Plato: The Apology of Socrates
H. N. Fowler Translation, Loeb (1913)
Edited with introduction and notes by E. E. Garvin (2013)
Introduction
It would not be possible to overestimate the importance of Socrates in the development of the
Western episteme. While it is true that Socrates occupies a position in a continuum of philosophical
thought, it is equally true that his contribution was pivotal.
Socrates himself wrote nothing except some verses of poetry in his final days - of which
nothing survives - and our best connection to Socrates comes from the works of Plato and, to a
lesser degree, Xenophon. Plato was a young but ardent follower of Socrates and he produced a
body of literature known as the Socratic Dialogues which purport to be faithful transcriptions of
conversations Socrates had with various people over the course of his career. This corpus has been
so influential that A. N. Whitehead (Process and Reality. 1979: 39) famously says that all of
Western philosophy "consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." It is Plato, then, who is credited
with being the founder of the Western intellectual tradition and in his honour we coin such terms
as 'academic' and 'academia' after the Academy, the school founded by Plato a few years after the
death of Socrates. In that Academy Plato taught Aristotle and Aristotle's works form, among other
things, the basis of what is now called The Scientific Method. In a nutshell, then, we have in these
three men, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the genesis and guiding principles of all things
philosophical in the European, or Western, tradition.
Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete (Plato Alcibiades 131e), was born in 469/8
BC.
His father, was a sculptor and his mother a midwife. Socrates spent his entire life in Athens
and was married to Xanthippe by whom he had a son, Lamprocles. According to Xenophon
(Symposium 2.10), Xanthippe was "the most difficult to get along with of all the women there are
- yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be," but Socrates himself could not have been so
easy to live with either.
Apology - 2
The Indictment against Socrates is recorded by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers, ii.5.40: 1
[40] The affidavit in the case, which is still preserved, says Favorinus, 2 in the Metron, ran
as follows: "This indictment and affidavit is sworn by Meletus, the son of Meletus of
Pitthos, against Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of
refusing to recognize the gods recognized by the state, and of introducing other new
divinities. He is also guilty of corrupting the youth. The penalty demanded is death.
The Apology of Socrates
1 [17a - 18a]
[17a] [1] How you, men of Athens, have been affected by my accusers, I do not know; but I,
for my part, almost forgot my own identity, so persuasively did they talk; and yet there is hardly a
word of truth in what they have said. But I was most amazed by one of the many lies that they told;
when they said that you must be on your guard not to be deceived by me, [17b] because I was a
clever speaker. For I thought it the most shameless part of their conduct that they are not ashamed
because they will immediately be convicted by me of falsehood by the evidence of fact, when I
show myself to be not in the least a clever speaker, unless indeed they call him a clever speaker
who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator - not after
their fashion. Now they, as I say, have said little or nothing true; but you shall hear from me nothing
but the truth. Not, however, men of Athens, speeches; finely tricked out with words and phrases,
[17c] as theirs are, nor carefully arranged, but you will hear things said at random with the words
that happen to occur to me. For I trust that what I say is just; and let none of you expect anything
else. For surely it would not
be
fitting for one of my age to come before you like a youngster
making up speeches. And, men of Athens, I urgently beg and beseech you if you hear me making
my defence with the same words with which I have been accustomed to speak both in the market
place at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, [17d] not to be
1
Diogenes Laertius wrote a history of philosophy in ten books, probably in the late 2nd century
AD. Very little is otherwise known.
2
Favorinus was a philosopher who lived in the early 2nd century AD, under the reign of Hadrian
and although he wrote extensively, none of his works survive.
Apology - 3
surprised or to make a disturbance on this account. For the fact is that this is the first time I have
come before the court, although I am seventy years old; 1 I am therefore an utter foreigner to the
manner of speech here. Hence, just as you would, of course, if I were really a foreigner, pardon
me if I spoke in that dialect and that manner [18a] in which I had been brought up, so now I make
this request of you, a fair one, as it seems to me, that you disregard the manner of my speech - for
perhaps it might be worse and perhaps better - and observe and pay attention merely to this:
Whether what I say is just or not; for that is the virtue of a judge, and an orator's virtue is to speak
the truth. 2
2 [18a - 19a]
First then it is right for me to defend myself against the first false accusations brought against
me, and the first accusers, and then against the later accusations and the later accusers. [18b] For
many accusers have risen up against me before you, who have been speaking for a long time, many
years already, and saying nothing true; and I fear them more than Anytus and the rest, though these
also are dangerous; but those others are more dangerous, gentlemen, who gained your belief, since
they got hold of most of you in childhood, and accused me without any truth, saying, "There is a
certain Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer over the things in the air and one who has investigated
the things beneath the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger." 3 These, men of
Athens, [18c] who have spread abroad this report, are my dangerous enemies. For those who hear
them think that men who investigate these matters do not even believe in gods. Besides, these
accusers are many and have been making their accusations already for a long time, and moreover
they spoke to you at an age at which you would believe them most readily (some of you in youth,
most of you in childhood), and the case they prosecuted went utterly by default, since nobody
appeared in defence. But the most unreasonable thing of all is this; that it is not even possible [18d]
to know and speak their names, except when one of them happens to be a writer of comedies. And
all those who persuaded you by means of envy and slander - and some also persuaded others
1
His point here is that most Athenians found themselves in court quite often and it is very odd for
a politically active citizen, as Socrates was, to have lived so long and never been sued or accused
of a crime.
2
So far, Socrates is adhering to standardized tropes in forensic oratory. See Edwards, Michael J.
2000. ‘Antiphon and the Beginnings of Athenian Literary Oratory’ Rhetorica 18. 227-242.
3
The reference is to Aristophanes' Clouds a comedy produced in 423 BC., in which Socrates is
parodied.
Apology - 4
because they had been themselves persuaded - all these are most difficult to cope with; for it is not
even possible to call any of them up here and cross-question him, but I am compelled in making
my defence to fight, as it were, absolutely with shadows and to cross-question when nobody
answers. Be kind enough, then, to bear in mind, as I say, that there are two classes [18e] of my
accusers-one those who have just brought their accusation, the other those who, as I was just
saying, brought it long ago, and consider that I must defend myself first against the latter; for you
heard them making their charges first and with much greater force than these who made them later.
Well, then, I must make a defence; men of Athens, [19a] and must try in so short a time to remove
from you this prejudice which you have been for so long a time acquiring. Now I wish that this
might turn out so, if it is better for you and for me, and that I might succeed with my defence; but
I think it is difficult, and I am not at all deceived about its nature. But nevertheless, let this be as
is pleasing to God, 1 the law must be obeyed and I must make a defence.
3 [19a - d]
Now let us take up from the beginning the question, what the accusation is from which the
false prejudice against me has arisen, in which [19b] Meletus trusted when he brought this suit
against me. What did those who aroused the prejudice say to arouse it? I must, as it were, read
their sworn statement as if they were plaintiffs: "Socrates is a criminal and a busybody,
investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the weaker argument
stronger 2 and [19c] teaching others these same things." Something of that sort it is. For you
yourselves saw these things in Aristophanes' comedy, a Socrates being carried about there,
proclaiming that he was treading on air and uttering a vast deal of other nonsense, about which I
know nothing, either much or little. And I say this, not to cast dishonour upon such knowledge, if
anyone is wise about such matters (may I never have to defend myself against Meletus on so great
a charge as that!), but I, men of Athens, have nothing to do with these things. [19d] And I offer as
witnesses most of yourselves, and I ask you to inform one another and to tell, all those of you who
ever heard me conversing - and there are many such among you - now tell, if anyone ever heard
1
Although the Greeks adhered to a polytheistic religion, they often referred to 'god' in the singular,
rather than 'the gods' as one might expect. We might assume that Zeus is meant, especially in this
case since Zeus is god of justice.
2
For an interesting discussion on this phrase see Gagarin, Michael, 2002. Antiphon the Athenian;
Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists. Austin: University of Texas Press; 25.
Apology - 5
me talking much or little about such matters. And from this you will perceive that such are also
the other things that the multitude say about me.
4 [19d - 20c]
But in fact none of these things are true, and if you have heard from anyone that I undertake
to teach [19e] people and that I make money by it, that is not true either. Although this also seems
to me to be a fine thing, if one might be able to teach people, as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus
of Ceos and Hippias of Elis are. 1 For each of these men, gentlemen, is able to go into any one of
the cities and persuade the young men, who can associate for nothing with whomsoever they wish
among their own fellow citizens, [20a] to give up the association with those men and to associate
with them and pay them money and be grateful besides.
And there is also another wise man here, a Parian, who I learned was in town; 2 for I happened
to meet a man who has spent more on sophists than all the rest, Callias, the son of Hipponicus; 3 so
I asked him - for he has two sons - "Callias," said I, "if your two sons had happened to be two colts
or two calves, we should be able to get and hire for them an overseer who would make them [20b]
excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or a
husbandman; but now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as
overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind of excellence, that of a man and a citizen? For I think
you have looked into the matter, because you have the sons. Is there anyone," said I, "or not?"
"Certainly," said he. "Who," said I," and where from, and what is his price for his teaching?"
"Evenus," he said, "Socrates, from Paros, five minae." 4 And I called Evenus blessed, [20c] if he
really had this art and taught so reasonably. I myself should be vain and put on airs, if I understood
these things; but I do not understand them, men of Athens.
1
These are just three of the many itinerant sophists flourishing at the time. They would travel
about the Greek World teaching public speaking for a fee. It was believed that their teachings
could give a person the advantage in both the courts and the assemblies. It was also widely
believed that they taught a form of trickery and that these 'fancy speakers' should not be trusted.
