates may even reach out to supporters 4 Or in some cases, like the Texas Democratic Party’s delegate selection, a combination of both. Chapter Six: Political Parties, Voting, and Elections 115 of other parties. Today, these are high-tech efforts to target and appeal to the public using mailing and email lists, consumer and demographic data, and social networking media (e.g., YouTube, Twitter, Facebook) in addition to traditional speeches, Àiers, rallies, and T9/radio advertisements. Candidates who win the general election will take their seats in of¿ce to become their party’s party in government. In legislating or administering policy, they will attempt to represent their party and to get its agenda enacted into law. Modern Regional Bases The Democratic and Republican parties have competed head-to-head as our only major parties for over 150 years. Currently, the Democratic Party’s regional bases are in the Northeast, the Great Lakes region, and the West. The Republican Party’s regional bases are in the South, the Upper Midwest, and in the Great Plains. This distribution is evident in the 2012 presidential Electoral College results (e.g., see http://uselectionatlas.org/ RESULTS/). While this distribution is accurate, it is also misleading. It should also be noted that both parties are competitive in many areas nationally. Instead of a divided red and blue America (with red representing Republican and blue representing Democrat), some argue that a more accurate portrayal of party competition today is of a µµpurple America’’ (e.g., see Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder, 2006)5. Realignment The current alignment of political parties has not always been the case. We have seen many different partisan alignments. At any given time, there is a set of parties competing over the issues of the day. This set of parties competing over these issues comprises a part\ s\steP. New events and new generations with new issues will alter the composition of—and competition between—the parties, leading to a new party system. This change is often referred to as realignment (Burnham, 1970). Through much of our history, realignments occur with surprising regularity— approximately every 30 years. Perhaps it is a result of generational change. In any case, most electoral scholars identify ¿ve or six realignments in our history (e.g., see Sundquist, 1983), usually resulting in a dominant party. 5 For a graphic representation of this notion, see http://www.princeton.edu/arvdb/JA9A/election2012/ 116 The Basics of American Government They are identi¿ed here by approximate year: t
t
t
t
1800: In a sense, 1800 saw an alignment rather than a realignment since this was the point at which political parties were developing. Indeed, the very development of parties was the issue. Recall the differing views on organizing between the Federalists and AntiFederalists. The Federalists disliked factions, believing them detrimental to the public good, while the Anti-Federalists saw organizing as the key to success. The Anti-Federalists’ organization into Jefferson’s Republicans paid off as they became the dominant party in American politics for many years (and, indeed, the only party for a few years). 1828: A new generation of Americans saw the rapid disappearance of property requirements for voting. This change meant voting and politics were no longer limited to the wealthy elite. In a more practical sense, it made public campaigning a viable option for election. Andrew Jackson was the ¿rst person to run for president by openly campaigning for votes among the public. It was the new issue of the political age—political participation, and Andrew Jackson’s Democrats capitalized on the expansion of the vote to ordinary (white, male) citizens to become the dominant party for the next 30 years. 1860: An old issue, slavery, became the issue of the age as the nation debated its expansion into the west. The industrial North— less dependent upon slavery—was the locus of a growing movement to abolish the practice, while the agricultural South was still dependent upon it. The issue fractured both the Whigs and Democrats, destroying the former, and leaving the Democrats as a largely Southern, pro-slavery party. In 1854, the abolitionists united to form a new party, the Republicans. The growing antislavery movement rapidly catapulted the party to majority status (aided by the secession of largely Democratic Southern states from the union in the 1860s). They would remain the majority party nationally until well into the 20th century. 1896: The late 19th century saw the United States emerge as a major industrial, economic power in what we might today call the ¿rst age of globalization. The major issue was how far to pursue Chapter Six: Political Parties, Voting, and Elections t
t
