J Bus Ethics (2012) 110:33–44 DOI 10.1007/s10551-011-1145-x Spirituality and national culture as antecedents to ethical decisionmaking: a comparison between the United States and Norway Rafik I. Beekun • James W. Westerman Received: 2 September 2011 / Accepted: 5 December 2011 / Published online: 23 December 2011  Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract We investigate the cross-cultural relationships between spirituality and ethical decision-making in Norway and the U.S. Data were collected from business students (n = 149) at state universities in Norway and the U.S. Results indicate that intention to behave ethically was significantly related to spirituality, national culture, and the influence of peers. Americans were significantly less ethical than Norwegians based on the three dimensions of ethics, yet more spiritual overall. Interestingly, the more spiritual were Norwegians, the more ethical was their decision-making. By contrast, the more spiritual were Americans, the less ethical was their decision-making. The research also found that peer influences were more important to Norwegians than to Americans in making ethical decisions. Finally, spiritual people from the U.S. were more likely to use a universalistic form of justice ethics, as opposed to a more particularistic form of justice ethics used by Norwegians. Keywords Ethics
Spirituality
National culture
Religion
Peers This study has been approved by the appropriate ethics committee and has therefore been performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 declaration of Helsinki. All persons gave their informed consent prior to their inclusion in this study. R. I. Beekun Managerial Sciences Department/28, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557-0206, USA e-mail: rafikb@unr.edu J. W. Westerman (&) Appalachian State University, ASU Box 32089, Boone, NC 28608-2089, USA e-mail: westermanjw@appstate.edu Introduction In light of the recent rise in unethical business conduct, the need to understand the antecedents to ethical decisionmaking has become more critical. Although many have recognized the impact of the social context or the environment within which an individual makes ethical decisions (Hunt and Vitell 1992; Jones 1991; Robertson and Crittenden 2003; Trevino 1986), the influence of internal factors on ethical decision-making needs further study. In this article, data from Norway and the U.S. are utilized to examine three sources of influence on ethical decisionmaking, personal spirituality, and peer pressure (which represent two micro-level influences) as well as national culture (a macro-level influence). Taking into account the bombing and mass shooting which occurred on July 24, 2011 in Norway—with the Norwegian suspect claiming both religious and nationalistic motivations for his egregious behavior—an improved understanding of relationships between spirituality and ethical decision-making in Norway may have taken on an increased importance. Examining cross-cultural differences with the U.S. in regards to any relationships may be illuminating in determining the consistency, pervasiveness, and potential relevance of spirituality to business ethics. Social Identity Theory and Ethical Behavior To examine the relationship between ethical decisionmaking and behavioral norms, we use social identity theory (Tajfel 1982; Westerman et al. 2007). According to Stets and Burke (2000), this theory suggests a social identity is ‘‘a person’s knowledge that he or she belongs to a social category or group’’ (p. 225). A social group is a group of individuals who perceive themselves as part of the same 123 34 R. I. Beekun, J. W. Westerman social category. Part of the process of social identity formation involves individuals striving to highlight the perceive commonalities between the self and other in-group members. These commonalities include their religion, their families, communities, professions, and nations (Dworkin 1986; Gewirth 1988; Scheffler 2001; Stets and Burke 2000). If an individual were to say, ‘‘My faith would not allow me to that,’’ or ‘‘In my country, we wouldn’t do that,’’ he or she is asserting that behaving in a way contrary to spiritual or country norms and values would weaken one’s social coupling (Charney 2003). As a result, people abstain from tasks seen as incompatible with their identity (Steele et al. 2002). The Importance of National Culture to Social Identity Kymlicka asserts that national identity is particularly suited to serving as a primary focus of identification, and it ‘‘prioritizes nationalist identity over and above all of the other ‘identities’ that an individual might have and the nation over and above all other possible cites of identity formation’’ (Charney 2003, p. 301). National identifications have been argued to possess a transcendent quality in that, through national membership, our individual accomplishments take on an additional meaning by becoming part of a continuous creative effort (Tamir 1993). Identifying with one’s country also suggests that our daily activities have meaning in that they fit into a pattern of norms and behaviors which are culturally recognized as appropriate ways of leading one’s life. Thus, national culture plays a major role in determining identity and social referents. Kymlicka (1995) claims that individuals identify so closely with their cultural-national communities that assimilation into other cultures is very difficult: ‘‘Cultural membership affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity. The connection between personal identity and cultural membership is suggested by a number of considerations….Why cannot members of a decaying culture simply integrate into another culture?… [B]ecause of the role of cultural membership in people’s selfidentity….[N]ational identity…provides a secure foundation of individual autonomy and self-identity’’ (p. 105). Thus, national membership represents a bond that individuals cannot decouple from and they ‘‘regard it as unthinkable to view themselves without’’ (Rawls 1980, pp. 544–545). Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions are designed to describe cross-cultural differences in behavior. This study examines the influence of national culture on ethical decision-making by examining two countries (Norway and the U.S.) with significant differences on two cultural dimensions with the potential to have a significant impact on ethical decision-making: masculinity/femininity and individualism/collectivism (see Fig. 1). The individualism/collectivism cultural dimension varies from individualism on one end to collectivism at the 123 Fig. 1 Cultural differences between the U.S. and Norway other. Individualism describes the inclination of people to place their own interests and those of their immediate family ahead of the interests of any other stakeholder. By contrast, collectivism describes a culture where people form part of strong, cohesive groups, and care for each other. ‘‘We’’ is important in collectivist cultures (such as Norway) where members tend to safeguard each other’s interests in return for their loyalty. In a highly collectivistic country, decision-makers are looking out for the good of the maximum number of people and are more likely to adhere to macro-level norms (Hofstede 2001); hence, their ethical behavior is likely to more closely reflect their national culture. In an individualistic country like the U.S., it can be expected that decision-makers will be less concerned with achieving outcomes that result in the greatest benefit for the largest number of people, and therefore be more likely to use ethical criteria adopted on a more individual basis. The second Hofstede (1980) dimension on which the U.S. and Norway are reported to possess significant differences, masculinity/femininity, examines the degree to which a country embraces achievement or nurturing. In a masculine culture, ‘‘social gender roles are clearly distinct. Men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and this type of society values material success and achievements, women are supposed to more modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life’’ Hofstede (2001, p. 297). Thus, masculine cultures (like the U.S.) tend to place importance on ambition, ego, higher pay, and the pursuit of ‘‘things.’’ Femininity ‘‘pertains to societies in which social gender roles overlap (i.e., both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender and concerned with the quality of life)’’. As indicated by Spirituality and ethicsin Norway and the United States Arrindell et al. (2003), feminine cultures (such as Norway) tend to place importance on people and warm relationships, and the dominant values in society are caring for others and preservation. In a masculine country, it can be expected that decision-makers will be less concerned with achieving outcomes that take into account the needs of others, will therefore be less likely to use ethical criteria adopted from those closest to them, namely their peers, and will emphasize using more self-serving ethical criteria when making decisions. Feminine cultures, with their emphasis on relationships, can be expected to be the exact opposite and more strongly include peers in decision-making (Beekun et al. 2010). It is anticipated that these Hofstede (1980) cultural differences between Norway and the U.S. will have significant effects on ethical decision-making. Spirituality and Ethics Another major source of individual values that is increasingly linked to ethical thinking and behavior is spirituality. Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2003) define spirituality as ‘‘the individual’s drive to experience transcendence, or a deeper meaning to life, through the way in which they live and work.’’ Ashmos and Duchon (2000, p. 137) define spirituality at work as ‘‘the recognition that employees have an inner life that nourishes and is nourished by meaningful work that takes place in the context of community.’’ They stress that ‘‘spirituality at work is not about religion, although people may sometimes express their religious beliefs at work.’’ Mitroff and Denton (1999) summarize some key elements of spirituality as follows: • • • • Spirituality is ‘‘highly individual and intensely personal.’’ Spirituality revolves around the conviction that ‘‘there is a supreme power, a being, a force […] that governs the entire universe.’’ Our purpose on earth is ‘‘to do good.’’ Spirituality is non-denominational. Research has explored this theoretical connection between ethics and spirituality at work (Velasquez 1996; Giacalone and Jurkiewicz 2003), although the empirical research on this relationship is limited to the relationship of work values which have been correlated with spirituality (benevolence (Adams et al. 2006); and integrity (Kouzes and Posner 1995; George et al. 2002)). We focus on three specific ethics dimensions in relating spirituality to ethics: justice, utilitarianism, and relativism. Justice, Spirituality, and Culture The justice perspective is oriented to ensure fairness—fair treatment according to ethical or legal standards. It suggests that society imposes rules to protect all individuals 35 from the basic selfish desires of others resulting in tension between the needs of society as a whole and the freedom of the individual. However, as Faver (2004) points out, people of faith perceive justice, especially social justice, as being an integral part of their spirituality, and often use the resources of their religious institutions to provide services and to strive for social change. While more spiritual people may emphasize justice in their actions at work and elsewhere, the application of justice may not be uniform across national borders. Inhabitants from countries that are high in individualism may be more likely to use a different approach to justice when compared to those from countries that are high in collectivism. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) have proposed two views of justice: particularistic and universalistic. Particularism suggests that moral standards may be idiosyncratic and may vary among groups within a single culture, among cultures, and over time. Thus, an action’s ethicality is gaged solely on rules, but rather from the personal experiences of individuals and groups. Ascertaining ‘‘right’’ from ‘‘wrong’’ is done in terms of one’s in-group or kinship network (Ting-Tomey 1998). In collectivistic cultures, individuals view themselves as fundamentally and interdependently connected to others, where the self is defined in terms of its relationships with others (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Members of collectivist countries become members of cohesive in-groups from birth onward that protect and support them throughout their lifetimes. As a result, they are more sensitized to their social context, rely on their ingroups to reduce uncertainty, and are more likely to adopt a particularistic form of justice ethics. Universalism is the reverse of particularism, using objective rules and regulations to separate right from wrong; it tends to be oblivious to idiosyncrasies that obviate rules (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998). In individualistic and masculine cultures such as the U.S., there is a strong emphasis on individual competitive success, and a reliance on a fair playing field of systemsoriented justice norms that provide rules and procedures for guidance. Thus, when confronted with the same ethical dilemmas, one would expect the Norwegian feminine/collectivists to adopt a particularistic approach, whereas the U.S. masculine/individualists may prefer a universalistic approach. Utilitarianism, Spirituality, and Culture As suggested by Velasquez (1996) and Hartman and Desjardins (2008), utilitarianism is a consequentialist approach to ethics. An action is deemed ethical if it is achieves the greatest benefit or ‘‘good’’ for the largest number of people. Given that spiritually oriented people tend to want to help others, one would expect collectivist cultures to accentuate 123 36 this utilitarian aim even more than individualistic cultures due to their emphasis on caring for others. Relativism, Spirituality, and Culture Ethical relativism suggests that ‘‘ethical values are relative to particular people, cultures, or times’’ (Hartman and Desjardins 2008, p. 67). Velasquez (1996, p. 15) defines ethical relativism as ‘‘the view that the only standards determining the ethical quality of a particular act or type of act, are the moral norms present in the society within which the act takes place.’’ Sjöberg (1991, pp. 24–27) suggests that a universal code of ethics may not be practical since because day-to-day ethical decisions are dependent on our cultural background, local customs, and context. Ethical relativism is frequently contrasted with moral absolutism. Moral absolutism contends that moral standards are not relative but absolute and universal whether these involve general moral principles or codes of behavior (El-Astal 2005). As indicated by Husted et al. (1996), a strong case can be made for convergence of managerial values in the face of dubious international business practices. Unlike organized religion’s orthodoxy which is generally founded on absolute and universal principles, one would expect ethical relativism to be positively correlated with spirituality since it is, by definition, nurtured through each person’s personal life and work experiences. Peers and Ethical Decision-Making It has been asserted that organizational peers provide the normative structure and serve as the guides for employee decision-making (Schein 1984), and that they set the standards and serve as the referents for behavior within organizations (Jones and Kavanagh 1996). Prior research has demonstrated this important influence of peers in determining an employee’s intention to behave ethically (Westerman et al. 2007). Overall, peers have a greater influence on employees’ ethical behavior than managers (Keith et al. 2003; Zey-Ferrell et al. 1979). Physical proximity and frequency of direct physical contact have been shown to be primary predictors of comparative referents (Gartrell 1982) which are used for ethical decisions. The enhanced reliance on in-groups and personal relationships for ethical decision-making in collectivistic and feminine cultures leads us to believe that Norwegians will rely more on their peers for ethical judgments. In contrast, masculine and individualistic U.S. decision-makers, with an emphasis on objectivistic system-oriented justice norms are less likely to be influenced by peers in ethical decisionmaking. Thus, in addition to our focus on national culture and spirituality as sources of influence on ethical decisionmaking, our research examines the influence of one’s peers 123 R. I. Beekun, J. W. Westerman to determine their relative impact on an employee’s ethical decision-making, and whether national culture plays a role in this relationship. Based on the above discussion, we suggest the following hypotheses: H1 There is a relationship between intention to behave ethically and spirituality, national culture and peer pressure. H2 Choice of ethical criteria will be a function of the degree of spirituality and national culture: H2.a Spiritual people from a masculine and individualistic culture will use universalistic justice when faced with an ethical dilemma. H2.b Spiritual people from a feminine and collective culture will use particularistic justice when faced with an ethical dilemma. H3 Acceptance of peer pressure will be a function of the degree of spirituality and national culture: H3.a Spiritual people from a masculine and/or individualistic culture will be less likely to yield to peer pressure when faced with an ethical dilemma. H3.b Spiritual people from a feminine and/or collective culture will be more likely to yield to peer pressure when faced with an ethical dilemma. To test these hypotheses, we have chosen two countries (The U.S. and Norway) representing different quadrants of the individualism/collectivism and masculinity graphic plot (Hofstede 1980) (see Fig. 1). As indicated in Fig. 1, Norway represents a collectivistic, feminine culture. Respondents from this culture would be expected to rely on (a) criteria based on a particularistic approach to justice (Hypothesis 2b), utilitarianism and relativism (Hypothesis 1), and (b) to use peers as their primary referents for ethical decision-making behavior (Hypothesis 3b). The U.S. represents the opposite quadrant, an individualistic, masculine culture in which we would expect respondents to rely on (a) criteria based on a universalistic approach (Hypothesis 2a) to justice, utilitarianism, and relativism (Hypothesis 1), and (b) to use peers relatively less as their primary referents for ethical decision-making behavior (Hypothesis 3a). Methodology Sample Data were collected from a convenience sample of respondents (116 from Norway, 33 from the U.S.) who were invited to participate as a result of enrollment in selected Spirituality and ethicsin Norway and the United States 37 Table 1 Sample statistics Gender Nationality U.S. Norway 19 36 6 61 10 19 20–24 9 89 25–29 10 8 30–34 35–39 4 1 2 10–12 1 13 13–15 1 64 16–18 23 20 Unskilled or semi-skilled manual worker 1 71 Generally trained office worker or secretary 4 11 Vocationally trained 2 8 Academically trained professional 7 1 Manager of non-managers 6 4 Manager of managers 5 2 Male Female Unreported gender Age Years of education Job type classes. The participants included graduate business students at universities located in the two countries. Graduate business students were included because they are a commonly used proxy for business people and have been found in prior research to share a high degree of congruence with business professionals (Dubinsky and Rudelius 1980). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the complete data set. Measurement of Countries along Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions We utilized the two subdimensions of Hofstede’s (1980) measure of cultural differences that were the most divergent between Norway and the U.S. and relevant to the hypotheses in our study (individualism/collectivism and masculinity/femininity). In his seminal study involving 116,000 respondents, Hofstede (1980) classified over 70 countries along the key cultural dimensions utilized in our study. In addition, questionnaires to gather data to measure these cultural dimensions can be obtained from Hofstede in many languages. respondent with a set of three scenarios each involving an ethical dilemma, and asks a number of questions to determine whether the respondent or his/her peers will behave in the same manner as the character in the scenario. The scale used to assess intention to behave ranges from 1 to 7, but is reverse coded. Thus, a higher score means that the respondent believes that he or his/her peers would be less likely to behave in the same manner as the character in each scenario; in other words, a higher score would indicate more ethical behavior on behalf of the respondent or his/her peers. Table 2 shows the three scenarios used to assess intention to behave. The instrument was translated into Norwegian and backtranslated back into English to verify for content and understanding. The Norwegian respondents were proficient in English as they were taking their graduate business classes in English and completed the English version of the questionnaire. Second, using