16 John Vogler transnational interaction and reminds us that in empirical and behavioural terms the state is a legal abstraction. Changes in the old international system that have occurred since 1945, amongst which has been the rise in environmental concerns, have left it unrecognisable, and this makes the traditional emphasis on a world of states lacking supranational authority misplaced. 'Governments are still the focus of policy-making, but the systems of interaction have fundamentally changed, not only in the values that are dominant but also structurally.' Despite all the questioning of the relevance of statehood and of the utility of international organisation and institutions, the latter still provide a primary focus of interest for those who define themselves as students of IR. The dilemmas are well captured in Imber's essay on the environment and the United Nations. The UN is 'both the best and the worst place in which to conduct environmental diplomacy'. On the one hand, if some form of global regulation is required (many problems can be dealt with on a regional basis), the UN is unavoidable as the 'only global forum or arena in which norms and laws for the management of GEC can be negotiated'. On the other hand, however, the UN is 'the worst place' because it is an organisation of states acting in defence of their own narrow sovereign interests. Imber is also painfully aware of the sheer scale of the 'structural' inequalities and sources of degradation, embedded in the operation of the global economy, that underlie discussions at UNCED or at the Commission for Sustainable Development. In this context, the activities of a fragmented and 'feudal' UN system can be represented as an 'institutional bandage applied to a structural haemorrhage'. The only politically realistic path remains that of 'constant agitation for reform'. The generation of norms for changing and governing behaviour is, as Imber notes, a crucial function of the UN system and cannot be dispensed with. This view is shared by those other contributors whose primary concern is with the development and maintenance of effective international environmental regimes. Norm generation has also been the practical objective of the many NGO activists who have been an increasingly evident and recognised presence in international negotiations. Ogley addresses the highly salient question of the 'supply side' of global norm generation. He provides both a close analysis of the negotiating circumstances and processes involved and an assessment of their relative importance in the light of some recent environmental agreements. Informing the discussion throughout is the experience of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, the broadest and most sustained attempt ever to reform and codify a set of global environmental norms. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was the product of a decade of the most complex multilateral negotiations, and it only entered into force, in somewhat truncated form, in November 1994. Described by the UN Secretary-General as one of the 'greatest achievements of this century', one of the most 'definitive contributions of our era' and 'one of our most enduring legacies' ,5 it provides a range of precedents and often salutary lessons. As Ogley concludes, the point of all this activity is that of 'changing human behaviour'. When the fundamental question of regime effectiveness is addressed, the disjuncture between the international dimension and the global system of Introduction 17 commerce, investment, consumption and pollution becomes very evident. It is too often assumed that the conclusion of international agreements and formal 'compliance' by governments will have the desired environmental effects. The chapter by Greene reflects on the problem of implementation and on the complex national-international linkages which determine regime effectiveness. The actual implementation of agreements involves altering the behaviour of a whole range of transnational, corporate and even individual actors who may fall within state jurisdiction but not necessarily under governmental control. Implementation and learning strategies, therefore, have major policy implications for institutional design. SCIENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY The growing awareness of environmental issues in the late 1980s coincided with a period of theoretical flux and uncertainty in International Relations. This state of uncertainty was associated with the collapse of the ideological and political certainties that had characterised the Cold War, but it was also a small part of a wider unease that permeated the social sciences as a whole. The positivist epistemology of orthodox IR came under attack from a number of theoretical directions. Paterson's essay on the explanation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change reflects this critical approach. The focus is upon neorealism and neoliberalism. Paterson applies them to the case of the climatechange negotiations and concludes that neoliberal institutionalism provides the more adequate account. On the other hand, however, both have an oversimplified view of international as opposed to domestic phenomena, and share a flawed positivist epistemology. This is particularly serious because supposedly value-free, problem-solving theories do in effect 'privilege' certain positions and social groups, and this is evident in discussions of climate change. Positivist epistemology remains a source of deep contention. Willetts, for example, sets out a forthright defence asserting the possibility of the objective study of values in environmental politics, while at the same time completely disassociating himself from the ontological assumptions of political Realism. Beyond epistemological introspection in IR, the social construction and politics of science are a central question for all those interested in global environmental change issues. At the deepest level, radical critics of modernity have linked global environmental degradation with the entire 'enlightenment project' whereby science, since Bacon and Descartes, has enshrined a manipulative division between human beings and nature. A striking example is provided by a recent study of the World Bank's environmental policy containing an interpretative chapter entitled 'From Descartes to Chico Mendes' in which the Bank is described as the 'quintessential institution of high mid-twentieth century modernity, a practical embodiment of the philosophical and historical project of the modem era that began with the Enlightenment' (Rich 1994: 239). Such views are present within the IR community amongst 'postmodem' critics and in writings on gender (see Bretherton in this volume). However, in general, 18 John Vogler scholars have avoided theorising on this scale, being more concerned with the specific connections between scientific advice and policy. What BoehmerChristiansen describes as the 'global research enterprise' represents a novel challenge for students of international politics. