UCI Metaontological Debate Essay

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Phil 150E (Advanced Metaphysics) Spring 2022 Take-Home Final Exam (35 points total) Instructions: Answer the essay prompt below (in the form of an essay). • Thoroughly answer every component (a-d) of the prompt, while giving any necessary background, explaining technical terms, and using illustrative examples. • No more than 7 pages total (using double-spaced, reasonably-sized font). • Explain things in your own words as much as possible. • If you directly quote from the readings or lecture slides, you must cite them. • If you use outside (i.e. non-assigned) sources, you must cite them. Due: Wednesday (6/8) at 11:59 pm. (Unexcused late submissions lose 1 point per day late.) Submit: As a pdf or word doc on Gauchospace. (Do NOT put your name on your submission.) Essay Prompt: The Central Debate in Metaontology a) Give an overview of the central debate in metaontology regarding whether ontological questions have objective, determinate answers, and if so, whether the answers are trivial; and explain the three main positions in the debate: Heavyweight Ontological Realism, Lightweight Ontological Realism, and Ontological Anti-Realism. b) Present, explain, and motivate one argument for or against one of the main positions. c) Advance and develop an objection to that argument. d) In light of the argument and objection, should we accept that position? (Defend your answer.) Here is a list of potential arguments you can use in part (b); you may use any of these arguments (reconstructed however you think is most plausible) or come up with your own • For heavyweight realism: Sider’s argument based on objective structure/naturalness • Against heavyweight realism: Chalmers’ argument called ‘The Knowledge Argument’ • For lightweight realism: Hirsch’s argument based on the principle of charity • Against lightweight realism: Chalmers’ argument based on the discontinuity between ordinary and ontological existence assertions • For anti-realism: Carnap’s argument based on verificationism • Against anti-realism: Quine’s argument based on the continuity between science and ontology 1 Announcements 5/2 • Read Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” • The Take-Home Midterm is due Wednesday next week (5/11) at 11:59 pm • No other homework assigned this week Quine’s “On What There Is” • Shows common arguments in ontology to be fallacious • Advances an explicit theory of ontological commitment • Surveys views in the ontology of abstract objects • Recommends a methodology for answering ontological questions The permissive ontologist’s advantage • Suppose McX and Quine differ over ontology • McX: “There are Fs” • Quine: “There are no Fs” • How can each side describe this disagreement? • McX: “Quine refuses to recognize certain entities” • Quine: “There are certain entities that McX countenances that I don’t” (Contradiction) • The negative side has difficultly coherently describing the disagreement • Platonic riddle of non-being: Must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there’s not? • This leads philosophers like McX to infer being where they otherwise wouldn’t: • If Pegasus were not, then we’re not talking about anything when using the word ‘Pegasus’. • Hence, it’s nonsense to say that Pegasus is not. • Since denial can’t be coherently maintained, we must conclude that Pegasus is. What sort of entity could Pegasus be? • McX: an idea in people’s minds (Pegasus-idea) • Quine: This is not what we’re talking about when we deny existence of Pegasus • In other contexts, we don’t confuse the thing-idea with the thing itself • E.g. Parthenon (physical, visible) vs. Parthenon-idea (mental, invisible) • Wyman: an unactualized possible (“There is such a thing, but it doesn’t exist”) • Quine’s semantic critique: • Ruins word ‘exists’; affirms being (subsistence) of possible things but limits ‘existence’ to actual things • Preserves illusion of agreement between him and those who reject his bloated ontology • Quine’s ontological critique: • “It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes…” (i.e. violates simplicity) • “[It’s] a breeding ground for disorderly elements” (i.e. metaphysical puzzles of quantity, identity, etc.) • Absurd results if we switch examples: the round square cupola on Berkeley College • Same reasoning leads to acceptance of unactualized impossibles (e.g. round squares)? Help from Russell’s theory • Russell’s theory of descriptions shows how names can be meaningful without naming an (existing) entity • Applies primarily to complex descriptive names (i.e. definite descriptions); e.g.: • ‘The author of Waverly’ • ‘The present King of France’ • ‘The round square cupola on Berkely College’ • Analyzes such phrases as fragments of whole sentences in which they occur • No unified expression is given as an analysis of the descriptive phrase (‘The F’), but the statement as a whole is meaningful (“The F is G”) • “The F is G” = “Something is F and G, and nothing else is F” • “The F is not” = “It’s not the case that: something is F and nothing else is F” • Logically equivalent to: “Either nothing is F or multiple things are F” • Thus, the meaningfulness of ‘The F’ doesn’t presuppose existence of anything Making sense of “Pegasus is not” • Translate proper name (‘Pegasus’) into description • ‘The winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon’ • Or more artificially: ‘The thing that is-Pegasus’ or ‘The thing that Pegasizes’ • Then apply Russell’s theory: • “Pegasus is not” = • “The thing that Pegasizes is not” = • “It’s not that case that: something Pegasizes and nothing else Pegasizes” • No ontological commitment • Thus, we can coherently deny that Pegasus is Meanings vs. naming • Gulf between meaning and naming (reference) more obvious in other cases • ‘The Evening Star’ and ‘The Morning Star’ differ in meaning but name the same thing • Clearly differ in meaning, otherwise we could dispense with observation and just reflect on meanings of words to determine truth of identity statement • McX and Wyman seem to confuse meaning with naming • Assume that we can’t meaningfully affirm “So-and-so is not” unless so-and-so be (i.e. unless ‘so-and-so’ successfully names an entity) • Groundless; singular terms can be meaningful without naming an entity • For names: translate to definite descriptions and then apply Russell’s theory The problem of universals • One Over Many Argument • McX: “[Red houses, red roses, and red sunsets] have something in common; and this which they have in common is all I mean by the attribute of redness.” • Supposed to be obvious and trivial, as ontological claims often are; follow from common sense claims • Our ontology is basic to the conceptual scheme by which we interpret all experiences • Quine: “That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible… McX is no better off, in point of real explanatory power…” • Argument from Predicates as Names • McX: Predicates such as ‘red’ or ‘is red’ are meaningful; therefore, they must name entities (i.e. universals) • Quine: As previously shown, names can be meaningful without naming entities Meaningfulness vs. meanings • Argument from Meaningful Predicates (M1) Predicates are meaningful. (M2) If expression E is meaningful, then E has a meaning. (M3) Therefore, predicates have meanings (i.e. predicate meanings exist). (M4) Predicate meanings are universals (e.g. ‘red’ expresses redness). (M5) Therefore, universals exist. • Quine’s response: deny M2 • Rejects construal of meaningfulness as the having of some abstract entity as a meaning • Whether expressions are meaningful, or synonymous/heteronomous, is ultimate and irreducible • Or, perhaps, can be analyzed in behaviorist terms (i.e. what people do in presence of utterances) • Explanatory value of irreducible intermediary entities called ‘meanings’ is illusory • Prefers word ‘significant’ over ‘meaningful’ so as not to invite the assumption of meanings as entities Limits to ontological immunity? • Quine’s conclusions so far • Singular terms (e.g. names) and general terms (e.g. predicates) can be meaningful without naming entities of any sort • We can view utterances as meaningful (and as synonymous/heteronymous) without countenancing a realm of entities called ‘meanings’ • McX might wonder: Does nothing we say commit us to existence of entities? • Quine: No. Some statements are ontologically committing. • However, the mere use of names is not (e.g. “Pegasus is not”) • Can convert to descriptions and eliminate using Russell’s theory • But the use of bound variables does commit us (“There’s an x such that…”) • E.g. “There is something which red houses and sunsets have in common” • E.g. “There is a prime number between 1000 and 1010” Quine’s view of ontological commitment • “To be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a variable” • We are committed to entity E if and only if E must be among those entities over which our variables range in order to render our affirmations true • “Some dogs are white” commits us to white dogs but not to doghood or whiteness • “Some species are cross-fertile” commits us to species (which may be abstract) • In ordinary grammatical terms: “To be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun” • E.g. “There’s an x such that x is F” = “There is a thing such that it is F” • Compatible with first premise of Singular Term Argument • Not any use names commits us (e.g. “Pegasus is not”), but some uses do • We’re committed when names are used in simple (affirmative) statements • Statements of the form ‘a is F’ (e.g. “3 is prime”) or ‘a is R-related to b’ (e.g. “4 is greater than 2”) • Commitment remains even when the name is eliminated using Russell’s theory • “3 is prime” = “The thing that 3s is prime” = “Something 3s and is prime, and nothing else 3s” Positions in the ontology of abstracta • Realism (or logicism): There are universals, and they’re mind-independent • We discover but don’t create them • Condones use of bound variables to refer to abstract entities indiscriminately • Conceptualism (or intuitionism): There are universals, but they’re mind-made • Can refer to (e.g.) classes only when they can be cooked up from ingredients • Implications for amount of classical mathematics we can accept; not all orders of infinity • Nominalism (or formalism): There are no universals • Mathematics is a play of insignificant notation but has utility • The syntactical rules that govern manipulation of notation are significant and form an adequate basis for agreement among mathematicians Announcements 5/4 • Read Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” • The Take-Home Midterm is due Wednesday next week (5/11) at 11:59 pm • No other homework assigned this week How to adjudicate among rival ontologies? • Semantic formula (“To be is to be the value of a variable”) doesn’t help • Merely tests whether our assertions conform to our prior ontological commitments • Bound variables don’t tell us what is, merely what a given theory/remark says there is • There are still reasons to focus on semantic issues • Helps us give coherent descriptions of ontological disagreements (from the low-side) • Can talk about opponent’s utterances rather than the entities that they countenance (that we don’t) • Helps us find common ground on which to argue with our opponents • Differing conceptual schemes may still converge sufficiently to enable successful communication • May be able to translate ontological issues into questions about words and what to do with them • But that doesn’t mean ontological questions are really semantic ones • The fact that an issue can be translated into semantic terms doesn’t make it semantic • E.g. To see Naples is to bear a name that, when prefixed to the words ‘sees Naples’, yields a truth • Hence, we shouldn’t assume that what there is depends on words Quine’s methodology for ontology • The acceptance of an ontology is similar in principle to the acceptance of a scientific theory • It’s reasonable to adopt the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged • This overall conceptual scheme fixes our ontology • Ontology is continuous with science • No difference in kind between considerations that determine a reasonable