University of Delaware
Disaster Research Center
Preliminary Paper
#254
THE DISASTER RESEARCH CENTER (DRC)
FIELD STUDIES OF ORGANIZED BEHAVIOR
IN THE CRISIS TIME PERIOD OF
DISASTERS
E. L. Quarantelli
1997
The Disaster Research Center (DRC) Field Studies
of Organized Behavior in the
Crisis Time Period of Disasters
E. L. Quarantelli
This chapter discusses the methodology of the field research undertaken by the Disaster
Research Center (DRC) between its formation in 1963 to 1989. During that time DRC
conducted more than 450 field studies of community crises, the great bulk of them involving
natural or technological disaster agents. The major focus was on organized behavior whether in
formal organizations or informal and emergent groups, and usually about the social entities
involved in the preparedness and response activities in the crisis. After noting the background
context within which the Center operated, this chapter summarizes the general methodological
approach taken. It depicts the substantial attention DRC paid to the prefield training that was
given to the graduate students who did most of the field work. Also described are the in-field
procedures followed, particularly the open-ended type of interviewing conducted, the kinds of
participant observations made and the systematic document collecting that was done. We also
note certain post-field procedures systematized by the Center to measure the quantity and to
insure the quality of the gathered data. In the conclusion, we suggest four general implications
or lessons for other researchers who might want to follow the DRC model.
INTRODUCTION
DRC since its inception 35 years ago to the present time has used most social science
methodologies in its data gathering activities. Even in the first decade or so of its operations,
these included as examples, laboratory studies of simulated police department radio dispatching
rooms (Drabek 1970); participant observations of civil disturbance situations (Ponting,
Fitzpatrick and Quarantelli 1974), content analyses of disaster films (Quarantelli 1980), and
traditional population surveys of impacted communities (in the 1972 Wilkes Barre flood and the
1974 Xenia tornado; see Taylor, Ross and Quarantelli 1976).
Likewise, different units of
analysis have been utilized as well as different time periods of disasters. Thus, the Center has
looked at the full range from the micro, the individual, to the macro, the nation state or society.
There have been studies, but not equally, of the mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
aspects of disasters.
However, our intent here is to depict only what was the major although not exclusive field
research methodology of the Center from 1963 through 1989. In that time, the primary focus
was on organized behavior in the emergency/crisis periods of disasters (the latter being what is
currently known as the later preparedness and early response phases of disasters). Organized
behavior included not only formal organizations but also informal and emergent groups.
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The focus on organized behavior was a very conscious one. It is impossible in this
chapter to detail the complex of theoretical, professional and practical reasons for the choice.
Suffice it to say here that a major reason was that while the earliest studies in the area had
already established the parameters of the behavior of individuals in crises (see Quarantelli 1988),
almost nothing was known about group behavior. Also, field studies of persons undertaken
during the actual crisis times of disasters always have difficult sampling problems with an
unknown universe of participants, whereas the universe of most organized groups in a
community is known and finite (e.g., typically there is only one fire and police department, a
handful of mass media outlets and hospitals, etc.). Finally, even in the pioneering days of
disaster research it was evident that the most effective and efficient planning and managing
measures for responses during crises would have to be primarily carried out by organizations and
could not be done by individual households.
The basic model DRC employed was set early. It was initially drawn from the pioneering
field operations of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) in its 1949-1954 research on
disasters (see, Quarantelli 1987; 1988). However, also influential was the research focus on
organizations per se for which conventional survey methods during actual crisis times were not
appropriate or difficult. There were minor refinements and augmentations over the years. In the
main what we depict is the later rather than the earlier versions of the procedures. Also what is
set forth, using a Russell Dynes characterization, is the "generic" version rather than all the
variants used in the different research projects DRC undertook. Finally, while we generally
depict what was intended to happen, we do note difficulties in achieving what was wanted or
planned with relation to specific matters and near the end of the chapter indicate some
problematical aspects of the whole enterprise.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
The possibilities and problems inherent in the kind of field work DRC undertook requires
understanding the general context within which it operated. This is not the place for a history of
the Center, but we note selective aspects since they affected the research planned and done.
From its inception, DRC was administratively nested in and informally part of a department
of sociology. However, the Center for most of its existence never had any funding from any
university source, thus making organizational control by other entities over its operations mostly
nominal. Except in very recent years, funds for all DRC activities were from the research grants
and contracts it obtained on its own. In the early years most funding came from the predecessors
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (e.g., the Office of Civil Defense--OCD), but that was increasingly replaced in later years by grants from the National Science
Foundation (NSF). While the support from OCD came through contracts, the initial relationship
that quickly evolved soon allowed DRC, within very broad limits, to do what research it wanted
in whatever way it thought best. Overall, DRC had more freedom in its operations than many
centers or institutes typically have, a professional advantage the Center used in the studies it
independently launched, as illustrated later.
2
As an organization, DRC was never systematically planned or even formally created. The
Center was never a formal part of the Ohio State University. In many sense, it was an emergent
group with decisions on group structures and functions forced by situational contingencies.
Thus, its evolution had neither the advantages nor the disadvantages of a structured path. But
implicitly at least, DRC from the start was thought of by its founders as primarily a social
science research entity. It was never visualized as having teaching functions, providing any
formal training or having a consultative role; and as a group no such activities were ever
undertaken. Nevertheless, the sharp focus on research did lead to several auxiliary activities that
eventually were important in the Center's history, namely the systematic creation of an archive of
its own field data, the establishment of the largest specialized library in the world on the human
and social aspects of disasters, as well as the development of its own publication program.
From a research perspective, DRC from its inception looked at all kinds of "disasters." The
natural versus technological disaster distinction was ignored in its work (contrary to some
statements others have made about its focus), although sometimes particular projects because of
their funding source focused on a particular kind of disaster rather than another (e.g., the DRC
pioneering study of chemical disasters in the early 1980s, see Quarantelli 1984). As an
indication of its generic approach, the first ten events studied were a hurricane in Texas, the
overflow of a dam in Italy, the Coliseum explosion in Indianapolis, a nuclear plant accident near
San Antonio, a nursing home fire in northern Ohio, the dam break in Baldwin Hills California, a
plant explosion in Massachusetts, a flood in Cincinnati, and the Alaskan earthquake, and also a
student civil disturbance in Columbus, Ohio. Also, as just said, DRC sometime studied civil
disturbance and riot occasions (Warheit and Quarantelli 1969), mostly for comparative purposes
since it was assumed such conflict type episodes are somewhat substantively different from
natural and technological disaster occasions. While DRC found it could use the generic field
research methodology in all its work, conflict situations did require adjustments that however are
not discussed in this chapter.
The quantity of field work done also partly dictated the need for a standardized field
procedure. From 1963 to 1984 while DRC was at Ohio State University, it undertook 457
different field studies (in about a third of the cases this involved more than one actual trip to the
site). In several years, field trips were quite numerous, there being 55 different field studies in
1969 alone, 51 in 1972, 50 in 1982, and 46 in 1979. Only in two years did the number of field
studies drop below the double digit. As such, it was not rare to have two different teams in the
field simultaneously, and occasionally three teams were concurrently in the field.
