Transforming “Apathy Into Movement”:The Role of Prosocial Emotions in Motivating Action for Social Change Emma F. Thomas The Australian National University, Canberra Craig McGarty Murdoch University, Perth, Australia Kenneth I. Mavor The Australian National University, Canberra This article explores the synergies between recent developments in the social identity of helping, and advantaged groups’ prosocial emotion. The authors review the literature on the potential of guilt, sympathy, and outrage to transform advantaged groups’ apathy into positive action. They place this research into a novel framework by exploring the ways these emotions shape group processes to produce action strategies that emphasize either social cohesion or social change. These prosocial emotions have a critical but underrecognized role in creating contexts of in-group inclusion or exclusion, shaping normative content and meaning, and informing group interests. Furthermore, these distinctions provide a useful way of differentiating commonly discussed emotions. The authors conclude that the most “effective” emotion will depend on the context of the inequality but that outrage seems particularly likely to productively shape group processes and social change outcomes. Keywords: I emotion; social identity; helping/prosocial behavior; group processes; morality n 1938, Carl Jung wrote, “There can be no transforming of darkness into light and of apathy into movement without emotion” (p. 32). In this sentence, Jung celebrates the profound role that emotion plays in directing and shaping human behavior. Although individual emotion has long been a mainstay of clinical, personality, and social psychological research (e.g., the work of Ekman et al., 1987; Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Scheff, 1990; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001, to name a few), the advent of intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004; Smith, 1993) signaled increasing interest in the contribution that group-based emotion can add to the study of social phenomena, including prejudice and discrimination (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Smith, 1993), social harmony and reconciliation (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006), and social and political action (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; van Zomeren, Spears, Leach, & Fischer, 2004; see earlier contributions from relative deprivation theory, Runciman, 1966; Walker & Smith, 2002, for a review). This article concentrates on a specific aspect implied in the Jung quote above: the power of emotion to transform “apathy into movement.” More specifically, this article explores the transformation of an advantaged group’s apathy into movement to promote greater social equality. Following Leach, Snider, and Iyer (2002), we define advantaged groups as those “secure in their position, due to their greater size or control over resources” (p. 137). Thus, the scope of this article is defined by, first, a focus on group emotion and, second, a focus on emotions that advantaged group members experience in relation to other people’s deprivation. We argue that it is in this situation of relative advantage that the power Authors’ Note: The research has been supported in part by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project Grant No. DP0770731. The authors wish to thank Galen Bodenhausen and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Please address correspondence to Emma F. Thomas, Regulatory Institutions Network, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia; e-mail: emma.thomas@anu.edu.au. PSPR, Vol. 13 No. 4, November 2009 310-333 DOI: 10.1177/1088868309343290 © 2009 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc. 310 Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   311 of emotion to transform apathy to action is most profound—what Nietzsche (quoted in Leach et al., 2002) called “poisoning the consciences of the fortunate” (p. 136). Accordingly, this article explores the various emotional reactions that advantaged groups can have to the disadvantage of others and the potential for these discrete emotions to motivate efforts to achieve greater social equality. We draw on recent developments in the social identity literature that outline the ways that social group memberships shape prosocial behavior (e.g., helping and solidarity; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006) to provide a framework for understanding the various prosocial effects of group emotion. Taking a social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994), we explore the ways that social identities and emotion can, in combination, profoundly inform perceivers about the social context and shape their reaction to it. We argue that such an approach can help to differentiate oftenconfused emotion labels (e.g., sympathy and empathy) but also provide a useful way to distinguish between different prosocial strategies (e.g., tokenism, helping, solidarity, cooperation). We begin our analysis by outlining the developme­ nts in the social identity literature that detail the underlying group processes responsible for producing prosocial outcomes. In particular, Reicher et al. (2006) have argued that there are three interrelated group properties that are implicated in prosocial behavior. We then go on to explore the ways that emotion may theoretically shape these three prosocial group processes. In the next section, we move on to discuss the possibility that prosocial emotions might usefully be further classified on the basis of the sorts of social strategies they promote. We draw on Wright and Lubensky’s (2008) distinction between social cohesion and social change strategies. On the basis of these arguments, the main sections of this article are underpinned by a framework that uses Reicher et al.’s (2006) three categories to explore group processes and emotion and Wright and Lubensky’s (2008) two strategies to delineate prosocial emotion outcomes. In particular, we provide an analysis of the three prosocial emotions (guilt, sympathy, and outrage; Montada & Schneider, 1989), structured in terms of the etiology of the emotion; its implications for group processes (as relates to Reicher et al.’s, 2006, insights); and the sorts of social strategy outcomes likely to emerge (social cohesion or social change; Wright & Lubensky, 2008). We conclude with a discussion of implications for existing research but also the implications for people seeking to mobilize advantaged group members in support of positive social change. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND GROUP EMOTION: A DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR What sorts of identity processes underpin prosocial behavior? Let us note at the outset that we are using the general term prosocial to cover a number of separate behaviors including helping behavior, altruism, cooperation, and solidarity (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). These prosocial strategies will be differentiated throughout the article—indeed, it is one of the key purposes of the article—but at this point, let us generalize across them and explore the psychological underpinnings that are generally understood to motivate an advantaged group to help, assist, and otherwise take action on behalf of members of another disadvantaged group. The social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987) suggests that there are three core processes that underpin prosocial group behavior: category inclusion, category norms, and category interests. Reicher et al. (2006) crystallized these three elements into their social identity model of helping (see also Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005). The first, category inclusion, is a cognitive perceptual process that relates to the location of (inter)group boundaries. A wealth of evidence now supports the assertion, derived from the social identity perspective, that people will take action to support in-group members and that this can manifest in intergroup helping (Levine & Thompson, 2004; Reicher et al., 2006), political solidarity (Subašic´, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), cooperation between groups (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), and even bystander emergency intervention (Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005). In Reicher et al.’s (2006) social identity model of helping, the first element relates to the need for a meaningful superordinate categorization to be available, such that advantaged and disadvantaged can be included in a common in-group. In a similar vein, Subašic´ et al.’s (2008) recent model of political solidarity emphasizes a shared identity meaning with the minority group (and not the authority) as underpinning support for, and solidarity with, a disadvantaged minority. The second element, category norms, relates to the rhetorical meaning associated with the group, as evidenced by the group norms. When an identity is salient, people will behave in line with group norms that prescribe 312   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW appropriate and normative forms of action (Jetten, McAuliffe, Hornsey, & Hogg, 2006; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Terry & Hogg, 1996). Reicher et al. (2006) argue that the group norms must promote helping. Their analysis of documents used to mobilize support of Bulgarian Jews during World War II demonstrated the ways that the category norms for the Bulgarian identity prescribed support for a persecuted people. The final element, category interests, relates to the strategic concerns that accompany helping behavior. In particular, Reicher et al. (2006) suggest that helping is more likely to come about when in-group interests (e.g., maintenance of a positive in-group identity) are served by helping. Thus, in the WWII era documents, identity concerns were represented such that the Bulgarian ingroup would be threatened by not helping. Other research has shown that group members can engage in helping behavior to strategically improve the group’s stereotype (Hopkins et al., 2007) and/or restore a threatened identity (van Leeuwen, 2007). Overall, Reicher and colleagues argue that effective categories will be those that are able to include everyone whom one is seeking to mobilize (category inclusion) but also those categories that have the resources to render normative the actions one is advocating (category norms) and represent the strategic reasons for doing so (category interests). However, the social identity approach also emphasizes the fluid, dynamic, and constructed nature of social identity (Onorato & Turner, 2004). Other work by Reicher, Haslam, and colleagues (e.g., Reicher, 1996, 2004; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) has highlighted the ways that social identities are contested by group members, yielding a continual process of identity construction, reconstruction, and transformation through consensus (see also Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears, Lee, & Novak, 2005). Put another way, the category inclusion, category norms, and category interest elements discussed by Reicher and colleagues are also dynamic, contestable, changeable, and fundamentally shaped through processes of argumentation and consensualization among group members (Reicher et al., 2006). Building on these insights, in this article we explore the ways that emotions can powerfully shape the social identity processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006) and others (Hopkins et al., 2007; Levine et al., 2005; Subašic´ et al., 2008; van Leeuwen, 2007). We argue that exploring the synergies between group emotion, and the sorts of identity processes outlined above would contribute much to our understanding of prosocial group behavior. For group emotion to contribute usefully to our understanding of the dynamic processes of identity construction, reconstruction, and transformation, it is necessary to have a dynamic theory of group emotion. Indeed, the existing literature on social identity and group emotion suggests that the causal relationships between the two are likely to be bidirectional, dynamic, and complex (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005; Smith & Mackie, 2006). Consistent with these points, Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007) have emphasized the role of anticipation, reevaluation, and reconstruction in the emotion process, whereas Smith and Mackie (2006) have discussed the ways that group members can, over time, disengage with groups that elicit negative group emotions. Let us briefly discuss this literature, toward further clarifying the dynamic causal properties of social identity and group emotion. On one hand, group emotion is often theoretically understood as stemming from the straightforward appr­ aisal process elaborated in intergroup emotion theory, where appraisal based on a group (social) self leads to group emotion, which leads to group action (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993). Similarly, in the recently articulated social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), these authors causally place a salient social identity before the experience of emotional reactions to injustice (group emotion). Figure 1a depicts the simple causal model where a salient social identity leads to congruent group emotions, which then shape particular action strategies. This is group-based emotion, as it is traditionally defined and understood (Iyer & Leach, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), where social identities are (partially) enacted through an emotion pathway (van Zomeren et al., 2008). On the other hand, we argue that it is also useful to explore the ways that emotions can equally give rise to social group memberships and/or inform group norms. