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What Makes A Hero? The Impact of Integrity on
Admiration and Interpersonal Judgment
Barry R. Schlenker,1 Michael F. Weigold,1 and
Kristine A. Schlenker2
1
2
University of Florida
Penn State University
ABSTRACT Principled and expedient ideologies affect self-regulation
and guide people along divergent ethical paths. A more principled ideology, indicative of higher claimed integrity, involves a greater personal
commitment to ethical beliefs, standards, and self-schemas that facilitate
positive social activities and help resist the temptation of illicit activities.
Two studies showed that differences in reported integrity are related to
people’s preferences for and judgments of others. Those higher in integrity spontaneously described their heroes as more principled, honest,
spiritual, and benevolently oriented toward others (Study 1). In addition,
integrity was related to people’s evaluations of characters who made
ethical or unethical career decisions (Study 2). The judgments of those
higher in integrity were greatly influenced by whether or not the decision
was ethical but were largely unaffected by the consequences (career
success or failure), whereas those lower in integrity were less influenced
by whether the decision was ethical and more influenced by the career
consequences.
Ethical dilemmas pit principles against expediency. Doing the right
thing is a basis for acts of heroism and laudable accomplishment but
often involves personal sacrifice. Doing the expedient thing is a basis
for acts of self-indulgence and opportunism but often at a cost
to others. How people resolve the tension between principles and
expediency tests an individual’s character and a society’s ability to
function effectively. Each path has a certain appeal—the principled
Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to Barry R. Schlenker,
Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611. E-mail:
schlenkr@ufl.edu.
Journal of Personality 76:2, April 2008
r 2008, Copyright the Authors
Journal compilation r 2008, Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2007.00488.x
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path for its integrity and the expedient path for its profits. Informative glimpses may be gained into the values, aspirations, and ideologies of individuals and societies by examining whom they admire
and regard as a hero and what criteria they use to praise and condemn others. The present studies examined individual differences in
whom people regard as their heroes, why they regard them as heroes,
and how they judge others based on how those others resolve
conflicts between principles and expediency.
Principled and Expedient Ideologies: Commitment to Integrity
An ethical ideology is an integrated system of beliefs, values,
standards, and self-definitions that define an individual’s orientation
toward matters of right and wrong or good and evil (Schlenker,
2007). It provides a moral schema for evaluating events and a moral
identity that describes one’s ethical character. Principled ideologies
contain the ideas that ethical principles have a trans-situational
quality, these principles should be followed regardless of personal
consequences or self-serving justifications, and integrity is inherently
valuable and a defining quality of one’s identity. In contrast, expedient ideologies involve the ideas that moral principles can be flexible,
that it is important to take advantage of profitable opportunities and
foolish to fail to do so, and that what might seem to be deviations
from principles can usually be justified.
Schlenker (2007) proposed that personal commitment to a
principled ideology determines the strength of the relationship between ethical principles and behavior. Personal commitment links the
self-system to the ethical principles, producing an accompanying
sense of obligation to perform consistently with those principles and
a sense of responsibility for relevant actions (Schlenker, 2007; see also
Schlenker, 1997; Schlenker, Pontari, & Christopher, 2001). There is
then greater difficulty explaining inconsistent conduct and less perceived flexibility to pursue unprincipled alternatives. This analysis is
consistent with arguments, from several theoretical perspectives, that
people’s moral self-conceptions guide conduct across a range of situations (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1980, 1983; Narvaez, Lapsley,
Hagele, & Lasky, 2005; Peterson & Seligman, 2004).
Individual differences in reports of principled commitment can
be assessed with the Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2007). Principled
ideologies characterize people who regard themselves as having high
What Makes a Hero?
325
integrity. The first dictionary meaning of integrity is the ‘‘steadfast
adherence to a strict moral or ethical code’’ (American Heritage
Dictionary, 2000), and synonyms include being honest, upright, and
incorruptible. The 18-item scale (see Appendix) focuses on the
strength of people’s claims of being principled (as opposed to expedient), and items assess the inherent value of principled conduct, the
steadfast commitment to principles despite costs or temptations, and
the unwillingness to rationalize violations of principles. Although
some items include references to truthfulness, lying, and cheating,
which are inherent to definitions of integrity, participants are left to
define principles and right versus wrong for themselves.
Higher scores reflect stronger endorsement of a principled
ideology and the claim that one is a principled person with integrity, whereas lower scores reflect a more expedient orientation. People’s ethical ideologies may or may not coincide with their behavior,
of course, so it is an empirical question whether those who express a
commitment to principles actually behave in a principled fashion.
The scale demonstrates acceptable internal-consistency reliability
(Cronbach’s a ranged from .84 to .90 across 6 samples) and testretest reliability (r 5 .82 over 2–5 weeks; Schlenker, 2007). Confirmatory factor analyses supported the view that a single latent integrity dimension, which appears to reflect the principled-expedient
continuum, along with measurement effects from direct- and reversescored items, underlies responses ( Johnson & Schlenker, 2007). Social desirability bias, which is a substantial problem with measures of
overt integrity (i.e., honesty testing) used in business (Sackett &
Wanek, 1996), is small and accounts for under 3% of the common
variance (rs ranged from .05 to .17 in 5 samples; Schlenker, 2007).
Given the conceptual rationale for the scale, integrity scores
should be related to respondents’ moral identities and their prosocial versus antisocial orientations toward others, and research
shows that they are. In the personality realm, integrity scores are
positively related to scores on measures of the purpose and meaning in
life, authenticity, empathy, trust, and self-esteem and negatively related to scores on Machiavellianism, self-monitoring, cynicism, narcissism, alienation, and the tendency to rationalize antisocial and
illegal conduct. Integrity scores are unrelated to measures of dogmatism and the need for closure, indicating that the scale is not simply
assessing closed-mindedness (Schlenker, 2007). Further, integrity
predicts reported helping and volunteering even after controlling for
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empathy, as well as antisocial behavior, including lying, cheating,
stealing, and other undesirable behaviors (Schlenker, 2007).
People’s levels of integrity are accurately perceived by their
friends, as evidenced by significant correlations between respondents’ own integrity scores and their friends’ appraisals of their integrity (Miller & Schlenker, 2007). Higher scorers also prefer to
interact with others to see them as being high in integrity, whereas
those who score lower equally prefer evaluations of being principled
or expedient (Miller & Schlenker, 2007). It is worth noting that virtually no one claims to be unprincipled. Instead, those who score
lower express more of a balance between principles and expediency,
whereas those who score higher express a stronger commitment to
principles and greater aversion to expediency (e.g., compromising
principles for profit).
Prior research has not examined how integrity is related to social
judgment, particularly to admiration for others. The present studies
addressed evaluative social judgments.
Integrity and Heroes
Why Study Heroes?
Heroes can play important roles in people’s lives. Like any significant audience or reference group, heroes provide reference points for
goals, standards, and ways to behave. People’s perceptions of their
heroes’ values, standards, and behavioral tendencies are integrated
into cognitive schemas, and these serve as mental templates for desirable ways to act in various social situations. As such, heroes
function as exemplars or models for desirable conduct as imagined
judges of conduct and as social comparison targets. Although comparing oneself to heroes can produce a contrast effect and negative
self-evaluations, it can also serve as inspiration to motivate selfimprovement, produce the glow of basking in their accomplishments, and even enhance self-evaluation through assimilation (Collins, 1996). Indeed, college students became either more or less likely
to volunteer to help others depending on whether superheroes were
primed in ways that produced assimilation or contrast (Nelson &
Norton, 2005).
