Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:497-506, 2012 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group. LLC ISSN: 1057-61 OX print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.684647 IJ Routledge I^ Taylor & Francis Group Introduction Present Day Piracy: Scope, Dimensions, Dangers, and Causes PETER CHALK RAND Corporation Santa Monica, CA, USA STIG JARLE HANSEN International Relations Norwegian University of Life Sciences As, Norway Why lias international piracy re-emerged as a threat to international shipping? The article introduces the factors that influence modem piracy, and explore the causes of it in more general terms. This introduction provides an overview of the scope and dimensions ofmodern-day piracy. It looks at problems ofdeßnition, statistics, location of attacks and main drivers. The article suggests that there is a limited set of geographical clusters that drive contemporary piracy, each of which require their own unique and separate national and international counter-measures. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the European Communist eastern bloc in the late 1980s it was confidently assumed that the international system was on the threshold of an era of unprecedented peace and stability. Politicians, academics, and diplomats alike increasingly began to forecast the imminent establishment of a new world "order" that would be managed by liberal democratic institutions, and that would develop within the context of an integrated global economy based on the principles of the free market.' As this unprecedented inter-state structure emerged and took root, so it was assumed that destabilizing threats to national and international security would decline commensurately. However, the initial euphoria that was evoked by the end of the Cold War has been replaced by the resignation that global stability has not been achieved and has, in fact, been decisively undermined by transnational security challenges, or so-called gray area phenomena. More specifically, the geopolitical landscape that presently confronts the global community lacks the relative stability of the linear Cold War division between East and West. Indeed few of today's dangers have the character of overt military aggression stemming from a clearly defined sovereign source.^ Received 26 March 2011 ; accepted 2 November 2011. Address correspondence to Stig Jarle Hansen, Associate Professor, Head of the Intemational Relations Program, Universitetet tor milj0-og biovitenskap, 1432 As, Norway. E-mail: stig.hansen@umb.no 497 498 P. Chalk and S. J. Hansen The maritime realm is particularly "conducive" to these types of threat contingencies given its vast and largely unregulated, opaque nature. Covering 139,768,200 square miles,-' most of this environment takes the form of high seas that lie beyond the strict jurisdiction of any single state. These "over the horizon" oceans are fringed and linked by a complex lattice of territorial waters, estuaries and riverine systems, which in many cases are poorly monitored and in terms of internationally recognized jurisprudence exist as entirely distinct and independent entities.* One specific threat that is increasingly animating the minds of security analysts, politicians, and intelligence/law enforcement officials is the re-emerging specter of maritime piracy—a scourge long viewed as consigned to the annals of history.^ Although problems have been manifest since the late 1990s—especially in the waters of Southeast Asia—attention has become progressively more marked over the last five years, largely in reaction to attacks perpetrated by gangs operating in and around the wider Somali basin. Incidents in this region have reached unprecedented proportions and are now impacting on the perceived viability of key sea-lanes of communication that are of critical importance to global energy supplies, international commerce, and maritime trade in general.* Moreover, the areas where pirates are rampant change quickly and new zones of danger could quickly emerge with little prior notice. The following introductory article sets the context for this special issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, which focuses on the evolving dynamic of maritime piracy and counterpiracy in the modern era. It discusses the scope and dimensions of this particular manifestation of maritime disorder, the main dangers associated with attacks, and the key contributing factors that account for its recent growth. For the purposes of the analysis, piracy is defined as "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of the act."