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Clearly state and thoroughly defend one particular version of either the cosmological or ontological argument for God’s existence. Make the argument appear as plausible as possible. Then, develop some strong objections to the argument. Next, on behalf of the theistic proponent of the argument, offer at least one reply to each of the objections. Finally, you be the judge. At the end of the day, do you agree or disagree with the argument? Explain. In your explanation, make sure to engage the objections or replies that were most influential on your thinking. The body of the Paper should be five to six pages long (not counting the works cited page). Use 12-point Times New Roman font with double spacing and 1” margins on all sides. Use left justification (not full justification). Format the Paper according to the MLA style guidelines, and cite sources using the MLA in-text parenthetical style. Provide a MLA-style works cited page. Consult, engage, and cite at least four substantive, scholarly sources. The authors of these sources must be college or university professors in philosophy. Texts assigned for class may also serve as sources. You will likely need to skim several sources to find four relevant to your Paper. Make meticulous notes and citations so you do not accidentally commit plagiarism. Turn in your Paper on Blackboard only. It is perfectly acceptable to write a Paper on a philosophical topic that is unrelated to this prompt, but you must receive prior approval from the professor to write on your topic of choice.

also please provide an outline and a bibliography of the sources you intend to use and cite.

NO PLAGIARISM PLEASE. the book uploaded down

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CPHi 200 Course Packet Concordia University Irvine Edition 2017 Contents Augustine. On the Immortality of the Soul 1 Augustine. Against the Epistle of Manichæus 2 Augustine. City of God Book XIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Book XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5 20 Augustine. On the Morals of the Catholic Church 31 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles Book II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Book III (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 52 72 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae 89 René Descartes. Meditations on First Philosophy First Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Third Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fourth Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fifth Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sixth Meditation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 106 109 115 126 132 137 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan 147 Books 1-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Books 7-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 David Hume. Treatise of Human Nature 207 Book I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 Book II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Book III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 David Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals 266 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason 273 Book I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Book II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 Augustine (354-430) On the Immortality of the Soul This reading is available in Whitney J. Oates, ed., Basic Writings of Augustine, volum 1 (New York: Random House, 1948), pp. 301-316. (Note that only certain portions of the text are assigned.) The book is on three-hour reserve in the CUI library under CPhi 200 (Loy/Jordan/Yim). Your instructor will have more information. 1 Augustine (354-430) Against the Epistle of Manichæus, Called Fundamental Translated by Richard Stothert. From A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, series I, volume IV, edited by Philip Schaff (Edinburgh: T&T Clark and Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company) Chapter 16.—The Soul, Though Mutable, Has No Material Form. It is the same moment, the air that the neighbors have. And even All Present in Every Part of the Body. as regards light itself, one part pours through one window, and another through another; and a greater through the larger, and a But why speak of truth and wisdom which surpass all the powers smaller through the smaller. Nor, in fact, can there be any bodof the soul, when the nature of the soul itself, which is known to ily substance, whether celestial or terrestrial, whether aerial or be mutable, still has no kind of material extension in space? For moist, which is not less in part than in whole, or which can poswhatever consists of any kind of gross matter must necessarily sibly have one part in the place of another at the same time; but, be divisible into parts, having one in one place, and another in having one thing in one place and another in another, its extenanother. Thus, the finger is less than the whole hand, and one sion in space is a substance which has distinct limits and parts, finger is less than two; and there is one place for this finger, and or, so to speak, sections. The nature of the soul, on the other another for that, and another for the rest of the hand. And this hand, though we leave out of account its power of perceiving applies not to organized bodies only, but also to the earth, each truth, and consider only its inferior power of giving unity to the part of which has its own place, so that one cannot be where the body, and of sensation in the body, does not appear to have any other is. So in moisture, the smaller quantity occupies a smaller material extension in space. For it is all present in each separate space, and the larger quantity a larger space; and one part is at part of its body when it is all present in any sensation. There is the bottom of the cup, and another part near the mouth. So not a smaller part in the finger, and a larger in the arm, as the in air, each part has its own place; and it is impossible for the bulk of the finger is less than that of the arm; but the quantity evair in this house to have along with itself, in the same house at erywhere is the same, for the whole is present everywhere. For 2 when the finger is touched, the whole mind feels, though the sensation is not through the whole body. No part of the mind is unconscious of the touch, which proves the presence of the whole. And yet it is not so present in the finger or in the sensation as to abandon the rest of the body, or to gather itself up into the one place where the sensation occurs. For when it is all present in the sensation in a finger, if another part, say the foot, be touched, it does not fail to be all present in this sensation too: so that at the same moment it is all present in different places, without leaving one in order to be in the other, and without having one part in one, and another in the other; but by this power showing itself to be all present at the same moment in separate places. Since it is all present in the sensations of these places, it proves that it is not bound by the conditions of space. perceived by some bodily sense), who can conceive rightly where these images are contained, where they are kept, or where they are formed? If, indeed, these images were no larger than the size of our body, it might be said that the mind shapes and retains them in the bodily space which contains itself. But while the body occupies a small material space, the mind revolves images of vast extent, of heaven and earth, with no want of room, though they come and go in crowds; so that clearly, the mind is not diffused through space: for instead of being contained in images of the largest spaces, it rather contains them; not, however, in any material receptacle, but by a mysterious faculty or power, by which it can increase or diminish them, can contract them within narrow limits, or expand them indefinitely, can arrange or disarrange them at pleasure, can multiply them or reduce them to a few or to one. Chapter 17.—The Memory Contains the Ideas of Places of the Greatest Size Chapter 18.—The Understanding Judges of the Truth of Things, and of Its Own Action Again, if we consider the mind’s power of remembering not the objects of the intellect, but material objects, such as we see What, then, must be said of the power of perceiving truth, and brutes also remembering (for cattle find their way without mis- of making a vigorous resistance against these very images which take in familiar places, and animals return to their cribs, and take their shape from impressions on the bodily senses, when dogs recognize the persons of their masters, and when asleep they are opposed to the truth? This power discerns the differthey often growl, or break out into a bark, which could not be ence between, to take a particular example, the true Carthage unless their mind retained the images of things before seen or and its own imaginary one, which it changes as it pleases with 3 perfect ease. It shows that the countless worlds of Epicurus, in which his fancy roamed without restraint, are due to the same power of imagination, and, not to multiply examples, that we get from the same source that land of light, with its boundless extent, and the five dens of the race of darkness, with their inmates, in which the fancies of Manichæus have dared to usurp for themselves the name of truth. What then is this power which discerns these things? Clearly, whatever its extent may be, it is greater than all these things, and is conceived of without any such material images. Find, if you can, space for this power; give it a material extension; provide it with a body of huge size. Assuredly if you think well, you cannot. For of everything of this corporeal nature your mind forms an opinion as to its divisibility, and you make of such things one part greater and another less, as much as you like; while that by which you form a judgment of these things you perceive to be above them, not in local loftiness of place, but in dignity of power. 4 Augustine (354-430) City of God Translated by Marcus Dods. From A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, series I, volume II, edited by Philip Schaff (Edinburgh: T&T Clark and Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company) Book XIII Argument—In this book it is taught that death is penal, and had its origin in Adam’s sin. them with just sentence—which, too, has been spoken to in the preceding book. Chapter 2.—Of that Death Which Can Affect an Immortal Soul, and of that to Which the Body is Subject. Chapter 1.