People identify with their heroes and try to become more like
them, in their own minds and through their actions. Performance on
a Stroop-like self-description task is affected by whether people
What Makes a Hero?
327
judge their heroes or comparable nonheroes, suggesting that people
incorporate aspects of their heroes’ qualities into their own self-conceptions (Sullivan & Venter, 2005). Watching heroes who confront
challenging situations can have powerful emotional consequences,
producing not only shifts in mood and self-esteem but also physiological changes. For example, men who watched their favorite sports
teams win or lose showed increases or decreases, respectively, in testosterone (Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998). Thus, heroes
can have an impact on people’s self-concepts, emotional well-being,
and self-regulation.
What Is a Hero?
Heroes are known for their laudable achievements and praiseworthy
personal qualities. According to dictionary usage, the qualities of
heroes involve (1) ‘‘great nobility of purpose’’ and ‘‘sacrifice for
others,’’ (2) ‘‘great courage or strength’’ and being ‘‘celebrated for
bold exploits,’’ or (3) unusual ‘‘special achievements’’ in a field (e.g.,
heroes of sports or science) (American Heritage Dictionary, 2000).
People with such qualities contribute disproportionately to groups,
perhaps increasing the chances of a group’s survival and prosperity.
It is worth noting that these qualities are not invariably associated
with morality. They vary from those that have clear moral relevance
(nobility, self-sacrifice) to those that do not (courage, strength, special achievements), even though the latter may have implications for
morality under some conditions (e.g., acting on moral convictions
requires courage in the face of adversity).
A Harris Poll (2001) showed that people cite many reasons for
naming someone as a hero. The reasons named by three-fourths or
more of respondents involved ‘‘not giving up until the goal is accomplished’’ (86%), ‘‘doing what’s right regardless of personal consequences’’ (85%), ‘‘doing more than what other people expect of
them’’ (81%), ‘‘staying level-headed in a crisis’’ (79%), ‘‘overcoming
adversity’’ (79%), and ‘‘changing society for the better’’ (77%).
Other frequently listed reasons included the ‘‘willingness to risk personal safety to help others’’ (72%) and ‘‘not expecting personal recognition’’ (68%). These popular reasons again range from those that
are highly moral (e.g., doing what’s right, willingness to sacrifice for
others) to those that are morally neutral (e.g., perseverance, staying
level-headed).
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The Role of Integrity in Selecting Heroes
Although there have been numerous surveys describing whom people list as their heroes and the qualities they admire in them, there
has been little research on individual differences in the selection of
heroes. Why do different people identify with different heroes? We
propose that people’s integrity is a key predictor of the qualities they
prefer in their heroes.
A principled ideology consists of important moral schemas about
oneself and the world. Important schemas are more likely to be
accessible in memory, to guide social judgment, and to lead to
consistent behavior, and this is especially the case when important
self-schemas are involved (Brown, 1998; Markus & Wurf, 1987;
Moskowitz, 2005). When evaluating others, people tend to use constructs that are contained in their own self-schemas, both as social
judgment standards and to organize information about others (Dunning, Krueger, & Alicke, 2005; Moskowitz, 2005). People also are attracted to others who have personal qualities that are similar to those
they themselves possess (LaPrelle, Hoyle, Insko, & Bernthal, 1990).
As such, those who view themselves as more principled will be
more likely to notice, remember, and admire people who exemplify
high integrity. When asked about their heroes, they will be more
likely to think about people who exemplify integrity, and when asked
to list the qualities possessed by their heroes, they will be more likely
to list characteristics associated with integrity. We predicted that
they would describe their heroes as exemplifying moral conviction,
honesty, authenticity, and the concern for others. Based on research
indicating that integrity is negatively related to materialism and positively related to spirituality and intrinsic religiosity (Schlenker,
2007) we also predicted that people who scored higher in integrity
would be more likely to describe their heroes as being spiritual and
religious as compared to materialistic. In contrast, those who score
lower in integrity see themselves as having a more balanced mixture
of qualities reflecting principles and expediency (Miller & Schlenker,
2007) and therefore will prefer such a mixture in others. Their
heroes will have a variety of special achievements but without a
comparable moral tone.
Study 1 tests these hypotheses by asking participants to describe
their heroes and the qualities they admire in them. Study 2 uses a
different methodology—evaluating hypothetical characters whose
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actions vary in ethicality and in success—to examine the same fundamental issue: Will those higher in integrity admire people who
exemplify principled instead of expedient conduct? The method in
Study 1 allows us to address the question in the context of people’s
spontaneous descriptions of those admire; that of Study 2 allows us
to address it by controlling the conduct of characters to determine
how variations in their behavior are related to evaluations.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
One hundred fifty students (108 females, 42 males) enrolled in a journalism
course at the University of Florida participated for extra credit in their
class. The average age of participants was 20.3 years (SD 5 1.10), with a
range from 18 to 24.
Heroes Survey
The booklet asked participants to list and describe people they regarded
as heroes, with heroes defined broadly. The instructions indicated that
heroes come in many forms and can be real or fictional, living or dead,
and known or unknown to the participants. Heroes were to be people
whom participants admired and regarded as exemplars. It was also noted
that heroes can be influential in helping people deal with a variety of issues, including the type of person they want to become, the kinds of values they consider important, and the different strategies they might use to
pursue their goals and dreams or handle specific situations. Participants
were asked to ‘‘list as many or as few heroes as you think appropriate,
since some people have many heroes and others have fewer. For each
hero, list the qualities you admire in this person.’’
Next, participants were asked to ‘‘select the hero who has been the
most influential for you personally, that is, the hero who has had the
greatest impact on you.’’ They were to write the person’s name followed
by a brief description of the person in the event his or her name was
unfamiliar (e.g., movie star, politician, businessperson, musician, policeman, relative, friend). They then rated this individual on closed-ended
adjective scales.
Finally, they completed Rokeach’s (1973) Value Survey, in which they
rank-ordered 18 terminal values, or values that are important ends in
themselves (e.g., freedom, happiness, pleasure) and 18 instrumental values,
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
or values that are important means to other ends (e.g., ambitious, helpful,
honest). The value data from 8 participants were unusable (they failed to
complete the items or did not follow the instructions to rank items).
Procedure
On separate days about 2 weeks apart, participants completed (1) the
Heroes Survey and the Value Survey and (2) a copy of the Integrity Scale
(Schlenker, 2007) plus a short version of the Crowne-Marlowe Social
Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982). Participants were asked to take the
questionnaires home, complete them in a quiet place where they would
not be bothered or distracted, and return them at their next class. To
ensure anonymity, participants used a code name of their own choosing
to identify their questionnaires.
Dependent Measures: Spontaneous Listing
Coding scheme. A coding scheme was developed to assess important
qualities that might be possessed by heroes. Six categories reflected qualities
associated in the literature with moral identity and character, including being committed to principles, honest, impartial, beneficent (e.g., caring toward
others), determined, and spiritual. Studies examining people’s everyday conceptions of morality suggest moral character is organized as a distinct prototype (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Hennig,
2004; Walker & Pitts, 1998). Although some of the specific attributes can
vary by culture, historical period, and individual, at the core it includes the
qualities of being principled and having moral convictions, being honest,
and being fair; these are three distinguishable dimensions in naturalistic
conceptions of morality (Walker & Hennig, 2004). Moral prototypes also
can include the three virtues of being caring toward others (caring, kind,
compassionate, loving, unselfish), dependable (dependable, reliable, responsible, hardworking, determined), and spiritual or religious (Aquino & Reed,
2002; Walker & Pitts, 1998). It is worth noting that scores on the Integrity
Scale are positively correlated with scores on measures of being caring,
helpful toward others, and intrinsically religious (Schlenker, 2007).