^ It should be noted that piracy appears in many forms and, as such, it may be useful to separate between the goals of the perpetrators: Do they seek the cargo of a vessel or a ship and its crew for ransom? In the latter instance, violence tends to be tempered as payments may be determined on how well captured "assets" are treated. At the same time, attackers need a relatively safe place to keep hijacked ships while negotiations proceed. Somalia, which lacks a central government, has proven to be particularly attractive in this regard, as the state has been largely unable to either prevent supplies from reaching held vessels or disturbing on-shore logistics. If the objective is simply to seize the cargo of a freighter, the potential for violence is greater as there is no perceived requirement to lever hostages for ransom. This is the style of piracy that has been witnessed in Nigeria. Another useful separation is between attacks that take place in coastal waters (which account for the majority of modern-day instances) and those that occur far from shore on the high seas—the classic definition of piracy. A final useful analytical division is the separation between subsistence and professional piracy. The former consists largely of gangs made up of part-timers who are often poor and seeking an alternative source of income. Professional piracy, on the other hand, is generally the realm of hierarchically organized syndicates that have standard operational procedures (SOPs) for boarding and benefit from well-developed logistical chains. Modern Day Piracy: Scope and Dimensions Piracy has emerged as a growing and increasingly visible threat to national and international security over the last five years. Between 2007 and 2012, a total of 1,850 actual and Introduction 499 • South China Sea • Somalia • Red Sea • Malaysia • Indonesia • Gulf of Aden • Benin Figure 1. Regional distribution of piracy attacks, 2011. Data source: 1MB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report 2011, pp. 5-6. (Color figure available online). attempted attacks were recorded around the world, which equates to an average of around 31 incidents per month. In 2010, piracy figures stood at 445, which is the highest annual tally on record.^ While the waters around Somalia remain the most severely affected region, gangs have been evident across the world—having a particularly marked presence in the South China Sea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Benin (see Figure 1). Although stark, these statistics almost certainly underplay the true extent of piracy in the modern age—maybe by as much as 50 percent. The reason for this is that many shipowners have a vested interest not to report attacks for fear that doing so will merely serve to increase their maritime insurance rates. In addition, there appears to be a generic concern of vessels being laid up (and, hence, not making money) for weeks, if not months, while post-attack investigations are completed. In short, unless an act of piracy results in a significant loss, owner-operators generally reason that it makes more (economic) sense to simply accept attacks as the inevitable risk of doing business in the maritime realm. Three main types of piracy have historically occurred in global waters. At the low end of the spectrum are anchorage thefts of ships at harbor. Maritime muggers normally carry out these attacks, taking advantage of relatively lax security procedures at many ports around the world. Perpetrators are usually armed with knives and pistols and they typically target a vessel's stocks, cash, and portable high-value goods with an average theft of between $5,000 and $10,000.^ More serious is the ransacking of vessels in territorial waters or on the high seas. Wellarmed gangs conduct these assaults with the aim to steal cargoes. In many cases crews will be killed or thrown overboard during or after the attack—a pattern that has been especially common in Southeast Asia. Not only does this have immediate implications for human life, it could also seriously threaten the safety of maritime navigation, especially if a vessel is left to drift in a congested sea-lane of communication.'° 500 P. Chalk and S. J. Hansen At the high-end of the spectrum are assaults that involve the outright hijacking of ships. Traditionally much of this activity was directed at seizing and reconverting vessels for illegal trading. Often referred to as the "phantom ship phenomenon," this form of piracy followed a common pattern." First a carrier would be seized and its cargo off-loaded on to a lighter at sea. It would then be renamed and re-registered under a flag of convenience (FoC), usually using bureaus in Panama, Belize, Malta, Cyprus, Honduras, the Bahamas, and Liberia.'^ With its new identity in place, the ship would take on a fresh payload (usually after offering extremely competitive terms for its transfer) that would be diverted and sold in an alternate port—often with complicity of local officials. The vessel would then adopt yet another name and flag and the whole cycle of fraud would commence once again.'^ Phantom ship frauds were particularly prevalent in Southeast Asia during the 1990s but have greatly diminished in recent times due to more effective and better regional intelligence cooperation. In addition, a number of states have moved to decisively crack down on the corruption that facilitated many of these swindles. This has been especially true of China which by the turn of the millennium had become increasingly concerned that criminal syndicates operating from and through its territory were serving to seriously damage the country's reputation as a safe and reliable maritime trading hub.''