construction of any part of conceptual scheme (e.g. physics, biology, etc.) vs. the whole • To whatever extent adopting a scientific theory may be a matter of language, the same is true for ontology (but no more) The ambiguity of “simplicity” • Consider the dispute between a phenomenalist and physicalist • Physicalist: the world consists of physical objects • Phenomenalist: the world consists of streams of experience • Each view has a different sort of simplicity • Phenomenalist only posits individual subjective events of sensation or reflection; physical objects are reducible to (and thus nothing “over and above”) such events • Physicalist posits independently existing physical objects, reducing complexity of stream of experience (e.g. different sense events explained as perceptions of single object) • Thus, each view deserves to be developed (according to Quine’s methodology) Analogy between “myths” of math and physics • From physicalist’s POV, the platonistic ontology is a convenient myth • Mathematical discourse is good and useful insofar as it simplifies our account of physics • Temptation to regard as merely a useful fiction; echoing formalism/nominalism • Similarly, from phenomenalist’s POV, physicalist ontology is convenient myth • Physical objects are postulated entities that systematize and simplify experience • A phenomenalist may adopt a formalist attitude towards physicalist conceptual scheme • Positing abstract objects is no different in principle from positing physical ones • Suggests appropriate attitude: tolerance and experimental spirit • Pursue reduction of physicalist conceptual scheme to phenomenalist one, while still pursuing physics (even if irreducible) • Pursue reduction of platonistic conceptual scheme and/or elimination from natural science, while still pursuing mathematics and delving into platonistic foundations Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” • Critiques (fellow) empiricists’ suspicions about talk of abstract entities • Draws a central distinction between internal and external existence questions • Presents a methodology for resolving (or dissolving) such questions • Gives an account of what “acceptance of a kind of entities” entails Background: Empiricism vs. Rationalism • Empiricism: synthetic statements can only be justified empirically (i.e. through sense experience/observation) • Logical empiricists’ principle of verificationism: synthetic statements are meaningful only if they can be verified empirically • Rationalism: some synthetic statements can be justified a priori (i.e. independently of sense experience/observation) • Typically say: we have a faculty of intellectual intuition by which we can come to know certain truths (e.g. those of mathematics, logic, metaphysics, ethics, etc.) Empiricists’ suspicion of abstracta • Empiricists tend to sympathize with Nominalism over Platonism • After all, abstract entities don’t seem to be empirically accessible • Try to avoid reference to abstract entities; but difficult in scientific contexts • Try to treat mathematics as a mere formal calculus with no interpretation/reference • More difficult for physics, which communicates reports and predictions but seems to reference abstracta (real numbers, functions, limits, etc.) • Skeptical of approaches to semantics that appeal to abstract entities (e.g. properties, propositions) as designata of certain linguistic items (e.g. predicates, sentences) • Carnap’s goal: to clarify this issue and show this suspicion is misguided • Using the language of abstracta does not imply embracing a Platonistic ontology • Compatible with empiricism and “strictly scientific thinking” Linguistic frameworks • To talk about a new kind of entity, simply construct a linguistic framework • Introduce new expressions and the rules they’re subject to • Example: the framework of numbers • Expressions • Singular terms (e.g. ‘two’, ‘five’) • General terms (e.g. ‘number’, ‘prime’, ‘greater than’) • Variables (e.g. ‘m’, ‘n’) • Sentence forms (e.g. “Five is odd”, “There’s an n such that n is prime and n is between two and five”) • Rules: given by the axioms of mathematics • Some frameworks are factual (with rules specified in empirical terms) • Material things, spacetime coordinates, etc. • Other frameworks are logical (with rules specified in logical terms) • Numbers, propositions, properties, etc. Announcements 5/9 • Finish reading Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” • Read Chalmers’ “Ontological Anti-Realism” (excerpt) • The Take-Home Midterm is due this Wednesday (5/11) at 11:59 pm Linguistic frameworks • To talk about a new kind of entity, simply construct a linguistic framework • Introduce new expressions and the rules they’re subject to • Example: the framework of numbers • Expressions • Singular terms (e.g. ‘two’, ‘five’) • General terms (e.g. ‘number’, ‘prime’, ‘greater than’) • Variables (e.g. ‘m’, ‘n’) • Sentence forms (e.g. “Five is odd”, “There’s an n such that n is prime and n is between two and five”) • Rules: given by the axioms, definitions, conventions, etc. of mathematics • Some frameworks are factual (with rules specified in empirical terms) • E.g. Framework of material things, spacetime coordinates, etc. • Other frameworks are logical (with rules specified in logical terms) • E.g. Framework of numbers, propositions, properties, etc. Two kinds of existence questions • Internal questions: about the existence of certain entities within the framework; posed from “within the framework” • These questions and possible answers formulated using the new forms of expressions • Answers determined according to the rules of the framework, either by logical methods (for logical frameworks) or empirical methods (for factual ones) • External questions: about the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole; posed from “outside the framework” • Can be interpreted as either theoretical or practical questions • Theoretical: Does the world really contain such entities? • A pseudo-question with no cognitive content; no clear (logical/empirical) rules for answering • Raised only by philosophers, not scientists or ordinary people; controversy/debate is intractable • Practical: Should we adopt (or continue to use) the linguistic framework? • A sensible question to ask, but misleading to express it as if it were factual/theoretical • Answer determined by efficiency, fruitfulness, simplicity, etc.; not yes/no, but a matter of degree Internal questions: e.g. the framework of numbers • First, introduce the new linguistic forms and rules • Singular terms (e.g. ‘five’), general terms (e.g. ‘number’), variables (e.g. ‘n’), etc. • Rules: axioms, definitions, conventions, etc. of mathematics • Second, formulate internal questions • E.g. “Are there numbers?” • Finally, answer the internal questions by applying the rules • (1) “Five is a number” is analytic in the framework • (2) “There is an n such that n is a number” logically follows from (1) • (3) “There are numbers” is equivalent to (2); thus, it’s analytic in the framework • Can also formulate non-trivial internal questions • E.g. “Is there a prime number between 1151 and 1158?” • Non-trivial (unobvious) answer, but still analytic; determined by applying logical rules (Theoretical) external questions: pseudo-questions Against Theoretical External Questions (my reconstruction) (P1) Theoretical external questions cannot be answered by either logical or empirical means. (P2) A question has cognitive content (i.e. is meaningful) only if it can be answered by either logical or empirical means. (P3) So, theoretical external questions lack cognitive content (i.e. are meaningless). “Accepting a kind of entities” • Many philosophers think one must first answer the (theoretical) external question in the affirmative before using the relevant linguistic forms • E.g. must accept Platonism before using the language of abstracta • E.g. must accept Universalism before using the language of arbitrary fusions • They interpret the question as about the ontological status or “reality” of entities • Carnap: the introduction of new ways of speaking doesn’t need any theoretical justification because it doesn’t imply any assertion of reality • Talk of “acceptance of new entities” is customary, but merely means accepting new forms of language; must not be regarded as implying a metaphysical doctrine • Acceptance cannot be judged as true or false (no cognitive content); merely more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive towards aims, etc. Tolerance “To decree dogmatic prohibitions of certain linguistic forms instead of testing them by their success or failure in practical use, is worse than futile; it is positively harmful because it may obstruct scientific progress. The history of science shows examples of such prohibitions based on prejudices deriving from religious, mythological, metaphysical, or other irrational sources, which slowed up the developments for shorter or longer periods of time… Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.” Chalmers – “Ontological Anti-Realism” • Gives overview of metaontology and three broad metaontological views: • Heavyweight Ontological Realism • Lightweight Ontological Realism • Ontological Anti-Realism • Draws distinction between ordinary and ontological existence assertions • Gives analysis of disputes in ontological theory • Sketches some arguments for and against each broad metaontological view • (Develops a version of Ontological Anti-Realism and defends its coherence) Ontology vs. metaontology • Basic question of ontology: (QO) What is there? • E.g. Platonism: Abstract entities (vs. Nominalism: No abstract entities) • E.g. Universalism: Arbitrary fusions (vs. Nihilism: No fusions at all) • Basic question of metaontology: Are there objective answers to QO? • Ontological Realist: Yes • Ontological Anti-Realist: No • For comparison, basic question of ethics: (QM) What is right? • E.g. Kantian ethics: Respecting autonomy • E.g. Utilitarianism: Maximizing well-being • Basic question of metaethics: Are there objective answers to QM? • Moral Realists: Yes • Moral Anti-Realists: No Announcements 5/11 • Finish reading Chalmers’ “Ontological Anti-Realism” (excerpt) • Start reading Hirsch’s “Physical Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense” • The Take-Home Midterm is due tonight at 11:59 pm • Homework 5 will be assigned today and is due on Sunday (5/15) at 11:59 pm Rough overview of metaontological views • Ontological Realism • Traced to Quine: ontological questions are as legitimate as scientific questions • Naturalistic methodology: determine ontology from our best scientific theory of the world • Recently, stronger versions proposed (e.g. Sider) • Ontological Anti-Realism • Traced to Carnap: many ontological frameworks; no fact of the matter which is correct • Resolve internal ontological questions logically or empirically; dismiss (factual) external questions • Intermediate position: “Lightweight” (or “Deflationary”) Realism • There are objective answers, but they’re somehow shallow or trivial (e.g. Hirsch) • Contrasts with “Heavyweight” Realism (e.g. Sider): answers are highly non-trivial Quick objections to each view • Against Heavyweight Realism • Suppose we know all qualitative properties (and relations) of two objects (e.g. cups) • Intuitively, we’re in a position to know everything there is to know about such objects • No deep further truth concerning whether they compose something (e.g. a cupcup) • If there’s a truth, merely a matter of bookkeeping or semantic decision, not discovery • Against Anti-Realism • Some ontological theses, or their consequences, can be stated in wholly logically vocab • E.g. “∃𝑥∃𝑦∃𝑧(𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 & 𝑥 ≠ 𝑧 & 𝑦 ≠ 𝑧)” • Intuitively, such statements cannot fail to have objective and determinate truth-values • Against Lightweight Realism • Consider ontological theses: • E.g. “If there are particles arranged F-wise, then there is an F” • Intuitively, such claims are not analytic or otherwise trivial • What is analytic/trivial: “If there’s an object composed of particles arranged F-wise, then there is an F” Ontological vs. ordinary existence assertions • Ordinary: of the sort typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of relevant subject matter • E.g. Mathematician: “There are four prime numbers less than ten” • E.g. Child: “There’s an apple on the table” • Ontological: of the sort typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount • E.g. Platonist: “Abstract objects exist” • E.g. Universalist: “For any set of objects, there’s an object that’s their mereological sum” • Differ with respect to standards of “correctness” • Ordinary: perhaps not literal truth; insensitive to truth of Platonism, Universalism, etc. • Perhaps correctness amounts to truth of a paraphrase (e.g. “If there were numbers, then…”) • Ontological: plausibly coincides with truth; sensitive to truth of ontological theories Are ontological disputes verbal? • Suppose there are two (simple) particles in a vacuum chamber • Nihilist: “There exist exactly two objects in the chamber” • Universalist: “There exist exactly three objects in the chamber” • Some deflationists (e.g. Hirsch) claim that this is a verbal dispute • The nihilist expresses existencen by ‘exists’ (and/or objectn by ‘object’) • The universalist expresses existenceu by ‘exists’ (and/or objectu by ’object’) • Thus, according to Hirsch, each side is really expressing: • Nihilist: There existn exactly two objectsn in the chamber • Universalist: There existu exactly three objectsu in the chamber • These claims are consistent; both can be true • Assuming we can make sense of there being multiple existence-like concepts Chalmers’ test for verbalness • Does the dispute disappear once difference senses for the problematic terms are distinguished, or does it persist as strongly as ever? • If the dispute disappears completely: verbal • If the dispute is reduced but residual disagreement remains: partly verbal • If the dispute persists as strongly as ever: non-verbal; factual/substantive • Example: “Is the pope a bachelor?” Bob: “Yes” vs. Sally: “No” • Bob: “The pope is an unmarried man.” • Sally: “Sure, but he’s not an unmarried man who’s eligible for marriage.” • Example: “Is there a god?” Bob: “Yes” vs. Sally: “No” • Bob: “There’s a supernatural person outside of spacetime who created the universe.” • Sally: “No, there’s no supernatural person outside of spacetime who created the universe.” Chalmers: test indicates non-verbal • Recall the ontological dispute • Nihilist: “There exist exactly two objects in the chamber.” • Universalist: “There exist exactly three objects in the chamber.” • Even after attempting to distinguish difference senses of ‘exists’ (e.g. existn, existu) or ‘object’ (e.g. objectn, objectu), the dispute typically persists • E.g. “Are objectsu real objects?” • E.g. “If something existsu, does that something really exist?” • E.g. “Does existenceu correspond to anything in reality?” • E.g. “Which is real existence, existencen or existenceu?” • Suggests ontologists not using ‘there exists’ to express different concepts • When attempt dissolution, concept of existence or cognate (e.g. being, reality) reoccurs • Suggests existence is primitive, unanalyzable • Like disputes involving other (seemingly) primitive concepts: e.g. good, ought, conscious The concept of absolute existential quantification • There’s prima facie reason to think participants in ontological debates use terms like ‘exists’ to express a single, common, primitive concept • Since primitive, can’t define in other terms • Use it to attempt to quantify over absolutely everything that exists, in the most fundamental sense of ‘exists’ (*table pound*, *foot stomp*) • These elucidations are circular, but it’s the best we can do • Unclear whether there really is such a concept or whether ontological discourse merely functions as if there were such a concept • May only be a “meta-concept”—i.e. a concept of the concept of absolute existence • There’s at least a “pseudo-concept”—i.e. something that functions like a concept, but may be defective in various respects (e.g. truth-evaluability) • We’ll assume there is such a concept, leaving open whether it’s defective Ontological Realism vs. Anti-Realism • Ontological Realism: Unproblematic ontological existence assertions have objective and determinate truth-values (either T or F) • Strong: All have objective and determinate truth-values • Moderate: Most have objective and determine truth-values (e.g. ‘exists’ slightly vague) • Ontological Anti-Realism: Unproblematic ontological existence assertions do not have objective and determinate truth-values • Strong: None have objective and determinate truth-values • Moderate: Few have objective and determinate truth-values • E.g. “There are round squares”, “There are unicorns”, etc. (trivially false) • Different forms of anti-realism: different ways to not be objective/determinate • Ontological Relativism: truth-values are assessment-dependent • Ontological Indeterminism: truth-values are indeterminate (neither true nor false) • Ontological Non-Cognitivism: not truth-apt at all; don’t function to express beliefs Lightweight vs. heavyweight quantification • Consider ordinary existence assertions • Unconditional: “There are prime numbers” • Ampliative conditional: “If there are particles arranged heap-wise, there is a heap” • Consequent makes existence claim that’s not (semantically) built into antecedent • Unlike: “If X is a parent, then there is a Y such that Y is the child of X” (not ampliative) • Lightweight quantification: can be used to express unconditional or ampliative existence assertions that are trivially correct • Heavyweight quantification: cannot be used to express unconditional or ampliative existence assertions that are trivially correct • Express the concept of absolute existential quantification The three main views, restated • Heavyweight Ontological Realism: ontological existence assertions involve heavyweight quantification and have objective, determinate truth-values • Typically: sees ontology as investigation into fundamental structure of reality • Lightweight Ontological Realism: ontological existence assertions involve lightweight quantification and have objective, determinate truth-values • Typically: sees ontology as largely a matter of conceptual analysis • Ontological Anti-Realism: ontological existence assertions involve heavyweight quantification, but lack objective, determinate truth-values Another “Triangle of Opposition” Heavyweight Ontological Realism: Inflationary truth-conditions + Objective truth-values Heavyweight Realists and Anti-Realists agree: Ontological claims express heavyweight existence Ontological Anti-Realism: Inflationary truth-conditions + No objective truth-values Heavyweight and Lightweight Realists agree: Ontological claims have objective truth-values Lightweight Ontological Realism: Deflationary truth-conditions + Objective truth-values Anti-Realists and Lightweight Realists agree: the world contains nothing that satisfies inflationary truth-conditions, only deflationary ones Announcements 5/16 • Finish reading Hirsch’s “Physical Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense” • Start reading Sider’s “Ontological Realism” The three main views, restated • Heavyweight Ontological Realism: ontological existence assertions involve heavyweight quantification and have objective, determinate truth-values • Typically: sees ontology as investigation into fundamental structure of reality • Lightweight Ontological Realism: ontological existence assertions involve lightweight quantification and have objective, determinate truth-values • Typically: sees ontology as largely a matter of conceptual analysis • Ontological Anti-Realism: ontological existence assertions involve heavyweight quantification, but lack objective, determinate truth-values Another “Triangle of Opposition” Heavyweight Ontological Realism: Inflationary truth-conditions + Objective truth-values Heavyweight Realists and Anti-Realists agree: Ontological claims express heavyweight existence Ontological Anti-Realism: Inflationary truth-conditions + No objective truth-values Heavyweight and Lightweight Realists agree: Ontological claims have objective truth-values Lightweight Ontological Realism: Deflationary truth-conditions + Objective truth-values Anti-Realists and Lightweight Realists agree: the world contains nothing that satisfies inflationary truth-conditions, only deflationary ones Against lightweight realism • Ordinary existence assertions appear to express lightweight quantification • But ontological existence assertions appear to function differently • Seems to involve inquiry into fundamental reality; not mere conceptual analysis • Ontologists don’t fear asserting counterintuitive, non-common-sense claims • No obstacle to defining a quantifier expression: “Let ‘existencea’ express the primitive concept of absolute existential quantification if coherent; defective if not coherent” • Objection: implausible discontinuity between ordinary & ontological discourse • Surely ontology is beholden to our ordinary notion of existence? • By analogy, surely we intend to use the ordinary notion of right, knows, conscious, etc. in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, etc. respectively • Chalmers’ response: ontological discourse has more in common with the stipulated existencea discourse than ordinary discourse • E.g. (relative) insensitivity to common sense; typically different aims/methods Against heavyweight realism • Discontinuity between ontological and ordinary discourse also suggests we don’t have a non-defective grasp of absolute existence • Absolute existence seems like a philosopher’s invention; lacks determinate content • Assuming we hold underlying distribution of matter constant, do we really grasp what it would be for a table to “really exist” vs. fail to “really exist”? • The Knowledge Argument (K1) Given full knowledge of the properties (and relations) of two objects, we would be in a position to trivially know everything about the two objects. (K2) But if heavyweight realism is true, then we would not be in a position to trivially know everything about the two objects (e.g. whether they compose a further object). (K3) So, heavyweight realism is false. Hirsch – “Physical Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense” • Defends two main theses (1) Typical disputes in ontology of material objects are merely verbal (2) The proper way to resolve them is appealing to “common sense” or ordinary language • Gives characterization of verbal disputes consistent with social externalism • Discusses principles of linguistic interpretation • The Principle of Charity • Appeal to eligibility/naturalness Announcements 5/18 • Read Sider’s “Ontological Realism” for next week • Homework 6 will be assigned today and due this Sunday (5/22) at 11:59 pm Verbal disputes • Consider this intuitively verbal dispute: • A: “A hotdog is a sandwich” • B: “A hotdog is not a sandwich” • First pass at characterization: • A dispute over sentence S is merely verbal iff S means something different in each side’s private idiolect, such that both sides speak truly in their private idiolects • Social externalism: Meaning isn’t private • The content of an individual’s beliefs and thoughts is determined by what asserted sentences mean in the public language of their linguistic community • Revised characterization: • A dispute over sentence S is verbal iff S would mean something different in different languages spoken in communities with linguistic dispositions corresponding to each side’s position, such that each side would speak truly in their corresponding language Interpretive charity • The Principle of Charity: • Other things being equal, an interpretation is plausible to the extent that it makes many of the community’s shared assertions come out true or at least reasonable • Charity to Perception • Strong presumption that perceptual reports are generally accurate, especially when widely accepted • Charity to Understanding • Strong presumption that typical speakers of a language don’t generally make a priori (conceptually) false assertions, especially when relatively simple • Charity to Retraction • Strong presumption that people are expected to improve the accuracy of their judgments in the face of additional evidence; their retractions are generally correct Case study: Universalism