Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology
1973, Vol. 27, No. 2, 165-175
VIDEOTAPE AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS:
REVERSING ACTORS' AND OBSERVERS' POINTS OF VIEW1
MICHAEL D. STORMS
2
Yale University
Two actor subjects at a time engaged in a brief, unstructured conversation
while two observer subjects looked on. Later a questionnaire measured the
actors' attributions of their own behavior in the conversation either to dispcsitional, internal causes or to situational, external causes. Similarly, each
observer attributed his matched actor's behavior. Videotapes of the conversation, replayed to subjects before the attribution questionnaire, provided an
experimental manipulation of visual orientation. Some actors and observers
saw no videotape replay, while other subjects saw a tape that merely repeated
their original visual orientations. As predicted for both of these conditions,
the actors attributed relatively more to the situation than the observers. A
third set of subjects saw a videotape taken from a new perspective—some
actors saw a tape of themselves, while some observers saw the other participant
with whom their matched actor had been conversing. With this reorientation,
self-viewing actors attributed relatively more to their own dispositions than
observers. The results indicated the importance of visual orientation in determining attributional differences between actors and observers. Pragmatically,
the theoretical framework and results of the study had relevance to the use
of videotape self-observation in therapy and T groups.
When an individual observes a behavior
and attempts to understand its causes, he is
concerned with the relative importance of
personal dispositions of the actor and the
surrounding social and environmental context. Both an observer who wishes to explain
another's behavior and an actor who tries to
understand his own behavior attempt to make
the appropriate causal attributions. There is
reason to believe, however, that actors and
observers do not always arrive at the same
explanation of the actor's behavior. Jones and
Nisbett (1971) have argued that when actors
seek to explain their own behavior, they are
inclined to give considerable weight to external, environmental (i.e., situational) causes.
Observers, on the other hand, place considerably more emphasis on internal, personal
(i.e., dispositional) causes of the actor's
behavior.
1
The research for this article was performed as
part of the author's PhD dissertation submitted to
the Department of Psychology, Yale University. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to Richard
E. Nisbett, who served as advisor for the thesis and
who has contributed many helpful criticisms of the
present article.
2
Requests for reprints should be sent to the author, who is now at the Department of Psychology,
University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66044.
Several studies (Jones & Harris, 1967;
Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward,
1968; McArthur, 1970, 1972; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973) have been
cited in support of this general proposition,
and Jones and Nisbett have discussed a variety of factors which might lead to such attributional differences between actors and. observers. These factors include (a) differences
in information about the event, behavior, and
context which is available to actors and observers and (b) differences in how information is processed by actors and observers.
Actors may have private information about
some aspects of the event, including their
own feelings and the historical context in
which the event transpires, while observers
may have more complete information about
the .behavior itself. Furthermore, in the interests of controlling events and predicting the
future, actors may attend more to situational variables in an event, and observers
may attend more to variations in the actor's
behavior.
The present study examines a fundamental
difference between actors and observers which
may lead, in turn, to some of the information
differences postulated by Jones and Nisbett
(1971). Perhaps the most obvious difference
165
166
MICHAEL D. STORMS
between actors and observers is that they
have, quite literally, different points of view.
Actors cannot see themselves act; physically
they cannot observe much of their own behavior. They may watch the antecedents of
their own behavior, or its consequences, or
both. But they do not normally view the
behavior itself. In addition to the physical
difficulty of watching oneself, there are temporal restrictions which contribute to a lack
of self-observation. There may not be enough
time or mental capacity to contemplate past
behavior, monitor present behavior, and plan
future behavior all at once. Finally, there are
motivational reasons for avoiding an excess
of self-observation. In the interest of acting
unself-consciously and maintaining control
over the immediate events taking place, the
actor may learn that it is dysfunctional to
be overly concerned with his own present and
past behavior. Instead, it is reasonable to
assume that most actors focus on the situation in which they find themselves. They look
at, attend to, and think about various
changing aspects of the environment in which
and to which they must respond.
While the actor is watching the situation
in which he finds himself, the observer is
probably watching the actor. It is usually
interesting and often important to watch the
behavior of other people. Consequently, observers are often visually oriented toward the
actor. Although an observer can take his eyes
off the actor and view other aspects of the situation, he probably sees less of the situation
than the actor does. As with actors, the observer's scope is also limited by time. Observers cannot simultaneously watch the actor
and observe as much of the situation as the
actor can. Moreover, observers may find it
more efficient in terms of controlling and
predicting the ongoing event to concentrate
on the actor's behavior rather than on the
actor's situation. Finally, the actor is, after
all, part of the observer's situation. For the
same reasons that an actor focuses on his
own situation, the observer focuses on the
behavior of the actor, which is part of his
(the observer's) situation.