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) represents the apex of this complex interand transnational enterprise with its mission to provide consensual scientific advice to the framers of the climate-change regime. Boehmer-Christiansen's study of the IPCC sets out to demonstrate that the 'global research enterprise has not only become a significant political actor promoting the globalisation of information collection and ''business as usual" research, but has also done so with reference to specific global environmental concerns that were exaggerated for this purpose'. These are important and controversial claims, directly relevant to functionalist thinking on international cooperation and the supposedly 'benign' influence of epistemic communities on the creation of international environmental regimes. CONCLUSION Whereas, in the hiatus between Stockholm and Rio, the study of the international relations of the natural environment may have been the neglected preserve of the technical specialist removed from the main axes of contention in the discipline, this is clearly no longer the case, as the essays in this volume demonstrate. Many of the themes pursued and the theoretical disagreements are clearly part of a wider debate within the social sciences - as portrayed by Redclift and Benton (1994). Questions of structure and agency, or ofholism or individualism, and the assault on positivist orthodoxy all figure, along with the politics of science. The international relations of GEC is not isolated, but has it a specific contribution to make within the social sciences? Political and IR research is omitted from some schema that outline the convergence between the natural sciences and the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, economics and geography.6 Like environmental economics, IR exhibits a close connection with policy. As argued in the first part of this chapter, much of the intellectual history of the discipline can be written in terms of responses to political events, and it is probably inevitable that its primary contribution will continue to be in the study of policy-making at the international level, and in the engineering of 'solutions'. This places a heavy emphasis on the second part of the volume. There was at one time a serious discussion amongst participants about the desirability of publishing two separate volumes of papers. The temptation to do this was resisted on the grounds that both theoretical argument and 'policyrelevant' empirical work ought to inform each other. Otherwise, there is a danger that the consideration of theoretical questions will become arid introspection and that policy-related work will be unable to rise above institutional politics and the intricacies of framework conventions and protocols. Beyond this there is also the point, made by a number of contributors, that the study of global environmental change has the potential to alter ( or even subvert) the essential elements of IR as an academic pursuit. Introduction 19 NOTES 1 The British International Studies Association Environment Working Group was founded in 1990 and received initial financial assistance from the Association. During 1992 and 1993, it received a grant from the ESRC Global Environmental Change Programme which allowed the presentation and discussion of the papers that now form the chapters of this volume. We continue to hold meetings, and we gratefully ack- nowledge the support of the ESRC and its GEC Programme, of which the Group forms a small part. 2 A survey of citations in the International Political Science Abstracts for the period 1985-90 yielded the following results. Even though the Third Law of the Sea Conference had ended in 1982 without ratification of the Convention, the literature was still dominated by maritime issues. Indeed, there were no less than forty citations. Political, economic and legal aspects of the Antarctic regime received fourteen citations, while the Arctic received eight. The emerging global environmental agenda, the Brundtland Report, stratospheric ozone and climate change merited only six citations. By the early 1990s, this situation would have changed dramatically. 3 The United Nations Yearbook 1972 (New York: United Nations, pp. 318-23), provides the text of the twenty-six Principles and a concise report of the Conference issues and participants. 4 This well-known distinction, highlighted by critical theorists, derives from the work of Cox (1981). 5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, speech to the inaugural session of the Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica, 16 November 1994, UN Press Release SG/SM/94/196. 6 See Figure 1.1, 'Environmental research', in Redclift and Benton 1994, p. 12. BIBLIOGRAPHY Benedick, R.E. (1991) Ozane Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Pkmet, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P. Boardman, R. (1981) International Organisation and the Protection of Nature, London: Macmillan. Brandt, W. (1980) 'Independent commission on international development issues', North-South: a Programme for Survival, London: Pan. Brenton, T. (1994) The Greening of Machiavelli: the Evolution of International Environmental Politics, London: RIIA/Earthscan. Brown, C. (1992) International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Brundtland, G. (1987) 'Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development', Our Common Future, Oxford: O.U.P. Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear, 2nd edn, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Caldwell, L.K. (1984) International Environmental Policy, 1st edn, Durham and London: DukeU.P. Carr, E.H. (1939) The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-39, London: Macmillan. Carroll, J.E. (ed.) (1988) International Environmental Diplomacy, Cambridge: C.U.P. Cox, R.W. (1981) 'Social forces, states and world order', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10(2): 126-53. Deudney, D. (1990) 'The case against linking environmental degradation and national security', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19(3): 461-76. The &ologist (1993) 'Whose common future? Reclaiming the commons', London: Ilarthscan. Ekins, P. (1992) A New World Order: Grassroots Movements for Global Change, London: Routledge. 