Three additional categories reflected fundamental interpersonal qualities
that are not uniquely related to moral prototypes but appear in most personality and group rating schemes: intelligence, social skills, and power. Perusal of the qualities spontaneously listed by respondents produced three
additional categories: having a positive attitude or outlook, being forgiving,
and being materialistically successful. Finally, an other category includes
attributes that did not fit elsewhere and appeared infrequently enough so as
to not warrant creation of a new category. Table 1 presents these 13
categories and examples of the qualities that were coded in each.
What Makes a Hero?
331
Table 1
Study 1: Categories Used for Coding the Spontaneous Descriptions
Category
Description and Examples
Commitment to
principles
References to being morally principled: ‘‘principled,’’
‘‘fought for her/his beliefs,’’ ‘‘stands up for what she
believes,’’ ‘‘strong convictions,’’ ‘‘true to morals,’’
‘‘strong moral values,’’ ‘‘morals to live by,’’ ‘‘moral’’
References to truth-telling: ‘‘honest,’’ ‘‘truthful,’’
‘‘sincere’’
References to spirituality, religion, and faith: ‘‘spiritual,’’
‘‘strong faith in God,’’ ‘‘religious’’
References to being impartial: ‘‘unbiased,’’ ‘‘fair’’
References to altruism, concern for others, and a lack of
self-absorption: ‘‘caring,’’ ‘‘helpful,’’ ‘‘supportive,’’
‘‘considerate,’’ ‘‘devoted to family,’’ ‘‘loyal,’’
‘‘unselfish,’’ ‘‘selfless,’’ ‘‘humble,’’ ‘‘puts others before
self,’’ ‘‘thinks of others before self’’
References to resoluteness, dedication, commitment to
unnamed goals, and perseverance to goals: ‘‘dedicated,’’
‘‘committed,’’ ‘‘goal oriented,’’ ‘‘determined,’’ ‘‘hard
working,’’ ‘‘persevered,’’ ‘‘overcame obstacles,’’ ‘‘neversay-die attitude’’
References to wisdom and intelligence: ‘‘smart,’’ ‘‘wise,’’
‘‘creative,’’ ‘‘genius’’
References to social attributes that make interactions
easier: ‘‘outgoing,’’ ‘‘extraverted,’’ ‘‘good listener,’’
‘‘funny,’’ ‘‘good sense of humor’’
References to strength, leadership skills, and the ability
to motivate others: ‘‘leader,’’ ‘‘in control,’’ ‘‘calm,’’
‘‘brave,’’ ‘‘inspirational,’’ ‘‘strong’’
References to being optimistic and confident:
‘‘optimistic,’’ ‘‘upbeat,’’ ‘‘confident’’
References to forgiveness: ‘‘forgiving’’
References to materialism: ‘‘materialistic,’’ ‘‘wealthy,’’
‘‘successful’’
References to qualities not included in the above:
‘‘speedy’’ described Superman, ‘‘soft’’ described Audrey
Hepburn, ‘‘stylish,’’ ‘‘hot,’’ and ‘‘emotional’’ described
other heroes
Honesty
Spirituality
Impartiality
Beneficence
Determination
Intellectual skill
Social skill
Power
Positive attitude
Forgiveness
Materialistic
success
Other
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Interrater reliability. One of the authors coded all of the respondents’
descriptions of the heroes into the categories. To calculate reliability,
another trained judge randomly selected 20 of the original booklets and
independently coded them. Intraclass correlations (which assumed the
same raters did the coding, were the entire population of raters, and the
ratings were not averaged, see Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) showed acceptable
interrater reliability for the 13 categories (reliabilities4.75 for all categories except materialistic success, which was .65). There were no significant differences between the judges’ ratings on any of the 13 categories
(all ps4.16). All of the categories were thus deemed to have acceptable
reliability.
Dependent Measures: Closed-Ended Ratings
Respondents were asked to identify the hero who was most influential to
them and then rate this main hero on 7-point evaluative scales with labeled end points. Ratings were averaged into groupings that largely corresponded with the spontaneous-listing categories. A principled grouping
reflected ethical versus unethical conduct (Cronbach’s a 5 .73; 7 dimensions, e.g., being principled, high in integrity, moral, trustworthy, honest,
valuing principled conduct [versus valuing personal gratification]); items
assessing honesty and commitment to principles were combined rather
than kept separate because they were highly correlated and showed the
same patterns. An authenticity or true-to-self grouping (a 5 .60; 3 dimensions: follows own conscience, is true to own self, speaks own mind) was
included to test hypotheses about the relationship between principled
commitment and authenticity (discussed shortly). A beneficence grouping
reflected items dealing with concerns for others as opposed to oneself
(a 5 .70; 6 dimensions, e.g., caring for others, altruistic, generous, humble). An effectiveness grouping reflected determination and power
(a 5 .77; 9 dimensions, e.g., effective, persevering, determined, powerful,
strong, capable, successful); items assessing effectiveness and power were
combined because they were highly correlated and showed the same patterns. A likableness grouping included two items (a 5 .65; likable, would
want as a friend). Finally, single items assessed spirituality (spiritual–
materialistic), intellectual skill (wise–foolish), and similarity to self (similar
to me–different from me).
Results
Integrity Scores and Analyses
The mean integrity score for the sample was 64.9 (SD 5 9.2).
Consistent with prior research (Schlenker, 2007), females scored
What Makes a Hero?
333
higher than males, F (1, 148) 5 7.38, p 5 .007, Z2 5 .04 (Females:
M 5 66.1, SD 5 8.29; Males: M 5 61.7, SD 5 10.63).
Unless otherwise noted, analyses of the dependent measures were
conducted using the General Linear Model (GLM) procedure in
SAS, with integrity (centered, continuous), sex (effects coded), and
their interaction as predictors. Standard regression, using the same
predictors and coding, was used to calculate the beta weights for
effects (when coded identically, as done here, GLM and standard
regression produce identical common statistics). None of the reported effects were qualified by sex, which will not be discussed further.
Types of Heroes
Participants named an average of 3.2 heroes (SD 5 1.38). Most of
the heroes were real people (90.8% were classified as real, 4.2% were
fictional, and 5.4% could not be classified) who were personally
known by the respondents (59.2% were personally known, 28.7%
could not have been known personally, and 12.4% could not be
unequivocally classified). The largest single category consisted of
family members (46.2% of all heroes were members of one’s family),
especially one’s mother or father. Friends, star athletes, and religious
or spiritual figures (e.g., Jesus, the Pope, Billy Graham, Mother
Theresa, a pastor) each comprised 5% or more of the respondents’
heroes.