* Despite the drop in phantom ship frauds, there has been no diminution in the overall rate of hijackings, which today have reached unprecedented and chronic proportions. These attacks are now generally undertaken for the more straightforward purposes of extorting money and it is this style of piracy that is presently being witnessed off the Horn of Africa and, increasingly, across the Indian Ocean. Since 2008, Somali gangs operating in the wider vicinity of the Gulf of Aden (GoA), Red Sea, and Arabian Peninsula have seized more than 166 ships, and in 2011 earned an estimated $135 million in ransoms.'^ As of December 2011, an estimated 1,206 mariners continued to be held in Somalia.'* Dangers Associated With Piracy There are at least four reasons why the international community should care about piracy. First, attacks represent a direct threat to the lives and welfare of the citizens of a variety of flag states. As noted, 2011 saw 802 people forcibly abducted from vessels and held against their will. Fatalities and injuries have also been apparent, especially in the Gulf of Guinea and around the Indonesian archipelago where the main motivation is to steal cargoes rather than kidnap crew for ransoms.''' Since 2007,42 have lost their lives to piracy, with a further 415 injured or subjected to some form of physical or mental abuse.'^ Second, piracy has a direct economic cost in terms of insurance premiums, ransom payments, stolen cargoes, delayed trips, and naval deployments/mitigation measures, and prosecutions. According to an estimate from One Earth Future Foundation, the combined fiscal impact of piracy during the course of a year can now be expected to run to between $5.1 and $12 billion per year (excluding re-routing of ships; see Table 1)." These costs could significantly increase if more ships start to re-route around the Cape of Good Hope in preference to transiting through the GoA to the Suez Canal.^° This alternate routing would add an extra three weeks of steaming time to an average voyage, which would represent around $2.4 to $5 billion in additional fuel, time, and labor expenses.^' It should not be forgotten that these costs impact disproportionately on the world's poor as shipowners typically offset higher operating expenses by increasing freight charges. This, in turn, elevates the price of commodities, which may already be beyond the means of underdeveloped populations (including, notably, food). Certain island states also suffer as a result of reduced Introduction 501 Table 1 Total estimated costs of maritime piracy per year Cost factor Ransoms: Excess costs Insurance premiums Re-routing ships Security equipment Naval forces Prosecutions Antipiracy organizations Cost to regional trade Food price inflation Total estimated cost Value (U.S. dollars) $148 million $460 million to $3.2 billion $2.9 to $5 billion $363 million to $2.5 billion $2 billion $31 million $ 18.7 million $1.5 billion $1 to $3 billion $8 to $ 17 billion/year Source: Anna Bowden, "The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy," One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper, December 2010, p. 23. tourism and a drop in fishing income. In 2009, for example, the Seychelles lost four percent of its GDP to piracy—either directly or indirectly.^^ Third, piracy has the potential to cause a major environmental disaster. The "nightmare scenario" is a mid-sea collision between an unmanned vessel and an oil tanker. The resultant discharge of petroleum would not only cause possibly irreparable damage to offshore resources and marine life, if left to drift it could seriously erode extended stretches of fertile coastline.^' Such effects would have particular significance to any littoral state that relies on the seas as a primary source of protein for indigenous consumption and regional export.^"* Moreover, if governments are viewed as ineffective in containing the environmental fallout, it could act as a trigger for political condemnation or even censure. The lessons from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico are instructive in this regard. Although responsibility for the disaster lay strictly with British Petroleum (BP), the Obama administration's handling of the crisis generated widespread criticism from Republicans and Democrats alike.^'' Finally, piracy can erode political stability and legitimacy by encouraging corruption. This has been evident in a number of states, including China, the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, Peru, India, and Bangladesh. The range of official complicity has included everything from providing intelligence on shipping movements and manifests, to facilitating with the rapid discharge of stolen cargoes.