—Of the Fall of the First Man, Through Which Mortality But I see I must speak a little more carefully of the nature of Has Been Contracted. death. For although the human soul is truly affirmed to be imHaving disposed of the very difficult questions concerning the mortal, yet it also has a certain death of its own. For it is thereorigin of our world and the beginning of the human race, the fore called immortal, because, in a sense, it does not cease to live natural order requires that we now discuss the fall of the first and to feel; while the body is called mortal, because it can be forman (we may say of the first men), and of the origin and prop- saken of all life, and cannot by itself live at all. The death, then, agation of human death. For God had not made man like the of the soul takes place when God forsakes it, as the death of the angels, in such a condition that, even though they had sinned, body when the soul forsakes it. Therefore the death of both— they could none the more die. He had so made them, that if that is, of the whole man—occurs when the soul, forsaken by they discharged the obligations of obedience, an angelic immor- God, forsakes the body. For, in this case, neither is God the life tality and a blessed eternity might ensue, without the interven- of the soul, nor the soul the life of the body. And this death tion of death; but if they disobeyed, death should be visited on of the whole man is followed by that which, on the authority of 5 the divine oracles, we call the second death. This the Saviour referred to when He said, “Fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.”1 And since this does not happen before the soul is so joined to its body that they cannot be separated at all, it may be matter of wonder how the body can be said to be killed by that death in which it is not forsaken by the soul, but, being animated and rendered sensitive by it, is tormented. For in that penal and everlasting punishment, of which in its own place we are to speak more at large, the soul is justly said to die, because it does not live in connection with God; but how can we say that the body is dead, seeing that it lives by the soul? For it could not otherwise feel the bodily torments which are to follow the resurrection. Is it because life of every kind is good, and pain an evil, that we decline to say that that body lives, in which the soul is the cause, not of life, but of pain? The soul, then, lives by God when it lives well, for it cannot live well unless by God working in it what is good; and the body lives by the soul when the soul lives in the body, whether itself be living by God or no. For the wicked man’s life in the body is a life not of the soul, but of the body, which even dead souls—that is, souls forsaken of God—can confer upon bodies, how little so-ever of their own proper life, by which they are immortal, they retain. But in the last damnation, though man does not cease to feel, 1 Matthew 10:28 yet because this feeling of his is neither sweet with pleasure nor wholesome with repose, but painfully penal, it is not without reason called death rather than life. And it is called the second death because it follows the first, which sunders the two cohering essences, whether these be God and the soul, or the soul and the body. Of the first and bodily death, then, we may say that to the good it is good, and evil to the evil. But, doubtless, the second, as it happens to none of the good, so it can be good for none. Chapter 3.—Whether Death, Which by the Sin of Our First Parents Has Passed Upon All Men, is the Punishment of Sin, Even to the Good. But a question not to be shirked arises: Whether in very truth death, which separates soul and body, is good to the good? For if it be, how has it come to pass that such a thing should be the punishment of sin? For the first men would not have suffered death had they not sinned. How, then, can that be good to the good, which could not have happened except to the evil? Then, again, if it could only happen to the evil, to the good it ought not to be good, but non-existent. For why should there be any punishment where there is nothing to punish? Wherefore we must say that the first men were indeed so created, that if they had not sinned, they would not have experienced any kind of death; but that, having become sinners, they were so punished 6 with death, that whatsoever sprang from their stock should also be punished with the same death. For nothing else could be born of them than that which they themselves had been. Their nature was deteriorated in proportion to the greatness of the condemnation of their sin, so that what existed as punishment in those who first sinned, became a natural consequence in their children. For man is not produced by man, as he was from the dust. For dust was the material out of which man was made: man is the parent by whom man is begotten. Wherefore earth and flesh are not the same thing, though flesh be made of earth. But as man the parent is, such is man the offspring. In the first man, therefore, there existed the whole human nature, which was to be transmitted by the woman to posterity, when that conjugal union received the divine sentence of its own condemnation; and what man was made, not when created, but when he sinned and was punished, this he propagated, so far as the origin of sin and death are concerned. For neither by sin nor its punishment was he himself reduced to that infantine and helpless infirmity of body and mind which we see in children. For God ordained that infants should begin the world as the young of beasts begin it, since their parents had fallen to the level of the beasts in the fashion of their life and of their death; as it is written, “Man when he was in honor understood not; he became like the beasts that have no understanding.”2 Nay more, infants, we see, are even feebler in the use and movement of their limbs, and more infirm to choose and refuse, than the most tender offspring of other animals; as if the force that dwells in human nature were destined to surpass all other living things so much the more eminently, as its energy has been longer restrained, and the time of its exercise delayed, just as an arrow flies the higher the further back it has been drawn. To this infantine imbecility the first man did not fall by his lawless presumption and just sentence; but human nature was in his person vitiated and altered to such an extent, that he suffered in his members the warring of disobedient lust, and became subject to the necessity of dying. And what he himself had become by sin and punishment, such he generated those whom he begot; that is to say, subject to sin and death. And if infants are delivered from this bondage of sin by the Redeemer’s grace, they can suffer only this death which separates soul and body; but being redeemed from the obligation of sin, they do not pass to that second endless and penal death. 2 Psalm 49:12 7 Chapter 4.—Why Death, the Punishment of Sin, is Not Withheld from mirable grace of the Saviour, the punishment of sin is turned Those Who by the Grace of Regeneration are Absolved from Sin. to the service of righteousness. For then it was proclaimed to man, “If thou sinnest, thou shall die;” now it is said to the marIf, moreover, any one is solicitous about this point, how, if death tyr, “Die, that thou sin not.” Then it was said, “If ye trangress be the very punishment of sin, they whose guilt is cancelled by the commandments, ye shall die;” now it is said, “If ye decline grace do yet suffer death, this difficulty has already been handeath, ye transgress the commandment.” That which was fordled and solved in our other work which we have written on the merly set as an object of terror, that men might not sin, is now baptism of infants.3 There it was said that the parting of soul to be undergone if we would not sin. Thus, by the unutterable and body was left, though its connection with sin was removed, mercy of God, even the very punishment of wickedness has befor this reason, that if the immortality of the body followed imcome the armor of virtue, and the penalty of the sinner becomes mediately upon the sacrament of regeneration, faith itself would the reward of the righteous. For then death was incurred by sinbe thereby enervated. For faith is then only faith when it waits ning, now righteousness is fulfilled by dying. In the case of the in hope for what is not yet seen in substance. And by the vigor holy martyrs it is so; for to them the persecutor proposes the and conflict of faith, at least in times past, was the fear of death alternative, apostasy or death. For the righteous prefer by beovercome. Specially was this conspicuous in the holy martyrs, lieving to suffer what the first transgressors suffered by not bewho could have had no victory, no glory, to whom there could lieving. For unless they had sinned, they would not have died; not even have been any conflict, if, after the layer of regenerabut the martyrs sin if they do not die. The one died because tion, saints could not suffer bodily death. Who would not, then, they sinned, the others do not sin because they die. By the guilt in company with the infants presented for baptism, run to the of the first, punishment was incurred; by the punishment of the grace of Christ, that so he might not be dismissed from the body? second, guilt is prevented. Not that death, which was before an And thus faith would not be tested with an unseen reward; and evil, has become something good, but only that God has granted so would not even be faith, seeking and receiving an immediate to faith this grace, that death, which is the admitted opposite to recompense of its works. But now, by the greater and more adlife, should become the instrument by which life is reached. 3 De Baptismo Parvulorum is the second half of the title of the book de Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione. 8 Chapter 5.—As the Wicked Make an Ill Use of the Law, Which is Good, fer it, since either the former is abandoned wickedly, and makes So the Good Make a Good Use of Death, Which is an Ill. transgressors, or the latter is embraced, for the truth’s sake, and makes martyrs. And thus the law is indeed good, because it is The apostle, wishing to show how hurtful a thing sin is, when prohibition of sin, and death is evil because it is the wages of sin; grace does not aid us, has not hesitated to say that the strength but as wicked men make an evil use not only of evil, but also of of sin is that very law by which sin is prohibited. “The sting of good things, so the righteous make a good use not only of good, death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law.”4 Most certainly but also of evil things. Whence it comes to pass that the wicked true; for prohibition increases the desire of illicit action, if righmake an ill use of the law, though the law is good; and that the teousness is not so loved that the desire of sin is conquered by good die well, though death is an evil. that love. But unless divine grace aid us, we cannot love nor delight in true righteousness. But lest the law should be thought to be an evil, since it is called the strength of sin, the apostle, Chapter 6.—Of the Evil of Death in General, Considered as the Separawhen treating a similar question in another place, says, “The tion of Soul and Body. law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and Wherefore, as regards bodily death, that is, the separation of the good. Was then that which is holy made death unto me? God soul from the body, it is good unto none while it is being endured forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death in me by those whom we say are in the article of death. For the very by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might beviolence with which body and soul are wrenched asunder, which come exceeding sinful.”5 Exceeding, he says, because the transin the living had been conjoined and closely intertwined, brings gression is more heinous when through the increasing lust of sin with it a harsh experience, jarring horridly on nature so long as it the law itself also is despised. Why have we thought it worth continues, till there comes a total loss of sensation, which arose while to mention this? For this reason, because, as the law is not from the very interpenetration of spirit and flesh. And all this an evil when it increases the lust of those who sin, so neither is anguish is sometimes forestalled by one stroke of the body or death a good thing when it increases the glory of those who sufsudden flitting of the soul, the swiftness of which prevents it 4 from being felt. But whatever that may be in the dying which 1 Corinthians 15:56 5 Romans 7:12, 13 with violently painful sensation robs of all sensation, yet, when 9 it is piously and faithfully borne, it increases the merit of patience, but does not make the name of punishment inapplicable. Death, proceeding by ordinary generation from the first man, is the punishment of all who are born of him, yet, if it be endured for righteousness’ sake, it becomes the glory of those who are born again; and though death be the award of sin, it sometimes secures that nothing be awarded to sin. Chapter 7.—Of the Death Which the Unbaptized Suffer for the Confession of Christ. For whatever unbaptized persons die confessing Christ, this confession is of the same efficacy for the remission of sins as if they were washed in the sacred font of baptism. For He who said, “Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God,” 6 made also an exception in their favor, in that other sentence where He no less absolutely said, “Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven;” 7 and in another place, “Whosoever will lose his life for my sake, shall find it.” 8 And this explains the verse, “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the 6 John 3:5 Matthew 10:32 8 Matthew 16:25 death of His saints.” 