Special Education Law Court Case Brief Assignment Description You will write one court brief. You will become the expert on your court case. You will complete one written court brief. A sample court brief as well as the rubrics for these two assessments are below. This is an example of court brief SAMPLE COURT BRIEF Topic: Denial of freedom of expression must be justified by a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption (Alexander & Alexander, 2001, p. 386). Relief Sought: The petitioners, three public school pupils, sought to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upholding the prohibition against the wearing of armbands in public school as a form of symbolic protest. The petitioners claimed in earlier court proceedings and continue to claim the prohibition is a violation of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections. The petitioners sought an injunction restraining the school officials and members of the board of directors of the school district from disciplining the petitioners. In addition, the petitioners sought nominal damages. Issue(s): Whether a school policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands in school, as a form of symbolic protest, violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution relative to the freedom of speech protection of students attending school in the district. Whether the actions of school officials violated the due process rights of the students according to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Facts of Case: Petitioners John Tinker, 15 years old, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, 13 years old, and Christopher Echardt, 16 years old, attended schools in Des Moines, Iowa. The students decided to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to their schools beginning on December 16, 1965 and continuing throughout the holiday season. The parents of the students supported their children in their decision and subsequent action. School officials learned of the students plan to wear armbands prior to the scheduled protest. The principals of the schools feared the armbands would provoke disturbances. The principals met on December 14, 1965 and adopted a policy that any student wearing a black armband to school would be asked to remove it or face suspension. The aforementioned students wore their armbands to school in spite of their knowledge of the policy. The students were asked to remove the armbands. The students refused to remove them. They were suspended for failure to comply with school policy. The suspensions lasted until after New Year's Day. The students believed their First Amendment right had been violated. Thus, with the support of their parents they filed suit in the District Court in Des Moines. The District Court in Des Moines ruled in favor of the school district. The court dismissed the complaint because it determined the regulation was within the Board's power. The court decided this “despite the absence of any finding of substantial interference with the conduct of school activities.” Finding of Lower Court: The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, “sitting en banc” affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court affirmed by an equally divided court. Decision of Higher Court: The United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision by a 3-2 vote (Justices Fortas, Stewart and White as majority; Justices Black and Harlan dissenting). The Court expressed no opinion with respect to the form of relief to be granted and decided relief should be determined by the lower courts. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Thus, the petitioners, the students, won the case. Basis for Ruling: Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court found the wearing of armbands to be "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and protected by the First Amendment. Justice Fortas writes: The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to "pure speech" [506], which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). Quotable Statement: “In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.” -Justice Abe Fortas in Tinker. References: Kern Alexander and David M. Alexander. American Public School Law, 5th ed., Wadsworth Publishing Co. ISBN 0-534-57744-X. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. Retrieved March 1, 2009 from: http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/aup/cas/comm/free_speech/tinker.html Criteria 0 1 Knowledge of Law and Policy • Failure to submit assignmen t. • Ethical Practice • Failure to submit assignmen t. • Content • Failure to submit assignmen t. • • Court Brief Rubric 1.5 Court brief does not demonstrate a clear understandin g of the relevant laws and policies. Court brief does not demonstrate a clear understandin g of the ethical issues of the profession. Court brief does not demonstrate a clear understandin g of either court cases or the legal process. Court brief does not demonstrate an understandin g of how the law protects people with disabilities and their families. 2 Scor e • Court brief • demonstrate s a partial understandin g of the relevant laws and policies. Court brief demonstrate s a clear understandin g of the relevant laws and policies. • Court brief • demonstrate s a partial understandin g of the ethical standards of the profession. Material • presented demonstrate s an emerging understandin g of court cases and the legal process. • Court brief demonstrate s a partial understandin g of how the law protects students with disabilities and their families. Court brief demonstrate s a clear understandin g of the ethical standards of the profession. Material Presented demonstrate s a clear understandin g of court cases and the legal process. Court brief demonstrate s a clear understandin g of how the law protects students with disabilities and their families. • • • Failure to submit assignmen t. • Mechanics, • Organization s and Details of Assignment Failure to submit assignmen t. • Language Court brief • does not use legal language and/or does not use it accurately or appropriatel y. Writing • contains numerous errors that make it challenging to read the assignment and/or parts of the assignment are missing. Legal language in court brief is mostly accurate, but does contain some errors. • Court brief uses accurate and appropriate legal language throughout the brief. Writing contains some errors and/or organization makes it challenging to follow the assignment. All parts of the assignment are