117 industrialization and globalization. The Democrats, still located largely in the more agricultural South, resisted the trend while the Republicans embraced it. The nation sided with the Republicans, reenergizing their majority at the dawn of the 20th century. 1932: Perhaps the most iconic realignment occurred in the 1930s as a result of the Great Depression—the greatest period of economic distress the country has experienced. The issue for the age was the extent to which the federal government should actively combat it. While both parties embraced at least some activism (it may be argued that Herbert Hoover, the Republican president at the time the Depression hit in 1929, made greater use of the federal government to address the nation’s troubles than any previous president6), it was the Democratic Party under Franklin Delano Roosevelt that eventually advocated extensive use of the federal government to actively combat the effects of the Depression (the New Deal). An increasingly distressed public Àocked to Roosevelt and the Democrats, who won unprecedented majorities in the 1930s. 1960s? If the 30-year cycle held, we would expect to see another realignment in the 1960s. However, there is scant evidence of any traditional realignment. The Democratic Party maintained a relatively strong majority through the 1970s and weaker majority into the early 1990s. While there were new issues—most notably the civil rights movement, and more recently the rise of economic and social issues—they led neither to a new majority, nor to radically reformed parties. To this day, while Democratic support has weakened notably, there is little corresponding increase in support for Republicans. Instead, beginning in the 1970s, people began to leave both parties and identify as independents (e.g., see the American National Election Studies data on party identi¿cation: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/ tab2a_1.htm). This change leaves us with a more competitive twoparty system, but not with a µµ50-50’’ division of Democrats and Republicans. More accurately we now have a µµ33-33-33’’ division that includes independents—leading some to say there has not been a realignment, but rather a dealignment, or a movement away from political parties (Nie, 9erba, Petrocik 1976, Rosenof, 2003). 6 See for example the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, created in 1929 (http://www.archives.gov/ research/guide-fed-records/groups/234.html). 118 The Basics of American Government In the mid-1990s, many proclaimed a Republican realignment. There were similar claims of a Democratic realignment after the 2006 and 2008 elections, and again by Republicans after the 2010 elections. All are wrong. The key to realignments is their establishment of a stable, longterm party system, which means you can never proclaim one after only one or two elections. They may only be designated in retrospect after a decade or more. Minor Parties That only two major parties have dominated our politics for over 150 years does not mean no other parties exist. There are dozens and possibly even hundreds of smaller parties7, which raises a few questions. Why are there only two major parties? There are several contributing reasons. First, as noted earlier, we divided into two major factions very early on, leading almost inevitably to our two major parties. Second, though, is that our divisions have never been so vast as to sustain many major parties. We share several universal values (see chapter 4) that do not leave much support for additional parties. Third is our self-ful¿lling skepticism of third parties. Most all of us are not so issue driven that we will back parties with little chance of winning, even if we agree with their issue positions. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary— we often adjust our own issue positions to conform to the party we support (Campbell, et al, 1960, Fiorina, 1981, Green, et al, 2002, Karol, 2009). We like to back winners, essentially because the rather reasonable logic is that parties do us no good unless they can actually win elections. Of course, if we do not support them, they will not win. It is a vicious cycle for third parties. Last, and least appreciated, are rules. Rules matter. While we like to think that elections are simply µµThe candidate with the most votes wins,’’ it is more complicated. Different rules may lead to different outcomes even with the same set of votes. All American elections are state-run; it is a delegated power (see chapter 3). There are federal regulations and constitutional requirements imposed on the states, but the bottom line is that they actually run the contests. This in itself is a µµrule’’ that matters It means 50 states may have 50 sets of differing electoral rules. Since all 7 The site Politics1.com lists 47 others at the time of this printing (see: http://politics1.com/parties.htm) Chapter Six: Political Parties, Voting, and Elections 119 contemporary state legislatures and governors, who write the rules, are under the control of one major party or the other, those rules are generally favorable to the major parties. The ¿rst hurdle third parties must clear is negotiating 50 sets of rules—none of which were written by (or for!) them. There are two sets of rules that have the greatest effect: voting rules and ballot access rules. t
Voting Rules: The most common American voting rules are SingleMember District, Plurality rules—known as SMDP. Not all U.S. elections are SMDP, but most are. o As the name implies, SingleMember Districts have only one representative. It is how we elect representatives to Congress and state legislatures. For example, the state of Georgia is currently apportioned 14 U.S. representatives based on its population (see chapter 2). The state does not, however, simply elect 14 people state-wide. Federal law requires states to create one electoral district per representative—so Georgia must elect one representative each in 14 separate districts. It is this winner-take-all nature (often referred to as µµ¿rst-past-the-post’’) that advantages major parties. You must have enough support to ¿nish ¿rst. As such, it may be better to think of singlewinner elections. Contrast this with MultiMember District systems (or multi-winner elections), where each district elects several representatives. If states were allowed to use multi-member systems for Congress, Georgia might hold a single, state-wide election where the top 14 ¿nishers won of¿ce. Another possibility might be a handful of districts electing several representatives each. In either case, candidates can ¿nish second, third, or lower and still win of¿ce. This procedure gives minor parties a much better chance. o In Pluralit\ elections, the threshold for victory is simply getting more votes than anyone else. Contrast this to Majorit\ elections where the threshold is higher: more than half of the votes cast (or alternatively, more votes than everyone else combined). The advantage of plurality rules to major parties may seem counter-intuitive at ¿rst. 120 The Basics of American Government t