9 For what is more precious than a death by which a man’s sins are all forgiven, and his merits increased an hundredfold? For those who have been baptized when they could no longer escape death, and have departed this life with all their sins blotted out have not equal merit with those who did not defer death, though it was in their power to do so, but preferred to end their life by confessing Christ, rather than by denying Him to secure an opportunity of baptism. And even had they denied Him under pressure of the fear of death, this too would have been forgiven them in that baptism, in which was remitted even the enormous wickedness of those who had slain Christ. But how abundant in these men must have been the grace of the Spirit, who breathes where He listeth, seeing that they so dearly loved Christ as to be unable to deny Him even in so sore an emergency, and with so sure a hope of pardon! Precious, therefore, is the death of the saints, to whom the grace of Christ has been applied with such gracious effects, that they do not hesitate to meet death themselves, if so be they might meet Him. And precious is it, also, because it has proved that what was originally ordained for the punishment of the sinner, has been used for the production of a richer harvest of righteousness. But not on this account should we look upon death as a good thing, for it is diverted to such useful purposes, not by any virtue of its own, 7 9 Psalm 116:15 10 but by the divine interference. Death was originally proposed again,—those of the just to life everlasting, and of the others to as an object of dread, that sin might not be committed; now it death eternal, which is called the second death. must be undergone that sin may not be committed, or, if committed, be remitted, and the award of righteousness bestowed Chapter 9.—Whether We Should Say that The Moment of Death, in on him whose victory has earned it. Which Sensation Ceases, Occurs in the Experience of the Dying or in that of the Dead. Chapter 8.—That the Saints, by Suffering the First Death for the Truth’s The point of time in which the souls of the good and evil are separated from the body, are we to say it is after death, or in death Sake, are Freed from the Second. rather? If it is after death, then it is not death which is good or For if we look at the matter a little more carefully, we shall see evil, since death is done with and past, but it is the life which the that even when a man dies faithfully and laudably for the truth’s soul has now entered on. Death was an evil when it was present, sake, it is still death he is avoiding. For he submits to some part that is to say, when it was being suffered by the dying; for to of death, for the very purpose of avoiding the whole, and the sec- them it brought with it a severe and grievous experience, which ond and eternal death over and above. He submits to the sepa- the good make a good use of. But when death is past, how can ration of soul and body, lest the soul be separated both from that which no longer is be either good or evil? Still further, if God and from the body, and so the whole first death be com- we examine the matter more closely, we shall see that even that pleted, and the second death receive him everlastingly. Where- sore and grievous pain which the dying experience is not death fore death is indeed, as I said, good to none while it is being itself. For so long as they have any sensation, they are certainly actually suffered, and while it is subduing the dying to its power; still alive; and, if still alive, must rather be said to be in a state but it is meritoriously endured for the sake of retaining or win- previous to death than in death. For when death actually comes, ning what is good. And regarding what happens after death, it it robs us of all bodily sensation, which, while death is only apis no absurdity to say that death is good to the good, and evil proaching is painful. And thus it is difficult to explain how we to the evil. For the disembodied spirits of the just are at rest; speak of those who are not yet dead, but are agonized in their but those of the wicked suffer punishment till their bodies rise last and mortal extremity, as being in the article of death. Yet 11 what else can we call them than dying persons? for when death which was imminent shall have actually come, we can no longer call them dying but dead. No one, therefore, is dying unless living; since even he who is in the last extremity of life, and, as we say, giving up the ghost, yet lives. The same person is therefore at once dying and living, but drawing near to death, departing from life; yet in life, because his spirit yet abides in the body; not yet in death, because not yet has his spirit forsaken the body. But if, when it has forsaken it, the man is not even then in death, but after death, who shall say when he is in death? On the one hand, no one can be called dying, if a man cannot be dying and living at the same time; and as long as the soul is in the body, we cannot deny that he is living. On the other hand, if the man who is approaching death be rather called dying, I know not who is living. … For not yet was the particular form created and distributed to us, in which we as individuals were to live, but already the seminal nature was there from which we were to be propagated; and this being vitiated by sin, and bound by the chain of death, and justly condemned, man could not be born of man in any other state. And thus, from the bad use of free will, there originated the whole train of evil, which, with its concatenation of miseries, convoys the human race from its depraved origin, as from a corrupt root, on to the destruction of the second death, which has no end, those only being excepted who are freed by the grace of God. … Chapter 16.—Concerning the Philosophers Who Think that the Separation of Soul and Body is Not Penal, Though Plato Represents the Supreme Deity as Promising to the Inferior Gods that They Shall Never Be Dismissed from Their Bodies. Chapter 14.—In What State Man Was Made by God, and into What But the philosophers against whom we are defending the city Estate He Fell by the Choice of His Own Will. of God, that is, His Church seem to themselves to have good For God, the author of natures, not of vices, created man up- cause to deride us, because we say that the separation of the right; but man, being of his own will corrupted, and justly con- soul from the body is to be held as part of man’s punishment. demned, begot corrupted and condemned children. For we all For they suppose that the blessedness of the soul then only is were in that one man, since we all were that one man, who fell complete, when it is quite denuded of the body, and returns to into sin by the woman who was made from him before the sin. God a pure and simple, and, as it were, naked soul. On this 12 point, if I should find nothing in their own literature to refute this opinion, I should be forced laboriously to demonstrate that it is not the body, but the corruptibility of the body, which is a burden to the soul. Hence that sentence of Scripture we quoted in a foregoing book, “For the corruptible body presseth down the soul.” 10 The word corruptible is added to show that the soul is burdened, not by any body whatsoever, but by the body such as it has become in consequence of sin. And even though the word had not been added, we could understand nothing else. But when Plato most expressly declares that the gods who are made by the Supreme have immortal bodies, and when he introduces their Maker himself, promising them as a great boon that they should abide in their bodies eternally, and never by any death be loosed from them, why do these adversaries of ours, for the sake of troubling the Christian faith, feign to be ignorant of what they quite well know, and even prefer to contradict themselves rather than lose an opportunity of contradicting us? Here are Plato’s words, as Cicero has translated them, 11 in which he introduces the Supreme addressing the gods He had made, and saying, “Ye who are sprung from a divine stock, consider of what works I am the parent and author. These (your bodies) are in10 Wisdom 9:15 A translation of part of the Timæus, given in a little book of Cicero’s, De Universo. 11 destructible so long as I will it; although all that is composed can be destroyed. But it is wicked to dissolve what reason has compacted. But, seeing that ye have been born, ye cannot indeed be immortal and indestructible; yet ye shall by no means be destroyed, nor shall any fates consign you to death, and prove superior to my will, which is a stronger assurance of your perpetuity than those bodies to which ye were joined when ye were born.” Plato, you see, says that the gods are both mortal by the connection of the body and soul, and yet are rendered immortal by the will and decree of their Maker. If, therefore, it is a punishment to the soul to be connected with any body whatever, why does God address them as if they were afraid of death, that is, of the separation, of soul and body? Why does He seek to reassure them by promising them immortality, not in virtue of their nature, which is composite and not simple, but by virtue of His invincible will, whereby He can effect that neither things born die, nor things compounded be dissolved, but preserved eternally? Whether this opinion of Plato’s about the stars is true or not, is another question. For we cannot at once grant to him that these luminous bodies or globes, which by day and night shine on the earth with the light of their bodily substance, have also intellectual and blessed souls which animate each its own body, as he confidently affirms of the universe itself, as if it were one huge 13 animal, in which all other animals were contained.12 But this, as I said, is another question, which we have not undertaken to discuss at present. This much only I deemed right to bring forward, in opposition to those who so pride themselves on being, or on being called Platonists, that they blush to be Christians, and who cannot brook to be called by a name which the common people also bear, lest they vulgarize the philosophers’ coterie, which is proud in proportion to its exclusiveness. These men, seeking a weak point in the Christian doctrine, select for attack the eternity of the body, as if it were a contradiction to contend for the blessedness of the soul, and to wish it to be always resident in the body, bound, as it were, in a lamentable chain; and this although Plato, their own founder and master, affirms that it was granted by the Supreme as a boon to the gods He had made, that they should not die, that is, should not be separated from the bodies with which He had connected them. 12 Plato, in the Timæus, represents the Demiurgus as constructing the kosmos or universe to be a complete representation of the idea of animal. He planted in its centre a soul, spreading outwards so as to pervade the whole body of the kosmos; and then he introduced into it those various species of animals which were contained in the idea of animal. Among these animals stand first the celestial, the gods embodied in the stars, and of these the oldest is the earth, set in the centre of all, close packed round the great axis which traverses the centre of the kosmos.—See the Timæus and Grote’s Plato, iii.250 ff. Chapter 17.