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that social identities can be actively created by group members based on shared cognition (where shared cognition refers to shared knowledge structures; Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007). In a similar vein, Peters and Kashima (2007) have described the ways that the social sharing of emotion can create links among people and foster a shared understanding of the world. This shared understanding can be used to coordinate social interaction within a group but also action between groups (Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007; Smith et al., 2007). Figure 1b depicts this simple causal model where emotion can form the basis for an effective social category, which then motivates social action. Given that we propose that group formation can stem from emotional experience, it seems likely that perception is personalized, or individuated, in this context (which is different from how group emotion is traditionally defined and Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   313 1a: salient social self (social identity) gives rise to group emotion. Social Identity Group Emotion Social Action 1b: recognition of shared emotion precipitates group formation. (Individual) Emotion Social Identity Social Action Figure 1 A dynamic causal model of social identity and group emotion. NOTE: In everyday social interaction, the two processes would be interactive. understood; Iyer & Leach, 2008). That is, the emotion is initially experienced at an individual level, but the recognition that others share the emotion forms the basis for group formation (see Peters & Kashima, 2007). We further articulate some of the implications of this causal order below where we consider how group emotion might shape the processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006). Thus, on the basis of the available literature, both causal orderings seem likely and plausible in the everyday social context of group emotion and identity. Consistent with these points, Kessler and Hollbach (2005) emphasized the bidirectionality of causal links between emotion and identification. Elsewhere (Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), we have argued that these elements are best seen as part of a dynamic system of interrelations, where causal ordering will vary over time and depending on social context. In particular, we argued that a shared group membership can give rise to, or facilitate, the experience of group emotion and other action-relevant beliefs (as in Figure 1a; see Mackie et al., 2000; van Zomeren et al., 2008), as may be the case in established, historical social groups, but that, similarly, those emotional experiences can also trigger psychological group formation and subsequently become encapsulated in “what it means” to be a group member (Turner, 1991), as may be the case of incipient, emergent social groups (Figure 1b). Such ideas are also broadly consistent with recent developments exploring the role of individuality within the group, which have emphasized the ways that individuality can shape emergent groups (as in Figure 1b) and groups shape individuals (as in Figure 1a) (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes & Jetten, 2006). Thus, incorporating these different causal orderings is consistent with the dynamic, iterative, transformational, and constructed nature of social identity described above. Given these points, what are the ways that group emotion can contribute to our understanding of the three interrelated processes outlined by Reicher et al. (2006)? We argue that the experience of emotion can fundamentally inform the perceiver about the social context by (a) providing a basis on which to categorize in-group members or out-group members based on whether the emotion is shared or not; (b) informing the content, and relational meaning, of the identity; and (c) shaping the ways that group members take strategic action. These are the three general processes considered most important in the work outlined above on social identity and helping (Reicher et al., 2006). Let us consider each of these points in more detail. Category Inclusion With regard to the first component, category inclusion, we argue that advantaged groups’ emotions have the potential to shape and restructure (inter)group boundaries. For example, experiencing feelings of fear in relation to another person is unlikely to lead to a categorization of that person as an in-group member; the very fact that someone elicits a fearful reaction is indicative of a different worldview and antagonistic relationship (Bar-Tal, 2001; Turner, 2005). Conversely, experiencing the same emotion is more likely to give rise to a perception of the other person as an in-group member (see Peters & Kashima’s, 2007, work on emotion sharing; Swaab et al., 2007). Extending on this point, we argue that some emotions have the potential to traverse ostensible intergroup boundaries. Because emotions can assist in creating a shared worldview and uniting previously separate groups in coordinated social action (Peters & Kashima, 2007), then it follows that emotions that can be experienced by both the advantaged and the disadvantaged are likely to be more successful at motivating genuine attempts to create intergroup equality and cooperation. Category Norms Emotions can also inform group members about the reasons for, and context of, disadvantage and, in doing so, can powerfully shape normative considerations (the second component). For example, group guilt is understood to be accompanied by appraisals of ingroup responsibility (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). To the extent that perceptions of in-group responsibility become embodied in the group membership (in relation to the disadvantage suffered by the other group), then this emotion is likely to inform norms for specific sorts of action. The idea that an emotional reaction can inform relational meaning, or normative content, of an identity is contained in the arguments of Stürmer, Simon, and Klandermans (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, in press). 314   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW These authors argue that anger plays a powerful role in politicizing a social identity, transforming the identity such that it is more ready for social action. Thus, to the extent that anger becomes normatively engaged with the identity, this will engender particular sorts of normative action (usually surrounding political action). There also is converging evidence that it may be fruitful to explore emotions as normative processes themselves (Smith et al., 2007; Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, in press; Thomas & McGarty, 2009). In other words, it is possible that the emotion overall will shape group memberships both directly (by shaping behavior norms) and indirectly (by shaping emotion norms). Category Interests Finally, related to the points above, emotions will shape the sorts of strategies that group members prefer (category interests), in particular depending on where the emotion implies that blame lies (one of the key appraisal components; Lazarus, 1991). Emotions will also inform the perceiver about the (group) self-relevant strategic dimensions to the inequality. For example, as we will argue below, moral outrage is likely to make strategic representations concerning the need to restore a moral status quo, whereas empathy is likely to represent category interests based on a perceived interchangeability between self and other. Nadler and Liviatan (2006) have also explored the ways in which emotions themselves can be deployed tactically, to aid in promoting intergroup cooperation, reconciliation, or conflict. Thus, it seems that, just as groups can be strategic about their behavior in the helping context (Hopkins et al., 2007; Reicher et al., 2006; van Leeuwen, 2007), it can be beneficial for both the intergroup relationship and the disadvantaged group in particular if they can be equally tactical about the ways they express themselves. Overall, then, we argue that incorporating an understanding of group emotion has much to contribute to our understanding of the dynamic social identity processes and prosocial behavior outlined by Reicher and colleagues. We acknowledge, though, that we are far from the first to make such points; indeed, it was similar arguments concerning the potential for emotion to usefully capture and differentiate group processes that motivated E. R. Smith, Mackie, and colleagues (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie et al., 2004; Smith, 1993; Smith & Ho, 2002) to develop intergroup emotion theory in the first place. Rather, our concern is that group emotion is sometimes explored in rather static ways. Thus, our point is to reenergize a focus on the ways in which emotions can shape and reshape group boundaries and transform subjective group memberships, to promote either action or apathy. We pursue these points with regard to prosocial emotion and behavior. THE PROSOCIAL EMOTIONS Appraisal theory, on which intergroup emotion theory is based, makes it clear that emotional reactions are premised on a basic process of appraising, or evaluating, features in the environment. For something to be appraised, it must first be observed (Frijda, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However, Leach et al. (2002) have explored the ways that members of advantaged groups can go to great lengths to either minimize or completely ignore their own privilege. Only when the advantage is recognized, with the associated emotion, is the potential for promoting social equality greatest (Leach et al., 2002). It is also clear that not all feelings of relative advantage will produce a reaction designed to overcome the inequality and promote action to bring about positive social change. For example, disdain is unlikely to motivate positive prosocial behavior (Leach et al., 2002). Given the broad range of emotions that can be experienced in situations of relative advantage, Leach and colleagues (Leach et al., 2002), drawing on work by Montada and Schneider (1989), differentiated four appraisal dimensions on which feelings of relative advantage might be differentiated: the extent to which the advantaged are focused on themselves (self) or on the disadvantaged (other); the perceived legitimacy of the privilege; the perceived stability of the advantage; and the degree of perceived control that the advantaged have over their position. Overall, the emotion that is experienced in the face of relative advantage is a function of the structure of the intergroup relations, along the four dimensions (see also Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008). In this work (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989) and in that on interpersonal emotion (Feather, 2006; Lazarus, 1991), there are understood to be three primary prosocial emotions implicated in a desire to help another: guilt, sympathy, and moral outrage. The first goal of this article is to provide a review of what is known about each of these emotions in motivating positive group-level action. That is, what role does each of these play in turning apathy into social action on behalf of