Film Analysis-2page

timer Asked: Nov 28th, 2017
account_balance_wallet $15

Question description

I would really appreciate if you sent the job in the shortest time possible.

For doing this paper you should first watch the film "No Country for Old Men". then read the power points that I upload here from"Saldana_Portill's reading".
Then use one of the class sources that I upload them , so choose one from these.
then find a source from outside.
Please cite clearly even cite the film by writing the minutes where you use it. Instructor is strict about pilgrims.
Let me know if any question.

Impossible Subjects Ngai’s Project “Impossible Subject sought to explain how formal immigration status (or lack thereof) and the categories of restriction produced new racial knowledge and new ethno-racial identity formations in the interwar period” (xxiv). Show: “race and illegal status remain closely related” (2). The book “charts the historical origins of the ‘illegal alien’ in American law and society and the emergence of illegal immigration as the central problem in U.S. immigration policy in the twentieth century” (3). “Thus, at one level, this study is an attempt to address a gap in the historiography of American immigration [1924-1965]. Although Americans long ago concluded that the national origins quota system was an illiberal policy that blighted the nation’s democratic tradition, we still know little about how that restriction actually worked, how the nation was racially and spatially reimagined” (3). “The task of this book, however, is not to resolve the foundation problem. Its more modest goal is to detach sovereignty and its master, the nation-state, from their claims of transcendence and to critique them as products of history” (12). Argument “Restriction not only marked a new regime in the nation’s immigration policy; I argue that it was also deeply implicated in the development of twentieth-century American ideas and practices about citizenship, race, and the nation-state” (3). “[In addition to the Civil War] I argue that the 1920s was also an extraordinary time when immigration policy realigned and hardened racial categories in the law” (7). Key Term: Sovereignty “Nationalism’s absolute defense is sovereignty—the nation’s self-proclaimed, absolute right to determine its own membership, a right believed to inhere in the nation-state’s very existence, in its ‘right of self-preservation.’ The doctrine appeared in international law in the 18th century and explicitly in American immigration law in the late 19th century when the Supreme Court established that the regulation of immigration was incident to the nation’s control over foreign affairs and gave Congress plenary, or absolute, power of it” (11). “The notion that migrants pose a potential threat of foreign invasion has become a familiar provocation in nationalist discourses. But immigrants have always been but a small percentage of the receiving country’s total population, never approaching anything that could be considered an actual invasion. The association of immigration control with the state’s authority to wage war reveals that sovereignty is not merely a claim to national rights but a theory of power” (12). “Chinese Exclusion [1917] was significant because it occasioned the U.S. Supreme Court to articulate the principle that control over immigration was a matter of national sovereignty. Believing immigration to be a potential form of “foreign aggression and encroachment,” the court gave Congress absolute control over it as part of its authority over foreign relations. It ruled that aliens enter and remain in the U.S. only with ‘the license, permission, and sufferance of Congress’” (18). Key Claim: Immigration Policy “Immigration policy is constitutive of Americans’ understanding of national membership and citizenship, drawing lines of inclusion and exclusion that articulate a desired composition—imagined if not necessarily realized—of the nation” (5). “The exclusion of Chinese, and other Asians, and various classes of undesirable aliens in the late 19th and early 20th century signaled the beginnings of a legal edifice of restriction” (3). Chinese Exclusion Act 1882 Immigration Act of 1917 (18) Key Claim: 1924 Immigration Act The 1924 act was the nation’s first comprehensive restriction law. It established for the first time numerical limits on immigration and a global racial and national hierarchy that favored some immigrants over others. The regime of immigration restriction remapped the nation in two important ways: 1) It drew a new ethnic and racial map based on new categories and hierarchies of difference. 2) It articulated a new sense of territoriality, which was marked by unprecedented awareness and state surveillance of the nation’s contiguous land borders. (3) Key Claim: Illegal Aliens are “Impossible Subjects” “Even if immigrants face obstacles along the way, it is believed that these obstacles are eventually overcome; Americans consider the path to full inclusion normative and evidence of the nation’s democratic nature. In contrast, Impossible Subjects points out that illegal immigrants are a caste group that is categorically excluded from the national community” (xxiii). “Immigration restriction produced the illegal alien as a new legal and political subject, whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred from citizenship without rights. Moreover, the need of state authorities to identify and distinguish between citizens, lawfully resident immigrants, and illegal aliens posed enforcement, political, and constitutional problems for the modern state” (4-5). Key Term: Alien Citizen Alien Citizens –“persons who are American citizens by virtue of their birth in the United States but who are presumed to be foreign by the mainstream of American culture and, at times, by the state” (2). “Thus, unlike Euro-Americans, whose ethnic and racial identities became uncoupled during the 1920s, Asians’ and Mexicans’ ethnic and racial identities remained conjoined. The legal racialization of these ethnic groups’ national origin cast them as permanently foreign born and unassimilable to the nation. I argue that these racial formations produced ‘alien citizens’—Asian Americans and Mexican Americans born in the U.S. with formal U.S. citizenship but who remained alien in the eyes of the nation” (7-8). Key Terms: Juridical & non-juridical citizenship “Ethno-racial minority groups pursue social inclusion, making claims of belonging and engaging with society, irrespective of formal status. Latino studies scholar William Flores and Rena Benmayor, for example, argue that the mobilization of ‘cultural citizenship’ by subordinate ethnic groups is ‘redressive’ [sets right] and contributes to a multicultural society. “For Rosaldo, cultural citizenship ‘refers to the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity, or native language) with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one’s right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes’” ( Lazar 2013, 10). From another angle, a nonjuridical concept of membership suggests the production of collectivities that are not national but transnational, sited in borderlands and in diaspora. The liabilities of illegal alienage and alien citizenship may thus be at least partially offset through individual and collective agency, within and across national borders”(3). Immigration Act of 1924—Driving Factors 1) Post WWI wartime nationalism, specifically a “feverish sentiment against presumably disloyal ‘hyphenated Americans’ (19). 2) “The country [manufacturing/industrial capitalism had matured] simply no longer needed the same levels of mass immigration” [agricultural workers were needed] (19) 3) “The international system that emerged with WWI gave primacy to the territorial integrity of the nation-state, which raised the border between nations [e.g. passport and visa requirements]” (19). Immigration Act of 1924—Components 1) “restricted immigration to 155,000 a year, established temporary quotas based on 2 percent of the foreign-born population in 1890, and mandated the secretaries of labor, state, and commerce to determine quotas on the basis of national origins by 1927” (23). 2) “excluded from immigration all persons ineligible to citizenship, a euphemism for Japanese exclusion” (23). 3) “placed no numerical restrictions on immigration from countries of the Western Hemisphere, in deference to the need for labor in southwestern agriculture and American diplomatic and trade interests with Canada and Mexico” (23). National Origins Quota System–Data “Before the Quota Board could address the data (or lack of it), it had to conceptualize the categories that comprised the national origins quota system. ‘National origin,’ ‘native stock,’ ‘nationality,’ and other categories were not natural units of classification; they were constructed according to certain social values and political judgments. For example, ‘native stock’ did not refer to persons born in the United States but to persons who descended from the white population of the United States at the time of the nation’s founding. The board defined the ‘immigrant stock’ population as all persons who entered the United States after 1790 and their progeny” (26). “The law defined ‘nationality,’ the central concept of the quota system, according to country of birth. Although the statue made no explicit reference to race, race entered the calculus and subverted the concept of nationality in myriad ways. Ironically, nationality did not mean ‘country of birth’ as far as defining the American nationality was concerned. The law excluded nonwhite people residing in the United States in 1920 from the population universe governing the quotas. The law stipulated that ‘inhabitants in continental United States in 1920’ does not include: 1) Immigrants from the [Western Hemisphere] or their descendants 2) Aliens ineligible for citizenship or their descendants 3) Descendants of slave immigrants 4) Descendants of the American aborigines “To the extent that the ‘inhabitants of the continental United States in 1920’ constituted a legal representation of the American nation, the law excised all nonwhite, non-European peoples from that vision, erasing them from the American nationality” (26). National Origins Quota System—Link to Census “Few, if any, doubted the Census Bureau’s categories of race as anything other than objective divisions of an objective reality, even though the census’s racial categories were far from static. [ . . . ] Census data carried the weight of official statistics: its power lay in its formalization of racial categories. The census gave the quotas an imprimatur that was nearly unimpeachable and was invoked with remarkable authority [ . . . ]” (27 and 29). [Quoting Margo Anderson] “the classifications created for defining urban and rural populations, social and economic classes, and racial groups created a vocabulary for public discourse on the great social changes taking place in America at the time—industrialization, urban growth, and, of course, immigration” (30, see also 31). National Origins Quota System—Fundamental Problem “While the national origins quota system intended principally to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe and used the notion of national origins to justify discrimination against immigrations from those nations, it did more than divide Europe. It also divided Europe from the non-European world. It defined the world formally in terms of country of nationality but also in terms of race. The quota system distinguished persons of the ‘colored races’ from ‘white’ persons from ‘white’ countries” (27). “Thus the national origins quota system proceeded from the conviction that the American nation was, and should remain, a white nation descending from Europe. If Congress did not go so far as to sponsor race breeding, it did seek to transform immigration law into an instrument of mass racial engineering” (27). Fundamental Problem: “its methodology assumed that national identities were immutable and transhistorical, passed down through generations without change” (33). [Intended/Unintended?] Result: “Composite American” would be white. [ . . . ] Congress and the Quota Board invented national origins that paradoxically upheld both the inviolate nature of racial bloodlines and the amalgamation of the descendents of European nationalities into a single white American race. Hill presciently imagined that one consequence of restricting European immigration would be the evolution of white Americans” (36-37). National Origins Quota System—Effects The national origins quota system [establishing temporary quotas based on 2% of the foreign-born population in 1890, and mandated the secretaries of labor, state, and commerce to determine quotas on the basis of national origins by 1927] involved a complex and subtle process in which race and nationality disaggregated and realigned in new and uneven ways” (24). 1) “The new immigration law differentiated Europeans according to nationality and ranked them in a hierarchy of desirability” (24-25). 2) “The law constructed a white American race, in which persons of European descent shared a common whiteness distinct from those deemed not to be white” (25). “IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THAT WHITENESS, THE LEGAL BOUNDARIES OF BOTH WHITE AND NONWHITE ACQUIRED SHARPER DEFINITION” (25). Immigration Act of 1924: Nationalism and Race “Taken together, these three components of the Immigration Act of 1924 constructed a vision of the American nation that embodied certain hierarchies of race and nationality. At its core, the law served contemporary prejudices among white Protestant Americans from northern European backgrounds and their desire to maintain social and political dominance. Those prejudices had informed the restrictionist movement since the late nineteenth century. But the nativism that impelled the passage of the act of 1924 articulated a new kind of thinking, in which the cultural nationalism of the late nineteenth century had transformed into a nationalism based on race” (23). “Consensual Citizenship” Takao Ozawa and Bhagat Sing Thind “argued their claims based on the principle of consensual citizenship, but the principle was always a double-edged sword, for the idea of a social compact required consent by both the individual and the community. It implied liberal, inclusive possibilities, but it also justified racism and exclusion” (42). Ascriptive citizenship: “American citizenship in this instance was not consensual, either in terms of traditional liberal ideology or by individual assent. Rather, it indicated Mexicans’ new status as a conquered population”(51). Deportation Policy: Focus and Argument “This chapter examines the advent of mass illegal immigration and deportation policy under the Immigration Act of 1924” (57). “It argues that numerical restriction created a new class of persons within the national body—illegal aliens—whose inclusion in the nation was at once a social reality and a legal possibility. This contradiction challenged received notions of sovereignty and democracy in several ways: 1) the increase in the number of illegal entries created a new emphasis on control of the nation’s contiguous land borders, which emphasis had not existed before” (57). 