the above scenarios, the questionnaire allowed for the measuring of three ethical perspectives or areas of moral philosophy: justice, utilitarianism, and relativism. The seven-point bipolar scales for measuring these three dimensions are described in Table 3. Measurement of Spirituality The Human Spirituality Scale (HSS) (Wheat 1991) was used to gage the degree of individual spirituality, and has been validated previously by Belaire and Young (2000). The Cronbach Alpha coefficient for the HSS is 0.89 (Wheat 1991), and was calculated as 0.83 in our study. This instrument contains 20 Likert-scaled items with the scale ranging from 1 (constantly) to 5 (never) for each item. Respondent scores are calculated by adding the ratings across all 20 items, and can range from 20 to 100. The respondent scores were rescaled so that the higher the respondent’s score on the HSS, the more personally spiritually he/she is. Model The model in our study was comprised of the following: 1) 2) Measurement of Peer Pressure and of Ethics Dimensions The instrument used is Reidenbach and Robin’s (1988, 1990) and Cohen et al.’s (1996) multi-scenario, multi-item survey. This multi-criteria instrument presents the 3) Three dependent variables representing the three/ ethical dimensions of justice, utilitarianism, and relativism. Four independent variables representing the expected behavior of peers (PEER), the degree to which the respondent conformed to Hofstede’s two dimensions of national culture (INDIVIDUALISM and MASCULINITY), and the level of spirituality of the individual. A control variable for the type of scenario used in the survey instrument. As shown in Table 2, three types of 123 38 R. I. Beekun, J. W. Westerman Table 2 Scenarios used in ethics survey Scenario 1: Retail—automobile A person bought a new car from a franchised automobile dealership in the local area. Eight months after the car was purchased, he began having problems with the transmission. He took the car back to the dealer, and some minor adjustments were made. During the next few months, he continually had a similar problem with the transmission slipping. Each time the dealer made only minor adjustments on the car. Again, during the 13th month after the car had been bought the man returned to the dealer because the transmission still was not functioning properly. At this time, the transmission was completely overhauled. Action: Since the warranty was for only 1 year (12 months from the date of purchase), the dealer charged the full price for parts and labor. Scenario 2: Retail—neighborhood store A retail grocery chain operates several stores throughout the local area including one in the city’s ghetto area. Independent studies have shown that the prices do tend to be higher and there is less of a selection of products in this particular store than in the other locations. Action: On the day welfare checks are received in this area of the city, the retailer increases prices on all of his merchandise. Scenario 3: Retail—Salesman A young man, recently hired as a salesman for a local retail store, has been working very hard to favorably impress his boss with his selling ability. At times, this young man, anxious for an order, has been a little over-eager. To get the order, he exaggerates the value of the item or withholds relevant information concerning the product he is trying to sell. No fraud or deceit is intended by his actions, he is simply over-eager. Action: His boss, the owner of the retail store, is aware of the salesman’s actions but has done nothing to stop such practice. Table 3 Ethical perspectives instrument scales (Reidenbach and Robin 1988) Ethical perspective Items (seven-point likert scale: 1–7)* Justice Fair/Unfair Utilitarianism Produces greatest utility/produces the least utility Just/Unjust Maximizes benefits while minimizes harm/minimizes benefits while maximizes harm * Generally speaking, in the above bipolar scales, 1 fair or just or efficient (unethical) whereas 7 unfair, unjust, or inefficient (ethical) Leads to the greatest good for the greatest number/leads to the least good for the greatest number Relativism scenarios are used in this study. Prior research (Reidenbach and Robin 1988) also indicates that judgments may depend on the setting in which they occur. Results Table 4 summarizes of the descriptive statistics. In general, Americans were less ethical than Norwegians based on the three dimensions of ethics, they were less likely to be susceptible to peer pressure, and they were more masculine, and more spiritual. Table 5 summarize the correlations across all three scenarios for each country. In general, the more feminine Norwegians were, the more spiritual they were (r = -.27, p \ .001). Surprisingly, the more individualistic Norwegians were, the more spiritual they were (r = .21, p \ .01). 123 Culturally acceptable/Unacceptable Individually acceptable/Unacceptable Acceptable/Unacceptable to my family Table 4 Descriptive statistics U.S. Norway N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. Utilitarianism 33 2.49 1.25 107 4.96 1.45 Justice 33 2.33 1.28 114 5.92 1.12 Relativism 33 2.63 1.38 111 5.48 1.26 Peer 33 3.39 1.62 116 4.85 1.73 Masculinity 33 29.39 92.25 113 -28.94 83.14 Individualism 33 93.64 42.34 113 91.50 39.33 Spirituality 31 71.19 6.43 103 67.16 8.82 The more spiritual Norwegians were, the more they found the decisions in the three ethical scenarios to be less ethical based on utilitarianism (r = .29, p \ .001), justice (r = .18, p \ .01), and relativism (r = .19, p \ .001), and the more susceptible they were to peer pressure (r = .29, p \ .001). Spirituality and ethicsin Norway and the United States 39 Table 5 Correlations between ethical perspectives and independent variables across all three scenarios for (a) U.S. sample and (b) Norway sample Utilitarianism Relativism Peer Masculinity Individualism Spirituality (a) U.S. sample Justice .64*** Utilitarianism .64*** .10 .72*** .33*** Relativism .27** Peer .11 -.08 -.29** -.03 -.13 -.27** .03 -.15 -.29** .13 -.16 -.20 -.02 -.25* Masculinity Individualism (b) Norway sample Justice .17 .46*** Utilitarianism .68*** .19*** -.17** .20*** .29*** .45*** .20*** -.03 .11* .18** .32*** -.07 .20*** .19*** Relativism Peer Masculinity Individualism -.04 .18** -.07 .29*** -.27*** .21** *** p \ .001, ** p \ .01, * p \ .05 Similarly, the more feminine were Americans, the more they were spiritual (r = -.25, p \ .05). However, spirituality and individualism were not significantly correlated for them. In contrast to the Norwegians, the less spiritual were Americans, the less ethical they found the decisions in the three ethical scenarios based on utilitarianism (r = -.29, p \ .01), justice (r = -.27, p \ .01), and relativism (r = -.29, p \ .01), and the less susceptible they were to peer pressure. As we will see in the ‘‘Discussion’’ section, this may be due to the fact spirituality may hold a different meaning for Norwegians as compared to Americans. Hypothesis 1 was largely supported through repeated measures MANOVA analysis: respondents’ decision to behave ethically was a function of spirituality, national culture (masculinity/femininity), and peer pressure. Consistent significant results were reported for justice, utilitarianism, and relativism for spirituality, national culture, and peer pressure (Table 6). The choice of ethical criteria (justice) was a function of multiple variables (p6,367 = 17.92, p \ .0001, r2 = 0.23) with several independent variables being significant: spirituality (F1,367 = 12.05, p \ .001), peer pressure (F1,367 = 64.06, p \ .0001), and masculinity (F1, 367 = 27.37, p \ .001). Utilitarianism was also a function of multiple variables (p6,367 = 14.19, p \ .0001, r2 = .191) with several independent variables being significant: spirituality (F1,367 = 4.95, p \ .05), peer pressure (F1,367 = 63.96, p \ .0001), and masculinity (F1,367 = 10.69, p \ .01). Finally, relativism is a function of multiple variables (F6,367 = 24.06, p \ .0001, r2 = .29) with several independent variables being significant: spirituality (F1,367 = 13.79, p \ .001), peer pressure (F1,367 = 100.77, p \ .0001), and masculinity (F1,367 = 15.29, p \ .001). Hypothesis 2 was supported through the separate MANOVAs conducted for the U.S. and for Norway—as summarized in Tables 7 and 8. As can be seen in Table 7, justice in the U.S. is a function of spirituality without the influence of peers or of national culture (individualism and masculinity) (F6, 91 = 4.61, p \ .001). This result provides support for Hypothesis 2.a. By contrast, Table 8 indicates that justice in Norway is a function of spirituality and is subject to the influence of peers and both national culture dimensions (individualism/collectivism and masculinity/ femininity) (F6,275 = 15.18, p \ .0001). This supports Hypothesis 2.b. Hypothesis 3 also received partial support. Hypothesis 3.a was not supported whereas Hypothesis 3.b was supported. As seen in Table 7, it would seem that respondents from an individualistic and masculine culture such as the U.S. are influenced by peers when engaged in ethical decision-making (except with respect to justice). By contrast, respondents from a collective and feminine culture such as Norway are very much influenced by peers with respect to all three ethical dimensions when dealing with ethical dilemmas (as indicated in Table 8). That Norwegians are overall more susceptible to peer influence than Americans is also confirmed in Table 9 where a t test indicates that Norwegians are more influenced by peers than Americans (t = -7.5, p \ .0001). Finally, Table 9 indicates that Americans may be more spiritual (t = 4.1, p \ .0001) and more masculine than Norwegians (t = 5.99, p \ .0001). Interestingly, Americans and Norwegians in our sample did not differ significantly in the individualism/collectivism dimension. 