—Against Those Who Affirm that Earthly Bodies Cannot Be Made Incorruptible and Eternal. These same philosophers further contend that terrestrial bodies cannot be eternal though they make no doubt that the whole earth, which is itself the central member of their god,—not, indeed, of the greatest, but yet of a great god, that is, of this whole world,—is eternal. Since, then, the Supreme made for them another god, that is, this world, superior to the other gods beneath Him; and since they suppose that this god is an animal, having, as they affirm, a rational or intellectual soul enclosed in the huge mass of its body, and having, as the fitly situated and adjusted members of its body, the four elements, whose union they wish to be indissoluble and eternal, lest perchance this great god of theirs might some day perish; what reason is there that the earth, which is the central member in the body of a greater creature, should be eternal, and the bodies of other terrestrial creatures should not possibly be eternal if God should so will it? But earth, say they, must return to earth, out of which the terrestrial bodies of the animals have been taken. For this, they say, is the reason of the necessity of their death and dissolution, and this the manner of their restoration to the solid and eternal earth whence they came. But if any one says the same thing of fire, holding that the bodies which are derived from it to make celestial beings must be restored to the universal fire, does not 14 the immortality which Plato represents these gods as receiving from the Supreme evanesce in the heat of this dispute? Or does this not happen with those celestials because God, whose will, as Plato says, overpowers all powers, has willed it should not be so? What, then, hinders God from ordaining the same of terrestrial bodies? And since, indeed, Plato acknowledges that God can prevent things that are born from dying, and things that are joined from being sundered, and things that are composed from being dissolved, and can ordain that the souls once allotted to their bodies should never abandon them, but enjoy along with them immortality and everlasting bliss, why may He not also effect that terrestrial bodies die not? Is God powerless to do everything that is special to the Christian’s creed, but powerful to effect everything the Platonists desire? The philosophers, forsooth, have been admitted to a knowledge of the divine purposes and power which has been denied to the prophets! The truth is, that the Spirit of God taught His prophets so much of His will as He thought fit to reveal, but the philosophers, in their efforts to discover it, were deceived by human conjecture. But they should not have been so led astray, I will not say by their ignorance, but by their obstinacy, as to contradict themselves so frequently; for they maintain, with all their vaunted might, that in order to the happiness of the soul, it must abandon not only its earthly body, but every kind of body. And yet they hold that the gods, whose souls are most blessed, are bound to everlasting bodies, the ce- lestials to fiery bodies, and the soul of Jove himself (or this world, as they would have us believe) to all the physical elements which compose this entire mass reaching from earth to heaven. For this soul Plato believes to be extended and diffused by musical numbers, from the middle of the inside of the earth, which geometricians call the centre, outwards through all its parts to the utmost heights and extremities of the heavens; so that this world is a very great and blessed immortal animal, whose soul has both the perfect blessedness of wisdom, and never leaves its own body and whose body has life everlasting from the soul, and by no means clogs or hinders it, though itself be not a simple body, but compacted of so many and so huge materials. Since, therefore, they allow so much to their own conjectures, why do they refuse to believe that by the divine will and power immortality can be conferred on earthly bodies, in which the souls would be neither oppressed with the burden of them, nor separated from them by any death, but live eternally and blessedly? Do they not assert that their own gods so live in bodies of fire, and that Jove himself, their king, so lives in the physical elements? If, in order to its blessedness, the soul must quit every kind of body, let their gods flit from the starry spheres, and Jupiter from earth to sky; or, if they cannot do so, let them be pronounced miserable. But neither alternative will these men adopt. For, on the one hand, they dare not ascribe to their own gods a departure from the body, lest they should seem to worship mortals; on the other 15 hand, they dare not deny their happiness, lest they should acknowledge wretches as gods. Therefore, to obtain blessedness, we need not quit every kind of body, but only the corruptible, cumbersome, painful, dying,—not such bodies as the goodness of God contrived for the first man, but such only as man’s sin entailed. Chapter 18.—Of Earthly Bodies, Which the Philosophers Affirm Cannot Be in Heavenly Places, Because Whatever is of Earth is by Its Natural Weight Attracted to Earth. But it is necessary, they say, that the natural weight of earthly bodies either keeps them on earth or draws them to it; and therefore they cannot be in heaven. Our first parents were indeed on earth, in a well-wooded and fruitful spot, which has been named Paradise. But let our adversaries a little more carefully consider this subject of earthly weight, because it has important bearings, both on the ascension of the body of Christ, and also on the resurrection body of the saints. If human skill can by some contrivance fabricate vessels that float, out of metals which sink as soon as they are placed on the water, how much more credible is it that God, by some occult mode of operation, should even more certainly effect that these earthy masses be emancipated from the downward pressure of their weight? This cannot be impossible to that God by whose almighty will, according to Plato, neither things born perish, nor things composed dissolve, especially since it is much more wonderful that spiritual and bodily essences be conjoined than that bodies be adjusted to other material substances. Can we not also easily believe that souls, being made perfectly blessed, should be endowed with the power of moving their earthy but incorruptible bodies as they please, with almost spontaneous movement, and of placing them where they please with the readiest action? If the angels transport whatever terrestrial creatures they please from any place they please, and convey them whither they please, is it to be believed that they cannot do so without toil and the feeling of burden? Why, then, may we not believe that the spirits of the saints, made perfect and blessed by divine grace, can carry their own bodies where they please, and set them where they will? For, though we have been accustomed to notice, in bearing weights, that the larger the quantity the greater the weight of earthy bodies is, and that the greater the weight the more burdensome it is, yet the soul carries the members of its own flesh with less difficulty when they are massive with health, than in sickness when they are wasted. And though the hale and strong man feels heavier to other men carrying him than the lank and sickly, yet the man himself moves and carries his own body with less feeling of burden when he has the greater bulk of vigorous health, than when his frame is reduced to a minimum by hunger or disease. Of such consequence, in estimating the weight of earthly bodies, 16 even while yet corruptible and mortal, is the consideration not of dead weight, but of the healthy equilibrium of the parts. And what words can tell the difference between what we now call health and future immortality? Let not the philosophers, then, think to upset our faith with arguments from the weight of bodies; for I don’t care to inquire why they cannot believe an earthly body can be in heaven, while the whole earth is suspended on nothing. For perhaps the world keeps its central place by the same law that attracts to its centre all heavy bodies. But this I say, if the lesser gods, to whom Plato committed the creation of man and the other terrestrial creatures, were able, as he affirms, to withdraw from the fire its quality of burning, while they left it that of lighting, so that it should shine through the eyes; and if to the supreme God Plato also concedes the power of preserving from death things that have been born, and of preserving from dissolution things that are composed of parts so different as body and spirit;—are we to hesitate to concede to this same God the power to operate on the flesh of him whom He has endowed with immortality, so as to withdraw its corruption but leave its nature, remove its burdensome weight but retain its seemly form and members? But concerning our belief in the resurrection of the dead, and concerning their immortal bodies, we shall speak more at large, God willing, in the end of this work. Chapter 19.—Against the Opinion of Those Who Do Not Believe that the Primitive Men Would Have Been Immortal If They Had Not Sinned. At present let us go on, as we have begun, to give some explanation regarding the bodies of our first parents. I say then, that, except as the just consequence of sin, they would not have been subjected even to this death, which is good to the good,—this death, which is not exclusively known and believed in by a few, but is known to all, by which soul and body are separated, and by which the body of an animal which was but now visibly living is now visibly dead. For though there can be no manner of doubt that the souls of the just and holy dead live in peaceful rest, yet so much better would it be for them to be alive in healthy, wellconditioned bodies, that even those who hold the tenet that it is most blessed to be quit of every kind of body, condemn this opinion in spite of themselves. For no one will dare to set wise men, whether yet to die or already dead,—in other words, whether already quit of the body, or shortly to be so,—above the immortal gods, to whom the Supreme, in Plato, promises as a munificent gift life indissoluble, or in eternal union with their bodies. But this same Plato thinks that nothing better can happen to men than that they pass through life piously and justly, and, being separated from their bodies, be received into the bosom of the gods, who never abandon theirs; “that, oblivious of the past, 17 they may revisit the upper air, and conceive the longing to return again to the body.”13 Virgil is applauded for borrowing this from the Platonic system. Assuredly Plato thinks that the souls of mortals cannot always be in their bodies, but must necessarily be dismissed by death; and, on the other hand, he thinks that without bodies they cannot endure for ever, but with ceaseless alternation pass from life to death, and from death to life. This difference, however, he sets between wise men and the rest, that they are carried after death to the stars, that each man may repose for a while in a star suitable for him, and may thence return to the labors and miseries of mortals when he has become oblivious of his former misery, and possessed with the desire of being embodied. Those, again, who have lived foolishly transmigrate into bodies fit for them, whether human or bestial. Thus he has appointed even the good and wise souls to a very hard lot indeed, since they do not receive such bodies as they might always and even immortally inhabit, but such only as they can neither permanently retain nor enjoy eternal purity without. Of this notion of Plato’s, we have in a former book already said14 that Porphyry was ashamed in the light of these Christian times, so that he not only emancipated human souls from a destiny in the bodies of beasts but also contended for the liberation of the souls of the 13 14 Virgil, Æneid vi.750, 751. Book X.30 wise from all bodily ties, so that, escaping from all flesh, they might, as bare and blessed souls, dwell with the Father time without end. And that he might not seem to be outbid by Christ’s promise of life everlasting to His saints, he also established purified souls in endless felicity, without return to their former woes; but, that he might contradict Christ, he denies the resurrection of incorruptible bodies, and maintains that these souls will live eternally, not only without earthly bodies, but without any bodies at all. And yet, whatever he meant by this teaching, he at least did not teach that these souls should offer no religious observance to the gods who dwelt in bodies. And why did he not, unless because he did not believe that the souls, even though separate from the body, were superior to those gods? Wherefore, if these philosophers will not dare (as I think they will not) to set human souls above the gods who are most blessed, and yet are tied eternally to their bodies, why do they find that absurd which the Christian faith preaches, namely, that our first parents were so created that, if they had not sinned, they would not have been dismissed from their bodies by any death, but would have been endowed with immortality as the reward of their obedience, and would have lived eternally with their bodies; and further, that the saints will in the resurrection inhabit those very bodies in which they have here toiled, but in such sort that neither shall any corruption or unwieldiness be suffered to attach to their flesh, nor any grief or trouble to cloud their felicity? 