2) the application of the deportation laws gave rise to an oppositional political and legal discourse, which imagined deserving and undeserving illegal immigrants and, concomitantly, just and unjust deportations. These categories were constructed out of modern ideas about social desirability, in particular with regard to crime and sexual morality, and values that esteemed family preservation. Critics argued that deportation was unjust in cases where it separated families or exacted other hardships that were out of proportion to the offense committed. As a result, during the 1930s deportation policy became the object of legal reform to allow administrative discretion in deportation cases. Just as restriction and deportation ‘made’ illegal aliens, administrative discretion ‘unmade’ illegal aliens” (57) [e.g “Canadian pre-examination procedure” p. 87]. “The processes of territorial redefinition and administrative enforcement informed divergent paths of immigrant racialization. Europeans and illegal alien, which facilitated their national and racial assimilation as white American citizens. In contrast, Mexicans emerged as iconic aliens. Illegal status became constitutive of a racialized Mexican identity and of Mexicans’ exclusion from the national community and polity” (58). History of Deportation “Legal provisions for the deportation of unwanted immigrants existed in America since colonial times, the principle having been derived from the English poor laws [removal of paupers]. [ . . . ] The expense of transatlantic removal, however, meant that deportations to Europe rarely took place, if at all” (58). “The Alien and Sedition Laws (1798-1801) provided for the exclusion and expulsion of aliens on political grounds. But Americans quickly rejected the principle of political removal [ . . .] Unfettered migration was crucial for the settlement and industrialization of America, even if the laboring migrants themselves were not always free” (58). History of Deportation cont. “It was not until 1891 that Congress authorized the deportation of aliens who within one year of arrival became public charges from causes existing prior to landing, at the expense of the steamship company that originally brought them” (59). The Immigration Act of 1917 added six excludable categories and harsher sanctions, which included “appropriating funds for enforcement the first time” (59). The Act of 1924 “eliminated the statute of limitations on deportation on nearly all forms of unlawful entry and provided for the deportation at any time of any person entering after July 1, 1924, without valid visa or without inspection” (60). Mexican as the prototypical Illegal Alien “It was ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal immigration because, unlike Europeans, they were not subject to numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics, they were not excluded as racially ineligible to citizenship. But as numerical restriction assumed primacy in immigration policy, its enforcement aspects—inspection procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and irregular categories of immigration—created many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants. The undocumented Mexican laborer who crossed the border to work in the burgeoning industry of commercial agriculture emerged as the prototypical illegal alien”(71). Ambiguity of Apprehension and Deportation [January 1930] Members of the House immigration committee expressed concern that the Border Patrol, which was not a criminal law enforcement agency and had no statutory authority to execute search warrants, had defined its jurisdiction not just at the border but far into the nation’s interior. If, as Hull said, ‘wherever [officers] find an alien, they stop him,” how did the officers know the difference between an alien and a citizen? Indeed, what did it mean that Border Patrol officers could stop, interrogate, and search without a warrant anyone, anywhere, in the United States?” (56). Argument: “imported colonialism” The transnationalization of Mexican labor force [i.e. Bracero Program], “constituted a kind of ‘imported colonialism’ that was a legacy of the 19th century American conquest of Mexico’s northern territories. Modern, imported colonialism produced new social relations based on the subordination of racialized foreign bodies who working in the U.S. but who remained excluded from the polity by both law and social custom. I do not mean to suggest a formal structure or model of colonialism in the classical sense. Rather, imported colonialism is better described as a de facto socio-legal condition embedded in the formally noncolonial relationships and spaces, in which free citizens of Mexico, an independent nationstate, voluntarily contracted to putatively free, waged labor, within the United States proper” (129). “The decision to use foreign contract labor was a momentous break with past policy and practice. The United States had outlawed foreign contract labor in 1885” (137, see also 138). Contract labor “The decision to use foreign contact labor was a momentous break with past policy and practice. The United States had outlawed foreign contract labor in 1885. Since the time of the Civil War, Americans had believed that contract labor, like slavery, was the antithesis of free labor, upon which democracy depended. Like the slave, the contract laborer was not free to gain over wages or working conditions, either individually or collectively. [ . . . ] Americans’ rejection of contract labor was so embedded in the national political culture that its practice in Hawai’I was terminated in 1898, when the United States formally annexed the islands. [ . . . ] As African American sharecroppers and tenant farmers in the South continued to bear the marks of race slavery, Mexican workers in the Southwest and California were racialized as a foreign people, an ‘alien race’ not legitimately present or intended for inclusion in the polity” (137-38). Bracero Program (1942-1964) “From 1948 to 1964, the United States imported, on average 200,000 braceros a year” (139). “Involved some 4.6. million workers” (138). Public Law 78/Migrant Labor Agreement (139) (145) Remittances (142) Wage Depression (143) Work Permits (154) (161) [Supply, Demand, and Control] “Operation Wetback” [June 1954] (155) End of Bracero Program 1)Postwar Prosperity (165) 2)National Triumphalism (165) 3)Mechanized Agribusiness (166) Source: Site of Construction: U.S.-Mexico Border “Walking (or wading) across the border emerged as the quintessential act of illegal immigration, the outermost point in a relativist ordering of illegal immigration. The method of Mexicans’ illegal entry could thus be perceived as ‘criminal’ and Mexican immigrants as undeserving of relief. Combined with the construction of Mexicans as migratory agricultural laborers (both legal and illegal) in the 1940s and 1950s, that perception gave powerful sway to the notion that Mexicans had no rightful presence on U.S. territory, no rightful claim of belonging” (89). Western Hemisphere Quotas Strategic Neglect 1) Pan-American and Good Neighbor Policies (254) 2) Economic Reciprocity (254-55) a) Agribusiness’s Interests b) Access to Mexican, Caribbean, and Latin American countries’ markets. McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (237) Amended Immigration Act of 1917 (237) “While also preserving nonquota immigration from countries of the Western Hemisphere, it imposed quotas on the former British colonies in the Caribbean, a move that was designed to limit the migration of black people into the United States” (238). “The law eliminated the racial bar to citizenship, which finally ended Japanese and Korean exclusion and made policy consistent with the recent repeals of Chinese, Indian, and Filipino exclusion” (238). Used Asian-race quota to promote a “color-blind naturalization policy” (238) Introduced the concept of “occupational preferences designed to further narrow and refine the immigrant stream. The law required at least one-half of each country’s quotas to go to persons with naturalized skills deemed in short supply in the United states. The second and third preferences were for parents of adult U.S. citizens (30%) and spouses and children of permanent resident aliens (20%), respectfully” (238) Stiffened deportation policy” (239) Construction of “Mexican” “The formation of the migratory agricultural workforce was perhaps the central element in the broader process of modern Mexican racial formation in the United States” (131). “Restrictive policies created Mexican illegal aliens—migrants who were ‘undocumented’ because they crossed the border without going through formal entry and inspection and therefore lack the requisite papers: visas, head-tax receipts, border-crossing cards, inspection certificates, bathing certificates, and the like” (131). “The construction of ‘Mexican’ into a one-dimensional ‘commodity function and utility’ devalued nearly everything that held meaning to Mexicans—the individual self, the family, culture, and political experience” (132). “The construction of the ‘wetback’ as a dangerous and criminal pathogen fed the general racial stereotype of ‘Mexican.’ [ . . . ] Wetbacks, said one official were ‘superficially indistinguishable from Mexicans legally in the United States.’ In fact, undocumented migrants were part of a heterogeneous ethno-racial Mexican community in the southwestern United States. More precisely, they represented that generation of newcomers that exists in nearly all immigrant groups, which is distinguished by its concentration in low-waged jobs, its lack of acculturation, and simultaneously, by its settlement and assimilation into the resident ethnic community” (149). We “all look the same”? Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, Wetbacks, Aliens… Mexican American Point of View (255) “Mexican Americans empathized with the plight of undocumented workers and braceros [e.g. Operation Wetback, the El Paso Incident, the “Ninth Proviso” (p. 155)], with whom they shared a common ethno-racial identity” (158). “At the same time, Mexican Americans believed that ‘wetbacks’ and braceros were the direct cause of their own social and economic problems” (158). “scabs” (158) “racial degradation” (159) “invoking citizenship” (159) LULAC [Spanish heritage] (74) (159) (160) Administrative Control [Secretary of Labor and INS] (256) (257) Ch. 7 The Liberal Critique: Argument “This chapter argues that the thinking that impelled immigration reform in the decades following World War II developed along a trajectory that combined liberal pluralism and nationalism. These views emerged in the historical specificities of postwar domestic race and class relations and the political economy of the United States’ position as a world superpower. Post-World War II liberal nationalism conjoined a pluralist view of American domestic group relations and a nationalist privileging of the U.S. nation-state’s geopolitical and economic position in the world. Elucidating the ways in which various strains of nationalism inflected liberal pluralism and the reformation of immigration policy helps us understand both the inclusionary and exclusionary features in the Immigration Act of 1965” (230). Postwar Liberals’ Rhetorical Moves “Apotheosis of postwar liberalism, cultural pluralism, and democratic political mobilization” (227). Nature of the American Nation—Three Basic Intellectual Schools: 1) Nativists: American identity is best represented by individuals with northern European cultural and ethnic roots. 2) Nationalists: the nation is humankind’s best institutional hope. a) Conservative: preach a hard-edged assimliationism b) Liberal: take the best qualities of the nation-state as a form of human association and put them to work in the advancement of liberal ideas (i.e. individual rights and equality) 3) Multiculturalism: while it emphasizes group different at the expense of national unities, it is premised on the persistence of a strong state as an agent of redistribution. Immigration Policy reflects: America’s “normative constructions of nation-state territoriality that dominated immigration policy since World War I” (230). America’s support or disavowal of fascism (242). America’s commitment to a policy of formal equality reflects the nation’s stance on equal treatment of all ethnic groups” (245). America’s ability to mold itself outside of conceptions of image, reputation, and formal equality (253). [secular morality] Cultural Pluralism: “The idea that America comprises a diversity of ethno-racial groups. In this vision, democracy respects and depends upon all ethnic groups’ contributions to society and the equal rights of all individuals, regardless of their national origin” (228). Watershed legislation of Kennedy-Johnson Era Civil Rights Act of 1964 (227) Outlawed discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, religion, etc. Voter Registration Outlawed Segregation 1965 Hart-Cellar Immigration Act (258) “Repealed the system of national origins quotas [ . . . ] It’s single achievement was that it ended the policy of admitting immigrants according to a hierarchy of racial desirability and established the principle of formal equality in immigration” (228). Effects—Intended and Unintended “Congress had not understood that the system of formal equality would have the practical result of continuously producing new chains of migration. As part of their abstract, formalist approach, reformers viewed the quotas statically, as a fixed number of admissions a year. They had not understood that each quota immigrant admitted into the country could open a path for nonquota family migration ,as well as for additional family migration in other quota-preference categories” (262). “Eastern and southern Europeans, the principal objects of exclusion in the Immigration Act of 1924, could now enter the United States in equal numbers as northern and western Europeans. This was an important political victory for Euro-American ethnic groups” (263). “non-European immigrant communities and intellectuals had virtually no agency in the reform movement” (263). “Created greater opportunities for migration from Asia and Africa [1980s] but severely restricting it from Mexico, the Caribbean, and Latin America” (261) (263 *Increased Asian immigration (262) [family preference and professional preference] *Numerical restrictions placed on Western Hemisphere did not take labor demands into account. Overarching Impact “The persistence of numerical restriction in the postwar period, with its emphasis on territoriality, border control, and deportation of illegal aliens, suggests that in some respects immigration reform only hardened the distinction between citizen and alien” (229). “The thinking that impelled immigration reform in the decades following WWII developed along a trajectory that combined liberal pluralism and nationalism” (230). “Narrating Western Hemispheric restriction as an expression of the liberal principle of fairness reinforced the notion that illegal immigration was a problem that could be blamed on the Mexican migrant (or on Mexico) and, moreover, one that could be solved with enforcement” ( 264). “Latinos” and Immigration The 2000 Census counted 32.8 million Latinos and Latinas in the United States; these diverse communities—Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Dominican, Salvadoran—collectively account for 12% of the total U.S. population. Because Mexicans and Central Americans make up the vast majority of undocumented immigrants today, they experience persistently high levels of poverty and disenfranchisement and embody the stereotypical illegal alien” (267). “At the same time, some Latinas and Latinos have achieved a measure of structural assimilation into the mainstream of American society. The business and professional classes (particularly among Cuban Americans and Mexican Americans) have garnered considerable political influence; and Latinas and Latinos such as Ricky Martin, Jennifer Lopez, and Cameron Diaz have broken into the top echelons of the entertainment industry” (267). Do the 1924 and 1965 Immigration Acts evince American Exceptionalism? Ngai’s take: “America’s Greatness” “If liberals clearly saw the war [II] as an opportunity for advancing cultural pluralism, a more subtle process advocating a nationalist claim to superiority and world leadership is also visible. ‘Greatness,’ which a half-century earlier comprised Anglo-Saxon race superiority, now inhered in the American pluralist ethos, which was envisioned paradoxically as universal and unique to the U.S. nation-state. [ . . . ] Wartime nationalism was indeterminate, however, and as a vision for the postwar world order it was ambivalent and contested” (233). Louis Adamic [Slovene-American writer], A Nation of Nations (1945)—promoted America’s ethnic diversity. Henry Luce “American Century” 1942—based on foreign investment, exports, and cultural and military hegemony. Centralize power while promoting democracy worldwide. Henry A. Wallace [VP under FDR] “The Century of the Common Man” (1942) Connected Democracy and Christianity. Advocated to spread New Deal Liberalism Across the World. Ralph Ellison and Angelo Herndon [labor organizer] “peoples’ century”—common man’s century