20 John Vogler Groom, AJ.R. and Light, M. (eds) (1994) Contemporary International Relations: a Guide to Theory, London: Pinter. Haas, P.M. (1990) Saving the Mediterranean: the Politics of International Environmental Cooperation, New Yorlc: Columbia U.P. --(1990a) 'Obtaining international environmental protection through epistemic communities', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19(3): 347-64. --( 1992) 'Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination', International Organization 46(1): 1-36. --, Keohane, R.O. and Levy, M.A. (1993) Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Hoffman, M. (1994) 'Normative international theory, approaches and issues', in Groom, A.J.R. and Light, M. (eds) Contemporary International Relations: a Guide to Theory, London: Pinter, pp. 27-44. Huntington, E. (1915) Civilization and Climate, New Haven, Conn.: Yale U.P. --(1919) World Power and Evolution, New Haven, Conn.: Yale U.P. Hurrell, A. and Kingsbury, B. (eds) (1992) The International Politics of the Environment, Oxford: Clarendon. Imber, M.F. (1994) Environment, Security and UN Reform, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kay, D. and Jacobson, H.K. (eds) (1983) Environmental Protection: the International Dimension, New Jersey: Allanheld Osmun. Kay, D. and Skolnikoff, E. (1972) World Eco-Crisis: International Organizations in Response, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Keohane, R.O. and Nye, J.S. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown. Krasner, S.D. (ed.) (1983) International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P. Light, M. and Halliday, F. (1994) 'Gender and international relations', in Groom, AJ.R. and Light, M. (eds) Contemporary International Relations: a Guide to Theory, London: Pinter, pp. 45-55. McCormick, J. (1989) The Global Environmental Movement: Reclaiming Paradise, London: Belhaven. Mackinder, H.J. (1904) 'The geographical pivot of history', The Geographical Journal XXIII: 421-44. --(1919) Democratic Ideals and Reality, New York: Holt & Co. Mahan, A.T. (1890) The Influence of Sea Power upon History 166/>-1783, 1965 edn, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. Mathews, J.T. (ed.) (1991) Preserving the Global Environment: the Challenge of Shared Leadership, New York: Norton. Meadows, D.H. et al. (1972) The Umits to Growth: a Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, London: Pan. -(1992) Beyond the Umits: Global Collapse and Sustainable Development, London: Earthscan. Middleton, N., O'Keefe, P. and Moyo, S. (1993) Tears of the Crocodile: From Rio to Reality in the Developing World, London: Pluto. Mills, C.A. (1949) 'Temperature dominance over human life', Science, 16 September, reprinted in Sprout and Sprout (eds) (1962) Foundations of International Politics, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 350-3. Mitrany, D. (1943)A Working Peace System, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Morgenthau, HJ. (1948) Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and the Struggle for Peace, 4th edn (1967), New Yorlc: Alfred A. Knopf. Morse, E.L. (1976) Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations, New York: Free Press. Newsom, D.D. (1988/9) 'The new diplomatic agenda: are governments ready?', International Affairs 65(1 ): 29-42. Introduction 21 North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: C.U.P. Porter, G. and Brown, J.W. (1991) Global Environmental Politics, Boulder, Col.: Westview. Redclift, M. and Benton, T. (eds) (1994) Social Theory and the Global Environment, London: Routledge. Rich, B. (1994) Mortgaging the Earth: the World Bank, Environmental Impoverishment and the Crisis of Development, London: Earthscan. Rosenau, JN. and Cziempel, E.O. (eds) (1992) Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: C.U.P. Sachs, W. (ed.) (1993) Global Ecology: a New Arena of Global Conflict, London and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books. Sand, P.H. (1991) 'International cooperation: the environmental experience', in Mathews, J .T. ( ed.) (1991) Preserving the Global Environment: the Challenge of Shared Leadership, New York: Norton, pp. 236-79. --(ed.) (1992) The Effectiveness of Environmental Agreements: a Survey of Existing Legal Instruments, Cambridge: Grotius/UNCED. Sjostedt, G. (ed.) (1993) International Environmental Negotiation, Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage/llASA. Smith, S. (1993) 'The environment on the periphery of international relations: an explanation', Environmental Politics 2(4): 2~5. Soroos, M.S. (1986) Beyond Sovereignty: the Challenge of Global Policy, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. Sprout, H. and Sprout, M. (eds) (1962) Foundations of International Politics, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. --(1968) 'Environmental factors in the study of international relations', in Rosenau, J .N. (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: a Reader in Research and Theory, New York: Free Press. Strange, S. (1982) 'Cave! hie dragones: a critique of regime analysis', International Organization 36(2). Susskind, L. (1994) Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, Oxford: O.U.P. Thomas, C. (1992) The Environment in International Relations, London: RIIA. Vasquez, J.A. (1983) The Power of Power Politics, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers U.P. Vogler, J. (1995) The Global Commons: a Regime Analysis, Chichester: Wiley. von Neumann, J. (1955) 'Can we survive technology?', Fortune, June, reprinted in Sprout and Sprout (eds) (1962) Foundations of International Politics, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 242-50. Wheeler, R.H. (1946) 'Climate and human behavior', The Encyclopaedia of Psychology, New York Philosophical Library Inc., reprinted in Sprout and Sprout (eds) (1962) Found-ations of International Politics, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, pp. 347-9. Young, O.R. (1977) Resource Management at the International Level, New York: Nichols. --(1982) Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions, Berkeley: University of California Press. --( 1989) International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment, Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P. 2 