2
A reference to Evenus of Paros (Plato Phaedrus 267a; Aristotle Metaphysics 1015a)
3
One of the wealthiest men in Athens and a frequent patron of sophists. The dialogue of Plato's
Protagoras takes place in the house of Callias. He most famous for squandering the family
fortune
4
Or 500 drachmae, a considerable sum given that soldiers were paid two drachmae per day (Thuc.
iii.17.3). Socrates claimed that his entire estate was worth only 5 minae (Xenophon Oec. ii.3).
Apology - 6
5 [20c - 21a]
Now perhaps someone might rejoin: "But, Socrates, what is the trouble about you? Whence
have these prejudices against you arisen? For certainly this great report and talk has not arisen
while you were doing nothing more out of the way than the rest, unless you were doing something
other than most people; so tell us [20d] what it is, that we may not act unadvisedly in your case."
The man who says this seems to me to be right, and I will try to show you what it is that has
brought about my reputation and aroused the prejudice against me. So listen. And perhaps I shall
seem to some of you to be joking; be assured, however, I shall speak perfect truth to you.
The fact is, men of Athens, that I have acquired this reputation on account of nothing else
than a sort of wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Just that which is perhaps human wisdom.
For perhaps I really am wise in this wisdom; and these men, perhaps, [20e] of whom I was just
speaking, might be wise in some wisdom greater than human, or I don't know what to say; for I do
not understand it, and whoever says I do, is lying and speaking to arouse prejudice against me.
And, men of Athens, do not interrupt me with noise, even if I seem to you to be boasting; for the
word which I speak is not mine, but the speaker to whom I shall refer it is a person of weight. For
of my wisdom - if it is wisdom at all - and of its nature, I will offer you the god of Delphi as a
witness. You know Chaerephon, I fancy. [21a] He was my comrade from a youth and the comrade
of your democratic party, and shared in the recent exile and came back with you. 1 And you know
the kind of man Chaerephon was, how impetuous in whatever he undertook. Well, once he went
to Delphi 2 and made so bold as to ask the oracle this question; and, gentlemen, don't make a
disturbance at what I say; for he asked if there were anyone wiser than I. Now the Pythia 3 replied
that there was no one wiser. And about these things his brother here will bear you witness, since
Chaerephon is dead. 4
1
That is, Chaerephon was a democrat and fled into exile during the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. He
returned after the restoration of the democracy in 403 BC. but died sometime before 399.
2
The Temple of Apollo at Delphi was the most famous source of prophesy in the Greek World.
Questions could be put to the god and cryptic answers or prescriptions were given.
3
The Pythia was the priestess of Apollo at Delphi. She would sit on a tripod above a crevasse in
the rock and Apollo would communicate through her in a language only intelligible to the priests.
The priests would then translate for the questioner.
4
We can assume a pause here while the brother came forward to assure the jury that what Socrates
had said was accurate. It was normal practice for speakers in court to interrupt their speeches
with witnesses.
Apology - 7
6 [21b - 21e]
[21b] But see why I say these things; for I am going to tell you whence the prejudice against
me has arisen. For when I heard this, I thought to myself: "What in the world does the god mean,
and what riddle is he propounding? For I am conscious that I am not wise either much or little.
What then does he mean by declaring that I am the wisest? He certainly cannot be lying, for that
is not possible for him." And for a long time I was at a loss as to what he meant; then with great
reluctance I proceeded to investigate him somewhat as follows:
I went to one of those who had a reputation for wisdom, [21c] thinking that there, if anywhere,
I should prove the utterance wrong and should show the oracle "This man is wiser than I, but you
said I was wisest." So examining this man - for I need not call him by name, but it was one of the
politicians 1 with regard to whom I had this kind of experience, men of Athens - and conversing
with him, this man seemed to me to seem to be wise to many other people and especially to himself,
but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he thought [21d] he was wise, but was not. 2 As
a result, I became hateful to him and to many of those present; and so, as I went away, I thought
to myself, "I am wiser than this man; for neither of us really knows anything fine and good, but
this man thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas I, as I do not know anything, do
not think I do either. 3 I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that
what I do not know I do not think I know either." From him I went to another of those who were
reputed [21e] to be wiser than he, and these same things seemed to me to be true; and there I
became hateful both to him and to many others.
7 [21e - c]
After this then I went on from one to another, perceiving that I was hated, and grieving and
fearing, but nevertheless I thought I must consider the god's business of the highest importance.
So I had to go, investigating the meaning of the oracle, to all those who were reputed to know
Fowler translates 'one of the public men' for τις τῶν πολιτικῶν (tis ton politikon) but there seems
no need to avoid the obvious here; the phrase is "one of the politicians."
2
It is impossible to know with any certainty who is referred to here, but my suspicion is that the
man would have been Pericles.
3
Here, then, is the first tenet of Socratic philosophy: In order to learn one must admit ignorance.
True wisdom is understanding how little you know, and how much you have still to learn.
1
Apology - 8
anything. [22a] And by the Dog, 1 men of Athens - for I must speak the truth to you - this, I do
declare, was my experience; those who had the most reputation seemed to me to be almost the
most deficient, as I investigated at the god's behest, and others who were of less repute seemed to
be superior men in the matter of being sensible. So I must relate to you my wandering as I
performed this hard work, 2 in order that the oracle might be proved to be irrefutable. For after the
politicians I went to the poets, those of tragedies, and those of dithyrambs, [22b] and the rest,
thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the
poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them
what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to
tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one
might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed.
So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognised this; that it was not by wisdom that
they composed [22c] what they composed, but imagination 3 and because they were inspired, like
the prophets and givers of oracles; for these also say many fine things, but know none of the things
they say; it was evident to me that the poets too had experienced something of this same sort. 4 And
at the same time I perceived that they, on account of their poetry, thought that they were the wisest
of men in other things as well, in which they were not. So I went away from them also thinking
that I was superior to them in the same thing in which I excel1ed the politicians.
A literal translation of νὴ τὸν κύνα (ne ton kyna) and the favourite oath of Socrates (Pahedo 98e;
Cratylus 411b; Phaedrus 228b; Gorgias 461b, 466c). The meaning is obscure but it may be
equivalent to 'by gosh' and 'by golly' in English; ways to say 'by God!' without using the name in
vain. However, Socrates is never afraid to call on a god by name. We are tempted, however, by
the phrase "by the Dog, god of the Egyptians" in Plato's Gorgias (482b); more clearly a reference
to Anubis, the Egyptian god who is depicted with a dog's (jackal's) head.
2
Fowler offers '… as I performed my Herculean labours, so to speak,' but the Greek does not
support a reference to Heracles, hence the amendment.
3
Fowler has '…that what they composed they composed not by wisdom, but by nature and because
they were inspired." The word order above more accurately reflects the MS and, in this context,
'nature' seems a rather ambiguous rendering of φύσει (physei) The Greek physis is most often
translated as 'nature' but its nuances are many.
4
These statements alone should have been enough to convict Socrates. What he has just said is
much like standing in St. Peter's and declaring that the Pope knows nothing about religion.
1
Apology - 9
8 [22c - e]
Final1y then I went to the craftsmen: [22d] For I was conscious that I knew practical1y
nothing, but I knew I should find that they knew many fine things. And in this I was not deceived;
they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, the good
artisans also seemed to me to have the same failing as the poets; because of practising his art well,
each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs
obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle [22e] whether I should prefer
to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly, or to be in both respects as
they are. I replied then to myself and to the oracle that it was better for me to be as I am.
9 [22e - 23c]
Now, from this investigation, men of Athens, [23a] many enmities have arisen against me,
and such as are most harsh and grievous, so that many prejudices have resulted from them and I
am called a wise man. For on each occasion those who are present think I am wise in the matters
in which I confute someone else; but the fact is, gentlemen, it is likely that the god is really wise
and by his oracle means this: "Human wisdom is of little or no value." And it appears that he does
not really say this of Socrates, but merely uses my name, [23b] and makes me an example, as if he
were to say: "The one of you human beings is wisest who, like Socrates, recognises that he is in
truth of no account in respect to wisdom."
Therefore, I am still even now going about and searching and investigating at the god's behest
anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, who I think is wise; and when he does not seem so to me, I
give aid to the god and show that he is not wise. And by reason of this occupation I have no leisure
to attend to any of the affairs of the state worth mentioning, 1 or of my own, [23c] but am in vast
poverty on account of my service to the god.
10 [23c - 24b]
And in addition to these things, the young men who have the most leisure, the sons of the
richest men, accompany me of their own accord, find pleasure in hearing people being examined,
and often imitate me themselves, and then they undertake to examine others; and then, I fancy,
1
He was politically active: In 406 BC he was Epistates, President of the Prytaneis, when the
generals from Arginusae were tried and convicted (Xen. Hell.i.7.9-15). See below, 32b.
Apology - 10
they find a great plenty of people who think they know something, but know little or nothing. As
a result, therefore, those who are examined by them are angry with me, instead of being angry with
themselves, and say that "Socrates is a most abominable person and is corrupting the youth."1
[23d] And when anyone asks them "by doing or teaching what?" they have nothing to say, but they
do not know, and that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these things that are handy to say
against all the philosophers, "the things in the air and the things beneath the earth " and "not to
believe in the gods " and "to make the weaker argument stronger." 2 For they would not, I fancy,
care to say the truth, that it is being made very clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing.
[23e] Since, then, they are jealous of their honour and energetic and numerous and speak
concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears both long ago and now with
vehement slanders.
