Plato’s Republic, Book I The Republic is arguably Plato’s most well-known dialogue. The dialogue’s focus is justice and the just life. Plato’s Republic, Book I The dialogue begins with a conversation between Cephalus and Socrates. Cephalus says … What I have to say probably wouldn't persuade most people. But you know, Socrates, that when someone thinks his end is near, he becomes frightened and concerned about things he didn't fear before. It's then that the stories we're told about Hades, about how people who've been unjust here must pay the penalty there—stories he used to make fun of—twist his soul this way and that for fear they're true. And whether because of the weakness of old age or because he is now closer to what happens in Hades and has a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding and fear, and he examines himself to see whether he has been unjust to anyone. If he finds many injustices in his life, he awakes from sleep in terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of bad things to come. (continued on next slide) Plato’s Republic, Book I The dialogue begins with a conversation between Cephalus and Socrates. Cephalus says (continued from previous slide) … But someone who knows that he hasn't been unjust has sweet good hope as his constant companion—a nurse to his old age, as Pindar says, for he puts it charmingly, Socrates, when he says that when someone lives a just and pious life “Sweet hope is in his heart / Nurse and companion to his age / Hope, captain of the ever-twisting / Minds of mortal men.” How wonderfully well he puts that. It's in this connection that wealth is most valuable, I'd say, not for every man but for a decent and orderly one. Wealth can do a lot to save us from having to cheat or deceive someone against our will and from having to depart for that other place in fear because we owe sacrifice to a god or money to a person. It has many other uses, but, benefit for benefit, I'd say that this is how it is most useful to a man of any understanding. (330d-331b). Plato’s Republic, Book I Cephalus then offers this definition of justice, “[…] justice […] is speaking the truth and paying whatever debts one has incurred” (331c). Why does this attempt fail as a definition of justice? Plato’s Republic, Book I Polemarchus offers this definition of justice, “… it is just to give to each what is owed to him” (331e). Why does this attempt fail as a definition of justice? The answer is found in the following counterargument that Socrates presents: “everyone would surely agree that if a sane man lends weapons to a friend and then asks for them back when he is out of his mind, the friend shouldn't return them, and wouldn't be acting justly if he did. Nor should anyone be willing to tell the whole truth to someone who is out of his mind” (331c). Plato’s Republic, Book I Polemarchus then revises his definition. He says, “… that friends owe it to their friends to do good for them, never harm … [and] what enemies owe to each other is appropriately and precisely — something bad” (332a-b). So, according to Polemarchus, justice is to do good to one’s friends and to do harm to one’s enemies. Plato’s Republic, Book I Socrates and Polemarchus examine more closely this definition of justice, suggesting that justice is an art or craft (technê) that gives benefits to friends and does harm to enemies. But if so, then this definition fails on two counts, 1. Justice as a technê has no domain: it is a craft of nothing specific and therefore cannot be of any use. It is other technai that benefit our friends and harm our enemies (332c-333e). 2. The expert knows how to produce the good by employing his/her art, but also knows how to produce the bad. If so, and if justice is a craft, the just person will both guard money and steal it. But this is unacceptable, as it is an essential feature of justice that it aims at the good (333e-334b). Plato’s Republic, Book I So understanding justice as a technê fails (at least, this version of it). Still, Polemarchus insists that justice is to do good to one’s friends and to do harm to one’s enemies. But are we not, at least sometimes, mistaken as to who is good and who is bad? How does this affect Polemarchus’s definition? (Hint: see 334b-e) Plato’s Republic, Book I Polemarchus amends his previous definition to read: justice is to treat well a friend who is good and to harm an enemy who is bad. (335a) However, it is the ergon of goodness to benefit, and the just person is good. Therefore, the just person benefits while the unjust person harms. Socrates and Polemarchus conclude from this that it is never just to harm anyone (335e). Consequently, this definition must be dropped. Plato’s Republic, Book I At this point Thrasymachus thrusts himself into the discussion, and offers his own definitions of justice. 1. Justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger. (338c) 2. Justice is nothing but obeying the laws. (338e-339a) 3. Justice is to obey the rulers. (339b) 4. Justice is the advantage of another. (343c) Plato’s Republic, Book I Since Thrasymachus’s third definition is a combination of the earlier two definitions, Socrates focuses on it. Again, it reads, justice is to obey the rulers. But rulers can find themselves in error — they can prescribe laws that are not in fact to their advantage. How does this affect Thrasymachus’s definition? (Hint: see 339e-340b) Plato’s Republic, Book I Thrasymachus amends his third definition by asserting, “a ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and this his subjects must do” (340e-341a). Plato’s Republic, Book I Thrasymachus’s revised or precise definition is refuted in this way, 1. Justice is to obey the rulers. 2. No technê seeks its own advantage, but the advantage of that of which it is the craft (341d-342b). 