Thus, we postulate that there is a simple
difference between actors and observers. Actors watch their environment (which in-
cludes the behavior of other people) more
than they watch their own behavior. Observers watch the behavior of the actor more
than they watch the actor's situation.
If it is true that attributions are largely
influenced by point of view, it should be possible to change the way actors and observers
interpret a behavior by changing their visual
orientations.
A test of this hypothesis requires some
means of changing actors' and observers'
orientations. Fortunately, modern technology
provides a simple and interesting means to
accomplish this change—namely, the use of
videotape. Videotapes of an event, taken
from various camera angles, can be replayed
to actors and observers to redirect their attention to other aspects of the event. Of
particular interest is the case in which videotape presents a new visual orientation, that
is, when actors are shown a tape of their
own behavior from the observer's perspective
and when observers are shown a tape of some
key aspect of the actor's situation from the
actor's perspective. Such reorientation should
affect actors and observers so as to weaken
(or even reverse) their original attributional
biases. Actors who see themselves should
make more dispositional attributions about
their own behavior. Observers who see another aspect of the actor's situation should
become more situational in attributing the
actor's behavior.
Thus, the question to be answered by this
study is whether actors' and observers' attributions can be significantly influenced, perhaps even reversed, by changing their visual
orientation toward an event. The implications
of such a question may go beyond immediate
theoretical concerns. Discrepancies between
actors' and observers' perceptions and interpretations of behavior are of paramount
concern to therapists, group relations consultants, and T group trainers. Often such
practitioners must attempt to bridge the
interpretational gap between actor and observer, patient and therapist, and individual;
and group.
METHOD
Overview
The hypothesis was tested in an experiment ffiat
featured a simple interpersonal event, namely a
VIDEOTAPE AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS
brief getting-acquainted conversation between two
strangers (actors). In addition, two other subjects
(observers) were told to watch the conversation but
not to participate in it.
Videotape replays of the conversation provided
the experimental manipulation. The design made it
possible to compare the effects of three orientation
conditions: (a) one in which no visual reorientation
was attempted (no videotape), (6) one in which
videotape was used simply to repeat the subject's
original orientations (same orientation), and (c) one
in which videotape reversed the orientation of actor
and observer (new orientation). In one set of conditions, actors and observers saw a videotape from
essentially the same orientation as they had had
in "real life." Actors saw a videotape replay of the
other participant with whom they were conversing
(actor—same orientation), and observers saw a
videotape of the same actor they had been observing
and about whom they would later answer questions
(observer—same orientation). In another set of conditions, actors and observers received an entirely new
orientation on videotape. Actors saw a videotape of
themselves in the conversation (actor—new orientation), and observers saw a videotape of the other
participant with whom their target actor had been
conversing (observer—new orientation). In addition,
a set of actors and observers were run with no
videotape replay.
Subjects
One hundred and twenty Yale undergraduate male
volunteers participated in 30 groups of 4. Subjects
were solicited by sign-up sheets which specified that
people who volunteered for the same session should
not be previously acquainted.
Procedure
When each group of four subjects arrived at the
experiment, they were told,
This is a study in an area of social psychology
called "interpersonal dynamics." More specifically,
I'm interested in what I call "getting acquainted"
—that is, what happens when two strangers meet
for the first time and initiate their first conversation. Two of you in this study will be having a
short, first conversation with each other. In addition, this study calls for two observers.
Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of actor
(actually referred to as participant in the script) or
observer. Two subjects were assigned to be actors
and to have a getting-acquainted conversation together. Each of the remaining two observer subjects
was assigned to observe his matched actor during
the conversation.
The experimenter then mentioned,
There is one thing I would like to add to the
procedure today. I've gotten hold of some videotape equipment and I will be taping your con-
167
FIG. I. Setup of the experimental room.
versation. My thought was that it might be useful
to you in answering the questionnaires to see the
conversation replayed on tape.
Subjects were then seated in the experimental room
as shown in Figure 1. Actors sat at one end of the
table, across from each other, with one camera
focused on each. Observers sat at the other end of
the table, diagonally across from and facing their
matched actors. The experimenter reiterated that
the conversation would last about 5 minutes, that
the actors could talk about anything they wished,
perhaps starting with their names and where they
lived, and that observers should silently watch their
matched actors.
After adjusting the equipment, the experimenter
signaled to the participants to begin their conversation. Five minutes later, he asked them to stop and
wait silently while the tapes were rewound. At this
point, the experimental manipulation was performed.
