ParaUel between stktements and beUefe: when speakers are sincere and the circumstances are
normal, thfeir^tatemerits e^^ress*. their beliefs.
Propositions: the contents of statements and beliefs. Since each proposition is either tru
CHAPTER
false, each statement is either true or false.
Direct links between sentence types and uses of language.
Sentence Types
Speech Acts
INFORMATIVES
DIRECTIVES
EXPRESSIVES
COMMISSIVES
The Virtues
of Belief
Speech acts: The things we do simply by using language (inforrning. apologizing, greeting,
objecting, promising, recommending, etc.). Tliere are four types of speech acts:
Informatives (language used to convey information)
Directives (language used to get the audience to do something)
Expressives (language used to express the speaker’s psychological states)
Commissives (language used to bring about a state of affairs)
Figurative meaning: when an expression isn’t used with its customary meaning, as in
*» ^ 5" 'f*' “'t”1 f “ 'SS)■.toTr°e
sides: What is to be defined (d^niendum), and what does the,defimng ( fi
three’types of meaning^definition:
Reportive definition: its dejiniens is synonymous with its dejiniendum. It’s tested by
OsteS^S£itioiu its d^niens points to cases to which the d^^i^ndum applies.
Contextual definition: its denims offers a replacement of the definiendum.
■ Keywords
Evidence'
Tmth conditions
Proposition
Declarative sentence
Speech act
I
This chapter looks more closely at beliefs, the building blocks of inference. Iil
I connection with this, you’ll learn about such topics as
,
■•Belief, disbelief, apd nonbelief.
Some virtues of belief that are to be cultivated: accuracy, truth, reasonableness,
consistency, conservatism, and revisability.
■,Some vice^ of belief that aretg.be avoided: inaccuracy, falsity, .unreasonableness,
, jnconsistency, dogmatism, and relativism.
■ The difference between^empirical belief and conceptual belief.
■ The notions of self-contradiction, contradiction, and logically possibly world.
■ The “supervirtue” of rationality and the “supervice” of irrationality.
Indirect speech act
Figurative language
Reportive definition
Ostensive definition
Contextual definition
49
3.1 Belief, Disbelief, and Nonbelief
Beliefs and disbelief? are two types of psychological attitudes people may have when they are
engaged in accepting ^hat they think is true and rejecting whafs false. We’ll call these was states of
minH ‘cognitive attitudes’ (from the Latin, ‘cognoscere,’ which means ‘to know’). Nonbeliefs
represent the lack of either of these two attitudes. A belief is the cognitive attitude of accepting
a proposition, which is an information content representing states of affairs. Consider, for
example, the proposition expressed by
1 Dogs are carnivorous.
Anyone who believes (i) has the psychological attitude of accepting that dogs are carnivorous.
That person takes (i) to be tme. If asked whether (i) is true, under normal circumstances, she
would assent. Assuming she’s sincere and competent, she could voice her belief by stating (i),
or many other sentences such as
2 It is trae that dogs are carnivorous.
3 It is the case that dogs are carnivorous.
(i), (a), and (3) may be used to express the same content: namely, the proposition that dogs are
carnivorous.
Supposing we use ‘S’ to stand for a speaker (or person), *P’ for a proposition, and ‘believing
that P’ for the psychological attitude of accepting that P, we can define belief in this way;
BOX 1
would dissent. And to voice her disbelief, she would deny (1)—^for example, by asserting (4). We
may now summarize the concept of disbelief in this way:
BOX 2
■ DISBELIEF
S has a disbelief that P just in case S rejects that P. Assuming that the circumstances are normal
and S is sincere, if asked,
■ ‘Is P true?’ S would dissent.
■ ‘What do you make of P?’ S would deny that P is trae by uttering sentences such as 'P is false,’
‘NotT,’ and ‘It is not the case that P.’
What about those who neither believe nor disbelieve (1)? They have the attitude of
nonbeli^ about (1). Under normal circumstances, they would neither accept nor reject it. If
asked whether that content is true, they might shrug, giving no sign of assent or dissent. Box 3
summarizes all these reactions.
BOX 3 ■ NONBELIEF
S has a nonbelief that P just in case S neither accepts, nor rejects, that P. Assuming that the
circumstances are normal and S is sincere, if asked
■ ‘Is P true?’ S would neither assent nor dissent.