From among them Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon. Meletus angered on account
of the poets, and Anytus on account of the artisans and the politicians, and [24a] Lycon on account
of the orators; so that, as I said in the beginning, I should be surprised if I were able to remove this
prejudice from you in so short a time when it has grown so great. There you have the truth, men
of Athens, and I speak without hiding anything from you, great or small or prevaricating. And yet
I know pretty well that I am making myself hated by just that conduct; which is also a proof that I
am speaking the truth and that this is the prejudice against me and these are its causes. [24b] And
whether you investigate this now or hereafter, you will find that it is so.
11 [24b - c]
Now so far as the accusations are concerned which my first accusers made against me, this is
a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the
later ones, I will try to defend myself next. So once more, as if these were another set of accusers,
let us take up in turn their sworn statement. It is roughly as follows: it states that Socrates is a
1
Part of Socrates' problem is that these "sons of the richest men" included Alcibiades, the nephew
of Pericles and a man so consumed with self-interest that he was condemned as a traitor;
Theramenes, one of the architects of the oligarchic revolution of 411; and Critias, leader of the
Thirty Tyrants, to name but a few. In the two decades prior to his trial it is difficult to find a
single political disaster in Athens the authors of which cannot be linked to Socrates.
2
See above, p. 3 n.5. Fowler's translation "to make the weaker argument the stronger" is an error.
The MS says τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, 'to make the weaker argument stronger.' The
inclusion or omission of the second definite article is what determines the meaning of the phrase.
Apology - 11
wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but
in other new spiritual beings. [24c] Such is the accusation. But let us examine each point of this
accusation. He says I am a wrongdoer because I corrupt the youth. But I, men of Athens, say
Meletus is a wrongdoer, because he jokes in earnest, lightly involving people in a lawsuit, 1
pretending to be zealous and concerned about things for which he never cared at all. And that this is
so I will try to make plain to you also.
12 [24c - 25c]
Come here, Meletus, tell me: don't you consider it of great importance [24d] that the youth be
as good as possible?
"I do."
Come now, tell these gentlemen who makes them better? For it is-evident that you know,
since you care about it. For you have found the one who corrupts them, as you say, and you bring
me before these gentlemen and accuse me; and now, come, tell who makes them better and inform
them who he is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and cannot tell? And yet does it not seem
to you disgraceful and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell,
my good man, who makes them better?
[24e] "The laws."
But that is not what I ask, most excellent one, but what man, who knows in the first place just
this very thing, the laws.
"These men, Socrates, the Jurors."
What are you saying, Meletus? Are these gentlemen able to instruct the youth, and do they
make them better?
"Certainly."
All, or some of them and others not?
"All."
Well said, by Hera, and this is a great plenty of helpers you speak of. But how about this:
[25a] Do these listeners make them better, or not?
"These also."
1
Frivolous lawsuits were a problem in the highly litigious Athenian political and financial culture.
To reduce sycophancy, any prosecutor who won less than one fifth of the jury vote had to pay a
fine of one thousand drachmae. Socrates is, here, accusing Meletus of sycophancy.
Apology - 12
And how about the member of the Boulé?
"Yes, the Boulé also."
But, Meletus, those in the Ecclesia, the Ecclesiastai, don't corrupt the youth, do they? Or do
they also all make them better?
"They also."
All the Athenians, then, as it seems, make them excellent, except myself, and I alone corrupt
them. Is this what you mean?
"Very decidedly, that is what I mean."
You have condemned me to great unhappiness! But answer me; does it seem to you to be so
in the case of horses, [25b] that those who make them better are all mankind, and he who injures
them some one person? Or, quite the opposite of this, that he who is able to make them better is
some one person, or very few, the horse-trainers, whereas most people, if they have to do with and
use horses, injure them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in that of all other
animals? Certainly it is, whether you and Anytus deny it or agree; for it would be a great state of
blessedness in the case of the youth if one alone corrupts them, and the others do them good. But,
Meletus, you show clearly enough [25c] that you never thought about the youth, and you exhibit
plainly your own carelessness, that you have not cared at all for the things about which you hale
me into court.
13 [25c - 26a]
But besides, tell us, for heaven's sake, Meletus, is it better to live among good citizens, or bad?
My friend, answer; for I am not asking anything difficult. Do not the bad do some evil to those
who are with them at any time and the good some good?
"Certainly."
[25d] Is there then anyone who prefers to be injured by his associates rather than benefited?
Answer, my good man; for the law orders you to answer. Is there anyone who prefers to be injured?
"Of course not."
Come then, do you hale me in here on the ground that I am corrupting the youth and making
them worse voluntarily or involuntarily?
"Voluntarily I say."
What then, Meletus, are you at your age so much wiser than I at my age, that you have
recognized that the evil [24e] always do some evil to those nearest them, and the good some good;
Apology - 13
whereas I have reached such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make
anyone of my associates bad I am in danger of getting some harm from him, so that I do this great
evil voluntarily, as you say? I don't believe this, Meletus, nor do I think anyone else in the world
does! [26a] But either l do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them, I do it involuntarily, so that you
are lying in both events. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, for such involuntary errors the law is
not to hale people into court, but to take them and instruct and admonish them in private. For it is
clear that if l am told about it, I shall stop doing that which I do involuntarily. But you avoided
associating with me and instructing me, and were unwilling to do so, but you hale me in here:
where it is the law to hale in those who need punishment, not instruction.
14 [26a - 27a]
But enough of this, for, men of Athens, this is clear, as l said, that Meletus never cared much
[26b] or little for these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say, Meletus, that I corrupt
the youth? Or is it evident, according to the indictment you brought, that it is by teaching them not
to believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings? Do you not say that
it is by teaching this that I corrupt them?
"Very decidedly that is what I say."
Then, for the sake of these very gods about whom our speech now is, speak still more clearly
both to me and to these gentlemen, [26c] Meletus: For I am unable to understand whether you say
that I teach that there are some gods, and myself then believe that there are some gods, and am not
altogether godless and am not a wrongdoer in that way, that these, however, are not the gods whom
the state believes in, but others, and this is what you accuse me for, that I believe in others; or you
say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people.
"That is what I say, that you do not believe in gods at all."
You amaze me, Meletus! Why do you say this? [26d] Do I not even believe that the sun or yet
the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do?
"No, by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth."
Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these
gentlemen and think they are so unversed in letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras
Apology - 14
of Clazomenae are full of such utterances? 1 And indeed the youth learn these doctrines from me,
which they can buy sometimes [26e] (if the price is high) for a drachma in the orchestra and laugh
at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially when they are so absurd! But for heaven's
sake, do you think this of me, that I do not believe there is any god?
"No, by Zeus, you don't, not in the least."
You cannot be believed, Meletus, not even, as it seems to me, by yourself. For this man
appears to me, men of Athens, to be altogether hubristic and undisciplined, and actually to have
composed this baseless indictment with arrogance and juvenile carelessness. 2 [27a] For he seems,
as it were, by composing a puzzle to be making a test: "Will Socrates, the wise man, recognize that
I am joking and contradicting myself, or shall I deceive him and the others who hear me?" For he
appears to me to contradict himself in his speech, as if he were to say," Socrates is a wrongdoer,
because he does not believe in gods, but does believe in gods." And yet this is the conduct of a
jester.
15 [27a - 28a]
Join me, then, gentlemen, in examining how he appears to me to say this; and do you, Meletus,
answer; [27b] and you, gentlemen, as I asked you in the beginning, please bear in mind not to
make a disturbance if I conduct my argument in my accustomed manner.
Is there any human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but
no human beings? Let him answer, gentlemen, and not make a disturbance in one way or another.
Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but does believe in things pertaining to horses, or
who does not believe that flute-players exist, but that things pertaining to flute-players do? There
is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and these others here. But answer
at least the next question. [27c] Is there anyone who believes divine things exist, but does not
believe in divinity? 3
"There is not."
1
Anaxagoras of Clazomenae was a Natural Philosopher who lived and taught in Athens from 479
to roughly 429 BC. He was exiled for impiety.
2
This line has been retranslated by the editor to conform more closely with the MS..
3
Fowler has "spiritual things" for δαιμόνια (daimonia) but 'divine' is the correct translation.
Because Greek religious beliefs have long been denigrated as pagan mythology, the Greek
daimon has, in English, evolved into 'demon.'
Apology - 15
Thank you for replying reluctantly when forced by these gentlemen. Then you say that I
believe in divine beings, whether new or old, and teach that belief; but then I believe in divine
beings at any rate, according to your statement, and you swore to that in your indictment. But if I
believe in divine beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in divinity; is it not so? It is; for I
assume that you agree, since you do not answer. But do we not think [27d] the divinities are gods
or children of gods? Yes, or no?
"Certainly."
Then if I believe in divinities, as you say, if divinities are a kind of gods, that would be the
puzzle and joke which I say you are uttering in saying that I, while I do not believe in gods, do
believe in gods again, since I believe in divinities; but if, on the other hand, divinities are a kind
of bastard children of gods, by nymphs or by any others, whoever their mothers are said to be,
what man would believe that there are children of gods, but no gods? It would be just as absurd as
if [27e] one were to believe that there are children of horses and asses, namely mules, but no horses
and asses. But, Meletus, you certainly must have brought this suit either to make a test of us or
because you were at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could accuse me of; but there is no way
for you to persuade any man who has even a little sense that it is possible for the same person to
believe in divine beings and gods and again for the same person not to believe in divine beings or
gods or heroes. [28a] Such a person does not exist.