The great majority of work was done in the United States. However, 18 field studies were
done between 1963-1973 in 11 foreign countries (five times in Canada, three times in Italy,
twice in Japan, and once each in Mexico, Chile, Greece, El Salvador, Australia, Iran, Curacao
and Yugoslavia). These foreign studies mostly ended with the emergence of native disaster
researchers in many places.
The actual field work especially after the first few years, was done by graduate students.
Depending on the research funding available, these at any given time numbered between four
and fifteen (the total DRC personnel once peaked at 59 staff members, but two dozen was the
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more typical work force). These students appointed as research assistants (GRAs) were mostly
drawn from sociology but in later years were also selected from other areas (e.g., political
science, journalism, anthropology, nursing, etc.). In principle they were employed only on a half
time basis (20 hours per week), but the informal understanding was that there was no limit in
doing field work. While major efforts were made not to disrupt class attendance and
examination taking, it was nonetheless an unambiguous stipulation for employment that all
GRAs had to be available for field work on any day at any time of the year, university holidays
and vacations to the contrary. In part this was related to the fact that DRC never employed
GRAs for a specialized work role (e.g., field interviewer, coder, or any other specific task).
Instead, it was an explicit condition of employment that all would work on all research aspects
ranging from the designing of the field work through data gathering to data processing to data
analysis and initial report writing. It was also assumed that GRAs would work on all research
projects in being during their employment (usually two or three, in rare instances, more).
Most Center funding was for specific research topics. As an example, DRC once had a fiveyear contract with OCD to study the major community organizations involved in disasters; under
this, particular studies were done of local emergency management agencies, police and fire
departments, hospitals and related entities, the public utilities, and the Red Cross. DRC also
specifically studied the delivery of mental health services under a grant from the National
Institute of Mental Health, and the delivery of emergency medical services through a Health
Resources Administration grant.
In addition, DRC at times was funded to study very general topics such as "community
coordination" or "organizational functioning," labels deliberately vague but which allowed the
Center to venture into different research areas. For instance, DRC studied the military, religious
groups and --in the early days of its existence--the mass media, which otherwise probably could
not have been attempted at that time. This work did at times lead to more specific studies, for
example, a later NSF grant to study news reporting by community mass communication
systems. In addition, DRC taking advantage of the professional freedom mentioned earlier, did
studies not directly funded by anyone. These were "piggybacked" in various ways on funded
projects. Among such research were studies on the handling of the dead in mass casualty
situations, disaster induced long run organizational changes, the characteristics of disaster
subcultures, state level disaster planning, rumor control centers, and non-riot looting behavior,
etc.
DRC chose all the topics it studied. It rejected suggestions by funders that were not of
professional interest to the directors or that made little sense on the basis of earlier research (e.g.,
a proposal by a federal agency to fund the Center for a field study of the "looting" in Hurricane
Camille). Important is that a conscious effort was made to keep moving on continually to new
topics for study. In only a few cases did the Center replicate or build upon previously studied
topics (the major exception was a multi year restudy for FEMA of an earlier five-year OCD
study of emergency organizations). There was a logic to this pioneering. For years DRC was
the only research entity of its kind anywhere; given that, studying new topics was seen as the
best way to call attention to the importance and significance of social science studies of disasters.
At another level, a pioneering effort is more of an intellectual challenge, requires innovation in
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the field design, and is certain to generate unexpected findings. In short, we found it both "fun"
and "interesting" to pioneer, and accordingly did so.
DRC research in one sense operated at two levels. At one level, the intent was to understand
disaster phenomena per se such as the Conditions that generated disaster problems, the
Characteristics of organized disaster behavior, the later Consequences of that, and the Careers of
disasters (this jokingly came to be known as the C model). At another level, the goal was to
further sociological understanding of emergent groups and organizational behavior. Put another
way, the DRC sociologists true to their disciplinary background, assumed that the better
sociology they did, the better would be the research on disasters. Therefore a conscious effort
was made in analysis and report writing to interplay the descriptive disaster data and sociological
ideas, but a balance was not always achieved. While the Center was successful in explicitly
resisting the development of a separate field of "disasterology," and had some success in
developing the sociology of disasters, the latter was not as much as might have been ideal.
Yet the Center never operated with one explicit theoretical orientation. There was in fact a
conscious effort to avoid the development of a Center orthodoxy or "party line." Nevertheless,
certain views about social phenomena were implicitly used more than others. A sociological
orientation was always present, and not a geographical one as in the early hazards studies by
others. In addition, the implicit social psychology framework used was symbolic interactionism.
Similarly, ideas from the classical University of Chicago view of collective behavior permeated
the approach to emergent behaviors and groups (for the historical background of these two
orientations see, Quarantelli 1987, 1994). Organizations, on the other hand, tended to be viewed,
but not always consistently, in an amorphous structural functional framework. Our point is that
the field operations and research procedures were influenced by the indicated theoretical
preference so while a rigid theoretical orthodoxy was avoided, DRC did lean implicitly in certain
directions rather than others.
As loose as the theoretical preferences were, the DRC methodology was even more eclectic
and catholic. There was to be sure a preference for methods that allowed induction rather than
requiring deduction and which allowed qualitative rather than demanded quantitative analyses.
In a general sense, what DRC by trial and error evolved, was similar to the "grounded theory
methodology" which was being created roughly at the same time by other sociologists with no
direct connection to the disaster area (see Glaser and Strauss 1967). However, the Center did not
explicitly or consciously borrow from the formal literature on grounded theory. In fact, it was
quite a while before DRC consciously recognized that it too had gone down the same
methodological path developed by grounded theory scholars.
PRIOR OR PREFIELD PROCEDURES
While there was "trial and error" in training the first cohort of GRAs, from the first the
prefield training was deemed very crucial for their ability to do well at disaster sites. So much
time and effort were spent on training. Among procedures usually followed were providing all
new GRAs: (1) a general introduction to the history of disaster research and the Center, (2) the
procedures, promises and problems in qualitative field research, and (3) a detailed introduction
5
to the specific research project(s) in which they were to be involved. Indicative of the coverage
of this training for new GRAs are the topics of the 30 sessions listed in the outline for 1987, and
given by the DRC directors.
OUTLINE FOR 1987
I. BACKGOUND ON THE DISASTER AREA AND DRC. 1) Nature of disasters and disaster
preparedness and response in the U.S.; 2) History of disaster research in general in the social and
behavioral sciences; 3) Overall view of substantive disasters findings in general; 4) History and
activities of DRC; 5) Past DRC work and resources; and 6) DRC operations including logistical
issues. II. DRC FIELD WORK. 7) General orientation and policies (including ethical issues); 8)
Preparations and entry; 9) Interviewing problems and procedures; 10) Observing
problems and procedures; 11) Documenting problems and procedures; 12) Processing of
field data; and 13) Report writing.