■ *What do you make of P?’S would suspend judgment.
■BELIEF
S has a belief that P just in case S accepts that P. Assuming that the circumstances are normal and
S is sincere, if asked,
■ Is P trae?’S would assent
■ ‘What do you make of P?’ S would assert sentences such as ‘P,’ *P is true,’ add ‘It is the case tha^ P.’
Note that the definition of belief in Box 1 invoked normal circumstances and the speaker’s
sincerity. In thwfhbsence, it may be that what a person S sa^s is not what she believes. Because
there are deceivers (whose words misrepresent the beliefs they actually have) and self
deceivers (who deny the beliefs they actually hdve), we must assume the speaker s sincerity
when we draw a parallel between wHat she says'and what she believes. And becausd S might,
out of coercion, delusion, or other' impairment, say soniethihg she doesn’t in fact believe, we
must assume normal circumstances, which include the speaker’s being competent ^that is,
not mentally compromised, threatened, or impaired in anyway.
But what about those who simply don’t believe a certain proposition, such as (1) above?
They may have either a disbelief or a nonbelief. A disbelief about (1) may be expressed by
sentences such as (4) through (6):
4 Dogs are not carnivorous.
5 It is false that dogs are carnivorous.
6 It is not the case that dogs are carnivorous.
Under normal circumstances, a person who sincerely says any of these disbelieves (1), which
amounts to having the psychological attitude rejecting (1). If asked whether (1) is true, she
Nonbelieving that P, then, amounts to lacking any belief or disbelief about P. The corre
sponding psychological attitude is that of suspending judgment about P. We should bear in mind
that whenever we are considering whether to accept or reject a proposition—^for example, that
dogs are carnivorous—^there is also the option of nohbelief, which amounts to withholding
belief about a proposition. Thinking logically can help in developing the most adequate attitude
toward a proposition, whether that be accepting it, rejecting it, or suspending judgment about
it. Deciding which is the correct attitude matters, since our beliefs are the building blocks of our
reasoning. Here the rule is that, to keep the whole edifice sound, one must use high-quality
building blocks and do regular maintenance. But how are we to tell which building blocks of
reasoning are high-quality and which aren’t? That’s the topic of our next section.
III
»
*8.'It is neither true nor false that galaxies afe flyihg outward.
9. friangles are not figures.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
II.
What is a belief? And what do we call the content of a belief?
What is the difference between a disbelief and a nonbelief?
la nonbelief a kind of belief? If yes, why? If not, why not?
i
Think of two scenarios of your own where a person has a nonbelief.
Is disbelief a kind of belief? If yes, why? If not, why not?
In what does suspending judgment consist?
, Why must the thinker's sincerity be assumed in order to take her statements to express her beliefs?
Why must the thinker's competence be assumed in order to take her statements to express her
beliefs?
For each of the following, indicate whether it expresses a belief, a disbelief,
or a nonbelief.
’
• ■
1.1 accept that the Earth revolves.
*10.1 am thinking.
11.1 am not thinking.
*12. Is tlrere life after death? I cannot say.
t3. UFOs do not exist.
r
*14.1'tTi agnostic about whether humans are the fSroduct of evolution or divine creation.
15. If Pjuto orbits the Sun, then it is a planet.
IV. Your
Ovm Thinking
Lab
*1. Explain why normal circumstances are a needed assumption in exercises (II) and (111) above.
2. Provide two examples of belief.
SAMPLE ANSWER: Belief
,3. -Recast your examples as examples of disbelief.
2.1 reject that the Pope is in Rome.
"
,
*3.1 neither accept nor reject that God exists.
I
53
4. Prdvide two example^'of nonbeliefs.
5. Recast your examples of nonbelief as examples of belief.
4.1 think that it is false that cats are feline.
*6. Suppose you were considering the proposition that there is life after death. What cognitive attitudes
are your options? Report those attitudes.
*5.'In my opinion, it is the case that Newton was smart.
6. I'm convinced that it is not the case that the Moon is bigger than the Earth.
3.2 Beliefs’ Virtues and Vices
*7.1 suspend judgment about whether there is life after death.
8.1 neither accept nor reject the belief that there are UFOs.
*9.1'm sure that Barack Obama is tall.