123 40 Table 6 Repeated measures ANOVA by ethical perspective R. I. Beekun, J. W. Westerman Source DF Sum of squares Mean square F value p Value 17.92 \.0001 (a) Repeated measures ANOVA with justice as dependent variable 6 320.33 53.39 Error Overall model 361 1075.21 2.99 Corrected total 367 1395.54 2 13.81 Scenario type 6.91 2.32 n.s. Spirituality 1 35.9 35.9 12.05 \.001 Peer 1 190.8 190.8 64.06 \.0001 Individualism 1 0.87 0.87 0.29 Masculinity 1 81.53 81.53 27.37 \.0001 n.s. 14.19 \.0001 R2 = 0.23 (b) Repeated measures ANOVA with utilitarianism as dependent variable 6 224.1 37.35 Error Overall model 361 950.1 2.63 Corrected total 367 1174.2 Scenario type Spirituality 2 1 10.72 13.02 5.36 13.02 2.04 4.95 168.33 168.33 63.96 Peer 1 Individualism 1 Masculinity 1 0.044 28.14 0.044 28.14 n.s. \.05 \.0001 0.00 n.s. 10.69 \.01 24.06 \.0001 R2 = .191 (c) Repeated measures ANOVA with relativism as dependent variable Overall model 6 327.6 Error 361 819.31 Corrected total 367 1146.92 54.6 2.27 Scenario type 2 34.22 17.11 7.54 \.001 Spirituality 1 31.29 31.29 13.79 \.001 228.71 228.71 100.77 \.0001 Peer 1 Individualism 1 Masculinity 1 .677 34.71 .677 34.71 0.30 15.29 n.s. \.001 R2 = .29 Discussion Our goal in this study was to shed some light on the relationships between three fundamental variables in human existence: ethics, spirituality, and national culture. Our hypotheses were generally supported by the data, indicating a complexity between these influences. Results indicated that intention to behave ethically was significantly related to spirituality, national culture, and the influence of peers. Thus, spirituality alone does not determine ethical behavior—the results of this research indicate that we must take into account the simultaneous impact of peer pressure and national culture. We also found that spiritual people from the U.S. were more likely to use a universalistic form of justice ethics, as opposed to the more particularistic form of justice ethics used by Norwegians. Further, peer influences were more significant to Norwegians than to Americans in making ethical decisions. Finally, our results indicated that Americans were 123 significantly less ethical than Norwegians based on the three dimensions of ethics, yet more spiritual overall. Perhaps one of the most intriguing results was that the relationship between spirituality and business ethics was opposite for Norwegians and Americans. The data from this study indicated that the more spiritual were Norwegians, the more ethical was their decision-making. In contrast, the more spiritual were Americans, the less ethical was their decision-making. The contradictory results may be due to the fact that spirituality may mean different things for Norwegians as compared to Americans. We can only speculate as to the reasons. Milliman et al. (2003) noted that spirituality emphasizes connectedness and the needs of the many before the needs of the one. It is possible that more spiritual Americans do not share this understanding or definition of spirituality. In the U.S., spirituality has become increasingly intertwined with national politics, which may be altering how spirituality is perceived by Americans. In a recent study of religion and politics, the Spirituality and ethicsin Norway and the United States Table 7 Repeated measures ANOVA for U.S. by ethical perspective Source 41 DF Sum of squares Mean square F value p Value (a) U.S.: Repeated measures ANOVA with justice as dependent variable Overall model 6 37.45 Error 85 115.0 Corrected total 91 152.46 Scenario type 2 23.45 4.61 \.001 11.72 8.66 \.001 6.24 1.25 Spirituality 1 8.57 8.57 6.34 \.05 Peer 1 .38 .38 .28 n.s. Individualism 1 .37 .32 .24 n.s. Masculinity 1 .49 .49 .37 n.s. R2 = .25 (b) U.S.: Repeated measures ANOVA with utilitarianism as dependent variable Overall model 8.60 \.0001 13.56 6.15 13.45 6.10 \.0001 \.05 \.001 6 52.07 8.68 Error 85 85.76 1.00 Corrected total 91 137.83 Scenario type Spirituality 2 1 27.133 6.15 Peer 1 12.22 12.22 12.11 Individualism 1 .36 .36 .36 n.s. Masculinity 1 1.61 1.61 1.59 n.s. 8.19 \.0001 R2 = .38 (c) U.S.: Repeated measures ANOVA with relativism as dependent variable Overall model 6 64.26 10.71 Error 85 111.1 1.31 Corrected total 91 175.37 Scenario type 2 36.52 18.26 13.97 Spirituality 1 7.87 7.87 6.02 \.05 \.0001 Peer 1 9.32 9.32 7.13 \.01 Individualism 1 2.1 2.1 1.61 n.s. Masculinity 1 0.10 0.10 0.07 n.s. R2 = .366 Pew Research Center (2011) concluded that for the 2008 U.S. Presidential election ‘‘Religion remained a very strong predictor of voters’ choices,’’ and a logistic regression analysis confirmed that ‘‘church attendance was a very strong predictor of how people voted in 2008, even after taking into account other demographic factors, such as race, age, gender, education, income, urban/rural status, region and union membership. Holding these other factors constant, the probability that a voter who attends religious services at least weekly cast his ballot for Obama was 37 out of 100 (.37).’’ Further evidence of this enhanced relationship is indicated by the fact that George W. Bush was the first U.S. President to host events for a National Day of Prayer every year when he was in office. Mirriam-Webster (2011) notes two definitions of the word ‘‘politics’’ of relevance to this conjecture: (1): ‘‘competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership (as in a government)’’; and (2) ‘‘political activities characterized by artful and often dishonest practices.’’ If there exists an increasing conflation between politics and religion in the U.S., it is possible that the sense of community that is critical to enhancing spirituality and the needs of the many over the needs of the few may be weakened, replaced by a more political definition as a means of expressing competitive and potentially divisive political thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. Further, the results of this study indicated opposite results in terms of the relationship between peer pressure and business ethics. More ethical Norwegians were influenced by peer pressure, whereas more ethical Americans resisted peer influence. As spirituality in practice has social and community-building aspects with an intrinsic reliance on peer influence, it may provide further support for the concerns regarding potential interrelationships between religion, politics, and reduced business ethics in the U.S. 123 42 R. I. Beekun, J. W. Westerman Table 8 Repeated measures ANOVA for Norway by ethical perspective Source DF Sum of squares Mean square F value p Value 15.18 \.0001 22.6 \.0001 (a) Norway: Repeated measures ANOVA with justice as dependent variable Overall Model 6 89.42 Error 269 264.1 Corrected Total 275 353.51 2 44.37 Scenario Type 14.9 0.98 22.19 Spirituality 1 9.67 9.67 9.85 \.01 Peer 1 4.69 4.69 4.78 \.05 Individualism 1 6.29 6.29 6.40 \.05 Masculinity 1 5.2 5.2 5.31 \.05 R2 = .253 (b) Norway: Repeated measures ANOVA with utilitarianism as dependent variable Overall model 6 83.5 Error 269 505.6 Corrected total 13.9 7.41 \.0001 1.88 275 589.11 Scenario type Spirituality 2 1 43.9 9.88 21.97 9.88 11.69 5.26 \.0001 \.05 Peer 1 11.49 11.49 6.12 \.05 Individualism 1 2.64 2.64 1.41 n.s. Masculinity 1 0.15 0.15 n.s. n.s. 24.29 \.0001 R2 = .14 (c) Norway: Repeated measures ANOVA with relativism as dependent variable Overall model 6 154.0 Error 269 284.3 Corrected total 25.67 1.057 275 438.33 Scenario type 2 97.71 48.86 46.23 \.0001 Spirituality 1 1.43 1.43 1.35 n.s. Peer 1 29.15 29.15 27.58 \.0001 Individualism 1 7.31 7.31 6.92 \.01 Masculinity 1 0.36 0.36 0.35 n.s. R2 = .35 Table 9 Summary of t test results across all three scenarios U.S. Spirituality Norway N Mean 93 71.2 S.D. N 6.43 309 Mean 67.16 S.D. T-score 8.33 4.1*** Peer 99 3.39 1.62 348 4.85 1.73 -7.5*** Masculinity 99 29.39 92.24 339 -28.93 83.14 5.99*** *** Significant at p \ .0001 We want to again emphasize that this is speculative. As religious values and beliefs can exert a profound influence on human behavior and codes of ethics, an enhanced understanding of the social or intrapersonal mechanisms underlying the relationship between enhanced spirituality and reduced American business ethics represents fertile ground for future research. For example, it is not uncommon in the U.S. for an individual to reference God as a 123 primary role model for their behavior. Future research could focus on developing a better understanding of why spiritual people seem more willing to commit ethical violations in a business setting in the U.S., while others can be persuaded in the appropriate direction by peers, norms, or organizational culture. The recognition of the important cross-cultural differences in these relationships may present opportunities for enhanced personal and interpersonal Spirituality and ethicsin Norway and the United States awareness, behavioral interventions, or training and development on appropriate business ethical norms. Perhaps leadership in organizations may play an important role in linking ethics and spirituality in a consistently more constructive direction. For example, ‘‘transformational leadership’’ is rooted in the ability of leaders to inspire followers to transcend their own selfinterests for the good of the organization, and such transformational leaders are described as being capable of having a profound and extraordinary effect on their followers (Bass et al. 2003). Servant leadership (Greenleaf 1977) is inspired partly by the story of Jesus washing the feet of his Apostles, and combines the idea of service with leadership. The leader is to serve the needs of his/her followers before taking care of his/her own needs, and is to help them become ‘‘better servants’’ themselves. Socialized charismatic leadership (Brown and Trevino 2006) conveys values that are other-centered (as opposed to self-centered) and is represented by leaders who model ethical conduct. These leadership theories focus on inspiring followers and transcendence, possess foundations built on ethical leadership, and seem to share commonalities with spirituality. As such, they represent an additional area for future study. A significant limitation of this study is that the sample population consisted of students. A specific focus on surveying employees may result in a stronger analysis of the relationships. However, since today’s students are tomorrow’s employees, using a student population is beneficial in determining forthcoming workplace issues. 