Module 3 Chapter Outline and Summary: Chapter Five Intergovernmental Relations, Program and Policies Important Advice to Students: This notes and chapter outline is a summary of the chapters in your textbook to get you started while you await your textbook. The notes SHOULD NOT be in any way considered a substitute to your textbook. The textbook, (Public Administration: Concepts and Cases) offers the detailed information and discussion necessary for the proper understanding of the concepts and topics under discussion. Therefore, treat this as a skeletal sketch, for which the textbook offers the full body of the discussion on the topics. Chapter Summary The chapter examines the origin, structure, and nature of intergovernmental relations in the US and the role of public administrators. It compares the relationship between federalism and intergovernmental relations and discusses the different types of federalism, the new trend of federalism and how it relates to the intergovernmental relations. The chapter also explains the concept of opportunist federalism, the management of intergovernmental, the new trend in the management, and how the changes in trend impact the role of public administrators. Chapter Outline and Lecture Notes The nature of US government Unlike other unitary forms of government which allows little or no semiautonomous local units of government, the US government is framed on the idea of federalism and the structure of government, as designed by the Constitution, distributes authority among the various levels of government (federal, state, and local). The nature of the US federalism was facilitated by several factors such as the desire to attract the states to ratify the Republican Constitution and be part of the federal government, the memories of the harsh rule from the top-down unitary government of George III’s monarchy, and the loose nature of the extreme decentralization of the Articles of Confederation. Even though federalism is the central idea of the US Constitution, the precise role of the various units and levels of government are not clearly indicated in the Constitution beyond the items listed in Article I, Section 8. Public administrators in the US therefore work in an unusual, complex framework in which various jurisdictions, levels, units of governments share power and authority over agency and programs activities. The scattering and sharing of authority sometimes generates administrative problems, which extends to the study of intergovernmental relations (IGR). IGR involves comprehending the complexities of the federal system based on mutual interdependence, shared functions, and intertwined influence. Thus, federalism in the US confounds and confuses public administrators’ role and responsibilities to an extreme degree but fail to provide a clear picture of which level of government or unit is the boss. Cooperative Federalism According to Conlan, a professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, Cooperative federalism was epitomized by the ideas embodied in the 1955 Commission on Intergovernmental Relation Report (the Kestnbaum Report, named after Meyer Kestnbaum, the chair of the committee). The Report stressed effective intergovernmental management and coordination as the cornerstone for sound IGR practices. The recommendation of the Report led to the creation of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations for promoting better information, analysis, and coordination of IGR throughout the federal system; the establishment of an office within the Executive Office of the President to improve cooperation among executive branch agencies involved with IGR; the formation of subcommittee in both the House and Senate to oversee IGR processes; and the development of broader use of federal categorical grants-in-aid for strengthening overall administrative direction and control. Conlan traces the rise and unraveling of the cooperative federalism paradigm and conceptualizes the way that federalism and IGR operate nowadays as “opportunistic federalism”. Opportunist Federalism Opportunist is a system that allows- and often encourages actors in the system to pursue their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective consequences. For example, the federal mandates, policy preemptions, and highly prescriptive mandates tend to be driven by opportunistic policy makers who seek to achieve their own policy and policy goals regardless of traditional norm of behavior or boundaries of institutional responsibility. States also behave in a similar way towards local governments and both the states and local governments exhibits opportunistic behavior when they direct federal programs away from their intended purpose to serve their parochial interests. Opportunist federalism that places individual political and jurisdictional interest above shared goals has been on the increase to replace cooperative federalism as it diminishes. Intergovernmental Management and Performance Management The US government has seen a lot reform since the 1950s and in the area of Public Administration, the focus of reform has been on simplifying and coordinating grants. Many different methods to improve grants coordination were examined when the grants program flourished and coordination became difficult. The Budget of Bureau and the Office of Management and Budget issued management circulars mandating elected officials to receive notice about the offer of grants to their jurisdictions and also to establish area-wide clearing house for grant information. The use of block grants and increased use of waiver authority, etc were also tried. In addition, other reform of grant management focused on standardization and simplification, which was done through the Single Audit Act, Circular A-133 (on common auditing standards), and OMB Circular A87 (on cost principle sought to standardize requirements