Indian Given RACIAL GEOGRAPHIES ACROSS MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES MARÍA JOSEFINA SALDAÑA-PORTILLO DUKE UP, 2016 Project Significance of “across” (2) (15) [This book] “is about the power of racialized ‘ways of seeing’ national geographies as presumably natural, especially as they are visualized along the divide of the Mexico-U.S. border. [ . . . ] While concerned with how Mexico and the United States are visualized and known as nations, across in the title indexes a relationship between these two geographies rather than an exhaustive account of either, suggesting a process that is ongoing rather than a settled state” (2). Indian and indio “untranslatability” (8) (16) (20, ethnographical terms) (21) “ ‘Indians’ and ‘indios’ are not transhistorical phenomena, in other words. The point is not simply that the terms Indian and indio fail to index the rich heterogeneity of the thousands of indigenous peoples in the United States and Mexico, but rather, that there were multiple generic ‘Indians’ and ‘indios’ deployed over time, with these generic concepts morphing as required by the acquisition of space by Spanish and AngloAmerican colonialism especially during moments of colonial or national crisis” (8). “Necessary to reconstruct the genealogies of our divergent yet shared Mexican and U.S. racial geographies” (7). Argument 1) Nation and border produced by “colonial” encounters with indigeneity (6) (9) 2) Careful placement and displacement of indigenous subjects created colonial spaces (7) (11) 3) Heterotemporality [Endnote 31] “Heterotemporality is an effect of the lived reality of multiple racial geographies unfolding in one place, but it is not exclusive to the contemporary moment. Thus Spanish colonialism on the northern frontier of New Spain was itself heterotemporal, as the time of Spanish conquest encountered, negotiated, and cohabited with the time of indigenous nations therein. The same is true, of course, for Anglo-American racial geographies” (263, see also (25) (27) (64-65) (66-67) (70) (77) (85) 4) Contemporary cultural phenomena [i.e. Chicano Atzlán, White Vigilantism, ‘Muslim jihadist,’ and ‘narco-terrorist’] are the effects of overlapping racial geographies (7) Framework and Method Trace “colonial modes of governmentality imposed on and engaged by indigenous people” (6) (28-29) Pursue a “transnational study of the colonial records of Spanish and British colonization” (6) Demonstrate “the ways in which racial geographies of Mexico and the United States were mutually constituted and imbricated in their colonial legacies” (7) Investigate “instances in which colonial enterprises conspired in their construction of racialized spaces” (7) Trace “how Spanish and Anglo-American colonial concerns re-placed or removed indigenous concerns in/from certain places. Eventually, colonial concerns became national ones, and an ensemble of tangible and measurable geographical forms became ‘national landscapes,’ those desired, remembered and somatic spaces that imaginatively relied on the visioning and emplotment of Indians and indios” (19) Interpret “the racial geographies of the United States and Mexico as both material and perpetual scenes/seens of social worlds past” (20). Key Idea: Racial Geography [CONCEPT] “It is my contention that Mexican and U.S. national geographies are neither merely natural nor strictly politically derived. Rather, they are the effect of visualizing indios and Indians in landscape. If both national boundaries and the way in which we visualize national geographies are derived from the racializing of space through the figure of the Indian, then ‘racial geography’ is not simply a term for describing a given effect in space in racial terms. Racial geography is a technology of power, and when used as an analytic and theory of spatial production, it indexes the series of techniques used to produce space in racial terms” (17, emphasis mine). [AS AN ANALYTIC] “Visualizing spaces as racial geographies is not just about discussing a manner of seeing, in other words; racial geography theorizes a way of envisioning, of mapping, of accounting for and representing space as Indian given. Thus, racial geography as an analytic necessarily bu8lds on the recent disciplinary critiques of the role geography played in colonialisms and augments these critiques” (17, emphasis mine). [AS INDICATIVE OF PROCESS] “Geography, then, implies a process— ‘the inherently unfinished and multilayered ‘graphing of the geo’ –rather than a given representation of a cartographically fixed place (Sparke 2005, xii). Understanding racial geography as an unfinished geo-graphing defamiliarizes the maps of Mexico and the United States as well, allowing us to see these maps not as the given cartography of closed and settled nation, but as ongoing palimpsests of spatial negotiation amongst colonial, national, and indigenous populations”( 19, emphasis mine). Savage Indians/Vanishing Indians Two Key Tropes: “Savage” and “Vanishing” Indian (54) ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ a) U.S. Nation (54) b) as “tactics” (55) c) fair purchase and consent (55) d) colonial space-making terms (56) Barbarous Indian (24) Savage Indian (54) Vanishing Indian (27) (28) (54) Faithful and Unfaithful Indians (53) Indians as landscape (53) Ch. 1 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class Project ◦ [Manuscript] “Indian Given considers defining instances in the formation of the racial geographies of the United States and Mexico as recorded in the historical and legislative archive, in literature and film, and in political speech. I trace the emergence of these two representational and material national spaces from their respective colonial mappings of the figure of the Indian from the 18th through the 21st centuries” (33, emphasis mine; see also Encounter (link to Joseph et. al. 33 and 40). ◦ [Chapter] (56) “My purpose is neither to adjudicate the ethics of these tactics of recognition, nor to parse the incongruent meanings of ‘property’ among settlers and Indians. Rather my purpose is to note, once again, the similarity of effect occasioned by the tactics of vision and recognition that imputed nomadic savagery and those that imputed propertied civilization; both rendered the land held by indigenous peoples alienable” (56, empahsis mine). Intervention [Genealogy of Racial Graphing] ◦ “My point in foregrounding this twofold historical context for the 1550 Valladolid debate is to point out the inevitable conflation of—indeed the genealogical affiliation among—the Islamic infidel, the Morisco and converso collaborator, the Christian heretic, and the New World barbarian. This is a key aspect in the racial graphing of the colonial geo for Spain, for the indios the Spanish encountered for the first time at the end of the 15th century were no cut from a new cloth. Rather, the ideas expressed about their nature, particularly by their detractors, emerged out of this deeper history of Spain’s encounter with Islam and with the Protestant reformation” (39-40). Ch. 1 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class (cont.) Key Idea: Indian-as-property (34) (42-43) Key Idea: Nature of indigenous humanity (34) ◦ Link to Valladolid (1550) and idea that Indians have not rejected Christ (43-44) Key Idea: Performance of the Contract (58) “This performance of the contractual exchange, in other words, was a central tactic for the recognition of Indians as capable human agents; but the performance was as well the evidence of its constitutive fraudulence: a purely formal participation in the contract process made the contract substantive, regardless of the unequal power relations that mediated the meaning of the contract’s content” (58). ◦ a) Performance of Free Will [via contracts] (59) ◦ b) Indians as coproducers of British colonial space (59) ◦ c) Land tenure and the transformation of the Atlantic seaboard (59) Larger Point: Freedom to acquire land and Freedom from feudal tyranny contributed to “the constitution of a ‘revolutionary’ American subjectivity” (61-62) Ch. 2 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class Theoretical Framework—H. Lefebvre ◦ “the local” or “punctual” (66) (67) ◦ “punctual practices” and “punctual geographies” (68) Argument: ”Indian space is never simply absorbed” (66-67) “The punctual indigenous geographies of the region coexist, heterotemporally, with the emergent Spanish racial geography. In other words, the time of Spanish settlement does not simply impose itself on indigenous time, usurping it. Indigenous time persisted, intercalated with Spanish colonial time” (77, emphasis mine). Evidence ◦ Pages “Indian plot points” [Encode and Embody] (68) ◦ Knowledge Production (72) (93) Ch. 2 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class (cont.) Link to Class—Contact Zone (91) Transnational Legacy of San Saba Papers (69-70) Intervention: “Indian Aggressors” –Anticolonial Resistance [too rehearsed] (85) (91) ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Spanish nomenclature [“Indios Grandes”] (72) representational spaces (21-22) (78) (82) (94) “prose of counter insurgency” (83) “heterotemporality” (85) No Country for Old Men Key Claims (95) ◦ a) The cinematography in the film reiterates the coordinates of a 19th century U.S. racial geography: representing the southwestern landscape as bereft of indigenous presence” (95). ◦ b) No Country functions as a political allegory, representing U.S. imperial violence abroad as if it were an internal matter, a recent flaw in the otherwise ethical character of a nation” (95). Approach [“ . . . ] with attention to the hetertemporal racial geographies of the region, we can deconstruct the film’s encoding of the landscape as emptied of Indians, finding instead the punctual Indian who refuses to cede ground, willingly or unwillingly” (95). Chigurth ◦ “jihadist within” (98) ◦ ”In this reading of the film, the character of Chigurh does not represent the quintessential foreigner after all but the original indigenous inhabitants who refuse anachronistic reduction, who refuse to cede their territory even after dispossession has occurred. Political Allegory of the Film (100-101) “common hysteria” claim (106-107) Ch. 4 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class Project [Chapter] “In this chapter, I follow the heterotemporal trace of the indio bárbaro into the making of the segregated 20th century landscape of the Southwest and the bipolar racial geography of the post-Civil War United States. Between 1896 and 1954, Mexicans and Mexican-Americans fought a series of legal cases for naturalization, for ending segregation in schools, and for challenging discrimination in the empanelment of juries. [ . . . ] I consider how these cases produces space in the Lefebverian sense: the litigation and resolution of these cases facilitated the representation of U.S. national space as emptied of indigeneity, while also encoding ‘America’ as a representational space of democracy” (160-161) . [Manuscript] (160) Link to Class: Weise (156) Key Idea: Mestizaje (156) (159) (167) ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ a) “Hispano-Mexican” (156) b) As claim for U.S. citizenship (157) (161) (167) (173) c) “Authentic Mexicans” (158) d) Culture and Biology (158) Ch. 4 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class (cont.) Key Claim #1: Border (159) ◦ a) racial embodiment and geographical emplotment (159) ◦ b) Mexican-Americans offer unique window into U.S. jurisprudence (159) ◦ c) International Justice (169) (187) Key Claim #2: Mestizaje and Political Enfranchisement (168) (171) ◦ a) Intervention [Link to Ch. 1 Discussion of Resistance] (160) ◦ b) Revolutionary Mestizaje (160) ◦ c) “racial geography of mestizaje” (191) Key Idea: Resolution of Justice (163) (167) ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ a) Naturalization law (165) b) U.S. recognition of “indigenous surrender” (166) c) Asian Immigrants (168) d) Indeterminate racial status [Link to Knowledge Production] (169) e) Performance of justly reasoned exclusion and exceptions [Link to Ch. 1] (175) b) “reparative justice” [link to Ngai and 1964] (189) Ch. 4 Project, Key Ideas, and Links to Class (cont.) Key Ideas: “Aspirational Whiteness” and “Other White” Strategy ◦ a) Link to Afro-Latinx issues [Mendez v. Westminster] (185) and [LULAC & NAACP, George I. Sánchez] (190-191) ◦ b) Mexican Americans—”distinct class within whiteness” (189) ◦ c) LULAC—”doubts about homogeneity” (190) Key Idea: Transcontinental American Patriotism (193) Key Idea: Racial Geography of Aztlán (194) Key Idea: “la gran familia mejicana” (173) Link to Class: “Annexed Mexicans” (155) [Link to Ngai: 155 and 187]
Prompt: Critically examine the film No Country for Old Men. Your task is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of Saldaña-Portillo's reading of the film by utilizing at least one secondary source (peer-reviewed article or chapter) from class as well as one secondary source (peer-reviewed article or chapter) from outside of class. Your analysis should consider how the readings you choose compliment and/or critique her interpretation of the film. To illustrate, should consider not only the strengths and weaknesses of her reading of the film, but how your secondary sources help us to better understand the film in ways that Saldaña-Portillo's text does not. Film Link: 27%2Fwatch%3Ftoken%3D65838b434cde73351e7a0a8348b9515bd153b883e6a57b1d9596574 48f05e608 Sources from class: I upload some sources from class, you can choose one of them. Source outside of class: You can use any secondary source that you has connection with the film.