18 Chapter 20.—That the Flesh Now Resting in Peace Shall Be Raised to better than it was here in its best estate of health, but it will sura Perfection Not Enjoyed by the Flesh of Our First Parents. pass the bodies of our first parents ere they sinned. For, though they were not to die unless they should sin, yet they used food Thus the souls of departed saints are not affected by the death as men do now, their bodies not being as yet spiritual, but anwhich dismisses them from their bodies, because their flesh rests imal only. And though they decayed not with years, nor drew in hope, no matter what indignities it receives after sensation is nearer to death,—a condition secured to them in God’s marvelgone. For they do not desire that their bodies be forgotten, as lous grace by the tree of life, which grew along with the forbidPlato thinks fit, but rather, because they remember what has den tree in the midst of Paradise,—yet they took other nourishbeen promised by Him who deceives no man, and who gave ment, though not of that one tree, which was interdicted not them security for the safe keeping even of the hairs of their head, because it was itself bad, but for the sake of commending a pure they with a longing patience wait in hope of the resurrection of and simple obedience, which is the great virtue of the rational their bodies, in which they have suffered many hardships, and creature set under the Creator as his Lord. For, though no evil are now to suffer never again. For if they did not “hate their thing was touched, yet if a thing forbidden was touched, the very own flesh,” when it, with its native infirmity, opposed their will, disobedience was sin. They were, then, nourished by other fruit, and had to be constrained by the spiritual law, how much more which they took that their animal bodies might not suffer the disshall they love it, when it shall even itself have become spiritual! comfort of hunger or thirst; but they tasted the tree of life, that For as, when the spirit serves the flesh, it is fitly called carnal, death might not steal upon them from any quarter, and that they so, when the flesh serves the spirit, it will justly be called spirimight not, spent with age, decay. Other fruits were, so to speak, tual. Not that it is converted into spirit, as some fancy from the their nourishment, but this their sacrament. So that the tree of words, “It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption,” 15 life would seem to have been in the terrestrial Paradise what the but because it is subject to the spirit with a perfect and marvelwisdom of God is in the spiritual, of which it is written, “She is lous readiness of obedience, and responds in all things to the will a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her.” 16 that has entered on immortality,— all reluctance, all corruption, … and all slowness being removed. For the body will not only be 15 1 Corinthians 15:42 16 Proverbs 3:18 19 Book XIV Argument—Augustin again treats of the sin of the first man, and teaches that it is the cause of the carnal life and vicious affections of man. Especially he proves that the shame which accompanies lust is the just punishment of that disobedience, and inquires how man, if he had not sinned, would have been able without lust to propagate his kind. … Chapter 3.—That the Sin is Caused Not by the Flesh, But by the Soul, and that the Corruption Contracted from Sin is Not Sin But Sin’s Punishment. But if any one says that the flesh is the cause of all vices and ill conduct, inasmuch as the soul lives wickedly only because it is moved by the flesh, it is certain he has not carefully considered the whole nature of man. For “the corruptible body, indeed, weigheth down the soul.” 17 Whence, too, the apostle, speaking of this corruptible body, of which he had shortly before said, “though our outward man perish,” 18 says, “We know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heav17 18 Wisdom 9:15 2 Corinthians 4:16 ens. For in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked. For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not for that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up in life.” 19 We are then burdened with this corruptible body; but knowing that the cause of this burdensomeness is not the nature and substance of the body, but its corruption, we do not desire to be deprived of the body, but to be clothed with its immortality. For then, also, there will be a body, but it shall no longer be a burden, being no longer corruptible. At present, then, “the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things,” nevertheless they are in error who suppose that all the evils of the soul proceed from the body. Virgil, indeed, seems to express the sentiments of Plato in the beautiful lines, where he says,— “A fiery strength inspires their lives, An essence that from heaven derives, Though clogged in part by limbs of clay And the dull ’vesture of decay;’”20 19 20 2 Corinthians 5:1-4 Æneid, vi.730-32 20 but though he goes on to mention the four most common mental emotions,—desire, fear, joy, sorrow,—with the intention of showing that the body is the origin of all sins and vices, saying,— “Hence wild desires and grovelling fears, And human laughter, human tears, Immured in dungeon-seeming nights They look abroad, yet see no light,” 21 yet we believe quite otherwise. For the corruption of the body, which weighs down the soul, is not the cause but the punishment of the first sin; and it was not the corruptible flesh that made the soul sinful, but the sinful soul that made the flesh corruptible. And though from this corruption of the flesh there arise certain incitements to vice, and indeed vicious desires, yet we must not attribute to the flesh all the vices of a wicked life, in case we thereby clear the devil of all these, for he has no flesh. For though we cannot call the devil a fornicator or drunkard, or ascribe to him any sensual indulgence (though he is the secret instigator and prompter of those who sin in these ways), yet he is exceedingly proud and envious. And this viciousness has so possessed him, that on account of it he is reserved in chains of 21 Ibid., 733, 734 darkness to everlasting punishment. 22 Now these vices, which have dominion over the devil, the apostle attributes to the flesh, which certainly the devil has not. For he says “hatred, variance, emulations, strife, envying” are the works of the flesh; and of all these evils pride is the origin and head, and it rules in the devil though he has no flesh. For who shows more hatred to the saints? who is more at variance with them? who more envious, bitter, and jealous? And since he exhibits all these works, though he has no flesh, how are they works of the flesh, unless because they are the works of man, who is, as I said, spoken of under the name of flesh? For it is not by having flesh, which the devil has not, but by living according to himself,—that is, according to man,—that man became like the devil. For the devil too, wished to live according to himself when he did not abide in the truth; so that when he lied, this was not of God, but of himself, who is not only a liar, but the father of lies, he being the first who lied, and the originator of lying as of sin. … 22 On the punishment of the devil, see the De Agone Christi, 3-5, and De Nat. Boni, 33. 21 Chapter 5.—That the Opinion of the Platonists Regarding the Nature of Body and Soul is Not So Censurable as that of the Manichæans, But that Even It is Objectionable, Because It Ascribes the Origin of Vices to the Nature of The Flesh. There is no need, therefore, that in our sins and vices we accuse the nature of the flesh to the injury of the Creator, for in its own kind and degree the flesh is good; but to desert the Creator good, and live according to the created good, is not good, whether a man choose to live according to the flesh, or according to the soul, or according to the whole human nature, which is composed of flesh and soul, and which is therefore spoken of either by the name flesh alone, or by the name soul alone. For he who extols the nature of the soul as the chief good, and condemns the nature of the flesh as if it were evil, assuredly is fleshly both in his love of the soul and hatred of the flesh; for these his feelings arise from human fancy, not from divine truth. The Platonists, indeed, are not so foolish as, with the Manichæans, to detest our present bodies as an evil nature; for they attribute all the elements of which this visible and tangible world is compacted, with all their qualities, to God their Creator. Nevertheless, from the death-infected members and earthly construction of the body they believe the soul is so affected, that there are thus originated in it the diseases of desires, and fears, and joy, and sorrow, under which four perturbations, as Cicero660 calls them, or passions, as most prefer to name them with the Greeks, is included the whole viciousness of human life. But if this be so, how is it that Æneas in Virgil, when he had heard from his father in Hades that the souls should return to bodies, expresses surprise at this declaration, and exclaims: “O father! and can thought conceive That happy souls this realm would leave, And seek the upper sky, With sluggish clay to reunite? This direful longing for the light, Whence comes it, say, and why?” 23 This direful longing, then, does it still exist even in that boasted purity of the disembodied spirits, and does it still proceed from the death-infected members and earthly limbs? Does he not assert that, when they begin to long to return to the body, they have already been delivered from all these so-called pestilences of the body? From which we gather that, were this endlessly alternating purification and defilement of departing and returning souls as true as it is most certainly false, yet it could not be averred that all culpable and vicious motions of the soul originate in the earthly body; for, on their own showing, “this direful longing,” to use the words of their noble exponent, is so 23 Æneid, vi.719-21 22 extraneous to the body, that it moves the soul that is purged of all bodily taint, and is existing apart from any body whatever, and moves it, moreover, to be embodied again. So that even they themselves acknowledge that the soul is not only moved to desire, fear, joy, sorrow, by the flesh, but that it can also be agitated with these emotions at its own instance. into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing Chapter 6.—Of the Character of the Human Will Which Makes the that ought to be hated, will remain. Affections of the Soul Right or Wrong. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man’s will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned Chapter 7.—That the Words Love and Regard (Amor and Dilectio) are in Scripture Used Indifferently of Good and Evil Affection. He who resolves to love God, and to love his neighbor as himself, not according to man but according to God, is on account of this love said to be of a good will; and this is in Scripture more commonly called charity, but it is also, even in the same books, called love. For the apostle says that the man to be elected as a ruler of the people must be a lover of good. 24 And when the Lord Himself had asked Peter, “Hast thou a regard for me (diligis) more than these?” Peter replied, “Lord, Thou knowest that I love (amo) Thee.” And again a second time the Lord asked not whether Peter loved (amaret) Him, but whether he had a re24 Titus 1:8 according to Greek and Vulgate. 