III. THE FEMA STUDY. 14) FEMA as an organization and its interests; 15) Earlier related DRC
work; 16) Last's year's work; 17) Projected field work for the coming year; 18) The
research designed, new issues and questions that need consideration; 19) Specifics of the
research design; and 20) Planning and actually doing the upcoming field work.
IV. THE NSF MASS MEDIA STUDY. 21)NSF as an organization and its interests;
22) Earlier related DRC work; 23) Projected field work for this the coming year; 24) The
research design: issues and questions that need consideration; 25) Specifics of the research
design; and 26) Planning and actually doing the specific field work.
V. THE NSF MEXICO CITY EARTHQUAKE STUDY. 27) The study design used;
28) The survey work undertaken; 29) The organizational data obtained; and 30) Current status of
the work and what needs to be done to finish the study.
After the training sessions, new GRAs typically conducted practice field interviews with
officials in local emergency related groups (defined for them as studies DRC was doing of
preparedness planning). The tape interviews were then listened to by veteran DRC researchers,
with the positive and negative aspects of what had been done individually discussed with each
new GRA.
Even more important, at the start of any research project all GRAs were given copies of the
funded research proposal. After being told to read the proposal carefully, a series of meetings
were held, the first of which started with roughly the following statement: " This formal
proposal gives you a vague idea of what we think we are going to do: now we are collectively
going to have to work out the details of how we will actually proceed in the real world and what
we concretely need to find out." Succeeding sessions particularly focused on developing
research design specifics (e.g., the field instruments, early versions of which were often drafted
by smaller task forces of GRAs). The basic goal was to involve GRAs in the process so they
knew what information was to be sought from whom, why specific questions were asked, and
generally how much detail was wanted given the data analysis projected. Fully involving the
GRAs in building the research design insured they understood the logic of what DRC would do
in the field. Interview and other guides were always produced but by that point, GRAs needed
no further guidance on their use. GRAs who joined DRC in the middle of research projects were
not as heavily involved in building the research design, but there was always overlap of veteran
and rookie GRAs so the latter could informally learn from the former.
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A most important idea conveyed in the training was that DRC mostly wanted the overall
picture of the occasion, and no one or even several officials or persons together could possibly
provide by themselves such a picture (it was stressed that in disasters perceptions are even more
selective and narrower than at routine times). So like doing detective work, it was emphasized
that the team would have to develop the larger picture by putting together information from a
variety of different kinds of field data. Three major mechanisms were used to sensitize the
GRAs on this point: (1) emphasizing this process in the prefield training; (2) interviewing at
different levels and positions in the groups studied (from administrative heads to liaison
personnel); (3) in-the-field team meetings. There is not space here to discuss how inconsistent
or contradictory statements were handled, although it was stressed in the training that when the
perception and social location of informants/respondents is taken into account, there are far
more "seeming" rather than actual irreconcilable statements.
The specifics of what social dimensions were to be examined varied somewhat in each study.
However, in general information was almost always sought about the structure and function of
the group involved, the formal and informal division of labor in being, its interorganizational
contacts, the available material resources and facilities, as well as the group's prior disaster
planning and earlier disaster experience. It was always very explicit that the field workers
should make a very conscious effort to obtain a picture of the organization as it operated during
normal times and how it acted during the crisis period of the disaster being studied. This
contrast was frequently talked about as the differences between Time One (preimpact) and Time
Two (impact). In its later work, DRC tended to make more of a differentiation between the
preimpact or preparedness phase, the impact or transemergency period, and the immediate
postimpact period.
Also stressed in the training was that while particular officials or workers would be
approached in the field, the picture the Center wanted was how the group or organization of
which they were a part operated. DRC only had a secondary interest in the individuals as such.
Put another way, the theme was that the focus of the Center was on the group level, what the
organized group as a social entity did, not what social roles were played by particular people.
This point was not always easy to communicate in the training because even professional
sociologists do not always understand the difference between the study of a group as such and a
study of the members of the group (the emphasis on using as much participant observation and
systematic document collection as possible was also part of the effort to get the GRAs to think in
group rather than individual terms; easier to see in using those techniques compared with
interviewing individuals). This focus on the group level became even clearer in later DRC
work and was therefore made even more explicit in the training.
Related to the point in the last paragraph was that in almost all projects DRC wanted the
multiple perspectives of those involved. Thus, it was fairly standard in the research design that
certain work positions or occupational roles were automatically part of the listing of those who
should be interviewed (or approached for other kinds of data). It was stressed in the training that
it should be expected that DRC would obtain different accounts of "what happened" depending
on the perspective of those reporting the happening. The Center did assume that there was no
one "true" story. As such, in the training it was pointed out that in almost all cases there were at
7
least a minimum number of perspectives we wanted to obtain. These usually included the
administrative head of the organization, its operational head (which DRC early learned usually
knew more specific details about everyday activities of the group whether in routine or crisis
times than did the administrative head who was often more concerned with policy and political
issues), boundary personnel such as liaison persons or secretaries who represented or linked their
organization to the outside world, and communication personnel at almost any level. The last
role in particular could be rather low in the formal organizational chart but frequently would not
only have substantial information on the what and who in the communication flow, but also
often could supply to DRC relevant statistics or at least numbers on the flow. Of course, as was
indicated in the training of the GRAs, there was frequently more than one occupant of the
indicated roles in organizations and that should be taken into account on who should be
approached in the field work. In emergent or informal groups, the kind of social roles just
indicated would be less obvious, but for DRC purposes we should seek out those persons who
engaged in equivalent activities. In addition to the somewhat fixed sampling of certain work
roles, "snowballing" sampling was also used as a very useful procedure given what the Center
was often studying.
Apart from the training for substantive issues, DRC also paid much attention to logistic
matters in the dispatching of teams. This was important for achieving the major objective of
getting to a disaster site as soon as possible, while emergency operations were underway. In the
1964 Alaskan earthquake, DRC had five persons, including all three directors, in Anchorage
within the first 24 hours. This process is less complicated than might be believed if routines are
developed as DRC did early in its life. This included (1) training the Center's office staff how
travel arrangements were to be handled both within and outside the University context, including
educating others that normal travel procedures could not be followed and the need sometime to
operate outside of usual University hours; (2) preparing a standardized field kit always in the
personal possession of all GRAs; (3) insisting that all GRAs at all times have luggage bags
prepared for travel; and (4) putting in the possession of all field workers a master check list. A
later version of this list specified checking the following:
MASTER CHECK LIST
1. Tape recorder (test by recording and playing back before leaving). 2. Charger, cord. 3. Blank
cassettes and boxes with identifying cards. 4. Field kit folder. 5. Personal DRC business cards. 6.
Personal identification letter with photo. 7. Auto rental credit card*. 8. Receipt forms. 9. Stack
of DRC leaflets. 10. DRC fact sheets. 11. 11. Forms for reporting expenses. 12. Sheet with
office, home addresses and phones. 13. List of current telephone billing numbers. 14. Pens. 15.