Latinos in New England Edited by Andres Torres liffiil l!::I Temple University Press PHILADELPHIA x Acknowledgments junctures. Thanks also to others who provided materials, advice, and other forms of support: Ramon Borges-Mendez, Melissa Colon, Linda Delgado, James Green, Ramona Hernandez, Marta Monteiro-Sieburth, and Jaime Rodriguez. Jim O'Brien, who I have relied on in the past, produced the index. During my stint as director of the institute I was able to count on many colleagues for moral and material support, especially at the College of Public and Community Services, the Asian American Studies Institute, and the William Monroe Trotter Institute. I also extend special thanks to Robert J. Hildreth who, during my time, has been a steadfast and generous donor to the Institute's work. I am happy that Temple University Press is publishing this work. Dating back to my previous association with Doris Braendel, I have enjoyed collaborating with the Press. For their assistance with the present anthology, I thank Janet Francendese, Will Hammell, Gary Kramer, Peter Wissoker, Dave Wilson, and the production and marketing staffs. I am also appreciative of Kim Hoag for her diligent oversight of the production process. The final phase of the manuscript preparation process found me in a state of hectic transition. Leaving the Boston area and not yet settled in my new home in New York, I constantly fretted that some catastrophe might derail the manuscript's progress. Fortunately, this editor's nightmares were limited to the imagination. For this I am grateful to my brothers-in-law and their wives, Philip and Terri, Ruben and Nicki. Over the course of several weeks in limbo, they provided me with a writer's sanctuary, reliable technology, and warm company. As always, my wife Carmen Vivian, and my children, Rachel and Orlando, have been my principle cheerleaders. As well as John, Jaclyn, David and Jonathan. iGracias, familia! iGracias, todos! Latinos in New England: An Introduction Andres Torres h en the United States declared war on Mexico, more than a century and half ago, did anyone imagine that this act would ultimately bond this country into a permanent relation with our southern neighbor? It was a war of conquest, supported by the logic of Manifest Destiny and by the economic interests that desired the extension of slaveowning territories. U.S. imperial might (and Mexican internal division) dictated an easy victory, leading to the appropriation of half the land formerly belonging to Mexico. To this day Mexican-Americans can claim, with a measure of historical accuracy, "we didn't cross the U.S. border, the U.S. border crossed us." A little-known episode of the so-called Mexican War, which has ironic relevance to the present anthology, concerns the story of the San Patricios. This was a brigade of mostly Irish Americans who had been recruited to fight in the invading army, but who abandoned the U.S. side to join with the Mexicans. Like their putative enemy, these Irish had been colonial subjects and were Catholic. In the gateway cities of Boston and New York, the newcomers had been subjected to ethnic and religious discrimination. South of the border, they were enticed with promises of land 1 and freedom if they joined the Mexican Army. When U.S. victory came, the San Patricios met a tragic ending, most of them executed or jailed for desertion. North of the Rio Grande history treats them as an embarrassing chapter; in Mexico City a monument preserves their names in honor for their gallantry in battle. In 1997 the Mexican and Irish governments issued commemorative stamps of the St. Patrick's Battalion. Decades later history would record another interesting link of a Hispano-Yankee character.Jose Marti, writer and freedom fighter, was a leading figure in the Cuban independence struggle. In 1869 the Spanish authorities exiled him from bis homeland, after which he lived many years in Latin America and in New Yark City. Though he was skeptical of W 2 Latinos in New England U.S. intentions in the Caribbean, he was an admirer of this country's democratic ideals. Marti was attracted to the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, the famous New England essayist and philosopher. A democrat and humanist, Emerson was an active Abolitionist and had opposed the U.S. war on Mexico. Marti wrote about Emerson, showing his Latin American readers that there was another side to the bellicose Giant of the North.2 In the early twentieth century, by which time the United States had replaced Spain as the dominant foreign influence in Latin America, a young Puerto Rican was studying at Harvard. His records reveal how active Pedro Albizu Campos was while living in Cambridge. In June of 1916, he wrote, "I have given lectures in Boston and other cities on LatinAmerican questions. This year I was invited to speak at the Convention of New England Immigration Secretaries. I spoke on the Monroe Doctrine at the Boston Social Science Club ... [and gave] the welcome address at the reception given to all foreign students at Harvard." Like Marti, Albizu Campos was inspired by the democratic strain in U.S. history. After this country entered World War I, he wrote in the Harvard Crimson of "our [Puerto Ricans'] loyalty to the United States." He was still concerned, however, that U.S. power was impeding Puerto Rico's autonomy, two decades after the Spanish-American War. "We want Americans to know the facts of our situation that they may be true to themselves and find a just solution for our relations."3 It may be that these are but tenuous connections, individual stories plucked out of the historical record. Yet I hope they demonstrate some symbolic precedence to a reality that can no longer be denied. Latin America's children-her Latinas and Latinos-are a permanent fixture in New England. This book assembles new writings from experts who examine the Latino impact on New England, perhaps the most tradition-bound area of the United States. A "blue state" region perceived as a stalwart liberal zone, many are paying attention to this part of the country as a new testing ground for social and economic policies that will challenge the area's reputation for civil discourse and multicultural tolerance. The reality is that, in urban areas where racial/ethnic minorities are expanding their presence and asserting their rights, we observe ongoing tensions over the future direction of these cities and their populations. Latinos are increasingly a player in these dynamics. The central inquiry of this book is this: How is the Latino community influencing New England's socioeconomic, political, and cultural life, and, reciprocally, how is the community being shaped in its interaction with the region's peoples, traditions and institutions? Andres Torres 3 An underlying premise of this inquiry is that the Latino community, though multiethnic and multiracial, generally acts as a collective identity when interacting with the larger society. Yet, under specific circumstances, each national origin group ("sub-Latino" identity) may simultaneously express its political agency, cultural identity, and economic activity differently from other national groups. Latino social action takes place along a spectrum that ranges from unified collectivity (Pan-Latinismo) to nationalistic individuality (ethnic nationalism). There are corollary themes addressed in the chapters that comprise this volume. The contributors each deal with one or more of the following questions: • What is the extent and what are the sources of population growth in the recent past, and what are the socioeconomic trends and conditions at the regional, state, and local level? • What are some key racial/ethnic and class dimensions of Latino socioeconomic trends and Latino life? • What are some examples of the host society's response to the incursion of Latino newcomers? And the subsequent impact on Latino identity and political and social projects? • How do the various ethnic groups in the Latino community relate to each other? • What can we say about the relationship of ethnic identity (either country-specific or pan-Latino) to political participation and representation, social movements, and community institutions? What does the New England experience tell us about the ongoing debate concerning the viability of a pan-Latino identity? This volume disaggregates data and information by national origin sectors, describing discrete instances of Latino community formation and conditions. It assumes that variations within the population are just as instructive as differences between Latinos and the rest of the population. Studying the Latino condition through the lens of region, state, and sub-Latino ethnicity is a major ·goal of this collection. Hopefully, the accumulation of several case studies-each homing in on a specific nexus of geographic and ethnic contexts-will improve our understanding of the Latino experience, in its variations and multiple express10ns. Our methodology is multidisciplinary. The chapters include an eclectic array of approaches: oral histories, case studies, ethnographic inquiries, focus group research, statistical and regression analyses, and surveys.4 4 Latinos in New England Demographic Trends, Socioeconomic Issues Only three decades ago few people took notice of Hispanic demographics. Today the subject has permeated every aspect of American life. By now everyone recognizes three characteristics of the Latino population: its explosive growth, its geographic dispersion, and its ethnic diversity. The New England scene is no exception to these trends. Will the long winters deter the massive influx we have seen in other parts of the country? Perhaps. Most Latin American immigrants come from regions within and contiguous to our hemisphere's tropical zone. Nevertheless, according to the 2000 census, there were close to a million Latinas and Latinos residing in the six states that make up New England.5 Cold weather or not, the numbers will only grow. These immigrants, their children, and the descendants of the core Latino communities that have already been living in the region for decades will ensure a vibrant presence well into the future. Between 1990 and 2000, the Latino population in New England grew 60 percent, from about 545,000 to over 871,000. They comprised 6.3 percent of the total New England population. The number of Latino residents (and share of population) for each state was 427,340 (6.7) for Massachusetts, 318,947 (9.4) for Connecticut, 90,452 (8.6), for Rhode Island, 19,910 (1.6) for New Hampshire, 9,226 (0.7) for Maine, and 5,316 (0.9) for Vermont.6 Ninety-five percent of New England's Latinos live in southern New England: Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. As elsewhere in the country, growth is accompanied by significant geographic dispersion. Cities such as Boston and Hartford, the classic hubs of Latino New England, are no longer the dominant centers of Latino population growth. For example, the Latino growth rate during 19902000 for these cities was 37 percent (increasing from roughly 62,000 to 85,000) and 12 percent (increasing from roughly 44,000 to 49,000), respectively. Other cities are now taking their place alongside these. Among cities where we find fairly substantial Latino populations-say, of at least 20,000-there are a number in which Latino growth rates greatly exceed that of Boston. These include Providence (whose Latino population grew from 25,000 to 52,000, or by 108 percent), Springfield (growing from 26,500 to 41,300, or by 56 percent), and Waterbury (growing from 14,600 to 23,400, or by 60 percent). Other cities in this category are Lawrence (47 percent), New Haven (53 percent), and New Britain, (56 percent). There are also a good number of Latino concentrations in smaller towns of less than ten thousand inhabitants; some of these may appear to outsiders as having cropped up out of nowhere. To name some, Andres Torres 5 whose population at least doubled during the 1990s: East Hartford, Danbury, and Willimantic (in Connecticut), Central Falls and Pawtucket (in Rhode Island), Haverhill (in Massachusetts), and Manchester (in New Hampshire). Another new wrinkle in the Hispanic "demographic" is the increasing variety of national origins. Latinos of Puerto Rican heritage were always the largest single component in New England, and they continue to be so. But their share has declined steadily, even as their tenure in the region continues as the longest. In 1990, 55.7 percent of all Hispanic New . England originated from Puerto Rico, a U.S. territory. By 2000 that figure was 49.4 percent (about 430,000 of the 871,000 Latinos in New England). The Dominican share has doubled, officially, to almost 10 percent. This number represents a significant undercount, perhaps by as much as a quarter or a third. Postcensus examination has shown that many Latinos misconstrued the wording on the census forms. The confusion had the greatest impact on all groups that fell outside the traditional "Hispanic/ Latino" identifiers of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban. The result, in the case of New England, was an estimate of 15.4 percent of Latinos (some 134,000 respondents) who identified themselves as "other Hispanic/Latino," making this anomalous group the second largest population after Puerto Ricans. Researchers, including census officials, have recalculated the counts using other personal data on census forms to arrive at new, unofficial estimates. The result is that the "Other" category is much smaller, and the count for groups such as Dominicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Colombians, and Ecuadorians is much higher.7 There is no reason to expect a change in the growing ethnic diversity among Latinos. In their population and economic profile of Latino New England, Marcelli and Granberry accentuate the positive (Chapter 1). Rapid growth of unfamiliar newcomers has always been a source of alarm for Americans, as it has been for people throughout history. Yet without these infusions this country would never have attained economic affluence. The authors demonstrate that present-day Latino demographics are of the sort that have propelled economic growth in the past, becaLISe Latinos are more likely to form families, have children and spend. A further economic advantage that they offer is their relatively low elderly population: "the Latino population is important not only because without them New England's population would have stagnated between 1990 and 2000, but also because of an age profile that intimates future contributions to regional consumption and productivity." Still, the authors are cognizant that the economic position of Latinos is problematic. They show the statistical gaps between Latinos and other New Englanders in variables such as education, labor force participation, 6 Andres Torres 7 Latinas in New England earnings and employment, and job types. Also identified are the differences among the various Latino groups. The persistent inequalities faced by such groups as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Mexicans, is disconcerting. It is not coincidental that many of the chapters in this volume dwell on aspects of this divergent reality. Of the Hispanics in the region, some 30 percent were identified as foreign born by the 2000 census. A third of these are naturalized U.S. citizens, meaning that 20 percent of New England's Latino population was classified as nonnaturalized immigrants.8 Compared to national levels, New England's Latinos have a lower foreign-born population and a higher rate of citizenship among its immigrant population. Uriarte, Granberry, and Halloran examine recent immigration policies, and find them adversely affecting Massachusetts' foreign-born (Chapter 2). Groups such as Salvadorans, Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Colombians have been caught in a severe policy squeeze. The erosion of sympathy for newcomers dates back to the mid-1990s and is reflected in policy changes that have lead to a "vision of immigration that ignores the social dynamics of population flows and the fundamental interaction between the origin and destination of the flow. This blind spot continues to pull policy in the direction of ever stronger border controls and punitive measures for those who succeed in entering the country nevertheless." The authors remind us that after September 11, worsening attitudes towards immigrants make it only more difficult to appreciate their contributions, and what they need to achieve success in this society. Tightening controls and financial hardship have made it more difficult for people to see kin in their homeland, or to receive visitors from abroad. Budgetary cuts at the state level, where responsibility for immigrant benefits and services is now situated, have reduced access to basic needs, such as health care and housing. The intertwining of immigration and social policies has meant only trouble for this most vulnerable of Latino groups, according to these authors. Looking specifically at housing and homeownership issues, Michael Stone (Chapter 3) uncovers some alarming trends. Latinos seeking housing are having an especially difficult time. The majority of Latino renters, and a quarter of Latino homeowners, lives in a state of "shelter poverty." By this he means that their rental or mortgage costs are so great that they are left with insufficient funds to cover all the other basic household needs. During the 1990s the rise in shelter poverty was greater for Hispanics, especially Latina-headed households, than for any other major ethnic group in Massachusetts. As a result, Latinos have the lowest rate of homeownership. Further compounding the problem is the existence of programs and policies that entice low-income renters into premature homeownership. Migration and Community Several authors offer insights into the process of community formation in New England.9 Three case studies of medium-sized cities are described: Waterbury, Connecticut; Providence, Rhode Island; and Cambridge, Massachusetts. Ruth Glasser's portrait of Waterbury depicts an interesting case of Latino ethnic interaction outside the major urban centers (Chapter 4). The original Puerto Rican population, dating back to the 1950s, has been . joined by a growing Dominican settlement. Like their predecessors from the Caribbean, Dominicans have relied on kinship and social networks to identify residential and economic niches within which to pursue a new life. Affordable rents, the relative ease of home ownership, and plentiful work in the lower occupational echelons of this old industrial town: these are the appeals of Waterbury to Dominicans, whether they be former New Yorkers seeking a more sedate environment or islanders ready to abandon the tropical warmth for a chance at economic opportunity. Glasser situates the Dominican experience in the context of the prior history of Puerto Ricans. As the original Latino group, Puerto Ricans were instrumental in laying the groundwork for Latino community formation in Waterbury. The two groups are not quite co-ethnics (that is, they are not of the same country of origin), but anyone familiar with Caribbean history and with post-1960s migration patterns will attest to the long-standing relations and interactions between the two. It is not coincidental that Puerto Rico is a primary site for immigrants from the Dominican Republic, and that in many places where Dominicans have settled, there is a contiguous Puerto Rican barrio. Waterbury is another locale in which the Boricua-Quisqueyano nexus is being played out. Rhode Island, the smallest state in the country, is home to another thriving Latino community. And though there are other sites of Latino settlement in the state, the capital city of Providence is the center of Latino activity. Providence seems to be unlike other New England cities in that there was not really a substantial Puerto Rican population base out of which a subsequent Latino community is forged. From the beginning, in the 1950s and 1960s (not to speak of earlier decades in which a smattering of Spanish-speaking immigrants had settled in Providence and . other Rhode Island towns), the Hispanic presence had been comprised of a variety of Latin Americans and Caribbeans, as Miren Uriarte points out (Chapter 5). Tracking the community's development over time, Uriarte posits that the Latino experience here varies from standard expectations about the immigrant incorporation process. Neither Gordon's "assimilationist" 8 Latinos in New England model nor the "ethnic resiliency" approach, advocated by Portes and others, quite captures what is going on in the Providence scene. She argues that political activism has taken root quite early in the community's evolution, that it has occurred despite siguificant exclusion from the political and economic structures, and, finally, that it is not exclusively focused on local struggles. Latino diversity, a constant feature of the community's history from its incipient stages, has a lot to do with this trajectory of political activism. It is fair to say that Waterbury (exemplifying Latino succession) and Providence (exemplifying Latino diversity) both represent case studies of promising futures, notwithstanding the authors' concerns regarding Latino social and economic conditions. The city of Cambridge, on the other hand, symbolizes the case of a mature Latino community in the throes of stagnation and exclusion. In the words of a long-time community leader, Latino Cambridge is in the midst of a "quiet crisis" (Chapter 6). Cambridge too has experienced intense Latino political activism and ethnic succession. There was an initial period of ascendancy during the 1960s and 1970s, centering on movements for civil rights and socioeconomic advancement. Later in the 1980s a complex process of Latino succession occurred in which Central Americans augmented the early base of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. The Central Americans, mostly Salvadorans, caught the brunt of America's rightward mm in social and immigrant policy. Most recently a third cohort of newcomers has made its presence felt, a group dominated by professionals: highly educated, affluent, and including many South Americans. While this later group has made inroads in the city's social and political elite, their success has not lifted the standing of other Latinos who arrived previously. Deborah Pacini's inquiry into the causes of this decline includes an assessment of changing social welfare policy, the variability of ethnic and class relations among Latinos, and the "power of place." She reminds us that models of immigrant incorporation can hardly be expected to account for locales such as Cambridge, with an "elite economic environment" that is inhospitable to low-skill, low-wage workers. The specialized nature of Cambridge's key industries and excessive housing costs (the city ended rent control in the mid-!990s) leave little maneuverability for Latinos and other groups on the margin of society. The story of the Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Salvadorans of Cambridge is not a happy one. It is the story of a community with questionable prospects for stable growth and vigorous participation in the city's future. Latino community formation is anything but uniform, as the chapters in this book demonstrate. The sources of immigration are multiple and varying, heavily dependent on what is occurring in the home country, Andres Torres 9 or in U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico. Internal migration leads to the emergence of new U.S. communities as older Latino populations relocate and establish newer settings: from Hartford to West Hartford, New York City to Danbury, Boston to Framingham. Settlement patterns are further consolidated as the second-generation sinks roots in the same locale pioneered by their parents. Community formation ideally leads to the successful incorporation of the second and subsequent generations. (Im)migration, settlement, incorporation: the desired scenario. Various chapters in this collection show how this idealized process is at variance , with reality, often with problematic outcomes. Camayd, Karush, and Lejter (Chapter 7) argue persuasively that in places such as Manchester, New Hampshire, Latinos are on an upwardly mobile track. They make a useful distinction between Latino enclaves and Latino diasporas, the latter representing "Latino settlement characterized by branching regional dispersal from traditional areas of concentration into new enclaves in nontraditional states and cities." Furthermore, in less urbanized states such as New Hampshire, there is a secondary diasporic pattern of movement to suburban areas. Latino growth in Hillsborough county (where Manchester is located) was appreciable during the 1990s, and featured individuals with characteristics untypical of Latinos in the traditional settlement areas. Compared to the rest of the region, New Hampshire's Latinos have a higher ratio of U.S.-born status, and more of them trace their national origin to South America (as opposed to Central America or the Caribbean). Along most demographic and human capital dimensions, New Hampshire's Latinos approximate the characteristics of the mainstream population. Their levels of income, earnings, and asset ownership are higher than for Latinos elsewhere in New England. These are signs of an "emerging middle class" and present opportunities for economic and political contributions to the region. Up to now we have described several contributions to this volume that have depicted communities of place. Hosffman Ospino (Chapter 9) looks at an important religious community within the Latino experience. His study analyzes the terrain of encounter between the European and Latin American traditions within Catholicism in New England. Latinos are the bearers of ''gifts" to the regional church. But often they face resistance to their forms of spirituality, echoing some of the tensions Latinos experience in the political and economic realms. If there is a breach separating the two traditions in the Church, it is not entirely due to mainstream resistance. Ospino suggests that Latin American Catholics may be accustomed to a different way of dealing with the hierarchy, because of "their experience with the clericalist and paternalistic structures of the 10 Andres Torres Latinos in New England church in Latin America." They are often surprised to find that in many U.S. congregations, lay members are encouraged to be involved in the internal decision-making process. Latinos comprise 12 percent of the Catholic Church's following, which is double their share of the region's overall population. Their membership in key urban dioceses, such as Boston and Hartford, is much greater. AB in other parts of the country, they embody much of the Church's future. The manner in which this institution adapts to internal demographic change will determine how successfully it retains this important group. In a sense, the Latino Catholic experience serves as a microcosm of the larger society's handling of newcomer "incorporation." Will religious commonalities overcome cultural differences? The culturally sensitive practices of other Christian denominations continue to attract Latinos away from mainstream Catholicism. How will the political and theological fissures in the Church play out for Latinos? What will be the impact on Latino congregants of the controversies over reproductive rights and gay unions? Ospino's study opens the door to consideration of these questions. The idea that Latin American immigrants continue to maintain ties with the home country, well after they settle in the United States, has been thoroughly documented.10 The New England experience offers plenty of evidence that transnational linkages are an important element in Latino community formation. Dominican migration to Waterbury is incentivized not only by the availability of work and housing, but also by the opportunity to accumulate capital for home building back in La Republica. Glasser notes this pattern, described by some of her informants. Since migration from the Dominican Republic is more costly than it is from Puerto Rico, Dominicans who come to Waterbury tend to come from a higher economic stratum than Puerto Rican newcomers to the city. They tend to hail from the families of business proprietors, farmers, and ranchers. This is less the case for Puerto Ricans, who (when they arrived in large numbers during the 1960s and 1970s) generally were agricultural laborers recruited to work the fields of New England. The selectivity of Dominican immigrants, however, did not lead them to seek housing outside of the Latino working class barrios. They preferred to live in the same areas populated by Puerto Ricans, with whom they were culturally familiar, where affordable housing could be attained. Dominicans of relatively upper-class background could stow away resources for a longer-term goal: building their retirement homes back in the Caribbean. Each year these individuals visit their homeland and, with the funds economized, augment their property: home building on the installment plan. II Transnational activity of this sort differs qualitatively from the pattern of sojourner laborers, who work seasonally in a region and often don't return to the same locale. The bodeguero in Waterbury is a vital member of the community, residing here throughout the year and often involved in social and political efforts. Compared to his homeland status, this individual has dropped a notch or two in class standing, but these immigrants will accept some downward mobility as part of a rational strategy for security and comfort in later years, when they return to their birthplace. Connections with their homelands can also draw immigrant communities into the political realm. Several examples of such transnational linkages are described in this collection. During the 1980s, the Salvadoran community in Cambridge and elsewhere was at the center of solidarity movements protesting U.S. intervention in Central America. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, since the 1970s, Puerto Ricans were galvanized by the controversy over the use of Vieques island as a site for bombing practices by the U.S. Navy. In 2004 Waterbury's Dominicans mobilized compatriots to vote, using absentee ballots, in the Dominican national elections. Many Latin American countries-including Brazilhave increased the profile of their consulates in New England, offering immigration counseling and community development assistance. Countries south of the U.S. border are increasingly recognizing that the nationals who live in New England need to be attended to. Identity and Politics Judging by several chapters in this volume, Latino ethnic awareness owes as much to negative experiences in the host society as it does to pride in one's cultural heritage. The idea that society's hostility toward immigrants can foment nationalistic sentiments among newcomers has a long tradition. More recently scholars have shown how this process applies equally to the Hispanic experience in America. New England provides it own examples of this process of "reactive ethnicity."11 When Massachusetts's citizens voted overwhelmingly in 2003 to vote in favor of "Question 2," a proposal to eliminate the state's bilingual education programs, Latinos and other linguistic minorities were stunned. They were shocked not so much by the outcome but by the margin of defeat. Was the chasm between Latinos (along with other linguistic minorities) and the mainstream that large? Outside of a few cities and towns of liberal leaning, a virtually unanimous sentiment was rendered by the state's majority-white population: it was time to end targeted educational programs for non-English speakers. In the future, after a year 12 Latinos in New England of transition, foreign students would be channeled into "immersion" classrooms, where they would be expected to learn the language of the land. The fact that Massachusetts was home to the first publicly supported bilingual education program, established thirty years earlier, was not lost on supporters of English-only initiatives across the country. Jorge Capetillo and Robert Kramer's assessment of the referendumbased on exit polls, focus group discussions, and media analysis-examines several aspects ofthis contentious issue (Chapter 13). In their view, Englishonly proponents exploited mainstream fears of immigrants, and held out the hope that "by ending bilingual education voters might begin to mend the fractures of present day America." Central to the defeat of the program was the expertly organized and well-financed campaign conducted by bilingual education's critics and national figures such as Ron Unz. It is true that bilingual education's demise was speeded along by an effective campaign drive. Nevertheless, Capetillo and Kramer say, there was a deeper basis for the defeat: an underlying shift in the cultural mood of the majority Massachusetts population. Sympathetic attitudes towards racial/ethnic diversity have been displaced by a concern with large-scale immigration. Today, residents of the Bay State seem to be insisting that newcomers make a commitment to rapid assimilation. Despite this policy setback, Latinos gained immeasurable experience in the political process. Voter participation increased significantly and their ethnic consciousness appears to have intensified, not waned. Latinos interpreted the vote as a rebuke to their cultural identity, not merely a desire by mainstream voters to rid the state of a costly social program. For Anu1car Barreto, the dispute over Question 2 illustrates the dangers of mainstream myopia regarding language policy (Chapter 14). New Englanders should look northward, not southward, if they want a glimpse at the problems created by a forced monoculturalism. For decades the French-speaking Quebecois were deemed outsiders in their Canada. They responded by affirming their differences to the point, almost, of formal succession. "Latino political activism in the northeast developed, for the most part, outside the formal parry structure," Barreto argues. The resounding defeat of bilingual education is another instance in which cultural and political obstinacy may encourage minorities to seek redress through unconventional approaches. Much will hinge on the dominant society's attitude toward diversity. "The various forms of future Latino political participation may depend as much on the reactions of the area's majority as on the actions of Latinos themselves." In his intergenerational study of Dominicans in Rhode Island, Jose Itzigsohn finds that Spanish-language retention among Latino youth Andres Torres 13 reflects a desire to assert cultural pride in the face of discrimination (Chapter 12). In a departure from the practices of earlier European immigrants, Itzigsohn's interviewees even declare their intention to raise their children (the third generation) to be bilingual in Spanish. For the children of immigrants, the Spanish language-and ethnic music, food and celebrations-are used as a "marker of identity." In the U.S. context of discrimination, "maintaining identity symbols like language is in part a form of reactive ethnicity and in part a way of asserting their uniqueness in a plural society where a strong group identity is important for many to forge a strong individual identity." · Dominicans of different generations seem to share a similar worldview: they want to have their children be bilingual, they are critical of U.S. society, and they exhibit "transnational attachments" to the Dominican Republic. Yet the daily practices emanating from this common outlook differ across the generations. For the U.S.