^* In regions of endemic corruption, it has also extended to actually constraining costal patrols whenever they appear to be making substantial progress in denting attacks. Nigeria represents a case in point. Here members of the navy have vigorously decried government decisions to cut their funding—alluding that such moves reflect the dissatisfaction of central members of the administration who have actively colluded with maritime gangs operating in the Niger ^' Factors Associated With the Rise of Piracy in the Contemporary Era Piracy has traditionally been fed by three underlying drivers: the enormous volume of freight that moves by sea (which provides numerous targets of opportunity);^^ the increased dependence of ships to pass through narrow choke points (which has made these vessels vulnerable to mid-sea interception from fast-attack craft launched from shore);^' and the 502 P. Chalk and S. J. Hansen inherently opaque nature of the maritime environment (which has constrained options for effective policing over both high seas and coastal/territorial waters). The contemporary manifestation of piracy refiects the continued salience of these drivers in addition to six further contributing factors. First has been an increased trend toward "skeleton crews," both in an attempt to reduce overhead costs and as a result of advances in maritime navigation technology. Even some of the largest ocean-going vessels today operate with crews of only between a dozen and twenty. This "bare bones" complement has both negated the option of carrying out concerted antipiracy watches and greatly facilitated the technical ease by which boarding parties can take control of a ship they seize."^° Second have been competing demands for scare security resources in the post-9/11 era. Since Al Qaeda's attacks in New York and Washington, DC many states have moved to erect expensive systems of homeland security (either voluntarily or under pressure) focusing on tightening land and air borders and safeguarding components of critical infrastructure. This has admittedly led to the development of comprehensive countermeasures that in certain cases have been employed to deter pirates. However in countries that are already struggling to monitor their shorelines, these initiatives have further reduced already stretched resources for coastal surveillance and, in so doing, increased their exposure to criminal penetration.-^' Third, governance voids lie at the heart of piracy. The incidence of maritime crime is often a direct manifestation of general lawlessness, chaos, and lack of economic opportunity on-land.^^ Somalia is a glaring case in point. Until some sort of central political authority is restored in the country, there will almost certainly be no way to curtail the activities of gangs that enjoy a virtual free rein in coastal hamlets such as Eyl, Haradahere, and Garard.^^ Fourth has been the increased willingness of owner-operators to pay ever-larger ransoms. Whereas in the early 2000s negotiated settlements averaged in the range of $ 150,000 today they are in the millions.^'' As Table 2 shows, ransoms paid in 2011 totaled in $159.62 million, with the Irene SL allegedly fetching an unprecedented $13.5 million. Although attempts have been made to outlaw the payment of ransoms (by linking them to material support for terrorism) these have so far been unsuccessful.'^ The shipping industry, for its part, appears to have an unwritten rule to settle as quickly as possible, calculating that even million-dollar payouts are preferable to losing entire vessels and manifests. In addition, owner-operators are generally keen to fast track transactions, realizing that the more time it takes to conclude negotiations, the longer their vessels will be out of commission and not making money.-^^ Finally has been the global proliferation of arms. The range of weapons currently available on the international black market is truly enormous and includes everything from pistols and assault rifies to heavy caliber machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).'^ Many of these munitions can be procured relatively cheaply (which opens up a large buyer's market), providing pirates with the means to operate on a higher and significantly more lethal and sophisticated level. As Noel Choong, the current director of the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur remarks: "Five to six years ago, when pirates attacked, they used machetes, knives and pistols. Today they come equipped with AK-47S, M-16s, rifie grenades and RPGS."'