another group? We also expand the analysis of these three prosocial emotions to include two additional, related emotions that can also be associated with prosocial outcomes: empathy and (self-focused) anger. Thus, we argue that there are three general categories of prosocial emotion: guilt; sympathy and Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   315 empathy; and anger and outrage. Leach et al. (2002) provided an overview of these emotions; however, the subsequent proliferation of research on these emotions makes an updated review timely. As suggested, a second goal of this article is to explore the ways that these same prosocial emotions might shape and restructure intergroup boundaries, to produce different prosocial strategies to reduce inequality. Advantaged groups can use a range of social strategies to “help” or provide assistance to the disadvantaged; however, not all of these are premised on a genuine desire to change the status quo (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004; Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; Wright & Lubensky, 2008; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Indeed, Wright and Lubensky (2008; see also Wright, Kiu, Semenya, & Comeau, 2008) explored the differences between the collective action and prejudice reduction literatures, arguing that the two traditions have resulted in antithetical approaches to the question of addressing social inequality. Wright and Lubensky (2008) broadly differentiate the strategies preferred by the two literatures thus: “The prejudice reduction approach focuses on themes of intergroup harmony and social cohesion. . . . The collective action perspective speaks in terms of equality across groups, not harmony between groups, and focuses on social justice” (p. 306). We draw broadly on this critical distinction between approaches that attempt to address inequalities by creating social cohesion and those strategies that attempt to address inequalities by achieving social justice and social change. In this article, we are particularly interested in those social strategies that are likely to bring about a change in the social status of historically (or incidentally) disadvantaged groups. From our perspective, genuine social change is about redressing social inequality at a group level; thus, we are less interested in those approaches that might elevate individuals of disadvantaged groups (as in tokenism) but without changing the status of the group as a whole. Thus, we consider the ways in which the three categories of prosocial emotion act to (re)structure group boundaries and shape group processes and the different forms of prosocial strategies (broadly, social cohesion or social change) that may result. Emotion that is shared with others can create a shared understanding of the world (Leach & Tiedens, 2004; Peters & Kashima, 2007). Accordingly, our key argument throughout is that the most effective emotion (to mirror Reicher et al.’s, 2006, discussion of effective categories) is likely to be one that (a) can be shared by both the advantaged and disadvantaged, (b) will direct normative forms of social and political action, and (c) strategically recognizes the expertise and experience of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In other words, if the goal is genuine social cooperation toward positive social change, rather than top-down paternalistic assistance (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006), it may be more fruitful to explore emotions that both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups can experience. In exploring this proposition, we propose new ways of conceptualizing the differences between two sets of often-confused emotions at a group level: sympathy and empathy; outrage and anger. Given these two goals, in what follows we will first provide a review of the relevant literature relating to group-based emotions: guilt, sympathy and empathy, and anger and moral outrage, respectively. For each of these emotions, we will then consider the ways that the emotion might affect group boundaries, and the relational meaning of the social identities. We then conclude by exploring the sorts of prosocial strategies that group emotions seem likely to promote. Our overall analysis of each of these emotions can be seen in Figure 2, which depicts each of the prosocial emotions that are the focus in this article, the ways that they shape group processes, and the specific sorts of social strategies likely to emerge. It also organizes each emotion under the Wright and Lubensky (2008) social cohesion or social change framework. GUILT Etiology Broadly, guilt arises from internalized values about right and wrong (Lazarus, 1991). At an individual appraisal level, it centers around actions (or imagined actions) that we regard as morally reprehensible and the appraisal pattern is characterized by a moral transgression, for which there is blame to the self (Lazarus, 1991). Group-level guilt has been shown to be similar in nature to individual-level guilt; however, the self that has committed the transgression is a social self (see Turner et al., 1994). Consistent with a group-level perspective of guilt, there is good evidence that people can feel guilt based on their social group memberships (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Doosje et al. (1998, Study 1) used minimal groups to show that it is possible to induce guilt in people even though their personal self was not responsible for the harm inflicted on another. There is a large literature on the experience of guilt, in particular “White guilt,” in relation to the historical mistreatment and continuing inequality in the context of the White American treatment of African Americans (Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Iyer et al., 2004; Swim & Miller, 1999), the Dutch colonial treatment of Indonesians (Doosje et al., 1998; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2004), and the White 316   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW SOCIAL COHESION GUILT SOCIAL CHANGE (SELF-FOCUSED) ANGER Advantaged group Tokenism Disadvantaged group Advantaged group Regulation Disadvantaged group SYMPATHY Advantaged group OUTRAGE Paternalism System, government,or third party Disadvantaged group Social and political action EMPATHY Advantaged Disadvantaged group group Cooperation Figure 2 Disadvantaged group Advantaged group Solidarity The prosocial emotions and group processes as a function of social cohesion or social change strategies. Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   317 Australian mistreatment of Indigenous Australians (Branscombe et al., 2002; Leach et al., 2006; McGarty & Bliuc, 2004; McGarty et al., 2005; Pedersen, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004). Furthermore, there is related research on the atrocities committed against Jewish people during the Second World War (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004, 2005), the American and British occupation of Iraq (Iyer et al., 2007), and gender inequality between men and women (Branscombe, 1998; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2004; Schmitt, Ellemers, & Branscombe, 2003). What of cases where the group is not responsible for the disadvantage of another group? People in developed nations could hardly be held responsible for the disadvantage experienced by people in developing nations, yet members of developed countries often report feeling guilty about their advantage. Hoffman (1976) coined the term existential guilt to describe the emotional experience of feeling guilty about mere, unearned advantages that one group has over another (see also Montada & Schneider, 1989; Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Müller, & Müller-Fohrbrodt, 2000). Consistent with individual-level appraisal notions of guilt, the experience of group-based guilt is characterized by three interrelated properties (Branscombe et al., 2002; Iyer et al., 2004; McGarty et al., 2005). First, the person must self-categorize as a member of a group that has caused harm to another group. Second, the focus of attention of guilt is on the self rather than the disadvantaged, that is, guilt will be experienced when the inequality is in-group focused and seen to be illegitimate (Harth et al., 2008; Leach et al., 2002). Finally, guilt motivates either avoidance or narrow attempts at restitution, mainly to assuage the advantaged group’s own aversive state. Indeed, like personal guilt, there are at least three ways that individuals can avoid the experience of group-based guilt: They can minimize the harm that was done to the other group, question the appropriateness of guilt, and engage in argument about the cost of apology (McGarty et al., 2005). Group Processes and Outcomes Given the etiology of guilt, it is likely that guilt will maintain group boundaries between the disadvantaged and advantaged, that is, because it is not possible for the disadvantaged to feel guilt in relation to their own circumstances, guilt will effectively maintain an intergroup context. The intergroup relationship associated with guilt is depicted in Figure 2. The figure shows guilt maintaining strong intergroup boundaries, but where the advantaged group maintain their privileged status in society (i.e., at the top). Thus, as far as the framework provided by existing social identity models of helping and solidarity (Reicher et al., 2006), guilt is missing one of the key components (category inclusion) that is most likely to promote effortful attempts to create genuine social change. This implies that the positive prosocial outcomes associated with guilt can be seen as an outcome of normative considerations, vis-à-vis what is appropriate and consistent with the salient identity, or of strategic ones. Indeed, Berndsen and Manstead (2007) have argued that, rather than being an antecedent appraisal to guilt, responsibility may actually be an outcome of the experience of guilt. To the extent that this guilt, and accompanying acceptance of responsibility, becomes associated with the advantaged group membership, this is likely to lead to forms of assistance motivated by group normative prescriptions related to “doing the right thing” rather than genuine desires to achieve social equality. Thus, we argue that guilt will be ill-equipped to challenge the existing social structure, and assistance will inevitably flow in a top-down fashion (Figure 2). Consistent with this analysis, group-based guilt has been shown to be a useful, although limited, emotion in motivating attempts to overcome intergroup inequality or bring about collective action. Iyer et al. (2003) showed that guilt associated with the unearned advantages experienced by European Americans compared with African Americans predicted the abstract goal of compensation but not affirmative action policies. Similarly, McGarty et al. (2005) showed that guilt predicted apology to Indigenous Australians for historical mistreatment. Finally, Leach et al. (2006) showed that guilt is associated with the abstract goal of compensation but not at all associated with specific political actions designed to redress injustice. Other work has shown only very weak links with action designed to overcome inequality (Harth et al., 2008) or no links at all with collective action (Iyer et al., 2007). Thus, consistent with our arguments above, it seems that guilt promotes apology and compensation to the injured party (symbolic attempts to reduce inequality) but does not form a platform for ongoing opposition to inequality (Iyer et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2006). Iyer and colleagues have argued that because of its conceptual self-focus, guilt will motivate often relatively empty reparations in an attempt to stave off the unpleasant and aversive feelings that accompany guilt. Similarly, Leach et al. (2006) have argued that its “dejected phenomenology and low action potential” (p. 1233) make it a weak motivator of specific political actions. In an interesting twist on these ideas, Schmitt and colleagues (Schmitt et al., 2004; Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008) showed that the relationship between collective guilt and taking action on behalf of a disadvantaged group, in this case women, was mediated by the 318   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW difficulty associated with making reparations. It was found that, if the cost of making reparations was either too easy or too difficult, then levels of group-based guilt were low. That is, only when reparations are