Voting Systems Problem

Content Type

User Generated

User

pbyyrtobv

Subject

Mathematics

Description

I need a high quality tutor who can write in proper, native, U.S. English (no broken English, please) and is very familiar with the Hare voting system, Condorcet Winner voting system, Pluarity voting system, and Pluarity with single runoff voting system to provide 100% correct solutions to Problem 10.

This tutor must be able to provide a 100% correct solution to the attached Problem 10 in proper, native U.S. English. I also need 1 or more links to a website that can verify that the tutor's solution is correct. I want to be able to verify for myself that the solution to Problem 10 is correct.

I have attached the question to Problem 10, you can also use the Internet to find out more info on the Hare voting system, Condorcet Winner voting system, Pluarity voting system, and Pluarity with single runoff voting system

Very Important:

Please DO NOT BID if you are not familiar with the Hare voting system, Condorcet Winner voting system, Pluarity voting system, and Pluarity with single runoff voting system since it is necessary to provide the solution to problem 10.

Please DO NOT BID if English is not your primary language. The solution must be written in proper, native U.S. English.

Please DO NOT BID if you cannot meet the deadline.

Please DO NOT BID if you are not 100% confident that you can provide full, 100% correct solutions to Problem 10. It is VERY IMPORTANT that the solution is correct.

Unformatted Attachment Preview

Problem 10. There is an election with 4 candidates and 11 voters. The 4 candidates are abcx. Four voters have the order axbc, three voters have caxb, and six voters have bcax. Who wins under each of plurality, plurality with single runoff, Hare, Condorcet and Borda count? Can each of the candidates win under an appropriately chosen agenda for sequential pairwise with agenda? The election commission notices that every single voter prefers a to x. The commission decides that the supporters of a added x to the list of candidates to make a look more powerful, and disqualifies x from participating in the election. How does this change the outcome under Borda Count?
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Tags: math modeling voting condorcet borda count hare pluarity sequential runoff voting systems

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Explanation & Answer

attached is my answer

PROBLEM 10:
From the problem, it is given that 4 voters have the order AXBC , 3 voters have CAXB , and 6
voters have BCAX . Hence, the orders that 13 voters have can be demonstrated in the
following table:
A
X
B
C

A
X
B
C

A
X
B
C

A
X
B
C

C
A
X
B

C
A
X
B

C
A
X
B

B
C
A
X

B
C
A
X

B
C
A
X

B
C
A
X

B
C
A
X

In plurality method, each voter only votes for one candidate. The candidate with the most votes
will win. In this case, b wins with 6 votes.
In plurality method with a single runoff election, it may be necessary to restrict the election to
two candidates if one insists on getting a majority winner. The easiest way to do th...