Environmental security as a universal value Implications for international theory1 Hugh C. Dyer This chapter explores the theoretical implications of invoking environmental security as a universal value. It begins with a discussion of the concept of environmental security that draws· on recent literature, proceeds to a treatment of the concept in terms of values and interests, and concludes with a consideration of the implications of an emerging global norm of environmental security for the theory of international relations. In presenting environmental security as a norm, the intention is to make out the case for value-based theory (characterised here as normative theory) as opposed to interest-based theory. For present purposes, and in brief, values are taken to be an object of choice, while norms are taken to be socially constructed by consensus: that is, norms are social values. The society in this case is the broadest possible one, though we shall see that it matters whether this is understood as international society (a society of states) or cosmopolitan society (a global civil society). It may be argued that the influence of civil society and non-state actors in environmental politics parallels other processes of globalisation such as those found in international financial markets. The problems attending the conceptualisation of environmental security will be shown to arise from the preoccupation of traditional international theory with the categories of state interests and state power. In contrast to values, interests are objectified, thus reducing the grounds for choice down to strictly rational assessments of rank priority within the objective structure. The reification of the state and its interests is the grounds for accumulating state power for state purposes. However, the state itself is a value choice, inasmuch as other forms of social organisation and mechanisms of authoritative allocation might be equally successful. The security of the global environment stands against the state system as another, perhaps contradictory, value or set of values. This possibility is not readily admitted from the perspective of state-centric interest-based theory, but could be addressed from the perspective of a value-based theory. The dichotomy of state and environmental values underlies a contradiction between traditional definitions of security and environmental security. Environmental security as a universal value 23 ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY The principal difficulty in discussing environmental security is the recalcitrance of traditional politico-military definitions of security. It has been argued that the traditional threat to security, organised violence, is not analytically comparable to environmental threats (Deudney 1990: 461). Organised violence is a traditional prerogative of nation states, being both a domestic monopoly and (in the Clausewitzian sense) a tool of foreign policy. However, the developing logic of international environmental relations points to global relations among regional and local actors rather than to traditional inter-state relations. Global relations can be seen as succeeding what was begun by the phenomenon of transnational relations by further conditioning, if not eliminating, the role of nation states. Even where the state remains a principal focus, the traditional notion of national security 'becomes profoundly confused' when there is internal instability or insecurity (as would be the case environmentally, since the environment does not recognise political or territorial boundaries), and 'the image of the state as a referent object for security fades' (Buzan 1991: 103). These developments present an opportunity, as Pirages (1991: 8) says, for re-examining 'the meaning of security'. Indeed, the question of redefining security is the topic of a broad area of recent literature, much of which specifically addresses environmental security.2 Traditional security discourse is not well equipped to address the pressing global issues that a (new) definition of security must cope with. A continuing dependence on the troubled concepts of sovereignty, national interest and (state) foreign policy, which have historically provided the framework and rationale for military threats and actions, suggests that the notion of 'security' does not lend itself well to the project of conceptualising a response to emerging global changes - not least global environmental change. Military power is the traditional manifestation of state power, and is the locus of value investment for notions of security attaching to the state and (in these terms, by definition) to populations under its jurisdiction. These values are seldom in step with the human environment, but vast resources have been exhausted in their name. It is worth considering the origins of traditional security definitions, in order to place definitions of environmental security in context. As Richard Ullman notes, 'the tendency of American political leaders to define security problems and their solutions in military terms is deeply ingrained', and we 'should not overestimate the achievements of . . . nongovernmental organizations in putting forward alternative conceptions of national security, such as those involving limiting population growth or enhancing environmental quality' (Ullman 1983: 152-3). This is not perhaps true to the same extent for all countries, but it is to be expected that any sea change in the world political order will require the acquiescence if not the lead of the USA, and its security agenda will continue to influence others. At the level of international security (where one might hope the concept of environmental security would find a natural home), the traditional agenda is merely an extension of national state preoccupations such that collective security, 24 Hugh C. Dyer far from escaping the parochialism of state-centric security, remains a fundamentally conservative notion, viewed by Herz as 'an attempt to maintain, and render more secure, the "territoriality" or "impermeability" of states upon which their "sovereignty" and "independence" had rested since the beginning of the modern era' (Herz 1959: 76). The idea of international security as an improvement on national defence has a long history which includes various and sundry proposals for world government, but perhaps most significantly the initiatives leading to the League of Nations and the United Nations, both of which include collective security provisions in their founding documents. However, collective