Pencils. 16. Tablets for note taking. 17. Traveler's checks (as well as enough cash). 18. DRC card
for auto sunvisor. 19. Interview guides. 20. Special handouts. 21. List of prior contacts in the
area*. 22. Data analysis forms. 23. Data inventory forms, if relevant. 24. Video cassette and
cameras*. 25. Self addressed stamped envelopes. The field coordinator is to have the items
indicated as * .
Learning About Disasters
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All personnel at the Center were instructed to be attentive to news reports or weather
stories
that might have implications for possible field work (although DRC learned early that initial
accounts tended to overstate damage and destruction). Usually such information was directed to
the Field Director, who had the authority to dispatch field teams. Generally the judgment on
whether a team should be sent was made on whether the reported occasion fitted the existing
criteria for inclusion in whatever projects the Center had under way (sometimes field data could
be concurrently obtained for two different projects). At times a decision had to be made on
whether a team could be gotten into a locality before actual impact (e.g., possible in developing
hurricanes or floods). Thus, there was more than one occasion where a DRC team managed to
arrive on site before the airports in the area were closed. In other cases, where DRC had done
previous field studies, knowledgeable officials known to the Center were contacted and
information obtained from them.
The value of being on the scene at the height of crises cannot be overstated. It is worthwhile
to be in such situations for two basic reasons. First, observations can be made and documents
can be collected, that cannot be obtained through later interviewing. The social barriers that
normally exist to restrict access to high level officials and key organizations, simply to not exist.
A second reason for being on the scene early insures a high degree of access and cooperation.
Victims are typically candid, cooperative and willing to talk in ways far more difficult to get
later.
Arriving on the scene
Field teams on arrival did two things as quickly as possible. (1) finding living quarters
and
(2) going to Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs). The last was to learn what was going on as
seen from the perspective of community officials, keeping in mind that a "command post" bias
would be present. The basic purpose was to obtain an overview of the situation, learn who the
key officials and organizations were and also what they were doing, make personal contact with
them for later follow up interviews, gather ephemeral observational and documentary data, and
lay the groundwork for a later systematic in depth study. Contrary to popular imagery, there can
be many periods of lull and inactivity even in the most hectic of disasters where interaction with
officials can be initiated, provided entry is gained into EOCs or coordinating centers (although
not discussed here obtaining entry often requires considerable skill with a special need to be seen
as researchers and not "journalists").
A variety of research techniques were used for data gathering, particularly open ended
interviewing, selective participant observing, and systematic document collecting.
Interviewing
The guides and procedures used by DRC were basically for open-ended and in-depth
interviewing. The usual lead question was deliberately very general such as: "tell me what
happened in x (e.g., the tornado)." Other suggested questions were often also very general
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putting a premium on the field worker's ability and knowledge of when, where and what to
specifically probe. However, while formal interview guides were always prepared (with
questions, probes, instructions)and taken to the field, they were never thought of as field
manuals to read from. Given the involvement of GRAs in their production and thus their
presumed understanding of what was wanted, the guides were instead used to insure field
workers covered all relevant topics.
Certain principles that all field workers were to follow were evolved. In a later explicit
version, these were, to paraphrase the oral and written statements provided in training sessions:
(1) Always tell the truth about who we are and what we are doing. Apart from ethical
considerations, from a pragmatic point of view it is much easier to proceed in that way
since a "cover"story does not have to be remembered. However, you should not
volunteer too much information or details, unless asked to do so. Overexplaining often
confuses people and may raise unnecessary questions.
(2) DRC does not seek publicity especially in the field, and particularly from the mass
media. Try to
fend
off
inquiries
by
using the DRC
handouts which
indicate
who
we are, what we
do, etc. If such
contacts
are
unavoidable try
to structure the
picture of us we
want portrayed.
The principle
to
follow
regarding mass
media contact
for information
about the study
is to refer the
problem back to
the home office
of DRC.
(3) Indicate very explicitly the confidential nature of the information we seek and obtain.
Make clear that once in the Center's hands we have the responsibility to protect any data,
and we take that very seriously. If any problems on this score have them contact the
home office of DRC.
(4) We should try to have ourselves identified as researchers and from a university. Such
labels evoke positive reactions. You must make conscious effort to avoid being
misidentified as "journalists" or "investigators." We are not there to judge, to evaluate;
why word "investigation," "investigator" etc. should never be used. The term
"government" also needs careful use since not everyone is positive to it.
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(5) Adjust to what is going on rather than trying to fit others into our study. In crises
(and even outside in many emergency related groups), there is no 8am-5pm weekday
schedule. This means that field teams can make contacts literally around the clock and in
nonroutine locations (e.g., at EOCs, emergency shelters).
(6) Make field decisions on the basis of future consequences. The question of pressing
for a particular interview, entry into a specific organization, seeking information about
some sensitive topic, etc. is a field team decision. The judgment should be based on the
future rather than the immediately present situation. Before pressing regarding
something, ask would it matter and in what way if you or another researcher were to later
contact the involved parties again? Since we do follow up and repeat studies, our
reputation is important.
(7) Under no circumstance should any DRC field worker get in the way or interfere with
any emergency operation or personnel. Similarly, never under any circumstance should
you participate in any emergency disaster response even though there are times when
you may be asked to do so, and the task may be minor.
(8) There may be crises where there might be some general personal risk involved for
team members. It is understood that no research result is worth any personal risk. Thus,
use your common sense and avoid or move away from such situations.
(9) There is the danger that hearing more or less the same "story" over and over again, it
may be assumed that the overall picture is clear. However, team
members should ask the same question to everyone and to probe the
answers, because that assumptions should not be made. Beware also of
the "collective consensus" and "retrospective redescribing" that often
occurs the later from the time of the actual occurrence of any action.
Keep placing your interviewee back to the time period being reported
on. Ask for a step by step temporal and spatial chronology. Stress that
our interest is in the interviewee's own perception of happenings.
(10) Keep in mind that for diplomatic reasons, some non-substantive interviews may
have to be conducted. In complex organizations, it is not wise to interview lower and
middle level personnel without first obtaining an interview with a high level
official(where the field study and topics to be probed can be noted). Interviews at
different levels of an organization assure getting different perceptions of what occurred,
because of the DRC assumption that there is not only one "true" story.
(11) Never forget our distinction between informants and respondents as this is
understood in sociology. Different kinds of information are obtainable from each
perspective. That informants are discussing matters in which they were not personally
involved does not mean that the information is not useful. Always disentangle statements
involving the two perspectives because in any interview, interviewees may wander from
one to another.
(12) Field teams are not micromanaged. While consultation back to DRC is encouraged,
teams should make their own decisions about field problems and questions. You have
considerable autonomy; you will not be seconded guessed on your decisions.