vs. Nihilism • Consider two linguistic communities: U-Community and N-Community • U-Community: “There are chairs, trees, dogs, and countless other composite objects.” • N-Community: “There are no chairs, trees, dogs, or any other composite objects.” • First, suppose we’re members of the U-Community • If N-Community means what we do, making extreme (a priori and perceptual) mistakes • Instead, find charitable interpretation: semantically restricted quantifiers (to simples) • E.g. “There isn an F” is equivalent to “There isu a simple F” • Now, suppose we’re members of the N-Community • Again, we should find a charitable interpretation of U-Community’s assertions • E.g. “There isu an F” is equivalent to “Either there’sn an F or there aren simples arranged F-wise” • For anything one side can say about the world, the other can say something “equivalent” • “There’su a cat on a mat” ≈ “There aren simples arranged cat-wise on simples arranged mat-wise” Case study: Platonism vs. Nominalism • Consider two linguistic communities: P-Community and N-Community • P-Community: “There are numbers, properties, and countless other abstract objects.” • N-Community: “There are no numbers, properties, or any other abstract objects.” • First, suppose we’re members of the P-Community • We can interpret N-Community’s quantifiers as restricted to concrete objects • E.g. “There aren apples but not numbers” ≈ ”There arep concrete apples but not concrete numbers” • Now, suppose we’re members of the N-Community • Unclear how to interpret P-Community’s utterances • E.g. “There arep infinitely many prime numbers.” • E.g. “There arep two sets X and Y, whose members are sets of people, such that for any set X’ in X, there isp a set Y’ in Y, such that all persons in X’ love all and only persons in Y’, and some person in Y’ loves some person in some set in X other than X’.” • Not clear both sides can formulate charitable truth conditions for other • Thus, not clearly a verbal dispute (but might be) Announcements 5/23 • Read Sider’s “Ontological Realism” In defense of “common sense” • Consider three communities (and their corresponding languages): • U-Community: “There are trees, dogs, etc. and countless arbitrary fusions like trogs.” • C-Community: “There are trees, dogs, etc. but no arbitrary fusions like trogs.” • N-Community: “There are no trees, dogs, or any other mereological fusions at all.” • Now consider our own community and language (i.e. plain English): • Hirsch: Given how we ordinarily think/talk (“charity”), clearly plain English is C-English • Objection: two crucial differences between our community and C-Community (i) Non-philosophers in our community are generally perplexed by “ontological axioms” (ii) Many philosophers in our community reject “common sense” ontological claims • Hirsch’s response: not enough to undermine the argument from charity (i) In conflict of charity, favor linguistic use of simple ontological claims over tricky axioms (ii) Philosophers disagree with each other; also, they ignore linguistic interpretation Deflationary but still “realist” “There are numerous objects in the world—rocks, rivers, trees, apples, planets, electrons—whose existence do not depend in any way on the existence of language or thought. These objects typically do not have temporal parts or sums, and that too does not depend in any way on the existence of language or thought. If I had been speaking [Plenitude-English] instead of plain English, I would have correctly said, “These objects have temporal parts and sums, and that does not depend in any way on the existence of language or thought.” It’s essential in this area of philosophy to avoid a gross but somehow tempting usemention confusion. My view is that if we consider expressions in languages with the same formal role as our expression “the existence of things in the world”, the semantic functions of these expressions may vary depending on the specific rules of the different languages. I am most emphatically not saying that the existence of things in the world depends on there being certain rules of languages… [My metaontological view] does not imply idealism.” (Hirsch 93) Sider – “Ontological Realism” • Discusses various forms of ontological deflationism • Explicates Hirsch’s thesis, quantifier variance, underlying deflationary views • Introduces notion of structure (naturalness, fundamentality, “nature’s joints”) • Sketches his (heavyweight) realist response to ontological deflationism in terms of quantificational structure (i.e. natural/fundamental existence) • Offers a (brief, rough) defense of (heavyweight) ontological realism Losing one’s (metaphysical) nerve • Intractability of ontological debates suggests something wrong with them • Began as epistemic worries; unclear methodology • Contemporary ontologists not conceptual analysts or ordinary language philosophers • Quasi-scientific methodology; tentative hypotheses assessed using criteria: • Match with ordinary usage/belief (typically small role) • Theoretical insight; considerations of simplicity, parsimony, elegance, etc. • Integration with other domains (e.g. science, logic, mathematics, phil. of language, etc.) • Main positions internally consistent and empirically adequate • Unclear whether appeal to theoretical virtues justified or applicable in metaphysics • Unclear whether criteria can be clearly articulated or yield determinate verdicts • Rather then skeptics (deny knowledge), critics typically deflationists: • No sensible questions other than of conceptual analysis; equally good ways to talk Forms of ontological deflationism • Consider the following three-way debate: • Universalist: There exist tables • Nihilist: There do not exist tables • Deflationist: There’s something wrong with this debate • Equivocation: Both sides express different propositions by ‘There exist tables’ • Each side speaks truly given what they mean; debate merely verbal • Indeterminacy: Neither side expresses unique proposition by ‘There exist tables’ • ‘There exists’ is semantically indeterminate over various possible meanings, some favoring one side and other favoring other side; debate ill-formed • Obviousness: Both sides express same proposition but it has trivial truth-value • Different possible meanings, but one actual meaning in public language, determined through linguistic/conceptual reflection; debate is silly, off-track Blame predicates or quantifiers? • Given deflationism about “Do there exist tables?”, which term is problematic? • Arguably not the predicate ‘table’ • Unlike verbal dispute over “Do geese live by the bank?” with ambiguous predicate ‘bank’ • Both sides agree on conditions a thing must meet to be a “table”; disagree whether met • E.g. a composite object made up of particles arranged table-wise • Clear on difference between simples arranged table-wise and tables • Clear on difference between pluralities, sets, mereological sums, etc. • Can eliminate (non-logical) predicates from debate: “∃𝑥∃𝑦∃𝑧 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 & 𝑥 ≠ 𝑧 & 𝑦 ≠ 𝑧 ?” • So, must claim: something problematic about quantifier ‘there exists’ (or ‘∃’) • There are multiple distinct (and equally good) meanings for ‘there exists’ (or ‘∃’) Announcements 5/25 • Finish reading Sider’s “Ontological Realism” • Optional reading: Bennett’s “Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology” • Homework 7 (the final homework assignment) will be assigned today and due this Sunday (5/29) at 11:59 pm • The Take-Home Final Exam has been posted (in the week 10 section on Gauchospace) and is due on Wednesday (6/8) of finals week at 11:59 pm • Comments and grades on the midterm will be posted tomorrow • Feel free to email me with questions, comments, or concerns • No class on Monday (Memorial day); final lecture next Wednesday (6/1) Quantifier variance • Rough idea: there are different candidate meanings for ‘there exist’ • Problem: trivial; language is conventional (e.g. ‘exists’ could have been Carnap’s name) • More precise: the candidate meanings must meet the following conditions: • Grammatical adequacy: have “shape” matching grammar of quantifiers • Must suffice to generate truth conditions for sentences containing quantifiers • Inferential adequacy: obey logic of quantifiers • Core quantifier inference rules come out truth-preserving under determined truth-conditions • E.g. “Lisa is a philosopher” entails “Something is a philosopher” • Material adequacy: consistent with substantive truths • Requires that certain sentences (about matters more substantive than ontology) come out true • E.g. “Electrons have mass”, “There are no talking donkeys”, “There are simples arranged tree-wise”. • Equal naturalness: none is “metaphysically privileged” • None uniquely matches the structure of the world or carves nature at its joints better than the others Quantifier variance--the core of deflationism • Recall the debate: • Universalist: “There exist tables” • Nihilist: “There do not exist tables” • According to quantifier variance, there are different candidate meanings: • Existenceu, existencen, existencec, etc. • Equivocation: Each side expresses different proposition by ‘There exist tables’ • Each side’s linguistic usage favors different candidate; none favored by world’s structure • Indeterminacy: Neither side expresses a unique proposition • Neither linguistic usage nor world’s structure favor one candidate over another • Obviousness: Both sides express same proposition but with trivial truth-value • Linguistic usage favors one candidate but world’s structure doesn’t; thus, appeal to ordinary belief/talk (rather than quasi-scientific methodology) is best way to resolve Structure: some intuitive examples • Basic idea: the world has an objective structure • Some aspects of it are more natural/fundamental; others are gerrymandered/arbitrary • Consider the following definitions of properties: • X is grue iff X is green and discovered before time T or blue and not discovered before T • X is a melectron iff X is an electron on Mars • X is a bratcalog iff X is either a cat in Brazil or a dog in California • Now compare each example with its more natural counterpart: • Being green vs. beings grue • Being an electron vs. being a melectron • Being a cat vs. being a bratcalog • Intuitively, there’s a difference between the properties in each pair • The latter is (more) gerrymandered, arbitrary, or complex relative to the former • Furthermore, the difference seems objective (though this is controversial) Structure: the theoretical role • The idea of objective structure is meant to be intuitive and pre-theoretic • Intuitively, there’s a distinction between natural and “gerrymandered” properties • However, it’s also sometimes seen as a technical, theoretical posit • Supposed to play a role in addressing various philosophical problems • Allegedly justified by its ability to help solve such problems • The theoretical role of structure/naturalness connects to wide array of issues • Similarity-making • Reference-fixing • Aims of inquiry • Simplicity • Causation • Laws of nature • Induction Announcements 6/1 • Recall: the Take-Home Final Exam is due next Wednesday (6/8) at 11:59 pm on Gauchospace • Feel free to email me questions or try to set up a Zoom meeting Structure: similarity-making • Intuitively, two objects are similar when they share properties in common (and dissimilar when one has properties that the other lacks) • But any objects (however dissimilar) share countless properties in common • E.g. electrons and cows share the property being-an-electron-or-cow • E.g. emeralds discovered before T and sapphires discovered after T are both grue • Similarly, any objects (however similar) are divided by countless properties • E.g. electrons on Mars, but not electrons on Venus, have the property being a melectron • E.g. emeralds discovered before T, but not ones discovered after T, are grue • The intuitive solution to this problem is to appeal to natural properties • Only the sharing/not sharing of natural properties makes for similarity/dissimilarity • Another solution: deny objective similarity altogether • There is only similarity-in-some-respect-or-other; no respect is special or privileged Structure: reference-fixing • Intuitively, a