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LAM University of Hong Kong XIAO-PING CHEN University of Washington JOHN SCHAUBROECK Drexel University The relationship between perceived participative decision making and employee performance was examined in matched samples of employees from the Hong Kong and U.S. branches of one organization. Self-efficacy in regard to participating in decisions and idiocentrism moderated the relationship between perceived participative decision-making opportunity and individual performance. Perceptions of the participation efficacy of a work unit and allocentrism moderated the relationship between participative decision-making opportunity cind group performance. Idiocentrism and allocentrism appeared to explain regional differences in how participative decision making and efficacy perceptions interacted to predict performance. Participative decision making, defined as joint decision making (Locke & Schweiger, 1979) or influence sharing between hierarchical superiors and their subordinates (Mitchell, 1973), has been a focus of organizational research for nearly 50 years. Whereas many researchers have examined relationships between participative decision making and employee outcomes such as task performance, job satisfaction, and turnover, only equivocal conclusions can be drawn from existing research on the relationship between participative decision making and job performance. Some quantitative reviews bave reported moderately positive relationships between these variables (e.g.. Cotton, VoUrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, & Jennings, 1988; Miller & Monge, 1986). Other quantitative reviews have not found these positive effects (e.g., Wagner, 1994; Wagner & Gooding, 1987a, 1987b). Wagner and Gooding (1987a) inspected the studies cited by Miller and Monge (1986) and found that 90 percent involved percept-percept data collection techniques (that is, data collected from the same respondents using the same questionnaire at the same time). Wagner (1994) reanalyzed Cotton and his coauthors' (1988) data using meta-analysis and found that the overall effect of employee participative decision making on job performance (and job satisfaction) was positive but small, especially when the unisource studies were omitted. Wagner and his colleagues (1994; Wagner & Gooding, 1987a, 1987b) thus argued that the significant performance-related findings publisbed in participative decision making research were mainly the product of percept-percept artifacts. Although these inferences about the main effects of participative decision making appear sound, the inconsistent findings concerning the participation-performance relationship might also be explained by tbe absence (or presence) of other moderating variables. Indeed, Wagner and Gooding (1987b) noted that the moderating effects of other variables could hide a few noteworthy multisource relationships. The moderating effects of situational variables (work group size, task complexity, and others) have been well documented (Wagner & Gooding, 1987b). Therefore, the present study focused on testing the moderating effects of societal culture and psychological variables on group and individual performance. In particular, we focus here on individual difference variables associated with locus of identity and efficacy beliefs about participating as moderators of the effects of participative decision making on individual and group performance. Below, we discuss how these factors interact with participative decision making in influencing individual and group performance. The authors thank Thomas Lee, Terence Mitchell, and Marilyn Cist for their constructive and thoughtful comments on a draft. Part of the results of this study was presented at the Asia Academy of Management Meeting in Singapore, 2000. 905 Academy of Management Journal 906 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Allocentrism, Collective Efficacy, and Group Performance In the present study, we distinguished between two types of beliefs a person may have about his or her efficacy in participating in work decisions: participation efficacy (self) and participation efficacy (collective). Drawing on previous definitions of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997) and collective efficacy (Gist, 1987; Earley, 1994; Mischel & Northcraft, 1997; Riggs, Warka, Babasa, Betancourt, & Hooker, 1994), we define participation efficacy (self) as the extent to which an individual believes that he or she has the ability and skills to successfully participate in decision-making processes. Participation efficacy (collective) is the extent to which group members believe that their group has the ability and skills to successfully participate in decision making. In theory, participative decision making's effects on performance may stem from how people use it instrumentally to create situations that are more favorable to their effectiveness (Mitchell, 1973). People who are high on self-efficacy will utilize participative decision making opportunities to achieve what they desire, whereas those who are low on self-efficacy may tend to become distressed when presented with such opportunities. Similarly, people who have high levels of collective efficacy are likely to participate actively when they have the opportunity because they are confident that, together with their peers, they can effectively increase group performance. On the other hand, persons who have low levels of collective efficacy may tend to view such opportunities as threatening because they view their group as being unable to make decisions effectively. An opportunity for their group to participate in decision making may be seen as surfacing group dysfunctions toward no clear benefit. Thus, the degree to which employees believe that they or their work units are able to participate effectively (have participation efficacy) is critical in determining how strongly participative decision making influences performance. Whereas individualism and collectivism represent the general attributes of a given culture, the terms "idiocentrism" and "allocentrism" have been used to measure the individual-level orientations that reflect these cultural values (Triandis, 1989). Triandis suggested using idiocentrism and allocentrism to capture within-culture variation in personality attributes. Idiocentrics view the self as being separate from others, are concerned with achievement, and give priority to personal goals over the goals of collectives. Conversely, persons scoring high on allocentrism view the self as inseparable Octoher from the others in an in-group. They are so concerned with interpersonal harmony that, when they do distinguish between personal and collective goals, they subordinate their personal goals to the collective goals. From the individual perspective, according to Triandis, idiocentrism and allocentrism are distinct constructs measurable along a normal distribution. Common societal influences tend to make one of these two dimensions higher on the average in any particular societal culture; however, individuals often differ from their society's trends. The developing literatures on shared mental models (e.g., Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000) and "transactive memory" in groups (e.g., Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995) suggest that group members develop shared images of their groups. According to both these frameworks, shared experiences lead group members to develop interrelated knowledge structures that facilitate (or hinder) group process. For example. Cannon and Edmondson (2001) found that group performance was associated with members' shared beliefs about how to learn from failure. The identities of allocentric individuals tend to be grounded in goals tbat they share with other members of tbeir groups (Chen, Chen, & Meindl, 1998). When these people have little confidence in a group's ability to effectively confront challenges, they may see influence opportunities as debilitating rather than salutary for performance because they could create new conditions for group failure. Moreover, because allocentric persons' perceptions of collective efficacy have primacy over their perceptions of self-efficacy, personal influence opportunities may lead to person-role conflicts if they do not see a group as working together effectively. Thus, groups whose members are predominantly highly allocentric can be expected to respond effectively when they have opportunities to participate in decisions, but only when they share high participation efficacy (collective). There has been limited cross-cultural research on self-efficacy and collective efficacy (see Earley, 1994; Gibson, 1999; Schaubroeck, Lam, & Xie, 2000). Schaubroeck and his coauthors (2000) did not examine performance outcomes, but they found that having more job-related discretion (job control) enhanced stress-coping facility among allocentric persons only when they also reported high collective efficacy. Job control and participative decision making opportunity are similar in that both reflect an employee's level of influence at work, and both job performance and stress coping reflect how effectively a person is using influence opportunities. Thus, their study suggests that, at least at the individual level, "allocentrics"' confidence in their work 2002 Lam, Chen, and Schaubroeck groups may determine how effectively they use influence opportunities in group contexts. In vievk^ of the existing research and theory, we predict that, among work unit members with high allocentrism, collective efficacy cognitions concerning the use of influence will determine how successfully their work units use opportunities to participate in decision making to enhance group performance. Hypothesis la. Perceptions of an opportunity for participative decision making will have a positive effect on the performance of a group when the group (a) is high on allocentrism and (b) has high participation efficacy. Hypothesis lh. Perceptions of an opportunity for participative decision making will have a negative effect on the performance of a group when the group is (a) high on allocentrism and (b) has low participation efficacy. Idiocentrism, Self-Efficacy, and Individual Performance Idiocentric persons are less motivated to cooperate with other group members outside the context of their individual roles, and thus, collective efficacy cognitions have little primacy. Because they value individual achievement and autonomy, however, "idiocentrics" can be expected to use influence opportunities as a means of pursuing the rewards associated with effective individual performance. In the study by Schaubroeck and his colleagues cited above (Schaubroeck et al., 2000], among more idiocentric persons with high job control, collective efficacy did not enhance coping as it did among allocentrics; rather, self-efficacy on the job played the crucial moderating role. Similarly, whether idiocentric workers use influence opportunities effectively or ineffectively to achieve their personal performance goals may depend on their domain-specific self-efficacy. Specifically, when idiocentric workers lack confidence in their own ability to participate in decision making, they may be less inclined to involve themselves in decisions when opportunities to participate arise. They may hold back because having more influence opportunities creates conditions in which they expect to fail. Moreover, persons scoring high on idiocentrism place high credence in individual differences in merit in various domains. Therefore, those who lack confidence in their participative decisionmaking abilities may fear embarrassment or ridicule if they offer their views and opinions. In addition, unlike people high on allocentrism, idiocentrics may be less inclined to view participative 907 decision making as a group responsibility in which their own identity and limitations are submerged in a collective effort. For