achievable but moderate would levels of collective guilt be sufficient to promote action. Consistent with these findings, recent work by Berndsen and McGarty (in press) found perceived difficulty of making reparations for historical harm and that this relationship was mediated by the experience of group-based guilt. When reparations were seen as impossible, group-based guilt levels were low. This speaks to the idea that actions must be sufficiently, but not substantially, effortful to alleviate guilt. In so much as guilt can be understood to motivate action only under very specific circumstances (that is, when the required action is moderately effortful), these findings also provide further insight into the work of Iyer, Leach, and colleagues, who have found that guilt is associated with the abstract goal of compensation (arguably a moderate response to social inequality) and/or no action at all (if the context of the inequality is such that change is too difficult). Overall, then, guilt seems to be associated with a social cohesion approach, in general, and tokenism, as outlined by Wright and colleagues (Wright et al., 1990), more specifically. Because guilt maintains group boundaries and the advantaged group generally has greater control over resources, any prosocial outcomes may be largely symbolic (Iyer et al., 2004) and may even serve to entrench the subordination of the disadvantaged (as per Wright & Lubensky, 2008; Wright & Taylor, 1998), while simultaneously relieving the consciences of the advantaged. SYMPATHY Etiology Sympathy has been defined as “heightened awareness of another’s plight as something to be alleviated” (Wispé, 1986, p. 314). For Lazarus (1991), the core relational theme for sympathy (or compassion, as he prefers to call what we would term sympathy) involves “being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help” (p. 289). Its appraisal pattern is characterized by a lack of self-involvement and an absence of blame for the plight (either to ourselves or to the victim; Weiner, 1995). Similarly, Feather’s work on the structural model of deservingness (Feather, 2006; Feather & Nairn, 2005) suggests that sympathy will occur when another person has suffered an undeserved outcome (characterized by a positive action and a negative outcome). Its key motivating action tendency is to attempt to help the disadvantaged and mitigate their suffering (Lazarus, 1991). Consistent with this, sympathy has been implicated in both interpersonal (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1988; Betancourt, 1990; Dovidio, Schroeder, & Allen, 1990) and intergroup prosocial behavior (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003).1 More recent work by Batson and colleagues (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Batson et al., 1997) increasingly blurs the interpersonal-intergroup boundaries by exploring the effect of group memberships on sympathy and willingness to help. At a group level, sympathy is conceptually understood to have an other-focus in that it is based in a recognition of the plight of the disadvantaged rather than the person’s own distress at the situation, and it will arise where there is an illegitimate but stable disadvantage over which the victim has little control (Leach et al., 2002). Harth et al. (2008) experimentally manipulated the structural conditions described by Leach et al. (2002) and showed that sympathy was indeed incre­ ased by a focus on the suffering group and an illegitimate inequality. Group Processes and Outcomes Given that sympathy is premised on an “other” focus (that is, the suffering of the other group) but it is still not possible for the disadvantaged themselves to share in feelings of sympathy (such feelings would, instead, be akin to self-pity), it is likely that sympathy will also maintain group boundaries between the disadvantaged and advantaged. The intergroup relationship that is associated with sympathy is depicted in Figure 2, where sympathy actively maintains group boundaries but also the group status hierarchy (advantaged group stays at the top, disadvantaged group stays at the bottom). Thus, as far as the framework provided by social identity processes outlined above (Reicher et al., 2006), sympathy is also missing one of the key components (category inclusion) that is most likely to promote concerted attempts to create genuine social change. This suggests that the positive prosocial outcomes associated with sympathy can be seen as an outcome of normative considerations vis-à-vis what is appropriate and consistent with the salient identity. The experience of sympathy does not imply responsibility for the disadvantage in the ways that guilt does; rather, sympathy simply recognizes that the disadvantage exists, that it is illegitimate, and that the disadvantaged were not themselves responsible for their plight (Feather & Nairn, 2005; Leach et al., 2002). As such, it is likely that where there are strong feelings of sympathy and this becomes contextually embedded in a salient identity, this will motivate a range of attempts to help. Consistent with these points, Harth et al. (2008, Study 3) showed that Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   319 group-based sympathy predicted support for equal opportunity for an artificially created group, whereas Iyer et al. (2003) showed that sympathetic emotion motivates broad and concerted attempts to help disadvantaged Black Americans. Indeed, Iyer et al. (2003; see also Iyer et al., 2004) have argued that the attentional other-focus on the disadvantaged makes sympathy a powerful motivator of prosocial behavior. Recent work by Tarrant et al. (in press) has shown the utility of directly invoking a sympathy in-group emotion norm on prosocial behaviors. Note that their research actually refers to empathy, but given that their definition is more consistent with our conceptualization of sympathy (see Note 1 and our arguments below), we will review it briefly here. In particular, Tarrant et al. showed that invoking a sympathy group norm by informing participants that in-group members “typically respond to the experiences of other people with high levels of compassion, tenderness and sympathy” actively invoked feelings of sympathy among in-group members and improved overall attitudes toward the ostensible out-group. Tarrant et al.’s research, in particular combined with other evidence surrounding the utility of outrage norms and prosocial behavior (Thomas & McGarty, 2009), provides one clear instantiation of emotion norms to positively influence what Reicher et al. (2006) would term the rhetorical meaning associated with group memberships. Despite the evidence that sympathy can promote fruitful outcomes if it becomes contextually embedded in an identity (Harth et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2003), or if a group emotion norm for sympathy is prescribed (Tarrant et al., in press), it is likely that sympathy may also have some limits in terms of its ability to motivate genuine attempts to achieve greater social equality. Specifically, given that there is still structural differentiation between groups (Figure 2), the assistance may neglect to recognize the role and expertise of the disadvantaged group members they are seeking to help (a recognition that would take place with genuine cooperation). In their political solidarity model of tripolar intergroup power relations, Subašic´ et al. (2008) argue that sympathy is likely to be an outcome where the majority group has shared identity meaning with both the (disadvantaged) minority group and the authority. Under these conditions, the advantaged group has little intention of challenging the authority (perhaps because they meet other tactical majority group needs) but will maintain feelings of sympathy for the disadvantaged group. Put another way, they “feel sorry for them” but are simultaneously committed to maintaining the status quo. Consistent with these points, in the international development context, Thomas (2005) showed that there were high levels of sympathy in relation to the disadvantage suffered by people in developing nations, but this was a poor predictor of actual social and political action (see also Schmitt et al., 2000). Furthermore, because sympathy does not allocate blame for the inequality (Leach et al., 2002), it is illequipped to direct group behavior in productive ways. That is, cooperative social action to achieve equality across groups involves directed, tactical behavior that sympathy is unlikely to motivate. Given this overall picture, we argue that sympathy is generally likely to be associated with a social cohesion approach (Wright & Lubensky, 2008) and, in some contexts, more specifically associated with top-down, paternalistic forms of helping (as opposed to genuine cooperative efforts to achieve social equality; see Figure 2). Nadler (2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006) has described the ways that high status groups can use intergroup helping as a method of maintaining social inequality. Nadler (2002) distinguishes between autonomy-oriented help, which is focused on providing recipients with tools to solve their own problems and implies that the disadvantaged are effective agents in overcoming their situation, and dependency-oriented help, which provides recipients with the full solution and implies that the disadvantaged are unable and incapable of contributing toward solving their own problems. It is significant that Nadler suggests that high status groups are more likely to provide dependency-oriented help when the disadvantage is illegitimate, which, according to Leach et al. (2002), is one of the antecedents of group sympathy. Overall, Nadler’s (2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006) analysis highlights the complexities involved in intergroup helping, in particular where those in-group boundaries are maintained (as with sympathy) and are strongly meaningful to the groups involved. EMPATHY Etiology Sympathy and empathy are easy to confuse. Conceptually differentiating sympathy from empathy and compassion is difficult and perplexing, with many authors using the emotion labels sympathy and empathy interchangeably, despite important differences in the historical, etiological, and psychological processes implicated in each (Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986; Wispé, 1986). Indeed, even in the context of the group emotion literature there is a lack of clarity or consistency surrounding the two terms, with some researchers preferring sympathy (e.g., Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002) and others preferring empathy (e.g., Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005; Tarrant et al., in press) to describe overall feelings of compassion and sympathy. 