-born cohort, Spanish-language maintenance and fondness for their island are symbolic expressions. These practices are less ingrained in concrete living than they are for the first generation. The original immigrants rely on Spanish as their language of birth and speak it daily, and they connect to the homeland through political and economic activities. For the second generation, "the attachment to Spanish and to a transnational identity are part ofasserting their place and identity in the United States." The United States, which to them "feels like home," is the main context for their daily practices, even if its values seem to be at variance with their worldview. Itzigsohn concludes that the path of secondgeneration Dominican incorporation "combines strong critical views of mainstream society, strong pan-ethnic and transnational attachments, and middle-class aspirations." Once again, we see how Latino ethnic formation emerges from both negative and affirmative forces. Pantojas' study of Latino political opinion and behavior in Connecticut is premised on the notion that racial/ethnic minorities are aware of their politically disadvantaged status (Chapter 10). They therefore tend to be alienated regarding formal governmental structures. He draws on the "political empowerment" thesis to test the argument that, only through the election of Latinos and Latinas to public office (that is, the increase in "ascriptive representation"), will mainstream political institutions gain the community's trust and participation. There is plenty of evidence that Connecticut's Latinos feel separated from the political system, according to Pantojas' analysis of survey data. The results reveal cynicism toward political officials and political parties, whether in their home state or in Washington, DC. "These are troubling 14 Latinos in New England findings, since these orientations are often associated with political apathy or participation in other antidemocratic behaviors." There are two interesting additional results of this study. First, that among the state's second-generation Latinos there is even greater distrust of government than among immigrant Latinos. Second, that cynicism toward certain political institutions is greater among those with higher levels of education. It appears that increased exposure to the system undermines confidence in it. Jose Cruz provides another perspective on Latino participation in the arena of formal politics (Chapter 11). The author reports on his interviews of a dozen Latino political leaders in Connecticut. The bulk of Latino leadership is Puerto Rican, reflecting the fact that Connecticut is the state with the highest share of Puerto Rican population. In the few instances of elected officials of other Latino origins, even these were dependent on the Puerto Rican electorate, which combines citizenship status with longest residency in the area. Cruz goes so far as to say that, in the case of Connecticut, "the pan-ethnic category (of Latinos) is not much more than an artificial label for what are essentially Puerto Rican politics." One might assume a certain convenience in connection with this virtual dominance of a single group within the Latino polity. There would be no need for constant negotiation among the Latino partners as they try to forge pan-Latino collaboration. Cruz argues, however, that the Puerto Rican-dominated leadership has not succeeded in building an effective statewide presence. For example, the majority of his informants (all are elected officials) do not view coalition building as a requirement for political success. And he finds that there is no "systematic effort ... to coordinate and share resources, ideas, and strategies among themselves." In the end, the author says, there is not much of a basis for optimism. Despite the achievements at the local level, where a number of cities and towns have elected Latinos into government, there has not emerged a coherent policy agenda or strategy for action at a broader level. This would require a deliberate and focused approach on unifying Latinos internally, and reaching out to natural allies. In the meantime, Cruz is concerned that "Latinos achieve political representation but are not able to address the basic needs of the community....[They] seem unable to impact the socioeconomic status of Latinos as a whole." Inter-Latino Relations In their daily lives Hispanic New Englanders of varying nationalities are interacting actively with each other. Recent demographic trends have assured that there will be no single group exercising political and cultural Andres Torres 15 hegemony, as was the case of Puerto Ricans during the 1960s and 1970s. The future development of the community, including the manner of its incorporation or participation in society, is likely to be shaped by the forms of inter-Latino relations. We can reasonably posit that the stronger and more cooperative are these relations, the less likely Latinos will pursue the traditional assimilationist path. There are a number of examples of Latino interconnectivity identified in this collection. As community-based organizations were formed in the context of the War on Poverty during the 1960s and 1970s, Puerto Ricans were the primary actors. Agencies like Concilio Hispano, based in Cambridge, were a leading force for social change and a center of Puerto Rican and Dominican activity (Chapter 6). By the 1980s, Concilio's clientele increasingly mirrored the shift toward Central Americans that was taking place in Cambridge. Reagan-era politics frowned on advocacy and forced a transformation in Concilio's original mission, from grass roots organizing to direct social service. The capacity to implement even this latter role was reduced by budgetary cuts, and with each passing year the organization faced tighter constraints. Within the context of a single organization, the process of Latino succession was occurring. Yet it would be erroneous to imagine a sharp break between the two phases (Puerto Rican-Dominican to Central American). As long as Concilio was a "player" in city politics and could wield at least some resources, the earlier group of Latinos continued to relate to it. Until the early 2000s, for example, the board chairwoman was a Puerto Rican. Waterbury's Puerto Ricans had established church and social clubs in the early years of the community (Chapter 4). In time Dominicans and other Latinos arrived, joining them and participating in congregations such as of St. Cecilia's. Religious celebrations gradually took on a more diverse flavor, with observation of non-Puerto Rican symbols and dates. Hosffinan Ospino's discussion of Catholics in New England (Chapter 9) also illus•.. trates the multi-Latino character ofreligious communities.12 As with community based organizations and churches, businesses also serve as settings for inter-Latino relations. For evidence of this claim, we can again look to the studies on Waterbury and Cambridge in this collection. In the Waterbury case, Glasser shows that as Dominicans took 0ver Puerto Rican businesses, they astutely marketed themselves with ta generic identity. For example, El Utuadefio and Borinquen Grocery were replaced by Hispano and Las Colinas. Bodegas were decorated with an array of national flags. To capture a broader, more variegated Latino demographic, businesses need to cast a wider net. , i. In Cambridge the Dominican owners of a travel agency and a moving company used a reverse strategy. During the 1970s, when Puerto Ricans 16 Latinos in New England were the largest Latino group, they opted to give their businesses a Puerto Rican name (La Borincana). Because they share certain affinities with Spanish-speaking immigrants, Brazilians are often included within the designation of Hispanic or Latino. Is this appropriate? Are these newcomers, who have come to populate areas of New England in significant numbers, to be considered an integral part of the Latino community? Siqueira and Lauren o review these and other questions in their assessment of the Brazilian immigration to Massachusetts (Chapter 8). According to the authors' interviews with students and workers, Brazilians do not view themselves as "Latino" or "Hispanic." Like many, if not most Latinos, their primary reference point as to ethnicity is their nationality: Brazilians. However, they are unlike Salvadorans, Dominicans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans who are adopting the Latino rubric as a second-level identifier. And even though the Portuguese-speaking Brazilians find themselves working side by side with other Latinos in service and light manufacturing jobs, they tend not to enter into social relations with them. There are several possible reasons for this cultural breach. First, and most obvious, is language. Secondly, it appears that Brazilians may want to distance themselves socially from Hispanics, whom they perceive as targets of hostility and discrimination by the dominant society. They even manifest some of the same stereotypes about Latinos that are held by the majority population. Siqueira and Lauren o also examine the Brazilians' perplexity concerning U.S. racial identification and note their resistance to accepting the "white" versus "black" dichotomy. Might it be that this resistance to being pigeonholed into U.S. racial categories is linked to avoidance of membership in the "Latino" group? After all, the logic and provenance of the latter label are likely more ambiguous to new arrivals on the U.S. scene. The authors acknowledge Brazilians wariness about accepting the Latino label, but regard this an open question that will only be resolved as the community figures out its place in U.S. society. Pan•Latinismo There has been a virtual cottage industty generating studies on the question of Latino identity formation. Several scholars argue that movement toward a pan-Latino identity has taken hold during the last decades, inspired by a complex of political and commercial forces.13 Others dismiss this trend as artificially imposed from external sources and as lacking substantive meaning at the community level.14 Resistance to an umbrella term grouping Latinos is independent of political ideology. On the right Andres Torres 17 or the left can be found writers who doubt the veracity or utility of the non•on.15 Skepticism is based on several arguments. The sheer diversity in nationality, ethnic/racial traits, and lingnistic characteristics preclude a "Latino/a label." Differences in class background among the various groups are too severe to allow for a common Latino identity. Variations in citizenship status are prevalent (from undocumented to legal resident to citizen), undermining a coherent political vision. Political differences among the three major subgroups (Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban)-originating in differences in origin ofimmigration-invalidate the notion of a Hispanic voting bloc at the national level. Inter-Latino relations can be problematic in settings of intense competition for resources and power: for example, in higher education institutions, in the domains of immigration and language policy, and in local politics. In the case of Puerto Ricans, submersion into a Hispanic identity threatens a perceived historical unity with African Americans, and also implies a diminution, even elimination, of blackness from their identity.16 Despite these doubts the idea of a pan-Latino identity seems here to stay. Explanations abound. (1) Notwithstanding their internal differences, Latinos continue to embrace the "Latino" or "Hispanic" label when speaking generally of their condition and aspirations within U.S. society. Although ethnic-specific terminology (e.g., Mexican American, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Dominican) is preferred, "Latino/Hispanic" is accepted as an additional identifier. (2) The structure of North American thinking about racial identity compels Hispanic-origin peoples to define themselves in a panLatino sense or be dissolved ultimately into the black-white racial order. (3) Racial categorization systems used by government agencies give Latino political activists a practical reason to assert a pan-ethnic identity when making claims for a greater share of resources and representation. 17 Additional explanations have been advanced in defense of the generic terminology. (4) In large metropolitan settings some groups (e.g., Puerto Ricans in New York City) have adopted an "instrumentalist use" of Hispanic identity to strengthen their political standing. (5) This phenomenon gives credence to the idea that identity formation can be fluid and situational; that it is no longer remarkable to observe Latinos living comfortably with multiple identities, since such identities are formed and transformed in dynamic engagement with America's evolving cultural debates and with changing official definitions of race. (6) Finally, the growth of Latino diversity in an increasing number of urban settings creates the demographic basis for the forging of pan-Latino identity.18 The chapters in this book offer evidence, historically and contemporaneously, of pan-Latinismo as a vibrant force in New England. In their 18 Andres Torres 19 Latinos in New England daily lives-and in their social, economic, and political activities-Latinas and Latinos transcend the bounds of ethnicity and interact vigorously with each other. In their engagement with the larger society and institutions, they are forging an autonomous identity that stands intermediate between their native nationalities and the dominant U.S. culture. In their encounter with the U.S. racial order, they are staking out a territory that blurs and complicates the color line. The sources of this pan-Latino identity are various: the diversity of Latino ethnicities and the lack of a clearly hegemonic group within the Latino population; the history of extensive inter-Latino relations and practices, strengthened and channeled by organizations and institutions which are reproduced over time; the dominant society's resistance to the inclusion of Latinos in the region's social and economic structures. As mentioned above, studies have identified a number of potential obstacles to a Pan Latino identity. For the time being, however, none of these countervailing forces-class fractures, racial background, ethnic heritage, political orientation, citizenship status, differential incorporation into society-appear to threaten its continued development. These factors surely undermine any notion of Latinas and Latinos operating as a monolithic block within U.S. society. Yet cultural identity and political pragmatism seems to be overriding the centrifugal forces. Conclusion Perhaps it is more useful to think of pan-Latinismo as a transitional identity, occupying a unique and temporary space within the U.S. social and racial order. It is a powerful idea, adopted by millions of people as they define and pursue collective aspirations. And what might those aspirations be? Winning the race for socioeconomic achievement, perhaps with "model minority" status? Incorporation into a vaguely defined "mainstream"? Acceptance by the mainstream society of Latino cultural symbols and political representation, even at the cost of continued class inequality and racial exclusion? I believe the underlying assumption of most contributors to this volume is that none of these aforementioned aspirations is satisfactory. They would say, I think, that the truly distinctive achievement would be one in which Latinas and Latinos help nudge America in the direction of a society that is more egalitarian and more respectful of multicultural values. Today the people of this country, in New England and elsewhere, are asked to choose between an "ownership society" and a "fairness" society. The forms of community life, the expressions of cultural identity, and the strategies of political action that Latinos adopt must ultimately address these competing visions of the future. This introductory overview has discussed some of the central themes running through this volume, but not all. In the interests of brevity, I have neglected several topics that are covered in greater depth by the contributors, such as socioeconomic trends at the state and local level, social and economic policy debates and recommendations, and proposals for community development and political action. For an appreciation of these themes, and to gain a fuller sense of what is happening in New England, the reader is invited to proceed on to the next pages. Notes 1. Robert Miller, Shamrock and Sword: The St. Patrick's Battalion in the US.-Mexican War (University Press of Oklahoma, 1989); George Winston Smith and Charles Judah, Chronicles of the Gringos: The U.S. Army in the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968); Peter F. Stevens, The Rogue's March: John Riley and the St. Patrick's Battalion, 1846-1848 (Dulles, Virginia: Potomac Books, 1999). Thanks to Mary Jo Marion for bringing my attention to the story of the San Patricios. 2. Lawrence Buell, Emerson (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003), 137, 243, and 249;JoseMarti, Selected Writings, ed. Ester Allen (New York: Penguin, 2002), 116-129; Philip S. Foner, ed., Inside the Monster by Jose Marti (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 30. 3. My thanks to Anthony deJesus for providing a copy of Albizu Campos's student 1,records, which Harvard University recently made available to the public. The letter cited, "Puerto Rico and the War," appeared in the Harvard Crimson, April 14, 1917; 2, 7. For more on the life and politics of Albizu Campos see Juan Manuel Carri6n, Teresa C. Gracia Ruiz, and Carlos Rodriguez Fraticelli, eds., La naci6n puertorriquefla: ,.; ensayos en torno a Pedro Albizu Campos (San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1993); Ronald Fernandez, The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United _States in the Twentieth Century (W"estport, CN: Praeger, 1996). 