These instructions seemed to work well. Not only were outright refusals to participate in
the study extremely low (in most field studies none ever occurred) in the thousands of contacts
made, but the cooperation was such that
candor was the norm rather than the
exception. We could attribute all of this to
the excellence of the DRC planning and
11
training and its implementation in the field,
but that would be an overstatement. Our
field work was helped by several
psychological reasons, primarily that
persons under stress are far more willing to
talk without reservation than during normal
times, and secondarily by the fact that
respondents and informants were often very
impressed that the team had traveled from
afar to try and learn from their experiences
on how other communities elsewhere might
cope with a disaster.
A member of the field team was usually designated as the field coordinator with final
responsibility for field trip decisions. For the educational experience, this temporary position
was typically rotated among the GRAs (when the Field Director was not a member of the team).
This choice and the actual composition or mix of the team when choices were available required
some tact and sensitivity in the decision making. As in any work situation, not everyone liked
everyone else, various kinds of rivalries and conflicts sometime existed, and despite attempts to
standardized the role, there were varying views of what constituted responsibility. So while
DRC found liking others was not necessary for good field performance having a professional
attitude about the GRA role was crucial. Overall, most team efforts went well but there were
occasions when because DRC had put together a poor field team mix, there was a negative effect
on the data obtained in field operations.
Observing
Although DRC did work out several systematic field observational guides for crowds and
civil disturbance situations, it never developed systematic and general parallel ones for
disastrous occasions (in retrospect this is probably a major shortcoming of the DRC field
research methodology). Nonetheless, field team members were trained to be alert to make
relevant observations of unscheduled as well as scheduled happenings (briefings, press
conferences, etc.), and if possible to tape record their observations live (including, for example,
photographing or drawing diagrams of EOCs, etc.). The simple fact is that field workers who
do good participant observations can "see" things that cannot or will not be reported on in a later
interview.
Let us illustrate through a personal example from Hurricane Betsy which hit New Orleans.
At the height of the crisis we were able to walk into the Mayor's office which then was in a top
floor of a high rise building which was informally being used as the major EOC and sit in his
chair without having to go through a single secretary or obtain the permission of anyone. We
just walked in. While there, we monitored the radio messages being sent. At one point a police
car reported several stores with broken windows might be vulnerable to "looting." To our
12
surprise, a half hour later the dispatcher ordered two other police cars to go to that location to
stop the "extensive looting going on." But the initial police car had only reported certain open
store fronts were susceptible to looting! It is very doubtful later interviewing would have evoked
the sequence of events that we saw and heard, especially since the informal log used only
recorded the later sending of the two cars.
Also, observations were often intermingled at the same time with other procedures for
obtaining field data. For instance, in one study the Center focus was on outside-of-the-hospital
handling of mass casualties. As indicated in the following outline reproduced from what was
used by the GRAs, much of the information sought could be obtained in observing particular
situations, although others of it might require at least some informal interviewing. In addition,
the cues and ideas picked up earlier while in an observational mode could be made part of a later
interview with some of the observed emergency medical service providers at a triage point
(Again crucial for this to be done well required that the GRAs have a very good picture of what
the project was about, what questions DRC wanted answered, and how different answers might
fit together).
OUTLINE
INSTRUMENT III. EMS DISASTER SITE DATA NEEDED
WE
WANT
A
CHRONOLOGY
OF
INVOLVEMENT,
THE
INTERORGANIZATIONAL LINKS THAT EXISTED AND THE RESOURCES
USED. TO MOVE TOWARD THAT PICTURE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
NEED TO BE ANSWERED:
1. How many triage sites?
2. Was there any observable overall coordination of multiple sites (if such existed)?
3. Who was in "charge" at each triage site?
4. What organizations participated at each site?
5. What were the modes of transportation used from each site?
6. Was there any communication from the sites with the hospitals?
7. Was there any communication from sites to transportation units?
8. Which organizations handled transportation and what % was handled by each of the parties?
9. What hospitals were destinations from each site?
10. How many casualties were sent off from each site?
11. Were casualties treated and/or examined but not sent to hospitals from each site?
12. Was there any other kind of communication observable from site to medical and/or general
coordination centers? What?
13. When was the triage site set up?
14. How long did it exist?
15. By when had the bulk of the casualties been sent off?
MAKE SURE YOU IDENTIFY MEDICAL COMPETENCE (i.e., physician, nurse, EMT,
medical aide, etc.) AND AFFILIATIONS (organizational name) OF ALL INVOLVED.
In connection with the observational procedures, in later years sporadic efforts were
made
13
to have GRAs take photographs in the field. For various reasons, this only occasionally
produced good results. Some of what DRC attempted to obtain is noted in a 1986 statement for
field workers:
PHOTOGRAPHS that SHOULD BE TAKEN OR OBTAINED BY DRC FIELD
TEAMS.
We are not interested in photos of physical damage or destruction; for the most part these
can be obtained from mass media sources or appear in souvenir books put together by
professional photographers. What DRC primarily needs are photos that either illustrate
some social or even better sociological aspects of the disaster situation. For instance,
there could be photos showing convergence on disaster sites, of search and rescue teams
going through debris, of officials working in a very crowded EOC, of non-medical
personnel handling the injured, of victims waiting in line at relief centers, of a very large
evacuation area holding only a handful of evacuees, of backups at road blocks (shots that
show misconceptions of disaster behavior would be especially valuable), of
announcements and blackboards with information (including those that cannot be read
very well), of people laughing against a background of damage or children playing in the
debris, of emergency organization switchboards at the height of the crisis period, of mass
media personnel crowding around victims or officials, etc. Basically keep in mind what
is known about disaster behavior and if you come across scenes either supporting or
contradicting such supposed knowledge, shoot it. We are social scientists and our
photographs should be shots of social not physical phenomena.
Documenting
For each project DRC frequently had two lists of documents to be collected. One, the
master
list was used in all field work. It listed items that were always to be obtained. This included, for
instance, local phone books, maps of the area, police statistics of their activities, etc. In addition,
there often was another list, a special one, which was more specific and addressing particular
research questions. For example, the GRAs once were given a memo to take into the field about
the kind of statistics and from which organization they ought to be gathered. This was for the
purpose of addressing research questions dealing with what features might be used to identify
disruption of community life. The memo specified that:
MEMO
In all future disasters of any magnitude, with appropriate modifications, DRC shall
attempt to obtain statistics, afteraction reports and whatever other documentary data are
available from the listed organizations. The intent is to try and to develop measures of a
quantitative sort of the disruptions and difficulties a community undergoes as a result of a
disaster. Unless otherwise indicated, we should get the statistics on a three week period
around the disaster (assuming an emergency period of one week), and a comparable three
weeks a year before.
1. Police (city, county, state) Crime and traffic reports/arrest statistics. Note looting cases.
2. Fire (city, county) Statistics on calls and alarms.
14
3. Public health dept. (city and county) Whatever vital statistics maintained.
4. Utilities: water, gas, electricity. Usage statistics.
5. Telephone co. Statistics on local and long distance calls.
6. Western Union. Statistics on telegrams.
7. Post office. Mail delivery statistics
8. Hospitals (all general ones) In/out patients and emergency room statistics.
9. Chamber of Commerce. Business and economic statistics.
10.Airport. Statistics on plane, freight and passenger traffic.