16 [28a - d]
Well then, men of Athens, that I am not a wrongdoer according to Meletus' indictment, seems
to me not to need much of a defence, but what has been said is enough. But you may be assured
that what I said before is true, that great hatred has arisen against me and in the minds of many
persons. And this it is which will cause my condemnation, if it is to cause it, not Meletus or Anytus,
but the prejudice and dislike of the many. This has condemned many other good men, and I think
will do so; [28b] and there is no danger that it will stop with me. But perhaps someone might say:
"Are you then not ashamed, Socrates, of having followed such a pursuit, that you are now in danger
of being put to death as a result?" But I should make to him a just reply: "You do not speak well,
Sir, if you think a man in whom there is even a little merit ought to consider danger of life or death,
and not rather regard this only, when he does things, whether the things he does are right or wrong
and the acts of a good or a bad man. For according to your argument [28c] all the demigods would
Apology - 16
be bad who died at Troy, including the son of Thetis, 1 who so despised danger, in comparison with
enduring any disgrace, that when his mother (and she was a goddess) said to him, as he was eager
to slay Hector, something like this, I believe, 'My son, if you avenge the death of your friend
Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself shall die;' "for straightway," she says, "after Hector, is death
appointed for you." He, when he heard this, made light of death and danger, [28d] and feared much
more to live as a coward and not to avenge his friends, and 'Straightway,' said he, 'may I die, after
doing vengeance upon the wrongdoer, that I may not stay here, jeered at beside the curved ships,
a burden of the earth.' 2 Do you think he considered death and danger?
For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth; wherever a man stations himself, thinking it is best to
be there, or is stationed by his commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run his
risks, considering neither death nor any other thing more than disgrace. 3
17 [28d - 30b]
So I should have done a terrible thing, [28e] Men of Athens, if, when the commanders whom
you chose to command me stationed me, at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, 4 I remained
where they stationed me, like anybody else, and ran the risk of death, but when the god gave me a
station, as I believed and understood, with orders to spend my life in philosophy and in examining
myself and others, [29a] then I were to desert my post through fear of death or anything else
whatsoever It would be a terrible thing, and truly one might then justly hale me into court, on the
charge that I do not believe that there are gods, since I disobey the oracle and fear death and think
I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, gentlemen, is nothing else than to think one is wise
when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know: For no one knows whether
death be not even the greatest of all blessings to man, but they fear it as if they knew that it is the
greatest of evils. [29b] And is not this the most reprehensible form of ignorance, that of thinking
1
Achilles.
These quotes are from Homer, Iliad xviii 96; 98 & 104.
3
This last section is a tour de force in argumentation. What he is saying is that he, just like any
member of the Jury, knows his Homer and his obligations as a hoplite soldier and citizen. He
might just have said 'Men of Athens, I value our common religious and civic beliefs and customs
just as you do.' But it is much more effective to make the statement as a display.
4
The Siege of Potidaea began in the winter of 432/1 and did not end until the winter of 430/29 BC.
The Battle of Delium was fought in November of 424 and it was very shortly after that
Amphipolis fell to the Spartans without a battle. Socrates could be referring to the battle at
Amphipolis in 421, but he may also be referring to the founding of Amphipolis in 437.
2
Apology - 17
one knows what one does not know? Perhaps, gentlemen, in this matter also I differ from other
men in this way, and if I were to say that, I am wiser in anything, it would be in this, that not
knowing very much about the other world, I do not think I know. But I do know that it is evil and
disgraceful to do wrong and to disobey him who is better than I, whether he be god or man. So I
shall never fear or avoid those things concerning which I do not know whether they are good or
bad rather than those which I know are bad. And therefore, [29c] even if you acquit me now and
are not convinced by Anytus, who said that either I ought not to have been brought to trial at all,
or since I was brought to trial, I must certainly be put to death, adding that if, I were acquitted your
sons would all be utterly ruined by practising what I teach - if you should say to me in reply to
this, "Socrates, this time we will not do as Anytus says, but we will let you go, on this condition,
however, that you no longer spend your time in this investigation or in philosophy, and if you are
caught doing so again you shall die." [29d] If you should let me go on this condition which I have
mentioned, I should say to you, 'Men of Athens, I respect and love you, but I shall obey the god
rather than you, and while I live and am able to continue, I shall never give up philosophy or stop
exhorting you and pointing out the truth to any one of you whom I may meet, saying in my
accustomed way: Most excellent man, are you who are a citizen of Athens, the greatest of cities
and the most famous for wisdom and power, not ashamed to care for the acquisition of wealth
[29e] and for reputation and honour, when you neither care nor take thought for wisdom and truth
and the perfection of your soul?" 1 And if any of you argues the point, and says he does care, I shall
not let him go at once, nor shall I go away, but I shall question and examine and cross-examine
him, and if I find that he does not possess virtue, but says he does, I shall rebuke him for scorning
the things [30a] that are of most importance and caring more for what is of less worth. This I shall
do to whomever I meet, young and old, foreigner and citizen, but most to the citizens, inasmuch
as you are more nearly related to me. Remember that the god commands me to do this, and I
believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about
doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property
[30b] more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does
not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the
individual and to the state. If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, these things must be
1
The irony here is thick: At that time Athens was struggling to recover from her defeat by Sparta
and was still anything but great, powerful or wealth.
Apology - 18
injurious; but if anyone asserts that I say other things than these, he says what is untrue. Therefore
I say to you, men of Athens, either do as Anytus tells you, or not, and either acquit me, or not,
knowing that I shall not change my conduct [30c] even if I am to die many times over.
18 [30c - 31c]
Do not make a disturbance, men of Athens; continue to do what I asked of you, not to interrupt
my speech by disturbances, but to hear me; and I believe you will profit by hearing. Now I am
going to say some things to you at which you will perhaps cry out; but do not do so by any means.
Know that if you kill me, I being such a man as I say I am, you will not injure me so much as
yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus [30d] could injure me; that would be impossible, for I
believe it is not permissible by divine law 1 that a better man be injured by a worse. He might,
however, perhaps kill me or banish me or disfranchise me; and perhaps he thinks he would thus
inflict great injuries upon me, and others may think so, but I do not; I think he does himself a much
greater injury by doing what he is doing now - killing a man unjustly. 2 And so, men of Athens, I
am now making my defence not for my own sake, as one might imagine, but far more for yours,
that you may not by condemning me err in your treatment of the gift the god gave you. [30e] For
if you put me to death, you will not easily find another, who, to use a rather absurd figure, attaches
himself to the city as a gadfly to a horse, 3 which, though large and well bred, is sluggish on account
of his age and needs to be aroused by stinging. I think the god fastened me upon the city in some
such capacity, and I go about arousing, [31a] and urging and reproaching each one of you,
constantly alighting upon you everywhere the whole day long. Such another is not likely to come
to you, gentlemen; but if you take my advice, you will spare me. But you, perhaps, might be angry,
like people awakened from a nap, and might slap me, as Anytus advises, and easily kill me; then
you would pass the rest of your lives in slumber, unless the god, in his care for you, should send
someone else to sting you. And that I am, as I say, a kind of gift from the god [31b] sent to the
city, you might understand from this; for I have neglected all my own affairs and have been
1
Fowler translates themitos as; "…it is not God's will…" But the term applies even to gods and
refers to a law above gods and men.
2
One of the basic tenets of Socratic philosophy: It is better to suffer injustice that to do injustice
because in doing injustice you injure your soul and bring the contempt of the gods upon yourself,
but in suffering injustice you bear only material loss, not spiritual. The argument is developed in
Gorgias (466a ff).
3
After this analogy, Socrates won the nickname, 'The Gadfly.'
Apology - 19
enduring the neglect of my concerns all these years, but I am always busy in your interest, coming
to each one of you individually like a father or an elder brother and urging you to care for virtue;
now that is not like human conduct. If I derived any profit from this and received pay for these
exhortations, there would be some sense in it; but now you yourselves see that my accusers, though
they accuse me of everything else in such a shameless way, have not been able to work themselves
up to such a pitch of shamelessness [31c] as to produce a witness to testify that I ever exacted or
asked pay of anyone. For I think I have a sufficient witness that I speak the truth, namely, my
poverty.
19 [31c - 32a]
Perhaps it may seem strange that I go about and interfere in other people's affairs to give this
advice in private, but do not venture to come before your assembly and advise the state. But the
reason for this, as you have heard me say at many times and places, [31d] is that something divine
and spiritual comes to me, the very thing which Meletus ridiculed in his indictment. I have had
this from my childhood; it is a sort of voice that comes to me, and when it comes it always holds
me back from what I am thinking of doing, but never urges me forward. This it is which opposes
my engaging in politics. And I think this opposition is a very good thing; for you may be quite
sure, men of Athens, that if I had undertaken to go into politics, I should have been put to death
long ago and should have done [31e] no good to you or to myself. And do not be angry with me
for speaking the truth; the fact is that no man will save his life who nobly opposes you or any other
populace and prevents many unjust and illegal things from happening in the state. [32a] A man
who really fights for the right, if he is to preserve his life for even a little while, must be a private
citizen, not a public man.
20 [32a - e]
I will give you powerful proofs of this, not mere words, but what you honour more; actions.