23 gard (diligeret) for Him, and, he again answered, “Lord, Thou knowest that I love (amo) Thee.” But on the third interrogation the Lord Himself no longer says, “Hast thou a regard (diligis) for me,” but “Lovest thou (amas) me?” And then the evangelist adds, “Peter was grieved because He said unto him the third time, “Lovest thou (amas) me?” though the Lord had not said three times but only once, “Lovest thou (amas) me?” and twice “Diligis me ?” from which we gather that, even when the Lord said “diligis,” He used an equivalent for “amas.” Peter, too, throughout used one word for the one thing, and the third time also replied, “Lord, Thou knowest all things, Thou knowest that I love (amo) Thee.” 25 I have judged it right to mention this, because some are of opinion that charity or regard (dilectio) is one thing, love (amor) another. They say that dilectio is used of a good affection, amor of an evil love. But it is very certain that even secular literature knows no such distinction. However, it is for the philosophers to determine whether and how they differ, though their own writings sufficiently testify that they make great account of love (amor) placed on good objects, and even on God Himself. But we wished to show that the Scriptures of our religion, whose authority we prefer to all writings whatsoever, make no distinction between amor, dilectio, and caritas; and we have already shown that amor is used in a good connection. And 25 John 21:15-17 if any one fancy that amor is no doubt used both of good and bad loves, but that dilectio is reserved for the good only, let him remember what the psalm says, “He that loveth (diligit) iniquity hateth his own soul;” 26 and the words of the Apostle John, “If any man love (diligere) the world, the love (dilectio) of the Father is not in him.” 27 Here you have in one passage dilectio used both in a good and a bad sense. And if any one demands an instance of amor being used in a bad sense (for we have already shown its use in a good sense), let him read the words, “For men shall be lovers (amantes) of their own selves, lovers (amatores) of money.” 28 The right will is, therefore, well-directed love, and the wrong will is ill-directed love. Love, then, yearning to have what is loved, is desire; and having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is opposed to it, it is fear; and feeling what is opposed to it, when it has befallen it, it is sadness. Now these motions are evil if the love is evil; good if the love is good. What we assert let us prove from Scripture. The apostle “desires to depart, and to be with Christ.” 29 And, “My soul desired to long for Thy judgments;” 30 or if it is more appropriate to say, “My soul longed to desire Thy judg26 Psalm 11:5 1 John 2:15 28 2 Timothy 3:2 29 Philippians 1:23 30 Psalm 119:20 27 24 ments.” And, “The desire of wisdom bringeth to a kingdom.” 31 Yet there has always obtained the usage of understanding desire and concupiscence in a bad sense if the object be not defined. But joy is used in a good sense: “Be glad in the Lord, and rejoice, ye righteous.” 32 And, “Thou hast put gladness in my heart.” 33 And, “Thou wilt fill me with joy with Thy countenance.” 34 Fear is used in a good sense by the apostle when he says, “Work out your salvation with fear and trembling.” 35 And, “Be not highminded, but fear.” 36 And, “I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ.” 37 But with respect to sadness, which Cicero prefer to calls sickness (œgritudo), and Virgil pain (dolor) (as he says, “Dolent gaudentque”38 ), but which I prefer to call sorrow, because sickness and pain are more commonly used to express bodily suffering,—with respect to this emotion, I say, the question whether it can be used in a good sense is more difficult. 31 Wisdom 6:20 Psalm 32:11 33 Psalm 4:7 34 Psalm 16:11 35 Philippians 2:12 36 Romans 11:20 37 2 Corinthians 11:3 38 Æneid vi.733 32 … 25 Chapter 13.—That in Adam’s Sin an Evil Will Preceded the Evil Act. Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it. And what is the origin of our evil will but pride? For “pride is the beginning of sin.” 39 And what is pride but the craving for undue exaltation? And this is undue exaltation, when the soul abandons Him to whom it ought to cleave as its end, and becomes a kind of end to itself. This happens when it becomes its own satisfaction. And it does so when it falls away from that unchangeable good which ought to satisfy it more than itself. This falling away is spontaneous; for if the will had remained steadfast in the love of that higher and changeless good by which it was illumined to intelligence and kindled into love, it would not have turned away to find satisfaction in itself, and so become frigid and benighted; the woman would not have believed the serpent spoke the truth, nor would the man have preferred the request of his wife to the command of God, nor have supposed that it was a venial trangression to cleave to the partner of his life even in a partnership of sin. The wicked deed, then,—that is to say, the trangression 39 Ecclesiasticus 10:13 of eating the forbidden fruit,—was committed by persons who were already wicked. That “evil fruit” 40 could be brought forth only by “a corrupt tree.” But that the tree was evil was not the result of nature; for certainly it could become so only by the vice of the will, and vice is contrary to nature. Now, nature could not have been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Consequently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. But man did not so fall away as to become absolutely nothing; but being turned towards himself, his being became more contracted than it was when he clave to Him who supremely is. Accordingly, to exist in himself, that is, to be his own satisfaction after abandoning God, is not quite to become a nonentity, but to approximate to that. And therefore the holy Scriptures designate the proud by another name, “self-pleasers.” For it is good to have the heart lifted up, yet not to one’s self, for this is proud, but to the Lord, for this is obedient, and can be the act only of the humble. There is, therefore, something in humility which, strangely enough, exalts the heart, and something in pride which debases it. This seems, indeed, to be contradictory, that loftiness should debase and lowliness exalt. But pious humility enables us to submit to what is above us; and nothing is more exalted above us than God; and therefore humility, by making us subject to God, exalts us. But pride, being a defect of nature, by the very act of refusing subjection and revolting from Him who is supreme, falls to a low condition; and then comes to pass what is written: “Thou castedst them down when they lifted up themselves.” 41 For he does not say, “when they had been lifted up,” as if first they were exalted, and then afterwards cast down; but “when they lifted up themselves” even then they were cast down,—that is to say, the very lifting up was already a fall. And therefore it is that humility is specially recommended to the city of God as it sojourns in this world, and is specially exhibited in the city of God, and in the person of Christ its King; while the contrary vice of pride, according to the testimony of the sacred writings, specially rules his adversary the devil. And certainly this is the great difference which distinguishes the two cities of which we speak, the one being the society of the godly men, the other of the ungodly, each associated with the angels that adhere to their party, and the one guided and fashioned by love of self, the other by love of God. The devil, then, would not have ensnared man in the open and manifest sin of doing what God had forbidden, had man not already begun to live for himself. It was this that made him listen with pleasure to the words, “Ye shall be as gods,” 42 which they would much more readily have accom41 40 Matthew 7:18 42 Psalm 73:18 Genesis 3:5 26 plished by obediently adhering to their supreme and true end than by proudly living to themselves. For created gods are gods not by virtue of what is in themselves, but by a participation of the true God. By craving to be more, man becomes less; and by aspiring to be self-sufficing, he fell away from Him who truly suffices him. Accordingly, this wicked desire which prompts man to please himself as if he were himself light, and which thus turns him away from that light by which, had he followed it, he would himself have become light,—this wicked desire, I say, already secretly existed in him, and the open sin was but its consequence. For that is true which is written, “Pride goeth before destruction, and before honor is humility;” 43 that is to say, secret ruin precedes open ruin, while the former is not counted ruin. For who counts exaltation ruin, though no sooner is the Highest forsaken than a fall is begun? But who does not recognize it as ruin, when there occurs an evident and indubitable transgression of the commandment? And consequently, God’s prohibition had reference to such an act as, when committed, could not be defended on any pretense of doing what was righteous. 44 And I make bold to say that it is useful for the proud to fall into an open and indisputable transgression, and so displease themselves, as already, by pleasing themselves, they had fallen. For 43 44 Proverbs 18:12 That is to say, it was an obvious and indisputable transgression. Peter was in a healthier condition when he wept and was dissatisfied with himself, than when he boldly presumed and satisfied himself. And this is averred by the sacred Psalmist when he says, “Fill their faces with shame, that they may seek Thy name, O Lord;” 45 that is, that they who have pleased themselves in seeking their own glory may be pleased and satisfied with Thee in seeking Thy glory. Chapter 14.—Of the Pride in the Sin, Which Was Worse Than the Sin Itself. But it is a worse and more damnable pride which casts about for the shelter of an excuse even in manifest sins, as these our first parents did, of whom the woman said, “The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat;” and the man said, “The woman whom Thou gavest to be with me, she gave me of the tree, and I did eat.” 46 Here there is no word of begging pardon, no word of entreaty for healing. For though they do not, like Cain, deny that they have perpetrated the deed, yet their pride seeks to refer its wickedness to another,—the woman’s pride to the serpent, the man’s to the woman. But where there is a plain transgression of a divine commandment, this is rather to accuse than to excuse oneself. For the fact that the woman sinned on the serpent’s persuasion, and 45 46 Psalm 83:16 Genesis 3:12, 13 27 the man at the woman’s offer, did not make the transgression in spirit, condemned even to eternal death (had not the grace of less, as if there were any one whom we ought rather to believe God delivered him) because he had forsaken eternal life. Whoor yield to than God. ever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided. For as Abraham’s obedience Chapter 15.—Of the Justice of the Punishment with Which Our First is with justice pronounced to be great, because the thing comParents Were Visited for Their Disobedience. manded, to kill his son, was very difficult, so in Paradise the disTherefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of obedience was the greater, because the difficulty of that which God,—who had created man; who had made him in His own im- was commanded was imperceptible. And as the obedience of age; who had set him above the other animals; who had placed the second Man was the more laudable because He became obehim in Paradise; who had enriched him with abundance of ev- dient even “unto death,” 47 so the disobedience of the first man ery kind and of safety; who had laid upon him neither many, was the more detestable because he became disobedient even nor great, nor difficult commandments, but, in order to make a unto death. For where the penalty annexed to disobedience is wholesome obedience easy to him, had given him a single very great, and the thing commanded by the Creator is easy, who can brief and very light precept by which He reminded that crea- sufficiently estimate how great a wickedness it is, in a matter so ture whose service was to be free that He was Lord,—it was just easy, not to obey the authority of so great a power, even when that condemnation followed, and condemnation such that man, that power deters with so terrible a penalty? In short, to say all who by keeping the commandments should have been spiritual in a word, what but disobedience was the punishment of disobeeven in his flesh, became fleshly even in his spirit; and as in his dience in that sin? For what else is man’s misery but his own pride he had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His jus- disobedience to himself, so that in consequence of his not betice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute inde- ing willing to do what he could do, he now wills to do what he pendence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to cannot? For though he could not do all things in Paradise belive dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage fore he sinned, yet he wished to do only what he could do, and to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself, doomed in 47 Philippians 2:8 spite of himself to die in body as he had willingly become dead 28 therefore he could do all things he wished. But now, as we recognize in his offspring, and as divine Scripture testifies, “Man is like to vanity.” 