11. Port. Statistics on shipping activity
12. Railroad yard. Statistics on freight car loadings and movements.
13. Bus terminal. Statistics on traffic.
14. School system. Statistics on absentee rates.
15. Rental agencies. Statistics on turnovers.
We should note that in the DRC framework, the term "document" was used to cover
anything
of a physical nature that could either be obtained or copied. Thus, for example, it included, at
one end, relevant graffiti, signs on buildings, notes placed on EOC bulletin boards, informal
organizational logs and group minutes, citizen recordings of the event, jokes circulating about
the occasion (including gallows humor), to at the other end, official handouts, public
proclamations and press releases, written organizational data (e.g., charters, budgets, annual
reports, disaster plans, manuals, afteraction reports), printed community data (e.g., Chamber of
Commerce profiles, telephone books), statistics from emergency related organizations (with
similar data from the previous week and year), and mass communication stories.
The first sets of documents are quite ephemeral and if not quickly gathered on site, will be
forever lost. They can be quite important. For instance, a team member in one disaster was told
by a police major that he had ordered and then quickly rescinded an evacuation order concerning
police cars in an endangered area, and showed the informal logs on it. The DRC research
assistant alertly asked for and obtained a copy of the log and brought it back to DRC. Later
when the Center obtained the official organizational logs, the order and rescinding of it was not
at all noted. This was not a cover up. It turned out the official logs only listed actions taken;
since the police cars never left the area, this was never recorded. Yet it surfaced the problems of
organizational officials attempting to follow plans that do not indicate what is to be done when
contradictory advice is offered.
Developing a field consensus about the data.
Very important is that at the end of the day in the field, the team members met and
collectively discussed what they had learned in their interviewing and observing. When done
every day, this allowed a slow reconstruction of happenings during the disaster, and also
provided clues on where the research attention ought to be directed the next day (e.g., in studies
of emergent groups where the "snowballing" sampling ought to proceed). Also, as pointed out in
training sessions, this meant that after several days the DRC team would collectively have a
broader and more comprehensive picture of the disaster than would be known to even the most
heavily involved organizational official. The danger of assuming too much because of this
15
knowledge required that team members had to be very alert in asking the same questions and
probing appropriately, later respondents and informants. This did not always occur. DRC early
established that later interviews in the field were without good reason often shorter in length than
earlier ones.
POSTFIELD PROCEDURES
Upon returning to the Center the field team would present a detailed briefing to the staff,
make its recommendations on whether to do an in-depth study, and process the material it had
collected. Reconnaissance trips led to in-depth studies about 40 percent of the time. These initial
trips were not wasted abortive efforts since they provided good feedback for improving field
instruments, gave valuable insights on substantive issues, and was realistic field training for new
GRAs. The directors always made the final decisions on in-depth studies. It was learned early
that the best timing for such work was usually two-three weeks after impact and not while the
crisis period was still in being.
A field report of about 3-10 pages was usually written for almost all trips taken. Its purpose
was twofold: to produce a quick historical record of the study and to force the field workers to
think substantively about what they had studied. This is illustrated by a 1978 guide for writing
field reports that required the following information.
GUIDE
I. Identification Data: Field trip report #, event name, date of report, author of report,
field team members. Type of trip (baseline, planning, actual event, follow-up, other),
purpose of trip.
II. Disaster Agent Characteristics: Briefly describe disaster agent and community context,
agent type (see inventory list), scope of impact--localized or diffuse, speed of onset-sudden or gradual, prior warning or not, length of warning period, scope of disaster
planning--community wide, organizations mainly, interorganizational, little or no
planning. Previous disaster experience in last five years--if so what kind. Losses to
community--deaths, injuries, residences and businesses destroyed, evacuees. Was there a
federal declaration, if so, date of declaration.
III. The Organized Response. Note organizations involved in disaster planning and/or
response. Specify tasks and responsibilities of each. Note if there were any emergent
groups.
IV. Problems in Communication, Coordination and Control. Note in general terms,
problems encountered by responding groups such as conflicting planning, duplication of
effort, etc. Note also adaptive mechanism used.
V. Relevant Comparisons and Contrasts. Tell briefly in what ways the preparations for or
the response is similar to or different from the organized response to other events we
have studied.
VI. Methodological Notes. a. What implications does the study of this situation have for
future field operations? What implications for data analysis are there in the material
gathered? Are there any special problems regarding entree, confidentiality, etc.? Are
there any other groups besides DRC doing research in the area--who and what are they
doing? Any contact made with them?
16
There was also the putting together of a master list of the field data obtained. In one form
prepared in 1979 the field coordinator had to indicate if and how much of the following had been
obtained:
I. Field Interviews obtained for guide A (preparedness informants), guide B
(organizational informants), guide C (organizational respondents); Interview notes made
in person and over phone;
II. Field analysis forms for planning, response, organizational linkages;
III Participant Observer sheets---(1) photos of activities at site, EOCs, etc., (2)
diagrams/charts of EOC layout, etc., (3) description of physical topography of impact
sites, (4) other items;
IV. Documentary data: (1) phone books, (2) maps with disaster site marked, (3) disaster
plans--list of organizations, (4) communication tapes, (5) organizational logs, (6) after
action reports, (7) minutes of emergency meetings, (8) organizational charts, (9) mutual
aid agreements, (10) radio and TV tapes, (11) local newspapers, during, before and after
impact, (12) other items--leaflets, booklets, news releases, etc.
V. Statistical data and sources of: (1) casualties, (2) property damage, (3) injured-treated at
hospital, admitted, DOA; (4) other.
VI. Follow up calls/letters needed as well as anything DRC promised to send back.
In the early days of DRC almost all interviews, the great bulk of which was tape recorded,
were fully transcribed. This followed the processing model set up by NORC in its pioneering
effort in disaster research (see Bucher, Fritz and Quarantelli 1956a and b). In time this led to
the setting up of a massive transcribing operation and more than 6,000 interviews were
transcribed. However, the time, cost and effort were too costly to be continued and no funding
could ever be obtained after 1974 for such an operation. This was unfortunate since analyzing
from tapes is very tedious. The later making of summaries of tape content by the actual
interviewers themselves was a partial but not perfect solution, although it did have the
unintended consequence of GRAs spending more time and effort in the field on insuring the
quality of recordings!
Although informal case studies following an outline were often written, very few were ever
actually formalized or published. DRC never had a major interest in case studies as such, or the
disaster history of any given social entity. Instead, to the extent there were case studies, they
were aggregated or combined to draw more general observations or conclusions. A worthwhile
side product of involving GRAs in writing case studies is that they quickly learned, as a result of
finding unnecessary gaps in the information, why it was necessary in their own field work to
obtain the details specified in the data gathering procedures.