security is time-bound, and Herz, writing in 1959, is concerned with the new conditions of the 'Atomic Age', which he characterises in a final chapter entitled 'Universalism as an alternative to the Power Dilemma' (instructively, the conditions are also true of global environmental change): Any discussion of the details of a more integrated world structure ... must of necessity remain rather theoretical and detached from present realities .... Our task is more basic; it concerns the conclusions to be drawn from the unprecedented condition that has befallen mankind. And the first thing to realize is that the situation confronts for the first time the whole human race as one group. (Herz 1959: 303) Yet this realisation has had little effect on policy in the intervening years, and it is the famous 'security dilemma' which continues to dominate conceptions of security for the 'units' in international relations: a feeling of insecurity, deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort which proves self-defeating because complete security remains ultimately unobtainable. (ibid.: 231) It is an open question whether or not concepts of environmental security will allow an escape from the essential structure of international relations, but to the extent that the present structure remains inadequate, this must surely be an aspiration. Peter F. Drucker, for example, notes that crucial environmental needs such as the protection of the atmosphere and of forests 'cannot be addressed as adversarial issues' (Drucker 1990: 110--11). Ken Conca has suggested that it is not clear whether the existing global structures (and their inequalities) will be changed or reinforced by the pursuit of environmental security (Conca 1992, 1993). If environmental or ecological security means insulation or isolation from that which cannot be nationally controlled, there will not be much progress beyond traditional forms of isolation based on national sovereignty. It is even conceivable that environmental security itself could become militarised, and the opportunity for fundamental change lost through the co-option of the environmental agenda by a traditional security agenda. This prospect is enhanced by the Environmental security as a universal value 25 complexity and ambiguity of the concept of environmental security, its definition being tied to 'insecurity' as a social phenomenon with localised variations in perception and valuation as well as a global dimension. There are a number of different approaches and perspectives in the literature, and the discourse about environmental security is consequently unclear, exhibiting sometimes contradictory mixed metaphors (Conca 1992). Not surprisingly, proposals range from attempts at the reform of traditional security conceptions to the radical overhaul of world politics. At one end of the spectrum are proposals which advocate adding selected parts of the environmental agenda to the list of things to be secured militarily - obviously a very conventional approach. At the other end of the spectrum are proposals for the restructuring of the entire political order in such a way as to allow an effective response to a perceived environmental crisis of immense proportions. Neither of these polar positions on the spectrum is very convincing. The former position is clearly inadequate or retrograde, and the latter position cannot justify panic on the existing fragmentary evidence about global environmental change (Broecker 1992: 6-14). There are, however, a number of intermediary positions, some recognising the profound changes in recent international relations, some ignoring them. Certainly, it seems appropriate to acknowledge change, since it is this feature of international relations which has brought existing concepts into disarray, if not disrepute. Any proposal for addressing environmental security must surely take into account the challenges that arise from both changes in the global environment and changes in the international political system following the end of the Cold War. The question is not, then, about changes themselves but rather about what these changes mean for our conception of security. In some respects, it is not even clear what is being secured: some view the environment as a potential source of danger or insecurity to the state, and some view the states themselves as the principal threat to the environment, with the emphasis on environmental aspects of traditional threats such as military activity, migration, famine and drought. If it is populations which are being secured, then what is at risk? Existence, says Rowlands (1992: 299); life, ideals, beliefs, territorial integrity and well-being, says Pirages (1991: 8). And against what are these being secured? War, revolution and civil strife, says Pirages (1991: 8); non-military threats, says Rowlands (1992: 299). The definition of that which is secured, and of that against which it is secured, is of course dependent on the conception of security employed. The case to be made is for the broadest possible definition of security, and this should be broad enough to 'include' environmental security - indeed, environmental security, broadly understood, could be the only, or the overall, conception of security from which all other considerations flow. This is not because traditional security concerns have vanished, but because they can be better incorporated into a broad notion of environmental security than can environmental security be squeezed into rigid and outmoded traditional, largely militaristic conceptions of security. The influence of traditional (largely Realist) theories of international relations has made it very difficult to escape the traditional conceptions of security. 