large part of what determines the meaning of terms is linguistic usage (i.e. our dispositions to assent to some sentences and deny others) • The Principle of Charity: interpret meaning in a way that make our usage reasonable • But there may be countless candidate meanings that fit with our usage of terms • E.g. Usage of ‘green’ may fit equally well with both green and grue • E.g. Usage of ‘plus’ may fit equally well with both plus and quus • E.g. Usage of ‘pigs’ may fit equally well with both pigs and pigs-we’ve-encountered • E.g. Usage of ‘gold’ may fit equally well with both gold and gold-or-fool’s-gold • Thus, “charity” may not be enough to secure (sufficiently) determinate meaning • Solution: (“Reference Magnetism”) other things being equal, more natural meanings are more eligible to be meant (i.e. easier to express) • Meaning is determined by “charity and eligibility” (i.e. usage and naturalness) • Alternatives: find other constraints (e.g. causal) or accept radical indeterminacy Structure: an aim of inquiry • Consider the (fictional) Grue-Community who speak Grenglish • In Grenglish, ‘gricular’, ‘grincular’, and ‘ngricular’ are primitive (i.e. undefined) expressions • Refer to things that are green or circular, green or not circular, and not green or circular respectively • Grenglish does not have the terms ‘green’ or ‘circular’ • Instead, they say: “X is gricular and grincular” (for green) and “X is gricular and ngricular” (for circular) • In general, Grenglish has terms for unnatural properties and lacks terms for natural ones • The Grue-Community can speak truly and describe all the same facts as we can • Though they tend to study and form beliefs about unnatural facts; ignore natural facts • Intuitively, there’s something wrong or unreasonable about the Grue-community • Their language/conceptual framework and theorizing fail to “carve nature at its joints” • Sider: truth is not enough for (fully) successful cognition or inquiry • We should discern reality’s objective structure and employ terms that match it • Alternative idea: the value of natural terms/concepts/beliefs is merely pragmatic Logical/quantificational structure • Consider the following candidate meanings for ‘exists’: • Being an x such that x exists • Being an x such that x exists and x is either simple or living • Being an x such that either x exists or there exist simples arranged being-x-wise • Being an x such that x would exist if composition were unrestricted • Being an x such that x would exist if the Doctrine of Plenitude were true • Being an x such that Dan Korman has an intuition that x exists • Being an x such that the Bible says that x exists • Being an x such that x exists and x is no further than 25,000 lightyears from the Sun • Being an x such that x exists and x is not identical to Donald Trump • Intuitively, some are more natural—better match reality’s structure—than others • Sider: we can extend notion of naturalness/structure to quantifiers and other logical terms • Roles of similarity-making, reference-fixing, and aim-of-inquiry seem to apply Reply to deflationist • Sider’s version of (Heavyweight) Ontological Realism: • The world’s distinguished structure includes (unitary) quantificational structure • Of all the candidate meanings for ‘exists’ (e.g. existenceu, existencen, existencec, etc.), there is a uniquely most natural one (i.e. existencenatural) • So, reference magnetism applies: meaning of ‘exists’ determined by charity and eligibility • Different candidate meanings may provide a more charitable interpretation in different linguistic communities, but all communities nevertheless express existencenatural due to its superior naturalness • Thus, ontological questions have substantive answers • Can’t resolve by trivial conceptual analysis; ordinary talk/belief may not match structure • Hirsch’s objection: the naturalness/eligibility semantic constraint is defeasible • Even if there is a most natural quantifier meaning, and even if it is more eligible to be meant other things being equal, charity outweighs it • We should interpret different ontological communities (U-Community, N-Community, etc.) as reasonable even if they express slightly less natural quantifier meanings Sider’s “revolutionary strategy” “Let’s give the speakers of ordinary English ‘there exists’; let us henceforth conduct our debate using ‘∃’. We hereby stipulate that ‘∃’ is to express an austere relative of the ordinary English notion of existence. We hereby stipulate that although the meaning of ‘∃’ is to obey the core inferential role of English quantifiers, ordinary, casual use of disputed sentences involving ‘there exists’ (such as ‘Tables exist’) are not to affect at all what we mean by ‘∃’. We hereby stipulate that if there is a highly natural meaning that satisfies these constraints, then that is what we mean by ‘∃’. Perhaps the resulting ‘∃’ has no synonym in English. Fine—we hereby dub our new language Ontologese.” (Sider 412) Why believe in quantificational structure? • Recall Quine’s criteria for accepting an ontology: • Believe in those entities that your best (overall) theory of the world is committed to (i.e. that are indispensable for the truth of that theory) • Sider offers an analog for structure: • Believe in as much structure as your best (overall) theory of the world is committed to (i.e. corresponding to indispensable expressions or concepts employed by that theory) • Sider’s indispensability argument (SI1) Quantifier expressions are indispensable in our best theory of the world. (SI2) If an expression is indispensable in our best theory, then we have good reason to believe it carves the world at its joints. (SI3) So, we have good reason to believe that quantifier expressions carve the world at its joints (i.e. have uniquely most natural candidate meanings). No detour around metaphysics • Deflationism motivated by aim: dissolving (seemingly) unanswerable questions • Especially questions that resist direct empirical methods or conceptual analysis • Sider: won’t work; can’t bypass debate over ultimate structure of the world • “The world does not contain quantificational structure” is a claim about world’s structure • “Scientific/empirical questions, not ontological questions, concern the world’s structure” is a metaphysical claim that resists verification by empirical methods/conceptual analysis • Deflationism (quantifier variance) is “just more metaphysics” • Can’t avoid metaphysics entirely Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology Rudolf Carnap Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (1950): 20-40. Reprinted in the Supplement to Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic, enlarged edition (University of Chicago Press, 1956). 1. The problem of abstract entities Empiricists are in general rather suspicious with respect to any kind of abstract entities like properties, classes, relations, numbers, propositions, etc. They usually feel much more in sympathy with nominalists than with realists (in the medieval sense). As far as possible they try to avoid any reference to abstract entities and to restrict themselves to what is sometimes called a nominalistic language, i.e., one not containing such references. However, within certain scientific contexts it seems hardly possible to avoid them. In the case of mathematics some empiricists try to find a way out by treating the whole of mathematics as a mere calculus, a formal system for which no interpretation is given, or can be given. Accordingly, the mathematician is said to speak not about numbers, functions and infinite classes but merely about meaningless symbols and formulas manipulated according to given formal rules. In physics it is more difficult to shun the suspected entities because the language of physics serves for the communication of reports and predictions and hence cannot be taken as a mere calculus. A physicist who is suspicious of abstract entities may perhaps try to declare a certain part of the language of physics as uninterpreted and uninterpretable, that part which refers to real numbers as space-time coordinates or as values of physical magnitudes, to functions, limits, etc. More probably he will just speak about all these things like anybody else but with an uneasy conscience, like a man who in his everyday life does with qualms many things which are not in accord with the high moral principles he professes on Sundays. Recently the problem of abstract entities has arisen again in connection with semantics, the theory of meaning and truth. Some semanticists say that certain expressions designate certain entities, and among these designated entities they include not only concrete material things but also abstract entities e.g., properties as designated by predicates and propositions as designated by sentences.1 Others object strongly to this procedure as violating the basic principles of empiricism and leading back to a metaphysical ontology of the Platonic kind. It is the purpose of this article to clarify this controversial issue. The nature and implications of the acceptance of a language referring to abstract entities will first be discussed in general; it will be shown that using such a language does not imply embracing a Platonic ontology but is perfectly compatible with empiricism and strictly scientific thinking. Then the special question of the role of abstract entities in semantics will be discussed. It is hoped that the clarification of the issue will be useful to those who would like to accept abstract entities in their work in mathematics, physics, semantics, or any other field; it may help them to overcome nominalistic scruples. 1 2. Linguistic frameworks Are there properties classes, numbers, propositions? In order to understand more clearly the nature of these and related problems, it is above all necessary to recognize a fundamental distinction between two kinds of questions concerning the existence or reality of entities. If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question. And now we must distinguish two kinds of questions of existence: first, questions of the existence of certain entities of the new kind within the framework; we call them internal questions; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the system of entities as a whole, called external questions. Internal questions and possible answers to them are formulated with the help of the new forms of expressions. The answers may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the framework is a logical or a factual one. An external question is of a problematic character which is in need of closer examination. The world of things. Let us consider as an example the simplest kind of entities dealt with in the everyday language: the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable things and events. Once we have accepted the thing language with its framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions, e.g., "Is there a white piece of paper on my desk?" "Did King Arthur actually live?", "Are unicorns and centaurs real or merely imaginary?" and the like. These questions are to be answered by empirical investigations. Results of observations are evaluated according to certain rules as confirming or disconfirming evidence for possible answers. (This evaluation is usually carried out, of course, as a matter of habit rather than a deliberate, rational procedure. But it is possible, in a rational reconstruction, to lay down explicit rules for the evaluation. This is one of the main tasks of a pure, as distinguished from a psychological, epistemology.) The concept of reality occurring in these internal questions is an empirical scientific non-metaphysical concept. To recognize something as a real thing or event means to succeed in incorporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position so that it fits together with the other things as real, according to the rules of the framework. From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the reality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this question is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a negative one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the system itself. Those who raise the question of the reality