SOME PROBLEMATICAL ASPECTS
Although the system developed worked well there were some inherent problems. For one,
about the time GRAs acquired substantial field experience, they graduated from the university.
While a very few of the best were occasionally kept on for a year or two as full time Field
Directors, the Center never had the funding to do this on a regular or continuous basis. So while
veteran workers were overlapped with new recruits on field teams, the value of having much
17
field experience was always eventually lost to the Center Second, it was the rare graduate
student who was very good on all phases of the research process. So there was a tendency to let
senior research assistants gravitate to what they were best at, for example, interviewing or report
writing. This, however, generated problems of equity in use of staff members. Third, and
related to the second problem, is that not all persons are comfortable and good at working
concurrently on several different projects at varying stages of their development. Some people
work much better on only one sequentially developing project. Yet the Center had the former
rather than the latter style. Fourth, research assistants sometime had "overlearned" their
classroom training. Thus, some thought scientific research could only be of a deductive,
quantitative and hypothesis testing nature. Such students had difficulty operating in an
inductive, qualitative and hypothesis generating framework. Finally, post field data processing
(not data analysis) activities are time consuming and not intrinsically interesting. GRAs tended
to delay this work with a compound of memory failures. Unless there is a continuous
monitoring effort, this work is often not well done leading to a compromising of the gathered
data.
IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS
This chapter has another goal besides providing a detailed historical documentation of a
major pioneering social science research effort in the disaster area. It is also to indicate the
implications and lessons that the DRC effort has for future field researchers on crisis time
disaster behavior. These will be briefly discussed under four general themes.
1. The kind of field research described cannot only be done, but can be done well. When
DRC first started its work, other social scientists often expressed doubt that such field research
could even be undertaken, or if attempted, could produce any worthwhile research results. The
question asked was how could one do research in the midst of social chaos and extreme personal
stress and essentially very difficult working conditions? As late as 1976 a highly placed
administrator in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences very strongly objected to a proposal that
the National Research Council set up quick response field research teams to study disasters. His
objections were:
How can the investigative team be alerted and got to the right place in
time? It is difficult for me to see how you can select a site and collect the
sort of data outlined . . . Officials are going to be so preoccupied with
their own immediate problems that I cannot imagine their talking to
researchers in advance of a known emergency. How can the monitoring
system envisioned . . . actually be put in place in the face of imminent
disaster? (Brooks 1976)
Perhaps because of the now known DRC work, currently such views are seldom anymore
expressed by other researchers. Actually the problem of skepticism may exist more outside the
research area, among research funders and users. This is increasingly less so in developed
societies but skepticism still occasionally surfaces in some developing countries. Possibly this
chapter will give "ammunition" and professional support to those who still have to convince
policy makers and research funders that such research can be undertaken.
18
A statement on how well the work was done, might appear self serving. Nevertheless, DRC
did obtain thousands of interviews, record innumerable observations, and collect tens of
thousands of documents. More important, from those data nearly five hundred publications were
produced including 29 Ph.D. dissertations. Of even more value, the published results are a
prominent part of the disaster literature, which in turn shows up in introductory sociology texts,
summaries of the literature and compilations for research users. Here too what was done can be
pointed to by researchers and research users who still have to make a case that not only can field
research be undertaken but the end results can be worthwhile.
2. Certain relevant data and assessment of data gathered in other ways can only be
obtained
by the kind of field study described. There are several aspects to this, depending on whether
interviewing, observing or documenting is the research technique in question. For example, as
previously illustrated, certain activities can be noted via observations than could probably not be
recalled in later interviewing. However, even the episodic and informal interviewing that can
sometime be done even during the midst of a crisis at a central site like an EOC, is likely to be
more candid and honest than a more formal interview later in a less hectic setting (as one
respondent remarked to us in a crisis setting, "I could tell you I know what I am doing, but you
can clearly see I'm wildly guessing in much of what I'm doing"). This is apart from the typical
reconstruction that occurs toward what should have happened in later interviewing away from
the time of the occurrence. This is a serious problem about formal interview data that to this day
has been almost completely ignored by disaster researchers, but can be partly counterbalanced by
having trained researchers present in the crisis setting. It has also always bothered us that the
"decision making" we have observed during actual crises, seldom corresponds to the picture
evoked in later interviews outside of the actual crisis context where the process is often depicted
as explicit, conscious, individually based and involves the consideration of alternative options.
This is why we think that it is very unfortunate that too many current disaster researchers
who
are the ultimate analysts of data often not only get the information third hand via first an
interviewer and then a coder, but also have absolutely no direct experience in disaster occasions
which would give them a larger context for interpreting the data. In part, we are paralleling here
what a famous social scientists we had in our graduate studies used to say in his introductory
lecture on doing community studies. "The very first thing you must do is to walk very slowly
and several times through the area and observe everything you can. Your interpretation of all the
statistics you may later play with will differ depending on your observations. In any case they
will certainly be more accurate if you make the walk."
Of course many possible observations and many gatherable documents at a time of crisis are
very ephemeral and if not collected at the time are lost forever. (DRC did try to get its field
teams to photograph and/or tape record such material as much as possible but for unclear reasons
the admonition to do so was not consistently followed). Future field researchers should attempt
even more than did the Center to collect such kind of fleeting and transitory data.
3. However, for this kind of field research, to be done and done well, requires much prior
19
planning as well as continual monitoring of the implemented measures. The notion that research
consists of an initial training and pilot period, and then a moving on to the actual gathering of
data and its later analysis, is not an appropriate model/image of what should be in place
(although this is the naive view in some guidelines on how to write research proposals or even in
some formal courses for students on how to do research generally). The methodology used has
to be kept in mind from the start to the end of the work. The quality and quantity of the data
obtained will be mostly determined long before the first study in the field. As such, it is
important that much time and much effort be explicitly allocated to teaching the methodology
involved. However, it is also crucial that a continuous evaluation be undertaken of whatever is
done. Even very well trained and experienced personnel will show slippages and regressions
back to inappropriate behaviors and actions.
4. Finally, just because something has been done and done well, does not mean that
whatever
the "traditional" approach has been, should be blindly followed. In particular, we would strongly
urge that even for the kind of disaster research just described, it will be necessary to take into
account whatever larger social changes are occurring. These changes can both hinder and help
future crisis time field studies that might attempt to follow or build upon what has been
described in this chapter. For example, the increasing litigiousness nature of Western type
societies as well as the increasing tendency of negative disaster effects to cut across national not
to mention community boundaries (see Quarantelli 1996) were not major problems that faced
DRC researchers. Yet that is part of the future for field students of disasters, and the
methodology used will have to take such difficulties into account. However, there are also some
positive aspects of the changing social context of disasters. For instance, as suggested elsewhere
(Quarantelli 1995), the Internet can now be used to directly collect "real time" data on
organizational behavior and interorganizational communications during disasters. And of
course, as discussed in other chapters in this volume, there are now many very useful
technological tools and machines such as camcorders and laptop computers that were not
available to DRC in its early decades of existence. The newer technological devices ought to be
incorporated into the methodology of future field studies, taking into account their negative as
well as positive effects.