And listen to what happened to me, that you may be convinced that I would never yield to any
one, if that was wrong, through fear of death, but would die rather than yield. The tale I am going
to tell you is ordinary and commonplace, but true. [32b] I, men of Athens, never held any other
office in the state, but served in the Boulé; and it happened that my tribe held the Prytaneia when
you wished to judge collectively, not severally, the ten generals who had failed to gather up the
Apology - 20
slain after the naval battle. 1 This was illegal, as you all agreed afterwards. At that time I was the
only one of the Prytaneis who opposed doing anything contrary to the laws, and although the
orators were ready to impeach and arrest me, and though you urged them with shouts to do so, I
thought [32c] I must run the risk to the end with law and justice on my side, rather than join with
you when your wishes were unjust, through fear of imprisonment or death. That was when the
democracy still existed; and after the oligarchy was established, 2 the Thirty sent for me with four
others to come to the Tholos (Prytaneum) and ordered us to bring Leon the Salaminian from
Salamis to be put to death. They gave many such orders to others also, because they wished to
implicate as many in their crimes as they could. [32d] Then I, however, showed again, by action,
not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that
I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its
power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the Tholos, the
other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have
been put to death for it, if the government had not quickly been put down. [32e] Of these facts you
can have many witnesses. 3
21 [32e - 33b]
Do you believe that I could have lived so many years if I had been in public life and had acted
as a good man should act, lending my aid to what is just and considering that of the highest
importance? Far from it, men of Athens; nor could any other man. [33a] But you will find that
through all my life, both in public, if I engaged in any public activity, and in private, I have always
1
The Battle of Arginusae, in the late Fall of 406 BC (referred to above p.8 n.1). The Athenians
defeated a Spartan fleet and, in the face of a coming storm, chose to pursue the fleeing
Peloponnesian ships rather than collect the bodies of those who had died in the battle. In that
month, probably Pyanepsion, the fifty members of the Boulé from the tribe Antiochis held the
Prytaneia and Socrates was elected (by lot) Epistates (See Ath. Pol. 43 for exegesis).
After the Battle of Arginusae, ten of the general were tried and convicted for failing to recover
the dead, among them was Pericles, son of Pericles (Xen. Hell.i.7.9-15; Mem. iv.4.2: Plut. Per.
24: Diodorus xiii 98 - 103).
2
Athens was defeated by Sparta in 404 BC ending the Peloponnesian War. One of the terms
imposed on Athens was that the Democracy be dissolved and an oligarchic Council of Thirty be
established to govern the city. Their rule, so harsh that they are called the Thirty Tyrants, ended
in rebellion in the Spring of 303 BC.
3
One of those witnesses was Meletus himself, who was one of the four who did arrest and execute
Leon (Andocides 1.94).
Apology - 21
been the same as now, and have never yielded to any one wrongly, whether it were any other
person or any of those who are said by my traducers to be my pupils. But I was never any one's
teacher. If anyone, whether young or old, wishes to hear me speaking and pursuing my mission, I
have never objected, [33b] nor do I converse only when I am paid and not otherwise, but I offer
myself alike to rich and poor; I ask questions, and whoever wishes may answer and hear what I
say. And whether any of them turns out well or ill, I should not justly be held responsible, since I
never promised or gave any instruction to any of them; but if any man says that he ever learned or
heard anything privately from me, which all the others did not, be assured that he is lying. 1
22 [33b - 34b]
But why then do some people love to spend much of their time with me? [33c] You have
heard the reason, men of Athens; for I told you the whole truth; it is because they like to listen
when those are examined who think they are wise and are not so; for it is amusing. But, as I believe,
I have been commanded to do this by the god through oracles and dreams and in every way in
which any man was ever commanded by divine power to do anything whatsoever. This, Athenians,
is true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting some of the young men [33d] and have corrupted
others, surely some of them who have grown older, if they recognise that I ever gave them any bad
advice when they were young, ought now to have come forward to accuse me. Or, if they did not
wish to do it themselves, some of their relatives - fathers or brothers or other kinsfolk - ought now
to tell the facts. And there are many of them present, whom I see; first Crito here, [33e] who is of
my own age and my own deme and father of Critobulus, who is also present; 2 then there is Lysanias
the Sphettian, father of Aeschines, 3 who is here; and also Antiphon of Cephisus, father of
Epigenes. Then here are others whose brothers joined in my conversations, Nicostratus, son of
Theozotides and brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus is dead, so he could not stop him by
entreaties), and Paralus, son of Demodocus; Theages was his brother; [34a] and Adimantus, son
1
We can safely assume that this section is in response to some specific allegations in the speech
by Meletus regarding some of Socrates' more infamous associates such as Alcibiades and Critias.
See above p.9 n.2.
2
According to Demetrius of Byzantium, a lost source cited in Diogenes Laertius ii.20, Crito was
the long-time sponsor of Socrates having "removed him from his workshop and educated him…"
One of Plato's dialogues, Crito, is set in the prison where Socrates awaited execution.
3
Not the famous orator, who was not yet born, this Aeschines was a follower of Socrates but
something of a failure in both his business enterprises and his philosophy.
Apology - 22
of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here; and Aeantodorus, whose brother Apollodorus is present.
And I can mention to you many others, some one of whom Meletus ought certainly to have
produced as a witness in his speech; but if he forgot it then, let him do so now; I yield the floor to
him, and let him say, if he has any such testimony. But you will find that the exact opposite is the
case, gentlemen, and that they are all ready to aid me, the man who corrupts and injures their
relatives, as Meletus and Anytus say. [34b] Now those who are themselves corrupted might have
some motive in aiding me; but what reason could their relatives have, who are not corrupted and
are already older men, unless it be the right and true reason, that they know that Meletus is lying
and I am speaking the truth?
23 [34b - 35b]
Well, gentlemen, this, and perhaps more like this, is about all I have to say in my defence.
Perhaps someone among you may be offended when he remembers his own conduct, [34c] if he,
even in a case of less importance than this, begged and besought the judges with many tears, and
brought forward his children to arouse compassion, and many other friends and relatives; whereas
I will do none of these things, though I am, apparently, in the very greatest danger. Perhaps
someone with these thoughts in mind may be harshly disposed toward me and may cast his vote
in anger. Now if any one of you is so disposed [34d] - I do not believe there is such a person - but
if there should be, I think I should be speaking fairly if I said to him, My friend, I too have relatives,
for I am, as Homer has it, "not born of an oak or a rock," 1 but of human parents, so that I have
relatives and, men of Athens, I have three sons, one nearly grown up, and two still children ; but
nevertheless I shall not bring any of them here and beg you to acquit me. And why shall I not do
so? Not because I am stubborn, Athenians, or lack respect for you. [34e] Whether I fear death or
not is another matter, but for the sake of my good name and yours and that of the whole state, I
think it is not right for me to do any of these things in view of my age and my reputation, whether
deserved or not; for at any rate the opinion prevails that Socrates is in some way superior to most
men. [35a] If, then, those of you who are supposed to be superior either in wisdom or in courage
or in any other virtue whatsoever are to behave in such a way, it would be disgraceful. Why, I have
often seen men who have some reputation behaving in the strangest manner, when they were on
1
Odyssey xix.163, where Penelope is asking Odysseus, who is still in disguise, who he is and what
is his lineage.
Apology - 23
trial, as if they thought they were going to suffer something terrible if they were put to death, just
as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. It seems to me that they are a disgrace to the
state and that any stranger might say that those of the Athenians who excel in virtue, [35b] men
whom they themselves honour with offices and other marks of esteem, are no better than women.
Such acts, men of Athens, we who have any reputation at all ought not to commit, and if we
commit them you ought not to allow it, but you should make it clear that you will be much more
ready to condemn a man who puts, before you such pitiable scenes and makes the city ridiculous
than one who keeps quiet.
24 [35b - d]
But apart from the question of reputation, gentlemen, [35c] I think it is not right to implore
the Juror 1 or to get acquitted by begging; we ought to inform and convince him. 2 For the Juror is
not here to grant favours in matters of justice, but to give judgment; and his oath binds him not to
do favours according to his pleasure, but to judge according to the laws; therefore, we ought not
to get you into the habit of breaking your oaths, nor ought you to fall into that habit; for neither of
us would be acting piously. Do not, therefore, men of Athens, demand of me that I act before you
in a way which I consider neither honourable nor right nor pious, [35d] especially when impiety
is the very thing for which Meletus here has brought me to trial. For it is plain that if by persuasion
and supplication I forced you to break your oaths I should teach you to disbelieve in the existence
of the gods and in making my defence should accuse myself of not believing in them. But that is
far from the truth; for I do believe in them, men of Athens, more than any of my accusers, and I
entrust my case to you and to the god to decide it as shall be best for me and for you.
25: [35d - 36b] The Second Speech
I am not grieved, men of Athens, [36a] at this vote of condemnation you have cast against me,
and that for many reasons, among them the fact that your decision was not a surprise to me. I am
much more surprised by the number of votes for and against it; for I did not expect so small a
1
2
Here as elsewhere Fowler translates dikastes as 'judge' but the more literal translation is 'juror.'
It was the habit for defendants to resort to a practice called the 'Speaker's Pathos' in which
attempts are made to gain the sympathy of the jurors through emotional appeals. Aristotle
(Rhetoric 1354a - b) agrees that the practice should be prohibited.
Apology - 24
majority, but a large one. Now, it seems, if only thirty votes had been cast the other way, I should
have been acquitted. 1 And so, I think, so far as Meletus is concerned, I have even now been
acquitted, and not merely acquitted, but anyone can see that, if Anytus and Lycon had not come
forward to accuse me, [36b] he would have been fined a thousand drachmas for not receiving a
fifth part of the votes.
26 [36b - 37a]
And so the man proposes the penalty of death. Well, then, what shall I propose as an
alternative? Clearly that which I deserve, shall I not? And what do I deserve to suffer or to pay,
because in my life I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what most men care for - money-making
and property, and military offices, and public speaking, and the various offices and confederacies
and factions that come up in the state - [36c] and thinking that I was really too honourable to
engage in those activities and live, refrained from those things by which I should have been of no
use to you or to myself, and devoted myself to conferring upon each citizen individually what I
regard as the greatest benefit? For I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own
perfection in goodness and wisdom rather than for any of his belongings, and for the state itself
rather than for its interests, and to follow the same method in his care for other things. What, then,
does such a man as I deserve? [36d] Some good thing, men of Athens, if I must propose something
truly in accordance with my deserts; and the good thing should be such as is fitting for me. Now
what is fitting for a poor man who is your benefactor, and who needs leisure to exhort you? There
is nothing, men of Athens, so fitting as that such a man be given his meals in the Prytaneum. That
is much more appropriate for me than for any of you who has won a race at the Olympic Games
with a pair of horses or a four-horse team. For he makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make
you happy in reality; [36e] and he is not at all in need of sustenance, but I am needy. So if I must
propose a penalty in accordance with my deserts, [37a] I propose maintenance in the Prytaneum.