A random number table was consulted to determine
whether the session would be a control session, in
which case the subject would not see any tape, or
an experimental session. If an experimental session
was indicated, the experimenter continued, "I'm
afraid only one camera was working very well and
the other one is just too poor to see anything. So
we'll only be able to see one of you on the videotape." Experimental subjects were always shown the
tape of Actor 1.
Thus one actor, Actor 2, saw a tape of the same
participant he had just seen in real life (Actor I)
and was the actor-same orientation subject. The
other actor, Actor 1, viewed the tape of himself and
was the actor-new orientation subject. Similarly, one
observer, Observer I, saw a tape of the same actor
he had been observing in the conversation (Actor 1)
and was the observer-same orientation subject. The
other observer, Observer 2, saw a tape of the participant whom he had not been observing previously
(Actor 1) and was the observer-new orientation
subject. Thus each experimental session yielded one
subject in each of the four experimental cells.
If a control session was indicated, the experimenter
said the following instead: "I'm afraid this is lousy
equipment. It just didn't take a good enough picture
to be worth our while looking at it. So we'll just
168
MICHAEL D. STORMS
have to skip the tapes and go on to the questionnaire." These no-videotape control sessions produced
two actor-no-videotape subjects and two observerno-videotape subjects.
At this point, for control subjects, and after the
videotape replay for experimental subjects, the experimenter introduced the questionnaire, stressing
that it was confidential and that the subjects would
not see each other's responses. When the subjects
completed the questions, they were debriefed. At this
time, the experimenter raised the issue of experimental deception, but no subject indicated suspicion that
the videotape had been a deliberate manipulation or
even an essential part of the experiment.
Measures
On the postexperimental questionnaire, actor subjects answered mostly questions about themselves,
and observer subjects answered questions about their
matched actor. After a few introductory filler items,
a page of instructions and the key dependent measures of attribution were presented. The instructions
informed subjects that in the next part of the
questionnaire they would be asked to describe their
own (their matched actor's) behavior along four
standard dimensions: friendliness, talkativeness, nervousness, and dominance. Then, for each of the four
behaviors, subjects were to indicate how much influence they thought the following two factors had in
causing that behavior:
(A) Personal characteristics about yourself (your
matched participant): How important were your
(his) personality, traits, character, personal style,
attitudes, mood, and so on in causing you (him)
to behave the way you (he) did?
(B) Characteristics of the situation: How important were such factors as being in an experiment, the "getting acquainted" situation, the topic
of conversation, the way the other participant
behaved and so on in causing you (him) to behave
the way you (he) did?
Thus, on each of the next four pages, three questions were presented. The first asked about the perceived level of behavior on one of the four dimensions, for example, "To what extent did you (your
matched participant) behave in a friendly, warm
manner?" The question was followed by a 9-point
scale labeled extremely friendly (9) to extremely
unfriendly (1). Presented next were the two attribution questions: "How important were personal
characteristics about you (your matched participant)
in causing you (him) to behave that way?" and
"How important were characteristics of the situation
in causing you (him) to behave that way?" Each of
these questions was followed by a 9-point scale
labeled extremely important (9) to extremely
unimportant (1).
These last two questions, repeated over the four
behavioral dimensions, provided the principal and
most direct measure of subjects' attributions. These
four dimensions were not selected on the basis of
any particular theoretical or empirical considerations,
but simply because it was anticipated that subjects
would manifest behaviors along each of these dimensions and that subjects would be able to make judgments about them. Since the hypothesis was concerned with the relative strength of dispositional
versus situational attributions and made no distinctions among the four behavioral dimensions, the
appropriate measure was the difference between perceived importance of personal characteristics and
perceived importance of situational characteristics in
causing the actor's behavior, summed over all four
behaviors. This difference score was referred to as
the dispositional-situational index. A higher value on
this index indicated that a subjects' attributions were
relatively more dispositional and less situational. It is
important to note this dual meaning of the dispositional-situational index. When an effect is described
as "relatively more dispositional," it is equally valid
to say "relatively less situational."
