Special Education Law
Court Case Brief Assignment
Description
You will write one court brief. You will become the expert on your court case.
You will complete one written court brief.
A sample court brief as well as the rubrics for these two assessments are below.
This is an example of court brief
SAMPLE
COURT BRIEF
Topic: Denial of freedom of expression must be justified by a reasonable forecast of substantial
disruption (Alexander & Alexander, 2001, p. 386).
Relief
Sought:
The petitioners, three public school pupils, sought to reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upholding the prohibition against the
wearing of armbands in public school as a form of symbolic protest. The petitioners
claimed in earlier court proceedings and continue to claim the prohibition is a violation of
the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections. The petitioners sought an
injunction restraining the school officials and members of the board of directors of the
school district from disciplining the petitioners. In addition, the petitioners sought
nominal damages.
Issue(s):
Whether a school policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands in school, as a form of
symbolic protest, violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution relative
to the freedom of speech protection of students attending school in the district. Whether
the actions of school officials violated the due process rights of the students according to
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Facts of Case: Petitioners John Tinker, 15 years old, his sister Mary Beth Tinker, 13 years old, and
Christopher Echardt, 16 years old, attended schools in Des Moines, Iowa. The students decided to
protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to their schools beginning on December 16, 1965
and continuing throughout the holiday season. The parents of the students supported their children in
their decision and subsequent action. School officials learned of the students plan to wear armbands
prior to the scheduled protest. The principals of the schools feared the armbands would provoke
disturbances.
The principals met on December 14, 1965 and adopted a policy that any student wearing a black
armband to school would be asked to remove it or face suspension. The aforementioned students wore
their armbands to school in spite of their knowledge of the policy. The students were asked to remove
the armbands. The students refused to remove them. They were suspended for failure to comply with
school policy. The suspensions lasted until after New Year's Day. The students believed their First
Amendment right had been violated. Thus, with the support of their parents they filed suit in the District
Court in Des Moines. The District Court in Des Moines ruled in favor of the school district. The court
dismissed the complaint because it determined the regulation was within the Board's power. The court
decided this “despite the absence of any finding of substantial interference with the conduct of school
activities.”
Finding of Lower Court: The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, “sitting en banc” affirmed the
lower court’s decision. The court affirmed by an equally divided court.
Decision of Higher Court: The United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision
by a 3-2 vote (Justices Fortas, Stewart and White as majority; Justices Black and Harlan dissenting).
The Court expressed no opinion with respect to the form of relief to be granted and decided relief should
be determined by the lower courts. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion. Thus, the petitioners, the students, won the case.
Basis for Ruling:
Mr. Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court found the
wearing of armbands to be "closely akin to 'pure speech'" and protected by the First Amendment.
Justice Fortas writes:
The District Court recognized that the wearing of an armband for the
purpose of expressing certain views is the type of symbolic act that is
within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. See West Virginia
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931). Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of this
case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct
by those participating in it. It was closely akin to "pure speech" [506],
which, we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection
under the First Amendment. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555
(1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
Quotable Statement: “In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.” -Justice Abe Fortas in Tinker.
References: Kern Alexander and David M. Alexander. American Public School Law, 5th ed.,
Wadsworth Publishing Co. ISBN 0-534-57744-X.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. Retrieved March 1, 2009
from: http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/aup/cas/comm/free_speech/tinker.html
Criteria
0
1
Knowledge
of Law and
Policy
•
Failure to
submit
assignmen
t.
•
Ethical
Practice
•
Failure to
submit
assignmen
t.
•
Content
•
Failure to
submit
assignmen
t.
•
•
Court Brief Rubric
1.5
Court brief
does not
demonstrate
a clear
understandin
g of the
relevant
laws and
policies.
Court brief
does not
demonstrate
a clear
understandin
g of the
ethical
issues of the
profession.
Court brief
does not
demonstrate
a clear
understandin
g of either
court cases
or the legal
process.
Court brief
does not
demonstrate
an
understandin
g of how the
law protects
people with
disabilities
and their
families.
2
Scor
e
•
Court brief
•
demonstrate
s a partial
understandin
g of the
relevant
laws and
policies.
Court brief
demonstrate
s a clear
understandin
g of the
relevant
laws and
policies.
•
Court brief
•
demonstrate
s a partial
understandin
g of the
ethical
standards of
the
profession.
Material
•
presented
demonstrate
s an
emerging
understandin
g of court
cases and
the legal
process.
•
Court brief
demonstrate
s a partial
understandin
g of how the
law protects
students
with
disabilities
and their
families.
Court brief
demonstrate
s a clear
understandin
g of the
ethical
standards of
the
profession.
Material
Presented
demonstrate
s a clear
understandin
g of court
cases and
the legal
process.
Court brief
demonstrate
s a clear
understandin
g of how the
law protects
students
with
disabilities
and their
families.
•
•
•
Failure to
submit
assignmen
t.
•
Mechanics,
•
Organization
s and Details
of
Assignment
Failure to
submit
assignmen
t.