3. No kind of knowledge rules or orders what is advantageous to itself, but what is advantageous to the weaker, which is subject to it. (342c-e) So, 4. No one in any position of rule, insofar as he is a ruler, seeks or orders what is advantageous to himself but what is advantageous to his subjects. (342e) Plato’s Republic, Book I Thrasymachus responds harshly to Socrates’s cross-examination. He points out that shepherds take of their flocks for their own advantage; in this same sense rulers rule their subjects for their own advantage (see 343b). But Thrasymachus is not satisfied with this rebuttal. He proceeds to contend, 1. Justice is to one’s disadvantage, while injustice is to one’s advantage; that 2. The most complete injustice makes the doer of that injustice happiest and the sufferers of it most wretched and miserable; and hence 3. Injustice, if on a grand enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. Plato’s Republic, Book I How does Socrates respond to Thrasymachus’s latest rebuttal? He contends that 1. A just person is clever and good, while an unjust person is ignorant and bad. (348b-350c) 2. It is only just persons that are capable of doing things together; unjust persons are not able to act together. (351b-352c) 3. The ergon of the soul is governing the body, and its aretê is justice. Therefore, only a just soul lives well, is blessed, and happy. By contrast, an unjust soul lives badly, is wretched, and unhappy. (352d-354a) From which Socrates concludes that injustice is never more profitable than justice. (354a) PLATO'S MENO 70a 79e 70 a: can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these but men possess it by nature or in some other way? 71b: the priority of definition. 'If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it possesses? Or do you think that someone who does not know at all who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or well born, or the opposite of these? Do you think that is possible? - I do not. But, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? What is virtue? 71e - 72a: Unity of Definition Meno's first definition is the wrong answer: there are many virtues, one for every man, every action, every age, every task. Socrates retorts that he is looking for one virtue, but Meno gives him a whole swarm of virtues. Socrates is asking what is ‘one and the same form that makes them virtues' (72c). As health has the same form in everyone, and the same holds strength, largeness, and the form of a bee, so virtue should have the same form in everyone and everywhere - man, woman, child, freeman and slave, young and old. 73a: Meno doubts this. 'I think, Socrates, that somehow this is no longer like those other cases'. Socrates demonstrates that virtue is indeed like those other cases: “all human beings are good in the same way, for they become good by acquiring the same qualities (sc. justice and moderation)' (73a-c). 73c: Meno's second definition: “Virtue is to be able to rule over people', He claims that this description fits them all. 73d: Socrates shows that this definition runs the risk of inconsistency: it applies to masters but not to slaves, to adults but not to children. To explain to Meno just what sort of definition he is looking for he gives the example of shape. He gives different sorts of definitions of shape. a) a mathematical definition: shape is the limit of a solid (76a, e). b) a physical definition: shape is that which always accompanies colour (75b). Colour, in its turn, is defined as effluence of shapes, commensurable with sight and thus perceptible' (76d). But, Socrates continues, if shapes flow from external bodies to the eye, how can shape still be "the limit of a solid”? Clearly, the physical definition runs into problems that do not affect the mathematical definition - inconsistency and regress. 77b-79e: Meno's third definition. 77b: 'virtue is, as the poet says, "to find joy in beautiful things and have power”. So, I say that virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them', Meno concedes that people desire beautiful things in so far as they believe them to be good. Socrates infers: 78c: “Then, according to your argument, virtue is the power of securing good things'. 78e: Virtue is the power of securing good things justly or moderately or piously or with some other part of virtue. If this is not the case, the definiendum will not be virtue, even though it may secure good things. 79b-c: It follows that to act with a part of virtue is virtue, e.g. to act with justice, which is a part of virtue, is virtue as a whole. But Socrates asked what is virtue as a whole. Answering in terms of parts of virtue does not address the question 'what is the nature of virtue'. In fact, this definition is threatened by circularity: if we do not understand virtue first, how can we understand its parts? 80a-b: Meno likens Socrates to a torpedo fish. 80d: Meno's paradox “How will you look for it (sc. virtue), Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? How will you aim to search for something you do not know at all? If you should meet with it, how will you know that this is the thing that you did not know?' 80e: Socrates responds that this is a debater's argument: we cannot search either for what we know or for what we do not know. We cannot search for what we know, because we have no need to. And we cannot search for what we do not know, because we do not know what to look for. Socrates answers the paradox by the theory of recollection (anamnesis). 