Integrity scores were unrelated to the total number of heroes who
were named (Fo1, p 5 .52) but were related to types of hero. Higher
integrity was associated with naming a greater number of spiritual or
religious figures as heroes, F (1, 146) 5 12.97, p 5 .0004, b 5 .29. To
ensure that a few people did not simply name a large number of such
figures, chi-squares were calculated on whether low versus high integrity respondents, defined by median split, named none versus one
or more spiritual/religious figures; this measure provides an indication of whether the category itself is spontaneously salient regardless
of number of such heroes named. One or more religious figures were
named by only 4.2% of those who scored below the median on integrity but by 26.6% of those who scored above the median in
integrity, w2 (1, N 5 150) 5 13.91, po.0002. Given that the total
number of heroes was comparable for those high versus low in integrity, one would expect a compensating difference for other types
of heroes. Although no other effects reached po.05, there was a
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
marginal negative relationship between integrity and selecting
athletes as heroes, F (1, 146) 5 2.81, p 5 .10, b 5 .13. One or
more athletes were named by 18.3% of those below the median in
integrity but by 8.9% of those above the median, w2 (1,
N 5 150) 5 2.89, po.09. Those higher in integrity display a clear
preference for morally notable heroes, whereas those lower in integrity seem to have a slight preference for those noted for impressive
personal achievements.
Spontaneous Descriptions of Heroes
Respondents spontaneously described the qualities they admired in
each of their heroes. An average of 2.82 qualities were listed per
hero, or 9.12 qualities (SD 5 5.16) possessed by the average set of
heroes.
A dichotomous measure of whether or not respondents listed a
category of qualities to describe one or more of their heroes was
calculated, and chi square analyses were conducted to see if those
high versus low in integrity (median split) used different categories.
As shown in Table 2, participants who were high rather than low in
integrity were more likely to describe their heroes using the categories of honesty, principled conduct, spirituality, and beneficence. In
fact, more than twice as many respondents who scored high rather
than low in integrity used the categories of honesty, commitment to
principles, and spirituality, and nearly all of those high in integrity
referenced the beneficence of their heroes. There were no other significant differences involving integrity on the dichotomous measures.
GLM analyses were also conducted on the frequencies with which
respondents used each of the categories. These analyses provided
information about the number of times each category was used
(which can include multiple instances of a category across heroes or
for a specific hero, e.g., helpful, caring, and unselfish reflect three
instances of beneficence), instead of information about whether a
category was used (as in the chi square analyses). Identical results
were obtained, with significant main effects of integrity on references
to honesty, principles, spirituality, and beneficence (all Fs
(1, 146)44.02, pso.05). No other main effects of integrity or interactions of integrity and sex of respondent were significant. These
results show that those who score higher in integrity are more likely
to access these qualities in memory when thinking about their heroes
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What Makes a Hero?
Table 2
Study 1: Integrity and the Percentage of Respondents Who Used Each
Category to Describe Their Heroes
Percentage Using Category
Attribute
Principled
Honest
Spiritual
Beneficent
Determined
Intellectually skilled
Socially skilled
Powerful
Attitudinally positive
Forgiving
Materialistically successful
Impartial
Other
X2 (150)
p5
6.42
9.66
6.03
14.86
0.01
1.69
0.05
0.89
2.59
0.23
0.00
0.33
0.41
.01
.002
.014
.0001
.91
.19
.83
.85
.11
.63
.96
.57
.52
Low Integrity High Integrity
11.3%
22.5%
5.6%
71.8%
66.2%
45.1%
22.5%
73.2%
12.7%
5.6%
9.9%
4.2%
19.7%
27.9%
46.8%
19.0%
94.9%
67.1%
55.7%
24.1%
79.8%
22.8%
7.6%
10.1%
3.3%
24.1%
Note: Integrity scores were dichotomized (median splits) to form low and high
integrity groups.
(chi square analyses) as well as to apply these qualities repeatedly to
their heroes (GLM analyses).
Closed-Ended Ratings of the Main Hero
As shown in Table 3, those higher in integrity evaluated their main
hero as more principled, authentic, beneficent, spiritual, and (marginally) effective. Integrity was unrelated to how likable, similar to
self, and wise the main hero was perceived to be. These patterns are
consistent with those found on the spontaneous descriptions and
with prior research on personal qualities associated with integrity
(Schlenker, 2007). The qualities that those who score higher in
integrity seem to possess are also admired in their heroes.
Authenticity, or being true to self, is often regarded as a facet of
integrity (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Although being true to self
does not have identical implications as being committed to ethical
principles (e.g., a serial killer acts consistently with personal
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
Table 3
Study 1: Evaluations of Heroes on the Closed-Ended Items
Integrity Main Effects
Attribute
Principled
Authentic
Beneficent
Effective
Likable
Spiritual
Intelligent
Similar to oneself
F (1, 146)
p5
b
5.26
7.31
4.21
3.16
o1
4.08
o1
o1
.02
.008
.04
.08
.40
.05
.48
.52
.19
.23
.17
.15
.09
.17
.06
.06
preferences but quite immorally), these constructs are conceptually
and empirically related (Schlenker, 2007). As such, closed-ended
items were selected to assess both the commitment to principles and
authenticity. These groupings were modestly correlated (r 5 .25,
p 5 .002) and positively related to scores on the Integrity Scale. Unfortunately, comparable groupings could not be distinguished in the
spontaneous listings (qualities like ‘‘fought for his beliefs,’’ ‘‘stands
up for what she believes,’’ and ‘‘strong convictions’’ can reflect both
principled commitment and authenticity). When these concepts are
distinguished, as in the closed-ended items, both the adherence to
principles and authenticity are directly related to integrity scores.
Further, authenticity, perhaps because it centers on the self, has
weaker implications for concerns about others than does principled
commitment. Ratings of beneficence were highly correlated with the
commitment to principles (r 5 .62, po.0001) but modestly correlated
with authenticity (r 5 .25, p 5 .002); these correlations differ in magnitude (po.05). The pattern suggests that principled commitment
subjectively implies concerns for others, at least in the United States.
Values
On Rokeach’s Value Scale (1973), those who scored higher in
integrity ranked higher (closer to 1) the instrumental values honest,
F (1, 138) 5 5.30, p 5 .02, b 5 .19, and helpful, F (1, 138) 5 8.72,
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What Makes a Hero?
p 5 .004, b 5 .25, and the terminal value salvation, F (1, 138) 5
4.57, p 5 .03, b 5 .19. Conversely, those higher in integrity
ranked lower (closer to 18) the instrumental values self-controlled,
F (1, 137) 5 12.22, p 5 .006, b 5 .29, and polite, F (1, 137) 5 7.97,
p 5 .006, b 5 .23, and the terminal values a comfortable life,
F (1, 137) 5 9.49, p 5 .003, b 5 .25, and self-respect (self-esteem),
F (1, 137) 5 5.27, p 5 .02, b 5 .20. High integrity themes of honesty,
helpfulness, genuine feelings for others, and salvation run consistently through the data. Further, their lower ranking of a comfortable life and self-esteem may reflect a disdain those with higher
integrity have for materialism and self-absorption and/or a preference for these qualities in people who are more expedient. The relationships thus form converging patterns.
Social Desirability
Consistent with prior findings (Schlenker, 2007), integrity and social
desirability showed only a small, insignificant relationship (r 5 .14,
p 5 .08). Analyses that included social desirability revealed only one
main effect (i.e., those higher in social desirability rated their heroes
as more likeable on the closed-ended scales, p 5 .03) and no interactions that qualified any of the effects reported.