48 For who can count how many things he wishes which he cannot do, so long as he is disobedient to himself, that is, so long as his mind and his flesh do not obey his will? For in spite of himself his mind is both frequently disturbed, and his flesh suffers, and grows old, and dies; and in spite of ourselves we suffer whatever else we suffer, and which we would not suffer if our nature absolutely and in all its parts obeyed our will. But is it not the infirmities of the flesh which hamper it in its service? Yet what does it matter how its service is hampered, so long as the fact remains, that by the just retribution of the sovereign God whom we refused to be subject to and serve, our flesh, which was subjected to us, now torments us by insubordination, although our disobedience brought trouble on ourselves, not upon God? For He is not in need of our service as we of our body’s; and therefore what we did was no punishment to Him, but what we receive is so to us. And the pains which are called bodily are pains of the soul in and from the body. For what pain or desire can the flesh feel by itself and without the soul? But when the flesh is said to desire or to suffer, it is meant, as we have explained, that the man does so, or some part of the soul which is affected by the sensation of the flesh, whether a harsh 48 Psalm 144:4 sensation causing pain, or gentle, causing pleasure. But pain in the flesh is only a discomfort of the soul arising from the flesh, and a kind of shrinking from its suffering, as the pain of the soul which is called sadness is a shrinking from those things which have happened to us in spite of ourselves. But sadness is frequently preceded by fear, which is itself in the soul, not in the flesh; while bodily pain is not preceded by any kind of fear of the flesh, which can be felt in the flesh before the pain. But pleasure is preceded by a certain appetite which is felt in the flesh like a craving, as hunger and thirst and that generative appetite which is most commonly identified with the name” lust,” though this is the generic word for all desires. For anger itself was defined by the ancients as nothing else than the lust of revenge; although sometimes a man is angry even at inanimate objects which cannot feel his vengeance, as when one breaks a pen, or crushes a quill that writes badly. Yet even this, though less reasonable, is in its way a lust of revenge, and is, so to speak, a mysterious kind of shadow of [the great law of] retribution, that they who do evil should suffer evil. There is therefore a lust for revenge, which is called anger; there is a lust of money, which goes by the name of avarice; there is a lust of conquering, no matter by what means, which is called opinionativeness; there is a lust of applause, which is named boasting. There are many and various lusts, of which some have names of their own, while others have not. For who could readily give a name to the lust of ruling, 29 which yet has a powerful influence in the soul of tyrants, as civil members serve him for their respective ends? But even those wars bear witness? who delight in this pleasure are not moved to it at their own will, whether they confine themselves to lawful or transgress to unlawful pleasures; but sometimes this lust importunes them in Chapter 16.—Of the Evil of Lust,—A Word Which, Though Applicable spite of themselves, and sometimes fails them when they desire to Many Vices, is Specially Appropriated to Sexual Uncleanness. to feel it, so that though lust rages in the mind, it stirs not in Although, therefore, lust may have many objects, yet when no the body. Thus, strangely enough, this emotion not only fails object is specified, the word lust usually suggests to the mind to obey the legitimate desire to beget offspring, but also refuses the lustful excitement of the organs of generation. And this lust to serve lascivious lust; and though it often opposes its whole not only takes possession of the whole body and outward mem- combined energy to the soul that resists it, sometimes also it bers, but also makes itself felt within, and moves the whole man is divided against itself, and while it moves the soul, leaves the with a passion in which mental emotion is mingled with bodily body unmoved. appetite, so that the pleasure which results is the greatest of all bodily pleasures. So possessing indeed is this pleasure, that at the moment of time in which it is consummated, all mental activity is suspended. What friend of wisdom and holy joys, who, being married, but knowing, as the apostle says, “how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor, not in the disease of desire, as the Gentiles who know not God,” 49 would not prefer, if this were possible, to beget children without this lust, so that in this function of begetting offspring the members created for this purpose should not be stimulated by the heat of lust, but should be actuated by his volition, in the same way as his other 49 1 Thessalonians 4:4 30 Augustine (354-430) On the Morals of the Catholic Church Translated by Richard Stothert. From A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, series I, volume IV, edited by Philip Schaff (Edinburgh: T&T Clark and Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company) Chapter 1.—How the Pretensions of the Manichæans are to Be Refuted. to a profane critic, and if he begins his inquiries from a desire to Two Manichæan Falsehoods find truth, and not in rash opposition. And should the inquirer meet with some, whether bishops or presbyters, or any officials 1. Enough, probably, has been done in our other books in the or ministers of the Catholic Church, who either avoid in all cases way of answering the ignorant and profane attacks which the opening up mysteries, or, content with simple faith, have no deManichæans make on the law, which is called the Old Testament, sire for more recondite knowledge, he must not despair of findin a spirit of vainglorious boasting, and with the approval of the ing the knowledge of the truth in a case where neither are all able uninstructed. Here, too, I may shortly touch upon the subject. to teach to whom the inquiry is addressed, nor are all inquirers For every one with average intelligence can easily see that the ex- worthy of learning the truth. Diligence and piety are both necplanation of the Scriptures should be sought for from those who essary: on the one hand, we must have knowledge to find truth, are the professed teachers of the Scriptures; and that it may hap- and, on the other hand, we must deserve to get the knowledge. 2. pen, and indeed always happens, that many things seem absurd But as the Manichæans have two tricks for catching the unwary, to the ignorant, which, when they are explained by the learned, so as to make them take them as teachers,—one, that of finding appear all the more excellent, and are received in the explanation fault with the Scriptures, which they either misunderstand or with the greater pleasure on account of the obstructions which wish to be misunderstood, the other, that of making a show of made it difficult to reach the meaning. This commonly happens chastity and of notable abstinence,—this book shall contain our as regards the holy books of the Old Testament, if only the man doctrine of life and morals according to Catholic teaching, and who meets with difficulties applies to a pious teacher, and not will perhaps make it appear how easy it is to pretend to virtue, 31 and how difficult to possess virtue. I will refrain, if I can, from attacking their weak points, which I know well, with the violence with which they attack what they know nothing of; for I wish them, if possible, to be cured rather than conquered. And I will quote such testimonies from the Scriptures as they are bound to believe, for they shall be from the New Testament; and even from this I will take none of the passages which the Manichæans when hard pressed are accustomed to call spurious, but passages which they are obliged to acknowledge and approve. And for every testimony from apostolic teaching I will bring a similar statement from the Old Testament, that if they ever become willing to wake up from their persistent dreams, and to rise towards the light of Christian faith, they may discover both how far from being Christian is the life which they profess, and how truly Christian is the Scripture which they cavil at. Chapter 2.—He Begins with Arguments, in Compliance with the Mistaken Method of the Manichæans 3. Where, then, shall I begin? With authority, or with reasoning? In the order of nature, when we learn anything, authority precedes reasoning. For a reason may seem weak, when, after it is given, it requires authority to confirm it. But because the minds of men are obscured by familiarity with darkness, which covers them in the night of sins and evil habits, and cannot perceive in a way suitable to the clearness and purity of reason, there is most wholesome provision for bringing the dazzled eye into the light of truth under the congenial shade of authority. But since we have to do with people who are perverse in all their thoughts and words and actions, and who insist on nothing more than on beginning with argument, I will, as a concession to them, take what I think a wrong method in discussion. For I like to imitate, as far as I can, the gentleness of my Lord Jesus Christ, who took on Himself the evil of death itself, wishing to free us from it. Chapter 3.—Happiness is in the Enjoyment of Man’s Chief Good. Two Conditions of the Chief Good: 1st, Nothing is Better Than It; 2d, It Cannot Be Lost Against the Will 4. How then, according to reason, ought man to live? We all certainly desire to live happily; and there is no human being but assents to this statement almost before it is made. But the title happy cannot, in my opinion, belong either to him who has not what he loves, whatever it may be, or to him who has what he loves if it is hurtful or to him who does not love what he has, although it is good in perfection. For one who seeks what he cannot obtain suffers torture, and one who has got what is not desirable is cheated, and one who does not seek for what is worth seeking for is diseased. Now in all these cases the mind cannot but be unhappy, and happiness and unhappiness cannot reside 32 at the same time in one man; so in none of these cases can the man be happy. I find, then, a fourth case, where the happy life exists,—when that which is man’s chief good is both loved and possessed. For what do we call enjoyment but having at hand the objects of love? And no one can be happy who does not enjoy what is man’s chief good, nor is there any one who enjoys this who is not happy. We must then have at hand our chief good, if we think of living happily. 5. We must now inquire what is man’s chief good, which of course cannot be anything inferior to man himself. For whoever follows after what is inferior to himself, becomes himself inferior. But every man is bound to follow what is best. Wherefore man’s chief good is not inferior to man. Is it then something similar to man himself ? It must be so, if there is nothing above man which he is capable of enjoying. But if we find something which is both superior to man, and can be possessed by the man who loves it, who can doubt that in seeking for happiness man should endeavor to reach that which is more excellent than the being who makes the endeavor. For if happiness consists in the enjoyment of a good than which there is nothing better, which we call the chief good, how can a man be properly called happy who has not yet attained to his chief good? or how can that be the chief good beyond which something better remains for us to arrive at? Such, then, being the chief good, it must be something which cannot be lost against the will. For no one can feel confi- dent regarding a good which he knows can be taken from him, although he wishes to keep and cherish it. But if a man feels no confidence regarding the good which he enjoys, how can he be happy while in such fear of losing it? Chapter 4.