How does Berkeley agree with Locke? How does Berkeley disagree with Locke?

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Execute the following question in at most fifteen sentences and provide quotations. Please only use the reading provided by me to answer this question.

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Chapter 9 Excerpts from Three Dialogues by Berkeley Contents 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 9.2 No Material Substratum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 9.3 No Material Substance Without Accidents . . . . . . . . . 132 9.4 Nothing Independent of Minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 9.5 No Mediately Perceived Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 9.1 Introduction HYLAS: You were represented, in last night’s conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as material substance in the world. PHILONOUS: That there is no such thing as what philosophers call material substance, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion. HYLAS: What I can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as matter? PHILONOUS: Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain page131 more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense, than I who believe no such thing? HYLAS: You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point. PHILONOUS: Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common Sense, and remote from Scepticism? HYLAS: With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say. 9.2 No Material Substratum PHILONOUS: Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived and a sensation. HYLAS: The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which, there is something perceived; and this I call the object. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip. PHILONOUS: What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see? HYLAS: The same. PHILONOUS: . And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension? HYLAS: I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a material substratum, without which they cannot be conceived to exist. PHILONOUS: Material substratum call you it? Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being? HYLAS: It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses. PHILONOUS: I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained the idea of it? Page 132 HYLAS: I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support. PHILONOUS: It seems then you have only a relative notion of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to sensible qualities? HYLAS: Right. PHILONOUS: Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation consists. HYLAS: Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term substratum, or substance? PHILONOUS: If so, the word substratum should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents? HYLAS: True. PHILONOUS: And consequently under extension? HYLAS: I own it. PHILONOUS: It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension? HYLAS: I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting? PHILONOUS: So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the substratum of extension? HYLAS: Just so. PHILONOUS: Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in spreading? HYLAS: It is. PHILONOUS: Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread? HYLAS: It must. PHILONOUS: Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the substratum of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a substratum: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the substratum was something distinct from and exclusive of extension? Page 133 9.3 No Material Substance Without Accidents HYLAS: Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is spread in a gross literal sense under extension. The word substratum is used only to express in general the same thing with substance. PHILONOUS: Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term substance. Is it not that it stands under accidents? HYLAS: The very same. PHILONOUS: But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended? HYLAS: It must. PHILONOUS: Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former? HYLAS: You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair, Philonous. PHILONOUS: I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs support your body? HYLAS: No; that is the literal sense. PHILONOUS: Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in.—How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas? HYLAS: I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter’s supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it. PHILONOUS: It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents? HYLAS: I acknowledge it. PHILONOUS: And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them? HYLAS: I did. PHILONOUS: That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive? HYLAS: It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour page134 cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind. PHILONOUS: Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not at all without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so. 9.4 We Cannot Conceive of Things Existing Independently of Minds HYLAS: If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner. PHILONOUS: How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen? HYLAS: No, that were a contradiction. PHILONOUS: Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is unconceived? HYLAS: It is. PHILONOUS: The tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by you? HYLAS: How should it be otherwise? PHILONOUS: And what is conceived is surely in the mind? HYLAS: Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind. Page 135 PHILONOUS: How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever? HYLAS: That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them existing out of the minds of all spirits. PHILONOUS: You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind? HYLAS: I do. PHILONOUS: And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive? HYLAS: I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see things at a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses? PHILONOUS: Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects? HYLAS: I do. PHILONOUS: And have they not then the same appearance of being distant? HYLAS: They have. PHILONOUS: But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind? HYLAS: By no means. PHILONOUS: You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived. HYLAS: I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases? PHILONOUS: By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind. HYLAS: I do. PHILONOUS: And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive? page136 HYLAS: I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I see things at a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses? PHILONOUS: Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects? HYLAS: I do. PHILONOUS: And have they not then the same appearance of being distant? HYLAS: They have. PHILONOUS: But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind? HYLAS: By no means. PHILONOUS: You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are perceived. HYLAS: I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases? PHILONOUS: By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind. HYLAS: True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of outness or distance? PHILONOUS: Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances? HYLAS: They are in a continual change. PHILONOUS: Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach. HYLAS: It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case. PHILONOUS: Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion. HYLAS: Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else. Page 137 PHILONOUS: Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be suggested by sight? HYLAS: It is. PHILONOUS: He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations, existing only in his mind? HYLAS: It is undeniable. PHILONOUS: But, to make it still more plain: is not distance a line turned endwise to the eye? HYLAS: It is. PHILONOUS: And can a line so situated be perceived by sight? HYLAS: It cannot. PHILONOUS: Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight? HYLAS: It should seem so. PHILONOUS: Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance? HYLAS: It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind. PHILONOUS: But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures? HYLAS: They do. PHILONOUS: How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both? HYLAS: I know not what to answer. PHILONOUS: But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist out of the mind? HYLAS: To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas? PHILONOUS: As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed from what you then thought. Page 138 9.5 No Mediately Perceived Objects HYLAS: To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects:— the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called ideas; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your discourse. PHILONOUS: Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other faculty? HYLAS: They are perceived by sense. PHILONOUS: How Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived? HYLAS: Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses. PHILONOUS: It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas? HYLAS: That is my meaning. PHILONOUS: And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense. HYLAS: In the very same. PHILONOUS: Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole? HYLAS: Nothing else. PHILONOUS: And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar see as much? HYLAS: He would. PHILONOUS: Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you? HYLAS: I agree with you. PHILONOUS: Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge page 139 you have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not? HYLAS: It should. PHILONOUS: Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be heard but sound; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your comparison of Caesar’s picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call real things or material objects. Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did. HYLAS: I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never convince me. PHILONOUS: My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of material beings. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by sens ...
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