4. Some readers will be justifiably surprised to find that there is no chapter d_edicated to Boston. On the one hand, the Bostpn Latino experience is inevitably -- dressed in the several chapters dealing with Massachusetts. On the other hand, there iS a significant body of scholarship about Boston over the years, and the contributor ,(esponse to the· editor's original call for papers was heavily skewed toward non\Bostonian contexts. Yet there certainly is room for more work on Boston, and the 4i-i:or is happily aware of new scholarship in the pipeline. Recent political develop. ents, such as Felix Arroyo's historic victory in 2003 as the first Latino elected to the oston City Council, call for scholarly analysis. Arroyo surprised most pundits by g an at-large seat, essentially by tapping into a broad and progressive constituency. In so doing, he became the biggest Latino vote-getter in Massa[&usetts history. Michael Jonas, "Arroyo Singing a Song of Reelection," Boston Globe, 20 Latinos in New England January 16, 2005. In the same year,Jeffrey Sallchez's election as a State Representative meant that Boston's Latinos would have a voice in the State House for the first time since Nelson Merced's term in the late l 980s. Sanchez's strategy, also dependent on coalition politics, offers another case study of how Latinos can gain electoral power. Despite differences in political orientation, Arroyo and Sanchez each demonstrated that success depends on a creative relationship between ethnicity, pan-Latino identity, and multiracial politics. How each approached class aspects in their program was also an important factor. Finally, it should be noted that State Senator Jarrett Barrios, the most influential Latino politician in Massachusetts, receives considerable support from Boston's Latinos. Though his electoral district is based in Cambridge and Chelsea, he is a significant figure in Boston's Latino politics. As this book goes to press, Senator Barrios is running for District Attorney of iVI:iddleset County, often a steppingstone to a statewide office. 5. A,; of this writing (2006) there is no doubt that the one million mark has been passed, even if the 60 percent growth rate of the 1990s is not replicated. Projections of the national Latino population during the early 2000s estimate that the growth rate continues unabated. Roberto Ramirez, U.S. Hispanic Population 2002 (U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, Ethnicity and Ancestry Branch, 2003). Daniel Vasquez prepared the census profiles that give Latino population counts for the region, the six states, and some fifty cities and towns in New England. The sources for these counts are U.S. Census, 1990 and 2000, SF-3 Data. Unless othenvise noted, the discussion in thiS section is based on these tables, which can be consulted at http://www.gaston. 6. Population figures for the region and states that are cited in other chapters of this book may vary slightly from these, since they may have been based on different sources within the series of the census 2000 releases. 7. The Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research reported that the wording of the Census's "Hispanic Origin" question led to "a highly inflated number of uncategorized 'other Hispanics.'" cen2000/HispanicPop/HspPopData.htm (accessed February 16, 2005). For another estimate of the "Other" population, Roberto Suro, "Counting the 'Other Hispanics': How Many Colombians, Dominicans, Ecuadorians, Guatemalans and Salvadorans Are There in the United States?" (Washington DC: Pew Hispanic Center, May 2002). 8. Daniel V:isquez, "Latinos in New England," unpublished paper, Mauricio Gast6n Institute, University of Massachusetts Boston (February, 2004). 9. This introduction uses the term community formation in a generic sense, to refer simply to the evolution and consolidation of U.S. Latino communities over time. This definition ignores the controversies over the contested interpretations of this and related concepts such as "community development" and "community empowerment." Useful discussions of this literature include William V. Flores and Rina Benmayor, eds., Latino Cultural Citizenship: Claiming Identity, Space and Rights (Beacon Press, 1997), 72-76; Carol Hardy-Fanta, Latina Politics, Latino Politics (Temple University Press, 1993), 99-102; Michael]ones-Correa, Between Two Nations: The Political Pred:frament of Latinos in New York City (Cornell University Press, 1998), 20-21; and George Yudice, "Community," in New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society, ed. Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg, and Meaghan Morris (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 51-54. 10. Robert C. Smith, "Mexicans in New York: Membership and Incorporation in a New Immigrant Community," in Latinos in New York: Communities in Transition, Andres Torres 21 ed. Gabriel Haslip-Viera and Sherrie L. Baver (Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press, 1996); Ramona Hernandez and Glenn Jacobs, "Beyond Homeland Politics, Dominicans in Massachusetts," in Latino Politics in Massachusetts: Struggles, Strategies, and Prospects, ed. Carol Hardy-Fanta andJeffrey Gerson (New York: Routledge, 2002); Peggy Levitt, The Transnational Villagers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). For an explanation of why the new immigrants are likely to retain transnational attachments more so than earlier {European) immigrants to the United States, see Peggy Levitt, "iVI:igrants Participate across Borders: Toward an Understanding of Forms and Consequences," in Immigration Research for a New Century, ed. Nancy Forrer, Ruben G. Rumbaut, and Steven]. Gold (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000). , 11. "This process of forging reactive ethnicity in the face of perceived threats, persecution, and exclusion is not uncommon....itis one mode of ethnic identity formation, highlighting the role of a hostil context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than erosion of ethnicity." Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 148. Also see Alejandro Portes and Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immigrant America: A Portrait (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1996), 95. 12. For a case study of a Catholic church in Willimantic, Connecticut, see X. A. Reyes, Language and Culture as Critical Elements in Qualitative Research (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, forthcoming 2006). Based in Boston, La Congregaci6n Le6n deJudah is one of the largest evangelical Latino churches in New England and features "a very diverse sector of the Hispanic community ... Practically all the countries of Hispanic America are represented in its congregation, and the leadership includes a broad range of nationalities and cultures ...." For an account of how Puerto Ricans and Colombians found themselves pitted against each other in different local Catholic churches (in Lowell, Massachusetts), see Jeffrey N. Gerson, "Latino l\lligration, the Catholic Church and Political Division" in Hardy-Fanta and Gerson, Latim; Poh'tics in Massachusetts, 2002. 13. Antonia Darder and Rodolfo D. Torres, "Latinos and Society: Culture, Politics and Class," in The Latino Studies Reader: Culture, &onomy and Society, ed. Antonia Darder and Rodolfo D. Torres (Oxford, Blackwell, 1998); Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 14. Arlene D.ivila, Latinos, Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Vilma Santiago-Irizarry, Medicalizing Ethnicity: The Construction of Latino Ethnicity in a P.rychiat:ric Setting (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). 15. On the right, Linda Chavez, Outof the Barrio (New York: Basic Books, 1991); on the left,Juan Flores, "Pan-Latino/Trans-Latino: Puerto Ricans in the 'New Nueva York,"' CENTRO Journal 8, nos. 1-2 (1996); in between, Harry Pachon and Lonis DeSipio, New A,mericans by Choice: Political Perspectives of Latino Immigrants (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). 16. On diversity: Suzanne Oboler, Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). On class, Chavez, Out of the Barrio, Chapter 8, and Martha Gimenez, "Latino Politics-Class Struggles: Reflections on the Future of Latino Politics," in Latino Social Movements, ed. R. Torres and G. Katsia:ficas (New York: Routledge, 1999). On citizenship status, Harry Pachon and Louis DeSipio, New Ame1icans by Choice: Political Perspectives of Latino Immigrants (Bolder: Westview 22 Latinos in New England Press, 1994). On political differences, Rodolfo De la Garza, Louis DeSipio, F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia, and Angelo Falc6n, Latino Voices: Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban Perspectives on American Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); and Jose Cruz, "In Search of Latino Politics," review of Rodney Hero, Latinos in the U.S. Political System, in Latino Review of Books l, no. 1 (1995). On inter-Latino relations in immigration and language policy: R. De La Garza et al., Latino Voices. On local politics: Jones-Correa, Between Two Nations, Chapter 6. On Puerto Ricans and African Americans: Juan Flores, "Pan-Latino/Trans-Latino:Puerto Ricans in the 'New Nueva York,'" CENTRO Journal 8, nos. 1-2 (1996). On blackness in the Puerto Rican identity: Raquel Z. Rivera, Nw York Ricans From the Hip Hop Zone (New York Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 32-33. 17. On the openness to multiple identities: Jones-Correa, Bet:ween Two Nations, 117-119. On Latino identity and the U.S. racial order: Gerald Torres, "The Legacy of Conquest and Discovery: Meditations on Ethnicity, Race and American Politics," in Borderless Borders: U.S. Latinos, Latin Americam, and the Paradox of Interdependence, ed. Frank Bonilla, Edwin Melendez, Rebecca Morales, and Maria de los Angeles Torres (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1998). On racial categorization systems, John Garcia, Latino Politics in America: Community, Culture and Interests (Lanham, lvID: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). 18. On "instrumentalist use": Jones-Correa, Bet:ween Two Nations, Chapter 6. On the fluidity of identity formation: Clara Rodriguez, Changing Race: Latinos, the Census and the History ofEthnicit:y in the United States (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 7 and following. On Latino urban diversity and social practice: Nlilagros Ricourt and Ruby Danta, Hispanas de Queem: Latino Pan Ethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Augustin Lao-Montes and Arlene Davila, eds., Mambo Montage: The Latinization of New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); and Jose Itzigsohn, "The Formation of Latino and Latina Pan ethnic Identities," in Not Just Black and W'hite, ed. Nancy Foner and George M. Frederickson (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 197-216. Part I Demographic Trends, Socioeconomic Issues
Ethnicity 1 Ethnicity The definition of the terms "ethnic group" and "ethnicity" is muddy. "The connotation of an ethnic 'group,'" William Peterson writes in the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, ... [I]s that its members are at least latently aware of common interests. Despite the difficulty of determining at what point people become a group, that is, the point at which coherence becomes established, it is important to retain the fundamental distinction between a group and a category ..... 1 Theoretically, the ethnicity paradigm represents the mainstream of the modern sociology of race. The paradigm has passed through three major stages: a pre-1930s stage in which the ethnic group view was an insurgent approach, challenging the biologistic (and at least implicitly racist) view of race which was dominant at that time; a 1930s to 1965 stage during which the paradigm operated as the progressive/liberal "common sense" approach to race, and during which two recurrent themes-assimilationism and cultural pluralism-were defined; and a post-1965 phase, in which the paradigm has taken on the defense of conservative (or "neoconservative") egalitarianism against what is perceived as the radical assault of "group rights." The ethnicity-based paradigm arose in the 1920s and 1930s as an explicit challenge to the prevailing racial views of the period. The pre-existing biologistic paradigm had evolved since the downfall of racial slavery to explain 14 racial inferiority as part of a natural order of humankind. Whites were considered the superior race; white skin was the norm while other skin colors were exotic mutations which had to be explained. 2 Race was equated with distinct hereditary characteristics. Differences in intelligence, temperament, and sexuality (among other traits) were deemed to be racial in character. Racial intermixture was seen as a sin against nature which would lead to the creation of "biological throwbacks." These were some of the assumptions in social Darwinist, Spencerist, and eugenicist thinking about race and race relations. 3 But by the early decades of the 20th century biologism was losing coherence. It had come under attack by adherents of Progressivism, and had also been called into question by the work of the "Chicago school" of sociology. The Progressive attack was led by Horace Kallen, who also introduced the concept of cultural pluralism, which was to become a key current of ethnicity theo ry. The Chicago sociologists were led by Robert E. Park, who had been secretary to Booker T. Washington, and whose approach embodied the other major current of the ethnicity paradigm, assimilationism .4 In contrast to biologically oriented approaches, the ethnicity-based paradigm was an insurgent theory which suggested that race was a social category. Race was but one of a number of determinants of ethnic group identity or ethnicity. Ethnicity itself was understood as the result of a group formation process based on culture and descent.5 "Culture" in this formulation included such diverse factors as religion, language, "customs," nationality, and political identi fication. 6 "Descent" involved heredity and a sense of group origins, thus suggesting that ethnicity was socially "primordial," if not biologically given, in character. While earlier theorists did indeed assume this,7 later ethnicity theory came to question the validity of any primordial sense of identity or attachment, arguing instead that these concepts too were socially const ructed.8 Early ethnicity-based theory, considered in the U.S. context, concentrated on problems of migration and "culture contact" (to use Park's phrase). The problems and foci generated by this approach have continued to preoccupy the school: incorporation and separation of "ethnic minorities," the nature of ethnic identity, and the impact of ethnicity on politics. 9 With the advent of the vaguely egalitarian (racially speaking) vision of the New Deal10 and of the antifascism of World War II (a war which was antiracist on the Atlantic front but decidedly racist on the Pacific front), the ethnic paradigm definitively dislodged the biologistic view in what appeared to be a triumph of liberalism. There remained, to be sure, many survivals from the old theoretical system (Jim Crow retained its grip on the South, for example, which would prove crucial for racial events in the 1950s and 1960s), but in the main, cultural and intellectual acceptance of the inevitabil15 Ethnicity ity and even desirability of integration was achieved. Politically, the 1948 confrontation between integrationists and segregationists within the Democratic Party-a battle won decisively if not absolutely by the integrationists-symbolized the consensual shift. Yet this victory was a hollow one where racial minorities were concerned, for the new paradigm was solidly based in the framework of European (white) ethnicity, and could not appreciate the extent to which racial inequality differed from ethnic inequality. Were the historical experiences which racial minority groups encountered similar to those of white Europeans? Were the trajectories for their perceived eventual incorporation and assimilation the same? To these questions ethnicity theorists generally answered yes. Many minority activists and movement groups, though, disagreed. Theoretical Dominance The chief debate between assimilationists and cultural pluralists within the ethnic group paradigm has been about the possibility of maintaining ethnic group identities over time, and consequently the viability of ethnicity in a society characterized by what one writer has labelled "Angloconformity,"11 that is, the presence of a supposedly unitary majority culture. However, both currents agree on the existence of that culture, and both treat race as a component of ethnicity. Insurgent ethnicity theory's main empirical reference point had been the study of immigration and the social patterns resulting from it. Park and his student Louis Wirth saw the development of ethnic enclaves and what Park called a "mosaic of segregated peoples" as stages in a cycle leading to assimilation. 