A second, less direct measure of the subjects'
attributions appeared later in the questionnaire. The
subjects were asked to report their estimates of the
actor's level of behavior in general on each of the
four behavioral dimensions, for example, "How
friendly a person are you (is your matched participant) in general?" Responses were made on a scale
from very friendly (9) to very unfriendly (1). It
was then possible to compare these answers to the
subjects' previous answers about the actor's level of
behavior in the conversation. If a subject had perceived that the actor's behavior in the conversation
was due to a stable personal disposition, then the
subject would likely have predicted that the actor
behaved the same way in general. Thus, dispositional
attributions would lead to a low discrepancy between
the subject's perception of the actor's behavior in the
conversation and his behavior in general. On the
other hand, if the subject had thought that the
actor's behavior was caused by the situation, he
would more likely have reported that the actor
behaved differently in general. Thus, situational
attributions would lead to greater discrepancy between the subjects' perceptions of the actor's present
and general levels of behavior. The simplest measure
of this discrepancy was the absolute value of the
difference between the present level-of-behavior
scores and the general level-of-behavior scores,
summed over all four behaviors. This measure was
referred to as the present-behavior-general-behavior
index. The higher the value of this discrepancy index,
the more a subject made situational (or the less he
made dispositional) attributions.
The remainder of the questionnaire contained items
not directly related to present concerns.
RESULTS
Dispositional versus Situational Attributions
for Behavior
The main hypothesis of the present study
concerns the effects of videotape reorientation
VIDEOTAPE AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS
on actors' and observers' causal attributions
of the actor's behavior. Before considering the
effects of reorientation, however, it is helpful
to examine the evidence pertinent to the
original Jones and Nisbett (1971) hypothesis
that actors are characteristically inclined to
attribute causality to aspects of the situation,
while observers tend to attribute causality to
the actor's disposition. Evidence for this
proposition is found in two conditions of the
present experiment: the no-videotape cells in
which the subjects did not receive any videotape replay, and the same-orientation cells in
which the videotape merely repeated the
subjects' original visual perspectives.
The relevant data are presented in Table 1.
The key dependent measure, the total dispositional-situational index, reflects the relative
strength of dispositional and situational attributions; a higher value on this index indicates
relatively more dispositional (less situational)
attributing. A comparison of the dispositional-situational means for actors and observers in the no-videotape and same-orientation cells reveals that, in both of these
conditions, actors attributed relatively more
to situational causes than did observers
(p < .12, p < .05, respectively).3 It is further
noted from these data that a videotape which
merely repeated the subjects' original orientation had little effect on either actors or
observers. Dispositional-situational scores for
actors in the same-orientation condition did
not differ from those for actors in the novideotape condition (q — 1.79, ns), and scores
for observers in the two conditions were also
similar (q — 1, ns). Thus, under conditions
of no videotape and under conditions of repeated videotape orientation, the subject's
role as actor or observer was an important
determinant of attributions. Actors attributed
their own behavior relatively more to situational causes, and observers attributed the behavior relatively more to dispositional causes.
8
These comparisons, and all two cell comparisons
in the present study, are based on the q statistic
from the Newman-Keuls procedure for testing differences among several means (see Winer, 1962).
The degrees of freedom, taken from the overall
analysis of variance, equal 114; « equals 20 per cell.
The Newman-Keuls is a more stringent test than the
usual two-tailed t test.
169
TABLE 1
DISPOSITIONAL, SITUATIONAL, AND DISPOSITIONAL
MINUS SITUATIONAL ATTRIBUTION SCORES TOTALED
OVER ALL FOUR BEHAVIOHS
Attribution
Actors' attributions of
own behavior
Dispositional
Situational
Dispositionalsituational
Observers' attributions of matched
actor's behavior
Dispositional
Situational
Dispositionalsituational
Same
No
orientation videotape
26.10
25.95
.15"
27.10
22.20
4.90b°
27.35
25.10
2.25ab
27.30
22.50
4.80bo
New
orientation
27.50
20.70
6.80°
25.75
24.15
1.60»"
ATo/tf.Dispositional-situational means not sharing the same
superscript are significantly different at the .05 level or beyond
by Newman-Keuls tests.
The main hypothesis of the present study
can be examined with the data presented in
the last column of Table 1. It was anticipated
that actors who saw themselves on videotape
would become relatively less situational
(more dispositional) in attributions of their
own behavior, while observers who saw a
videotape of the other participant with whom
the actor had been conversing would become
relatively more situational (less dispositional)
in their attributions of the actor's behavior.
Since opposite effects of videotape reorientation were predicted for actors and observers,
the hypothesis was properly tested by the
interaction between subjects' roles (actor or
observer) and videotape orientation. The predicted Role X Videotape Orientation interaction was obtained at beyond the .001 level of
confidence (F = 9.72, df = 2/114, p < .001).
Neither the main effect for role, nor the main
effect for videotape orientation was significant. The interaction reflected a complete
reversal of the relative perspectives of actor
and observer in the new-orientation condition.
In the same-orientation and no-videotape
conditions, the actors' attributions were more
situational than the observers'. In the neworientation condition, in contrast, the actors
were relatively more dispositional than the
observers. This reversed effect was significant
in itself (p < .05).