Since winning requires a lower threshold, it is tempting to think minor parties have a better chance at meeting the lower standard—and they do. However, major parties do, too—and they get, by de¿nition, more votes than minor parties (the very meaning of plurality, right?). In addition, they do so without needing help from anyone else. This situation leaves little hope for smaller parties. In contrast, even major parties will not always meet the higher standard of a majority election without help (see the case study at the end of this chapter). That help may come in the form of coalitions with smaller parties to build the necessary majority—giving those smaller parties at least some inÀuence (and a reason to stick around!). State Ballot Rules: As noted above, states control elections, and each sets its own rules. This power includes deciding which parties get access to limited ballot space. All states award space to parties who won a signi¿cant portion of the vote in previous elections— usually 20-25%. Major parties easily meet that standard, so their candidates appear on virtually all ballots. However, minor parties rarely do that well, so they generally do not get automatic access. They must seek it each time. To get access, states have all manner of requirements: fees (ranging from a few to thousands of dollars), petition signatures (again, ranging from a handful to thousands), paperwork, and legal action. Minor parties have to spend precious resources meeting these requirements, while the major parties are already out campaigning. This structure means the major parties can devote all of their time and money to campaigning while minor parties have to devote a signi¿cant portion just to get on ballots. So why do they bother? Minor parties bother because they have a message. That message usually involves individuals, issues, or just a better way (or any combination of those things). Some minor parties are vehicles for a single candidate. The Reform Party of the 1990s was the classic example of a single-person, or cult-ofpersonality party (see http://reformparty.org/). Its life blood was two-time presidential candidate Ross Perot, a billionaire who practically bankrolled Chapter Six: Political Parties, Voting, and Elections 121 the entire party from his own pocket. While he was a candidate in 1992 (when the entity was the more loosely-organized µµUnited we Stand America’’), and 1996, the Reform Party was born and rose to become the most formidable third party in decades. In 1992, Perot captured almost 20 million votes—the best showing for a third party presidential candidate in 80 years. In 1996, he ran for the Reform Party’s nomination at a convention that he paid for. In the general election, he captured over 8 million votes —a signi¿cant drop, but still one of the best third party showings in years. After that, Perot began to withdraw from active participation in the party, and in 2000, he declined another bid for president. The effect on the party was dramatic. Public support dropped, and the party fractured among internal ¿ghting. The of¿cial party nominated conservative columnist Patrick Buchanan for president, and a splinter group nominated Dr. John Hagelin. Combined, they managed to win fewer than 600,000 votes. The Reform Party (though it still exists today) was effectively dead. Some minor parties are, in a sense, super-interest groups. Much like a traditional interest group, they will focus on a single issue (or a small range of related issues). However, they will go beyond merely trying to inÀuence government; they will actively run candidates for of¿ce. Perhaps the best known national single-issue party is the Green Party (technically, a collection of parties with international roots). While generally a liberal party, their focus is on environmental issues (see http://www.greenparty. org, and http://www.gp.org). Green Parties originated in Germany in the 1980s, and came to the United States in the 1990s. They reached the height of their prominence in 2000 when their presidential candidate, long time consumer activist Ralph Nader received over 2 million votes for president. The party continues to function nationally, claiming over 130 elected of¿cials nation-wide as of March, 2013 (see http://www.gp.org/elections/ of¿ceholders/). Still other minor parties are organized and function just like the major parties with a range of issue positions and ¿elding candidates throughout the country. They are simply smaller. One of the more prominent betterway parties is the Libertarian Party (http://www.lp.org). The Libertarians ran hundreds of candidates nation-wide in 2012, including their presidential candidate, Gary Johnson,...
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