12 Kallen's perspective, by contrast, had focused on the acceptance of different immigrant -based cultures. But both assimilation ism and cultural pluralism had largely emphasized European, white immigrants, what Kallen called "the Atlantic migration." The origins of the concepts of "ethnicity" and "ethnic group" in the U.S., then, lay outside the experience of those identified (not only today, but already in Park's and Kallen's time), as racial minorities: Afro-Americans, Latin Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans (blacks, browns, reds, and yellows). The continuity of experience embodied in the application of the terms of ethnicity theory to both groups-to European immigrants and racial minorities-was not established; indeed it tended to rest on what we have labelled (following Blauner) the immigrant analogy. The appearance of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma in 1944 marked the ascent of the ethnicity paradigm to a position of theoretical 16 Ethnicity dom inance.13 This monumental study, funded by the Carnegie Commission, was the product of the labors not only of its director and principal author, but also of an unequalled array of talented students of racial issues in the U.S.14 Myrdal both challenged biologistic theories of racism and asserted the desirability of assimilation for blacks.15 He argued that the "American Creed" of democracy, equality, and justice had entered into conflict with black inequality, segregation, and racial prejudice in general. In order to resolve this conflict, America would be called upon, sooner or later, to extend its "creed" to include blacks. Myrdal's assessment was optimistic about the ultimate resolution of this battle--the contradictions would give way to racial equality and the eventual integration of blacks into the mainstream of American life. The positions of many of his American advisors (particularly Park's students such as E. Franklin Frazier and "enlightened" liberals such as Arnold Rose), and Myrdal's own views as well, were predicated on the European immigrant model of assimilation. The U.S. had absorbed the immigrants, had eventually granted them their rights, and had seen them take their places as "Americans" despite the existence of considerable nativist hostility and prejudice against them. Was this not the essence of the "creed"? True, blacks presented this model with a stern challenge. Yet Myrdal and his associates firmly believed that black assimilation was an ineluctable imperative which presented the nation with a clear choice: If America in actual practice could show the world a progressive trend by which the Negro finally became integrated into modern democracy, all mankind would be given faith again-it would have reason to believe that peace, progress, and order are feasible. . . . America is free to choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability or become her o pportunity.16 Assimilation was viewed as the most logical, and "natural," response to the dilemma imposed by racism. Indeed, Myrdal, drawing on the work of E. Franklin Frazier (as Daniel Patrick Moynihan was to do twenty years later) suggested that there was a "pathological" aspect to black culture which only full assimilation could cure.17 In its elevation to theoretical dominance with the Myrda l study, ethnicity theory derived its agenda from the political imperatives of the period: to condemn in the liberal terms of the war years the phenomenon of racial inequality, which smacked of the kinds of despotism the U.S. was fighting; to modernize and mobilize American society in preparation for its postwar role of world leadership; and to distribute the seemingly limitless resources deriving from U.S. hegemony-resources which were not only economic, 17 Ethnicity but also political and cultural-to all at home, even as they were to be offered to the vanquished as well as American allies abroad. The ethnicity-based theoretical tradition, derived from the experiences of European immigrants, was extended in the conclusions of An American Dilemma so that it might apply as well to nonwhites, especially blacks. In the 1960s Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan attempted a further innovation in ethnicity theory, stimulated by the burgeoning civil rights movement. Glazer and Moynihan wished both to validate the assimilationist bent of previous ethnic group-based theory, and to reintroduce the theme of "ongoing ethnicity" or cultural pluralism . In Beyond The Melting Pot (1963) they sought to link cultural pluralism with political pluralism, the dominant construct in American political science, and thus seemingly to reconcile the paradigm's problem of ethnic group identityassimilation vs. cultural pluralism, incorporation vs. preservation-at a stroke.18 Glazer and Moynihan argued that immigrating groups were transformed, if hardly "melted," by their experiences in New York, emerging as communities distinct not only from each other and their pre-existing sociocultural milieux, but also from their communities of origin . Ethnic groups, then, even after distinctive language, customs, and culture are lost ... are continually recreated by new experiences in America. The mere existence of a name itself is perhaps sufficient to form group character in new situations, for the name associates an individual, who actually can be anything, with a certain past, country, or race.19 Assimilation, they argued, does take place as individuals acculturate and groups enter the political arena. Yet out of this very process a separate identity emerges, which must sustain itself culturally and deliver tangible political gains (as well as-ultimately-economic gains, e.g., "upward mobility"} to the group. It was thus fundamental political interests, rather than factors such as primordial ties, cultural differences, or majoritarian resistance to incorporation which were ultimately decisive in the maintenance of ethnic identities. Continuing with the same passage: But as a matter of fact, someone who is Irish or Jewish or Italian generally has other traits than the mere existence of the name that associates him (sic) with other people attached to the group. A man is connected to his group by ties of family and friendship. But he is also connected by ties of interest. The ethnic groups in New York are also interest grou ps.20 18 Ethnicity This political focus initially seemed quite compatible with the racial conflicts of the 1950s and early 1960s. At that time ethnicity theory was grappling with black attempts to achieve equality through the civil rights movement. As seen through the lens of ethnicity, the civil rights movement was a drive for black integration and for the removal of any remaining forms of institutional/legal discrimination. From the perspective of writers such as Glazer and Moynihan or Milton Gordon, civil rights demands were intelligible and comprehensible within the ethnicity framework, and deserved the dominant paradigm's support. The civil rights movement was trying to create for blacks the same conditions that white ethnics had found: "opportunity" and relative equality (i.e., the absence of formal discriminatory barriers, however much attitudinal prejudice may have existed).21 While debates about specific "affirmative" measures such as busing existed,22 the ethnicity school supported such "negative" measures as the outlawing of discrimination to create and maintain conditions of equality. 23 Although virulent forms of racism persisted in the South, the remedies for segregation were clear. The North, though, presented a different set of problems for the ethnicity theorists. At first glance, it was assumed that black equality had already been achieved there: One looked at the demands of the civil rights movement in 1963-equality in the vote, equality in the courts, equality in representation in public life, equality in accommodations--saw that they existed more or less in New York City, and concluded that the political course of the Northern Negro would be quite different from that of the Southern Negro. He (sic) would become part of the game of accommodation politics-he already was-in which posts and benefits were distributed to groups on the basis of struggle, of course, but also on the basis of votes, money, and political talent, and one concluded that in this game Negroes would not do so badly.24 In other words, blacks already had equal opportunity in the North; what more could they demand? Once equal opportunity legislation along with its judicial and administrative enforcement were accomplished facts, it fell to blacks to follow in their "predecessors"' footsteps. Through hard work, patience, delayed gratification, etc., blacks could carve out their own rightful place in American society. In the North, where blacks were still recent "immigrants" (from the South}, this would involve some degree of assimilation.25 It would involve the development of a new postimmigration cultural identity, and it would require engagement in mainstream pluralist politics. Race relations would thus continue in what Nathan Glazer was later to call the "American ethnic pattern ." 19 Ethnicity So, ethnicity theory assigned to blacks and other racial minority groups the roles which earlier generations of European immigrants had played in the great waves of the "Atlantic migration" of the 19th and early 20th centuries. But racial minorities refused to play their assigned roles. Structural barriers continued to render the immigrant analogy inappropriate and the trajectory of incorporation did not develop as the ethnicity paradigm had envisioned. Many blacks (and later , man y Latinos, Indians, and Asian Americans as well) rejected ethnic identity in favor of a more radical racial identity which demanded group rights and recognition. Given these developments, ethnicity theory found itself increasingly in opposition to the demands of minority movements. 26 The ethnicity paradigm had to be reworked once again. The result was the phenomenon of neoconservatism.27 Therefore, beginning around 1970, ethnicity theorists developed a conservative egalitarian perspective which emphasized the dangerous radicalism and (in their view) antidemocratic character of "positive" or "affirmative" antidiscrimination policies. State activities should be restricted, they argued, to guarantees of equality for individuals. This position was not new. As we have noted, Gordon had argued something similar as early as 1964. But the doyens of the ethnicity school, Glazer and Moynihan, were ambivalent about the group rights question in the 1960s. Indeed, Moynihan had endorsed positive antidiscrimination measures (" equality of result") in his famous "Repo rt,"28 though Glazer had warned about the principle's dangers early on.29 Some Critical Remarks on the Ethnicity Paradigm Substantial criticism has been directed at the ethnicity school for its treatment of racially defined minorities as ethnically defined minorities, and for its consequent neglect of race per se. These arguments point to the limits of the immigrant analogy in addressing what was in many cases a qualitatively different historical experience-one which included slavery, colonization, racially based exclusion, and in the case of Native Americans, virtual extirpation. In addition, it has been argued, the paradigm tends to "blame the victims" for their plight and thus to deflect attention away from the ubiquity of racial meanings and dynamics. We share much of this critique, and will not recapitulate it here.30 Instead we shall explore two less frequently noticed problems of the ethnicity approach to race: the social scientific, indeed methodological, limitations encountered by the ethnicity paradigm in its attempt to reduce race to an element of ethnicity, and the paradigm's consequent inability to deal with the particular character20 Ethnicity istics of racial minority groups as a direct consequence of this reductionism. The first of these we call the "bootstraps model"; the second we refer to as "they all look alike." The "Bootstraps Model". As we have noted, substantial reworking of the ethnicity paradigm took place in the later 1960s and early 1970s. By 1975 Glazer and Moynihan felt themselves able to offer a general hypothesis on the dynamics of group incorporation: "Ethnic groups bring different norms to bear on common circumstances with consequent different levels of success- hence group differences in status." 31 The "group norms/common circumstances" correlation raises enormous problems, which can in turn be traced back to the immigrant analogy. The key factor in explaining the success that an ethnic group will have in becoming incorporated into majority society (a goal whose desirability is unquestioned) is the values or "norms" which the group brings to bear on the general social circumstances it faces just as all other minorities have done. Since the independent variable is the "norms," the idea that "differences in status" could be affected by factors outside or even unrelated to the group is ruled out at the level of assumptions. Everything is mediated through "norms" internal to the group. If Chicanos don't do well in school, this cannot, even hypothetically, be due to low-quality education; it has instead to do with Chicano values. After all, Jews and Japanese Americans did well in inferior schools, so why can't other groups? Ongoing processes of discrimination, shifts in the prevailing economic climate, the development of a sophisticated racial ideology of "conservative egalitarianism" (or should we say "benign neglect"?)-in other words, all the concrete sociopolitical dynamics within which racial phenom ena operate in the U.S.-are ignored in this approach. It is the European immigrant analogy applied to all without reservation.32 "Common circumstances," by contrast, are relegated to the dependent variable. They are the universal conditions to which each ethnic group must accommodate. The assumption is made that each minority faces the majority society alone. Successful achievement of mobility-the achievement of high group status-reflects group willingness and ability to accept the norms and values of the majority. The "difference" that characterizes a minority group, once incorporated, will be outweighed by the "commonality" it shares with the ma jo rity. In other words, something akin to Milton Gordon's notion of "structural assimilation" 33 is assumed to take place as immigrant groups pass beyond their "fresh off the boat" status and gain the acceptance of the majority. Yet this assumption is quite unwarranted with respect to racial minorities, whose distinctiveness from the white majority is often not appreciably altered by adoption of the norms and values of the white ma jo rity. It 21 Ethnicity would in fact be just as plausible to assume the opposite: that in the case of racial minorities "common circumstances" consist in relatively permanent racial difference and non-incorporation. The entire model for comparing and evaluating the success of ethnic groups in achieving higher status or in being incorporated into the majority society is limited by an unwillingness to consider whether there might be any special circumstances which racially defined minorities encounter in the U.S., circumstances which definitively distinguish their experiences from those of earlier European immigrants, and make the injunction to "pull yourselves up by your own bootstraps" impossible to fulfill. "They All Look Alike". In what sense can racial minority groups be considered in ethnic group terms? In what sense is the category "black," for example, equivalent to the categories "Irish" or "Jewish" ? The ethnicity paradigm does acknowledge black "uniqueness" because of the particular historical experience of institutionalized discrimination rooted in slavery. Yet there is something awkward, something one-dimensional, about ethnicity theory's version of black exceptionalism. "Blacks" in ethnic terms are as diverse as "whites." They resist comparison to the Jews and Irish, and even to Mexican Americans or Japanese Americans. The notion of "uniqueness" doesn't go far enough because it is still posed within the ethnic group framework, while "black," like "white," is a palpably racial category. In fact, with rare exceptions, ethnicity theory isn't very interested in ethnicity among blacks. The ethnicity approach views blacks as one ethnic group among others. It does not consider national origin, religion, language, or cultural differences among blacks, as it does among whites, as sources of ethnicity. It would be quite interesting to see how ethnicity theory might address the range of subgroupings represented in the U.S. black community. What distinctions might it employ? Haitians? Jamaicans? Francophones? Georgians? Northern/Southern? The black community has been intensively studied from an ethnographic standpoint, so there is no lack of materials for analysis.34 But ethnicity theory has not delved to any significant extent into the meaning of these "ethnic" distinctions. There is, in fact, a subtly racist element in this substitution-in which whites are seen as variegated in terms of group identities, but blacks "all look alike." In our view, this is nothing intentional, but simply the effect of the application of a paradigm based in white ethnic history to a racially defined group. Blacks are thus aggregated-and treated as the great exception-because they are so clearly racially identified in the U.S. But this issue cannot be confined to blacks. Similar problems can be discerned in ethnicity-based treatments of other racially based categories: Native Americans, Latin Americans, and Asian Americans. The aggrega22 Ethnicity tion of Americans of Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and now Vietnamese, Laotian, Thai and Cambodian descent into the category "Asian American," for example, is clearly a racially based process. Ethnicity theorists might object that this is an improper exercise of "race-thinking," that there should be no recognition by the state of such a category, that these various groups should be able to maintain their ethnic identities and thus avoid "racialization," 35 But the majority of Americans cannot tell the difference between members of these various groups. They are racially identified-their identities are racially constructed-by processes far more profound than mere state policy formation. 23

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No country for Old Men
No Country for Old Men
The film no country for old men is on that was produced in the year 2007 and was based on the
novel No country for old men by an American author Cormac McCarthy. The story occurs along
the Mexican-united state's border and revolves around a drug transaction story that goes out of
with the men owning the money lost by their peddlers looking for someone to look for the
individual who makes away with the money.
The United States has always had a bad relationship with her Mexican neighbor and believed
that they were the people behind the ever-escalating drug menace in the country. The story
brings us ...

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