of the thing world itself have perhaps in mind not a theoretical question as their formulation seems to suggest, but rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question. In the case of this particular example, there is usually no deliberate choice because we all have accepted the thing language early in our lives as a matter of course. Nevertheless, we may regard it as a matter of decision in this sense: we are free to choose to continue using the thing language or not; in the latter case we could restrict ourselves to a language of sense data and other "phenomenal" entities, or construct an alternative to the customary thing language with another structure, or, finally, we could refrain from speaking. If someone decides to 2 accept the thing language, there is no objection against saying that he has accepted the world of things. But this must not be interpreted as if it meant his acceptance of a belief in the reality of the thing world; there is no such belief or assertion or assumption, because it is not a theoretical question. To accept the thing world means nothing more than to accept a certain form of language, in other words, to accept rules for forming statements and for testing accepting or rejecting them. The acceptance of the thing language leads on the basis of observations made, also to the acceptance, belief, and assertion of certain statements. But the thesis of the reality of the thing world cannot be among these statements, because it cannot be formulated in the thing language or, it seems, in any other theoretical language. The decision of accepting the thing language, although itself not of a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge, just like any other deliberate decision concerning the acceptance of linguistic or other rules. The purposes for which the language is intended to be used, for instance, the purpose of communicating factual knowledge, will determine which factors are relevant for the decision. The efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity of the use of the thing language may be among the decisive factors. And the questions concerning these qualities are indeed of a theoretical nature. But these questions cannot be identified with the question of realism. They are not yes-no questions but questions of degree. The thing language in the customary form works indeed with a high degree of efficiency for most purposes of everyday life. This is a matter of fact, based upon the content of our experiences. However, it would be wrong to describe this situation by saying: "The fact of the efficiency of the thing language is confirming evidence for the reality of the thing world; we should rather say instead: "This fact makes it advisable to accept the thing language." The system of members. As an example of a system which is of a logical rather than a factual nature let us take the system of natural numbers. The framework for this system is constructed by introducing into the language new expressions with suitable rules: (1) numerals like "five" and sentence forms like "there are five books on the table"; (2) the general term "number" for the new entities, and sentence forms like "five is a number"; (3) expressions for properties of numbers (e.g. "odd," "prime"), relations (e.g., "greater than") and functions (e.g. "plus"), and sentence forms like "two plus three is five"; (4) numerical variables ("m," "n," etc.) and quantifiers for universal sentences ("for every n . . . ) and existential sentences ("there is an n such that . . .") with the customary deductive rules. Here again there are internal questions, e.g., "Is there a prime number greater than a hundred?" Here however the answers are found not by empirical investigation based on observations but by logical analysis based on the rules for the new expressions. Therefore the answers are here analytic, i.e., logically true. What is now the nature of the philosophical question concerning the existence or reality of numbers? To begin with, there is the internal question which together with the affirmative answer, can be formulated in the new terms, say by "There are numbers" or, more explicitly, "There is an n such that n is a number." This statement follows from the analytic statement "five is a number" and is therefore itself analytic. Moreover, it is rather trivial (in contradistinction to a statement like "There is a prime number greater than a million which is likewise analytic but far from trivial), because it does not say more than that the new system is not empty; but this is immediately seen from the rule which states that words like "five" are substitutable for the new variables. Therefore nobody who meant the question "Are there numbers?" in the internal sense would either assert or even seriously consider a negative answer. This makes it plausible to assume that those philosophers who treat the question of 3 the existence of numbers as a serious philosophical problem and offer lengthy arguments on either side, do not have in mind the internal question. And indeed, if we were to ask them: "Do you mean the question as to whether the framework of numbers, if we were to accept it, would be found to be empty or not?" they would probably reply: "Not at all; we mean a question prior to the acceptance of the new framework." They might try to explain what they mean by saying that it is a question of the ontological status of numbers; the question whether or not numbers have a certain metaphysical characteristic called reality (but a kind of ideal reality, different from the material reality of the thing world) or subsistence or status of "independent entities." Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a formulation of their question in terms of the common scientific language. Therefore our judgment must be that they have not succeeded in giving to the external question and to the possible answers any cognitive content. Unless and until they supply a clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised in the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is a non-theoretical; in the present case it is the practical problem whether or not to incorporate into the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the framework of numbers. The system of propositions. New variables, "p," "q," etc., are introduced with a role to the effect that any (declarative) sentence may be substituted for a variable of this kind; this includes, in addition to the sentences of the original thing language, also all general sentences with variables of any kind which may have been introduced into the language. Further, the general term "proposition" is introduced. "p is a proposition" may be defined by "p or not p" (or by any other sentence form yielding only analytic sentences) . Therefore every sentence of the form ". . . is a proposition" (where any sentence may stand in the place of the dots) is analytic. This holds, for example, for the sentence: (a) Chicago is large is a proposition. (We disregard here the fact that the rules of English grammar require not a sentence but a that-clause as the subject of another sentence; accordingly instead of (a) we should have to say "That Chicago is large is a proposition.") Predicates may be admitted whose argument expressions are sentences; these predicates may be either extensional (e.g. the customary truth-functional connectives) or not (e.g. modal predicates like "possible," "necessary," etc.). With the help of the new variables, general sentences may be formed, e.g., (b) "For every p, either p or not-p." (c) "There is a p such that p is not necessary and not-p is not necessary." (d) "There is a p such that p is a proposition." (c) and (d) are internal assertions of existence. The statement "There are propositions" may be meant in the sense of (d); in this case it is analytic (since it follows from (a)) and even trivial. If, however, the statement is meant in an external sense, then it is non-cognitive. It is important to notice that the system of rules for the linguistic expressions of the propositional framework (of which only a few rules have here been briefly indicated) is sufficient for the introduction of the framework. Any further explanations as to the nature of the propositions (i.e., the elements of the system indicated, the values of the variables "p," "q," etc.) are theoretically unnecessary because, if correct, they follow from the rules. For example, are propositions mental events (as in Russell's theory)? A look at the rules shows us that they are not, because otherwise existential statements would be of the form: "If the mental state of the person in question fulfills such and such conditions, then there is a p such 4 that . . . ." The fact that no references to mental conditions occur in existential statements (like (c), (d), etc.) shows that propositions are not mental entities. Further, a statement of the existence of linguistic entities (e.g., expressions, classes of expressions, etc.) must contain a reference to a language. The fact that no such reference occurs in the existential statements here, shows that propositions are not linguistic entities. The fact that in these statements no reference to a subject (an observer or knower) occurs (nothing like: "There is a p which is necessary for Mr. X."), shows that the propositions (and their properties, like necessity, etc.) are not subjective. Although characterizations of these or similar kinds are, strictly speaking, unnecessary, they may nevertheless be practically useful. If they are given, they should be understood, not as ingredient parts of the system, but merely as marginal notes with the purpose of supplying to the reader helpful hints or convenient pictorial associations which may make his learning of the use of the expressions easier than the bare system of the rules would do. Such a characterization is analogous to an extra-systematic explanation which a physicist sometimes gives to the beginner. He might, for example, tell him to imagine the atoms of a gas as small balls rushing around with great speed, or the electromagnetic field and its oscillations as quasi-elastic tensions and vibrations in an ether. In fact, however, all that can accurately be said about atoms or the field is implicitly contained in the physical laws of the theories in question.2 The system of thing properties The thing language contains words like "red," "hard," "stone," "house," etc., which we used for describing what things are like. Now we may introduce new variables, say "f," "g," etc., for which those words are substitutable and furthermore the general term "property." New rules are laid down which admit sentences like "Red is a property," "Red is a color," "These two pieces of paper have at least one color in common" (i.e., "There is an f such that f is a color, and . . ."). The last sentence is an internal assertion. It is an empirical, factual nature. However, the external statement, the philosophical statement of the reality of properties -- a special case of the thesis of the reality of universals -- is devoid of cognitive content. The system of integers and rational numbers. Into a language containing the framework of natural numbers we may introduce first the (positive and negative) integers as relations among natural numbers and then the rational numbers as relations among integers. This involves introducing new types of variables, expressions substitutable for them, and the general terms "integer" and "rational number." The system of real numbers. On the basis of the rational numbers, the real numbers may be introduced as classes of a special kind (segments) of rational numbers (according to the method developed by Dedekind and Frege). Here again a new type of variables is introduced, expressions substitutable for them (e.g., "√2" [square root of 2]), and the general term "real number." The spatio-temporal coordinate system for physics. The new entities are the space-time points. Each is an ordered quadruple of four real numbers, called its coordinates, consisting of three spatial and one temporal coordinates. The physical state of a spatio-temporal point or region is described either with the help of qualitative predicates (e.g., "hot") or by ascribing numbers as