these reasons, the individual performance of idiocentrics who have low participation efficacy (self) is not likely to benefit from participative decision making opportunities. On the other hand, because of their emphasis on personal achievement, idiocentric people who have high participation efficacy (self) may readily seek to obtain the individual performance rewards that participating can facilitate through such mechanisms as helping individuals clarify and negotiate role expectations, enhancing their performance expectancies, and removing performance barriers (Mitchell, 1973; Schuler, 1980). Hypothesis 2a. Perceptions of an opportunity for participative decision making will have a positive effect on the performance of an individual when the individual is high on (a) idiocentrism and (b) participation efficacy (self). Hypothesis 2b. Perceptions of an opportunity for participative decision making will have a negative effect on the performance of an individual when the individual (a) is high on idiocentrism and (b) has low participation efficacy (self). METHODS Sample and Procedures An important methodological issue in conducting cross-cultural research is the comparability of different samples on dimensions that are not central to the investigation (Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973). In the present study, our samples were matched in terms of organization, job, and numerous demographic characteristics. The respondents were junior workers in the Hong Kong and U.S. branches of a large multinational bank. All the branches were divided into either four- or fivemember units, each of which reported to a single supervisor, who in turn reported to an operating supervisor. These two national samples did not differ significantly in age, gender, education, or tenure. Age ranged from 20 to 38, with the mean age being 25.4 years; 82 percent were women; 94 percent had at least high school educations; and 8 percent had undergraduate degrees. The respondents had been employed in their present positions from 1 to 7 years, with the mean tenure being 2.7 years. Questionnaires were sent to potential participants through the company's internal mail system. Respondents were guaranteed anonymity and pro- 908 Academy of Management Journal vided with stamped envelopes preaddressed to the researchers. We asked respondents to provide their employee numbers so that we could match responses with job performance data. They were assured that these numbers would be used strictly for research purposes and would not be associated with their names. To maintain confidentiality of the responses, we processed tbe data off-site and reported only aggregated data to the organization. Questionnaires were sent to 338 junior workers in Hong Kong, and 265 (78%) returned them. Five workers did not provide their employee identification numbers, and supervisor performance ratings were missing for seven workers. They were excluded from the analysis. Questionnaires were sent to 358 junior workers in the United States, and 288 (80%) were returned. We excluded 6 U,S, workers who did not provide their identification numbers and 9 for whom supervisor performance ratings were absent. To determine tbe representativeness of the sample, we compared data from the respondents with company data measuring (1) the total employee population of junior workers of the organization and (2) the employees who received the mailing in each country. There were no significant differences between the respondents and those who did not respond in terms of age, gender, education, and tenure. Also, the respondents did not differ significantly from tbe total junior worker population of the organization on any demographic variable in either sample. All Hong Kong participants were of Chinese ethnic origin. Tbe etbnic beritage of the U,S, participants, obtained from archival records, is as follows: 72,8 percent Caucasian-American, 11.5 percent Asian-American, 9,7 percent Hispanic-American, 5,2 percent AfricanAmerican, and 0.8 percent Native American, Measures Tbe questionnaire distributed in Hong Kong was written in Cbinese, Tbe conventional method of back-translation (Brislin et al., 1973) was used to translate the measures from English to Chinese. The translators were professionals in this practice with college education in translation. The translated version was pretested with several junior workers in the organization who were asked to comment on any item tbat they found ambiguous or difficult to understand. These queries did not reveal any major changes that needed to be made to any of the items.^ ^ We conducted a confirmative factor analysis to ensure the equality of factor structure across the two na- October Participative decision making opportunity. Participative decision making opportunity was measured with the five-item scale adopted from Siegel and Rub (1973). The items essentially ask individuals to indicate the degree of participation they bave in decisions affecting their jobs (for example, "In tbis organization, I have bigh degree of influence in company decisions," "In tbis organization, I often participate in decisions regarding my job," "In tbis organization, I bave bigb degree of influence in tbe decisions affecting me," "In tbis organization, I can participate in setting new company policies," and "In tbis organization, my views have a real influence in company decisions"), Tbe response categories ranged from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 5 ("strongly agree"). The Cronbacb alpba for tbis scale was ,95. Participation efficacy. The participation efficacy (self) scale was adapted from tbe Personal Efficacy Beliefs Scale developed by Riggs et al, (1994) and contained five items (for example, "I have confidence in my ability to participate effectively" and "I bave excellent participation skills"). Participation efficacy (collective) was adapted from tbe Collective Efficacy Beliefs Scale (Riggs et al,, 1994). Tbe scale consists of five items (for example, "Tbe unit I work witb bas above-average ability to participate effectively" and "Tbe members of tbis unit have excellent participation skills"). Botb scales were based on a five-point scale ranging from 1 ("very inaccinrate") to 5 ("very accurate"). The alphas for tbese two scales were .90 and ,90, respectively. Individual and group performance. The immediate unit supervisors were asked to provide a performance rating for each individual employee. We adapted three items from an instrument developed by Heilman, Block, and Lucas (1992): "This employee is very competent," "This employee gets bis or ber work done very effectively," and "Tbis employee bas performed his/her job well," Tbe supervisors returned these ratings directly to us. Tbey also provided performance ratings for eacb whole unit they supervised, using three items, again adapted from Heilman et al. (1992): "This unit is very competent," "This unit gets the work done very effectively," and "Tbis unit bas performed tbe job well." Tbe alpbas for tbese two scales were .94 and .95, respectively. tions, examining each instrument separately using LISREL 8 (Joreskog & Sorhom, 1993). The results indicated that a factor structure specifying the unidimensionality of all constructs was consistent with the data for hoth countries. Details concerning these analyses are availahle from the first author. 2002 Lam, Chen, and Schaubroeck Allocentrism and idiocentrism. Two separate eight-item scales developed by Triandis and Gelfand (1998) were used to measure allocentrism (for example, "I feel good when I cooperate witb others" and "If a co-worker gets a prize, I would feel proud") and idiocentrism (for example, "My personal identity, independent of otbers, is important to me" and "I would rather depend on myself than otbers"). The reliabilities for allocentrism and idiocentrism were .92 and ,91, respectively. Aggregation Tests Testing for group-level effects requires opportunity for participative decision making, allocentrism, and participation efficacy (collective) to be aggregated by taking tbe average of group members' scores. To test tbe suitability of sucb aggregation, both between-group differences and witbin-group agreement on tbese measures bad to be examined (Coodman, Ravlin, & Scbminke, 1990). We estimated witbin-group agreement (r^g) using a metbod developed by James, Demaree, and Wolf (1993), which assesses the consistency within a group with respect to ratings of a common scale. The average r^g coefficients for the Hong Kong and U,S, samples respectively were ,90 and ,87, Every group's coefficient was above ,85, demonstrating witbin-group agreement. To verify between-groups differences, we conducted a witbin and between analysis (WABA; Dansereau, Alutto, and Yammarino, 1984), In tbis test, a statistic, eta, obtained between groups is compared to tbat obtained within a group in terms of a value called the E ratio, a test of practical significance. The E ratio for the Hong Kong sample was 1.5, and for U.S. sample it was 1.3. That these ratios were greater than 1.0 indicated that tbe variation between groups was significantly greater tban tbe variation witbin groups. We computed corrected F-tests for eacb measure, and all results were statistically significant. Togetber, these results indicate that it is appropriate to infer group-level constructs for each work unit's average individual scores on eacb variable. RESULTS Table 1 sbows tbe means, standard deviations, and correlations among tbe variables for the two samples. The Hong Kong means were significantly higher than the U,S, means on individual performance [t = 2.23, p < ,05), participation efficacy (collective) (t = 4,18, p < .0001), and allocentrism [t = 4.36, p < .0001), whereas tbe U.S, means were bigher tban tbe Hong Kong means on participation 909 efficacy (self) [t = -3,62, p < ,001) and idiocentrism (f = -6.32, p < .0001). Hypotbeses la and lb predict tbat allocentrism and participation efficacy (collective) will moderate tbe relationsbip between participative decision making opportunity perceptions and group performance. As Table 2 sbows, tbe tbree-way interaction (participative decision making X participation efficacy [collective] X allocentrism) was significant (Afl^ = ,12, Fi,io2 = 12,35, p < ,001), providing support for tbe first set of bypotheses. Specifically, we foimd tbat within the group of participants scoring high on allocentrism, strong positive relationships between an opportunity to participate in decisions and group performance were present, but only among participants reporting high participation efficacy (Hypotbesis la). We also found that witbin tbe subgroup witb low participation efficacy (collective), participative decision making opportunity was negatively related