27 [37a - e]
Perhaps some of you think that in saying this, as in what I said about lamenting and imploring,
I am speaking in a spirit of bravado; but that is not the case. The truth is rather that I am convinced
that I never intentionally wronged any one; but I cannot convince you of this, for we have
1
With a jury of 501, needing 30 votes to gain the 251 for acquittal, Socrates must have won 221
votes with 280 voting to convict.
Apology - 25
conversed with each other only a little while. I believe if you had a law, as some other people have,
[37b] that capital offenses should not be decided in one day, but only after several days, you would
be convinced; but now it is not easy to rid you of great prejudices in a short time. Since, then, I am
convinced that I never wronged any one, I am certainly not going to wrong myself, and to say of
myself that I deserve anything bad, and to propose any penalty of that sort for myself. Why should
I? Through fear of the penalty that Meletus proposes, about which I say that I do not know whether
it is a good thing or an evil? Shall I choose instead of that something which I know to be an evil?
What penalty shall I propose? Imprisonment? [37c] And why should I live in prison a slave to
those who may be in authority? 1 Or shall I propose a fine, with imprisonment until it is paid? But
that is the same as what I said just now, for I have no money to pay with. Shall I then propose exile
as my penalty? Perhaps you would accept that. I must indeed be possessed by a great love of life
if I am so irrational as not to know that if you, who are my fellow citizens, [37d] could not endure
my conversation and my words, but found them too irksome and disagreeable, so that you are now
seeking to be rid of them, others will not be willing to endure them. No, men of Athens, they
certainly will not. A fine life I should lead if I went away at my time of life, wandering from city
to city and always being driven out! For well I know that wherever I go, the young men will listen
to my talk, as they do here; and if I drive them away, they will themselves persuade their elders to
drive me out, [37e] and if I do not drive them away, their fathers and relatives will drive me out
for their sakes.
28 [37e - 38c]
Perhaps someone might say, "Socrates, can you not go away from us and live quietly, without
talking?" Now this is the hardest thing to make some of you believe. For if I say that such conduct
would be disobedience to the god and that therefore I cannot keep quiet, you will think I am jesting
and will not believe me; [38a] and if again I say that to talk every day about virtue and the other
things about which you hear me talking and examining myself and others is the greatest good to
man, and that the unexamined life is not worth living, 2 you will believe me still less. This is as I
say, gentlemen, but it is not easy to convince you. Besides, I am not accustomed to think that I
1
Only short-term sentences were served in a prison cell in Athens. Those convicted of more serious
crimes were sentenced to slavery in the state-owned mines or other such labour.
2
Another of the Socratic tenets. Socrates taught self-examination; that is, to constantly question
one's own perceptions and attitudes.
Apology - 26
deserve anything bad. If I had money, I would have proposed a fine, [38b] as large as I could pay;
for that would have done me no harm. But as it is, I have no money, unless you are willing to
impose a fine which I could pay. I might perhaps pay a mina of silver. 1 So I propose that penalty;
but Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus, and Aristobulus tell me to propose a fine
of thirty minas, saying that they are sureties for it. So I propose a fine of that amount, and these
men, [38c] who are amply sufficient, will be my sureties.
29 [38c - 39b]: The Third Speech
It is no long time, men of Athens, which you gain, and for that those who wish to cast a slur
upon the state will give you the name and blame of having killed Socrates, a wise man; for, you
know, those who wish to revile you will say I am wise, even though I am not. Now if you had
waited a little while, what you desire would have come to you of its own accord; for you see how
old I am, how far advanced in life and how near death. I say this not to all of you, [38d] but to
those who voted for my death. And to them also I have something else to say. Perhaps you think,
gentlemen, that I have been convicted through lack of such words as would have moved you to
acquit me, if I had thought it right to do and say everything to gain an acquittal. Far from it. An
yet it is through a lack that I have been convicted, not however a lack of words, but of impudence
and shamelessness, and of willingness to say to you such things as you would have liked best to
hear. You would have liked to hear me wailing and lamenting [38e] and doing and saying many
things which are, as I maintain, unworthy of me - such things as you are accustomed to hear from
others. But I did not think at the time that I ought, on account of the danger I was in, to do anything
unworthy of a free man, nor do I now repent of having made my defence as I did, but I much prefer
to die after such a defence than to live after a defence of the other sort. For neither in the court nor
in war ought I or any other man [39a] to plan to escape death by every possible means. In battles
it is often plain that a man might avoid death by throwing down his arms and begging mercy of
his pursuers; and there are many other means of escaping death if one is willing to do and say
anything. But, gentlemen, it is not hard to escape death; it is much harder to escape wickedness,
for that runs faster than death. [39b] And now I, since I am slow and old, am caught by the slower
runner, and my accusers, who are clever and quick, by the faster, wickedness. And now I shall go
1
See above p.6 n.1.
Apology - 27
away convicted by you and sentenced to death, and they go convicted by truth of villainy and
wrong. And I abide by my penalty, and they by theirs. Perhaps these things had to be so, and I
think they are well.
30 [39c - e]
[39c] And now I wish to prophesy to you who have condemned me; for I am now at the time
when men most do prophesy, the time just before death. And I say to you, men who have slain me,
that punishment will come upon you straightway after my death, far more grievous indeed than
the punishment of death which you have meted out to me. For now you have done this to me
because you hoped that you would be relieved from rendering an account of your lives, but I say
that you will find the result far different. [39d] Those who will force you to give an account will
be more numerous than heretofore; men whom I restrained, though you knew it not; and they will
be harsher, inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more annoyed. For if you think that by
putting men to death you will prevent anyone from reproaching you because you do not act as you
should, you are mistaken. That mode of escape is neither possible at all nor honourable, but the
easiest and most honourable escape is not by suppressing others, but by making yourselves as good
as possible. [39e] So with this prophecy to you who condemned me I take my leave.
31 [39e - 40c]
But with those who voted for my acquittal I should like to converse about this which has
happened, while the authorities are busy and before I go to the place where I must die. Wait with
me so long, my friends; for nothing prevents our chatting with each other while there is time. [40a]
I feel that you are my friends, and I wish to show you the meaning of this which has now happened
to me. For, Jurors - and in calling you Jurors I give you your right name 1 - a wonderful thing has
happened to me. For hitherto the customary prophetic monitor always spoke to me very frequently
and opposed me even in very small matters, if I was going to do anything I should not; but now
this thing which might be thought, and is generally considered, the greatest of evils has come upon
me; [40b] but the divine sign did not oppose me either when I left my home in the morning, or
when I came here to the court, or at any point of my speech, when I was going to say anything;
1
A bit of a pun; the Greek dikastes, which can be translated as 'judge' but, in the Athenian legal
system referred to jurors, is based on the Greek root-word dike, 'justice.' Socrates is saying that
those jurors who voted to acquit him are truly just and deserve the name.
Apology - 28
and yet on other occasions it stopped me at many points in the midst of a speech; but now, in this
affair, it has not opposed me in anything I was doing or saying. What then do I suppose is the
reason? I will tell you. This which has happened to me is doubtless a good thing, and those of us
who think death is an evil must be mistaken. [40c] A convincing proof of this has been given me;
for the accustomed sign would surely have opposed me if I had not been going to meet with
something good.
32 [40c - 41c]
Let us consider in another way also how good reason there is to hope that it is a good thing.
For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no
consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to
another place. And if it is unconsciousness, [40d] like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even
dream, death would be a wonderful gain. For I think if anyone were to pick out that night in which
he slept a dreamless sleep and, comparing with it the other nights and days of his life, were to say,
after due consideration, how many days and nights in his life had passed more pleasantly than that
night - believe that not only any private person, but even the great King of Persia himself [40e]
would find that they were few in comparison with the other days and nights. So if such is the nature
of death, I count it a gain; for in that case, all time seems to be no longer than one night. But on
the other hand, if death is, as it were, a change of habitation from here to some other place, and if
what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be, Jurors?
For if a man when he reaches the other world, [41a] after leaving behind these who claim to be
judges, shall find those who are really judges who are said to sit in judgment there, Minos and
Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus 1 and all the other demigods who were just men in their lives, would
the change of habitation be undesirable Or again, what would any of you give to meet with Orpheus
and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? 2 I am willing to die many times over, if these things are
true; for I personally should find the life there wonderful, [41b] when I met Palamedes or Ajax,
the son of Telamon, or any other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment, and
1
Minos is the semi-mythical king of Crete, Rhadamanthus one of his sons. Aeacus was the king
of Aegina and grandfather of Achilles. All three were rewarded for their lives of justice with
positions as judges of the souls of the dead in Hades.
2
Orpheus is the mythical inventor of music and the founder of the Orphic Mysteries. Musaeus,
also mythical, was a disciple of Orpheus and composed music and poetry as he presided over the
cult of Demeter at Eleusis.
Apology - 29
compared my experience with theirs. 1 I think that would not be unpleasant. And the greatest
pleasure would be to pass my time in examining and investigating the people there, as I do those
here, to find out who among them is wise and who thinks he is when he is not. 2 What price would
any of you pay, judges, to examine him who led the great army against Troy, 3 [41c] or Odysseus, 4
or Sisyphus, 5 or countless others, both men and women, whom I might mention? To converse and
associate with them and examine them would be immeasurable happiness. At any rate, the folk
there do not kill people for it; since, if what we are told is true, they are immortal for all future
time, besides being happier in other respects than men are here.