Examining the simple dispositional and
situational scores also presented in Table 1,
170
MICHAEL D. STORMS
it is apparent that reorientation had a experimental effects. Considering each behavstronger influence on the subjects' evaluation ioral dimension separately, the Role X Videoof situational factors than on their evaluation tape Orientation interaction was significant
of dispositional factors. The array of means for friendliness, talkativeness, and nervousfor attributions to dispositional causes was in ness, each at the .025 level of confidence, but
the direction of the predicted interaction, was trivial for dominance (F < 1). Combut the effect did not reach significance ments by subjects during the debriefing sug(77=1.38, df = 2/114, ns). The situational gest a possible reason for the failure of domiattribution scores showed the expected reverse nance to contribute to the experimental efpattern, and the interaction was significant fects. Subjects complained that dominance
was a difficult dimension on which to
(F = 5.78, df = 2/114, p < .005).
The hypothesis is thus strongly supported. judge people in the context of a simple,
Visual orientation has a powerful influence 5-minute getting-acquainted conversation.
on the attributions of actors and observers. While friendliness, talkativeness, and nerIndeed, the data in Table 1 suggest the vousness are dimensions with concrete behavstrongest possible conclusion: Under some ioral counterparts (such as smiling, talking,
circumstances actual role as actor or observer and fidgeting), apparently dominance is a
is unimportant, and visual orientation is more abstract dimension and requires a higher
order of inference.
totally determinative of attributions.
When the dominance question was excluded
Two other aspects of the dispositionalsituational data are noteworthy, (a) Repeti- from the analysis, each of the experimental
tion on videotape of essentially the same effects was strengthened. Across the remaininformation which had been presented in real ing three dimensions, the interaction test of
life had little effect on either the actors or videotape reorientation was strengthened from
the observers. Actors in the same-orientation an F of 9.72 to an F of 13.89 (df = 2/114,
condition were only slightly and nonsignifi- p < .001). Tests for the Jones and Nisbett
cantly more situational than no-videotape (1971) hypothesis were also strengthened;
actors, and same-orientation observers were the contrast between actors and observers in
only slightly and nonsignificantly more dispo- the no-videotape condition was significant at
sitional than no-videotape observers, (b) The the .05 level, and the contrast between actors
predicted experimental effects were not ob- and observers in the same-orientation conditained with equal strength for all four of the tions was significant at the .01 level.
behaviors on which the total dispositionalPerceived Level of Behavior and Perceived
situational index was based.
The fact that videotape in the same- Discrepancy from General Behavior
In addition to the two attribution quesorientation cells had little effect on the subject's attributions suggests that mere repeti- tions, the subjects also answered questions
tion of information and the addition of time about the perceived level of behavior on each
to review the event did not affect the sub- dimension. Past experiments in this area have
ject's perceptions of the event. The subjects typically created a specific, standardized beappear to have absorbed all relevant data havior for subjects to attribute. The present
about the event during its real-life occurrence. experiment, with its unstructured conversaOf course, one would not necessarily expect tions, did not furnish all subjects with the
this to be true of all events. If the episode same behavior. This flexibility was desirable,
were more complex or of longer duration, in that it provided a more general test of the
subjects could easily miss important informa- attribution hypotheses over several, naturally
tion in vivo. A videotape replay would fill occurring behaviors. But it also created the
in these informational gaps and could, quite possibility that perceptions of the perceived
level or intensity of behavior could differ
possibly, produce different attributions.
The most noteworthy difference among the among experimental conditions and thus acfour behavioral dimensions was the failure of count for the different attributions. This does
the dominance dimension to contribute to the not appear to have been the case, however.
VIDEOTAPE AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS
There were two ways of calculating perceived
level of behavior: (a) by taking the direct
value from the 9-point scale for each level-ofbehavior response and (b) since the scales
were bipolar (for example, 9 = very friendly
to 1 = very unfriendly), by taking the deviation of the subject's response from the midpoint of the scale (5). Neither of these measures yielded significant comparisons between
any cells in the experiment, either for each
behavior considered separately or for all four
behaviors totaled. Furthermore, the overall
correlations between the total dispositionalsituational measure of attributions and the
two measures of perceived level of behavior
were trivial and nonsignificant (r — — .049,
for the direct score; r = —.021, for the score
of deviation from midpoint). Thus, it is apparent that differences in perceived level of
behavior could not account for the attribution
differences.