10. In my view, no zealots can be trusted.
1
III. Report the belief, disbelief, or nonbdiief expressed by each of the statements
below. Avoid rdportinq a disbelief as a belief with a negation inside the fhaf-ciause.
Among the traits or features of beliefs, some contribute to good reasoning and others to bad.
M^e njay thinlj of the good-making features as virtues, and of the bad-making ones as vices.
Prominent among the formei^ is the supervirtue of rationality, and among the latter, the
supervice of irrationality. Why are these,so significant? Because rationality marks the limits of
acceptable reasoning. Irrational beliefs are beyond that limit. In their case, the aims of
reasoning are, as we’ll see, no longer achievable. In this section, we take up som^ virtues and
vices of belief, leaving rationaUty and irrationality for the next sertion. The features of beliefs
in our agenda how are those lisfed in Box 5.
1. The Earth is not a star.
SAMPLE ANSWER; The disbelief that the Earth is a star. [Avoid reporting this as “the belief that the Earth is
BOX 5
■ BELIEF’S VIRTUES AND VICES
not a star."]
2. It is not the case that the Earth is not a planet.
3. It is false that Earth is a staV.
*4. It Is neither true nor false that the Sun will rise tomorrow.
5. Either the Earth is a star or it isn't.
*6. The Earth is a planet.
7. It is not the case that the Earth is a planet:
Virtues
Accuracy
Thrth
Reasonableness
Consistency
Conservatism"
Reusability "
BELIEFS' VIRTUES AND VICES
THE VIRTUES OF BELIEF
. Review Qtifistinns______________________________________ ___________________
rs .2
Exercises
Vices
Inaccuracy
Falsity
Unreasonableness
Inconsistency
Dogmatism
Relativism
First, note that since logical thinkers wish to avoid beliefs with bad-making features,
someone might think that it is advisable to avoid beliefs altogether. For if we didn’t have any
beliefs at all, we wouldn’t have any beliefs with bad-making features! But this advice is selfdefeating, for it is not possible to avoid having beliefs. The very claim that logical thinkers are
better off without beliefs itself expresses a belief, assuming that those who make it are sincere
and competent. As logical thinkers, we must have some beliefs, so our aim should be simply to
have as many beliefs with good-making features, and as few \;^ith bad-making features, as
possible. Our aim, in other words, is that of maximizing the virtues and minimizing the vices
of beliefs. To say that a belief has a virtue is to praise it—^while to say it has a vice is to criticize
it. Let’s now take up each of the virtues and vices of beliefs.
3.3 Accuracy and Truth
Accuracy and Inaccuracy
To have an acceptable degree of accuracy, a belief must either represent, or get close to
representing, the facts. In the former case, the belief is true—in the latter, merely approxi
mately true or close to being true. The following belief represents things as they actually are,
and it is therefore true:
representing them as they are. A belief can fee mbre or less accurate-depending on how closeif is'
to representing the facts as they are—that is, to getting them right. Bht sorhe beliefs could be
accurate without being true. For example,
, •
,
.
10 Frarice is hexagonal.
11 Lord Raglan won the Battle of Alma.^
(10) is roughly accurate, but not accurate enough to count as strictly true (not good enough
for a cartographer!). Similarly, (11) is accurate, but should we say it’s true? Well, it’s approxi
mately true. In fact, the battle was won by the British army, not just by its commander. Yet
ifs no^ clearly wrong to say that “Lord-Raglan* won it.” These examples suggest that accurady
and inaccuracy are a matter of degree: some beliefs are closer to (or father from) representing'the facts than others arfe. Some beliefs are thus more accufate (dr indccurafe) ftian
others.‘Yet triith and falsity are not a mattdr of dbgree at all: each belief is either true or false.
It makes no sense to say of a belief that it is ‘more trufe’ or ‘less true’ (or ‘falsfe^th^Aanother
belief. A belief is either true or it isn’t. At the same time, both accuracy and'truth ar6 virtues
that either a single belief or a set of beliefs may have (likewise for the vices of inaccuracy and
falsity).
>
In the case of (12) and other beliefs that are vague, it is unclear whether they are true or •
false, and also unclear whether they are accurate or inaccurate.