In the preceding pages the focus has been almost exclusively on the field research
undertaken
by the Center. However, as noted in the initial paragraph of this chapter, many other
methodologies as well as other tools besides tape recorders were concurrently used by the
Center. The research results reported by DRC reflected this larger effort. As such, we favor
linking field research to other methodologies or incorporating newer tools in future large scale
and continuing field research. In fact, any study that merely mirrored what DRC once did,
would be an unnecessarily limited effort. Studies indicate that emergency managers should not
plan on the basis of the last disaster they experienced, no matter how efficiently and effectively it
was handled. Rather they should plan on what reasonably can be projected in the future. The
same is true of disaster field studies. No matter how well past studies were done, future
researchers need to continually improve and to add whatever new or novel relevant
methodologies and tools become available. If that is done, someone in the 21st Century should
20
be able to write from an historical viewpoint a chapter similar to this one but yet an improvement
on it.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brooks, H. (1976) Letter of May 18, 1976 to C. Fritz. (Copy in the DRC archives of
NAS
archival material).
Bucher, R., Fritz, C. and Quarantelli, E. L. (1956) 'Tape recorded interviews in social
research', American Sociological Review 21: 359-364.
Bucher, R., Fritz, C. and Quarantelli, E. L. (1956) 'Tape recorded research: Some field
and data processing problems', Public Opinion Quarterly 20: 427-439.
Drabek, T. (1970) Laboratory Simulation of a Police Communication System
Under Stress, Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University.
Glaser, B. and Strauss, A. (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
Qualitative Research, Chicago: Aldine.
Ponting, J. R., Fitzpatrick, J. and Quarantelli, E. L. (1975) 'Police perceptions of riot
participants and dynamics', International Journal of Group Tensions 5: 163-170.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1980) The study of disaster movies: Research problems, findings and
implications. Preliminary Paper # 65. Newark, DE. : Disaster Research Center, University of
Delaware.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1984) Sociobehavioral Responses to Chemical Hazards: Preparations
for and Responses to Acute Chemical Emergencies at the Local Community Level, Newark,
DE. : Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1987) 'Disaster Studies: An Analysis of the Social Historical Factors
Affecting the Development of Research in the Area', International Journal of Mass Emergencies
and Disasters 5: 285-310.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1988) 'The NORC Research on the Arkansas Tornado: A
Fountainhead Study', International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 6: 283-310.
Quarantelli, E. L. (1994) 'Disaster Studies: The Consequences of the Historical Use of a
Sociological Approach in the Development of Research', International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters 12: 25-49.
Quarantelli, E. 1995 Draft of a sociological disaster research agenda for the future:
Theoretical, methodological and empirical issues. Preliminary Paper #228. Newark, DE. :
Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.
Quarantelli, E. (1996) 'The future is not the past repeated: Projecting disasters in the 21st
Century from present trends', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 4: 228-240.
Taylor, V., Ross, G. and Quarantelli, E. L.. (1970) Delivery of Mental Health
Services in Disasters: The Xenia Tornado and Some Implications, Newark, DE. : Disaster
Research Center, University of Delaware.
Warheit, G. and Quarantelli, E. L. (1969) An Analysis of the Los Angeles Fire
Department Operations During Watts, Newark, DE. : Disaster Research Center, University of
Delaware.
21
Section One: Demographic Questions
All participants should participate in the demographic section. Follow these questions with the pa
1. Age (Free Answer)
2. Gender (Male, Female, Not specified)
3. Region or State of Origin
4. Years in Refugee Status in America
5. Years in conflict region
6. Years since being subjected to conflict region
Section Two: Conflict related PTSD and Depression Questions
The following questions will have an objective of gathering qualitative information, but will have a
7. Have you experienced or witnessed a life-threatening event that caused intense fear or helplessness in
8. If yes Explain
9. Do you re-experience the event in the following ways?
9a. Repeated, distressing memories, or dreams
9b. Acting or feeling as if the event were happening again (flashbacks or a sense of reliving it)
9c. Intense physical and/or emotional distress when you are exposed to things that remind you of the eve
10. Do reminders of the event affect you in the following ways?
10a. Avoiding thoughts, feelings, or conversations about it
10b. Avoiding activities and places or people who remind you of it
10c. Losing interest in the daily activities of your life
10d. Feeling disconnected from other people
10e. Feeling your emotions are stuck or that you cannot express them
Section Three: General Variable Testing for PTSD and Depression Questions
In this section, all children should participate regardless of experiences. The same procedure appl
11. What do you think about your future?
12. What do you want to do when you grow up?
13. What do you imagine you will do when you meet someone special?
14. Are you excited about your life in the future
15. Are you troubled by the following?
15a. Problems sleeping
15b. Irritability or outbursts of anger
15c. Problems concentrating
15d. Feeling "on guard"
15e. An exaggerated startle response
16. On any amount of days in the week do you feel any of the following?
16a. Sad or depressed
16b. Disinterested in life
16c. Worthless or guilty
Section Four: Non-Verbal Responses
For the following, record with the symbol denoted for each indiviudual response in response to the
1. Trouble answering question with physical signs of stress. (+1) for every question where this action is prevalelent.
2.Refusal to answer question not associated with a lack of understanding or knowledge (+1) for every question where this action
3. Leaving the interview intemittenly during or between questions to avoid stress (+1) for every individual episode. Episode is cle
Section Five: Parent/Guardian Notes
Dedicate this area to any additional notes that the parent may have about answers or behavoir of c
1. Additional Notes from Parent/Guardian
Participant # 1
Parent/Guardian of Participant #1
stions with the participants with the assistance from the parent/guardian as needed. It will not be neccessar
on, but will have a secondary objective of eliciting nonverbal and verbal reflex responses from the participan
r or helplessness involving war?
mind you of the event
s
me procedure applies for both non-verbal response and parent/guardian participation.
e in response to the time or action senstive indicator.
uestion where this action is prevalent
episode. Episode is cleared when participant is seating and continues with interview
rs or behavoir of childr participant. Fill in answers in the "Parent/Guardian of Participant #1,2.3... respective
Participant #2
Parent of Participant # 2
ded. It will not be neccessary to ask parent/gaurdian all questions. Only request information from Parent or G
sponses from the participants. Record these observations in section 4: Non-verbal cues. Additionally, the fir
ation.
rticipant #1,2.3... respectively.
information from Parent or Guardian when the child cannot answer. Try to allow for the child to complete th
bal cues. Additionally, the first question will seperate variable X participant from Variable Y participant. If no
for the child to complete their response before listening to any additional information provided willingly by
Variable Y participant. If no to first answer, skip to row 25 for question 11. The same rules apply for the pare
mation provided willingly by parent/guardian.
ame rules apply for the parent/guardian participation as in section 1.
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