81a-e: Recollection A) The soul is immortal. It has been born many times, It has seen all things both here and in the world beyond. It has learned everything there is to learn. B) Knowledge, once possessed, can be recollected. The soul has possessed all knowledge. The soul can recollect all knowledge - every single piece of knowledge. C) The whole of nature is akin. Every piece of nature is connected with every other piece of nature. Every piece of knowledge is connected with every other piece of knowledge. Starting from one piece of knowledge that a person is conscious of one can drag out of that person all knowledge there is. One will rely on that person's conscious knowledge in order to drag out that person's latent knowledge. On this view, all learning is recollection. The job of the teacher is not to transmit knowledge, but to ask the right questions in the right order and with the right method so as to help the student recollect the knowledge latent in him. MENO (second part) 81e-85b. A practical demonstration of recollection: one of Meno's house servants, a boy known never to have studied geometry, is taken by Socrates' systematic questioning and with the help of diagrams through the problem of constructing a square with twice the area of a given square. While initially he gives wrong answers, he realizes his mistakes and finally arrives at the right answer. Since the boy had no knowledge of geometry, and since Socrates did nothing more than ask him questions, it would seem to follow that the right answer was in the boy. Learning how to solved the geometrical problem under consideration was a matter of recollecting the relevant knowledge from within himself. 856-86c: Socrates summarizes what has been achieved and draws certain implications. “These (sc. the boy's) opinions have now just been stirred up like a dream, but if he were repeatedly asked these same questions in various ways, you know that in the end his knowledge about these things would be as accurate as anyone's. - It is likely. - And he will know it without having been taught but only questioned, and find the knowledge within himself? - Yes. - And is not finding knowledge within oneself recollection? - Certainly.' (85c-d). “Then, if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul would be immortal, so that you should always confidently try to seek out and recollect what you do not know at present, i.e. what you do not recollect (at present)' (86b). 86c. Socrates asks again the question “What is Virtue?!” The enquiry into virtue is resumed at 860-89a. Socrates agrees with Meno's request to address the initial question whether virtue is teachable and he proposes to apply the method of hypothesis (86-87b), He argues as follows: if virtue is good, then virtue is knowledge; and if virtue is knowledge, then it can be taught. The first hypothesis, a) virtue is good, is extremely plausible. So, the main aim of the argument is to establish that the second hypothesis, b) virtue is knowledge, follows from the first. Socrates argues that, on the hypothesis that virtue is good, everything that we count as good is good only derivately, namely only in so far as it is guided by knowledge or wisdom. Hence the only non-derivative but intrinsic good is knowledge or wisdom. The question that remains pending is whether virtue is the whole of wisdom or only part of it (89). As may be expected, Meno infers that, on the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge, it can be taught (89c). But who are the teachers of virtue? 89c-96c develops an argument for the conclusion that, in truth, virtue is not teachable: there are no teachers of virtue - not the sophists, not the politicians who have been good at public affairs. These empirical observations suggest the conclusion that virtue cannot be taught. 96d: Meno asks whether there is any good or virtuous person and, if there is, how does one become good or virtuous. Socrates replies that they have failed to understand how one becomes good, because they have failed to see that people are good or successful in their affairs not only under the direction of knowledge, but also under the direction of true belief. For instance, one can direct others correctly either through knowledge or through true opinion (97a-b). 'we said that only knowledge can guide correct action, for true opinion can also do so' (97b-c). 97c-d. Why is knowledge considered more valuable than true belief? How does knowledge differ from true belief? 97e-98a. The statues of Daedalus run away and escape if one does not tie them down.. Although they are fine, they are not worth very much, for they do not remain in our possession, Something similar holds for true beliefs: unless they are tied down by an account, they escape from our mind and flee. Therefore, even though they are fine so long as they remain, they do not have much value. If they are tied down by an account, they become knowledge and remain in place. Socrates' answer implies, first, that an item of knowledge is itself a true belief, which qualifies as knowledge when it is tied down by an explanatory account. Second, Socrates suggests that there are two sources of value: truth, which is shared by knowledge and true belief, and stability, which is possessed only by knowledge but not by true belief. The possibility remains open that the value that knowledge has is not so much a matter of stability as of the manner by which such stability is secured: a logos, explanatory account involving reference to the aitiai, causes. Let us now return to the problem of the transmission of virtue. Does Socrates really suggest that virtue is not knowledge and this is why there are no teachers of it? Two options present themselves: a) Only knowledge can be taught, but virtue is not knowledge. Eminent Athenians have virtue and are successful in their affairs because they have virtue. But since virtue is not knowledge, they cannot transmit virtue to others. b) Only knowledge can be taught, and virtue is knowledge. Eminent Athenians do not have virtue and hence cannot teach the knowledge they do not have. How are they successful? Not through knowledge, but through true belief.
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