7 Brasilia is the capital of Brazil.
True beliefs have the highest degree of accuracy. On the other hand, false beliefs have the high
est degree of inaccuracy, simply because they neither represent, nor get close to representing,
things as they actually are. For example,
,-
8 Rio is the capital of Brazil.
i
,
12 Queen Latifah is young.
Caution is likewise needed for statements that express' evaluations such as’(i3)i-It 4s
controversial among philosophers whether evaluative statements are capable of being true or
false. Some such statements seem plainly true (“ilitler was evil”), otherS'less deSrly true than ■
Any belief'that denies (8), ^yhich is false, would be true. Thus, that Rio is not the capital of
Brazil, and that it is not the case that Rio is the capital of Brazil; are both true—and therefore
have’ihaximal acfcuracy. To determine this, we use the tule in Box 6.
' 1
r
Truth ^nd Tafsity
■
-
'
i.
As logical thinkers, we should believe what is true and disbelieve what is false. But it is, often dif
ficult to tell which beliefs are true and which are false. Thus sometimes we end up mistakenly
believing what is false—as when people in the Middle Ages belieyed that
9 Thd Sun revolves around the Earth.
They were, bf course, later shown to be mistaken: (9) was always false, and therefore inaccurate.
For (9) not only fails to represent the facts truly, but (most cmcially) never even got close at all to
BOX 6 ■ ACCURACY AND INACCURACY
When a belief is tme, it has maximataccuracyjand when it is false, it has maximal inaccuracy.
■
II
I
ni,^
.
■
Tor more op puzzling examples of this sort, see J. L Austini 'Performative-Constatif (Za Philosophie Anafytique, Cahiers de
Royaumont, fgfia).
expressive of endorsement or attitudes of approval (“Frank Sinatra’s music is great”). Likewise
in judgments of taste such as
‘who- has mastered the cdncepts, ‘brother’ and ‘male sibling.’ Thus (16) and (17) are both
reasonable, since each is supported by adequate reasoning' alone.
S
13 Ford Mustangs are better looking than Chevrolet (Corvettes.
3n-
In cases of this sort, we’ll adopt the convention of simply indicating that they are statements of
value (more on this in Chapter 4).
3.4 Reasonableness
Beliefs that may fall short of being true, and even accurate, could still be reasonable. How-is
this possible? To answer that question, let us consider the virtue of reasonableness aqd,the vice
of unreasonableness, which, like accuracy and inaccuracy, are features that either a single
belief or a set of beliefs can have, and which come in degrees: some beliefs are more reason
able (or unreasonable) than others. Their, degree of, reasonableness depends on how much’
support of the adequate type they possess.
^'.belief is reasonable if.anddnlyj£ithassadequate^pport- Otherwise,dt is.unreasoWable.
Tf,
, ckb...
f ,,
Beliefs of different types are supported in different ways. Thus how a belief might attain
reasonableness jvould vary according to its type. Since, we’ll consider here only two kinds of
beliefs, empirical and conceptual, we’ll abstain, for* the time being, from judging the
reasonableness of other types Pf beliefs: for example, of beliefs that are value judgments such
as (13) above.
Two Kinds of Reasonableness
What’s required for a belief to be reasonable varies according to what sort of belief it is..
Consider
14 Fido is barking.
15 Dogs bark.
(14) and (15) can be supported only by observation and are therefore empirical beliefs
(‘empirical’ means observational). The kind of support needed for beliefs of this sort to be
reasonable differs from that of nonobservational beliefs. Among the latter are conceptual
beliefs, which may be supported by reasoning alone. For example,
•i.
16 7 5 = 12
17 A brother is a male sibling.The grounds for (16) and (17) are conceptual: it is sufficient to understand the concepts
involved to realize that each of these beliefs is true. The truth of (16) is clear to anyone who
Has mastered the numbers and the coKcep'f bf 'a“dditi. ■* S
I
■ A con^E{ujl.b^i^.i| Treasonable if and ojnl^if|ill that’s needed to realize that the belief is |
trae is t(^artef the-concepts involved.
\
|
A reasonable conceptual belief, then, is one whose truth goes without saying once we
understand the content of the belief.
j
By contrast, (14) and (15) are not eligible for this kind of support: they require the support
of observation or evidence. In which circumstances would (14) or (15) be unreasonable?