•
Language
Court brief
•
does not use
legal
language
and/or does
not use it
accurately or
appropriatel
y.
Writing
•
contains
numerous
errors that
make it
challenging
to read the
assignment
and/or parts
of the
assignment
are missing.
Legal
language in
court brief is
mostly
accurate, but
does contain
some errors.
•
Court brief
uses
accurate and
appropriate
legal
language
throughout
the brief.
Writing
contains
some errors
and/or
organization
makes it
challenging
to follow the
assignment.
All parts of
the
assignment
are included.
•
Writing is
essentially
error free,
organization
is logical
and all parts
of the
assignment
are included.
Citation:
Topic:
Relief Sought:
Issue(s):
Facts of Case:
Finding of Lower Court:
Decision of Higher Court:
Basis for Ruling:
Quotable Statement:
References:
LISA FITZGERALD, et vir, Petitioners v. BARNSTABLE SCHOOL
COMMITTEE et al.
No. 07-1125
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
555 U.S. 246; 129 S. Ct. 788; 172 L. Ed. 2d 582; 2009 U.S. LEXIS
592; 77 U.S.L.W. 4075; 105 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 358; 21 Fla.
L. Weekly Fed. S 593
December 2, 2008, Argued
January 21, 2009, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23620 (1st Cir. Mass., 2007)
DISPOSITION: 504 F.3d 165, Reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners, a student and her parents,
sought certiorari review of a judgment from the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit which affirmed the district court's dismissal
of petitioners' 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims against respondents, the
school district's governing board and superintendent, on the ground
that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20
U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., precluded the action under § 1983.
OVERVIEW: Petitioners alleged an inadequate response to peer-onpeer sexual harassment, and they raised a claim under § 1983 for
violation of the Equal Protection Clause under U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
The court of appeals held that Title IX's implied private remedy was
sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the use of § 1983 to advance
constitutional claims and to advance statutory claims based on Title
IX. The Court, however, did not agree that Congress saw Title IX as
the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from
gender discrimination perpetuated by educational institutions. In light
of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause,
as well as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme
comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho
Palos Verdes, the Court concluded that Title IX was not meant to be an
exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools
or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional
rights. Accordingly, the Court held that § 1983 suits based on the
Equal Protection Clause remained available to plaintiffs alleging
unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Unanimous decision.
CORE TERMS: gender discrimination, remedial, school committee,
daughter, congressional intent, bus, constitutional claims, restrictive,
constitutional rights, harassment, addressing, concurrent, right of
action, sex, school system, federal funds, injunctive relief, equal
protection claims, guaranteed, envisioned, redress, exempts, intend,
school officials, school district's, sexual harassment, attorney's fees,
deliberate indifference, educational, handicapped
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
HN1
See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN2
In three cases--Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes--the
United States Supreme Court finds that statutory enactments preclude
claims under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. These cases establish that the
crucial consideration is what Congress intended. If Congress intended
a statute's remedial scheme to be the exclusive avenue through which
a plaintiff may assert the claim, the § 1983 claims are precluded. The
critical question, then, is whether Congress meant the judicial remedy
authorized by the statute to coexist with an alternative remedy
available in a § 1983 action. In those cases in which the § 1983 claim
is based on a statutory right, evidence of such congressional intent
may be found directly in the statute creating the right, or inferred from
the statute's creation of a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is
incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983. In cases in
which the § 1983 claim alleges a constitutional violation, lack of
congressional intent may be inferred from a comparison of the rights
and protections of the statute and those existing under the
Constitution. Where the contours of such rights and protections
diverge in significant ways, it is not likely that Congress intended to
displace § 1983 suits enforcing constitutional rights. Conclusions
regarding congressional intent can be confirmed by a statute's context.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN3
In determining whether a subsequent statute precludes the
enforcement of a federal right under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, the United
States Supreme Court has placed primary emphasis on the nature and
extent of that statute's remedial scheme. When the remedial devices
provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may
suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of
suits under § 1983.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN4
In Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, the statutes at
issue required plaintiffs to comply with particular procedures and/or to
exhaust particular administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Offering
plaintiffs a direct route to court via 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 would have
circumvented these procedures and given plaintiffs access to tangible
benefits--such as damages, attorney's fees, and costs--that were
unavailable under the statutes. Allowing a plaintiff to circumvent the
statutes' provisions in this way would have been inconsistent with
Congress's carefully tailored scheme.
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Coverage
HN5
See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681(a).
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Enforcement
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Remedies
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN6
The only express enforcement mechanism, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1682, under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. §
1681 et seq., is an administrative procedure resulting in the
withdrawal of federal funding from institutions that are not in
compliance. In addition, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized an implied private right of action. In a suit brought
pursuant to this private right, both injunctive relief and damages are
available. These remedies--withdrawal of federal funds and an implied
cause of action--stand in stark contrast to the unusually elaborate,
carefully tailored, and restrictive enforcement schemes of the statutes
at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes. Unlike
those statutes, Title IX has no administrative exhaustion requirement
and no notice provisions. Under its implied private right of action,
plaintiffs can file directly in court and can obtain the full range of
remedies. As a result, parallel and concurrent 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983
claims will neither circumvent required procedures nor allow access to
new remedies.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Scope of Protection
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Enforcement
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN7
The United States Supreme Court explains in Rancho Palos Verdes that
the provision of an express, private means of redress in a statute itself
is a key consideration in determining congressional intent, and that the
existence of a more restrictive private remedy for statutory violations
has been the dividing line between those cases in which the Supreme
Court has held that an action would lie under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 and
those in which the Supreme Court has held that it would not. Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq.,
contains no express private remedy, much less a more restrictive one.