26 Hugh C. Dyer Because the dominant discourse is Realist, the most common approach to environmental security is to couch proposals in terms of the Realist paradigm. Pirages notes this phenomenon in pointing to a dominant social paradigm. in the cognitive dimension of social evolution, which is characterised by an industrial culture, and is also reflected structurally in social institutions - namely, the industrial paradigm: 'While individual world-views may differ slightly, there is a general set of values, attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions that are shared by most members of industrial societies' (Pirages 1991: 9). Under these conditions it is not surprising that proposals and arguments concerning environmental security play to the existing dominant discourse of security in an uncritical way, attempting to build on it rather than transcend it. Hence there are proposals to 'encompass' within the notion of security: resource and environmental threats (Brown 1977, 1986; Mathews 1989; Renner 1989a, 1989b); and the conflict-generating risks of environmental change (Brown 1989; Homer-Dixon 1991; Myers 1989). These include orone depletion and global warming (Rowlands 1991), and extend to include a further, wide array of threats from earthquakes to demographic dislocation (Ullman 1983). Another approach is to incorporate the environment indirectly by hitching it to the economic threats to national security. Sorenson does this by indicating the environmental implications of sustainable economic development and economic recovery, in the context of US foreign-aid policy (Sorenson 1990). Bu7.an tends to link environmental issues to economic security, as a subset within the overall topic of security, and refers to Mathews (1989) in agreeing that there is room for the environment on the security agenda (Bu7.an 1991: 256--8). The Brundtland Commission employs (for good reason, given its mandate) the hybrid tactic of connecting environmental stress to conflict, and conflict to unsustainable development (Brundtland 1987: 290-304). Although Bruce Rich's discussion of environmental reform in the multilateral development banks suggests mixed results at best (Rich 1990: 307-29), any of these propositions and activities might serve to bring environmental security onto the international agenda. However, this 'add-on' approach to environmental security does little to reform the traditional security discourse. Porter and Brown take a broad perspective on security which more directly incorporates the environment (even if as only one of several global concerns), arguing that the traditional politico-military international security system in fact constrains international cooperation: 'the new concept of security in terms of common global threats, including threats to the environment, now presents an alternative to the traditional definition' (Porter and Brown 1991: 141). The interaction of threats to human populations which are of environmental origin ( as seen from the anthropocentric perspective) and threats to the environment which are of human origin (including industrialisation in general) suggests the obvious point, which was implied by the Brundtland Report (1987) , that there must be a complete integration of environmental perspectives into our understanding of the economic, social and political condition of our species. The Brundtland Report, however, is more concerned with the 'redefinition of priorities, nationally and Environmental security as a universal value 27 globally', and with 'broader forms of security assessment' (Brundtland 1987: 302-3), and argues that: The whole notion of security as traditionally understood - in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress - locally, nationally, regionally, and globally. There are no military solutions to 'environmental security'. (ibid.: 19) But arguably, this idea of 'expanding' the security agenda has more in common with 'add-on' proposals than it has with the idea of actually redefining the concept of security from the intellectual starting point of a global perspective. The notion of 'common security' advocated by the Palme Commission (1982) ('Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security issues') goes some way towards capturing the essence of a global approach to security, but inevitably it too is caught up in the discourse of the modern state system - as all proposals must be if they hope to find a contemporary audience. The real challenge is to find sufficiently impelling points of reference in present circumstances to raise support for a longer-term perspective. Perhaps the speed of technological change and the growing awareness of environmental degradation, combined with models of globalisation offered by financial markets, the information and communication revolution and other transnational activities, will provide the necessary impetus for taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the collapse of Cold War structures and mind-sets. The concept of 'security' has been overstretched, and is in some respects passe (Sorenson 1990: 3), since in the traditional discourse of international security the notion of 'security' implies a threat or action coming from an assignable agent to which a response can be made. Such a threat, either to the security of a state or to international security, and the subsequent response generally involve the threat or use of armed force (Johnson 1991: 172). Environmental 'threats' may be assignable in some cases, but more to the point are those cases where assignability is problematic (in the way of public goods), and where 'securing' from such generalised states of affairs or 'natural' conditions is not possible or appropriate within the traditional meaning of the term 'security'. The 'security dilemma' is traditionally managed through the maintenance of relative symmetry between the parties (agents) involved, with special characteristics attaching to asymmetrical relationships. Thus, a 'balance' is sought through meeting perceived threats and by closing gaps in capability - paradoxically leading to the potential for spiralling arms races (hence the dilemma). The case of asymmetry is reflected, for example, in interventions by the more powerful, which are often presented as the management of general international security interests (not a dilemma for realpolitik). Yet, in the case of threats to the environment, where the threat in a given instance is identifiable with a particular agent (e.g. another state or non-state actor), asymmetry is more common because for any particular given case of environmental degradation the threat will be nonreciprocal. Consider, for example, the vulnerability of a state which is dependent 28 Hugh C. Dyer on river water originating in the territory of another state upstream: while the potential environmental threat cannot be reciprocated, a military action may be substituted, bringing traditional security concerns back in (Homer-Dixon 1994: 19). On the other hand, the environment as a whole is an ecosystem in which all parties are ultimately implicated, so in a sense asymmetry may only apply in the relative short run (or at least not in the long run) given that global change will have widespread consequences, either directly or indirectly. Of course, it is well to remember that the differential impacts