It is reasonable to ask why the relationship between integrity
scores and social desirability is not larger. Being principled is an inherently desirable quality, yet so is being flexible, adapting to circumstances, and taking care of oneself. During scale development,
attempts were made to reduce social desirability bias by selecting
items that presented expediency in a more palatable light (e.g., ‘‘Lying is sometimes necessary to accomplish important, worthwhile
goals’’) and pairing principled conduct with less desirable concepts
(e.g., ‘‘Being inflexible and refusing to compromise are good if it
means standing up for what is right’’). Although social desirability
bias probably can never be eliminated in self-report measures dealing
with principles and integrity, the small amount of shared variance
(usually less than 3%) suggests this attempt was at least somewhat
successful.
Discussion
Personal integrity predicted respondents’ heroes. Those higher in
integrity spontaneously described their heroes as more principled,
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
honest, spiritual, and benevolently oriented toward others. Further,
on closed-ended scales, they evaluated their main hero as more principled, authentic, spiritual (as compared to materialistic), and benevolent (as compared to selfish and egotistical). On qualities such as
likableness, similarity to oneself, and intelligence, which might be associated with any hero regardless of morality, there were no integrity
differences. The qualities that were differentially endorsed by those
with higher integrity—principled commitment, authenticity, beneficence toward others and non-self-absorption, and spirituality are
qualities that people associate with moral exemplars (Aquino & Reed,
2002; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001; Walker & Hennig, 2004) and that
people with high integrity are more likely to possess (Schlenker, 2007).
The strong preference for religious or spiritual heroes (e.g., the
Pope, a pastor, Jesus) by those higher in integrity probably reflects
several considerations. First, although the Integrity Scale does not
contain any items that refer to religion, integrity scores are positively
correlated with intrinsic religiosity (Schlenker, 2007). The association may be due to the fact that most religions emphasize adherence
to moral laws and personal integrity. Given religious convictions,
people may look to religion for their heroes. Second, religious figures
are generally regarded as exemplars of high integrity, so those for
whom moral exemplarity is a highly valued quality are likely to select
them as heroes.
Further, the category of religious heroes is the only one in which
the prototypic figure is likely to be seen as highly principled. Within
the category of family members, for example, some respondents may
have parents who are exemplars for morality whereas others may
not. Those high versus low in integrity select a parent with equal
frequency, but their choices may be based on different criteria, with
those high in integrity focusing on a parent’s morality and those low
in integrity focusing on a parent’s business success or nurturance.
The pattern of ratings is strongly consistent with such preferences.
For example, those higher in integrity rated their heroes as spiritual
rather than materialistic and tended to select fewer sports figures as
heroes. Sports heroes exemplify stellar personal achievement but are
often noted for materialistic excesses rather than moral excellence.
Study 2 will examine integrity differences in selection criteria by
manipulating the principled or expedient nature of a character’s
conduct, thereby testing directly whether those higher in integrity
show greater admiration for moral principles over expediency.
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What Makes a Hero?
STUDY 2
People high in integrity differ from lows in at least three important
ways: (1) they have a relatively coherent code or set of standards for
right and wrong to which they are personally committed, (2) these
standards are accessible in memory and a chronic input to their
choice considerations, and (3) they believe that these standards are
binding, so self-serving rationalizations are unacceptable as ways to
avoid the emotional (e.g., guilty, stress) and social (e.g., condemnation, disrespect) costs of violations. The fact that integrity predicted
people’s heroes suggests that those who are higher versus lower in
integrity use different criteria and standards to evaluate the actions
of others and to decide whom to admire. It is difficult to argue, given
these patterns, that those who differ in integrity merely perceive
different qualities in precisely the same person regardless of his or
her behavior. However, a stronger, more definitive test of whether
different criteria and standards are used is to manipulate the principled or expedient conduct of a character and then assess judgments. Such a test will also permit conclusions to be drawn about the
roles played by ethics versus outcomes during social judgment. If the
same patterns are found after controlling the principled or expedient
properties of the character’s behavior, then the converging data
would confirm the importance of the principled versus expedient dimension for social judgment and the important role that is played by
integrity in moderating the qualities people admire.
In Study 2, participants judged an individual who confronted an
ethical dilemma while pursuing an important career goal. This character had to chose between an unprincipled route that seemed to
boost in the chances of personal success and a principled route that
did not. It was hypothesized that integrity will be directly related to
the strength of the preference of principles over expediency. The
critical comparison—which directly contrasts principles and outcomes— will be between characters who take the ethical route and
fail versus those who take the unethical route and succeed. As compared to those higher in integrity, those lower will evaluate an unprincipled but successful character as more of a winner and as
savvier (more effective, intelligent), whereas an unsuccessful but ethical character will be seen as nice (likable) but ineffective (‘‘Nice guys
finish last’’), lacking the ‘‘street smarts’’ to realize that it is necessary
to bend the rules to be successful. In contrast, those higher in
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
integrity should more strongly admire a character who upholds high
moral standards, even if it means personal loss, and more strongly
disparage a character who violates ethical standards to accomplish
selfish goals.
Method
Participants
One hundred sixty-two students (115 females, 47 males) enrolled in a
journalism course at the University of Florida participated for extra
credit in their class. The average age of participants was 20.3 years
(SD 5 1.14), with a range of 18 to 24.
Scenario Booklet
The study was described as examining reactions to people who make
important decisions related to their careers. A short passage described a
situation faced by a decision maker, the decision that was made, and the
outcome that followed. Participants were asked to read and give careful
thought to the situation described in the booklet, and then answer the
questions that followed.
The scenarios described a situation in which the central character
could engage in unethical behavior and thereby increase the likelihood of
gaining a desirable career outcome. Participants were randomly assigned
to read one of three behavior-outcome combinations: (a) the central
character took the unethical route and succeeded, (b) the central character took the ethical route but failed, and (c) the central character took the
ethical route and succeeded. The critical comparison for examining integrity differences was between the ethical-failure condition and the unethical-success condition, because these pit a preference for principled
conduct against a preference for expediency. The ethical-success condition provided a relevant baseline for comparison to see how each group
shifted when compared to this optimally desirable behavior-outcome
combination. An unethical-failure combination was not included because
it was expected that this combination would be universally condemned
and would not distinguish those who score high versus low in integrity
(those high in integrity would condemn the unethical behavior and those
low in integrity would condemn the ineffectiveness). After reading the
scenario, participants were asked to evaluate the behavior, outcome, and
actor on 7-point attribute scales with labeled end points.
To increase generalizability, two scenarios were created and participants were randomly assigned to read one of them. One scenario described a businessman who is up for promotion to a desirable executive
What Makes a Hero?
341
position in his company, with attendant pay and status increases. The
promotion will go to either the central character or a rival about whom
the central character knows some personal gossip. Although the gossip is
irrelevant to the rival’s qualifications for the promotion, the central character knows that if the company’s board of directors learns the gossip, the
rival will probably be removed from consideration and the promotion will
go to the central character. The central character then decides either not
to spread the gossip, and then gets the position (ethical/success) or does
not (ethical/failure), or to spread the gossip and gets the position (unethical/success). Another scenario described a young actress in Hollywood who dreams of being a star. A more experienced actress suggested
that to get a break she will need to ‘‘sleep’’ with important people, such as
producers and directors, in the film business. The central character then
decides either to ignore this advice, and then becomes a star (ethical/success) or does not get any desirable roles (ethical/failure), or decides to
follow the advice and becomes a star (unethical/success). Although these
scenario types involve ethical decision making and important career
choices, they differ on a variety of dimensions (e.g., nature of the act,
type of career, sex of central character) and therefore provide a reasonable test of generalizability.1
Procedure
Participants completed (a) the Scenario Booklet, (b) a copy of the
Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2007), and (c) a short version of the Social
Desirability Scale (Reynolds, 1982).2 They took the materials home, were
asked to complete them in a quiet place where they would not be bothered
or distracted, and returned them at their next class. To ensure anonymity,
participants used a code name of their own choosing to identify their
questionnaires.