included. • Writing is essentially error free, organization is logical and all parts of the assignment are included. Citation: Topic: Relief Sought: Issue(s): Facts of Case: Finding of Lower Court: Decision of Higher Court: Basis for Ruling: Quotable Statement: References: LISA FITZGERALD, et vir, Petitioners v. BARNSTABLE SCHOOL COMMITTEE et al. No. 07-1125 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 555 U.S. 246; 129 S. Ct. 788; 172 L. Ed. 2d 582; 2009 U.S. LEXIS 592; 77 U.S.L.W. 4075; 105 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 358; 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 593 December 2, 2008, Argued January 21, 2009, Decided PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 23620 (1st Cir. Mass., 2007) DISPOSITION: 504 F.3d 165, Reversed and remanded. CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners, a student and her parents, sought certiorari review of a judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioners' 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims against respondents, the school district's governing board and superintendent, on the ground that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., precluded the action under § 1983. OVERVIEW: Petitioners alleged an inadequate response to peer-onpeer sexual harassment, and they raised a claim under § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause under U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The court of appeals held that Title IX's implied private remedy was sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the use of § 1983 to advance constitutional claims and to advance statutory claims based on Title IX. The Court, however, did not agree that Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetuated by educational institutions. In light of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, the Court concluded that Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court held that § 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remained available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. OUTCOME: The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Unanimous decision. CORE TERMS: gender discrimination, remedial, school committee, daughter, congressional intent, bus, constitutional claims, restrictive, constitutional rights, harassment, addressing, concurrent, right of action, sex, school system, federal funds, injunctive relief, equal protection claims, guaranteed, envisioned, redress, exempts, intend, school officials, school district's, sexual harassment, attorney's fees, deliberate indifference, educational, handicapped LexisNexis® Headnotes Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope HN1 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN2 In three cases--Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes--the United States Supreme Court finds that statutory enactments preclude claims under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. These cases establish that the crucial consideration is what Congress intended. If Congress intended a statute's remedial scheme to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert the claim, the § 1983 claims are precluded. The critical question, then, is whether Congress meant the judicial remedy authorized by the statute to coexist with an alternative remedy available in a § 1983 action. In those cases in which the § 1983 claim is based on a statutory right, evidence of such congressional intent may be found directly in the statute creating the right, or inferred from the statute's creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. In cases in which the § 1983 claim alleges a constitutional violation, lack of congressional intent may be inferred from a comparison of the rights and protections of the statute and those existing under the Constitution. Where the contours of such rights and protections diverge in significant ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights. Conclusions regarding congressional intent can be confirmed by a statute's context. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN3 In determining whether a subsequent statute precludes the enforcement of a federal right under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, the United States Supreme Court has placed primary emphasis on the nature and extent of that statute's remedial scheme. When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN4 In Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, the statutes at issue required plaintiffs to comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust particular administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Offering plaintiffs a direct route to court via 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 would have circumvented these procedures and given plaintiffs access to tangible benefits--such as damages, attorney's fees, and costs--that were unavailable under the statutes. Allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the statutes' provisions in this way would have been inconsistent with Congress's carefully tailored scheme. Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Coverage HN5 See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681(a). Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Enforcement Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Remedies Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN6 The only express enforcement mechanism, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1682, under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., is an administrative procedure resulting in the withdrawal of federal funding from institutions that are not in compliance. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recognized an implied private right of action. In a suit brought pursuant to this private right, both injunctive relief and damages are available. These remedies--withdrawal of federal funds and an implied cause of action--stand in stark contrast to the unusually elaborate, carefully tailored, and restrictive enforcement schemes of the statutes at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes. Unlike those statutes, Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement and no notice provisions. Under its implied private right of action, plaintiffs can file directly in court and can obtain the full range of remedies. As a result, parallel and concurrent 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims will neither circumvent required procedures nor allow access to new remedies. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Enforcement Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN7 The United States Supreme Court explains in Rancho Palos Verdes that the provision of an express, private means of redress in a statute itself is a key consideration in determining congressional intent, and that the existence of a more restrictive private remedy for statutory violations has been the dividing line between those cases in which the Supreme Court has held that an action would lie under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 and those in which the Supreme Court has held that it would not. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., contains no express private remedy, much less a more restrictive one. The Supreme Court has never held that an implied right of action had the effect of precluding suit under § 1983, likely because of the difficulty of discerning congressional intent in such a situation. The Supreme Court should not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal protection claim. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Enforcement Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN8 A comparison of the substantive rights and protections guaranteed under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., and under the Equal Protection Clause lends support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to preclude 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 constitutional suits. Title IX's protections are narrower in some respects and broader in others. Because the protections guaranteed by the two sources of law diverge in this way, the U.S. Supreme Court cannot agree that Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetrated by educational institutions. Title IX reaches institutions and programs that receive federal funds, which may include nonpublic institutions, but it has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals. The Equal Protection Clause reaches only state actors, but § 1983 equal protection claims may be brought against individuals as well as municipalities and certain other state entities. Title IX exempts from its restrictions several activities that may be challenged on constitutional grounds. Even where particular activities and particular defendants are subject to both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, the standards for establishing liability may not be wholly congruent. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Educational Institutions Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Enforcement Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN9 In light of the divergent coverage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause under U.S. Const. amend. XIV, as well as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, the United States Supreme Court concludes that Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court holds that § 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title IX > Enforcement Education Law > Discrimination > Racial Discrimination > Title VI > Enforcement Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights HN10 In enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., Congress amended 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000h-2 to authorize the Attorney General to intervene in private suits alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, it appears that the Congress that enacted Title IX explicitly envisioned that private plaintiffs would bring constitutional claims to challenge gender discrimination; it must have recognized that plaintiffs would do so via 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. Moreover, Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) and passed Title IX with the explicit understanding that it would be interpreted as Title VI was interpreted. At the time of Title IX's enactment in 1972, Title VI was routinely interpreted to allow for parallel and concurrent 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims, and the United States Supreme Court presumes Congress was aware of this when it passed Title IX. In the absence of any contrary evidence, it follows that Congress intended Title IX to be interpreted similarly to allow for parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims. At the least, this indicates that Congress did not affirmatively intend Title IX to preclude such claims. Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review HN11 Ordinarily, the United States Supreme Court does not decide in the first instance issues not decided below. Available Briefs and Other Documents Related to this Case: Go To Supreme Court Brief(s) Go To Supreme Court Transcript DECISION: [***582] Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq.) held not to preclude 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suits alleging gender discrimination in schools in asserted violation of equal protection clause of Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. SUMMARY: Procedural posture: Petitioners, a student and her parents, sought certiorari review of a judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioners' 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims against respondents, the school district's governing board and superintendent, on the ground that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., precluded the action under § 1983. Overview: Petitioners alleged an inadequate response to peer-onpeer sexual harassment, and they raised a claim under § 1983 for violation of the Equal Protection Clause under U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The court of appeals held that Title IX's implied private remedy was sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the use of § 1983 to advance constitutional claims and to advance statutory claims based on Title IX. The Court, however, did not agree that Congress saw Title IX as the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from gender discrimination perpetuated by educational institutions. In light of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, the Court concluded that Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court held that [***583] § 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remained available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools. Outcome: The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Unanimous decision.
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