to group performance (Hypotbesis lb). Moreover, in tbe groups scoring low on allocentrism, tbere was no relationsbip between participative decision making opportunity and group performance. We tben used tbe bierarchical linear cross-level modeling procedure recommended by Hofmann (1997) to test wbetber tbe group-level effects still held when individual effects were controlled. Results of these analyses revealed tbat tbe group-level effects on group-level performance were significant (p < .001) even after we controlled for both the effects of individuallevel performance and tbe effects of idiocentrism and individual efficacy (p < .001), Hypotbeses 2a and 2b predict tbat idiocentrism and participation efficacy (self) will moderate tbe relationship between participative decision making opportunity perceptions and individual performance. As sbown in Table 2, we found that tbe tbree-way interaction between participative decision making opportunity, participation efficacy (self), and idiocentrism was significant (Afl^ = ,13, ^1,515 = 13.44, p < .001), In particular, for tbose wbo scored high on both idiocentrism and participation efficacy (self), there was a strong, positive relationsbip between participative decision making opportunity and individual performance (Hypotbesis 2 a). The same relationsbip was negative among tbose wbo reported low participation efficacy and bigb idiocentrism (Hypotbesis 2b). Furthermore, among those who scored low on idiocentrism, regardless of participation efficacy (self) levels, there was no relationship between participative decision making opportunity and performance. These results support the second set of hypotbeses. We performed further analyses to examine (1) whether the U.S. and Hong Kong samples, which 'J" CM O) CO t o o o o o o CO rf in tr> a> iD o o o o o I cj) O) C^ CM rH O O O5 CO Xi tt 0) I CO i n CO t v o o o o o tt to Vi CO in CO o in O O O CM O5 00 fi o 00 fi o X rH in CO q O u -a < CO o CO CO o o o o o CO m O O rH O m rH rH rH O O O CO CO CM CO IN. CD CO ' ^ i n i n I and those in .02 -.04 .09 .06 .02 I -.04 .06 o "cc 1^ I I CM rH O CD i n i n CO CO T-5 d o d o Cfl rH CO CO o CO i n cd i n rH rH i n CD •* CO CO CO CO CO CO 3 in CO i n c^^ CO in in CM O O O O in CO in CO CO o o o o II s o 3 rH CO CO s CO •rH rH en 5s CO 253, nulti o u II •a -a '> CO d) o s < CO in cd cfl fi CO Cd CJ £ CO C3) c/i .2 II c in q V < .01 e *^ o ;cisi Cd a C 273, U. n the d goni CO CD CJ •fica y (sel •fica lecti king c3| Edu tion Indi Part: ipative oppi tunity Part ipation Part ic:ipation jntrism Idio ntrism I a> r-l O CO in in r^ CO CO CO in in a. a. 1 tt CO 2002 Lam, Chen, and Schaubroeck 911 TABLE 2 Results of Regression Analyses" Variable Individual performance Step 1 Age Sex Education AF(3, 522) Step 2 Participative decision making opportunity ^F(1, Coefficient -0.01 -0.20 0.20 .00 0.47 0.20* .04 10.02* 521) Step 3 Participation efficacy (self) Idiocentrism 0.13* -0.05 .02 2.33 AF(2, 519) Step 4 Participative Participative Participation Afl^ AF(1, 516) Step 5 Participative Afl2 AF(1, 515) Test decision making X participation efficacy (self) decision making x idiocentrism efficacy (self) X idiocentrism -0.27** .03 6.11* decision making X participation efficacy (self) X idiocentrism 0.85* .13 13.44** Overall model F(10, 515) Group performance Step 1 Age Sex Education AF(3, 109) Step 2 Participative decision making opportunity AF(1, 108) Step 3 Participation efficacy (collective) Allocentrism AF(2, 106) Step 4 Participative Participative Participation Afl^' AF(1, 103) Step 5 Participative Afl^ AF(1, 102) Overall model R^ F(10, 102) .23 12.27** 0.20 -0.20 0.20 .00 0.44 0.24* .05 11.37* 0.14* -0.03 .03 3.33* decision making X participation efficacy (collective) decision making X allocentrism efficacy (collective) X allocentrism -0.31* .03 6.50* decision making X participation efficacy (collective) X allocentrism 0.83* .12 12.35* .24 13.41* ° Coefficients are unstandardized. Intercepts are omitted. Participative decision making, participation efficacy (self and collective), idiocentrism, and allocentrism were mean-centered. * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 Academy of Management Journal 912 differed significantly on idiocentrism and allocentrism, also differed significantly regarding the effects of participative decision making opportunity on individual and group performance and (2) whether the effects of idiocentrism and allocentrism mediated the geographic differences. At the group level of analysis, the three-way interaction hetween participation efficacy (collective), participative decision making opportunity, and U.S.Hong Kong sample were no longer significant predictors of group performance after we controlled for allocentrism and its two-way and three-way interactions with participation efficacy (collective) and participative decision making opportunity (AR^ = .00, F^ gg = 1.37, n.s.). Similarly, the interaction hetween participation efficacy (self), participative decision making opportunity, and sample was no longer significant in predicting individual performance after we controlled these variables [AR^ = .00, F-i 511 = 1.22, n.s.). These findings suggest that allocentrism and idiocentrism mediate societal differences in the effects of participative decision making and efficacy heliefs on performance. DISCUSSION The results of the present study suggest that in studying the participation-performance relationship, researchers should look heyond situational and methodological moderators and examine psychological predispositions. We found that individual self-construal (as reflected hy allocentrism and idiocentrism) and domain-specific efficacy perceptions significantly determined the magnitude of participative decision making effects. We also ohserved that allocentrism (aggregated to a workgroup level) and idiocentrism mediated the relationships between the societal difference represented in our two samples (from Hong Kong and the United States) and group and individual performance, respectively. These findings suggest that allocentrism and idiocentrism are powerful individual differences that, although cultivated differently in particular societies, also have meaningful influences on behavior irrespective of societal boundaries. That is to say, even in the United States, where individualism is predominant, allocentric values may influence the effect of participative decision making opportunities on how much employees contribute to their work groups' performance. Similarly, for Hong Kong employees who are more idiocentric, the effect of participative decision making opportunities on individual performance will likely be influenced by their individual self-efficacy. Individual belief structures such as allocentrism aid in identifying aggregate (group. October organization, and society) propensities, and they also facilitate understanding why certain norms and stereotypes imputed to a culture often do not represent particular individuals within that culture. Moreover, when organizational or societal cultures are in transition, conceptualizations of beliefs at the individual level and their corresponding measures may better reflect the subtle nature of changes in belief structures. Limitations Given the cross-sectional data used here, our interpretations of causality need to be based on (1) theoretical grounds and (2) complex patterns of interaction and covariation. Previous studies (e.g., Mitchell, 1973) support the notion that having the opportunity to participate in decisions causes higher performance. In addition, it seems unlikely that the complex and yet interpretahle interactions we captured represent response set artifacts. On the other hand, longitudinal data may better allow for testing these relationships because levels of participative decision making and efficacy may be somewhat unstable, and their influences on performance may require time to materialize. We helieve that common method variance had little influence on the findings hecause the study had multisource data (supervisory ratings of performance matched with individuals' self-reports). However, future studies could improve on the present one by incorporating some form of participative decision making manipulation (with a corresponding control group) and bracketing changes in individual and group performance over time. Using a single occupation for this study ensured a strong match hetween the samples across cultures, but it likely led to less variation on some of the variahles than would he observed in more occupationally heterogeneous data. Conclusions Compared to the Hong Kong participants, the U.S. participants scored higher on idiocentrism and reported higher participation efficacy (self), whereas the Hong Kong participants scored higher on allocentrism and reported higher participation efficacy (collective) than their U.S. counterparts. Just as societal and local culture teaches people what ideals to hold and what beliefs to endorse, it plays a role in how people construct efficacy expectations (Bandura, 1997). In societies that encourage individualistic values, people pay more attention to themselves, know more about themselves than about others, and are more likely to 2002 913 Lam, Chen, and Schaubroeck change situations to fit their own desires rather than change themselves to fit situations. Consequently, Americans and other members of individualistic societies may tend to have more confidence in their own abilities, and self-efficacy has more primacy as an influence on behavior in these societies than does collective efficacy. In contrast, the Chinese culture emphasizes collectivist values, so people pay more attention to others and tend to descrihe themselves in terms that reflect their collective self (for a review, see Triandis [1989,1994]). As a result, Chinese people tend to have more confidence in their groups' capabilities, and this collective efficacy more readily guides their hehavior within group contexts than does self-efficacy. Because judgments of efficacy have a significant influence on employee job performance, especially when the type of efficacy (individual or collective) corresponds to culture-driven personality traits (for example, allocentrism and idiocentrism) and pertinent performance criteria, it is important to include cultural variables in efficacy-performance studies. As organizations increasingly introduce programs oriented toward participative decision making in order to facilitate reengineering, enrich johs, and develop high-commitment workplaces, the cultural values and efficacy heliefs held by employees may have unexpected effects. For example, participative goal setting between a supervisor and a subordinate on a one-on-one basis with an emphasis on individual performance