1. An attempt was made to manipulate the desirability of the goal (e.g., a promotion at a smaller company or a Fortune 500 company), but manipulation
checks indicated that the goal was seen comparably in both conditions (e.g., as
equally difficult to achieve). All analyses therefore collapsed across this variable.
2. Preliminary analyses included social desirability as a predictor along with integrity, event, sex, and their interactions. There were no main effects of social
desirability on any of the dependent variables and fewer interactions than would
be expected by chance, with no consistent or interesting patterns and no qualifications of any of the reported effects. As in Study 1, social desirability did not aid
in interpreting the results. Social desirability scores again showed only a small
relationship with integrity (r 5 .16, p 5 .04), accounting for 2.6% of the common
variance.
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
Dependent Measures
Participants evaluated the central character and the event on bipolar
scales (1 to 7 with labeled endpoints). Evaluations of the central character
were averaged into the categories used in Study 1. These included assessments of the extent to which the central character was principled (Cronbach’s a 5 .95; 7 items, e.g., principled, high integrity, moral, honest,
trustworthy); authentic (a 5 .92; 4 items, e.g., true to own self, follows
own conscience); beneficent (a 5 .88; 4 items, e.g., cares for others, altruistic, generous); likable (a 5 .88; 4 items, e.g., likable, would want as a
friend); intelligent (a 5 .85; 4 items, e.g., wise, knowledgeable, street
smart); and effective (a 5 .90; 9 items, e.g., effective, persevering, determined, successful, strong, powerful). Also as in Study 1, two items assessed the extent to which the central character was judged to be spiritual
and similar to oneself. In addition, items assessed the character’s retrospective reactions looking back on the decision (a 5 .89; 5 items: e.g.,
pleased, proud, satisfied). As checks of the ethical event manipulations,
respondents evaluated the valence of the outcome for the central character’s career-related goals (a 5 .94; 3 items: good, desirable, a dream) and
the ethicality of the decision (a 5 .90; 2 items: moral, good).
We expected that those higher in integrity would show more admiration for the ethical-failure, and more condemnation of the unethicalsuccess, than those lower in integrity. Those low as compared to high in
integrity would regard the unethical-success as more effective, intelligent,
likable and even moral and the ethical-failure as less effective, intelligent,
and likable. By including the different categories, we could discover if
effects generalized or were related only to specific dimensions (e.g., morality or effectiveness, which correspond to the ethics and consequences of
the manipulations).
Results
Analyses
There were no effects of the scenario event on integrity scores, so
integrity (M 5 64.9, SD 5 9.3) was used as a predictor in the major
analyses. Females scored higher than males, F (1, 158) 5 10.63,
p 5 .001, Z2 5 .06 (Ms 5 66.5 and 61.1, SDs 5 8.2 and 10.6). Analyses were conducted using the SAS GLM procedure; the predictors
in the model were integrity (continuous, centered variable), ethical
event (three levels: ethical decision and successful outcome, ethical
decision and unsuccessful outcome, and unethical decision and
successful outcome), sex of respondent (effects coded), and all
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What Makes a Hero?
Table 4
Study 2: Integrity by Event Interactions on Evaluations
Act Main Effect
Integrity by
Act Interaction
Interaction
Contrast of
Integrity by
Ethical Failure/
Unethical
Success
Dependent Variable
F
p
F
p
F
p
Principled
Authentic
Beneficent
Likable
Effective
Intelligent
Spiritual
Similar to self
Characters’
retrospective
reactions
Ethical evaluations
of the act
263.83
80.23
86.17
60.99
32.49
46.18
97.31
83.53
o.0001
o.0001
o.0001
o.0001
o.0001
o.0001
o.0001
o.0001
16.52
3.28
5.60
13.02
5.53
3.95
8.83
13.70
o.0001
.04
.005
o.0001
.005
.02
.0002
o.0001
29.05
6.40
6.60
19.62
7.29
3.80
4.12
16.40
o.0001
.01
.01
o.0001
.008
.05
.04
o.0001
59.83
o.0001
4.23
.02
8.29
.005
374.04
o.0001
10.58
20.61
.0001
.0001
Note: Tests of overall effects have 2 and 150 df except for spiritual (2, 148) and
similar (2, 148); interaction contrasts of integrity by ethical failure/unethical success
have 1 and 150 df except for spiritual (1, 148) and similar (1, 148).
interactions. The same significant overall effects and patterns described shortly were obtained if integrity was entered as a dichotomous variable (median split). None of the reported effects were
qualified by sex.
The major dependent measures are presented in Tables 4 and 5,
which show F and p values for effects and GLM estimates of condition values, respectively. High and low levels of integrity were
defined as 1 SD above and below the mean (see Cohen, Cohen, West,
& Aiken, 2003). Initial analyses also included scenario type (businessman or actress) and its interactions. The major results were not
qualified by scenario type, so it was dropped.
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
Table 5
Study 2: Integrity by Event Interactions on Evaluations
Event Means
Dependent Measure and
Integrity Level
Ethical Act/
Failure
Principled
Low integrity
High integrity
Authentic
Low integrity
High integrity
Beneficent
Low integrity
High integrity
Likable
Low integrity
High integrity
Effective
Low integrity
High integrity
Intelligent
Low integrity
High integrity
Spiritual (vs. Materialistic)
Low integrity
High integrity
Similar to Self
Low integrity
High integrity
Characters’ Retrospective
Reactions
Low integrity
High integrity
Ethical Evaluations of the Act
Low integrity
High integrity
Unethical Act/
Success
Ethical Act/
Success
5.54a
6.30b
2.95
1.98
5.93ac
6.30bc
5.44a
6.29b
3.26d
2.91d
6.00ac
6.29bc
5.17ad
5.53bd
3.11
2.37
5.17ac
5.77bc
4.69
5.71a
3.75
2.90
5.44
6.41a
5.14
5.80
4.54a
4.16a
5.77
6.56
5.14ad
5.47bd
3.75
3.21
5.45ac
6.18bc
4.50ab
4.61b
2.20
1.43
4.32a
5.48
4.98ac
5.72ab
2.89
1.54
4.95c
6.14b
4.22c
5.00a
4.24bc
3.80b
6.66a
6.85a
6.11
6.76b
2.60
1.73
6.78a
6.77ab
Note: Integrity was entered in the analyses as a centered, continuous variable.
Numbers represent GLM estimates of the values of the low ( 1 SD) and high (11
SD) integrity within each of the ethical event conditions. Means without a common
letter subscript differ significantly, po.05. Differences between high and low levels
of integrity were based on tests of simple slopes. Within rows, differences between
ethical events within low and high levels of integrity were based on tests of planned
contrasts.
What Makes a Hero?