33 [41c - 42a]
But you also, gentlemen of the jury, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this
one truth, [41d] that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, nor are his deeds
overlooked by the gods. So, too, this which has come to me has not come by chance, but I see
plainly that it was better for me to die now and be freed from troubles. That is the reason why the
sign never interfered with me, and I am not at all angry with those who condemned me or with my
accusers. And yet it was not with that in view that they condemned and accused me, [41e] but
because they thought to injure me. They deserve blame for that. However, I make this request of
them: when my sons grow up, gentlemen, punish them by troubling them as I have troubled you;
if they seem to you to care for money or anything else more than for virtue, and if they think they
amount to something when they do not, rebuke them as I have rebuked you because they do not
care for what they ought, and think they amount to something when they are worth nothing. If you
do this, [42a] both I and my sons shall have received just treatment from you.
But now the time has come to go away. I go to die, and you to live; but which of us goes to
the better lot, is known to none but God.
1
All three were participants in the Trojan War.
There is a joke here: Palamedes, is the mythical wise man, poet and inventor and Socrates is
likely eager to prove that Palamedes did not invent many of the things he takes credit for.
3
Agamemnon, King of Mycenae and leader of the expedition against Troy.
4
King of Ithaca and one of the captains serving under Agamemnon. Odysseus is famous for being
clever and deceitful. He is also the principal character of the Odyssey.
5
Mythical king of Corinth and an all-round villain. For his wicked life, Sisyphus is punished in
Hades by having to role a stone up a hill only to have it role back down.
2
The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women's Health Movement and
Epistemologies of Ignorance
Tuana, Nancy.
Hypatia, Volume 21, Number 3, Summer 2006, pp. 1-19 (Article)
Published by Indiana University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hyp.2006.0037
For additional information about this article
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hyp/summary/v021/21.3tuana02.html
Access Provided by University of Michigan @ Ann Arbor at 01/08/13 3:51PM GMT
The Speculum of Ignorance:
The Women’s Health Movement and
Epistemologies of Ignorance
Nancy Tuana
This essay aims to clarify the value of developing systematic studies of ignorance as
a component of any robust theory of knowledge. The author employs feminist efforts
to recover and create knowledge of women’s bodies in the contemporary women’s
health movement as a case study for cataloging different types of ignorance and
shedding light on the nature of their production. She also helps us understand the
ways resistance movements can be a helpful site for understanding how to identify,
critique, and transform ignorance.
The Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, Jane,
Carol Downer, Lorraine Rothman, and Belita Cowan,
conceived history. They imagined, as did countless others,
new ways of thinking about their bodies and taking control
of their reproductive lives. Then they acted. Working from
their own kitchens or from borrowed rooms in schools,
churches, and community centers, they presided over the
multiple births of the women’s health movement.
—Sandra Morgen
The women’s health movement, which spread across the United States in the
1970s and 1980s, is often characterized as a liberation movement. In this essay,
I argue that it was also an epistemological movement. The women’s health
movement developed hand in hand with the wider women’s movement, but
Hypatia vol. 21, no. 3 (Summer 2006) © by Nancy Tuana
Hypatia
was focused on women’s bodies and women’s health, with the goal not only of
providing women with knowledge, but also of developing new knowledge. In the
words of the authors of Our Bodies, Ourselves, the volume “contains real material
about our bodies and ourselves that isn’t available elsewhere, and we have tried
to present it in a new way—an honest, humane, and powerful way of thinking
about ourselves and our lives. We want to share the knowledge and power that
comes with this way of thinking and we want to share the feelings we have for
each other” (Boston Women’s Health Book Collective 1973, 2).
The women’s health movement, while a diverse movement, aimed to take our
bodies back from the institutions of medicine and reframe our knowledge and
experiences of our bodies in ways not configured by sexism and androcentrism.
In this sense, the women’s health movement was an epistemological resistance
movement geared at undermining the production of ignorance about women’s
health and women’s bodies in order to critique and extricate women from
oppressive systems often based on this ignorance, as well as creating liberatory
knowledges.1 While one aspect of the women’s health movement was to make
available to women basic medical knowledge that at that time was accessible
only to health-care professionals, an equally important goal of the women’s
health movement was to reexamine traditional medicine, not simply in order
to “get it right,” but rather to transform our knowledge of women’s bodies so
as to remove oppression, to augment women’s lives, and to transform society.
The members of the women’s health movement were motivated by justice and
by love, not only by truth.2
In this essay, I argue that what I and others have labeled “epistemologies of
ignorance” were a key strategic technology of the women’s health movement.
These feminist health activists were committed to uncovering the ways women’s
bodies had been ignored, to examining knowledge that had been withheld from
women and certain groups of men, to reclaiming knowledges that had been
denied or suppressed, and to developing new knowledge freed from the confines
of traditional frameworks.
My focus on the women’s health movement concerns the circulation of
knowledge/ignorance and resistance. I have argued elsewhere that if we are to
fully understand the complex practices of knowledge production and the variety
of factors that account for why something is known, we must also understand
the practices that account for not knowing, that is, for our lack of knowledge
about a phenomenon or, in some cases, an account of the practices that resulted
in a group unlearning what was once a realm of knowledge (Tuana 2004). In
this essay, I would like to extend my earlier work, both clarifying the value of
epistemologies of ignorance and, through a study of the ways epistemologies of
ignorance were a key component of the women’s health movement, suggesting
that epistemologies of ignorance are often integral to resistance movements.
Nancy Tuana
Ignorance in the realm of science is typically depicted as a gap in knowledge:
something that we do not (yet) know. But the condition of not knowing is not
(always) that simple. Just as any adequate account of knowledge must include
far more than the truth of that piece of knowledge—including, for instance, an
analysis of why those who are in a position of authority (which itself requires a
genealogical analysis) have come to accept that belief as true—so too ignorance
in the fields of knowledge production is far more complex an issue than something we simply do not yet know.3 In this essay, I use the example of feminist
efforts to recover and create knowledge of women’s bodies in the contemporary
women’s health movement as a case study for cataloging different types of
ignorance and shedding light on the nature of their production. I also clarify
the ways resistance movements can be a helpful site for understanding how to
identify, critique, and transform ignorance.
A Taxonomy of Ignorance
If we are to enrich our understanding of the production of knowledge in a
particular field, then we must also examine the ways in which not knowing is
sustained and sometimes even constructed. But just as our epistemologies have
moved away from the dream of any simple calculus for knowledge, the elusive
justified true belief, so too must any effort to understand ignorance recognize
that it is a complex phenomena, which, like knowledge, is situated. As Donna
Haraway reminded us:
We also don’t want to theorize the world, much less act within
it, in terms of Global Systems, but we do need an earth-wide
network of connections, including the ability partially to translate knowledges among very different—and power-differentiated—communities. We need the power of modern critical
theories of how meanings and bodies get made, not in order to
deny meaning and bodies, but in order to live in meanings and
bodies that have a chance for a future. (1991, 187)
To this I would add that we need the ability partially to translate practices of ignorance among very different—and power-differentiated—communities. Ignorance,
like knowledge, is situated. Understanding the various manifestations of ignorance and how they intersect with power requires attention to the permutations
of ignorance in its different contexts. While my effort here is to provide a taxonomy, I do not intend to provide categories of ignorance that float free from the
specificities of communities and agencies. My goal is to further the work that has
been done by feminists and other epistemologists who embrace the situatedness
of knowledge by reflecting on the role of not knowing and to encourage further
Hypatia
work in this arena by reflecting on the ways ignorance about women’s bodies
and health circulated and was (sometimes) disrupted by the epistemological
work of the U.S. women’s health movement. Through this examination I offer
the groundwork of a taxonomy of ignorance. While any such taxonomy will
fall short of reflecting the complexity of actual practice, it provides a form of
clarity that can be helpful in a field that has itself been largely ignored due to
the theories of knowledge that have been made to be dominant.4
Knowing That We Do Not Know, But Not Caring to Know
—not linked to present interests
It is a commonplace in the study of science that scientists do not aimlessly
chase truth. A topic is judged worthy of attention for various reasons: it can be
seen as key to advancing a large or important body of knowledge; it can be seen
as potentially lucrative; it might be judged essential to national security, and so
on. And there are numerous factors that can affect the judgment of “interest”
both positively and negatively: for example, the government (or venture capital)
may have decided to divert large sums of funding to or from that topic, theories
related to that topic may have been recently reinforced or undermined.
Ignorance is sometimes the result of the configurations of interest. Take the
case of male contraceptives. In her 1977 article, “Have You Ever Wondered about
the Male Pill?” Rita Arditti noted that far more contraceptive agents were being
developed for use by females than for males. And indeed, as the numbers of
contraceptive options for women began to increase dramatically from the 1960s
to the present, with the availability of hormone-based contraceptives from birth
control pills to implants to injections, male contraceptive choices remained
relatively constant: condoms and vasectomies. The interests here were those of
the drug companies that decided research in the area of hormonal contraception for men would not be profitable.5 There were some initial hormonal trials
for male contraceptive pills in the 1960s. However, the belief that men would
be less motivated than women to use such a contraceptive and less willing to
accept the side effects fueled corporate sentiment that the profit margin for male
contraceptives did not warrant the research or marketing expenses required for
developing or selling this knowledge (See Oudshoorn 2003). Arditti argued that
concern over “loss of libido” was a major factor in prohibiting research in the
area of male birth control pills. Yet, she noted that the same “loss of libido” was
“almost never taken into consideration when dealing with female contraception, the obvious bias being that women do not have anything to lose since the
‘active’ force in sexual intercourse stems from the male” (1977, 123).