Suppose that someone believes falsely that her dog, Fido, is barking now. That is, she believes
'(14) even though she knows that Fido has been mute fdr many years. When challenged, she
engages in what is plainly a case of wishful thinking: her desire that Fido could bark somehow
mcdces her believe that the dog is barking. In this scenario, (14) would |je unreasonable, simply
•because it’s an empirical'belief arid the rule is
i
ff,
I
To be reasonable, empincal,'Deuefs must be supported either by evicfence^or by inference
■‘j r .
It
from evidence.
As we saw in Chapter 2, evidence is the outcome of observation, which is provided by the
sensory experiences of seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and/or smelling. Thus if as a result of
■seeing Fido’s barking behavior and hearing him barking one>comes to believe (14), then that
sensory experience itself would count as evidence for (14), thus rendering it reasonable to
believe (in the absence of evidence to the contrary). Trustworthy testimony also counts as
evidence, since we may consider it vicarious Observation/ Being 'supported By the evidence,
then, is all that’s usually needed for a belief li]ce (14) to,be reasonable.
On the other hand, for beliefs such as (15) to be reasonable, inference from evidence is
required. After all, (15) amounts to
15'All dogs bark.
This belief is supported by the evidence and by other beliefs based on the available evidence.
The evidence consists in the observation that many dogs bark, from which one can infer that
all dogs bark. That is, one would need more than simply the firsthand evidence from
observing some barking dogs to support (15'). After all, it is impossible to observe dll barking
dogs. What else, apart from evidence, is contributing to its support? Other beliefs are
required, such as
,jns18 A great number of dogs have been observed.
-19 They all barked.
22 Dorothy Maloney is not a public official.'
(20), (21), and (22) make up an inconsistent set, since it is impossible for aU rts members to b
true at the same time:- clearly, no one could be a senator while at the same time failmg to be a
'public official. We may now say that
tA set ofibelieSis consistentif and ojilyif its membejs-couldaU*e iMiffat oncel fti
j, f a
Tosaythatsome beliefs are consistent is to say that they are logically compatiWeCbnlpatible
On the basis of (i8) and (19), it is reasonable to think that dogs bwk. But if (15) is supported>by
(18) and (19), then the relation among these is that ,of inference: (15) is inferred from (18)
and (19).
For empirical beliefs, then, evidence and inference from evidence are the two standard
routes to reasonableness. For conceptual beliefs, the route is reasoning alone. Empirical and
conceptual beliefs that lack the adequate kind of support would suffer from a substantial
degree of unreasonableness. Yet keep in mind that, for beliefs of other types, the criteria of
reasonableness may be different.
3.5 Consistency
Accuracy, truth, and reasonableness are virtues a single belief may have. Consistency, on the
other hand, is a virtue that only a set of beliefs, two or more of them, can havei—and likewise
for the vice of inconsistency. But what does ‘consistency’ mean?
beUefs need not in fact be true: it is sufficientthat they could ^ be true at
^
actuaUy false could make up a perfectly consistent or compatible set if they could all be true m
some possible scenario.
Logically Possible Propositions
Consider, for example, a set made up of
23 Arnold Schwarzenegger is a medical doctor.
24 Pigs fly.
(23) and (24) could both be true at once in some logicaUy possible scenario or world. Our world,
wWch we’ll caU the ‘actual world,’ is just one apiong many world? that are logicahy possibl^
where a world is logicaUy possible if it does not involve any contradiction. LogicaUy impossible
worlds make no sense and are therefore unthinkable. We can .also say that a proposition
logicaUy possible when it meets the condition in Box 9.
Defining ^Consistency’ and ‘Inconsistency’
Rm^^^GICALLY POSSIBLE. PROPOSITION
A good place to start for'a definition of‘consistency’ is ‘inconsistency,’ since a set of beliefs is
consistent just ill case it is not inconsistent. So, let’s begin with ‘inconsistency,’ defined thus:
A proposition is logicaUy possible if and only if it involves no contradiction.
Logically Impossible Propositions
Propositions that are not thinkable at aU are logicaUy impossible, necessarUy false, or absurd, as
iUustrated by each of the foUowing:
Consider (20) and (21),
25 AU pigs are mammals, but some pigs are not maminals.
20 Dorothy Maloney is a senator.
26 Arnold Schwarzenegger is a medical doctor and he isnt.
21 DorothyMaloney is ajogger.
27 Arnold Schwarzefieggfer is a married bachelor.
These could both be true at the same time: Dorothy Maloney c6uld be both senator and a
jogger. But suppose we add the belief that
_
• ,.5 >
Propositions of this sort are self-contradictions.