Since there were no significant differences
in perceived level of behavior, it is meaningful to examine the second measure of subjects'
attributions, the present-behavior-generalbehavior discrepancy scores. This index reflected the absolute difference between the
subjects' perceptions of the actor's present
behavior (in the conversation) and the actor's
general behavior, summed over all four behaviors. A small discrepancy would indicate
that a subject expected the actor's present
behavior to generalize and was thus making
a dispositional attribution. A greater discrepancy would indicate less generalization of
the actor's behavior and thus a situational
attribution.
The results of the present-behavior-generalbehavior discrepancy measure, presented in
Table 2, corroborated the findings on the
dispositional-situational measure of attributions. The effects of videotape reorientation,
as tested in the Role X Videotape Orientation
interaction, reached significance at p < .05,
(F = 3.38, df= 2/114). Again, neither the
main effect for role nor the main effect for
orientation was significant. Although the direction of differences between the actors and
observers in the various conditions was as
expected, none of the individual comparisons between cells reached significance on
the present-behavior-general-behavior mea-
171
TABLE 2
PRESENT BEHAVIOR MINUS GENERAL BEHAVIOR
DISCSEPANCY SCORES SUMMED OVER
ALL FOUR BEHAVIORS
Subjects
Same
orientation
No
videotape
New
orientation
Actors
Observers
7.15
5.45
5.00
4.90
4.25
5.90
sure, even with the exclusion of the dominance dimension. It appears that the results for the present-behavior-general behavior measure followed the same pattern as, but
were generally weaker than, the results for
the dispositional-situational measure. The
two measures were, incidentally, significantly
correlated (overall r — .361, p < .01).
DISCUSSION
The present study demonstrates that visual
orientation has a powerful influence on the
inferences made by actors and observers
about the causes of the actor's behavior.
When videotape was not presented and subjects were left to assume their own orientations, or when videotape reproduced subjects'
original orientations, actors attributed their
behavior relatively more to situational causes
than did observers. This finding supports the
Jones and Nisbett (1971) hypothesis that
actors' attributions are typically more situational than observers'. But under conditions
of reorientation, when subjects saw a new
point of view on videotape, the attributional
differences between actors and observers were
exactly reversed. Reoriented, self-viewing actors attributed their behaviors relatively less
to situational causes than did observers. This
effect was obtained on two very different
measures of attribution across a variety of
behavioral dimensions in an unstructured
situation.
Mechanisms of Videotape Reorientation
Two important issues arise concerning the
possible mechanisms by which video orientation affected attributions. The first issue,
one crucial to any laboratory social psychology experiment, concerns experimenter demand characteristics. Demand characteristics
could have influenced the results of the
172
MICHAEL D. STORMS
ent study if the hypotheses had been communicated to subjects either by the experimenter's behavior or by the fact the subjects
viewed only one videotape. Both of these
possibilities depend on subjects' developing
the expectation that videotape had importance for how they should respond. The possibility of communicating the hypotheses was
avoided by leading subjects to believe that
videotape was not an essential part of the
experiment and that the experimenter had
wanted to show both tapes but could not,
due to circumstances beyond his control.
During debriefing, subjects were questioned
on their reactions to this hoax; they reported
no suspicion that the videotape breakdown
had been intentional or important. Moreover,
if subjects had been responding to the attribution questions out of desire to support
the experimenter's hypotheses, it is unlikely they could have produced the results of
the indirect present-behavior-general-behavior measure. This index was derived from the
absolute value of the difference between the
four level-of-behavior questions and the four
general-behavior questions. These questions
were widely separated in the questionnaire,
and subjects would have had to perform a
rather elaborate calculus to produce these results deliberately. Thus, it does not seem
likely that the reorientation effects can be
accounted for by experimenter demand
characteristics.
The second issue involves the possible
mechanisms by which videotape caused the
predicted attributions. This study was designed to demonstrate that a global manipulation (visual orientation) affects actors' and
observers' attributions of the actor's behavior.
The study was not designed to separate
out the many possible mechanisms by which
this might occur. However, some informed
speculation is possible.
Jones and Nisbett (1971) proposed several
factors that contribute to attributional differences between actors and observers, including differences in the information available about an event and differences in how
that information is processed. These two categories are not mutually exclusive, and videotape orientation may have affected aspects of
both information availability and information
processing. When actors or observers saw a
videotape of an event from a different point
of view, they may have received some totally
new information. The actor may have realized, for the first time, some new aspects of
his own behavior; the observer may have seen
new aspects of the situation or of the other
participant. These new facts could have contributed to changes in subjects' inferences
about the cause of behavior. Second, the
salience of already available information may
have changed for reoriented subjects. Changes
in the salience of information have been
shown to affect people's perceptions of the
reasons for their behavior. For example,
Kiesler, Nisbett, and Zanna (1969) found
that subjects tended to adopt as explanations of their own behavior motives that were
made salient by a confederate. Similarly, subjects in the present study might have formulated their attributions about the actor's behavior on the basis of potential causes which
had just been made salient by the videotape.