345
Manipulation Checks
The outcome and ethicality manipulations were successful. Only a
main effect of condition was found on ratings of success in accomplishing career-related goals, F (2, 150) 5 67.71, po.0001 (Ms 5
2.94, 5.84, and 6.48 for the ethical-failure, unethical-success, and
ethical-success conditions; each success condition differed significantly from the failure condition, pso.001, and marginally from one
another, p 5 .06, as the unethical nature of a success may have tarnished the outcome). A main effect of condition and an interaction
of integrity and condition were found on the ethicality of the conduct
(Table 4). The conduct was seen as unethical when it involved unethical-success (M 5 2.17) and ethical when it involved either an
ethical-failure or ethical-success (Ms 5 6.44 and 6.77, respectively;
both differ from the unethical-success condition but not from one
another). Those high in integrity evaluated the ethical-success and
ethical-failure equally positively without regard to consequences,
whereas those low in integrity took consequences into account and
preferred the ethical-success to the ethical-failure (Table 5). Those
high in integrity also were more negative toward the unethical-success and more positive toward the ethical-failure than those low in
integrity.
Evaluations of the Central Character
Consistent patterns emerged on evaluations of the central character.
Overall, the central character was evaluated more positively after an
ethical act that failed than an unethical success, but this distinction
was more pronounced for respondents high rather than low in integrity. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the interaction of integrity by
event, and more specifically the key interaction contrast of integrity
by ethical-failure/unethical-success, was significant on all evaluative
ratings. Those higher in integrity showed a stronger preference for an
ethical act that failed over an unethical one that succeeded.
Comparisons of the ethical-success and ethical-failure conditions
provide another way of gauging the impact of the consequences of
the decision on judgments. Those high in integrity generally rated the
central character comparably regardless of whether an ethical act
produced a success or failure. For those high in integrity, the two
ethical-outcome conditions did not differ significantly on any of the
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
evaluative dimensions except effectiveness and materialism; the
latter realistically acknowledged the success. In contrast, those low
in integrity found the successful ethical character more likable and
effective than the unsuccessful ethical character and also evaluated
the conduct itself as ethically better. These patterns support the hypothesis that those high in integrity will emphasize the adherence to
principles and largely ignore the consequences of the act, while those
low in integrity take consequences more into account. When ethics
and outcomes conflict, those high in integrity expressed preferences
that primarily reflected ethics whereas those low in integrity reflected
a mix of ethics and expediency.
In the context of an unethical success, being true to self may reflect
getting what one wants regardless of the means, and this should be
an example of a situation in which principles and authenticity diverge. In support, correlations between ratings of the characters’
commitment to principles and authenticity were insignificant in the
unethical-failure condition (r 5 .17, p 5 .21) but were quite significant in the ethical-success and ethical-failure conditions (rs 5 .62 and
.68, respectively, pso.0001; the latter correlations differ significantly
from the former, pso.001). Although principles and authenticity
often go together, they become dissociated when people pursue
personal goals that conflict with ethical principles.
Retrospective Reactions of the Central Character
Participants projected their personal evaluations of the conduct onto
the characters. Those high in integrity believed that when the central
characters looked back on the decision, they would be more satisfied
with the ethical-failure than the unethical-success conditions, whereas those low in integrity believed the character would be equally
satisfied regardless (see Tables 4 and 5).
Discussion
When conduct was both ethical and successful, people usually
evaluated it similarly regardless of their own level of integrity, at
least on measures most relevant to morals. However, when principles
and outcomes were opposed, those higher in integrity were guided by
principles regardless of the outcome. Those lower in integrity were
consistently influenced by the outcome, showing less condemnation
of an unethical act that succeeded, less praise for an ethical act that
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What Makes a Hero?
failed, and a smaller distinction between unethical-success and
ethical-failure conditions as compared to those higher in integrity.
These patterns show that integrity is not simply associated with more
or less favorable evaluations across the board. Instead, when actions
are relevant to ethical decision making, those higher in integrity are
more admiring of those who behave ethically and more condemning
of those who behave unethically regardless the outcome.
People who score lower on the Integrity Scale do not regard
themselves as unprincipled or unscrupulous (Miller & Schlenker,
2007; Schlenker, 2007). Instead, they describe themselves as generally principled but are readily able to provide self-serving rationalizations for violating ethical and legal codes. They are willing to
excuse and justify a wider range of unethical and illegal behavior
(e.g., lying, stealing, cheating on one’s taxes or one’s spouse) to deflect morally the blame for transgressions from themselves and to
cheat to perform well on a test even when there are no obvious incentives for so doing (Schlenker, 2007). In short, they lack the degree
of commitment to ethical principles, with its attendant rejection of
deviations and rationalizations, shown by those who score higher. In
Study 2, those low in integrity did not disregard ethics because they
generally preferred an ethical act that failed to an unethical one that
succeeded; they were just more willing to allow expediency to play a
role in their assessments.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
People’s ethical ideologies play an important role in self-regulation.
People who profess greater commitment to ethical principles have a
more stringent set of standards for right and wrong, chronically access this information in memory and use it in their choices, and believe that these standards are binding, and so excuses and
justifications become unacceptable ways to avoid the negative repercussions of transgressions. The present findings show that integrity successfully predicts the selection of heroes and the judgment of
others who resolve ethical dilemmas by taking the principled versus
expedient road. These results add to a growing list of studies documenting integrity’s usefulness in predicting behaviors that are
considered virtues and vices.
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Schlenker, Weigold, & Schlenker
Ethical ideologies and heroes go hand in hand and probably
reciprocally influence each other. The heroes people admire can
affect their own ethical ideologies, as people identify with their heroes’ perceived personal qualities and try to emulate their conduct.
As models, heroes play important roles in the development of attitudes and identity. Social learning theory (Bandura, 1986) and socioanalytic theory (Hogan, 1982) document the importance of
significant reference others for forming attitudes and self-schemas.
Lickona (2004) argued that the development of character is accomplished through positive models who value and exemplify integrity,
responsibility, self-discipline, and other-oriented virtues such as respect, compassion, and cooperation. Consistent with these lines of
theory and research, one of the stronger predictors of helping in the
real world is having a parent who served as a model for altruism and
instilled the value of doing the right thing (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
Concomitantly, once ethical ideologies form, they influence the
subsequent selection of new heroes and reactions to old ones. We
hypothesize that people will add or even change heroes based on
whether those heroes live up to their standards. A national survey of
adults indicated that 25% of Americans had dropped someone from
their list of heroes because of that individual’s unethical conduct and
self-absorption (Harris Poll, 2001). For those higher in integrity,
qualities related to integrity should be vital for admiring someone as
a hero.
The concept of principled commitment, as assessed via the Integrity
Scale, converges with the existing literature on moral identity.
Beginning with Blasi’s (1980, 1983) seminal writings, theorists have
focused on moral identity as a link between moral beliefs and
behavior (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Lapsley &
Lasky, 2001). In contrast to earlier cognitive development models
that focused on moral reasoning as a determinant of moral behavior
(Kohlberg, 1969), these approaches emphasize the internalization of
moral goals, codes, and traits into the self-concept. Damon and Hart
(1992) proposed, ‘‘there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to
believe that the centrality of morality to self may be the single most
powerful determiner of concordance between moral judgment and
conduct’’ (p. 455). Hardy and Carlo (2005) reviewed evidence suggesting that people who are highly committed to moral causes are
more likely to describe themselves in moral terms, to regard moral
values as more important to their sense of self, to have greater
What Makes a Hero?