for grant recipients. However, the ascendant paradigm in intergovernmental relations and public administration is performance management and was one of the reforms President Clinton’s reinventing government established. It was also the core feature of President George Bush’s management agenda. Congress in recent times has also expressed interest in outcome and results especially in the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993. The adoption of the performance management system at the national level gives a lot of weight to the agenda. From Intergovernmental Analysis to Instrumental Advocacy The network of federal offices and agencies that were established to improve and rationalize intergovernmental management has been diminished, disbanded, or transformed into instrument of advocacy since the 1970s. Therefore, the tools and processes of intergovernmental analysis, coordination and consultation have fallen by the wayside. At the same time, congressional attention to the issues of intergovernmental relations and public administration has eroded as intergovernmental subcommittees have diminished in stature. The ACIR program, which was a major source of data, policy analysis, and the intergovernmental management expertise in the federal government, has been abolished. From Fiscal Deference to Federal Disregard The intergovernmental tax coordination in the federal system for both sources of tax and tax base recommended by the Kestnbaum Commission has also diminished over time. The Commission recognized the value of having different levels of government focus on different sources of tax revenue (income, sales, and property) and it recommended the coordination of tax bases and tax administration where there was overlap. It also endorsed a policy of federal restraint in taxation, demonstrated by deductibility of states and local taxes on federal income taxes and the exclusion of interest on state and local bonds. In addition, Coopearative federalism was also manifested in efforts to reconcile the valuation of assets for federal and state income tax purposes, state piggybacking of the federal income tax system, and coordination of estate taxes. However, all these have diminished over time and the federal policy makers do not consider how federal tax policy changes affect state or local governments. Causes of Changes The causes of change in the approaches to intergovernmental relations and management are many and complex and they include significant changes in the nature of our society and the structure of our economy; changes in the political system, both organizationally and ideologically; and increased polarization in American politics. The impact of social and economic changes can be seen in the growth of federal mandates and preemptions, many of which include civil rights and environmental protection regulations like Title VI of Civil Right Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and others. The civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s and the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the development of such laws and to the more expansive federal role. The expansive role was a necessary response to the long and sorry legacy of racial discrimination and the problems of cross-border pollution blazed a trail for a more assertive style of intergovernmental relations across the board. Similarly, economic changes have contributed to the accumulation of federal preemption statutes. In addition, the sharp increase in partisan and ideological polarization in American politics since 1970s has great implication for intergovernmental management and in Congress; this manifested itself in the decline in the number and influence of ideological partisanship. Implications for Intergovernmental Management: Hopeful Signs and Continuing Challenges In spite of the opportunistic federalism, a variety of developments hold promise for intergovernmental management. These include progress in rebuilding support for intergovernmental analysis, effort to meld intergovernmental flexibility with performance management, emerging paradigms of public administration that recognize the centrality of intergovernmental relations, and bottom –up efforts to new arenas of intergovernmental cooperation. At the same time the powerful political currents that have contributed to opportunistic federalism have not vanished and national policy makers continue to face strong incentives to embrace federal forbearance. Cooperative State Policy Making The continuing level of policy innovation by state government is the most positive signs of the health of American federalism. Such innovation has long been recognized within individual states- in policy fields as diverse as health care, welfare reform, and environmental policy – but it is also apparent in patterns of regional and national interstate cooperation. One such cooperative venture was the states’ efforts to forge a common sales tax system for the internet age and the collaboration to adopt common sales and use tax system for remote vendors, negotiating uniform definitions of taxable items, common tax rates, and simplified administration. In modern times, the intergovernmental relations in the US have changed significantly since the Kestnbaum Commission. There has been the expansion of vertical relationships and opportunistic federalism and less cooperation among the levels of government. In spite of that there have been signs of a period of relative disinterest and deinstitutionalization in the intergovernmental management and analysis at the national level, which being addressed. Reference: Stillman II, Richard J (2010) Public Administration: Concepts and Cases Ninth Edition Wadsworth: Cengage Learning Stillman II, Richard J (2010) Instructional Manual for Public Administration: Concepts and Cases. 
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