320   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW It is important to clarify the conceptual differences between the two, because at the group level, it seems likely that sympathy (with a conceptual other-focus; Leach et al., 2002) and empathy (with a merging of selfother; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997) are likely to shape group boundaries in different and important ways. This then allows us to also consider research that has been done into the role of empathy (as we define it) in promoting prosocial behavior. Note that it is beyond the scope of this article to reclassify all the existing interpersonal, intergroup, sympathy, and empathy research into a new framework; instead, our goal is to point out that the two emotions might be usefully differentiated by exploring the categorization and/or normative outcomes (as others have started to do; Tarrant et al., in press). In particular, whereas sympathy can be understood and conceptualized as a discrete emotion (with accompanying appraisals and action tendencies), empathy is better understood as a set of cognitive processes (Wispé, 1986) that have attendant emotion outcomes such as feelings of sympathy. Davis (2004) provides an overview of the empathy literature and attempts to unite multiple competing definitions of the elusive construct, ultimately defining empathy as “the psychological process that at least temporarily unites the separate social entities of self and other” (p. 20) (italics in original). He argues that empathy is made up of both a set of cognitive processes taking place within an observer as well as nonaffective and affective outcomes as a result of these processes. According to Davis, sympathy for the suffering person is one of the emotion outcomes that can be observed as a part of the broader empathy process, but an actual reproduction of the target’s feelings and personal distress is also a plausible outcome of the empathy process. Overall, then, we argue that sympathy can be understood as an emotion that we experience for disadvantaged others, whereas empathy is about vicariously placing oneself “in their shoes” and experiencing the events with them. Thus, the subjective feeling of sympathy, or compassion, is not what differentiates the two. Rather, where the compassion stems from a feeling of interchangeability, this is an empathy process; on the other hand, experiencing compassion for the other but without the cognitive processes is sympathy (see Figure 2). Another implication of this rationale is that empathy may be much more about cognitive recategorization (in the sense implied by self-categorization theory [Turner et al., 1987] and the common ingroup identity model [Gaertner et al., 1993]) to include the ostensible other in the in-group, whereas sympathy maintains a functional differentiation between groups, consistent with a conceptual other-focus on their suffering (Iyer et al., 2004). Put another way, the experience of empathy may lead to an inclusive in-group categorization (Figure 1b), but sympathy is more likely to stem from a salient social identity (Figure 1a; see Harth et al., 2008). The differences between these two emotions are depicted in Figure 2, where empathy is associated with a superordinate group, whereas sympathy maintains group boundaries (and status differences). Indeed, Turner et al.’s (1987) original statement of self-categorization theory stated the following: H3: Depersonalization of self-perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena [including] . . . empathy. (p. 50) Consistent with this point, Cialdini et al. (1997) showed that, once self-other merging (what the authors called oneness) had been controlled for, empathy as a subsidiary emotion had a negligible effect on helping behavior. Furthermore, much of the empathy research uses perspective-taking interventions that arguably alter the self-categorical relationships between self and disadvantaged other (e.g., Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). Thus, it is possible that many of the positive effects on helping and cooperation of the perspective taking–empathy paradigm may be a product of a shift in sociocognitive perception (Cialdini et al., 1997; see also Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Tarrant et al., in press). Recent empirical research by Stürmer and colleagues also speaks to the point that altering the self-other categorical relationships is likely to affect the feelings of compassion and sympathy (an empathy process). Stürmer, Snyder, and Omoto (2005; see also Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006) argued that it should be easier to feel empathy (defined as “feelings of compassion, concern or tenderness,” p. 533, which is consistent with our view of sympathy) for an in-group member than an outgroup member because of the relative similarity to self of an in-group target compared with an out-group target. They showed that empathy was a stronger predictor of long-term volunteerism when the recipient of help was an in-group member (heterosexual compared with a homosexual out-group, Study 1), whereas a second study showed that empathy was a significant predictor of intention to spontaneously help a person with hepatitis only when that person was an in-group member (Study 2). These findings suggest that the categorical relationship between the helper and the recipient can influence the subjective experience of feelings of sympathy such that it is easier to feel compassion for an in-group member (what we term empathy), although it is still possible to feel sympathy for a member of another group (what we term sympathy), in particular if group norms prescribe such feelings (Tarrant et al., in press). Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   321 Group Processes and Outcomes Overall, then, where the person is an in-group member, this is likely to lead to heightened levels of empathic emotion (the empathy process as discussed above); on the other hand, where the person is not in the in-group, this can lead to feelings of sympathy but is not premised in the same process of shared identification (Figure 2). Thus, empathy meets one of the key conditions set out by Reicher et al. (2006) to promote intergroup helping. In particular, it plausibly involves a recategorization of advantaged and disadvantaged into a common, superordinate in-group. It follows that many of the positive, strategic effects of empathy may stem from a perceived interchangeability, such that “I will help you because you are me” (Turner et al., 1987)—what Hornstein (1976) called the “bonds of we” (p. 62). In other words, it is likely that empathy will engender genuine feelings of cooperation toward a shared goal of equality for group members (Morrison, 1999). Consistent with these points, empathy’s potential to improve intergroup relations has been explored in a number of contexts. Again, we note that it is beyond the scope of this article to reclassify the existing literature based on a post hoc deduction of whether or not the experimental context also varied subjective group memberships. Instead, we limit our review to that research that has tended to employ perspective-taking interventions in invoking empathy. Finlay and Stephan (2000) showed that reading vignettes about African Americans who had suffered from discrimination, under instructions to empathize with the victim, eliminated the difference of evaluations of African Americans and Whites that were found in control conditions (see also Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Pedersen et al. (2004) showed that a lack of empathy, and affective perspective taking in general, was predictive of negative attitudes toward Indigenous Australians. In a more nuanced twist on the empathy literature, Stephan and Finlay (1999) employed the distinction between cognitive and affective empathy in investigating the role that empathy can play in improving intergroup relations. They argue that the subtleties of empathy can be used to achieve different goals, depending on the intergroup content. For example, if the goal is to create greater understanding between social groups, Stephan and Finlay suggest that cognitive empathy (perspective taking) would be better suited than affective empathy; conversely, if social action is the goal, then seeking to induce parallel empathy (where the advantaged group member feels the same emotions as the disadvantaged) should be employed. Finally, as discussed above, Stürmer et al. (2005, Study 2) showed that empathy was a significant predictor of intention to spontaneously help a person with hepatitis (but only when that person was an in-group member). On the other hand, empathy researchers have also considered some of the pitfalls of an empathy approach to intergroup relations, which have direct bearing on issues of group processes and categorization (Boler, 1997; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). In particular, Stephan and Finlay suggest that evoking compassion without awareness that the advantaged themselves are implicated in the social forces responsible for the suffering will do little to promote social equality. Furthermore, Boler (1997) argued that inducing empathy “may spare the reader of the emotions of rage, blame and guilt” (p. 260), which will ultimately undermine its effectiveness in issues of social justice, where these emotions are important and productive. We argue that both of these points relate to an important need for functional differentiation of subgroups in the context of a superordinate. That is, it may be that an empathy approach may have many of the problems that, for example, the common in-group identity approach has had with prejudice reduction and social cooperation (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; see Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009, for a review; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a, 2000b). In particular, Hornsey and Hogg (2000a, 2000b) have argued that common in-group approaches can be seen to convey an ideology of assimilationism, where the focus is on reducing realistic and meaningful differences between groups in efforts to create a more cohesive whole (see also Wright & Lubensky, 2008). These authors have concluded that to produce genuine cooperation that recognizes the strengths and diversity of both high- and lowstatus groups, it is important to maintain distinctive subgroups (i.e., functional differentiation) within the broader superordinate. Similarly, Mummendey and Wenzel’s (1999) work on the dynamics of cooperation suggests that using empathy-based approaches to invoke a superordinate is a potentially problematic approach given that it could ultimately give way to debate and conflict over the meaning of the superordinate. Finally, where the superordinate group is not well defined by group norms for prosocial behavior, there is a risk that an empathy approach will still fall short of meeting the conditions of Reicher et al.’s (2006) “effective categories.” Indeed, many solutions to creating cooperative behavior between groups would necessarily involve the higher order human-level category, which has been shown to be useful in some contexts (e.g., promoting forgiveness; Wohl & Branscombe, 2004, 2005) but problematic in others (e.g., as a moral defense; Morton & Postmes, 2008; see also Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a). Indeed, it is possible that a human-level categorization “where we are all human beings” does not reflect the reality in which perceivers operate, where there are real and palpable differences between members in different groups (McGarty, 2006). 322   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW Overall, then, many instantiations of the empathy process may usefully resituate group boundaries but result in an intergroup inequality that is underintellectualized and/or overidealized. In Figure 2, note that the resulting superordinate group boundaries are not bold, as they are in other figures, reflecting its potential problems. As with Wright and Lubensky’s (2008) arguments surrounding a social cohesion approach, neglecting the importance of recognizing group differences and situating the groups in a new framework may mean that the prospects for long-term change are remote because it fails to address the real issue. (SELF-FOCUSED) ANGER Etiology As suggested by Boler (1997) above, feelings of rage can be a strong motivator of action to overcome inequality. Moral outrage, anger, rage, and other related emotions are driven by appraisals of blame and attributions of responsibility for the harm done (Lazarus, 1991). In this article, we focus on the similarities and differences between two forms of anger: self-focused anger and moral outrage. Anger and moral outrage are not easily distinguished, given that both have a defining moral component (Batson et al., 2007; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Batson et al. (2007) have explored the ways to differentiate the different forms of interpersonal anger and outrage based on who, or what, the transgression was against. They suggest that there are at least three forms of anger: moral outrage, personal anger, and empathic anger. Moral outrage arises when the transgression is against a moral standard, personal anger arises when the transgression is against one’s self, and empathic anger arises from seeing someone one cares for treated unfairly. Batson et al. argue that it is important to distinguish these other forms of moral outrage and anger to better understand moral emotion and behavior. Anger and moral outrage can also be differentiated at a group level by distinguishing between who the blame for the transgression is directed at. In situations of relative advantage, there is one form of prosocial anger: a self-focused anger. Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2006), based on the work of Tangney and colleagues (Tangney, Hill-Barlow, et al., 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996), have described self-focused anger, where anger is directed inward at the advantaged group themselves for perpetrating and perpetuating the disadvantage (see also Iyer et al., 2007). They note that this form of anger shares a self-focus with guilt and thus can often arise in conjunction with guilt. Group anger has mostly been explored in the context of relative deprivation (rather than relative advantage, which is the focus here). Anger is straightforward in this case, where the disadvantaged group feels anger directed at the advantaged group over their unearned and illegitimate privileges (Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, & Fischer, 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2004). However, Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2007) showed that perceptions of relative advantage and disadvantage may be more intensely subjective than previously thought. In an extension of the relative deprivation literature, Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2007) have shown that groups that are (objectively) structurally advantaged can experience what the authors term inverted relative deprivation. This is when the structurally advantaged experience feelings of relative deprivation. For example, despite plentiful evidence to the contrary, many non-Indigenous Australians see their group as structurally disadvantaged compared with Indigenous Australians (based on unequal distribution of welfare and the like). They showed that this anger about their own group’s perceived deprivation predicted opposition to government redress to Indigenous Australians. Given our emphasis here on prosocial emotions as motivators for positive social change, we are primarily interested in subjectively perceived self-focused anger based on an acknowledgment of the real advantages of the privileged group. Group Processes and Outcomes Appraisal theorists have noted that anger generally motivates a desire to attack (Lazarus, 1991). Indeed, the high arousal that accompanies anger often motivates attempts to actively challenge or confront the agents responsible for the transgression, thus anger has been called an action-oriented emotion (Leach et al., 2006). Although Stürmer and Simon (in press) have expressed doubts over the utility of anger in directing functional, deliberate, and sustained forms of collective action, Lazarus (1991) has pointed out that the coping process associated with anger can also motivate a more prolonged and strategic attack on the agent responsible. At a group level, different forms of anger have been shown to motivate different forms of action strategies (Iyer et al., 2007). We argue that one reason that might underpin the different social and political action strategies is that the different forms of anger produce different outcomes in terms of the category boundaries, attributions of responsibility, and the direction of tactical behavior. Specifically, we argue that anger directed at an out-group (e.g., the sorts of anger that British citizens direct at the American government for the occupation of Iraq; Iyer et al., 2007) will maintain group boundaries, in particular if the group that is the target Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   323 of the anger is defensive of their actions. On the other hand, self-focused prosocial anger (anger directed at the in-group; Leach et al., 2006) could plausibly be shared across categories (see Figure 2). In situations where the in-group members are aware enough of their unearned privilege to be angry at their group, it seems likely that the disadvantaged group will also be angry at them. Given that both parties direct the anger and blame at the advantaged group, the action strategies are more likely to be directed at the regulation of the in-group (see Figure 2; Leach et al., 2006). This is likely to be a very fruitful focus where the advantaged in-group members are the agents directly responsible for perpetuating inequality. Consistent with these arguments, self-focused prosocial anger has been shown to motivate support for systemic compensation (Leach et al., 2006), an ingroup–directed strategy. Iyer et al. (2007) showed that self-focused anger predicted political opposition to the war in Iraq on three broad opposition strategies: compensation of Iraqi victims, confrontation of governments responsible, and advocating withdrawal. Leach et al. (2006) concluded that self-focused anger could be a very productive emotion, suggesting that it promotes exactly “the constructive, self-corrective action that the guilty want as a goal” (p. 1243). Overall, then, the ingroup–focused anger is likely to direct the attention of both advantaged and disadvantaged toward strategies that “fix” the misdeeds of the advantaged in-group. Thus, self-focused anger meets many of the criteria for Reicher et al.’s (2006) effective categories, where both the advantaged and disadvantaged can join in feelings of anger at the advantaged group and mobilize toward coordinated forms of action (Peters & Kashima, 2007). Where self-anger becomes a subjectively meaningful aspect of the identity, it prescribes normative and strategic actions to try to reduce the inequality. Given that the advantaged group, by definition, generally has greater control over resources, this emotion could plausibly be very productive in situations where the advantaged are required to take responsibility for their role in perpetuating the inequality (given, of course, that they are happy to do so). We think that there are two further aspects of selffocused anger that relate directly to its prospects for promoting social change. The first relates to the fact that it is self-focused. Iyer and colleagues (Iyer et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2004) have argued that guilt can motivate action out of a desire to rid the self of the aversive feeling. Given that anger is also a physiologically arousing emotional reaction, it is possible that its self-focus could also lead to a neglect of the plight of the disadvantaged. At the extreme, to the extent that group members become caught up in their own self-loathing, this also seems likely to undermine positive social actions. Second, as Wright and Lubensky (2008) point out, it is likely that those who feel angry at their own group have distanced themselves psychologically from the (advantaged) in-group. Indeed, Kessler and Hollbach (2005) found that identification with the in-group decr­eased when anger was directed toward the in-group. Thus, there may be a heightened potential for intragroup fracturing as advantaged group members debate group responsibility. Indeed, in the case of contentious social issues, it is plausible that those group members who willingly accept responsibility and feel angry at their own group could become socially marginalized. In particular, if the (self-focused) angry group is low in power, then marginalization seems more likely, and the prospects for productive in-group regulation (as in Figure 2) and sustainable social change strategies become remote. Thus, it seems that unless there are high levels of agreement and consensus surrounding in-group responsibility, and the self-focused anger is widely experienced among the advantaged group, that self-focused anger may be a relatively unsustainable response as the advantaged group fractures into subgroups along ideological fault lines. Nevertheless, this fracturing need not be seen in a negative light. It is possible that the self-focused anger could form the catalyst for the formation of new groups, where subgroups, defined by shared opinions about the inequality, form around contentious social issues (as outlined by McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, in press). That is, the meaningful groups in this context become less about advantaged and disadvantaged and more about pro and anti opinions. It is in these situations where subgroupings form along ideological (pro and anti) fault lines that the opinion-based group concept outlined by Bliuc and colleagues seems particularly useful (Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007). Indeed, other research by Musgrove and McGarty (2008) has shown that these groups can come to be characterized by specific, contrasting emotional reactions. Consistent with these points, Wright and Lubensky (2008) see such fracturing as part of the solution of competing social cohesion and social justice approaches. Thus, where there is limited scope for self-focused anger to motivate advantaged group regulation (because there is no consensus among advantaged group members about responsibility), self-focused anger may play an important role in catalyzing other responses to social change. MORAL OUTRAGE Etiology Moral outrage can be clearly distinguished from the (self-focused) anger discussed above based on where the 324   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW emotion implies that blame should be directed. According to Batson et al. (2007), moral outrage is “anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard—usually a standard of fairness or justice—has been violated” (p. 1272). Like anger in general, moral outrage is driven by appraisals of blame and attributions of responsibility for the harm done (Lazarus, 1991). Given these similarities with anger, it seems likely that the qualitative experience of anger and outrage would be very similar (where both are characterized by high levels of physiological arousal and an action-oriented reaction). However, moral outrage can be conceptually distinguished from self-focused anger based on where blame is attributed. Unlike self-focused anger where the blame lies within, in the case of moral outrage, the blame is directed outward (Iyer et al., 2004). In particular, moral outrage directs blame at a third party (a government or authority) or perceived system of inequality (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). To extend the definition offered by Batson et al. (2007), then, we define moral outrage as anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard—usually a standard of fairness or justice—has been violated by a third party (government or authority) or system. Thus, moral outrage arises from the appraisal of a moral transgression, and action is directed against either a third party, authority, or system of inequality. At a group level, Leach et al. (2002) suggest that moral outrage will be most likely to occur when the focus is on the disadvantaged (like sympathy) and the inequality is illegitimate but unstable (that is, the position could change). Moral outrage is thus characterized by a positive attitude toward the disadvantaged, with the affective outrage directed at a third party (often a governing authority), and an explicit other-focus. Group Processes and Outcomes We have argued above that self-focused anger can traverse group boundaries and direct a normative focus toward the regulation of the advantaged group. Moral outrage is characterized by anger directed at a third party, a government, or a system of inequality, and thus, like anger, it is possible that moral outrage can be shared by both advantaged and disadvantaged group members. To the extent that both advantaged and disadvantaged group members share their perception of the inequality as illegitimate, this implies a similar worldview and could invoke a shared category membership. This idea is illustrated in Figure 2. However, unlike anger, moral outrage tends to direct blame at political agents or systemic unfairness; in other words, the emotion is not directed at either group but a third, shared out-group or authority (labeled in Figure 2 as “system, government, or third party”). To the extent that the emotion becomes embodied within a contextually meaningful social identity (which both advantaged and disadvantaged can share in), it can strongly affect political action intentions. Consistent with these arguments, Montada and Schneider (1989) found moral outrage to be a powerful motivator of prosocial behavior, in particular in the political realm (see also Schmitt et al., 2000). Similarly, Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, and Chen (2007) found that moral outrage is associated with redistributive social policies, however, this could be attenuated by exposure to system justifying ideologies. Indeed, Wakslak et al. (2007) found that system justifying ideologies (e.g., “rags to riches” themes, which reinforce the belief that a disadvantaged person could achieve if he or she really wanted to) were negatively associated with moral outrage, existential guilt, and support for helping the disadvantaged. Thomas (2005; Thomas et al., 2009) also showed moral outrage to be a good predictor of intention to engage in antipoverty action. Thus, there is good evidence that moral outrage will direct collective, political forms of action.2 As well as political behaviors, there is also evidence