3. Should Goodrich be held morally responsible as a company for the A7D affair, or
should just the individuals involved be held responsible?
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The A7D Affair
KERMIT VANDIVIER COULD NOT HAVE PREDICTED
the impact on his life of purchase order P-237138, issued by
LTV Aerospace Corporation.26 The order was for 202 brake
assemblies for a new Air Force light attack plane, the A7D, and
news of the LTV contract was cause for uncorking the cham-
pagne at the B. F. Goodrich plant in Troy, Ohio, where Vandivier
worked. Although the LTV order was a small one, it signaled
that Goodrich was back in LTV's good graces after living under
a cloud of disrepute. Ten years earlier, Goodrich had built a
brake for LTV that, to put it kindly, hadn't met expectations.
As a result, LTV had written off Goodrich as a reliable source
of brakes.
LTV's unexpected change of heart after ten years was easily
explained. Goodrich made LTV an offer it couldn't refuse
a ridiculously low bid for making the four-disk brakes. Had
Goodrich taken leave of its financial senses? Hardly. Because
aircraft brakes are custom-made for a particular aircraft, only
the brakes' manufacturer has replacement parts. Thus, even if it
took a loss on the job, Goodrich figured it could more than make
up for it in the sale of replacement parts. Of course, if Goodrich
bungled the job, there wouldn't be a third chance.
John Warren, a seven-year veteran and one of Goodrich's
most capable engineers, was made project engineer and lost no
time in working up a preliminary design for the brake. Perhaps
because the design was faultless or perhaps because Warren
was given to temper tantrums when criticized, co-workers
accepted the engineer's plan without question. So there was
no reason to suspect that young Searle Lawson, one year out
of college and six months with Goodrich, would come to think
Warren's design was fundamentally flawed.
Lawson was assigned by Warren to create the final produc-
tion design. He had to determine the best materials for brake
linings and identify any needed adjustments in the brake design.
This process called for extensive testing to meet military specifi-
cations. If the brakes passed the grueling tests, they would then
be flight-tested by the Air Force. Lawson lost no time in getting
down to work. What he particularly wanted to learn was whether
the brake could withstand the extreme internal temperatures, in
excess of 1,000 degrees F, when the aircraft landed.
When the brake linings disintegrated in the first test, Lawson
thought the problem might be defective parts or an unsuitable
lining. But after two more consecutive failures, he decided the
problem lay in the design: The four-disk design was simply too
small to stop the aircraft without generating so much heat that
the brake linings melted. In Lawson's view, a larger, five-disk
brake was needed.
Lawson knew well the implications of his conclusion. The
four-disk brake assemblies that were arriving at the plant would
have to be junked, and more tests would have to be conducted.
The accompanying delays would preclude on-time delivery of
the production brakes to LTV.
Lawson reported his findings and recommendations to John
Warren. Going to a five-disk design was impossible, Warren told
him. Officials at Goodrich, he said, were already boasting to LTV
about how well the tests were going. Besides, Warren was con-
fident that the problem lay not in the four-disk design but in the
brake linings themselves
Unconvinced, Lawson went to Robert Sink, who supervised
engineers on projects. Sink was in a tight spot. If he agreed with
Lawson, he would be indicting his own professional judgment
He was the man who had assigned Warren to the job. What's
more, he had accepted Warren's design without reservation
and had assured LTV more than once that there was little left
to do but ship them the brakes. To recant now would mean
explaining the reversal not only to LTV but also to the Goodrich
hierarchy. In the end, Sink, who was not an engineer, deferred
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to the seasoned judgment of Warren and instructed lawson to
continue the tests
His own professional judgment overridden, Lawson could do
little but carry on. He built a production model of the brake with
now linings and subjected it to the rigorous qualification tests.
Thirteen more tests were conducted, and thirteen more failures
resulted. It was at this point that data analyst and technical
writer Kermit Vandivier entered the picture.
Vandivier was looking over the data of the latest A/D test
when he noticed an irregularity: The instrument recording some
of the stops had been deliberately miscalibrated to indicate that
less pressure was required to stop the aircraft than actually was
the case. Vandivier immediately showed the test logs to test lab
supervisor Ralph Gretzinger. He learned from the technician
who miscalibrated the instrument that Lawson had requested
the miscalibration. Lawson later said he was simply following
the orders of Sink and the manager of the design engineering
section, who were intent on qualifying the brakes at whatever
cost. For his part, Gretzinger vowed he would never permit delib-
erately falsified data or reports to leave his lab.
A month later, the brake was again tested and again it failed.
Nevertheless, Lawson asked Vandivier to start preparing the var-
lous graph and chart displays for qualification. Vandivier refused
and told Gretzinger what he'd been asked to do. Gretzinger
was livid. He again vowed that his lab would not be part of a
conspiracy to defraud. Then, bent on getting to the bottom of the
matter, Gretzinger rushed off to see Russell Line, manager of the
Goodrich Technical Services Section.
An hour later, Gretzinger returned to his desk looking like a
beaten man. He knew he had only two choices: defy his superi-
ors or do their bidding
*You know," he said to Vandivier, "I've been an engineer for
a long time, and I've always believed that ethics and integrity
were every bit as important as theorems and formulas, and
never once has anything happened to change my beliefs. Now
this.... Hell, I've got two sons I've got to put through school
and I just ... When his voice trailed off, it was clear that he
would in fact knuckle under. He and Vandivier would prepare the
qualifying data; then someone "upstairs' would actually write
the report. Their part, Gretzinger rationalized, wasn't really so
bad. After all," he said, 'we're just drawing some curves, and
what happens to them after they leave here well, we're not
responsible for that." Vandivier knew Gretzinger didn't believe
what he was saying about not being responsible. Both of them
knew that they were about to become principal charactors in a
plot to defraud.