values of a physical magnitude (e.g., mass, temperature, and the like). The step from the system of things (which does not contain space-time points but only extended objects with spatial and temporal relations between them) to the physical coordinate system is again a matter of decision. Our choice of certain features, although itself not theoretical, is suggested by theoretical knowledge, either logical or factual. For example, the choice of real numbers rather than rational numbers or integers as coordinates is not much influenced by the 5 facts of experience but mainly due to considerations of mathematical simplicity. The restriction to rational coordinates would not be in conflict with any experimental knowledge we have, because the result of any measurement is a rational number. However, it would prevent the use of ordinary geometry (which says, e.g., that the diagonal of a square with the side I has the irrational value √2) and thus lead to great complications. On the other hand, the decision to use three rather than two or four spatial coordinates is strongly suggested, but still not forced upon us, by the result of common observations. If certain events allegedly observed in spiritualistic seances, e.g., a ball moving out of a sealed box, were confirmed beyond any reasonable doubt, it might seem advisable to use four spatial coordinates. Internal questions are here, in general, empirical questions to be answered by empirical investigations. On the other hand, the external questions of the reality of physical space and physical time are pseudo-questions. A question like: "Are there (really) space-time points?" is ambiguous. It may be meant as an internal question; then the affirmative answer is, of course, analytic and trivial. Or it may be meant in the external sense: "Shall we introduce such and such forms into our language?"; in this case it is not a theoretical but a practical question, a matter of decision rather than assertion, and hence the proposed formulation would be misleading. Or finally, it may be meant in the following sense: "Are our experiences such that the use of the linguistic forms in question will be expedient and fruitful?" This is a theoretical question of a factual, empirical nature. But it concerns a matter of degree; therefore a formulation in the form "real or not?" would be inadequate. 3. What does acceptance of a kind of entities mean? Let us now summarize the essential characteristics of situations involving the introduction of a new kind of entities, characteristics which are common to the various examples outlined above. The acceptance of a new kind of entities is represented in the language by the introduction of a framework of new forms of expressions to be used according to a new set of rules. There may be new names for particular entities of the kind in question; but some such names may already occur in the language before the introduction of the new framework. (Thus, for example, the thing language contains certainly words of the type of "blue" and "house" before the framework of properties is introduced; and it may contain words like "ten" in sentences of the form "I have ten fingers" before the framework of numbers is introduced.) The latter fact shows that the occurrence of constants of the type in question -- regarded as names of entities of the new kind after the new framework is introduced -- is not a sure sign of the acceptance of the new kind of entities. Therefore the introduction of such constants is not to be regarded as an essential step in the introduction of the framework. The two essential steps are rather the following. First, the introduction of a general term, a predicate of higher level, for the new kind of entities, permitting us to say for any particular entity that it belongs to this kind (e.g., "Red is a property," "Five is a number"). Second, the introduction of variables of the new type. The new entities are values of these variables; the constants (and the closed compound expressions, if any) are substitutable for the variables.3 With the help of the variables, general sentences concerning the new entities can be formulated. After the new forms are introduced into the language, it is possible to formulate with their help internal questions and possible answers to them. A question of this kind may be either empirical or logical; accordingly a true answer is either factually true or analytic. From the internal questions we must clearly distinguish external questions, i.e., philosophical questions concerning the existence or reality of the total system of the new entities. Many 6 philosophers regard a question of this kind as an ontological question which must be raised and answered before the introduction of the new language forms. The latter introduction, they believe, is legitimate only if it can be justified by an ontological insight supplying an affirmative answer to the question of reality. In contrast to this view, we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need any theoretical justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality. We may still speak (and have done so) of the "acceptance of the new entities" since this form of speech is customary; but one must keep in mind that this phrase does not mean for us anything more than acceptance of the new framework, i.e., of the new linguistic forms. Above all, it must not be interpreted as referring to an assumption, belief, or assertion of "the reality of the entities." There is no such assertion. An alleged statement of the reality of the system of entities is a pseudo-statement without cognitive content. To be sure, we have to face at this point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question; it is the question of whether or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as being either true or false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities.4 Thus it is clear that the acceptance of a linguistic framework must not be regarded as implying a metaphysical doctrine concerning the reality of the entities in question. It seems to me due to a neglect of this important distinction that some contemporary nominalists label the admission of variables of abstract types as "Platonism."5 This is, to say the least, an extremely misleading terminology. It leads to the absurd consequence, that the position of everybody who accepts the language of physics with its real number variables (as a language of communication, not merely as a calculus) would be called Platonistic, even if he is a strict empiricist who rejects Platonic metaphysics. A brief historical remark may here be inserted. The non-cognitive character of the questions which we have called here external questions was recognized and emphasized already by the Vienna Circle under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, the group from which the movement of logical empiricism originated. Influenced by ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Circle rejected both the thesis of the reality of the external world and the thesis of its irreality as pseudostatements;6 the same was the case for both the thesis of the reality of universals (abstract entities, in our present terminology) and the nominalistic thesis that they are not real and that their alleged names are not names of anything but merely flatus vocis. (It is obvious that the apparent negation of a pseudo-statement must also be a pseudo-statement.) It is therefore not correct to classify the members of the Vienna Circle as nominalists, as is sometimes done. However, if we look at the basic anti-metaphysical and pro-scientific attitude of most nominalists (and the same holds for many materialists and realists in the modern sense), disregarding their occasional pseudo-theoretical formulations, then it is, of course, true to say that the Vienna Circle was much closer to those philosophers than to their opponents. 4. Abstract entities in semantics The problem of the legitimacy and the status of abstract entities has recently again led to controversial discussions in connection with semantics. In a semantical meaning analysis certain expressions in a language are often said to designate (or name or denote or signify or refer to) certain extra-linguistic entities.7 As long as physical things or events (e.g., Chicago or Caesar's death) are taken as designata (entities designated), no serious doubts arise. But strong objections have been raised, especially by some empiricists, against empiricists, against abstract entities as designata, e.g., against semantical statements of the following kind: 7 (1) "The word 'red' designates a property of things"; (2) "The word 'color' designates a property of properties of things"; (3) "The word 'five' designates a number"; (4) "The word 'odd' designates a property of numbers"; (5) "The sentence 'Chicago is large' designates a proposition." Those who criticize these statements do not, of course, reject the use of the expressions in question, like "red" or "five"; nor would they deny that these expressions are meaningful. But to be meaningful is not the same as having a meaning in the sense of an entity designated. They reject the belief, which they regard as implicitly presupposed by those semantical statements, that to each expression of the types in question (adjectives like "red," numerals like "five," etc.) there is a particular real entity to which the expression stands in the relation of designation). This belief is rejected as incompatible with the basic principles of empiricism or of scientific thinking. Derogatory labels like "Platonic realism" "hypostatization," or "'Fido'-Fido principle" are attached to it. The latter is the name given by Gilbert Ryle8 to the criticized belief, which, in his view, arises by a naive inference of analogy: just as there is an entity well known to me, viz. my dog Fido, which is designated by the name "Fido," thus there must be for every meaningful expression a particular entity to which it stands in the relation of designation or naming, i.e., the relation exemplified by "Fido"-Fido. The belief criticized is thus a case of hypostatization, i.e., of treating as names expressions which are not names. While "Fido" is a name, expressions like "red," "five," etc., are said not to be names, not to designate anything. Our previous discussion concerning the acceptance of frameworks enables us now to clarify the situation with respect to abstract entities as designata. Let us take as an example the statement: (a) "'Five' designates a number." The formulation of this statement presupposes that our language L contains the forms of expressions which we have called the framework of numbers, in particular, numerical variables and the general term "number." If L contains these forms, the following is an analytic statement in L: (b) "Five is a number." Further, to make the statement (a) possible, L must contain an expression like "designates" or "is a name of" for the semantical relation of designation. If suitable rules for this term are laid down, the following is likewise analytic: (c) "'Five' designates five." (Generally speaking, any expression of the form "'. . .' designates . . ." is an analytic statement provided the term ". . ." is a constant in an accepted framework. If the latter condition is not fulfilled, the expression is not a statement.) Since (a) follows from (c) and (b), (a) is likewise analytic. Thus it is clear that if someone accepts the framework of numbers, then he must acknowledge (c) and (b) and hence (a) as true statements. Generally speaking, if someone accepts a framework for a certain kind of entities, then he is bound to admit the entities as possible designata. Thus the question of the admissibility of entities of a certain type or of abstract 8 entities in general as designata is reduced to the question of the acceptability of the linguistic framework for those entities. Both the nominalistic critics, who refuse the status of designators or names to expressions like "red," "five," etc., because they deny the existence of abstract entities, and the skeptics, who express doubts concerning the existence and demand evidence for it, treat the question of existence as a theoretical question. They do, of course, not mean the