that group-based moral outrage will direct behaviors specifically to restore a violated moral standard. Lodewijkz, Kersten, and van Zomeren (2008) found that moral outrage and moral concerns influenced participation in protest, both directly and indirectly, where the outrage also directs actions to reestablish moral community standards. Where moral outrage successfully creates an inclusive group (Figure 2), it is likely that it will create contexts such that advantaged and disadvantage are included in the moral community (Opotow, 2001; Opotow, Gerson, & Woodside, 2005). Furthermore, it is also probable that this new group will see issues of morality as central to its self-definition and positive evaluation (see Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). Overall, then, we suggest that moral outrage, by directing attentional blame toward a third party or system, is characterized by two specific but interrelated group outcomes. The first is the idea that moral outrage can increase solidarity between group members. The members of ostensibly advantaged and disadvantaged groups come to share a worldview and to work for a common cause (Peters & Kashima, 2007). It is worth noting that, in the context of many social inequalities, this is by no means an insignificant step in itself, as many disadvantaged groups may find it difficult to cease being angry at the privileged, advantaged group. However, we argue that it will be very difficult to have common cause (to work together to overcome inequality) until this anger has been more productively reoriented Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   325 toward a shared anger at the system or third party that is responsible for perpetuating the disadvantage. Subašic´ et al. (2008) anticipate this idea when they write, “Solidarity captures not only a sense of unity in diversity and a coming together for a common cause but also that the majority . . . comes to embrace the cause as its own” (p. 331). This solidarity is premised on a shared moral standard, thus, the group is both morally inclusive (Opotow, 2001) but also sees issues of morality as central to its self-definition (Leach, Ellemers et al., 2007. It is significant, though, that this group is also strengthened by organic solidarity (see Haslam, 2001; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab’s, 2005, use of Durkheim’s term). That is, this is not just a group defined by what they share; this is a group that arose out of differentiation between groups. In such groups, the focus is on the different experience and expertise that group members can contribute to the collective as a whole (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). Second, because moral outrage embodies an explicit recognition of the political context, this new identity should be well equipped to take productive social and political forms of action. Indeed, Simon and Klandermans (2001) have argued that explicit recognition of an external enemy or agent is critical for the development of a politicized identity. Politicized identities are understood to be best equipped to take social and political forms of action because they have become embedded in a political context (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008); thus, moral outrage may play a powerful role in politicizing the identity (Stürmer & Simon, in press). Consistent with these points, Thomas and McGarty (2009) showed that invoking a moral outrage emotion norm for an antipoverty group significantly boosted commitment to take action (on behalf of people in developing countries) compared with those who did not receive the outrage norm. In keeping with our arguments above, Thomas and McGarty (2009; see also Thomas et al., 2009) argued that the outrage norm powerfully shaped the relational meaning of the identity, making particular sorts of social and political actions more consistent with, and normative for, the identity. Where moral outrage comes to be successfully embedded in a meaningful identity that prescribes action against an unfair system, it should be a powerful motivator of outcomes associated with strategies that Wright and Lubensky (2008) would see as broad social justice and social change strategies. This is true not least because these attempts can also recognize the expertise and capabilities held by the disadvantaged themselves. In this way, moral outrage may be a potential solution to the problems of paternalism raised by Nadler (2002). REVIEW AND SUMMARY In the section above, we have outlined the three categories of primary prosocial emotions—guilt; sympathy and empathy; and anger and outrage—and their prospects in terms of motivating action among members of advantaged groups. We drew, in particular, on recent advances in the social identity literature that have outlined the most effective categories in promoting social helping, solidarity, and rescue among members of privileged groups (Reicher et al., 2006). Furthermore, drawing on Wright and Lubensky’s (2008) distinction between a social cohesion and social change approach to equality, we argued that guilt, sympathy, and empathy are more in keeping with strategies that promote social cohesion, whereas self-focused anger and outrage are more likely to be associated with social change strategies. It is worth briefly summarizing our arguments before discussing further theoretical and practical implications. Table 1 usefully captures aspects of our argument for each emotion. We argued that group guilt maintains group boundaries (category exclusion) between advantaged and disadvantaged group members. Because guilt assigns responsibility for the disadvantage to the advantaged in-group, this is likely to foster normative forms of prosocial action that acknowledge the responsibility. However, because guilt is also self-focused (Iyer et al., 2004) and easy to mitigate if reparations are too easy or difficult (Schmitt et al., 2008), it is also likely that it will result in normative and strategic actions that aim mainly to assuage the aversive feeling (see Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen, 2007). Overall, we suggested that guilt could likely become associated with tokenistic, topdown forms of symbolic action (Iyer et al., 2004; McGarty et al., 2005) as group members assuage their aversive state but do not actually strive to achieve greater equality. Like guilt, sympathy will also maintain group boundaries but places a conceptual focus on the suffering of the disadvantaged (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2002). In situations where feelings of sympathy are strong, it is likely that they will motivate normative helping actions, in particular because the disadvantaged themselves are not responsible for their plight. However, because of the structural differentiation that maintains group boundaries and status differences, it is also possible that sympathy may promote a neglect of the experience and expertise of the disadvantaged group members themselves. We argued that, overall, this etiology makes sympathy more prone to the problems of paternalistic helping raised by Nadler (2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006). We also used our analysis of group-level processes as one means of differentiating between the often-confused 326   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW TABLE 1: Overview of the Classes of Prosocial Emotions, the Sorts of Group Processes They Will Be Associated With, and the Social Strategies They Are Likely to Promote Guilt Etiology Category inclusion Category norms Sympathy Outrage Guilt Sympathy for Empathy with self-focused; based in the perception that the disadvantage is illegitimate and the in-group is responsible maintains group boundaries between advantaged and disadvantaged; only advantaged group can feel guilt when normatively embedded, it’s likely to prescribe symbolic attempts at reparation (e.g., apology) other-focused; based in perceptions of illegitimacy but does not allocate blame for disadvantage cognitive process uniting self and other; associated with affective outcomes similar to sympathy and compassion self-focused; based in the appraisal that the disadvantage is illegitimate and the in-group is responsible other-focused; based in perceptions of illegitimacy for which a third party or system of inequality is responsible maintains group boundaries between advantaged and disadvantaged; only advantaged group can feel sympathy merges group boundaries such that advantaged and disadvantaged are included in superordinate group merges group boundaries as advantaged and disadvantaged share in anger toward advantaged group merges group boundaries as advantaged and disadvantaged share in outrage toward a third party when normatively embedded, it’s likely to prescribe wideranging attempts to help; however, these actions are likely to be for the disadvantaged, rather than with them is focus on the disadvantaged other; may strategically engage in sweeping forms of action simply to relieve the suffering of the disadvantaged given that the superordinate, inclusive category may not be well defined, it is possible that there will not be clear norms for supportive action when normatively embedded, it’s likely to prescribe actions that focus on the regulation, or behavior change, of the advantaged in-group when normatively embedded, it’s likely to prescribe social and political action to subvert the illegitimate system, government, or third party empathy renders the disadvantaged into a common in-group; thus, category interests are likely to be strategically represented based on perceived interchangeability attributes blame to the advantaged in-group, so it may represent actions as a strategic way to reduce the tension associated with anger motivates wide-ranging forms of action to alleviate suffering; because it does not attribute blame or recognize expertise of disadvantaged themselves, these actions can sometimes be misdirected or mistargeted motivates wide-ranging forms of action to alleviate suffering because “you and I are one”; may be underintellectualized or idealized; longterm change may be remote because it does not address the real issue or productively direct action motivates actions designed to regulate, or change, the advantaged group; useful in situations where the advantaged perpetuate inequality; potential for subgrouping within advantaged population as they contest responsibility outrage renders the disadvantaged into a common moral in-group; thus, category interests are likely to be strategically represented based on discourse of solidarity and moral imperative motivates political and social forms of action to reduce disadvantage; moralistic element provides additional rhetorical device in the fight for social justice Category interests attributes blame to the advantaged in-group, so it may represent action as a strategic way to reduce tension associated with guilt Implications for action motivates symbolic action that may, or may not, be sufficient to reduce inequality emotion labels of sympathy and empathy. We suggested that it is indeed important to differentiate the two, in particular at the group level, because it seems plausible that the two emotions shape group boundaries in different ways. In particular, it seems that empathy is an outcome of a merging of group boundaries into a single, Self-Focused Anger Moral Outrage superordinate group (category inclusion), whereas sympathy maintains separate group categories. Thus, empathy can motivate genuine attempts at cooperation because the advantaged and disadvantaged are united by a shared group membership (category inclusion) and thus, “I will help you because you and I are one” (as per Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   327 Turner et al., 1987; see also Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995). However, we also raised some problems with an empathy approach that have been explored in the cooperation, prejudice reduction literature (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; see Dovidio et al., 2009, for a review; McGarty et al., 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Perhaps most critically, where this empathyinduced superordinate (often a human-level identity) does not contain clear norms for deliberate action, it is likely that such an approach will fail to meet the other criteria for “effective” categories (Reicher et al., 2006). Indeed, such an approach can cause conflict rather than induce cooperation (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Finally, we explored the