may be less successful if the subordinate has strong allocentric beliefs. If it is done on a team basis and the emphasis is on team performance, its effect may not be significant if the subordinates hold individualistic values. Civen the concern for and emphasis on diversity in the U.S. workplace, managers must identify individual differences that may influence the desired outcomes of participative decision making and target training programs accordingly, rather than exhort employees to conform to a desired vision of participative decision making or select new employees on the basis of such conformity. Participative decision making interventions will he more successful to the extent that program developers match them to the values of target recipients and train them in ways that increase their most relevant efficacy cognitions (collective efficacy or selfefficacy). From a research perspective, our findings show that participative decision making can have significant positive or negative effects on employee performance that are not attributable to methodological artifacts. Whereas Wagner (1994), and others have argued that employee participation likely has at hest weak effects on individual and group per- formance, the moderators identified in this study suggest conditions under which higher participative decision making effects may be generally observed. To our knowledge none of the studies reviewed in the meta-analyses measured self or collective participation efficacy, and very few if any participative decision making studies have measured individualism and collectivism. Thus, it is plausible that very strong effects, like those we ohserved in particular subgroups within our study, might also have been present (but not measured) in prior participative decision making studies. Organizations can act to increase or decrease the levels of these moderator variables within their workforces and potentially amplify the positive performance effects of employee participation. REFERENCES Bandura, A. 1997. Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. York: Freeman. Brislin, R. W., Lonner, W., & Thorndike, R. M. 1973. Cross-cultural research methods. New York: Wiley. Cannon, M. D., & Edmondson, A. C. 2001. Confronting failure: Antecedents and consequences of shared beliefs about failtire in organizational work groups. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22: 161-177. Chen, C. C, Chen, X. P., & Meindl, J. R. 1998. How can cooperation be fostered? The cultural effects of individualism-collectivism. Academy of Management Review, 23: 285-304. Cotton, J. L., Vollrath, D. A., Froggatt, K. L., LengnickHall, M. L., & Jennings, K. R. 1988. Employee participation: Diverse forms and different outcomes. Academy of Management Review, 13: 8-22. Dansereau, F., Alutto, J. 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Administrative Science Quarterly, 32: 241-262. Wagner, J, A., & Gooding, R. Z, 1987b, Shared influence and organizational behavior: A meta-analysis of situational variables expected to moderate participation-outcome relationships. Academy of Management Journal, 30: 524-541, ^ Simon S. K. Lam (simonlam@business.hku.hk) received his Ph.D, from Australian National University, He is an associate professor of management at the School of Business, University of Hong Kong, His research focuses on quality management, work-related commitments, and cross-cultural human resource management. Xiao-Ping Chen received her Ph.D, from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, She is an associate professor in the Department of Management and Organization at the University of Washington. Her current research interests include group dynamics, decision making, conflict management, leadership, organizational citizenship behavior, employee turnover, and cross-cultural management. John Schaubroeck is currently a professor of management and the head of the Department of Management, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, He received a Ph,D. in organizational behavior and human resource management from Purdue University. His research interests include work stress and coping and cross-cultural issues in organizational behavior, AA Int. Studies of Mgt. & Org., vol. 42, no. 4, Winter 2012–13, pp. 86–105. © 2013 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com ISSN 0020–8825 (print)/ISSN 1558–0911 (online) DOI: 10.2753/IMO0020-8825420404 René Olie, Ad van Iterson, and Zeki Simsek When Do CEOs Versus Top Management Teams Matter in Explaining Strategic Decision-Making Processes? Toward an Institutional View of Strategic Leadership Effects Abstract: Theory on strategic leadership effects gives short shrift to the institutional context in establishing the impact of chief executive officers (CEOs) and top management teams (TMTs) on strategic decision making processes. In this article we develop the argument that the institutional context of the country in which they are embedded centrally shape the extent to which CEO or TMT characteristics provide more accurate predictions of strategic decision-making processes. We develop a set of exemplary propositions to substantiate this thesis and trace its implications for theory and testing on strategic leadership effects on the firm. Strategic leadership (SL) research focuses on top executives and their effects on organizations. The basic premise is that strategies are developed by humans who act on the basis of their idiosyncratic experiences, motives, and dispositions. Hence, organizational outcomes and strategic actions, such as strategic change, René Olie is an associate professor of strategic managment at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University; e-mail: rolie@rsm.nl. Ad van Iterson is an associate professor of organization studies at the School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University; e-mail: a.vaniterson@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Zeki Simsek is an associate professor of strategic management and entrepreneurship at the School of Business, University of Connecticut; e-mail: Zeki.Simsek@business.uconn.edu. The authors gratefully acknowledge the insights and comments of Geert Hofstede, two anonymous reviewers, and the guest editors on earlier versions. 86 CEOs Versus Top Management Teams in Strategic Decision-Making 87 innovation, and performance, as well as administrative choices, such as staffing, structure, and rewards, are seen as a reflection of its top managers (Hambrick and Mason 1984). A central question in SL research has been whose experiences, traits, values, and cognitions matter (most) in strategic decision-making processes? The chief executive officer’s (CEO’s) or the entire top management team’s (TMT’s)?1 Based on the assumption that the CEO is the most powerful person in the organizational hierarchy, SL research initially focused on the role of the CEO in shaping strategic decisions (for a recent overview, see Finkelstein et al. 2009). However, with the growing realization that leadership in large, complex organizations is a shared activity that involves executive groups rather than individual executives, researchers turned their attention to TMTs (Carpenter et al. 2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996). According to this “upper echelon” perspective (Hambrick and Mason 1984), focusing on TMT characteristics will yield stronger explanations of strategic decision making than focusing on the characteristics of CEOs alone (Hambrick 2007). Even though this upper echelon view of the firm has garnered significant support, both specifications have been contested in explaining strategic decision-making processes. The CEO model has been criticized as an “undersocialized” conception of SL that ignores the role of other top-level executives in the strategic decision making and implementation process. Conversely, other scholars have pointed to the “oversocialized” TMT view, particularly questioning the assumption of the “teamness” underlying this line of inquiry (Arendt et al. 2005; Hambrick 1994). Few TMTs display the strong interdependence among their members necessary to be characterized as “true teams” (Hambrick 1994; Katzenbach 1997). Additionally, the assumption of collective decision making in the TMT literature does not recognize that TMTs are essentially hierarchical bodies in which the CEO has disproportionate influence on decision making (Hollenbeck et al. 1995). Finally, TMTs are often not very stable in form and composition (Carpenter et al. 2004; Roberto 2003). In practice, a variety of SL configurations exist in which the CEO model and the TMT model represent the two ends of the SL continuum (Arendt et al. 2005). Few CEOs will act as sole decision makers who proceed without consultation of their top managers or the help of external advisors. Few TMTs will act as collective leadership groups (Denis et al. 2001) in which decision making is dependent on the equal input from all top managers. In most cases organizational leadership will be situated somewhere along this continuum representing different levels of interdependence among strategic leaders, leadership centrality, and group boundaries, depending on the CEO characteristics, such as leadership style and dominance in the team (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Ling et al. 2008; Peterson et al. 2003), environmental contingencies such as complexity and instability (Finkelstein et al. 2009), and organizational factors such as strategy, size, and structure (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Henderson and Frederickson 2001). Several efforts have been undertaken to better specify these oversocialized and undersocialized views of SL effects. Arendt et al. (2005) propose the CEO advisor 88 Olie, van Iterson (Netherlands), & Simsek (USA) model as a competing model. According to this model, top managers gather information, process and assimilate information, and recommend a decision, but the CEO holds ultimate authority for the final decision. Other scholars focus on the CEO–TMT interface (Ling et al. 2008; Peterson et al. 2003), conceptualizing the CEO and TMT as distinct, but interrelated entities. For example, Ling et al. (2008) investigated how transformational CEOs influence team characteristics, which, in turn, lead to organizational outcomes. Cao et al. (2010) investigated how CEOs’ influence on organizational ambidexterity is enhanced or inhibited by the extent to which information is shared, comprehensively processed, and jointly utilized by the other TMT members. Although these efforts represent productive refinements to theory on SL effects, they too fall short of recognizing that CEOs and TMTs operate within and a...
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