Finally, videotape reorientation may have
produced new response sets for subjects. Actors who viewed themselves on tape may have
been put into a "self-discovery" frame of
mind and thus led to think about their own
personality as revealed in their behavior.
Similarly, observers who saw a videotape from
the actor's point of view may have developed
an "empathic" set, imagining themselves to
be in the actor's shoes.
It is also of interest to consider the exact
nature of the attributional changes evoked by
videotape. Changes on the key dependent
variable, the dispositional-situational index,
were accounted for mostly by changed evaluations of situational causes. Actors assigned a
great deal of causality to the situation unless
videotape forced them to look away from the
situation and toward their own behavior. Observers originally assigned less causality to
the situation unless videotape impressed situational factors on them. Differences in attribution to dispositional causes, although in the
expected direction, were much weaker than
these differences in attribution to situational
causes. It may be that the relatively greater
amount of change on the situational dimension reflects people's general way of viewing
the role of dispositions in causing behavior.
VIDEOTAPE AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS
People may characteristically assign fixed and
fairly high importance to personal responsibility for behavior. Consequently, they may
be left with only one means of modifying
their relative assignment of causality and responsibility, namely by varying their evaluations of the situation. In line with this possibility, there may have been a ceiling effect
for dispositional attributions in the present
study; the overall mean importance assigned
to dispositional causes equaled nearly 7 out
of a possible 9 scale points. Subjects were
thus left with little room to express enhanced
dispositional influences.
Up to this point, discussion has been limited to information-related variables which
may be modified by video exposure and may
in turn affect attributions. Undoubtedly,
motivational variables, such as the need to
maintain self-esteem and particular self-concepts, could also be affected by videotape
observations. One might expect the self-viewing actors in particular to be influenced by
such motivations. It is important to note,
however, that the present findings were obtained in a situation which was, in many
respects, low-key. The behaviors elicited in
the gettingiacquainted conversations were
routine and probably not highly relevant to
actors' self-concepts, the interaction between
subjects was fairly unemotional, and actors
and observers did not have the opportunity
to discuss their potentially opposing views of
the actor's behavior. It is therefore important
to consider whether the present findings
would generalize to situations where actors
and observers are more emotionally involved,
such as in psychotherapy and T groups. There
is reason to believe that the present findings
have some applicability to the use of videotape even in such emotionally charged settings.
Videotape in Therapy and T Groups
There has been a recent and dramatic increase in the application of videotape feedback in therapy and human relations training.
Alger and Hogan (1966a) asserted that
"videotape recording represents a technological breakthrough with the kind of significance
for psychiatry that the microscope has had
for biology [p. 1]." In clinical practice,
173
videotape is frequently used to increase a
patient's knowledge of his own behavior (cf.
Bailey & Sowder, 1970; Holzman, 1969), and
this apparently leads to therapeutic gain. Reivich and Geertsma (1968) reported increased
accuracy in patients' knowledge of their own
behavior after videotape self-observation. They
measured the disparity between a patient's
self-ratings on clinical scales and the ratings
given him by psychiatric nurses. After videotape self-observation, the ratings of the actor
patient came to agree more with the ratings
of the observer nurses. Alderfer and Lodahl
(1971) found that videotape playback in T
groups increased subjects' "openness." Openness was defined as willingness to explore the
internal meaning of and accept personal responsibility for an attitude or behavior. Finally, case studies in marital therapy (Alger
& Hogan, 1966a; Kagan, Krathwohl, & Miller, 1963) have reported that one or both
marriage partners are more willing to assume
the blame for a poor relationship after seeing
themselves on videotape.
On the other hand, some negative consequences of self-observation have also been
reported. For instance, Carrere (1954) used
videotape to show alcoholics how they behaved when intoxicated, but he found it necessary to edit the more shocking scenes. The
full presentation of their behavior when
drunk was too stressful for many of his patients. Parades, Ludwig, Hassenfeld, and
Cornelison (1969) similarly reported the lowering of alcoholic patients' self-esteem after
viewing their own drunken behavior on tape.
Leitenberg, Agras, Thompson, and Wright
(1968) gave behavioral feedback (although
not video) to phobic patients undergoing behavior modification. These authors found that
feedback to patients about successful progress
speeds their cure, but information about temporary setbacks interferes with the therapy.