The Supreme Court has never held that an implied right of action had
the effect of precluding suit under § 1983, likely because of the
difficulty of discerning congressional intent in such a situation. The
Supreme Court should not lightly conclude that Congress intended to
preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for a substantial equal
protection claim.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Enforcement
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN8
A comparison of the substantive rights and protections guaranteed
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20
U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., and under the Equal Protection Clause lends
support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend Title IX to
preclude 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 constitutional suits. Title IX's protections
are narrower in some respects and broader in others. Because the
protections guaranteed by the two sources of law diverge in this way,
the U.S. Supreme Court cannot agree that Congress saw Title IX as
the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from
gender discrimination perpetrated by educational institutions. Title IX
reaches institutions and programs that receive federal funds, which
may include nonpublic institutions, but it has consistently been
interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers,
and other individuals. The Equal Protection Clause reaches only state
actors, but § 1983 equal protection claims may be brought against
individuals as well as municipalities and certain other state entities.
Title IX exempts from its restrictions several activities that may be
challenged on constitutional grounds. Even where particular activities
and particular defendants are subject to both Title IX and the Equal
Protection Clause, the standards for establishing liability may not be
wholly congruent.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Educational Institutions
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Enforcement
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN9
In light of the divergent coverage of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., and the
Equal Protection Clause under U.S. Const. amend. XIV, as well as the
absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme comparable to those at
issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho Palos Verdes, the United
States Supreme Court concludes that Title IX was not meant to be an
exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools,
or a substitute for 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Supreme Court holds that §
1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause remain available to
plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
Constitutional Law > Equal Protection > Gender & Sex
Education Law > Discrimination > Gender & Sex Discrimination > Title
IX > Enforcement
Education Law > Discrimination > Racial Discrimination > Title VI >
Enforcement
Governments > Legislation > Statutory Remedies & Rights
HN10
In enacting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),
20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., Congress amended 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000h-2
to authorize the Attorney General to intervene in private suits alleging
discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Accordingly, it appears that the Congress that enacted Title IX
explicitly envisioned that private plaintiffs would bring constitutional
claims to challenge gender discrimination; it must have recognized
that plaintiffs would do so via 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983. Moreover, Congress
modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)
and passed Title IX with the explicit understanding that it would be
interpreted as Title VI was interpreted. At the time of Title IX's
enactment in 1972, Title VI was routinely interpreted to allow for
parallel and concurrent 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims, and the United
States Supreme Court presumes Congress was aware of this when it
passed Title IX. In the absence of any contrary evidence, it follows
that Congress intended Title IX to be interpreted similarly to allow for
parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims. At the least, this indicates that
Congress did not affirmatively intend Title IX to preclude such claims.
Civil Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review
HN11
Ordinarily, the United States Supreme Court does not decide in the
first instance issues not decided below.
Available Briefs and Other Documents Related to this Case:
Go To Supreme Court Brief(s)
Go To Supreme Court Transcript
DECISION: [***582] Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 (20
U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq.) held not to preclude 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 suits
alleging gender discrimination in schools in asserted violation of equal
protection clause of Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.
SUMMARY: Procedural posture: Petitioners, a student and her
parents, sought certiorari review of a judgment from the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which affirmed the district court's
dismissal of petitioners' 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claims against
respondents, the school district's governing board and superintendent,
on the ground that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
(Title IX), 20 U.S.C.S. § 1681 et seq., precluded the action under §
1983.
Overview: Petitioners alleged an inadequate response to peer-onpeer sexual harassment, and they raised a claim under § 1983 for
violation of the Equal Protection Clause under U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
The court of appeals held that Title IX's implied private remedy was
sufficiently comprehensive to preclude the use of § 1983 to advance
constitutional claims and to advance statutory claims based on Title
IX. The Court, however, did not agree that Congress saw Title IX as
the sole means of vindicating the constitutional right to be free from
gender discrimination perpetuated by educational institutions. In light
of the divergent coverage of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause,
as well as the absence of a comprehensive remedial scheme
comparable to those at issue in Sea Clammers, Smith, and Rancho
Palos Verdes, the Court concluded that Title IX was not meant to be an
exclusive mechanism for addressing gender discrimination in schools
or a substitute for § 1983 suits as a means of enforcing constitutional
rights. Accordingly, the Court held that [***583] § 1983 suits based
on the Equal Protection Clause remained available to plaintiffs alleging
unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.
Outcome: The Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings. Unanimous decision.
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