349
alignment between their personal (self) goals and moral goals, and to
engage in moral behavior.
Broadly, commitment reflects a pledging or binding of the self to
something else, such as a goal (e.g., get a college degree), a set of
ideas (e.g., a political policy or ideology), another person (e.g., a
marriage partner), or a group (e.g., an organization). To say that
people have a commitment means they have selected a particular set
of prescriptions to follow and these prescriptions can be used to
evaluate and sanction their conduct, both by themselves and others
who are aware of the commitment. At the same time, they have rejected or downgraded alternative prescriptions that accomplish
different goals, take them along different paths, and offer justifications for their different conduct.
The psychological impact of a moral commitment should be
similar to the impact of commitment on other attitudes and identity images. Commitment crystallizes and strengthens corresponding
attitudes, making them more accessible in memory, resistant to subsequent change, and likely to guide future behavior (Kiesler, 1971;
Schlenker, Dlugolecki, & Doherty, 1994; Scholl, 1981). Once people
claim to ‘‘be’’ a particular type of person with specific beliefs, they
have an obligation to behave commensurately. The socialization
process continually emphasizes that people must be who they claim
to be or risk serious interpersonal repercussions.
This view of commitment can be placed in the broader context of
the triangle model of responsibility, which was developed to explain
when and why the self-system becomes engaged by tasks, as well as
how it can be disengaged from undesired events through a variety of
strategic activities and accounts such as excuses and justifications
(Schlenker, 1997; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty,
1994; Schlenker et al., 2001; Schlenker, Weigold, & Doherty, 1991).
According to the triangle model, the self-system becomes engaged
when (a) a clear, well-defined set of prescriptions is seen as applicable
in the situation (prescription clarity), (b) the actor is perceived to be
bound by the prescriptions (personal commitment), and (c) the actor
appears to have control over relevant events (personal control). It can
be disengaged when confronting undesirable events by attenuating
one or more of the three elements (e.g., claiming unclear or conflicting prescriptions, claiming not to be bound by the specific prescriptions, claiming external control of outcomes), with weaker elements
reduced first.
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Despite different conceptual origins, this view of commitment
complements analyses of moral identity and moral development
(Blasi, 1980, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1992; Hardy & Carlo, 2005).
Colby and Damon (1992), for example, argue that self-goals and
moral goals become fused during the development of moral identity,
such that moral exemplars regard ethical conduct as expressing identity rather than following external moral rules. For those with high
integrity, there is a strong linkage between identity and the moral
prescriptions, and it is implied that the prescriptions are generally
clear and well defined. The triangle model adds the element of perceived personal control to bring about the desired moral outcomes
and additional specific hypotheses about self-engagement and
disengagement.
The concept of principled commitment is also germane to the
organizational behavior literature. Honesty testing, usually called
integrity testing, focuses on identifying attitudes and personality
characteristics that predict desirable employee conduct. Organizational researchers have identified measures that predict undesirable
job behaviors (e.g., theft, disciplinary actions, absenteeism), good
organizational citizenship, and job performance (Ones, Viswesvaran,
& Schmidt, 1993; Sackett & Wanek, 1996). These include self-reports
of honesty, past inappropriate conduct (e.g., stealing), and attitudes
that justify theft, as well as personality traits relating to the Big Five
clusters of conscientiousness and agreeableness. Although a review is
beyond the scope of the present article, this research tradition converges on qualities related to moral identity and principled commitment. The Integrity Scale may be able to contribute to theory and
research in this tradition because it predicts a range of pro-social and
antisocial activities and, unlike some of the scales currently used
(Sackett & Wanek, 1996), it is not proprietary, is short and can be
readily incorporated into research, is not context bound for use only
in the workplace, and is not as highly correlated with measures of
social desirability.
The idea of principled versus expedient ideologies also brings to
mind research on self-monitoring and the principled versus pragmatic self. Snyder (1987) proposed that high self-monitors are pragmatic in their interpersonal orientation, being willing and able to
modify their behavior to obtain social rewards, whereas low selfmonitors are principled, displaying greater consistency between their
attitudes and behaviors. The self-monitoring scale consists of
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What Makes a Hero?
components that assess self-reported public performing, e.g., acting
ability, and other directedness, e.g., being different things to different
people (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). The former dimension is irrelevant to ethical ideology, and the latter dimension is conceptually
closer to authenticity (being true to self) than to integrity (being
committed to moral principles). Indeed, items that assess self-monitoring are generally neutral with respect to morality. Interestingly, it
has been suggested that low self-monitors want to establish identities
as people who are genuine and act on their beliefs (Gangestad &
Snyder, 2000; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990); this goal may contribute
to some convergence between constructs. As might be expected,
then, self-monitoring and integrity scores show a significant but
modest negative relationship, r (164) 5 .22, p 5 .004 (Schlenker,
2007).
In conclusion, individual differences in integrity are related to
how people perceive and respond to ethical dilemmas. Study 1 established the association between integrity and heroes. Study 2
showed that integrity predicted evaluations of characters who behaved in ethically admirable or condemnable ways. Those high in
integrity prefer evidence of doing the right thing even if it means
failure in a materialistic sense, whereas those low in integrity are
more torn between the right thing and the successful thing. Penn
State football coach Joe Paterno stated, ‘‘Success without honor is
an unseasoned dish. It will satisfy your hunger, but it won’t taste
good.’’ Paterno appears to be more correct when describing those of
higher integrity; the unseasoned dish seems to taste better for those
of lower integrity.
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APPENDIX
Items in the Integrity Scale
1 It is foolish to tell the truth when big profits can be made by lying.
(R)
2 No matter how much money one makes, life is unsatisfactory without a strong sense of duty and character.
3 Regardless of concerns about principles, in today’s world you have
to be practical, adapt to opportunities, and do what is most advantageous for you. (R)
4 Being inflexible and refusing to compromise are good if it means
standing up for what is right.
5 The reason it is important to tell the truth is because of what others
will do to you if you don’t, not because of any issue of right and
wrong. (R)
6 The true test of character is a willingness to stand by one’s principles, no matter what price one has to pay.
7 There are no principles worth dying for. (R)
8 It is important to me to feel that I have not compromised my
principles.
9 If one believes something is right, one must stand by it, even if it
means losing friends or missing out on profitable opportunities.
10 Compromising one’s principles is always wrong, regardless of the
circumstances or the amount that can be personally gained.
(Continued)
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APPENDIX (CONT.)
11 Universal ethical principles exist and should be applied under all
circumstances, with no exceptions.
12 Lying is sometimes necessary to accomplish important, worthwhile
goals. (R)
13 Integrity is more important than financial gain.
14 It is important to fulfill one’s obligations at all times, even when
nobody will know if one doesn’t.
15 If done for the right reasons, even lying or cheating is OK. (R)
16 Some actions are wrong no matter what the consequences or
justification.
17 One’s principles should not be compromised regardless of the
possible gain.
18 Some transgressions are wrong and cannot be legitimately justified
or defended regardless of how much one tries.
Note: Respondents are asked to read each of the statements and indicate the extent
of their agreement or disagreement where 1 5 strongly disagree, 2 5 disagree, 3 5 neither disagree nor agree, 4 5 agree, and 5 5 strongly agree. Items marked (R) are reverse scored. Integrity Scale r Barry R. Schlenker, 2006.
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