The so-called side effects from birth control pills were problematic for many
women. These included blood clots, depression, nausea, fatigue, migraines, and
lack of sex drive. As Arditti and others in the women’s health movement noted,
Nancy Tuana
such side effects were seen as unacceptable for men but tolerable for women,
perhaps because those associated with mood—lower sex drive, depression, or
fatigue—were seen as compatible with female gender roles.
To understand this instance of ignorance it is important to reflect on pharmaceutical companies’ biases. Research and development spokespeople argued
that women would and men would not be motivated to use birth control pills. In
addition to concern about men’s libidos, another central argument for this belief
revolved around two claims: first, that contraception is women’s responsibility
and second, that men would not be motivated to use contraceptives. The latter
claim is as much a piece of ignorance as the former, in that it involves forgetting
that until the development of the diaphragm in 1882, men were typically responsible for birth control, particularly in the marital context and took steps to prevent conception when another birth would not be in their best interest. Because
of such biases, however, the decision makers at pharmaceutical companies
deemed knowledge of male birth control pills not worth developing.
So where are we now? Despite the ensuing forty-plus years since the birth
control pill became popular, there still are no male contraceptive pills or
injections or implants are available outside of medical trials, although some
are predicting that one is right around the corner—well, if the market analysis
is favorable. According to Dr. Richard Anderson, a member of the Centre for
Reproductive Biology at the University of Edinburgh, “There are lots of studies,
including the world’s first phase-three trial for a male contraceptive in China.
I think the industry was skeptical that there was a real market. But now they
are putting big money into it. They clearly think there is a product, and money,
to be made. The million-dollar question is: when? Within this decade seems
realistic” (quoted in Dobson 2003).
With male hormonal contraceptives we have a case of knowing that we do
not know. It is not that this contraceptive possibility was overlooked. Indeed,
researchers knew that it was a theoretical option along with female hormonal
contraceptives. This, rather, is a case of not being willing to engage in the
research needed to know because such knowledge is not deemed important
by those in the position to initiate (and fund) such research. In this case,
the decision that such knowledge is not valuable is linked to privilege and to
oppression. We can easily add to the examples in this category of ignorance
from the women’s health movement—knowing that we do not know, but not
caring to know. Female ejaculation, for example, is an arena of knowledge that
is to this day widely ignored by researchers. Menopause is another nexus of
knowledge/ignorance that activist-scholars in the women’s health movement
made an important site of their epistemological resistance work. As a result
of those efforts and, arguably, shifts in perceived marketability, menopause is
a far more sophisticated site of knowledge production today. Nonetheless, as
the recent Women’s Health Initiative study of hormone replacement therapy
Hypatia
demonstrates, knowledge about menopause remains remarkably inadequate to
women’s health needs.
This aspect of ignorance is the mirror image of any study of values in science,
and thus fits hand in hand with the work done by such feminist philosophers
of science as Helen Longino, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Alison Wylie.
The question of whose interests are being served sheds light not only on how
values impact what we know, but also how they impact what we do not know
and why.
We Do Not Even Know That We Do Not Know
—current interests/knowledge block such knowledge
Another category of ignorance involves topics that we do not even know that
we do not know because our current interests, beliefs, and theories obscure them.
This is a category of ignorance that is difficult to identify without hindsight
and which can, once identified, slip into the previous category of knowing that
we do not know but having no interest in coming to know. While this form
of ignorance need not involve sexist or androcentric biases, when it comes to
women’s bodies it often does.
Take the case of clitoral structures. While twentieth-century medical and
anatomical illustrations included careful examinations of male and female
genitalia, the anatomy of the clitoris was not a focus of attention, even to the
point of being totally ignored in some mid-century textbooks (see Moore and
Clarke 1995). Even when authors or illustrators represented the clitoris, they
depicted it as an undifferentiated nub. I have argued elsewhere that ignorance
of clitoral structures was due in large part to the reproductive bias of the anatomies of female (and male) genitalia (Tuana 2004). As just one illustration of
this claim, consider the arbitrary division of the genitalia into external and
internal genitalia. For men, the penis is categorized as an external genital, but
testicles get divided in two, with the scrotum being listed as an external sex
organ and the testes as internal. Since many parts of the penis are internal,
one wonders why this distinction has been made. But when it comes to the
analogous division of female genitals, there is more than arbitrariness at work.
The politics of reproduction is written explicitly into this division, for another
descriptive phrase for the internal female sex organs is “the female reproductive
system” (Rathus 2002, 106). Because medical knowledge focused on reproductive
systems, the components of women’s so-called external genitalia, which were
seen as including the clitoris and the labia, have been ignored in contemporary
accounts of female anatomy.
In earlier centuries, medical theorists postulated that a female orgasm was
necessary for conception. But once the connection between women’s orgasms
and conception was severed, few anatomists saw any value in examining the
Nancy Tuana
structures or even the functions of the clitoris. The emphasis on knowledge of
reproduction became a barrier to knowledge of the clitoris and what knowledge
scientists had developed quickly became forgotten. Hence, while scientists were
becoming increasingly ignorant concerning clitoral physiology, their emphasis
on reproduction precluded their knowledge of this fact. They did not know that
they did not know.
In the response of feminists involved in the women’s health movement to this
practice of ignorance we see a clear example of an epistemology of resistance
that involves epistemologies of ignorance as tools. While the women’s health
movement did not ignore reproduction—indeed, they paid very close attention
to it—they also did not ignore women’s sexuality. And anyone who pays attention knows well the importance of the clitoris in female sexual pleasure. For
feminists in the early stages of women’s liberation movement, such knowledge
was political and was a source of resistance to oppressive conceptions of women’s
bodies. One of the many goals of the women’s health movement was to resist
and transform androcentric and sexist renditions of female sexuality. As Ann
Koedt explained in her now classic “The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm,”
Women have thus been defined sexually in terms of what pleases
men; our own biology has not been properly analyzed. Instead,
we are fed the myth of the liberated woman and her vaginal
orgasm—an orgasm which in fact does not exist. What we must
do is redefine our sexuality. We must discard the “normal” concepts of sex and create new guidelines which take into account
mutual sexual enjoyment. . . . We must begin to demand that if
certain sexual positions now defined as “standard” are not mutually conducive to orgasm, they no longer be defined as standard.
New techniques must be used or devised which transform this
particular aspect of our current sexual exploitation. (1970, 38)
The women’s health movement’s commitment to redefining our sexuality
included redefining anatomical knowledge of the clitoris. Many early feminist
views of the clitoris, Koedt’s in particular, viewed it as the sole location of
female sexual satisfaction. Regardless of how many sites of sexual satisfaction
were identified, no one who starts from women’s sexual experiences (an early
applied phenomenology) can miss the significance of the clitoris. The ignorance
that had been produced by a conception of women’s genitalia defined solely
via reproductive function was replaced in the epistemologies of the women’s
health movement with knowledge arising from embodied experience. Our
Bodies, Ourselves offered an enlarged body of knowledge of the clitoris, not
only providing far more information about its role in female sexual pleasure,
but also depicting it as including three structures: the shaft, the glans, and the
crura. These internal and external clitoral structures were richly detailed in
Hypatia
A New View of Woman’s Body, published in 1981 by the Federation of Feminist
Women’s Health Centers.
Attention to forms of ignorance such as this, where the experiences and
values of a group are being ignored in the production of knowledge, has been
the subject of feminist standpoint theorists.6 Here, both women’s experiences
and the values of feminist theorists can become sites for resisting ignorance
and transforming knowledge. The politics of knowledge central to the women’s
health movement was to take back our bodies by putting knowledge of them
back into our own hands. Members of the Boston Women’s Health Collective
did not simply consult medical textbooks to understand the sexual organs or
sexuality, but turned to their bodies. Genital self-exam was an epistemic practice that the women’s health movement used to undermine ignorance. Politics
demanded embodied knowledge, which in turn illuminated the deep ignorance
of standard accounts. Listen, for example, to the embodied episteme of the
following quotation from Our Bodies, Ourselves:
As you gently spread the inner lips apart, you can see that they
protect a delicate area between them. This is the vestibule.
Look more closely at it. Starting from the front, right below the
mons area you will see the inner lips joining to form a soft fold
of skin, or hood, over and connecting to the glans, or tip of the
clitoris. Gently pull the hood up to see the glans. This is the
most sensitive spot in the entire genital area. It is made up of
erectile tissue which swells during sexual arousal. Let the hood
slide back over the glans. Extending from the hood up to the
public symphysis, you can now feel a hardish, rubbery, movable
cord right under the skin. It is sometimes sexually arousing if
touched. This is the shaft of the clitoris . . . at the point where
you can no longer feel the shaft of the clitoris it divides into two
parts, spreading out wishbone fashion, but at a much wider angle,
to form the crura, the two anchoring wingtips which attach to
the pelvic bones. The crura of the clitoris are about three inches
long. (1973, 27)
This quotation offers a feeling of how the women’s health movement resisted
ignorance by enabling each of us to embody this important knowledge and to
insist that we literally take it into our own hands. Here we see both in practice
as well as in content that the women’s health movement was employing an
epistemology of ignorance as a crucial component of their epistemology of
resistance. Attentive to the complex interests that had produced ignorance
about clitoral structures, members of the women’s health movement crafted
an epistemic practice designed to resist this ignorance not simply by informing
women but by encouraging them to become embodied knowers.
Nancy Tuana
They Do Not Want Us to Know
—the ignorance of certain groups is systematically culti...
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