internal question; the affirmative answer to this question is analytic and trivial and too obvious for doubt or denial, as we have seen. Their doubts refer rather to the system of entities itself; hence they mean the external question. They believe that only after making sure that there really is a system of entities of the kind in question are we justified in accepting the framework by incorporating the linguistic forms into our language. However, we have seen that the external question is not a theoretical question but rather the practical question whether or not to accept those linguistic forms. This acceptance is not in need of a theoretical justification (except with respect to expediency and fruitfulness), because it does not imply a belief or assertion. Ryle says that the "Fido"-Fido principle is "a grotesque theory." Grotesque or not, Ryle is wrong in calling it a theory. It is rather the practical decision to accept certain frameworks. Maybe Ryle is historically right with respect to those whom he mentions as previous representatives of the principle, viz. John Stuart Mill, Frege, and Russell. If these philosophers regarded the acceptance of a system of entities as a theory, an assertion, they were victims of the same old, metaphysical confusion. But it is certainly wrong to regard my semantical method as involving a belief in the reality of abstract entities, since I reject a thesis of this kind as a metaphysical pseudo-statement. The critics of the use of abstract entities in semantics overlook the fundamental difference between the acceptance of a system of entities and an internal assertion, e.g., an assertion that there are elephants or electrons or prime numbers greater than a million. Whoever makes an internal assertion is certainly obliged to justify it by providing evidence, empirical evidence in the case of electrons, logical proof in the case of the prime numbers. The demand for a theoretical justification, correct in the case of internal assertions, is sometimes wrongly applied to the acceptance of a system of entities. Thus, for example, Ernest Nagel in his review9 asks for "evidence relevant for affirming with warrant that there are such entities as infinitesimals or propositions." He characterizes the evidence required in these cases -- in distinction to the empirical evidence in the case of electrons -- as "in the broad sense logical and dialectical." Beyond this no hint is given as to what might be regarded as relevant evidence. Some nominalists regard the acceptance of abstract entities as a kind of superstition or myth, populating the world with fictitious or at least dubious entities, analogous to the belief in centaurs or demons. This shows again the confusion mentioned, because a superstition or myth is a false (or dubious) internal statement. Let us take as example the natural numbers as cardinal numbers, i.e., in contexts like "Here are three books." The linguistic forms of the framework of numbers, including variables and the general term "number," are generally used in our common language of communication; and it is easy to formulate explicit rules for their use. Thus the logical characteristics of this framework are sufficiently clear while many internal questions, i.e., arithmetical questions, are, of course, still open). In spite of this, the controversy concerning the external question of the ontological reality of the system of numbers continues. Suppose that one philosopher says: "I believe that there are numbers as real entities. This gives me the right to use the linguistic forms of the numerical framework and to make semantical statements about numbers as designata of numerals." His nominalistic opponent replies: "You are wrong; there are no numbers. The numerals may still be used as meaningful expressions. But they are not names, there are no entities designated by them. Therefore the word "number" and numerical variables must not be used (unless a way were found to introduce them as merely abbreviating 9 devices, a way of translating them into the nominalistic thing language)." I cannot think of any possible evidence that would be regarded as relevant by both philosophers, and therefore, if actually found, would decide the controversy or at least make one of the opposite theses more probable than the other. (To construe the numbers as classes or properties of the second level, according to the Frege-Russell method, does, of course, not solve the controversy, because the first philosopher would affirm and the second deny the existence of the system of classes or properties of the second level.) Therefore I feel compelled to regard the external question as a pseudo-question, until both parties to the controversy offer a common interpretation of the question as a cognitive question; this would involve an indication of possible evidence regarded as relevant by both sides. There is a particular kind of misinterpretation of the acceptance of abstract entities in various fields of science and in semantics, that needs to be cleared up. Certain early British empiricists (e.g., Berkeley and Hume) denied the existence of abstract entities on the ground that immediate experience presents us only with particulars, not with universals, e.g., with this red patch, but not with Redness or Color-in-General; with this scalene triangle, but not with Scalene Triangularity or Triangularity-in-General. Only entities belonging to a type of which examples were to be found within immediate experience could be accepted as ultimate constituents of reality. Thus, according to this way of thinking, the existence of abstract entities could be asserted only if one could show either that some abstract entities fall within the given, or that abstract entities can be defined in terms of the types of entity which are given. Since these empiricists found no abstract entities within the realm of sense-data, they either denied their existence, or else made a futile attempt to define universals in terms of particulars. Some contemporary philosophers, especially English philosophers following Bertrand Russell, think in basically similar terms. They emphasize a distinction between the data (that which is immediately given in consciousness, e.g., sense-data, immediately past experiences, etc.) and the constructs based on the data. Existence or reality is ascribed only to the data; the constructs are not real entities; the corresponding linguistic expressions are merely ways of speech not actually designating anything (reminiscent of the nominalists' flatus vocis). We shall not criticize here this general conception. (As far as it is a principle of accepting certain entities and not accepting others, leaving aside any ontological, phenomenalistic and nominalistic pseudo-statements, there cannot be any theoretical objection to it.) But if this conception leads to the view that other philosophers or scientists who accept abstract entities thereby assert or imply their occurrence as immediate data, then such a view must be rejected as a misinterpretation. References to space-time points, the electromagnetic field, or electrons in physics, to real or complex numbers and their functions in mathematics, to the excitatory potential or unconscious complexes in psychology, to an inflationary trend in economics, and the like, do not imply the assertion that entities of these kinds occur as immediate data. And the same holds for references to abstract entities as designata in semantics. Some of the criticisms by English philosophers against such references give the impression that, probably due to the misinterpretation just indicated, they accuse the semanticist not so much of bad metaphysics (as some nominalists would do) but of bad psychology. The fact that they regard a semantical method involving abstract entities not merely as doubtful and perhaps wrong, but as manifestly absurd, preposterous and grotesque, and that they show a deep horror and indignation against this method, is perhaps to be explained by a misinterpretation of the kind described. In fact, of course, the semanticist does not in the least assert or imply that the abstract entities to which he refers can be experienced as immediately given either by sensation or by a kind of rational intuition. An assertion of this kind would indeed be very dubious psychology. The psychological question as to which kinds of entities do and which do not occur as immediate data is entirely irrelevant for semantics, 10 just as it is for physics, mathematics, economic;, etc., with respect to the examples mentioned above.10 5. Conclusion For those who want to develop or use semantical methods, the decisive question is not the alleged ontological question of the existence of abstract entities but rather the question whether the rise of abstract linguistic foms or, in technical terms, the use of variables beyond those for things (or phenomenal data), is expedient and fruitful for the purposes for which semantical analyses are made, viz. the analysis, interpretation, clarification, or construction of languages of communication, especially languages of science. This question is here neither decided nor even discussed. It is not a question simply of yes or no, but a matter of degree. Among those philosophers who have carried out semantical analyses and thought about suitable tools for this work, beginning with Plato and Aristotle and, in a more technical way on the basis of modern logic, with C. S. Peirce and Frege, a great majority accepted abstract entities. This does, of course, not prove the case. After all, semantics in the technical sense is still in the initial phases of its development, and we must be prepared for possible fundamental c...
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Running head: THE METAONTOLOGICAL DEBATE

The Metaontological Debate

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THE METAONTOLOGICAL DEBATE

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The Metaontological Debate
Ontology is one of the most basic branches of philosophy as well as the most
fundamental. All philosophical debates stem from answered ontological questions; therefore, it is
important to know the validity of those answers and whether or not objectivity can be achieved at
all. Metaontology deals with such questions. In this paper, the debate in metaontology will be
reviewed along with its three more common perspectives: heavyweight ontological realism,
lightweight ontological realism, and anti-realism. Following this overview, the heavyweight
ontological realism argument will be argued against and advanced with an objection. The paper
concludes with an analysis of the two arguments and a conclusion as to which one is the most
convincing.
Central Debate in Metaontology
Ontology is the study of what exists. “What is there” is the fundamental question of this
field (Chalmers, n.d., p. 77). The study of ontology is complex and riddled with debates,
primarily surrounding whether or not what there is actually exists. For example, the question of
whether or not God exists is an ontological question that has been debated by philosophers for
centuries. Consequently, ontology is not just the study of what there is but also the study of how
one settles debates on what there is.
While ontology deals with what is there, metaontology studies whether or not the answer
is objective. It investigates the objectivity of ontological claims. The main debate within this
field is whether or not ontological claims can drive objective answers (Hofweber, 2017).
Whether or not ontological claims are objective seems simple when dealing with concrete
objects. A table, for instance, can be directly perceived with one’s senses. However, when it
comes to concepts such as numbers, God, or other abstract concepts, the answer is not so clear.

THE METAONTOLOGICAL DEBATE

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Even in the case of a table, some philosophers argue that the human senses and mind are unable
to derive objective conclusions. Metaontology helps understand these issues by investigating the
meaning of ontology’s most basic question.
Heavyweight Ontological Realism
Several theories are associated with ...


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