Finally, Geertsma and Reivich (1965) reported that some self-viewing depressive patients become more depressed, some schizophrenic patients engage in more bizarre behavior, and some neurotics show an increase
in the symptoms characteristic of their particular disorder.
Research to date on the use of videotape in
therapy is insufficient to indicate how and
174
MICHAEL D. STORMS
with whom it is a beneficial therapy adjunct.
It may be possible, however, to apply the
findings and the theoretical framework of the
present study to the issue of videotape use in
therapy. The present study demonstrates that
self-observation can change the causal interpretation a person gives to his own behavior.
The self-viewing actor (and possibly the
self-viewing patient) is more likely to accept
personal, dispositional responsibility for his
behavior and is less likely to deflect responsibility to the situation.
This attributional consequence of self-observation may help to account for some of
the effects of videotape in therapy. For example, the increased openness of T group
participants after self-observation may reflect
a tendency for each group member to assume
more personal, dispositional responsibility for
his behavior in the group. Similarly, in marital therapy, the husband or wife who sees
himself or herself on videotape may realize
for the first time his or her own behavioral
contribution to the marital conflict and may
be more willing to place a dispositional blame
on himself or herself. Finally, the reported
increase in agreement between a patient's
clinical self-ratings after videotape self-observation and the ratings of observing psychiatric nurses closely parallels the present findings. Self-observation increases an individual's
dispositional attributions, thus bringing him
more in agreement with the observer's builtin bias for dispositional attributions.
It seems likely that this increase in dispositionality of a patient's attributions would
prove to be sometimes therapeutic and sometimes distherapeutic. Successful therapy no
doubt usually involves making a patient
aware of his own behavior and convincing
him to accept personal responsibility for that
behavior. Self-observation apparently aids
this process and, to that extent, should be
therapeutic. However, two potentially negative outcomes of this process might be suggested. First, in becoming more dispositional
about their own behavior, individuals who
see themselves on videotape may actually
underestimate real and viable situational explanations for their behavior. Actors in the
present study who saw their own behavior on
videotape had a higher mean for dispositional
attributions and a lower mean for situational
attributions than any other group of subjects.
This suggests the possibility that self-viewing
actors may have been "undersituational" in
attributing their own behavior. That is, videotape may have reoriented these actors so
much that they perceived situational causes
for their behavior to be even less important
than did others who viewed them. And if, as
Jones and Nisbett (1971) have suggested, observers are themselves inclined to underattribute to the situation, this poses a disturbing possibility for therapy. Ironically, the
therapist and the self-viewing patient could
reach complete agreement about the patient's
behavior, yet this agreement could result from
a mutual underestimation of the importance
of the patient's situation in causing his behavior. This collaborative illusion between
patient and therapist could be especially harmful if the patient blames himself for behavior
that is in fact due to some aspect of his environment.
Past research on attribution processes has
uncovered another area where attributions to
the self can have distherapeutic results.
Storms and Nisbett (1970) and Valins and
Nisbett (1971) have suggested that negative
self-labeling which results from attributing
uncomplimentary behaviors to dispositions
within oneself often lead to a loss of self-esteem and an actual increase in the pathological behavior. For example, insomniacs who
attribute their sleeplessness to some negative
state within themselves may increase their
anxiety and thus aggravate their original condition. Storms and Nisbett proposed that such
exacerbation may result whenever self-attributions of a negative disposition increase the
individual's anxiety and when anxiety is an
irritant to the pathology, such as in impotence, stuttering, and other neurotic conditions. This exacerbation phenomenon may be
occurring in some of the therapy cases where
negative results have followed the use of
videotapes. The finding that self-observation
lowers the self-esteem of alcoholic patients
might be an instance of this. An alcoholic patient who sees a tape of his own drunken
behavior may become quite upset and de-
VIDEOTAPE AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS
pressed about himself. Such a traumatic experience may only increase the likelihood that
the patient will drink to excess. Whenever a
pathology is caused or influenced by a poor
self-concept, self-observation of extremely
uncomplimentary behavior may serve to retard therapeutic progress.
Research on attribution processes may help
to create a theoretical framework for the area
of videotape self-observation in therapy settings. The present study suggests that selfobservation increases an individual's dispositional attributions of his own behavior and
that this brings interpretation of his behavior
more in line with an observer's interpretation. In most cases, this should be advantageous to the therapy process, but in certain cases self-attributions could lead to an
exacerbation of the original pathology. Therapists would therefore be well advised to look
critically at the potential consequences of
self-observation. It seems especially important to consider whether a personal, dispositional attribution of the pathological behavior
aids the patient to become aware of his problem and to deal with it, or whether selfattribution increases the patient's anxiety to
the point of exacerbating his problem.
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