of climate change mean that some groups, such as small island states, will be sensitive to their special vulnerability over the relatively long time scale of global change. Indeed, asymmetry in security relations is rather more commonplace than the simple balancing model of the security dilemma suggests. The point here is simply the familiar one that international security is of general interest, given the potential for 'spill-over' from any localised threat, and this is no less true of environmental threats. A new concept (perhaps 'assurance'?) is required to reflect the nuances of both a changing security discourse and the particular characteristics of environmental degradation which may define security threats. In contrast to the traditional concept of security which emphasises short-term military threats to national populations and territories, a concept of environmental security should take account of both the spatial (universal) and the temporal (intergenerational) scope of the threat. Finally, the real significance of taking a broad approach to environmental security (the security of the human environment) is the potential for employing this term as the all-encompassing conception of security, such that all other terms are derivative. VALUES Positing the universal value of environmental security does not suggest that the value necessarily manifests itself in the same form everywhere, or even that a global norm concerning the environment will be established (Buzan 1991: 172). However, the notion of environmental security as a universal value opens up the possibility of employing a central problematic factor in international relations as the basis of a case for transforming international theory, if it can be concluded that value-based theory provides a more appropriate explanation and understanding of this aspect of international relations than does interest-based theory. Buzan suggests that environmental security is linked to other problematic focal points of security - military, political, economic and social: 'Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend' (Buzan 1991: 19-20). The more inclusive the notion of environmental security is taken to be, the more persuasive the case for theory based on related values. In order to build the case for a normative, value-based approach, it is necessary to consider some of the traditional grounds for marginalising values in favour of interests. The first of these is the perception that values are subjective while Environmental security as a universal value 29 interests are, in some respect, objective - in Morgenthau, this objectivity is attained by defining interests in terms of power, which is pursued by all states (these being the principal international actors, in the Realist account). Values are thought to be relative to states and their societies, and this value-relativism marginalises the importance of values as an analytical category in the study of relations among states. Of course, this relativism is largely overcome by global conceptions of international relations which admit 'reciprocity' within a shared framework (Kegley 1992: 21-40), and it vanishes entirely under a fully cosmopolitan view. Values are only relative (in exactly the same way as interests) in the most uninteresting sense that they have a parochial manifestation, but otherwise they are a universal and readily observed feature of human life. The pursuit of power does little to add objectivity, since it may always be asked for what purpose (and at what cost) it is being pursued, and the answer will always betray parochial concerns. The interesting problem is in fact how values are individually selected, politically manipulated, and socially entrenched as norms. It may be clarifying to refer to the semiotician Greimas, and to note a parallel between our problem of values in international relations and his examination of ethnic literature where he distinguishes between two different kinds of manipulation of values. The first is the 'circulation of constant values (or equivalent ones) between equal subjects in an isotopic and closed universe' (Greimas 1987: 85-6). We might consider this to be the case in domestic or national societies, where the values in circulation are culturally embedded and where alien values are not readily admitted. The second, following from the first, involves 'the problem of the introduction and removal of these immanent values to and from the given universe, and it presupposes the existence of a universe of transcendent values that encompasses and encloses the first in such a way that subjects who possess the immanent values appear as receivers vis-a-vis the subject-senders of the transcendent universe' (ibid.). We might view this latter kind, then, as the problem of value exchange in international (global) relations, where the prospect of a shared system of values depends on such a shared system being somehow related to the various distinct value structures of the (local) participating societies. This could possibly, but not necessarily, result in the familiar settlement on lowest common denominators, given the difficulty of aggregating conflicting values. An important caveat here is that transcendent belief systems (for example, those involving a deity) exceed the limits of normative political theory, so any universe of transcendent values for international society cannot be a universalised reflection of a particular value system. The same may be said of any simplistic conclusions about the universal acceptance of liberalism - or any other political creed for that matter. Thus, what is required for the adoption of environmental security as a universal value is not the imposition of global consensus but rather a collective understanding of international political life as that which 'encompasses and encloses' the particularities of national political life, and for which both local environments and the global environment are of salience. Invoking environmental security as a universal value allows the theoretical possibility that less abstract manifestations of environmental security can be 30 Hugh C. Dyer grounded in such a universal value or menu of such values. Particular subjective environmental values may be chosen from such a menu as part of the formation of social norms concerning the security of the environment - whether these norms are global or local in their influence. Whatever their grounding or influence, it could still be held that values are insubstantial, whereas interests can be empirically identified, and