—Man—What? 6. Let us then see what is better than man. This must necessarily be hard to find, unless we first ask and examine what man is. I am not now called upon to give a definition of man. The question here seems to me to be,—since almost all agree, or at least, which is enough, those I have now to do with are of the same opinion with me, that we are made up of soul and body,—What is man? Is he both of these? or is he the body only, or the soul only? For although the things are two, soul and body, and although neither without the other could be called man (for the body would not be man without the soul, nor again would the soul be man if there were not a body animated by it), still it is possible that one of these may be held to be man, and may be called so. What then do we call man? Is he soul and body, as in a double harness, or like a centaur? Or do we mean the body only, as being in the service of the soul which rules it, as the word lamp denotes not the light and the case together, but only the case, yet it is on account of the light that it is so called? Or do we mean only the mind, and that on account of the body which it rules, as 33 horseman means not the man and the horse, but the man only, and that as employed in ruling the horse? This dispute is not easy to settle; or, if the proof is plain, the statement requires time. This is an expenditure of time and strength which we need not incur. For whether the name man belongs to both, or only to the soul, the chief good of man is not the chief good of the body; but what is the chief good either of both soul and body, or of the soul only, that is man’s chief good. Chapter 5.—Man’s Chief Good is Not the Chief Good of the Body Only, But the Chief Good of the Soul. 7. Now if we ask what is the chief good of the body, reason obliges us to admit that it is that by means of which the body comes to be in its best state. But of all the things which invigorate the body, there is nothing better or greater than the soul. The chief good of the body, then, is not bodily pleasure, not absence of pain, not strength, not beauty, not swiftness, or whatever else is usually reckoned among the goods of the body, but simply the soul. For all the things mentioned the soul supplies to the body by its presence, and, what is above them all, life. Hence I conclude that the soul is not the chief good of man, whether we give the name of man to soul and body together, or to the soul alone. For as according to reason, the chief good of the body is that which is better than the body, and from which the body receives vigor and life, so whether the soul itself is man, or soul and body both, we must discover whether there is anything which goes before the soul itself, in following which the soul comes to the perfection of good of which it is capable in its own kind. If such a thing can be found, all uncertainty must be at an end, and we must pronounce this to be really and truly the chief good of man. 8. If, again, the body is man, it must be admitted that the soul is the chief good of man. But clearly, when we treat of morals,—when we inquire what manner of life must be held in order to obtain happiness,—it is not the body to which the precepts are addressed, it is not bodily discipline which we discuss. In short, the observance of good customs belongs to that part of us which inquires and learns, which are the prerogatives of the soul; so, when we speak of attaining to virtue, the question does not regard the body. But if it follows, as it does, that the body which is ruled over by a soul possessed of virtue is ruled both better and more honorably, and is in its greatest perfection in consequence of the perfection of the soul which rightfully governs it, that which gives perfection to the soul will be man’s chief good, though we call the body man. For if my coachman, in obedience to me, feeds and drives the horses he has charge of in the most satisfactory manner, himself enjoying the more of my bounty in proportion to his good conduct, can any one deny that the good condition of the horses, as well as that of the coachman, is due to me? So the question seems to 34 me to be not, whether soul and body is man, or the soul only, or the body only, but what gives perfection to the soul; for when this is obtained, a man cannot but be either perfect, or at least much better than in the absence of this one thing. Chapter 6.—Virtue Gives Perfection to the Soul; The Soul Obtains Virtue by Following God; Following God is the Happy Life. 9. No one will question that virtue gives perfection to the soul. But it is a very proper subject of inquiry whether this virtue can exist by itself or only in the soul. Here again arises a profound discussion, needing lengthy treatment; but perhaps my summary will serve the purpose. God will, I trust, assist me, so that, notwithstanding our feebleness, we may give instruction on these great matters briefly as well as intelligibly. In either case, whether virtue can exist by itself without the soul, or can exist only in the soul, undoubtedly in the pursuit of virtue the soul follows after something, and this must be either the soul itself, or virtue, or something else. But if the soul follows after itself in the pursuit of virtue, it follows after a foolish thing; for before obtaining virtue it is foolish. Now the height of a follower’s desire is to reach that which he follows after. So the soul must either not wish to reach what it follows after, which is utterly absurd and unreasonable, or, in following after itself while foolish, it reaches the folly which it flees from. But if it follows after virtue in the desire to reach it, how can it follow what does not exist? or how can it desire to reach what it already possesses? Either, therefore, virtue exists beyond the soul, or if we are not allowed to give the name of virtue except to the habit and disposition of the wise soul, which can exist only in the soul, we must allow that the soul follows after something else in order that virtue may be produced in itself; for neither by following after nothing, nor by following after folly, can the soul, according to my reasoning, attain to wisdom. 10. This something else then, by following after which the soul becomes possessed of virtue and wisdom, is either a wise man or God. But we have said already that it must be something that we cannot lose against our will. No one can think it necessary to ask whether a wise man, supposing we are content to follow after him, can be taken from us in spite of our unwillingness or our persistence. God then remains, in following after whom we live well, and in reaching whom we live both well and happily. If any deny God’s existence, why should I consider the method of dealing with them, when it is doubtful whether they ought to be dealt with at all? At any rate, it would require a different starting-point, a different plan, a different investigation from what we are now engaged in. I am now addressing those who do not deny the existence of God, and who, moreover, allow that human affairs are not disregarded by Him. For there is no one, I suppose, who makes any profession of religion but will hold that divine Providence cares at least for our souls. 35 Chapter 7.—The Knowledge of God to Be Obtained from the Scripture. laws, and, in just retribution for his coveting mortal things, had The Plan and Principal Mysteries of the Divine Scheme of Redemption. brought forth a mortal offspring, still did not wholly abandon him? For in this most righteous government, whose ways are 11. But how can we follow after Him whom we do not see? or strange and inscrutable, there is, by means of unknown connechow can we see Him, we who are not only men, but also men tions established in the creatures subject to it, both a severity of of weak understanding? For though God is seen not with the punishment and a mercifulness of salvation. How beautiful this eyes but with the mind, where can such a mind be found as shall, is, how great, how worthy of God, in fine, how true, which is all while obscured by foolishness, succeed or even attempt to drink we are seeking for, we shall never be able to perceive, unless, bein that light? We must therefore have recourse to the instruc- ginning with things human and at hand, and holding by the faith tions of those whom we have reason to think wise. Thus far and the precepts of true religion, we continue without turning argument brings us. For in human things reasoning is employed, from it in the way which God has secured for us by the separanot as of greater certainty, but as easier from use. But when tion of the patriarchs, by the bond of the law, by the foresight of we come to divine things, this faculty turns away; it cannot be- the prophets, by the witness of the apostles, by the blood of the hold; it pants, and gasps, and burns with desire; it falls back from martyrs, and by the subjugation of the Gentiles. From this point, the light of truth, and turns again to its wonted obscurity, not then, let no one ask me for my opinion, but let us rather hear the from choice, but from exhaustion. What a dreadful catastrophe oracles, and submit our weak inferences to the announcements is this, that the soul should be reduced to greater helplessness of Heaven. when it is seeking rest from its toil! So, when we are hasting to retire into darkness, it will be well that by the appointment of Chapter 8.—God is the Chief Good, Whom We are to Seek After with adorable Wisdom we should be met by the friendly shade of auSupreme Affection. thority, and should be attracted by the wonderful character of its contents, and by the utterances of its pages, which, like shadows, 13. Let us see how the Lord Himself in the gospel has taught us to typify and attemper the truth. 12. What more could have been live; how, too, Paul the apostle,—for the Manichæans dare not done for our salvation? What can be more gracious and bounti- reject these Scriptures. Let us hear, O Christ, what chief end ful than divine providence, which, when man had fallen from its Thou dost prescribe to us; and that is evidently the chief end 36 after which we are told to strive with supreme affection. ”Thou shalt love,” He says, ”the Lord thy God.” Tell me also, I pray Thee, what must be the measure of love; for I fear lest the desire enkindl...
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Philosophy of Gods Existence
The philosophical arguments about the existence of God are strong debates in religion
and in the popular cultures. Several arguments have been developed which work to explain the
existence of God and approach the aspect of unique features. One of the common such argument
explains that everything has a cause (Copan, Paul, and William Lane Craig, 17). The argument
defines to explain that God is in existence because the universe must have had an initial cause
and this cause must be God. The philosophical paper is to explain in detail how the argument of
cause proves the existence of God followed by objections to the argument. The existence of the
universe must have been caused by a supernatural power beyond the universe itself as a first
cause of the existence of anything.
Cosmological Argument of Gods Existence
Cosmological argument of Gods existence defines that the existence of any unique thing
has a cause and therefore the universe which encompasses all aspects of major human beings is
caused by a supernatural being that is referred to as God. The theory depicts that if the universe
had no specific cause then it would have existed in a different form or even not exists at all. The
argument shows that the cause of this existence is defined by several parameters which define
the existence of a supernatural being as the world displays a lot of wonders about itself. The
major concern for this argument is why the universe exists the way it does and why not in a

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different form. The other concern question is the reason as to why the universe exists in the first
place. The existence of the universe shows that a cause has a determination for existence in a
given form for particular reasons. If God did not exist the universe would have no control and
would have no interrelated features. In this argument, God is seen ...


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