^ An underlying denominator to most, if not all, of these factors is money. Shipowners have inadvertently made their vessels vulnerable to attack due to cost considerations while at the same time they have provided a very strong incentive (through ransoms) for impoverished communities to engage in maritime crime. Littoral states have been unwilling or unable to secure their coastlines due to a lack of resources while the competitive nature of the global arms market has availed pirates to obtain the necessary hardware to contemplate ever more audacious and complex operations. Introduction 503 Table 2 Prominent ransom payments to Somali pirates, 2011 Ship name Motivator ¡zumi EMS River RAKAfrikana York Haniballll Jahan Moni Irene SL Thor Nexus Beluga Nomination Asphalt Venture Renaur Jih Chun Tsai No 68 Sinar Kudus Yuan Xiang Vega 5 Khaled Muhieddine K Zirku Suez Susan K Juba XX Sinin Eagle Polar Panama SY ING (Danish hostages) Hoang Son Sun Dover Blida Rosalia D 'Amato Gemini Savina Caylyn TOTAL Date of hijack Jul2010 Oct2010 Dec 2010 Apr 2010 Oct2010 Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Feb2011 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Sept 2010 Dec 2010 Mar 2010 Mar 2011 Nov 2010 Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Mar 2011 Aug20Il Apr 2011 Jul 2011 Feb2011 Jan 2011 Oct2010 Dec 2010 Feb2011 Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Jan 2011 Apr 2011 Apr 2011 Feb 2011 Date released Days held Jan 2011 Feb 2011 Mar 2011 Mar 2011 Mar 2011 Mar 2011 Mar 2011 Apr 2011 Apr 2011 Apr 2011 Apr 2011 Apr 2011 May 2011 May 2011 May 2011 May 2011 May 2011 Jun2011 Jun2011 Jun2011 Jul 2011 Aug2011 Aug2011 Aug2011 Sep 2011 Sep2011 Sep 2011 Sep 2011 Nov 2011 Nov 2011 Nov 2011 Dec 2011 196 141 64 332 137 120 99 57 108 81 199 133 397 46 170 134 125 75 315 69 11 182 214 300 270 195 243 214 306 218 214 316 Ransom paid (Smillions) 4.97 4.5 3 1.20 4.5 2 4 (Allegedly) 13.5 5 5 3.6 6 8 4.5 3.6 5 2.5 12 2.10 5.70 .20 4 4 7.7 7 3 4.5 3.5 3.5 6 4.05 11.5 159.62 Road Map to the Special Issue With these general points in mind, the remainder of this issue of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism will be devoted to a detailed examination of some of the key issues pertinent to global piracy in the contemporary era. The first article discusses piracy from a historical perspective, delineating common contributing factors and triggers across time (Martin Murphy). The next three articles look at the dynamics that underpin key geographical clusters of maritime crime, focusing on the Horn of Africa (Stig Jarle Hansen), Nigeria (Marc-Antoine Perouse de Móntelos), and Southeast Asia (Karsten von Hoesslin). The 504 P. Chalk and S. J. Hansen analyses from these contributors are especially valuable as their information is based on interviews with "real pirates," rather than desk studies. The fifth article addresses the relative utility of the current international naval response in the GoA (Peter Chalk). The next article examines the various initiatives that have been taken by the civil maritime sector to "harden" their vessels against attack (Stig Jarle Hansen). The seventh article goes on to analyze the range of legal measures taken to counter piracy and why the international community has yet to develop an appropriate framework for apprehending, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators (Tara Davenport). The final article assesses the relative pros and cons of using private security companies (PSCs) in a mitigation role-—something that is being increasingly debated in both industry and policymaking circles (Lars Bangert Struwe). Notes 1. See, for example. The International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (Washington, DC: IMF, 1991), pp. 26-27. 2. Peter Chalk, Non-Military Security and Global Order: The Impact of Extremism, Violence and Chaos on National and International Security (London: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 1-2. 3. This equates to some 2.42 times the planet's terrestrial surface area. 4. Rupert Herbert-Bums, "Terrorism in the Eariy 21st Century Maritime Domain," in Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara Raymond, eds.. The Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: Worid Scientific Publishing, 2005), p. 157. 5. See Commercial Crime Services, "International Maritime Bureau—Overview," available at http://www.icc-ccs.org/imb/overview (accessed 1 December 2009). 6. Neariy 12 percent of the world's petroleum and 80 percent of international maritime trade with Europe passes through the GoA, which sees an average of 18,000-20,000 ship transits a year. See National Security Council, Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan, December 2008, available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering.. Piracy-Off.The.Horn-Of-Africa.Partnership-ActionJ'lan.pdf (accessed 1 December 2009); "Potential Hikes in Shipping Rates Involving Gulf of Aden Transits," Gerson Lehman Group, 28 September 2009, available athttp://www.glgroup.com//NewsWatchPrefs/Print.aspx?pid=28099 (accessed 1 December 2009); and Jeffrey Gettleman, "The Pirates Have Seized the Ship," Gentleman's Quarterly Q (March 09), p. 193. 7. This conceptualization is wider than the one adopted under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which restricts its focus to attacks that only take place on the high seas. A delineation of this type is problematic as the majority of pirate incidents occur either in territorial or coastal waters. The 1MB definition also abolishes the traditional "two-ship" requirement for classifying an act, meaning that attacks from a raft or the dockside would be counted as piratical. 