■ SELF-CONTRADICTION
h
*•*«
1
^ '
*
•A set of beliefe'is consistent if and only if
■ There is a logically possible world where its members could all be true at once.
■ A proposition is self-contraof our minds
then given condition (i), those beliefs can be neither rational nor irrational. Current
conscious beliefs, on the other hand, must be either rational or irrational, depending on
whether or not they satisfy conditions (a) and (3). Given (2), the rationality of beliefs requires
that the thinker be able to account for them. Given (3), rationality requires that the thinker
not be aware of her beliefs’ failing in accuracy, truth, reasonableness, consistency, conser
vatism, and/or reusability. Suppose a thinker is currently, consciously entertaining these
'I
VIII.The following statements are all accurate, but none is actually true. Explain for
each one why that is.
14. {In some countries, abortion Is illegal. But in those countries, execution is legal.}
*15. {2+2i=4. Sisters are male siblings.}
SAMPLE ANSWER; Not true, because Magellan was killed halfway through the voyage, but he is credited
with the circumnavigation of the Earth.
*2. Prince Charles is the future king of Great Britain.
3. The United States won World War II.
*4. The Vikings discovered America.
*5. Russia was the first country to orbit the Earth.
6. Argentina invented the ball-point pen.
‘7. Italy is a boot.
X.
For each of the following statements, determine whether its content is empirical,
conceptual, or other. For statements that are ‘other,’ explain why they are in this
category. {Hint; In each case, ask yourself, which sort of reasons would matter to
determining whether the belief is true? Reasoning alone? Empirical evidence? Or
matters of value?)
1. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated.
SAMPLE ANSWER: Empirical
2. ‘Sister’ means ‘female sibling.’
*3.5-1-7 = 12
4. Madonna is taller than Lady Gaga.
iX. The foliowing sets of statements express either consistent or inconsistent beiiefs.
First, say which is which, and then, for any inconsistent set, indicate whether it
has contradictory beiiefs, at ieast one necessarily false belief, or both. (Tip:
Remember that the actual world is one among many logically possible worlds
that matter for consistency.)
1. {The fetus is a person and abortion is wrong. Convicts on death row are also persons, but capital
punishment is not wrong.}
*5. If Everest is taller than Aconcagua, then Aconcagua is not taller than Everest.
6. Some mushrooms are tasty.
*7. Poverty is inhumane.
*8. There is no life on Mars.
9. Jazz Is intolerable.
10. There are UFOs.
SAMPLE ANSWER: Consistent. By modifying ‘person’ with ‘innocent’ in the first case and ’guilty’ in the
second, any appearance of contradictory beliefs is eliminated.
2. {God exists. There is no deity.)
*3. {All students in Philosophy 101 are juniors. Some students in Philosophy 101 are freshmen.}
4. {All bachelors are married men. No bachelor is married.}
*5. {Helen is a sister. The Earth is a waterless planet.}
6. {The present king of France is bald. Triangles have four internal angles.}
*7. {The Earth is flat. The Earth is not flat.}
8. {New York City is the capital of the United States. New York City is in the state of New York. Snow
is white.}
*9. {Some people don’t like Picasso’s paintings. Everybody likes Picasso’s paintings.}
10. {No young-dog is a puppy. Some young dogs are puppies.}
*11. {It is false that there is a number' that is the larg'est number. Bachelors are unmarried men.}
12. {Lincoln was not assassinated. Homicide is legal in the United States.}
*13. {Bert was once in Romania. Bert was never in Romania.}
*11. Cookies are delicious.
12. A straight line is the shortest path between two points.
*13. Earth is the center of the universe.
14. Some forms of nonwestern medicine are worth considering.
*15. There is life after death.
XI. Given the state of our knowledge today, each of the following is either conservative
or nonconservative. Indicate which is which.
1. We are all aliens from another planet.
SAMPLE ANSWER: Nonconservative
2.2 +2 = 4
*3. The Earth will stop rotating tomorrow.
4. All pigeons are robots in disguise.
*5. If a figure Is a rectangle, then it is not a circle.
6. Puppies are young dogs.
3.7 RATIONALITY VS. IRRATIONALITY
1. Magellan circumnavigateci the Earth.
THE VIRTUES OF BELIEF
i
67 .