it has already been suggested that traditional International Relations theory denies the significance of values, relying instead on the identification of material interests. One aspect of this denial of values, Greimas suggests, is that 'there is a tendency to confuse the notions of object and value; the figurative form of the object guarantees its reality and at this level value becomes identified with the desired object' (Greimas 1987: 85-6). An apposite example drawn from international relations is that of the value of security, which traditionally takes objective defence capability (e.g. weapons) as its figurative form. Thus, defence postures become a pretext for the hidden value of security, a value which can then remain undifferentiated or assumed since it appears to be less than substantial in comparison to a concrete interest in an array of weapons, even though its implications are quite broad: security may, for example, take constructive economic relations, democratic political structures or indeed a clean natural environment as its figurative form, rather than defence capability. Built into the notion of 'security' are a range of values, readily ignored in an empirical calculation of defence interests, but accounted for in a normative approach. In fact, the value connotations of security are defined, and thus limited, by the traditional discourse of international security. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS The conceptual and normative tensions between the security of the environment and the security of states as defining values may be overemphasised, if the main features of international relations remain unchanged or only modified (Conca 1993). Yet the possibility of global social and political change accompanying global environmental change is significant enough to warrant a theoretical consideration of the implications. The implications for international theory have two aspects: general implications, on the one hand, and those bearing specifically on the international relations of the environment on the other. Clearly, they are connected. It may be said that the theories of inter-state relations (whether they involve statecentric Realism or liberal internationalism) are no longer tenable - at least for explaining environmental politics in particular, but perhaps also generally as well. If so, international theory must become the theory of global processes, incorporating multiple actors and considering global, regional and local relations as aspects of the whole. It is precisely this aspect of considering the world as a whole which characterises the global approach. Globalisation, as a central concept, indicates the relative autonomy and distinct logic of the global, as opposed to the national or international (Robertson 1990). In this respect, a normative approach may prove useful, showing environmental security as a value developing into a socio-political norm in a global Environmental security as a universal value 31 context, one which influences both behaviour (as in political regimes) and knowledge (as in theoretical paradigms). Environmental security arises in a changing international context where interdependence is already widely accepted as the baseline of international relations, and where shared values such as environmental security are more salient than the particularistic interests (such as national politicomilitary security) of the individual nation states. This transition coincides with the relative decline in the salience of nuclear deterrence and the increasing salience of environmental concerns. In this sense, the environment becomes the manifestation of new political values and norms as the detritus of the Cold War experience and the international system it bolstered is tossed out. Normative theory is clearly an appropriate theoretical approach to such changing values and emerging norms, in preference to traditional interest-based theories which maintain the categories of nationalism and militarism in their accounts of security. Furthermore, a normative theory is better able to address processes of globalisation. The absence of secure and certain knowledge generally (such uncertainty being a notable characteristic of global environmental change), and of undisputed theoretical foundations for global political life in particular, leaves the possibility of a 'correct' world-view an open question. Naturally, when political action is necessary, the question cannot be left open. One route to closure, of course, is ideological commitment, but there is a distinction between ideology, with its twin characteristics of 'an image of society and a political programme' (Eccleshall 1984: 7), and the role of ideas. In its descriptive mode, a normative theoretical account of world-views addresses the formation of an image of society - in this case, of international society or the global political condition - and is not concerned with political programmes as such. In its prescriptive mode, normative theory may nevertheless properly provide guidance with respect to the formation of political programmes, since it is not possible to separate political choice from the analysis of political life: in separating the wheat from the chaff, it must be acknowledged that they first grew as parts of one whole - a whole, in this case, which defies the 'is-ought' distinction such that what 'is' (as discovered by analysis) results from previous choices made on the grounds of what 'ought to be' or what one 'ought to do' (as affirmed by commitment). The task at hand, however, is to uncover the origins and foundations of our political conceptions, or world-views, as the starting point for claims about political knowledge and choice. Such choice clearly involves a form of security which reflects the gradual shift of emphasis from politico-military threats to the threat of environmental degradation. Specifically, the following discussion will address the theoretical implications of invoking, in policy formation, what are held to be objective interests as a means of determining 'correct' action. In examining interest-based theory and practice, underlying value assumptions will be exposed in order to assess the role of values in determining interests. It is argued here that values come prior to interests in theoretical significance, and that attempts to understand global environmental politics must take into consideration the value structures underlying world-views. It is these sructures that are the key
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