Unwilling to play his part, Vandivier decided that he, too,
would confer with Line.Line was sympathetic; he said he under-
stood what Vandivier was going through. But in the end he said
he would not refer the matter to chief engineer H. C. "Bud"
Sunderman, as Vandivier had suggested. Why not? Vandivier
wanted to know
"Because it's none of my business, and it's none of yours,"
Line told him. "I learned a long time ago not to worry about
things over which I had no control. I have no control over this."
Vandivier pressed the point. What about the test pilots who
might get injured because of the faulty brakes? Didn't their
uncertain fate prick Line's conscience?
"Look," said Line, growing impatient with Vandivier's moral
needling, "I just told you I have no control over this thing. Why
should my conscience bother me?" Then he added, "You're just
getting all upset over this thing for nothing. I just do as I'm told,
and I'd advise you to do the same."
Vandivier made his decision that night. He knew, of course,
he was on the hors of a dilemma. If he wrote the report, he
would save his job at the expense of his conscience. If he
refused, he would honor his moral code and, he was convinced,
lose his job-an ugly prospect for anyone, let alone a forty-two-
year old man with a wife and several children. The next day.
Vandivier phoned Lawson and told him he was ready to begin on
the qualification report.
Lawson shot over to Vandivler's office with all the speed of
one who knows that, swallowed fast, a bitter pill doesn't taste
so bad. Before they started on the report, though, Vandlivier, still
uneasy with his decision, asked Lawson if he fully understood
what they were about to do.
"Yeah," Lawson said acidly, "We're going to screw LTV. And
speaking of screwing," he continued, "I know now how a whore
feels, because that's exactly what I've become, an engineering
whore. I've sold myself. It's all I can do to look at myself in the
mirror when I shave. I make me sick."
For someone like Vandivier, who had written dozens of them,
the qualification report was a snap. It took about a month, during
which time the brake failed still another final qualification test,
and the two men talked almost exclusively about the enormity
of what they were doing. In the Nuremberg trials they found a
historical analogy to their own complicity and culpability in the
AZD affair. More than once, Lawson opined that the brakes were
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• The congressional committee adjoumed after four hours with no
real conclusion. The following day the Department of Defense,
citing the A7D episode, made major changes in its inspection,
testing, and reporting procedures.
The A/D eventually went into service with the Goodrich-made
five-disk brake.
• Searle Lawson went to work as an engineer for LTV assigned to
the A7D project.
Russell LIne was promoted to production superintendent,
• Robert Sink moved up into Line's old
• Kermit Vandivier became a newspaper reporter for the Daily News
in Troy, Ohio.
downright dangerous, that anything could happen during the
flight tests. His opinion proved prophetic.
When the report was finished, copies were sent to the Air
Force and LTV. Within a week test flights were begun at Edwards
Air Force Base in California. Goodrich dispatched Lawson to
Edwards as its representative, but he wasn't there long. Several
"unusual incidents" brought the flight tests literally to a screech-
ing halt
. Lawson returned to the Troy plant, full of talk about
several near crashes caused by brake trouble during landings.
That was enough to send Vandivier to his attorney, to whom he
told the whole sorry tale.
Although the attorney didn't think Vandivier was guilty of
fraud, he was convinced that the analyst/writer was guilty of par-
ticipating in a conspiracy to defraud. Vandivier's only hope, the
attorney counseled, was to make a clean breast of the matter to
the FBI. Vandivier did. At this point both he and Lawson decided
to resign from Goodrich. In his letter of resignation, addressed to
Russell Line, Vandivier cited the A7D report and stated: "As you
are aware, this report contains numerous deliberate and willful
misrepresentations which ... expose both myself and others to
criminal charges of conspiracy to defraud."
Vandivier was soon summoned to the office of Bud
Sunderman, who berated him mercilessly. Among other things,
Sunderman accused Vandivier of making irresponsible charges
and of arch disloyalty. It would be best, said Sunderman, if
Vandivier cleared out immediately. Within minutes, Vandivier had
deaned out his desk and left the plant.
Two days later Goodrich announced it was recalling the
qualification report and replacing the old brake with a new five-
disk brake at no cost to LTV.
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
1. Identify the main characters in this case, and explain what
happened.
2. To what extent did Lawson, Vandivier, and Gretzinger
consider the relevant moral issues before deciding to
participate in the fraud? What was their reasoning? What
would you have done if you were in their situation?
3. How did Sink and Line look at the matter? How would you
evaluate their conduct?
Aftermath
A year later, a congressional committee reviewed the A7D affair.
Vandivier and Lawson testified as government witnesses, together
with Air Force officers and a General Accounting Office team. All
testified that the brake was dangerous.
• Robert Sink, representing the Troy plant, depicted Vandivier as a
mere high school graduate with no technical training, who preferred
to follow his own lights rather than organizational guidance. R. G.
Jeter, vice president and general counsel of Goodrich, disinissed as
ludicrous even the possibility that some thirty engineers at the Tray
plant would stand idly by and see reports changed and falsified.
4. Do you think Vandivier was wrong to work up the quall-
fication report? Explain the moral principle or principles
that underlie your judgment.
5. Was Vandivier right to "blow the whistle"? Was he morally
required to so? Again, explain the moral principles on
which your judgment is based.
6. Describe the different pressures to conform in this case
and discuss the relevance of the concepts of groupthink
and diffusion of responsibility. Do any of these factors
excuse the conduct of particular individuals in this case?
If so, who and why?
7. Should Goodrich be held morally responsible as a com-
pany for the A/D affair, or just the individuals involved?
8. What might Goodrich have done, and what steps should it
take in the future, to ensure more moral behavior?
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