*7. Whales are fish.
8. The Earth is flat.
*9. Chickens can’t fly long distances.
10. The lines of your palm contain information about your future.
5. Write>thre6 sets of inconsistent beliefs.
v
’
6. Protagoras of Abdera (Greek, c. 490-421 B.C.E.) argued that “man p.e., human beings] is' the m^ure of all things—of things that are, that' they are, and of things that are not, that they are not. As a
thing appears to a man, so it is.” How does this amount to a relativist position? What sbrt of objections
might be brought against it?
*11. There are no witches.
*13. Sarah Palin is a Democrat.
14. Alabama is a southern state.
*15. There are out-of-body experiences.
XII. Determine whether the following combinations of propositions are rational or
irrational:
1.1 know that a bachelor can’t be married. Yet I’m a married bachelor.
SAMPLE ANSWER: Irrational
2. I’m aware that Jane was childless in 1989, but now she has four grandchildreni
*3.1 do believe that elephants are extinct and that they aren’t extinct.
4. In my view, God does not exist—and neither do angels.
*5. Although there are no good reasons for believing that the end of the universe is coming, I believe it is.
6.1 believe that all cats are felines and Jhat some cats are not felines. Furthermore, I believe that these
beliefs are contradictory.
>
*7. As a zoologist, I have no doubts that cats are felines and that all felines are mammals. I’m not aware
of these beliefs being defective.
8.1 have never seen muskrats. Moreover, I have never acquired any information whatsoever about
them. As far as I’m concerned, they are rodents.
*9. There is no evidence that there is an afterlife. Yet I prefer to believe that there is.
10.1 believe that Mario and Lucille have a romantic relationship. Yes, Brian says that they do, but he is
not a reliable source of information about who is dating whom. But I learned about their relationship
from a trustworthy source.
XIII.
Your Own Thinking Lab
1. Give three examples of irrational belief.
2. Explain why your examples for (1) above are irrational. What would be required to make them rational?
3. Provide a scenario in which a thinker is a dogmatist.
4. Provide a scenario in which a thinker is a relativist.
■ Writing Project
choose one of the following two projects and write a short composition:
1. A nonsense essay, where you describe three logically impossible scenarios, and then
explain why they are logically impossible.
2. Consider the passage below, from Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland.
“I can’t believe that!” said Alice.
“Can’t you?” the Queen said-in a pitying tone. “Try again: draw a long breath, and
shut your eyes.”
Alice laughed. ‘“There’s no use trying,” she said: “one can’t believe impossible
things.”
“I dare say you haven’t had much practice,” said the Queen. “When I was your age
I always did it for half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes. I’ve believed as many as sue
impossible things before breakfast.”
Write a short essay where you explain Alice’s refusal’s to believe impossible things. You may
invoke the virtue of conservatism, explaining what it is and how it sometimes leads to refusing
to believe things that one “sees.”
■ Chapter Summary
Belief: a psychological attitude of accepting a proposition.
Disbelief: a psychological attitude of rejecting a proposition.
Nonbeliefe the lack of a psychological attitude of accepting or rejecting a proposition.
Virtue: a good-making trait.
Vice: a bad-making trait.
Accuracy: a belief’s virtue of being either true or close to being tme. Related vice: inaccuracy.
A matter of degree.
TVuth: a belief’s virtue of representing the facts as they are. Related vice; falsity. Not a matter of
degree.
Reasonableness: for an empirical belief, the virtue of being supported by evidence, or infer
ence from evidence; for a conceptual belief, that of being based on good reasons. Related vice:
unreasonableness. A matter of degree.
Consistency: virtue of a set of beliefs insofar as they could all be true at once. Related vice:
inconsistency. Not a matter of degree.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
12. Water is H2O.
69
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-lativisn,
THE VIRTUES OF BELIEF
^ Part
me reason to support it and is not aware of the belief's having any of the
listed vices. Related supervice: irrationality,
When a belief is irrational, that’s a compelling
reason to reject it.
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■ Key Words
Belief
Disbelief
Nonbelief •
Accuracy
Tiruth
Reasonableness
Consistency
Contradiction
Self-contradiction
' Conservatism
Dogmatism
Extreme relativism
Revisability
Rationality
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^
% *
Reason and Argument
3
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