8. International Maritime Bureau (hereafter referred to as 1MB), Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. Annual Report 2011 (London: ICC-IMB, January 2012), pp. 5-6. 9. Peter Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Modern Era," Maritime Affairs 5(1 ) (Summer 2009), p. 3. 10. Ibid. See also Mark Valencia, "Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia," in Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia, eds.. Piracy in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 80-81. 11. In a number of instances shipowners were also thought to have arranged the hijacking of their vessels in order to defraud hull insurers. 12. For an excellent overview of FoCs and how they have been exploited for criminal and terrorist purposes see Catherine Meldrum, "Murky Waters: Financing Maritime Terrorism and Crime," Jane's Intelligence Review (May 2007). 13. Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Modern Era," pp. 3-4. For a good overview of the mechanics of the phantom ship phenomenon see Jayant Abyankar, Introduction 505 "Phantom Ships," in Eric Ellen, ed.. Shipping at Risk (London: International Chamber of Commerce, 1997), pp. 58-75. 14. In the mid-1990s, for instance, many shipping companies threatened to boycott ports in southern China as a direct result of the high incidence of phantom ship attacks that were taking place in the so-called Hainon-Luzon-Hong Kong (HLH) "terror triangle." See Robert Beckman, Carl Grundy-Warr, and Vivian Forbes, "Acts of Piracy in the Malacca Straits," Maritime Briefing 1 (1994); Kazuo Takita and Bob Couttie, "ASEAN Pressured to Act Against Pirates," Lloyds List 29 (May 1992); and Michael Pugh, "Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: Problems and Remedies," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 2( 1 ) ( 1993), p. 11. 15. See, 1MB and Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, 2011 (London and Broomfield, CO: 1MB and One Earth Future, 22 June 2012), p. 16; and House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Tenth Report of Session 2010-12 (London: The Stationery Office, January 5. 2012), p. 3. 16. 1MB and Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Human Cost of Somali Piracy, 2011, p. 4. "Pirates Seized Record 1,181 Hostages in 2010," MSNBC News. 18 January 2010, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4113I456/ns/world-news-afdca/ (accessed 18 February 2011 ); "New Study on Piracy Estimates Cost to Global Economy at $7 to $12 Billion," Insurance Journal, 18 January 2011 ; Manoj Nair, "Marine Piracy Losses Hit a Record $7b Lat Year," GulfNews, 1 February 2011. 17. Despite the massive rise of piracy off the HoA since 2008, fatalities have not emerged as a trait of attacks. This is simply because gangs want to lever crew (and vessels) to extort as large a ransom payment as possible. Indeed over the past three years, only around seven mariners are thought to have lost their lives at the hands of Somali gangs. This should be contrasted with the situation in West Africa and Southeast Asia where gangs lack the ability to hold ships for an extended period of time to negotiate a ransom—largely because there is no equivalent to the governance void of the sort seen in Somalia. As a result, targets are cargoes and perpetrators have shown no compunction in killing crew if this is viewed as necessary for a successful heist. 18. 1MB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report 2011, p. 11. 19. Anna Bowden, "The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy," One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper, December 2010, p. 23. 20. Despite the number of attacks that have occurred off the HoA, most shipowners have been prepared to play the odds that they will not be targeted (the risk is less than 0.5 percent) than contemplate the higher costs that would be associated with a re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope. However, if the scale of activity continues to grow and insurance premiums continue to rise, some may start to reconsider the wisdom of adhering to this traditional passage. 21. Nair, "Marine Piracy Losses Hit a Record $7b Last Year"; Bowden, 'The Economic Costs of Maritime Piracy," p. 12; U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), 'The Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade" (Washington, DC: Department of Transportation December 2008), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/HOA-Economic%20Impact%20of%20Piracy.pdf (accessed 18 February 2011). 22. VOA News, "Seychelles Attributes Income Loss to Piracy," available at http://www. voanews.com/somali/news/news-makers-in-english/Seychelles-Attributes-Income-Loss-toPiracy-102346419.html 23. Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Modem Era," p. 11 ; Greg Chaikin, "Piracy in Asia: International Cooperation and Japan's Role," in John and Valencia, eds.. Piracy in Southeast Asia, p. 127; Jayant Abyankar, "Piracy and Ship Robbery: A Growing Menace," in Hamzah Ahmad and Akira Ogawa, eds.. Combating Piracy and Ship Robbery (Tokyo: Okazaki Institute, 2001 ): Mark Valencia, "Piracy and Politics in Southeast Asia," in Johnson and Valencia, eds.. Piracy in Southeast Asia, p. 114. 24. Any state that suddenly finds itself in a position where it is unable to provide staples such as fish confronts the danger of mass protests and violence. Although not marine related, the 2008 Asian rice crisis is indicative of the sorts of problems that could arise. 506 P Chalk and S. J. Hansen 25. See, for instance, "Obania Draws Bipartisan Criticism for Using Oil Spill to Push Energy Policy," Fox News. 16 June 2010, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/06/15/obamaspitch-energy-speech-gulf-crisis-infuriates-republicans/ (accessed 18 February 2011); and Neela Banerjee, "Report Critical of Government Response to Gulf Oil Spill," The Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2010. 26. Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Modem Era," p. 6. 27. Author interviews, Nigerian Navy officials, Abuja, September 2008. See also Stephanie Hanson, "Combating Maritime Piracy," Council on Foreign Relations, 27 January 2009, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/combating.maritime-piracy.html (accessed 10 February 2009). 28. Approximately 80 percent of world trade moves by sea, representing around 93,000 merchant vessels, 1.25 million seafarers, and almost six billion tons of cargo. Since the end of World War II, seaborne trade has doubled every decade. See David Rosenberg, "The Political Economy of Piracy in the South China Sea," in Bruce EUeman, Andrew Forbes, and David Rosenberg, eds.. Piracy and Maritime Crime (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010); Bowden, "The Economic Costs of Piracy," p. 6. 29. Major chokepoints include the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab-el-Mandab, the Malacca Straits, the Bosphorus Straits, the Gibraltar Straits, and the Gulf of Aden. The high volume of shipping that passes through these bottlenecks necessarily forces vessels to significantly reduce speed in order to ensure safe passage (in the Bosphorus Straits, for instance, at least six accidents occur every 1 million transit miles), which dramatically increases their exposure to attack. See, for instance, Ali Koknar, "Maritime Terrorism: A New Challenge for NATO," Energy Security (24 January 2005). 30. Author interviews, maritime security analysts, Amsterdam and London, September 2005. See also "Stormy Waters: Q&A Counter-Piracy," Jane's Homeland Security Review (October/ November 2009), p. 19. 31. Chalk, "The Evolving Dynamic of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea in the Contemporary Era," p. 6. 32. Peter Chalk, "Piracy off the Horn of Africa," Brown Journal of World Politics (Spring/Summer 2010), p. 94. While the international community has really only focused on Somali piracy since 2008, gangs have been operating in this region for many years. Most are the outgrowth of self-organized clan militias that were formed in the early 1990s to prevent outsiders from poaching fish stocks and/or dumping hazardous materials in local waters. 33. See, for instance, "Private Fleet to Target Pirates," The Australian, 18 February 2011; Francois Very, "Bad Order at Sea: From the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Guinea," African Security Review 18(3) (2009), p. 27; and "Somali Piracy Threatens Trade, Boosts Terrorists, Analysts Say," CNN.com, 1 October 2008, available at http://cnn.comy2008/WORLD/africa/10/01/piracy.terror/ index.html (accessed 18 February 2011). 34. Nair, "Marine Piracy Losses Hit a Record $7b Last Year"; Bowden, "The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy," p. 9; John Payne, "Piracy Today: Fighting Villainy on the High Seas," The Wall Street Journal, 8 April 2010. 35. In February 2011, for instance, a U.K. court of appeal ruled that paying ransoms to pirates was not only legal but also recoverable as a sue and labor expense. See Eoin O'Cinneide, "Ransoms Get Green Light," TradeWinds, 28 January 2011, available at http://www.tradewinds.no/andalso/ article574970.ece (accessed 28 January 2011). 36. Peter Chalk, Laurence Smallman, and Nicholas Burger, Countering Piracy in the Modem Era: Notes from a RAND Workshop to Discuss the Best Approaches for Dealing with Piracy in the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), p. 6. 37. For a concise overview of the dynamics of the global proliferation of light weapons and their impact on sub-state violence and criminality see Gideon Burrows, Kalashnikov AK47 (Oxford: The New Internationalist, 2006). 38. Author interview, Noel Choong, 1MB, Kuala Lumpur, August 2006. Copyright of Studies in Conflict & Terrorism is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. 
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