differences between selffocused anger and moral outrage (anger at the system, government, or third party) as two similar reactions to injustice and inequality. Both self-focused anger (Leach et al., 2006) and moral outrage have the potential to traverse group boundaries to create a common ingroup, but in different ways. Self-focused anger can be shared by both advantaged and disadvantaged groups (category inclusion), but forms of action are normatively directed toward the regulation of the responsible advantaged group. We argue that this may be productive in some contexts and among some subgroups but could also lead to group fracturing along opinion-based fault lines (McGarty et al., in press). On the other hand, advantaged and disadvantaged groups can both share in feelings of moral outrage over the inequality (category inclusion), but this emotion directs action against a third party or agent (category norms). As such, it is likely to precipitate strategies related to social and political action, strategies designed to subvert the unfair ‘system’. It is significant that, when combined with relevant meaningful identities, moral outrage is likely to play a critical role in politicizing the identity and such that it is more prepared for the struggle in which it is embedded (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, in press), and the resulting identity is likely to be strengthened by its diversity (organic solidarity; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005) and moral inclusiveness (Opotow, 2001). WHICH EMOTION? Given this review, which emotion is likely to be most productive in promoting genuine attempts to achieve greater social equality among members of advantaged groups? Predictably, the answer is, “It depends.” It is clear from our review that we view moral outrage and to a lesser extent self-focused anger as promising emotional reactions to promote wide-ranging social and political behaviors. We argued at the beginning of this article that we were particularly interested in those social strategies that were likely to achieve greater social equality for disadvantaged groups (rather than, for example, simply elevating individuals). In pursuing this focus, we acknowledge that we may have been unnecessarily pessimistic and dismissive about the role of other emotions and other social strategies in promoting greater social equality between groups. Here, we note that it is possible and plausible that other emotional reactions will have a useful role to play in motivating advantaged groups to begin mending social injustices depending on the context, and trajectory, of the inequality. Let us take an example to illustrate our point. The 2008 apology from the Australian government to the Indigenous Australian Stolen Generations was premised on years of debate about group guilt and responsibility for the actions of a previous generation (Lecouteur & Augoustinos, 2001; McGarty et al., 2005). Although critics of the apology labeled the action as merely symbolic, it is also true that, as a starting point, this prosocial strategy was extremely meaningful to many members of the disadvantaged Indigenous Australian group. A recent survey showed that a high percentage of Indigenous Australians rated the apology as “very important” to Indigenous people (93%) and for improving relations with other Australians (80%; Australian Reconciliation Barometer, 2009). That is, this symbolic prosocial act, motivated around a national discourse of guilt (Lecouteur & Augoustinos, 2001), was ultimately seen as worthwhile and beneficial by many of the disadvantaged group members. Thus, we acknowledge that there is an important place for social strategies that concentrate on symbolic reparation and not just those strategies that focus on concrete attempts to reduce inequality. Another possibility is that different emotions might become more or less important, as efforts to create greater social equality face different challenges over the course of a movement. As we noted in our discussion of self-focused anger, it may be that some emotions provide a useful catalyst for the formation of supportive social movements. Similarly, in the context of the disadvantage of Indigenous Australians, it is possible that guilt played a positive role in initiating the symbolic act of apology; however, this must now transition into other forms of practical action (potentially motivated by other emotional reactions) to achieve greater social equality for Indigenous Australians. Thus, such emotions (self-focused anger and guilt) might play a useful role in initiating social action. On the other hand, we have elsewhere argued that moral outrage is one emotion that is more likely to be associated with sustainable attempts to overcome inequality (Thomas et al., 2009). As argued in our discussion of moral outrage, it is likely 328   PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW that such an emotion will fruitfully restructure intergroup boundaries such that the advantaged and disadvantaged can work together with common cause. The idea of an emotion trajectory, characterized by consecutive emotional reactions, suggests that there may be a complementary, transient place for many of the emotions discussed here in the long battle to achieve social equality for disadvantaged groups. Overall, then, the implication is that people seeking to transform apathy into movement among members of advantaged groups would do well to give careful consideration to the sorts of prosocial strategies that they are seeking to promote and to the overall trajectory of the movement. Reicher, Haslam, and Hopkins (2005) have labeled the leaders who have the ability to shape and transform groups (for good and evil) entrepreneurs of identity. This article, by exploring the ways that emotion affects these endeavors, suggests that it would be fruitful to attend to emotions as a strategy for creating contexts of inclusion and exclusion, shaping normative and rhetorical meaning (Thomas & McGarty, 2009), and promoting category interests. WHICH GROUPS? We have explored the ways in which emotions can traverse group barriers but have focused throughout mainly on the emotional reactions that advantaged group members can experience (that is, prosocial emotion). One literature we have not touched on is the burgeoning literature on dehumanizing emotion and infrahumanization, which has explored the ways that the manner in which the disadvantaged express themselves will change helping strategies. Indeed, there is now evidence to suggest that the sorts of emotions that a distressed or disadvantaged person (that is, a person requiring help) uses will have an effect on whether help is forthcoming or not (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003). It is beyond the scope of this article to explore this literature here, but suffice to say that these findings suggest that a disadvantaged group will have a better chance of eliciting help if its members express themselves in terms of uniquely human, secondary emotions (e.g., anguish rather than anger; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002). The research of Leyens and colleagues (Leyens et al., 2001; Vaes et al., 2002) raises interesting questions about the role of human-level categories in emotional reactions and intergroup relations. In our analysis of empathy, we documented some concerns that have been raised in the context of research on the common ingroup identity model, superordinate categories, and cooperation. In particular, we suggested that where a superordinate identity does not have clear norms for action, it can fall short of being an effective category and even promote conflict over superordinate group norms (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). Similarly, work by Morton and Postmes (2008) has shown the ways that human category norms can be flexibly used to promote both prosocial and hostile social behaviors. This raises the following questions: What are the social groups that are most likely to be effectively implicated in the sorts of group emotion and social identity processes discussed here? What is the nature of those groups who have a genesis in a shared emotional experience (Figure 1b)? Similarly, which groups are most likely to facilitate productive prosocial emotional reactions (Figure 1a)? Elsewhere, Bliuc, McGarty, and colleagues have put forward the opinion-based group concept as a solution to some of the complex problems associated with superordinate group memberships and cooperation (McGarty, 2006) and understanding collective action (McGarty et al., in press). Consistent with these points, we argue that opinion-based groups might be fruitfully deployed to develop understanding of the dynamic processes of social identity in group emotion. Opinion-based groups are psychologically meaningful groups, in the sense suggested by self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), but where these groups are based on shared opinions (Bliuc et al., 2007). McGarty et al. (in press) argue that one of the useful features of the opinion-based group concept is that it can be used to explain collective efforts to change circumstances even in relatively spontaneous, mundane, minimally political contexts (such as students joining together to protest over a change of examination format). Indeed, McGarty et al. point to the ways in which protest can emerge rapidly and in particular pockets of a community. Here, we take this argument one step further, arguing that a shared emotional reaction may form the basis for emergent opinion-based group formation, where people’s attention is captured first by their shared emotional reactions, and they then join together to seek redress (Figure 1b; see also the arguments of Peters & Kashima, 2007; van Zomeren et al.’s, 2004, analysis of social opinion support). On the other hand, the other work of Musgrove and McGarty (2008) has shown that opinion-based groups can become associated with emotional reactions in a more permanent way, and emotional reactions (to the War on Terror) are shaped by membership of particular (pro and anti) opinion-based groups (as in Figure 1a). Thus, we argue that opinionbased groups are well placed to capture the nuances of emotion triggering group formation, and vice versa. Furthermore, we suggest that opinion-based groups meet many of the criteria set out by Reicher et al. (2006) for effective categories. In particular, because members Thomas et al. / TRANSFORMING APATHY INTO MOVEMENT   329 of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups can belong to opinion-based groups, they too can foster a shared, inclusive categorization (McGarty, 2006), which is Reicher et al.’s first criteria. In this context, clear inequalities between advantaged and disadvantaged members of the opinion-based group can only increase the salience of the inequality and boost (opinion-based) collective commitment to act. Furthermore, opinion-based groups, based on support for, or opposition to, various social issues (e.g., pro-choice, anti-war), have clear norms for action (Reicher et al.’s second criteria). Finally, because opinion-based groups are formed around contentious social issues, then achieving the group’s pro-change goals is a clear strategic priority (Reicher et al.’s third criteria). Overall, then, we suggest that opinion-based groups can readily meet many of the conditions put forward for effective categories (Reicher et al., 2006). The opinionbased group interaction method described by Gee, Khalaf, and McGarty (2007) and Thomas and McGarty (2009) provides an experimental model of how these categories can be sustained through processes of consensualization and agreement. Consistent with our conceptualizations of social identity and group emotion as dynamic and iterative, the implication from this work is that categories become instrumental and effective through ongoing nego­ tiation and consensus (see also Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). Our ongoing work explores the ways that emotions can shape opinion-based groups, and vice versa, in particular toward antipoverty social action (see Thomas et al., 2009). CONCLUSIONS This article has attempted to provide novel ways of conceptualizing and understanding the complex sources and implications of prosocial emotions in intergroup relations. To that end, we have structured our review of prosocial emotion around two key frameworks. The first framework was based on the work of Wright and Lubensky (2008), who have ...
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